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Maroubra Force, under Potts' command, dug in and awaited the Japanese attack on
both sides of Eora Creek at Isurava. Along the bottom of a steep V-shaped gorge the
creek ran north towards Kokoda. On the left, as the Australians looked at it, was
Isurava village where the 2/14th and 39th Battalions stood. On the right side of the
gorge was 53rd Battalion and a half of 2/16th Battalion. The other half of this
battalion was held in reserve. With the various headquarters and detachments of
2/6th Field Ambulance, Australia New Guinea Administrative Unit, the Royal Papuan
Constabulary and the Papuan Infantry Battalion, there were about 2290 men
present.
Horii, the Japanese commander, was anxious to destroy the Australian force as soon
as possible, before it either counterattacked towards Kokoda or withdrew further
into the mountains. Consequently, when the main body of the Nankai Shitai arrived
by sea, he ordered it immediately to force march 120 kilometres to Isurava. Japanese
supply difficulties had resulted in the overloading of their men with food and
ammunition. The combination of a week long forced march and heavy packs
resulted in many Japanese soldiers falling out along the way to Isurava. These men
failed to arrive in time for the battle leaving Horii with about 3000 men with which to
attack.
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Horii's plan came completely unstuck. First 1/144, the battalion which was to make
the frontal attack, was in poor condition. It had been in Papua longest of all his
battalions and had taken the most casualties. When Horii's main attack began on 27
August, 1/144 did not go at the Australians with the vigour Horii expected so he
strengthened 1/144 with one company from 3/144 thus weakening 3/144 for its later
move around the Australian left. Though reinforced, 1/144 continued to disappoint
Horii. On 29 August an Australian counterattack, in which Private Bruce Kingsbury
won a Victoria Cross, cut right through a company of this battalion and killed the
company commander.
The second problem for the Japanese was that most of their artillery had not been
able to keep up with the forced march. Just three of ten artillery pieces were
available. The battalion gun of 2/144 went with it across to the east of the gorge. The
other two guns were placed on high ground overlooking Isurava. From there they
could fire in support of any of the Japanese attacks.
On 27 August to the east of the Eora Creek gorge, 2/144 failed to make much
headway against the Australian 53rd and 2/16th Battalions. The next day the
Japanese battalion commander decided to make a flank march through the jungle
to get behind the Australians. His battalion became lost in the jungle and as a result
there was little fighting east of the gorge this day.
On the west side of the gorge when 3/144 made its flank march around the
Australian left it too became lost. It blundered into the left of the Australian line
instead of getting into the Australian rear as intended. Having made little progress so
far Horii felt obliged to commit the battalion he had intended to keep fresh for the
pursuit. This battalion was sent on a wide outflanking move well around the
Australian left and was to emerge on the track far in their rear about Alola village. It
too found it impossible to navigate accurately in the jungle. It wandered far from the
battle and did not emerge until the fighting was over. 'At Isurava', this battalion
commander said, 'we didn't fire a shot or lose a man.'
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the Isurava rest house position, they came under attack from the high ground to
their west. What had happened was 3/144, which had the previous day wandered
unintentionally into the Australian left, swung out west then south again that night
and made for what they supposed would be the Australian rear. Instead they found
the Australians in their new position at Isurava rest house. By now more Japanese
guns had arrived and a total of eight were available to bombard the new Australian
position in support of the attack of 3/144. This bombardment contributed to Potts'
decision that the short retreat to Isurava rest house was not the answer to his
problem. Only a complete withdrawal of Maroubra Force would prevent its
destruction.
Breaking contact with an aggressive enemy is a most difficult operation of war and
at Isurava it was only partially successful. Japanese attacks during the retreat caused
the dispersion of hundreds of Australians into the jungle. Over the next week most of
these men were able to make their way back to the main body moving south along
the Kokoda track. One notable exception was Colonel Keys, commander of 2/14th
Battalion. He was captured, taken back to the Japanese base, interrogated then
executed.
While Isurava was a notable Japanese victory Horii had failed in his main aim, to
completely destroy the Australian force. Nor did the casualties inflicted by either side
favour the Japanese. Over the period from 25 August to 31 August the Australians
lost 99 killed and 111 wounded. The Japanese lost 140 killed and 231 wounded.
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