BDO v. Gomez, G.R. No.

199601, November 23, 2015

Super Summary:

Doctrine: Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in
this provision is more commonly known as the"abuse of right principle."

Facts: Josephine Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R. Harrington
opened Savings Account with said branch in January 1985.The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine
bank drafts issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to
"C.R.Harrington,"while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "ServantsC/C.R. Harrington.Upon
receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R.
Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When her supervisor answered in the
affirmative, Josephine received the deposit slip.

On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and
P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the
bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.The PCIB issued a
memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted
the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various
aspects of the job. She further alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving
the deposits.

The PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction
was made.After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The memorandum required
Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in her salary,allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing
until the amount is fully paid.Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent
and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00.

During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to
Josephine's letter, and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions were merely a withholding
pending the investigation.

On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank
had to pay Harrington.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages

The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine as having been
rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy.The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

PCIB went to the Supreme Court contending that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton
disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had
treated Josephine

Issue/s: Whether or not Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code were violated.

Ruling: No

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties
must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this
provision is more commonly known as the"abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this
fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the
PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be
exercised unjustly and illegally. In this case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was
still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the
amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor.When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for
the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on
Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses.WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED

=================

Coca-Cola v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R. No. 190667, November 07, 2016

Super Summary:

Doctrine:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Facts:

This case is a Petition for Review filed by Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc.

Sps. Bernardo were distributors of Coca-Cola products in their business “Jolly Beverage Enterprises” from 1987-1999.
Both parties agreed that the petitioner will extend cash assistance and trade discount incentives to the respondent while
the latter will: (1) sell the petitioner’s product exclusively, (2) meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases/month, and (3) assist
the petitioner in its marketing efforts. Prior to the expiration of their contract, Coca-cola required Sps. Bernardo a list of
their customers as the former would formulate a policy defining the territorial dealership in Quezon city, and for the
renewal of their contract to which Sps. Bernardo complied, however such contract was not renewed.

It was later found out that:

the petitioner started to reach out to those who were on the list;

that the respondents’ delivery trucks were being trailed by the petitioner’s agents that as soon as the trucks left, the
latter would approach the customers;

The petitioner employed a different pricing scheme, that the price given to the distributors are higher than what is given
to supermarkets;

Petitioners also also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it
gave away one free bottle for every case purchased; and

further engaged a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower price.

Sps. Bernardo filed a Complaint for damages alleging the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross
negligence, fraud and unfair competition in commercial enterprise. The petitioners denied the allegations stating that it
had obtained the list through surveys, and promotional activities were only implemented after the expiration of their
contract. The RTC held the petitioner liable for damages for abuse of rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 and for
unfair competition in Art. 28. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s: WON the petitioner violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil code (YES)

Ruling:

This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what the appellant did in order to take over the market: directly sell its
products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers.
It must be emphasized that the petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the products;
hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by respondents to facilitate its
takeover of the latter's usual business area.

Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though not
constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a
right of action to the injured party.

==================

Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006

Super Summary: Spouses Villalva bought a car from Toyota — they issued checks as payment installment, they secured a
chattel mortgage in favor of Toyota and both (promissory notes and chattel mortgage) were assigned to RCBC. Under
the mortgage, they are to insure the car. In 1997, they failed to deliver a copy of the insurance policy to RCBC (but they
complied prior to this). Because of this, RCBC had the car insured and the bank paid the premium, but that was cancelled
since the spouses did have the insurance policy already, they just failed to deliver a copy to RCBC. RCBC demands
payment from the spouses and claims they were unjustly enriched on account of the payment it made to the insurance
company. The Court ruled that they were not unjustly enriched, they were already paying the insurance and were never
in default of their payment. RCBC did not have to pay for the insurance premium since they were not in default anyway.

Doctrine: Unjust Enrichment – Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money—it may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the
patrimony of a person, as well as the prevention of a loss or injury.

Facts: Petitioner spouses Villalva issued 48 checks (P547,392.00) to cover installment payments due on promissory notes
secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of Toyota for the purchase of a Toyota Corolla. Under the Chattel
Mortgage, Spouses Villalva were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse
and deliver the policies to the mortgagor. The promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to respondent
RCBC.

The spouses were able to comply with the mortgage requirement on insurance until 1996. In 1997, they failed to deliver
a copy of the insurance policy to RCBC. As a consequence, RCBC had the mortgaged vehicle insured and paid P14,523.00
insurance premium, which was later cancelled due to the insurance policy obtained by the spouses. RCBC was then
reimbursed with P10,939.86 by the insurance company.

In 1999, RCBC sent a letter of demand to the spouses amounting to P12,361.02 allegedly for unpaid obligations on the
mortgage and demanded that the spouses surrender the vehicle. The spouses ignored the demand letter on the ground
that they have fully paid their obligations. The remaining amount was due to the insurance obtained by RCBC.

RCBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the spouses,
however the CA reversed the decision and ordered the petitioners to pay the difference between the premium paid by
RCBC against what they were able to reimburse from the insurance company. The MR was dismissed by the CA, hence
the petition for review.

Issue/s: WON Spouses Villalva were unjustly enriched when RCBC obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged
vehicle under Art. 22 of the NCC. –NO (there is no unjust enrichment)

Ruling: The key issue is whether petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Supreme Court held that petitioners did not default in the performance of their
obligation. Meaning that the condition sine qua non for RCBC to exercise its right to pay the insurance premium over the
car has not been established.

As a rule, demand is required before a party may be considered in default. Demand by a creditor is not necessary in
order that delay may exist: (1) when the obligation or the law expressly so declares; (2) when from the nature and the
circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the
service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or (3) when demand would be
useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. None of the exceptions are present in this
case

RCBC further contends that its payment of the insurance premiums on behalf of the spouses unjustly enriched the latter.
Respondent RCBC adverts to the provisions on quasi-contractual obligations in the Civil Code.

RCBC’s payment of the insurance premiums on behalf of Spouses Villalva did not unjustly enrich the latter. Enrichment
consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the
form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person. It may also include the
prevention of a loss or injury.

In this case, Spouses Villalva were not enriched when RCBC obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged Toyota
Corolla as the spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for it.

======================

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013

Super Summary:

Doctrine:

Facts:

James Walter Capili, the petitioner, faced a bigamy charge due to his prior legal marriage to Karla Y. Medina-Capili and
without his marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled. He contracted a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo
before the RTC of Pasig.

The Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity
of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; that in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and the pendency of the civil case
for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case. It was
granted.

The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thus, the petitioner filed his Manifestation and Motion
(to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC. It was granted but was
reversed in Court of Appeals upon proper appeal

Issue/s:

WON the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy.

Ruling:

NO. The subsequent judicial declaration that the petitioner's second marriage was bigamous in nature does not preclude
the prosecution of the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

This principle aligns with the precedent set in the case of Jarillo v. People, where the court affirmed the conviction for
bigamy. The court's rationale is that bigamy is committed at the moment a person enters into a subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been legally declared null and void.
The outcome of the civil case seeking the annulment of the petitioner's marriage to the private complainant does not
affect the determination of the petitioner's guilt or innocence in the criminal bigamy case. The key factor for a bigamy
charge to stand is the existence of a valid first marriage at the time of contracting the second marriage. According to the
law, a marriage, even if it may ultimately be deemed void or voidable, is considered valid until a competent court
declares it otherwise through a judicial proceeding.

It's crucial to emphasize that individuals cannot unilaterally decide the nullity of their marriage; this determination must
be made by the appropriate legal authorities. Only when a court officially declares the marriage as void can it be legally
considered as such. Therefore, anyone who enters into a second marriage before such a declaration assumes the risk of
facing prosecution for bigamy.

In this specific case, even if the petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void from the
beginning, both the first and second marriages were in existence before the annulment of the first marriage.
Consequently, it is evident that the crime of bigamy was committed by the petitioner when he contracted the second
marriage with the private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the petitioner's
second marriage does not prevent the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.

========================

Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Super Summary:

Doctrine:

Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of
Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide. On the other hand,
the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Issue/s: WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Ruling: NO. The court ruled that annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case of frustrated
parricide. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case.
The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. Thus, the petition was
denied.

===============================

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Doctrine: There was no mention of Civil code provision in the case. This will fall under Article 36 - Prejudicial questions.

Facts: Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10, 1990. A year after their marriage, Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he was previously married to a certain Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro
left Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Villareyes.

Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again contracted another marriage with Villegas. When Ancajas learned of
this third marriage, she then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.

During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found
him guilty of bigamy.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC, Tenebro presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage
to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.

Issue/s: Whether or not Tenebro may still be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage

Ruling:

Yes, Tenebro may still be convicted of Bigamy. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage
is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED in toto.

=============================
Te v. CA, 346 SCRA 327

Super Summary:

Private respondent filed with the RTC a criminal case of bigamy against petitioner and an administrative case filed with
the PRC Board for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license, while petitioner filed a civil case for annulment of
marriage with private respondent.

Petitioner filed with the PRC Board a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy, which the board denied.

Petitioner now raises the issue with the court claiming to suspend the other legal proceedings in view of the pendency
of the civil case on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Doctrine:

Pendency of a civil case for annulment of marriage does not give rise to a prejudicial question which warrants the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy if at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their
marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Article 40 of the Family Code states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even
one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Facts:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl,
petitioner stopped visiting her.

Less than two years after, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second
marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime after, when she learned about petitioner’s
marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent
on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.

Private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against
petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed
acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of
their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent
added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the
revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in the RTC of Quezon
City.

When the Board denied the said motion, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari

The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s motion and find that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the
ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue/s:

WON the legal [criminal and administrative] proceedings should be suspended in view of the pendency of the civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Ruling:

No.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case
for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case
before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.

The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40
of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September
1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage
unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which
is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid
and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We
have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

===================================

Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA 122

Super Summary:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva, contracted another marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan.

On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.

Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time he had
contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a
case to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and assailed the decision of the CA. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage
came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was
already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As
with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second
marriage.
============================

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

Super Summary:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four
years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court.

Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.

He was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete
was void ab initio.

Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

Issue/s: WON the marriage of Lucio Morigo with Lucia Barrete was not valid in order for him to be exculpated from his
bigamy case.

Ruling: The marriage with Lucia Barrete was not valid. Article 6 of the New Civil Code provides that:

“No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for
the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the
marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing
officer. x x x

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer.

The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.

As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was no marriage to
begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents
and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.”
=============================

Pahang v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004

Super Summary: Petitioners Sps Pahang obtained a loan with respondent Metrobank and was secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel od land. Petitioners failed to pay their obligation resulting in foreclosure of the property
mortgaged. Metrobank was the highest bidder and after 1 year of expiration of period to redeem, registered the land in
its name and filed a writ of possession. Petitioners, on the other hand, filed an injunctive relief and an alternative relief
to redeem the property after determination of exact obligations. The RTC granted the writ of possession so the
petitioners alleged that it committed grave abuse of discretion by not acknowledging the existence of prejudicial
question in both cases filed by the parties. The SC ruled that there is no prejudicial question.

Doctrine: A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

Facts: In 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of P1,500,000.00 from
the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (MBTC) payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by
Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered by a
TCT. As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a
consequence, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by the Sheriff in favor of the respondent on January 14, 1998 and was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on January 27, 1998.

On December, 1998, respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period would expire on January 27,
1999. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of
extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank and the Sheriff.

Petitioners prayed for injunctive relief, likewise the alternative reliefs to declare the foreclosure on the subject property
as null and void, and to allow the plaintiffs to pay the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the
subject real property based on the amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of plaintiffs to
defendant bank.

After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
property was issued a TCT by the Register of Deeds in its name for the auctioned property. On July 23, 1999, the
respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Mandaue City .

Petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, opposed the petition on the
ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a prejudicial question, which
warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the court. They averred that the filing of their complaint within the
period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an offer to redeem the same, and had the effect of
preserving such right since they prayed for the redemption of the same in their alternative remedy..

Issue/s: Whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale
is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3.

Ruling: NO. There is no prejudicia question in this case.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the
respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 is but an incident in the land registration
case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.

The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at public auction are null and
void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank was entitled to the possession of the
property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was issued.

==================

BOOK I. PERSONS

TITLE II. CITIZENSHIP

Limjoco v. Estate of Pedro Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948

Super Summary:

Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant and the Public
Service Commission (PSC) approved his application. The PSC held that original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino
Citizen at the time of his death, and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The petitioner (limjoco) contends that it was an error on the part of the PSC to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante and granting to the said estate the certification.

WON: the estate of the deceased is to be considered as “person”.

The SC said yes. The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration
thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights
was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in
the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.

Doctrine:

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems
clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person"
used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be
without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or
juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.

Facts:

Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan,
Rizal. The Public Service Commission approved his application and held that the evidence therein showed that the public
interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant in the municipality of San Juan, that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a
Filipino Citizen at the time of his death, and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service.
The commission ordered the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante and authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, to maintain and
operate an ice plant.

Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative
of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and
in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

Issue/s:

WON the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person"?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only
by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the
estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according
to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial
persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service
Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above,
an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Fallo:

=====================================

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, G.R. No. L-27956, April 30, 1976

Super Summary:

The Dumlaos are the heirs of Pedro Oria’s land. Pedro Oria (being a co-defendants of the principal, Soliven) was sued by
Quality Plastics. Oria’s land was a surety in case he, Soliven, and his other co-defendants will be unable to pay Quality
Plastics. Oria and his co-defendants were unable to pay, hence, Oria’s land was sold at a public auction. The heirs of Oria
contested that Oria was dead before the filing of the case against him by Quality Plastics. Thus, he cannot be subject to
such case.

The Supreme Court held in favor of the heirs. The court said that, pursuant to Article 37 and 42 of the Civil Code, Oria’s
juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
Doctrine:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and
is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
(n)

In relation to..

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

Facts:

● A civil case against Vicente Soliven (principal) and his co-defendants (here includes Pedro Oria) was lodged by
Quality Plastic Products, Inc.

● The defendants were made to pay the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958.

● The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became
final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer in solidarity for the
obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).

● The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants had been personally served by a deputy
sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original
summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.

● Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower
court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public
auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond.

● Oria’s land was sold at a public auction.

● It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's
death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of the Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
aware that there was a pending special proceeding filed in the same court for the Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Oria.

● On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria (for lack of jurisdiction over the person) and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his
capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).

● Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his
sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

Issue/s: WON Oria can still be subject to legal relations even if he is already dead.

Ruling:

The Court ruled in the negative.

Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and
Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts.
37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary
appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no
application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against
Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed
in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect
conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria
is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

===========================

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 64 SCAD 358, 248 SCRA 300

Super Summary:

Doctrine: In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence.

Facts: In 1995, petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative in the First District of Leyte. She claimed to have a seven-month residence in the area. However, Cirilo
Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative and a fellow candidate, filed a petition with the COMELEC alleging that
Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency for House of Representatives candidates.

Marcos later amended her Certificate of Candidacy, changing her residency claim to "since childhood” indicating that it
was an honest misrepresentation and that she have maintained domicile in Tacloban ever since.

Issue/s: Whether or not Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte

Ruling: Yes, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is indeed a resident therein.

The court carefully made a distinction between a residence and domicile for election purposes. It is clearly stated that,
an individual does not lose his domicile even if she lived and maintained residence in different places. Being a resident of
different places plays a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes and that it is just a mere physical
presence on the place. Article 50 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that for the exercise of civil rights and
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. The court took the
concept of domicile to mean as an individual’s permanent home or a place to which he intends to return.

Residence in the Civil law us a material fact referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. Residency is
acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place.

Fallo:

Moy Ya Lim Yao v. CID, 41 SCRA 292

Super Summary:

Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese National from Hong Kong, went to the Philippines in March of 1961 to visit her great grand
uncle, and was permitted to stay for a month. After repeated extension, Lau was permitted to stay until February of
1962. A month before her date of departure, Lau contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino Citizen. The Commission on Immigration ordered the arrest of Lau Yuen Yeung and deporatation, hence
this petition for injunction filed by Lau’s Filipino husband contending that such order may not be executed for Lau has
acquired Filipino citizenship following her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

HELD: Speaking through Justice Barredo, the Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. The Court permanently enjoined CIR from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao.

Topic: Acquisition of Citizenship [Citizenship of a Foreign Woman Who Marries a Filipino]

Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law)

Doctrine

1. Alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473.’

2. An alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.

C.A 473 Revised Naturalization Law Sec. 15

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in-the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the
parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after, the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen,
unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he. fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

Facts:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor’s visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to
visit her great (grand) Uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay
in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
February 13, 1962.

On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.’

Note: If there is a list of Supreme Court decisions with the greatest number of cases cited, I believe this case is at the top
10. In determining whether an alien who marries a Filipino ipso facto acquires Filipino citizenship, Justice Barredo
deemed it proper to discuss first what “who might herself be lawfully naturalized” means. In the pursuit of settling once
and for all the purpose and meaning of Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 or Revised Naturalization Law, Justice Barredo
traced and scrutinized decisions and judicial opinions relevant to the construction of “‘who might herself be lawfully
naturalized’ within the context of American laws and jurisprudence, to which a great number of Philippine laws are
heavily patterned from.

● “Who might herself be lawfully naturalized” - following American jurisprudence, it shall mean: She is required to
prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated
in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

(Side note: It is as if Justice Barredo has been waiting for a case like this. Not only did he cite a number of cases, but he
also mentioned the ponente of each case and explained its merits and why he does not agree with their conclusion.)

Summary of some of the prevailing cases cited by J. Barredo:

1. Ly Giok Ha, et al. v. Galang, et al., L-31332, Mar. 13, 1966 [TN: the first case in which Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction]

- Marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she ‘herself may be
lawfully naturalized,’ and that ‘this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473.’ In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that
defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.

- By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the mere fact of
marriage — automatically become a Filipino citizen.’’

- Reason: she must possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization.

2. Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964)

- If she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for Philippine citizenship she becomes a Filipino,
PROVIDED, that she is able to prove these facts in a proper proceeding. If she is unqualified (lacks qualifications) or
disqualified (possesses disqualifications), she cannot be considered a Filipino citizen. This is so even if by virtue of said
diverse citizenship, the husband and the wife will not be able to live together. This apparent subversion of family
solidarity, and the consequent violation of the duty to live together, according to the Supreme Court, are irrelevant to
the issue of citizenship — an issue which concerns only the right of a sovereign state to determine what aliens can
remain within its territory and under what conditions, they can stay therein.

3. Choy King Tee v. Emilio L. Galang (Application to the wife of a naturalized Filipino)

- While it is true that under Sec. 15 of the Naturalization Law, “any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines,’’ still the law requires that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized implying that she must first prove that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization. This rule is in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all, is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to
anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino customs and traditions.

4. In Re: Petition to Declare Zita Ngo Burca to Possess All the Qualifications and None of the Disqualifications for
Naturalization L-24252, Jan. 30, 1967 [TN: When Justice Barredo discussed the merits of the Burca case, the latter still
has a pending resolution, but used it anyway]

- An alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only
that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied
with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization.

[Note: Moy Ya case abandoned the ruling in Burca.]

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipina.

2. Whether or not an alien woman who marries a Filipino must apply for a naturalization judicial proceeding in
order to be deemed as a Filipina.

Ruling: [Seemed like Justice Barredo got carried away in scrutinizing relevant American and Philippine jurisprudence, and
construing the intention of the legislature in creating the Act. 2927 and CA 437 that he no longer discussed the opinion
of the Court as to the arrest and deportation of Lau. Hence, I included the fallo of the case which essentially contains the
final words of the Court regarding the validity of Lau’s acquisition of Filipino citizenship.]

1. The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Section 15 of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be
more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. It is in the best interest of all
concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed
when the phrase “who may be lawfully naturalized,” found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and
copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities.

Thus, under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

1. The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

In construing the provision of the United States statutes from which our law has been copied, the American courts have
held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. “In the Revised Statutes
the words ‘and taken’ are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the
United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in
that respect.”

Moreover, section 16 of Commonwealth Act 473, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15, If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently.

CA 437

Fallo:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants’ petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined
from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013

Super Summary: Batuigas initiated legal proceedings in December 2002 by filing a Petition for Naturalization with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga del Sur. In her petition, she affirmed her allegiance to the Philippine
Constitution's principles, her impeccable conduct during her stay in the Philippines, and her sincere embrace of Filipino
customs. She met the qualifications and lacked the disqualifications stipulated in Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473),
which governs naturalization. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to dismiss her case based on her alleged
lack of a lawful occupation or lucrative trade, but the court rejected this motion, leading to an ex-parte hearing when
the OSG failed to appear.

Batuigas, born in the Philippines to Chinese parents, demonstrated her strong ties to the nation. She received her
education in Philippine schools, became a teacher, and married a Filipino citizen with whom she had five children.
Together, they engaged in various business ventures and invested in real estate. Batuigas provided evidence of her clean
criminal record and sound physical and mental health. The court ultimately granted her Philippine citizenship through
judicial naturalization under CA 473, recognizing her qualifications and eligibility.

Doctrine: “It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family.”

Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 148-B Phil 773, 837 (1971).

Facts: On December 2, 2002, Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Batuigas) initiated a Petition for Naturalization in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga del Sur, denominated as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and assigned to Branch 29 of
said court.

In her Petition, Batuigas asserted her adherence to the tenets of the Philippine Constitution, her impeccable conduct
during her stay in the Philippines, and her genuine commitment to assimilating into the Filipino society. She also
affirmed her satisfaction of the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and the absence of any disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473). Batuigas declared her non-affiliation with
organizations opposing organized governments, her rejection of violence, her monogamous beliefs, her country's non-
hostile status towards the Philippines, her sincere intention to become a Filipino citizen, and her irrevocable
renunciation of allegiance to any foreign entity, particularly China. She further pledged continuous residency in the
Philippines throughout the naturalization process.

Upon fulfilling the jurisdictional prerequisites stipulated in Section 9 of CA 473, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submitted a Motion to Dismiss, contending Batuigas' failure to allege engagement in a lawful occupation or a profitable
trade. The RTC, deeming the OSG's grounds as evidentiary in nature, rejected the motion. Subsequently, the RTC
scheduled the evidentiary hearing for May 18, 2004.
Notably, neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor attended the hearing. Consequently, Batuigas’
counsel sought an ex-parte presentation of evidence, which the RTC granted, designating its Clerk of Court as the
Commissioner to receive Batuigas' evidence during the November 5, 2004 ex-parte proceeding.

Born to Chinese parents in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, on September 28, 1941, Batuigas has not left the Philippines
since birth. Her residence spans various locations in the country, primarily in Malangas and Margosatubig, Zamboanga
del Sur, and includes periods of residence in other regions. Batuigas possesses proficiency in English, Tagalog, Visayan,
and Chavacano. Her education, from primary to tertiary, occurred in Philippine educational institutions, culminating in a
Bachelor of Science in Education from the Ateneo de Zamboanga. Subsequently, she pursued a teaching career at
various Philippine schools.

At the age of 26 in 1968, Batuigas wed Santiago Batuigas, a natural-born Filipino citizen, and they have five children, all
educated in Philippine schools and pursuing professional careers. The couple engaged in the retail and
milling/distribution of rice, corn, and copra as conjugal partners. Supporting documents, including tax returns and
business permits, attest to their income. Real estate holdings were acquired jointly in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig,
during their marriage.

Batuigas provided clearances from the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and the National
Bureau of Investigation, affirming her absence of a criminal record. Additionally, she submitted a Health Examination
Record certifying her physical and mental fitness.

To bolster Batuigas' Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified in her favor.

The RTC granted the petition. The OSG appealed before the CA that the RTC did now comply with the mandate of law in
its ex-parte proceeding. However, it held that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the
OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.

Issue/s: Whether or not Batuigas has validly complied with the citizenship requirement as required by law
(Commonwealth Act. No. 473).

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or
administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens
and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States
which have since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent
to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife through derivative naturalization.

Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:

Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.

As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as
follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no
sufficient evidence that Azucenas husband is a Filipino citizen as only their marriage certificate was presented to
establish his citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial naturalization based
on CA 473. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant.

In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application
for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial
naturalization under the same law.

It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but
because her husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a
judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of
Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4
of the same Act. However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA
473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of
her qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was
affirmed by the CA.

The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing. However, the OSG or the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order an ex-parte
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex-parte
proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear.

On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest in, and the only
one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutors
office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523
which affirmed the January 31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the
Petition for Naturalization, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements
the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

======================

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996

Super Summary: Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon. Petitioner Raul R. Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled.

Was Frivaldo’s repatriation valid and did it cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the
Office of Governor?

Held: YES. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the very day the term
of office of governor (and other elective officials) began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his
application.

Doctrine: The requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement
the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Facts: On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled.

The Second Division of COMELEC granted the petition and declared respondent disqualified to run for the Office of
Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when the said order (dated June 21, 1995) of the
COMELEC was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor.
The Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s: WON Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and cured his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to
hold the Office of Governor?

Ruling: YES. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike
that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the very day the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office
and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified
to govern his native Sorsogon.

It is contended that Frivaldo could not have been a voter, much less a validly registered one,if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration. The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. It therefore stands to reason that
the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE
AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that
the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.

The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his
application.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

David v. SET, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzres, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

Super Summary:

Senator Poe was a foundling with unknown biological parents and was adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces.
She initially became a registered voter and citizen in the Philippines but later moved to the US for studies and married
Teodoro Llamanzares. Senator Poe eventually became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. In 2006, she regained her
Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance in 2010, no longer using her US Visa. Senator Poe ran for Senator in
the 2013 Elections and won. However, a losing candidate, David, contested her election in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) on the grounds that she did not meet the citizenship and residency requirements specified in the 1987
Constitution.

Did Senator Poe comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution?

HELD: YES. Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continues to be a natural-born citizen
as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect her Philippine citizenship. Further, Senator Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino
citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 (An Act Making The Citizenship Of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent.). Accordingly,
she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

Doctrine:

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is
presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or
both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.

Facts:

● Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. The Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The Decision also ordered the change
in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

● Senator Poe became a registered voter and citizen in the Philippines, until she moved to the US to study. She
later married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth.

● Senator Poe returned to the US with her husband. For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the
US. She then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

● In 2006, Senator Poe reacquired her citizenship through Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
and in 2010, she submitted her affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration, taking her oath of allegiance. From then on, she
stopped using her US Visa.

● Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May
16, 2013. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) a
Petition for Quo Warranto, contesting the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."

● SET rendered a decision finding Senator Poe is a natural born citizen and is qualified to hold office. David filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition alleging that SET acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue/s:

WON Senator Poe complied with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

● SC ruled in the affirmative.

● When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient
evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at
least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-
born citizen.

● Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continues to be a natural-born citizen as
defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect her Philippine citizenship.
● Further, Senator Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 (An Act Making The Citizenship Of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent.). Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of
the Republic.

● Moreover, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed Senator Poe as MTRCB
Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born citizenship. These public acts are prima facie evidence of the fact
that Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

======================

Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

Super Summary:

In this case, petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado challenged the eligibility of private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano to run
for the vice mayor's office in Makati City, claiming that Manzano held dual citizenship, which would disqualify him. The
Supreme Court clarified that dual citizenship and dual allegiance are distinct concepts. Dual citizenship occurs when an
individual's nationality is recognized by multiple states due to conflicting nationality laws, while dual allegiance involves
an individual voluntarily owing loyalty to multiple states. Since Manzano was born in the United States to Filipino
parents, he had dual citizenship at birth. However, Manzano argued that he was both a Filipino and a U.S. citizen at birth
but maintained his Filipino citizenship, renouncing his U.S. citizenship by registering as a voter and participating in
Philippine elections. Did Manzano effectively renounce his American citizenship?

HELD: YES. The Court emphasized that Manzano effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship and elected Philippine
citizenship by participating in Philippine elections and taking an oath of allegiance. Therefore, he was deemed eligible to
run for the vice mayor's position, and the challenge to his candidacy was dismissed. The ruling also highlighted that the
Philippines primarily follows "jus sanguinis" (citizenship by descent) in determining nationality, while the United States
follows "jus soli" (citizenship by place of birth).

Doctrine:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

Such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis (a person's Filipino nationality is primarily determined by their Filipino parentage, irrespective of where they
were born) is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli (a person is considered a citizen of the country where
they were born, regardless of their parents' nationality.) Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Facts:

● Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Gabriel V. Daza III was another candidate in the same election. Eduardo
B. Manzano won the election with 103,853 votes, followed by Ernesto S. Mercado with 100,894 votes, and Gabriel V.
Daza III with 54,275 votes.

● However, the proclamation of private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano was suspended due to a pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril. Mamaril alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.

● The Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) granted Mamaril's petition, ordering the
cancellation of Manzano's certificate of candidacy based on the grounds that he held dual citizenship, which disqualified
him from running for any elective local position under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
● Manzano argued that he was born a Filipino and a U.S. citizen due to his birth in the United States but
maintained his Filipino citizenship. He claimed that he had renounced his U.S. citizenship when he registered as a voter
and voted in the Philippine elections.

● The case remained pending, and the proclamation of the vice mayor winner was suspended. Later, petitioner
Ernesto S. Mercado sought to intervene in the case, but this motion was not resolved.

● On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of its Second Division, declaring Manzano
qualified to run for vice mayor, as he was considered a natural-born Filipino citizen due to his parents' citizenship at the
time of his birth. They argued that Manzano's registration as a voter and participation in elections effectively renounced
his U.S. citizenship under Philippine law.

● Based on this decision, Manzano was proclaimed as vice mayor of Makati City.

● Subsequently, Ernesto S. Mercado filed a petition for certiorari, challenging the COMELEC en banc's decision and
asserting that Manzano was still a U.S. citizen when he ran for the vice mayor's office. The case also raised questions
about Mercado's standing to bring the lawsuit as he was not an original party in the disqualification case filed by
Mamaril, and his motion to intervene had not been granted.

Issue/s: WON respondent Manzano had effectively renounced his American citizenship.

Ruling:

● YES.

● Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.

● Such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

● Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such
children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

● The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents.

● Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (a person's Filipino nationality is primarily
determined by their Filipino parentage, irrespective of where they were born), while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli (a person is considered a citizen of the country where they were born, regardless of their parents'
nationality), the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States.

● However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine
national.

● The SC ruled that the private respondent had effectively renounced his American citizenship and elected
Philippine citizenship, making him eligible to run for the position of vice mayor.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

========================

Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120 April 1, 2009

Super Summary:

Doctrine:
Facts:

On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC by concerned
citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental,
filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the
House of Representatives. The petition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006, alleged that she is not a natural-
born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando,
also a registered voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed as SPA
(PES) No. A07-007.He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still Chinese citizens as the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name
from the list of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a
naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her
husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed
after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization
on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action.
Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, she averred that a petition filed before an election, questioning the
qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), and not under Sections 68 and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
and Section 5, paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800. She also contended that the petitions were
dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her father’s citizenships, in
contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a direct action for
its nullity.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for the congressional seat of the First District of
Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

Ruling:

The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two material orders of the
trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting his petition for naturalization and the other
was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined that the OSG did not receive a
notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order
declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, and prevented
the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May
31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan was conducted without the
required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, that Fiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the
Solicitor General to represent the Government in the hearing of the application for naturalization. That authority,
however, does not extend to Fiscal [Veluz’s] right to appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking.
Private respondent Tan was therefore under legal obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a Filipino citizen for all intents
and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case of Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any way legalize the proceedings
relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these irregularities is the fact that Tan was
allowed to take his oath even before the expiration of the thirty (30)-day period within which an appeal may be made
thus making the said oath not only highly improper but also illegal.
To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. The grant of naturalization
under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata
may be set up as a bar from instituting the necessary proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21,
1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a naturalized Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one day short of the
reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could make known his objections and to
appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why
a copy of the petitioner’s motion to take his oath of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the whole world.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same. The OSG, being the
counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could be bound by what has transpired
therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence,
no rights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipino citizenship through the
naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, he was only able to transmit to his offspring, Chinese
citizenship.

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and having been born on November 9, 1959,
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinese national, and is disqualified to run as First District Representative of
Negros Oriental.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy
for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.