zw~

1'~ this

SERVIGEABLE? ,
?!
;
. tr
- rned . `

AIRGRAF'T
r ~ ~es~
'~_

IS MY

i~ . A startlin g number of our aircraft arE~ liter-

allti~ scheduled to crash beforE~ takeoff . Not

MAINTENANCE
"durin g " taktoff ~ but "befor~~'"-brfore the P ilots
ever pour on tht coal for the takeoff run ; possibly
even days b~~forr. the flights begin .

~ Pu~~s
Makf:s a rnan just a shade nervous t o admit
a thing like that . (~1 the surface it ought to be
i enough reason for any self-respecting F/0 to
turn in his robes of offict~ and adopt some simple
m o d e of 1 i f r~ , like flagpole-sitting on windy
days only .
But thc problern has t o be faced, not aban-
SOn1e boners) doned . L:ither that or pack it up . So thr first

/ step is to ask "Who is rcsponsible?" And the

ans we r is : "Maintenanc e" .
We are finger-pointing at ourselves . We
could lose: a lot of business this way, but some-
body has to clear the air and sweep the shop, and
it s h o u 1 d be us . W r stand convictE~d o n the
evidence, and the evid~~ncc~ says that sorne of us
aren't fit for thc: j o b of keeping our pilots and
thcir aircraft up in the air where they belon~;-
instead of down among the gophers . 'I'oo many
o f u s couldn't honestly stamp our work "good
for onc flight", let a 1 on e "guaranteed for the
life of the pilot ."
Directorate of Maintenance Engineering
~:nough of philosophy, and on to the facts of
thematter . '1'~chnicalpeoplewillbe interested
to le~arn c~xactly how their maintenance organ-
ization is falling down on th~~ job .
During 1 q 5 7 , 1 4 8 RCAF aircraft ran into
trouble d u r in g flight bt~caus~~ of improper or
inadE~quatt~ maintenance . A11148 cases were the
subjects of D 1 4 reports . Of these, l4 were
classed as "info only" because they did not re-
quire repairs or replacements and therefore did
not mcct the requir~ments of AF~AU Zl .56/O1 .
li o w e v e r , they a 11 resulted in cancelled or
aborted trips, m u c h paper w o r k , and a few
more gray hairs o n t h e flyboys' bright young
heads,

Airframes
Airframt~ technicians 1 e a d thF~ field i n thf~
b o n c r dc~partment : an even 80 o u t of th~~ 1 L-1

~~~%i~'
st,~tistics, and 1 1 out of L~ "info" rc~ports , ~I'he
b~csic airfrarT~~-uhich includ~~s lusc'l~ll ;c', winl ;s,
fix~d tail surfact~s, pancls, hatchc~s and cano-
pic~s-accountrd for L Z c a s c~ s ; the hydr ;culic
5yst~ rns also lrt ~o LL tin~~ s ; ,~nd undc~rcarriage
whc~c~ls and brak~s fail~c{ 17 tim~ s . 'hh~ hy~drau-
lic and undercarriagc~ failurc~s rt~sctlt~~d in fiv~~
seriouslydama} ;cd aircrait . CJineteen pilots had
control P r o b 1 ~~ m s , ninr of w h i c h r~-quirc~d
repairs o r replacc~mc~nts of various parts ; thc
rc~rr~aining 1 iJ necc~ssitated various trc~atments
including rc-tc~nsioninl; o f cabl~~s, connc~ctinK
trin~ tabs the ri K ht w~ay, r~movingvariotts nuts,
bolts and t o 01 s 1 r o rn unsuitable pl .?ces, and
thaw~inl; out icc~ on thc~ cockpit floor .
Nint~ aircraft had f u e 1 troublf~s, including
one "info" r~port that was a honey . Thc~ fus~-
lag~ tank in a T-bird had b~en wron~;ly put to-
K ~ thc~r ~ r~~sultin b~ in a 1 a r g c lt~ak at th~ filler
n e c k . When t h ~ aircraft landrd, its plenurn
charnber w~as found to be abouthalf full of fucl .
That pilot rnust have been carrying a horscshoe
as ~~~c°11 as a rabbit's foot . In anothc~r case, one
heater in a Neptunc~ spranK a leak and filled thc~
fust~la~e w~ i t h fumc~s . It was lucky the hf~atc~r
was uns~~rviccabl~~, or thin~s might have becom~~
too hot for evc~ryon~ . In another T-bird case,
one ti P tank left on its own ; tht ~ettison cable was
too tight .
En~ines
T h ~ rc cord of th ~~ engine techs isn't quite
a s bad : L9 statistics and ninc "info" reports .
Six of tht~ r ~- p o r t s u~e re o n thr~ basic engine :
t w o had o i 1 sulnp plugs cornc~ out ; o n e had a
lc~akinf; induction pip~~ which caused an engine
fire ; a Lancaster had a flame-trap bolt mixed
up with intake valvrs ; a Mitchcll pushrod cover
loosc~n~~d and oil sprayed all over the exhaust ;
and a C,anuckpilot doinK sinf;lc~ tngine practice
had a firr on rrlight aft~r a combustion charnbF~r
drain line bccamr loose and pc~rrnitted fuel to
collect in the nacc~llc .
:~nothc~r six aircraft had futl system
troublc~s, mostly loose connections . Five had
oil troubl~~s : a Mitchc~ll cau Yht fire when both
oil t a n k s started syphoninl; aftr~r bcing over-
iillrd~ ont Uak had an en R ine fall apart because
the oil iilter was pluggc~d ; and a second Dak had
thc und~-rcarriage foul the oildrainvalvc~ . 'I'he
balanc~ were caused b y loose connections and
plumbing .
A coupl~~ o f "info" rc~ports also referrt~d to
the oil s y s t e m . In onc, a Lanc had all four
c~ngm s v e n t i n 1,~ oil , after tak~off ( too
shortlv
rT~ u c h dilution and n o t enou K h boil-off) . The
other w~as a Harvard which was doing aerobatics
when the oil tank cap fc~ll off . Naturally thc oil
went out with the c~~p . Thrt ~~ propellers gave
t roubl e , includin g onc~ C . S . L' . that lost ablank-
ing plug . A NorthStar also lost an S .U , pump
b 1 a n k i n k plul ;, the pump going into full rich
o P eration so thatthrre wasa consid~~rabledrop
in power and clouds of black smoke .
k . n g i n ~~ controls c r e a t e d thc~ir sharr of
t roublc~ . A U ~+ k o t a had the mixture controls flying Canucks at spe~ds w~llbelow 10~) knots .
adjusted t o o rich anci the idlc~ mixturc~ sc~t full Onc aircraft had the pitot lint~ disconn~ ctc~d at
lcan to countt~ract . It didn't w~ork . A Sabrc~'s tht~ transducer by an "M&WTIJCI-{" doing a
idlr spc~c,d was adjustc~d at tht throttlc~ stop, but p e r i o d i c inspection . Anotht~ r pitot lin~ w~as
that didn't work c~ithc~r because the~ throttle link- disconnected by "IT'echs" looking for a droppc~d AE AF ELECT INST
a~;e partly clos~~cl the I1 P cock . A flameout in pa rt . The third airc raft had its pitot and static TECHS TECHS TECHS TECHS
thc circuit rt~sultc~d in a pilc~ of high class ~ar- lines crossed while tht~ wing 1c~adinK ~dg~~ v;as 10' ;
bage somewhat short of thc- runway . down . None of thc~ thr~c~ had any c~ntry in the
The six "info" reports on throttles were very L1~ concc~rning pitot lin~s .
~~v~~nly dividc~d-thrc~e~ Sabrr~s and three T-birds, No story that evt~n mt~ntions thr word "sta- 60,
t h r e c disconnected and three jammed . This tistics" is complete w~ithout charts and graphs,
m~lkf~s thc~ pilut's j ob much easier-o n e less so we have conformed to tradition and display~~d
control to usc~ . [ I~crvard t~nginc~ cowlings always 50,
a few . T h e y indicate at a glance the location
seem to show up in statistics, and they always of th~ trouble, tht~ tradts rc~sponsif~l~ , and thc~
chew up props . Unly two this year . Lancaster causeofthe t:rrors . Wh~~redoyou-individual, 40,
exhaust stacks havc a habit of dropping off, but section and unit-fit into thr pictur~_ '~
not on a f i r s t flight after a c y 1 i n d e r block Providing thc~sc charts and graphs would be
chan~t -~~xc~~pt when all four nuts and one stud an c~asic~r task if they consisted of one straight 30,
are mi5sink . Canucks havc~ thc~ occasional falsc~ lin~ running across each squared s h e e t from
firc tivarning, but when thc tail pipc comes partly zero to aero . To achieve this goal, and elirn-
unstuck, it isn't false a n y rnort . Finally, an inate those "crashts beforr takt:off"-all 148 of 20,
accessory drive shaft on a Canuck 1 r~ t go and them! -the maintenance man must acquire tw~o
smasht~d all thc~ fuel and oil lines within range K o o d habits : p r id e in his work, and careful
10, 'I i
b c f o r ~ the en g ine seized . (lncidentally, this atttntion to detail .
Canuck made t h e hop across the Atlantic «~ith That leaves us ~t~ith a sort of "tc~st question"
thc~ drive shaft barely hanging on .) which wr fe~l should have its place in the mind
of the maintenance man who considers himself
Electrics aprofessional craftsrnan . It canbes~~lf- TRADE RESPONSIBLE
appli~~d, like iodine to a c ut . E,very time you
I;lectricians didn't do t o o b a d 1 y eithr~r- compl~~t~~ an a s s i g n m ~~ n t , and whilc you' re
only 1 Z timr~s in 1 L months . Four of these w~ rc~ standing t h t~ r e «~iping your hands and looking
false fire warnings caused by loose screws or o ti~ c~ r w h a t v o u' v ~ done, ask >~ourself this
missing insulation . Twicc thc~ aircrew were q uestion : KNUWING W1fAT I K N 0 W ABOUT 1 JUL 31 DEC 1956
h~lving Eits because~ the und~~rcarriage seemed T11)v JGI~, W 0 U LD I F~'LY THIS AIRCRAF'I'?
tobc only half safe . Improprrly adjusted micro- ;;;;:;`':.:< 1 ~aN -- 30 JUN 1957
switches can cause quitc~ a panic at times . Then
there was the~ irnprop~ rly adjusted flap actuator 1 JUL 31 DEC 1957
that resultc~d inflapfailure whcnthe jack scrcw
torc~ outthe thrcaded slc~c~vc~ . T-33pilots don't
enjoy doinb steep turns on final approach wh~n CAUSE OF MAINTENANCE ERROR
one flap works and one do~~sn't .
Loosr~ wiring caused generator failure on a
Cc~ssna, low f u e 1 pr~ssure on a Canuck, and
canopyjettisonwhiletaxiing, alsoon a Canuck .
Tht~ pilot of a third Canuck had some~ difficulty
keepinK circuit breakers in place ; somc wiring
in th~~ wheel well was broken and shorted when
the undercarrilge retractc~d . 60' ~
Instru ments
50,
Instrumenttcchnicians wcr~ responsible for Figures for period
f o u r lous ed-up flights during t h e year . Onc:
ao,
1 1UL 31 DEC 1956
Mitchell had r~~port~~d 1 o w oil pressure, s o a
not available .
Cpl "ITech" w c~ n t to work . Part way through
the J~ o b hc~ discovered h e was workin g o n the
wronK airplane . Inhis haste toget to the right 30,
airc raft, h e forgot t o put t h c othe r onc~ back
togc-thc~r, soalocknutonthc~ oilprcssure trans-
mittc~r was 1 c~ f t loose, and the c~ngine pumped 20,
all its oil ove rboard .
Pilots dc~pcnd uponthe airspeed indicator to 10,
tell t h e~ m whc~n t h e y are flying, a n d u~ht~n it
doc~sn't ~a~ork, they become slightly p~~rturbc~d .
Tlr r E~ e of them h a d thc unusual exp~ rienc~~ of
3
~ontinued next poqe ,
 ~ cooii ~iuiir

F7/r~~ thouaand nceident-free f(yin~ houra!

T'hix irnprr~xsive rr+curd ix the. uniyup achieve-
rnr~nt of xix Rf.,~1F xqrrndrvrra nnd lhree unita,
and rmr~ /if.A Air Uhxervntion Posf, durin~
the ll~month period r~ndint,~ 1i f une II~B .
7'h~ xyundrons nnrl urk~nni~rclinns irrvalrerl
rrr~rr~ ax follon~x : 10:,~( :tnx), ~10;1( :1ux), ~11)~
(11), IOi ( .11), ~IOtI(AA ), ~I :,ri (F), 2(til)
()T 1 '', l a~'.ti,1 .~1111', nnd 1i~~1'C .
17r~ir aur~r~~xx ix lhr~ rnore rcnrnrknblr'
n~hNn trN ~unxidr~r thut the i0,0(H) hnura roere
"ra~lc~d np" in nll lvpPa o~ nir~rnft frorn th~
LOCATION OF TROUBLE L-1 ~l to !he (nnn~k, and covcrel n rnrivh~
of funr~tionx fmrn RC,dF Irninin~,~ arul vuxi(~
inr~~ flyinl,r, t)rroa~h the dutiNa of :9rmy
vhsNrrrrlinn pilutx, lo thr operutionnl rolr~x
lrrr/ornred b~~ nur dny Ji ;~hlPrx, rdl-rrPnlher
fi~,thfrra rutd !{Inritirnt' rr'evnnnisxunt~~ nirrrn/f .
/rr rornplr~fin),~ IrrNIrN ucridenh f rcc rnonths
v f flyinl,~, thr~ perxunnel o/ pnrh unit int+olverl
Irnrt' prvvc~d tlrnt the nltimrrte in Fli~ht SnfPfv
is nn utlninnblr~ ~onl anrl nol nn imprrsaihh
xlrrnr/rrrrf.
lt ia n~ith a ~rent donl o/ pride nnd rrrlmirn~
tiort llrnt the Dirr~rtorntP of Flifiht Snfel~~
n/jordx tlre4N xqnadrvnx arul nnits the nrer .
Ndc~rrt of n nurltiple l:nnd ,Shnto . In dnin~,~
xv, n~e nre rrlxo snlntin,~ rnrh nnr! every nrern~
lrPr uf tht~ir nrtitx for th~ indirirlrtal wntrihn~

Plf F-~'I;I~~N'I' 'I'E111'll

livnx rr"hirh nradr pox.riblr~ thP x~ftinl,~ vj nn
r~ .rrrmplP Ihnt ix n r" hnllPn~~r~ tv the uholP uf

I~UII .IUIII'li 1~11,L1D

rh~ RI: .qF.

A successf ul a i r transport o p e r a t i u n is
lart~ely the r e s u 1 t of c a r e f u 1 planning, co-
ordination and timin g . When somethin g int .er- Six t h o u s a n d feet i s not enough,
feres with these factors, anotherwise perfectly If you should try to run a bluff
synchronized operation soon becomes a hurried And land with wind against t .he rear,
and disorganized one, an operation under prey- The runway dwindles f a s t ., I fear,
sure w h i c h leads t o mistakes and accidents,
When tempo increases, response begins to fall Nor i s it good to 1 a n d half-way-
behind the required p a c e , and p e o p 1 e begin You won't get stopl~ed before the hay ;
working, operating a n d thinking f a s t e r than And strong chagrin i 5 also lel~
t h e y can normally handle any given situat .ion, When confidence and rubbf~r melt,
In short, increased tempo or hurryin~ ir~nds to
lead to corner-cuttin g and m i s t a k e ~ , T h i s
applies particularly t.o pre-flight c h ~~ c k s and
operations inthe cockpit when aflight becumes
involved . A wi~e pilot will calla halt to hurry-
ing, will hold up untilall factors are satisfied,
and then proceed accordingly .
Flight Safety Foundation

II~'nlter H. Johnson,
I)r" /rn~P Researr~h 1fr~rlie~al La6ur~furies
Disorientation
In Fll~ht .i~
Part 1I-SP.-17'IAL DIS()RIENT,4TION
~ talse im p ression of one's P osition in s P ace
with rt~sprcttothc : surface ofthe~:arth is called
" s p a t i a 1 disorientation" . A s in the case of
vertigo (d c" s c r ib e d in Part I of this series,
Flight (_;o~nment, Nov-Dec 1957), a pilot under
the i n f 1 u e n c e of this condition rtrav uninten-
tion a lly p t~rmit his aircraft t o assume a n un-
desirabl~~ attitude .
Spatial disorientation difft~rs f r o m vertigo
in that it causes the pilot to put thc aircraft in
a relativ~~ly s t e a d y "off course" attitude ( c~g,
nose down )r althoug hhE : continuts tothink he is
flying straight and level . Vertigo causcs the
pilot to correct for a rotation, or turn, ~ti'hich is
not actually occurring .
In t~ithe'r case, if thc: pilot fails to recognize
thc~ truc attitude and corrc-ct it strictly by using
Fliqhf" waa ~nlilled instrumrnts, a critical (and only too oftcn fatal)
Pnrt 1 oJ "Dixrrrir" nlation in
"{ rrti~o". nnd nppr "nrrd in rlte :Yor-1)," r~ 1957 iaaur u/ situation rrsults . 1lencE~ it is extrr'mely im-
F'IiRht Cnmnr~nl .
portant that all alrcr~_~w bc~corne full~~ awart~ of
Part !1 conrlurlr~x .Ilr, Juhnann'~ r "xr~rdlr" nt eeriea un one
of ihe problr " mx eon/rurrlinR murlr"rn nriafion . t h e various w a y" s in which thest~ tw~o hazards
may dr~v~lop . B y undt " rstanding the causes of
disorientation, o n t" is 1 r s s likc:ly to become
confusc~d, and will thereforc bc better equipped
to "straightrn things out" .
How Do We Orientate?
U n d e r normal circumstanccs, whc~ther we
are airborne or on the ground, our appreciation
of which way is "up" and which way is "down", is
d e p t~ n d e n t upon the direction o f the earth's
gravitational field . Thc~rc~ a r e three methods
by which man can assess his orientation with
rt~spect to thc~ surface of the earth .
Firstthc:r~isvision . Inflight, werecog-
nizt : the appearance of the earth's surface and
distinguish it readily from the sky, liowever,
these cues a r e of little o r no us~: wh~n flying
in clouds, haze or (often) at night .
Next there is the tactile or pressur~ sense
in the "seatof the pants", plus a pressure sen-
sation in the muscles and joints of tht~ neck,
trunk and limbs . Under normal circurnstances
these indicators a r e quite r e 1 i a b 1 e in most
flying positions ; but in certain aerobatic man-
oeuv rr :s-a bunt or an o u t s id e loop, for f~x-
ample-c~ntrifugalforces produce anegative G
conditioninwhichtheresultantforceis direct~d
towardthe head, with consequcnt loss of sensa-
tion in thc "seat of the pants" ,
Finally thr:re i s the organ o f balance in
tht~ head which c o n t a i n s special "G meters"
sensitiv~ to linear accelerations . (These are
distinct from the semicircular c ;anals involved
in vt~rtigo and d~~scribed in Part I of this article . )
In appearanc~ these "met~:rs" resemble an in-
ve rted pendulum (s er' figure 1) w h i c h swings
awav, from its r e 5 t in gP osition whenever thr
bod Y chan g es its oricntation with respc~ct to the
earth's surface . Linear accelerations of the
body also cause the pendulum to sway , The free-
moving t~nd of it consists of a series of small,
hard grains (s o m e w h a t resE~mbling compact
bonr.) which together form an appreciable mass .
In t h e upright position, t h e pendulum is sta-
tionary, but it exerts a c o n t i n u a 1 downward
pressurc~ on th~ sensitive nerv~~s at its base .
Reacting to this stimulus, t h e s e nerves dis-
tribut~: irnpulses to thc : various parts of the brain
and s p i n a 1 cord, and thence to t h e muscles
whose job it is to maintain our upright posture
by exerting thc proper degrec" of tc~nsion on the
skeleton .
A n y change i n eithcr t h c- direction or the
magnitude of forces a c t i n g on t h e "inverted
p~ndulurT~" will produce a definite sensation .
T h e direction o r plane of space in which this
apparent m o t i o n occurs will depend upon the
dircction of the applied f o r c e with respect to
that ofthe earth's field of gravity . This can be
w c 11 demonstrated by u s in g a centrifuge or
"G machine" and scating the subjtct in a chair
facin g in the direction of the motion and at some
distanc~ : out from th~. centr~~ of rotation . Once
rotation c o m m e n c e s , the centrifugal force
~~~hic:h is directed outward along l h e radius of
rotation becomes superimposed on th e dow~n-
ward pull of g r a v i t y . A situation is thereby
producc~d wherein thF~ organ o f balance i s ex-
po sed to two f o r c e s at r i g ht an g les to each
7

FII ; . 1 .
othr r , By applying the well known "parallc~lo-
gram of forces" rule, thc~ resultant vector is
produccd a t an angle t o the othc~r two and be-
comc~s the s i n g 1 e force (generating the same
t f f f: c t a s the simultaneous action of the two
corn p on~ nt forces ) to which the or g an of balancE~
a p p a r e n t 1 y re sponds . To t h e subjf~ct, the
v~ rtical appc~ars to tilt sideways as illustrated
in f i g u r e~ 1 . The drgrer of subjc~ctive tilt is
dependc~nt upon the rate of rotation of the sub-
J~~~ct ~ and also uP onhis distance alon g the radius
frorn the centre~ of rotation .
What Happens in Flight?
An equivalent situation may devclop during
flight, especiallythroughcloud or other condi-
tions in w h i c h orientation with respect to th~
s u r f a c e of the earth c a n n o t b e accurately
e s t i m a t e d by visual cues alone . This i s a
common hazard while a pilot i s making a turn
forthefinal approachbefor~~ landing . A centri-
fukal force produced by thc~ turn often effectively
stimulates th c~ organ of balance . The typc of
disorientation which results w i 11 depend upon
whether or not the pilot's h c ad leans with the
aircraft . Thus, if his head should assume an
attitude in which the v ~~ c t o r representing the
imposed centripetal (toward the centre of rota-
tion) force of the aircraft is not directed toward
his seat, a resultantforce is thereby produced
which gives a pilot thc~ illusion of being tilted in
an attitude which may be radicallydifferent from
his usual orientation when making a turn . The
pilot (not looking at h i s instrumcnts) rn a y be
completely unaware of such disorientation if he
is in cloud or othc:r conditions which rt~nd~~r the
horizon invisible . H~ncr tht momentary con-
fusion which may result when th~~ pilot breaks
through the overcast and suddenly realizes his
tru~~ situation . A sensation of being upside down
rnay even develop .
ll u r in g straight and level flight, a sudd~~n
chang~° in flying spE~ed without any turning of the
aircraft will produce on the pilot a resultant
f o r c e which is no longer directt;d downward .
This accounts f o r t h c illusions of nose-dovvn
attitudc rc~portc~d b y pilots as having occurred
when the dive brakes were suddenly applied . A
sudden boost in power will evoke the sensation
of a nosc-up a t t i t u d e for the same reasons .
Angular and Linear Acceleration
As was the c a s e with vertigo, illusions of
false positions r e 1 a t i v e to the horizon often
appear very "rcal" tothc pilot, inthatthe eyes
actually perceive thi~ horizon (o r other refer-
ences) t i 1 t i n g into a new plane o f space . In
vertigo the e y e s oscillate and there is a sen-
sation of c o n t i n u o u s rotation (nystagmus),
whereas i n the c a s e of spatial disorientation
the eyes simplydeviate toa new position in the
head, with the result that thc image of objects
lookcdattakes upacorrespondinglyneworient-
l:1 p r e s s e d i n another way, angular
ation ,
acc~~l~~rations cause the eyes tooscillate, while
linear accelerations cause t h e rn to de~viate to
a nc tiv, temporary, compc~ns ating p o s i t i o n .
FurthE~rmor~~, one f a c t o r is common to both
conditions : o n c ~~ the precipitating cause has
b~~~~n r~~rnoved, t h e illusions may linK~~r as an
"atter ~ffect" for several scconds .
Individual Sensitivity
Unc: may w e 11 ask, "How is it that a pilot,
even when he is not exposed to thc~se accclera-
P
s
t{e euddenh realizey hiy true situation .
tions, can still allow~ his aircraft to get into a
position of whichhe is unaware?~~ One ans~a~er
lies in thc so-called "threshold" of a person's
sensitivity . Individuals differ in the degrce to
which they react to acceleration . For exampl~~,
if an aircrafthas an inherenttend~ncy to "drop
a wing", it may occur without b~ing noticed by
t h e pilot . In oth e r words, the aircraft may
vc~ry slowly assume a position vv~ith respect to
the earth's surface without th~ pilot being aware
that it has happened .
T h i s is especially t r u e in thc~ absence of
visible cues, whenthere is nothing to orientate
oneselfwith-as whenflying incloud . Aircraft
instruments fortunately are sensitive enough to
indicate the c o n d i t i o n . Howeve r, should a
pilot's attention wander from thc~ instrum~~nts,
his aircraft may gradually movc into an unusual
position ; in fact, it may even reach an upside-
dow~n attitude before the pilot realizes what has
occurred .
Li~hts and Altitude
Some forms of optical illusion cause disturb-
ances inorientation without involvingthe~ organ
o f balance . It is not uncommon for the stars
in the sky and lights on thr ground to b~~ int~r-
changeable, subjt~ctively, to th~ p i 1 o t . This
is t~spi:cially t r u t~ if t h c aircraft is flying so
high that a distinct appreciatian of the shapts
of thc lights involvtd is not possible, r'urthr r-
morc, in modern aircraft flying at sufficic :nt
hright when the moon is low on the horizon, the
illusion maydev~:lop to tht~ point where the sky
sc~'rns t o b e bent~ath th~ airplane, a situation
which is made e v r n more realistic by ground
lights appearing as stars . Northcrn Lights are
also k n o w n t o' havc~ illusionary effects which
cause t h e m to b e mistaken for the horizon-
a phenomenon thatbecomes especially confusing
becausE~ of th e i r constantly changing pattern .
1: :ven in the daytime, clouds can be unreliable
as spatial reference points .
Casesin Point
r1 "ncar miss" incidcnt i n v o 1 v i n g a T-33
occurr~~dinNovemb~~x, 1y57 . Theaircraft was
approaching the airfield and had to make l-1 /Z
turns in the circuit befort receiving clearance
to line~ u p with the r u n w a y for landing . The
circuit was to the left and required -15 ° of bank
a n d an airspeed of approximately l 5 0 knots .
W h e n clearance was granted, the pilot com-
pleted 90 ° o f t u r n and t h e n h e a d e d in thr
dirc~ction of t h e beacon, climbing meanwhile .
I'he climb was startc~d at 4 0 0 0 feet, but at
~500 feet thc pilot wrnt o n instrumt nts beforC
ente ring a cloud bank . At that momrnt he looked
dowm at his radio compass and up at the instru-
rncnt panel . To his astonishment the T-33 was
doing a 90-degrce b a n k to the 1 e f t ; it was in
a nose-down a t t i t u d e , and its sp~ed had in-
cr~~ased to about 300 knots . The pilot's initial
correction was to thf~ left--thc~ wrong dir~~ction,
since it 1 e f t him upsidc-down in a nos~~-down
attitudc . A 1 t h o u g h he a t once att~ rttpted to
corre ct f rom his instruments t o what ht knew
rnust be the right direction, hc~ found it impos-
sible to force hirnself to adjust beyond l0° of
bank, so s t r o n g was tht~ sc~nsory impr~ ssion
which he obtained . Rt~duced to a state of gener-
alized confusion, h~~ hand~~d over control to th~~
copilot who complc~tcd the conversion .
Linear accelcratian in thr form of ct~ntri-
fugal forcc must have b~~en consist~~ntly appli~d
to tht~ pilot whil~ he was involvcd in his circuits
prior to receiving clearance to lin~ up with the
bcacon for landing . Upon recf~iving clearancc~,
hc~ had lift~~d the n o s ~~ oi' tht~ aircraft in ord~~r
toclimb on a newheadinl; . This rnovc~ produced
a change in thc r ~~ s u 1 t a n t direction of force
bc~twc~c~n the downward pu11 of gravity and the
eentrifugal f o r c ~ : t o which the pilot had been
exposrd whil~~ circlinl; .
U P on c~ n t c~ r i n g thr cloud bank, his visual
cues with respect to the horiron disappeared, so
he was left even morc vuln~~rable to any forcc~s
liable to stimulate his organ of balance and cause
spatialdisoric~ntation . Previouslythc : pilot did
not notice any unusual or unexpccted position of
his aircraft, and hence he experienced no dis-
orientation . Howc~ver, as soon as he entcred
cloud, hc~ rnov~~d h i s head down t o look at his
radio compass on the floor and then looked up
at his i n s t r u m e n t s . These changes in the
position of his h e a d altered the orientation of
his organ of b a 1 a n c e so that changes in t h e
resultant forces were most c~ffective in causing
sensations of false movemc~nt and position . The
effect must have 1 a s t e d for sc~vc~ral minutc~s,
11~-SRI I~EtiI'fE SI'll1'1'lll~
Recently an air-sea rescue exercise proved
a point for sun glasses . Sent out to spot a one-
manlife raft trailinga dye-marker, an observ-
er in an air-sea rescue plane reported thatthe
dye-marker was clearly visible with the nakcd
e Y e for 270° of the orbit . Over the remainin g
90 ° it wonld not have b e e n apparent enough to
a k t r a c t t}~e attention of an observer who was
unaware c~f the raft.'s exact . position . For about

IIE:IU~-l'P FI~1~111~
because thc~ pilot found it difficult to convince 30 ° on e ach side of a line directly into the sun,
himself t h a t thc~ instrume.nts were right, and tlre dye- rnarker was invisible to the naked eye .
to forcC his aircraft to thr proper orientation Howev e r , at any point in t h e orbit the dye-
indicated by his instruments . marker could be s e e n clearly by an obse rver
Spatial disori~~ntation m a y be the result of wearing P olaroid sun glas ~e
optical illusinns without involving any stirnu-
lation of the or blan of balance by linc:ar or ankular Flight Safety Foundation
forcc~s . '1'his rnusthave bt:en the case with the
Canuck pilot who was flying above an overc~+st
arranged in f u r r o w s , the long axis of which
followed the direction of flight . L'pon reaching
a change in t h ~ dircction o f t h e furrows, hc:
found i t difficult t o avoid c h a n g i n g his own
direction of flight to corrt~spond with t h c~ n~ :w
change in dir~~ction of thc~ furrows, c~vc~n though
such a changc~ would hav~ takenhim off course .

Another optical illusion t o o k place whilc z
Canuck pilot from North Bay was flying at night
on top of cloud layer with starlight abovc~ . As
h~ r r a c h e d a nt~w~ cloud formation extending
vf~rtically, he found himself dropping one wing
throu K h 9 0 ° in order to 1 i n e u p with th e new
cloud formation which was at right angles to the
previous one . 'I' h i s disoric~ntation eflect was
t~nhanced by thc~ appearance of l;round lights
f rorrr below . The~sc~ blend~d with t h e stars so
that the effect was one of continrrous sky abovc~
th~~ pilot's head and continuous c :loud below, even
though thc aircraft ~:~:as llyinl; 9(l ° off thE- trur
horizontal*
What To Do?
The most obvious safeguard againstthe dis-
turbing ~ffects of disorientation is obvious : rf~ly
on your instrumc~nts-advicE~ that is thoroughly
i m p r e s s e~ d in a 11 stages of flying training .
Thert~ arc~ timus, however, when even thc
mo st ex p erienced p ilots mom~~ntaril Y becomc
so affected by misleading sc~nsations as to doubt
th~ reliability of their instruments . A situation
like this can be fatal . Aircrew should be pre-
p~ired to expc~rience disorientation in one form
or another, particularly in vit-w of the continuing
d t v ~~ 1 o p m ~~ n t oi high performance aircraft .
Furthc~r, it is worth remembering that spatial
iroi~i~r
Part of the cause of accidents is worry and
not concentrating on the job . Mr . Robert D .
Gidel of the National Safety Cc~uncil complains
that livin}; is so complicated thcsc days folks
donrt even w o r r y straight . According tohim
\4'L' .
. Worry about the llussians-then get run
<~~~er by a neighbor
Worry about the kids running i n front ut
cars-thcn drag them across the street on the
red light
W orry a ba u t crashing in an airplane-
then fall off a ladder painting the house
. Worry about getting enough exercise-
thcr : drive two blocks for a pack of cigaretteti
. Worry about getting the car greased
every 1000 miles-then n e v e r get a medical
chcckup
. Worry about polio-then get crippled by
a power lawnmower o r home-shop power tool
Worry about tornadoes-then get liquid-
ated in a whirlwind-force auto collision
. Worry about winning a football pool-
tiien gamble o n our lives w i th nary a thought
. Worry about retirement-then do every-
IIaIC-Secund IVarning
FI O L .H . Coultr~r and a studc~nt were carry-
inf; out a routinc~ training trip in a T-33 . The
flight 1eve1 was approximatcly L5, UUO feet for
o n e hour, a n d then an SJRA was made to thc~
fit~ld . At Z300 feet the student applied full powcr
and bc~gan a missed approach proct~dure . Just as
power was rc~ducE~d to 90°fo, the amb~r overheat
light flashed on for approxirnately half a second .
'1'1,T showedno indication of an ovcr-tc~rnp~ra-
turc condition but 1'' /0 Coult~r turned downwind
immcdiatcly and landed .
'T'he flashing o f the overheat 1 i g ht is con-
sidered to h av e becn causc~d by an immediatc
ove rheat condition , The o v ~~ r h e a t condition
was caused bv three cracks that were found in
th~~ tail cone assc~mbl Y . The failure was attrib-
ute~d to impropcr heat treatment following '1'RS
1U07, reference Mod . EO lUB-17B-3 App L .
This i s a good ~~ x a m p 1 e of the wisdom of
paying attention to a w arning light, even though
it only flashes on'ce . HadF/0 Coulter ignored
Three craek~ Nerc fuund in the t~iil rnne A~sembh .

d i s o r i e n t a t i o n -~like othcr c~mcrgencies-
becomes more severe undc~r conditions of un-
usual fatigue . Undc~ rstanding why it occurs, and
respecting its cxist~nce a s a hazard-coupled
with explicit f a i t h in one's instruments-~~ ill
always overcome its disabling t~ff~~cts .
14
t h i r~ ~ we can t .o ke e p from la5ting that long . th~~ warnin~, or failc~d to report the incidt~nt, a
It's all right to think about the spectacular serious i n f 1 i g 1~ t fire undoubtc,dly would have
and the u n u s u a 1, but it's the ordinary things occurred,
and occurrcnces that will kill you
USN : 5afety Review
11

LOBBERED ON THE GROUND
Dc~ .rou hav e an h11~ .6'? Do Y ou know how to tow
.a~cl ~~~rk a n a i r c r a 1 t ? Hav~ you bcc~n fully
chf:cktd out on thc : dii'f'erc~nt typc:s of aircraft
1 turr : ~le IS the picturt . Supervisors must be
towing tractors in us~ by your unit'? Havc : you
c~v~r had a towing accid~nt or have you c :ver
w~itncssed an accidr~nt that could have been
1 n~aintaining propc:r standards . If thc supcrvisor
avoid~d?
Let's re-phrasc thatlast one to r~ad ; If you
were evE~r involv<~d in a ground accidtnt or wit-
n~~ssed on t : happen, then you saw an accident
that could have bc :~ :n avoidc :d .
You might think that, bccause your unit only
has a few~ ground accidents, they are not really
that irnportant and don't r a t e much attention .
You are dead wrong, Are you aware that last
yc~ar we had qZ ground accidents in which air-
craft werc: towc:d into hangardoors, other air-
craft, fuel tenders and othc~rvehicles ;and where
tractors, fuel tenders, battery carts and others
wc~re d r iv e n or pushed into parked aircraft'r
A study of thc~s~ accidents rE~vc :alcd that th~
d i r r c t causc: factors follow the s a m e trend
~,vhcahcr t h e accident happc~ncd i n Canada, in
~ : n t; l a n d or on the Continc~nt . Thesr: causes
c a n be g r o u p c~ d into threr: main catc~;oric:s :
()1 The drivc:r was unauthorizt:d and did not
lravc an h1L6 ; (L) a propertowing crew was not
bc :ing u s r~ d (r~~frrence EO ()0-50-1y) ; (3) just
p 1 a i n carelessnes s and 1 a c k of experic:ncc : .
ThE~ cjrivc~rs of the tractors arc sc :rvicing and
maintc:nanee P ersonnel, and thc r~sponsibility
f o r issuing MEbs rests at station lEVel and is
handledbythc station VMsection . The issuing
o f the ME6 is d c~ p c : nd ~ nt upon the airman's
ability t o drivt a particular vehiclc:, and if he
has driven a c a r he should b c able to drivc a
tractor-so he is issued an ML6 .
:~ut, is this man capable of towing a million
d o 11 a r acroplane just because hc~ can drivr: a
tractor? Not only that ; he graduates to a truck
trail~rthc~ secondhe hooks ontoan aircraft and
bc:gins to~ring a tremendous weight . And that
weight h a s an immc :diatc effect on the driving
characteristics of thr tractor .
'fhc: record speaks for i t s e 1 f ; we are not
facing up to t h e problc:m . Toward a solution,
i
whyllOt g1VE : practical instructions and dt_mon-
strations in t h e method of towing a particular
type of a i r c r a f t '? Why not teach the proper
tc~chniques : h o w to p a r k an aircraft, ho~~~ to
utilize a towing crc~w to best advantage . I am
surt: that thc~ airrnen ~a~ho have been involvcd in
ground accidents, and the men who are author-
ized to drive t r a c t o r s would have a bettrr
understanding of thc: problern and coulddo better
work if they we re taught the techniques of towing
aircraft and provided with a thorough knowledge
o_f their tractors .
DFS LIB RARY
S L G. L. Sheahan
Where do~s the supervisor iit into this pic-
dir~ctly rtsponsiblt for mor.itoring the ground
handling of a i r c r a f t and equipment, and for
allows onc of his crt~w to tow an aircraft when
he knows thc : airman has not been checked out,
whor» do yau think is r~sponsible r
: i~~re is an example of «hat is happening . A
corporal and an airman «-tnt to move a parked
a i r c r a f t furthe r d o w n the lint :, in orde r to
facilitate parking of o t h c~ r aircraft when they
returned frorn night flying . The corporal who
~,~,~as driving th~ tractor approachc-d thc~ parkc :d
aircraft at ~,valking speed ; ten fect irorr-~ th~~rr~,
he applied brakt~s to slow dow~i . Th~ airtnan .vho
was assisting steppc :d off the tractor carrying
thc: tow bar, and accidentally struck the driv~r
~,vith the end of it . The drivt r' S foot sli PP c :d off
the brake pedal, and the tractor collidcd ~~ith
tht nosc of the aircraft .
On the Airc raft Ground Accident Report, the
unit and commandfc :ltthat this accident did not
Call within thc : prc :ventable category but was the
result of an unfortunate coincidence .
A unit technical invc:stigation was rnad~~, and
the results w~c:re includcd inth~ Aircraft Main-
tcnancc Error Analysis R ~ p o r t , The driver
stated thathe hitthe parked aircraft at walking
speed-four or five miles per hour, according
to him . '1'hc~ a i r c r a f t , a Sabre, rolled back
approximately forty f~et from the point of im-
pact, and was stoppc-d ~ lhen the as sisting airman
climbed into th~~ cockpit and appli~ :d thc : brakcs .
Although thcre was a slight slope running
down toward the cdge of thc tarmac, it was felt
that an impact greater than a walking speed was
rc :quired to move t h e aircraft t h a t distance .
Furthcr investigation revcalc :d that the driver
did not have an ME6 and had not bt~n authorized
b y his NCO supervisor to d r iv r the tractor .
In this case, a11 th r e c cause factors were
involvc~d in thc : accident :
~ Unauthorized drivc~r .
Imprope r towinK c r ~: w .
Carelc :ssness and inexpcrience .
Whom do you think is responsiblc~ for this
a c c i d c: n t ? The driver ? The airmen'? The
sup~rvisor? The unit? You decide .
How does your station stack up ': Have you w~
had a ground accident lat~ :ly? I s your systc~m
such that you c a n sit back and say "I've got it
made, man ." If it isn't, now is the time to do
something ab o ut i t . Rt member, a needle:ss
ground accident is hard to c~xplain . Surc :, you
can fine an airrnan $7 .5~--but will that prtvent
the next man from doing the same thing? I

"The tailure of tht~ ni~ht flying crew to rrfuel
th+~ aircraft has b ~ c~ n traced to sloppy proce-
durc~s, which h av c~ now bc :en corrected . Two
rc fuelling tend~~rs w t~ r ~ being used, each one
a 1 t r r n a t e 1 y lc~~ip-fro~ging the othe~ r as they
proc~ c~ded do~~:n tli~_ line, Howevc~r, whi~n .one
tr~ndtr pass+d th+~ uthr~r, itwould not pull up to
th~~ ncxt aircraft on thc linc, but would ltave
scvc~ral for th~- othE~r tt~nd+~ r to r~fuCl bc fore it in
turn drov~ onp~istth~ first ttndr-r . Inevitably,
onc aircraft wa5 rrrissed, ~ ~~ch r~~fucllinl; crew
thinking that the othr~r had caught it .
"Prior to r~~3u~lling, o n c nran ~~ ~~ n t clo~~,n
th~~ line of aireraft ~~nd set allthefuc~l cuuntc~rs
to rr~ad -1'? 3 ~allons in ~rnticipation of thc ir b+~ing
refu~~ll~-d--anothtr instancr of a sloppy proci-
durc~, A11 sc~rvicing pc~rsonnel h~~ve now bt~c~n
instructed not to rc~st~t the f u E~ 1 count+~rs ~urtil
aftc~ r the aircraft has bc~t~n refuelled . Thr rnis-
takes of th<~ followin~ m o r n i n g , pa rticul :~rly
those mad~ by the ground crc~~ti, could have bee :n
avoided if the cr~~~~~had p~rid closer ~cttf~ntion to
d+~tail . The discr~ lrancics ~.~,~hich existeci arnong
the v a r i o u s c ntri~~s i n the L 1 1 should have
providc~d an indic,ction that sorrrtthin~ w ~+ s not
rii~,ht, and furth~~r chc~ckin~ ; would havc~ rcvc~llcd
BLllll 9':1hEIIFh~S
Thcre~s nothing innocent a b o u t a puddle of
water on a runway . Itr s a d a n g e r spot . The
water may not only damage flaps on landing but
also can b e something less than an a i d to the
crew on takeoff . Water splashing ont.o thc wind-
shieldcanobscurevision complctely . In freez-
ing wc~ather the resulting i c e may be difticult
t o remove, cou .ld create p r o p vibraiiorr, and
prevent retraction of the undercarriagc~ . Pil~tS,
beware of those puddles!
Skyways Ma~s :ine
18
thc wholc story .
"All in all, this looks likc~ a prf~tty sorry tale,
~a~ith mistakes left and ri~ht adding up to a poten-
tiall Y dan E,~f~rous situation . It is si b7nificantthat
by th+~ lat+~st count a total of E~i,ht mistakcs wc~ re
r+~yuircdto cr~atethissituation, A1lrxcehttht
faulty time entry by thc~ pilot on night flying and
thr r~ s~ tting o f the fuel counters were errors
of orni5sion, All ~,ve r ~ the rc~sult of somron~
tak ink too rn u c h for 1;rant~ d, of n o t allowinK
sufficient t i m ~ to ensurr that everything was
in ordt~r, and of not +~xp+~ctinl; to find mistakes
and thc r+~forr : not lookin~; for thrrn q uitc closely
:~a~ir:~i,~
c~noukh . It is betterto ~xprctto find mistakes ;
thc~n, iftherc ar~ ant~, ~~-+~ ~~ould b+~ morc~ likc~ly
to spot thc_ m . Noticc that il any one of tlrc~ ~ i,~ht
mist :ck+~s h~id not been n~ ad c~, this N~~ar Mlss
~n~
would nc~v+~r have devrlop~d in the first placc~ ,"
(Th~~ rnistakes t h a t c~iused this Nf~ar Miss
report havt~ been clc~arly uutlinc~d in the trchnical
oflicc~r's rc~marks . We a r r fortunate th at it
iiH;i~ .~K~~oisH;s
took only a Near A9iss and not a fatal acc idc nt
to lroint out thE-sr probl~ m arc~as , It is strongly
recornmend~d that all u n i t s takc~ a close look
at th+~ir own r+~fu~~llinl;practicc~s to E~nsur+_~ that
a sirr~ilar chain of ev~nts is impossiblc~--l~ ;ll,)
U01'T SCR:1T171 I~'
Recent spot check reports disclosed severe
scratches on the outer surface of aircraft wind-
shields, the result of rernoving ice with metal
scrapers . Such scratchE:s tend to distort vision
and present a definite vi~ibility hazard for the
crew, Theyalsoweakenthestructural integrity
of the windshield, This creates an explohive
decompressionhazardon pressurized aircraft .
Maintenance and servicing personnel should be
reminded of these hazards .
FSF: Mechanlcs Bulletin
Hair-Trigger
A pilot enter~d thr cockpit of a Sabre aireraft
and put his plastic data case on the right-hand
sid~~ o f the seat . 11 e next rernov c~d the safety
pins fromthe scat and canopy . Findingthr seat
too high, he reached f o r th e seat adjustment
handle a n d released it . The s e a t fell to the
lowest position and th~ canopy blew off,
When t h i n g s had quieted d o w n , th~ pilot
noticed that the right-hand seat handle locking
wire w a s broken, and that t h e data case was
lying on its sidc~ instc~ad of upright as it had bcen
placed . The data case is believed to have fouled
t h e ejection handlr, causing it to f i r e , The
moral is obvious : d on' t stow anythin}; around
thr e'ection
J release mechanism,
Birds and Screws
Flying at 1000 feet after takeoff, a Canuck
was hit b y a large bird o n the lrading c~dg~~ of
the P ortwin g , abouttwo feet fromthr tip, The
pilot checked the damage and continuc~d the CX-
ercisc~ whenthe aircraft's flying characteristics
did not appear to bc~ affected, On complction
of the extrcise, a succcssful landing was car-
ried out .
Thc~ b i r d strike left a d~nt i n t h e lt~ading
~.dge oi the w i n g o n f~ foot long, scvc~n inches
wide and four inchc:s derp . ThE~ skin was badly
wrinkled and stretched and th~ formrr behind
was so cracked and b u c k 1 e d that it required
t~xtcnsive repair .
W hile t h e a c c i d e n t was unavoidable, we
seriously question the airmanship of a pilot who
would continue an exercise with adamaged main
plane , He w a s lucky to get away w~ith it--and
we hate to have to depend on luck to gct a pilot
and his aireraft back in one piece .
In another C a n u c k the pilot experienced a
19
slight snatching in the ail~ron movement of the
c o n t r o 1 column . T h e snatching continued
through the climbto 40,000 feet, and occurred
about a dozen times after level-out, but the
exE :rcise was continued . D u r i n g descent the
controls felt stiff, and excess trim was rc~quired
to hold the aircraft levcl . Despite the handicap,
a successful landing was made, Investigation
revc :aled that one of the attaching screws on the
lower starboard aileron control rod fairing was
the i n c o r r e c t length ; it rxtended far enough
through the anchor nut to foul the bottom of the
aileron leading edge ,
In this c a s e the cause of the snatching and
stiffness did not prove to be a serious problem ;
but t h c~ pilot c o u 1 d not know that, and yet he
carried on with the exercisf~ . DFS has on record
many sirnilar cases in which the first signs
of trouble were ignored-only to result in major
accidents . S o learn your lesson f r o m these
two lucky people , If you experience trouble in
the air, get down on terra firma whilt you are
still in onc~ pic~c~~, :~ND REPORT IT .
LoQSe Mask
After flying forfifty minutes as number two
in a T-33 practice formation exercise at 33, 000
feet, the instructor took over as leader . He
renumbered the formation and r e q u e s t i: d an
oxygen check, on completion of which he handed
control to h i s student . 'I' h c studcnt acknow-
ledged t a k i n g over, b u t his actions seemed
s 1 o w e r than normal and his v o i c e sounded
muffle~d . Whc~n the instructor asked the student
t o initiatc~ a y0-degrce turn t o port using 30 °
bank, his response was slow, and bank in the
turn was not constant .
When they had r o 11 ed out, th e instructor
asked the student i f h e was feeling well . His
reply was noticeably muffled, slow and inco-
herent . S u s p e c t i n g oxygen difficultic~s the
instructor urged the student to check all con-
nections, press-to-test, a n d t o t a k e a deep
brcath . Hc replied that the oxygen blinker was
not operating and was then told to pull the cmer-
genc,y bottle . liis reaction was slow, but after
bein g t o 1 d a second time, he P ulled the bottle
and oxygc~n rushed into his mask .
While all this was taking place the instructor
was m a k i n g a rapid d e s c e n t . The student
recovered immediately after pulling the bottle,
and the return to base was uneventful,
20
Investigation revt~aled that prior t o join-up
at hcight, the student had dropped out of position
and a 1 m o s t lost sight of the formation . The
instructor had assumed control and asked the
studcnt to k e e p an eye o n the forrnation . To
do s o necessitatc ;d an awkward twisting of thc~
body and head which is believed to have causc:d
a disconnect from the main system .
Thc oxygen syst~~m wa s chrcked and found
cornpl~ ttly serviceable, but thc student's mask
appeared to be very loose . Thc~ student admitted
loosrning the mask during flight b~-cause it felt
uncomfortabl~ . Thc~ loosc-fitting m a s k per-
mittc d him to c~xhal~ without too much difficulty
a n d yet n o t rc :alizc : that a disconnect had oc-
currc~d . It is indecd f o r t u n a t c that this lad
wasn't solo!
No Fuel, No Wheel
Some days it would pay a man to stay in bcd .
This was s uc h a day, A pilot took off in a
T-33 on an Il~'R crosscountry, The weather at
base w a s 1000 feet, s k y obscurc~d, visibility
l-1 JL in light snow . Immediately after takeoff
the tip tanks failed to fced . A beacon and GCA
letdown was carried out, and when the undc~r-
c a r r i a g e was selected down, the starboard
whcel gavP an unsafe indication .
A low pass was made b y the control tower,
andthe controltoweroperator advised the pilot
that th~ r i g h t wheel was only partially down .
Sevr~ral a t t e rt~ p t s were mad~~ to reselect the
g ~- a r up and down, with n o success . Finally
emc~rgcncy lowering was tried, but thc towcr
advised thatth~~ right wheelstill was not down .
A total of five passes wert made by the tower .
At this point the fuel state was critical, so the
tip tanks were jettisoned and a t o u c h landing
made in an attr.rnpt to bouncc~ on the port wheel
to jar the starboard wheeldown, On the ovc:r-
shoot thc towE~r advised that the wheel still did
not appear to bc~ locked down .
A tight circuit w a s madc_~, the engine stop-
c o c k r d just prior to touch-down, a n d a last
attr,mpt was mad~~ t o bounce th e wheel down .
T h e pilot was 1 o w e r i n g thE: starboard wing
slowly o n the landing run when h e discovered
that the wheel was down and locked . There was
no damage to the aircraft .
Cause of thc faulty indication was found to
be a frozen and stuck starboard up-lock micro-
switch (178188-4) . This caused the ''up" sole-
noids in the starboard landing gear indicators to
remain energizcd although the wheel was down
and locked, ln other words the wheel never
was unsafe .
Why wouldn't the tip tanks ft~c~d ' Thry «~erC
empty, The evidence indicates that there was
no fuelin the droptanksalthough the fuel coun-
ters had been reset to 560 gallons, and the L1 ~-1
signed out,
Yes, some days it would pay a man to stay
in bed .
Now this accident is assessed against the
studc~nt and rightly so, but if the weathc~r is bad
~nough to r c~ c a 11 all solo aircraft, you would
think that the rntirr. controlling staff would be
on their toes to assist thc~ students in landing .
We have been preaching right along that every
one of us can help prcvent an accident-yet, in
this case, s ix of us f e 11 do~ti~n on the job .
Just Before the Takeoff, Mother
Help Wanted Do you rc~rn~~mber the day your instructor
patted you on the b a c k and said '' My boy, it's
A student took off in a Harvard and encount- all yours . Do one circuit and landing and make
ered a layer of haze at 500 feet . He~ levc-lled off it g o od . " Yes, the f i r s t time you solo is a
and turncd starboard to make a circuit, When he memorable d a y , and o n e we all rc~member .
was downw~ind he ht~ard the tower recalling all Here's t h e very short story of another boy
solo aircraft . He turnc~d base leg and did a base who isn't apt to forget his first attempt at going
leg cockpit check . When he. turned final at ap- solo . T h i s aspiring aviator pulled out of the
proximately-100 fcet, the undercarriage warning line and taxied approximately 150 feet with the
horn bl~-w . Concc~rnc~d about his low altitude, result you se~~ picturCd here .
the stud~~nt added power to r~~ach the runway, and What kind of stud~ nt w a s he ? A good one!
the horn stopped b 1 a r in g . The~ aircraft was But h e let his attention ~~~andrr and e n d e d up
1 a n d e d wheels-up and s u s t a i n e d extensivc~ withtwo bent aircraft . H~~'llsurely remember
damage . this day,
Throughout this landing the f 1 y i n ~; control
tender was in position with a tende~r controllc~r
and a r~~corder on duty . The ilying control
tow~c~r staff includc~d the DFCO, thc~ ACOp "B"
stand o p c r a t o r , th~~ homer operator and the
acting duty squadron cornmander . Inall, six
highly traincd personnel, each on ~~ ca P ablr of
pr~~v~~nting this accidc nt .
What wert~ theydoing % Well, thr recordc~r in
thr tc~ndc~r was trying to light a propane heatcr,
and th~~ t e n d e r controllrr was watching him .
Th~~ DFCO and t h e acting duty squadron com-
mandc~r were discussingthe wtathtr . The ACOp
''B" stand opcrator w a s pre p aring to mak~~ an
entry in the 1 o g regarding thc~ c h a n g e in the
flying statE:, and t h ~~ homer operator was just
standin}; .
In all . .ix highl . ~raincd
per>ounrl, rach one capa-
blc nf pte~rnring Ihie
ac~id~~ul .

Distracted
Amosttragic andunnecessaryfatal accidcnt
h a p p c n e d rc :cc~ntly, when a n instructor in a
Mitchell aireraft w a 1 k r d into one of thc~ pro-
p~llers when deplaning after a flight, Th~-
instructor had completc:d 767 hours in Neptune
aircraftbrforE: transferto instructionaldutirs .
HC had complf~ted all phases of training, andthis
w a s his first instructional flight . During thc
fli g ht he checked out two students, and on corn-
pletion of t h e exercisc~ li:ft the aircraft so the
students could go solo ,
It i s cornrnon practice for a n instructor to
1 e a v e the Mitchell with the enginc:s running .
A 1 t h ou g h there were no eyc witncsses, it is
believed that this instructor-~~ it h c: r through
inatt~ ntion, forl;c~tfulness o r a n unconscious
Thc accompanring photos
indicalr hMalion of rhe front
hatch on the Mitchcll and
!Vcptune.
rD
~rc;
22
r e v e r s i o n to a habit pattE: rn developed when
flyingNcptun~ " s-descendedfrornthefronthatch
o f the M i t c h e 1 1 and walked forward into the
port prop~ :ller,
Althoul;h the practice of leaving the Mitchell
aircraft when thr engines are running is a dan-
gerous one, our re :cords indicate this to be the
first such accident since World War II . There-
fore, our aircrf~w and groundcreware aware of
the danger a n d rnust be exercising the proper
prt :cautions , ln this case w e have to assume
that the pilot was preoccupit:d and allowed a habit
reflex to take ov t r, with disastrous results .
W o r k i n g around aircraft while their pro-
pcllc :rs arc : t u r n i n g ovr~ r can b c: hazardous .
You h a v e n o time f o r idle thoughts, but you
should take tirne to be careful .
la~a
Sl'I'ERIISIIIiI EI~I~III~S
, lncomplete pre-flight briefings . Special
flights may r e q u i r e special b r i e f i n g s for
unusual situations . Captains o f crews should
e n s u r e that t h e i r crews h a v e understood
the briefing and make e x p 1 a n a t i o n s where
necessary .
, Lack of c o n s i d e r a t i o n for individual
capacity .
Improper evaluation of conditions-for
example, specific hazards w h i c h rnay be c~n-
c o un t e r e d durinK an exercise or operation,
. Lack o f specific, clear instructions and
dirt :ctions .
Failure t o n o t i f y personnel concerned
of cl~anged conditions and directions .
I n a d e q u a t e o r imprope r ins pection ,
, Allowing an unsatisfactory but correct-
ablc situation to ~~xist,
F a i 1 u r e to provid~ adequate directives
and r~~gulations ,
, Release o f improperly maintaincd air-
craft for flight .
F a i 1 u r ~~ to p r o v i d c : proper training ,
Failure to rnonitor training .
Lack of active interest in flying by com-
mand~ rs .
Lack of a c t i v e int~ :rc~st i n the rnedical
asp~~cts of thr type of flyinf; concerned .
Ilo(ler'n
The jet blast of an Orenda engine turning up
at fullpower has a temperature of 375°F and a
velocity of 425 knots only 25 feet aft of the tail-
cone . At 50 feet the temperature is 195°F and
th e velocity 174 knots ; a n d at 75 feet, 130 °F
and 100 knots . Unless a blast deflector is used,
the area 200 feet behind a jet aircraft running
u p i s DANGER~US, An i n c i d e n t happened
recently in the USAF where a ground crewman
was fatally burned . Let us n o t have it happen
in the RCAF .
I~EII F:1CE
Recently a student set his helmet on the wing
of the aircraft while he was putting his chute in
the cockpit . The mask p i c k e d up some JP-4
residueonthewing, This combinedwith oxygen
to cause first and second-degree burns on one
side of the fledgling's face . Take care of your
personal equipment!
USN : Approach
'011, Sharpir~! liow man~ mieeed the error un p .l$P
Letters to ~M from the Edlter
The Major and the Tigers
I have finished reading thc March-April issue
of Flight Comment and particularly approve of
thc : article "HoldThatTiger" by W/C Lindsay .
If we are to assess "Tigers" by thc numb~~r
o E th~~ir victories, th e n the most outstanding
"Tiger" is without doubt Major Erich Hartmann
of the Gerrnan Air Force, who is credited with
35L v i c t o r i e s ! I havc shown him the F'light
Comment article and asked for his rc~action to it .
Hc endorsed the writer's opinions cornpletely
and made the following statement ;
"It is n o t necessary t o pu11 7 Gs , You fly
with your head, t h e n you ge~t older and oldt~r,
also a pilot . T h e n you get a 1 o n g time your
money! "
Flight Commc :nt is read by most of our pilots,
p a r t i c u 1 a r 1 y those who have had refresher
training in Canada, and it h a s been suggested
t o me t h a t tht~ GAF might model their futurc
flight safety publication after ours .
D. Warren, S ; L
Chef Kanadisches Beraterteam
Waftenschule 10 Fliegerhorst
Oldenburg 1, Germany
Gas or Gravitate?
I r e a d with i n t e r e s t your account of the
M i t c h e 11 which crashed short of thc: runway
becausc of f u r 1 s t a r v a t i o n (March-April,
p a g e Z4) . According t o the investigation the
aircraft was short of fuel to the tune of nearly
t w o hundrt:d gallons, a n d in your article you
statc " no one can account for it .
As an o 1 d 8-25 pilot, p e r h a p s I can cite
a few facts about the Mitchcll fur:l system with
which some aircrew may not b e familiar, and
w h i c h ground crews refuelling these aireraft
rnust know .
The normal fuel system of the aircraft con-
sists of two main rc :ar t a n k s , two main front
tanks and t w o auxiliary systems-one of each
to a wing , The auxiliary s y s t e m comprises
t h r e e fuel cells which are connected t o each
other by balance tubc~s , T o fill t h r auxiliary
system, it is necessary to top up the auxiliary
fille r n e c k and then, a f t c r approximately ten
minutes, to top up the tank neck again . 'I'his
interval a 11 o w s thc~ fuf:" 1 t o balancc off in the
thrc :e cc :lls , The fuel from thr~ auxiliary system
is pumped over into the appropriate front main
tank wh~:n required .
Th~: f ront main and rear main tanks arc~
connected to e a c h other b y a tubr in which a
non-return valve allows gasoline to flow from
rear to f ront tank . When f i 11 i n g thes c main

tanks, it i s very important t h a t the front one
be filled first . If the rear is filled first, gaso-
line will run into th e front (and continue to do
so even when the tank i s bemg filled) until the
fuel rea ;,hes its own level . Thr amount of fuel
flowing from rear to f r o n t will dGpend on the
delivery rate to the front main .
Let us suppose that all the cards are stacked
against u s and w e land for refuelling at some
base wh e r e the groundcrew a r e not too well
acquainted w i t h the B-L5 . If we a s k for full
tanks, or 812 gallons, and thc: refuelling crew
fill the rear m a i n first, f r o n t main second,
and 1 a s t 1 y t h e auxiliaries (in that order, on
e a c h wing), the L14 will s h o w 81 L gallons .
A c t u a 11 y , we will have only 6 9 0 gallons or
thercabouts, depending on the delivery rate .
Even when 6 9 0 g a 11 o n s is carried on the
B-L5, i t is at t i m e s possible to jettison fuel
if too steep a climbing angle is used after each
takeoff . The fuel tends to "pack" into the ex-
pansionand overflowtubeswhichprotrude from
thc: rear of the nacelles and which, under certain
conditions, c a n cause a syphoning action that
will dr~aw off a considerable q u a n t i t y of fuel
from the tankage .
Thc:re is yet another method by which fuel
c a n bi: 1 o s t f r o m the B-L5 . A s mentioned
before, the aaxiliarytanks n~ustbe pumped into
the f r o n t mains when this f u e 1 is required .
Ope.rational necessity will determine when it
should be t r a n s f e r r e d , but on a long range
journey it is wisc to transfer the fuel as space
b e c o m e s availaulC . If this is not done, and
the pilot waits for space enough to hold all the
contents of the auxiliary t a n k s (1 L7 gallons),
that quantity of fuel could b~come a mere pas-
senger if the electric transfer pump should fail .
It is alsopossible, unfortunately, for apilot
to selectthe small electric switch which pumps
gas from an auxiliary tank to a main tank and then
to forgetit and over-fillthe fronttank, causing
all the e x c e s s to vent i n t o the atmosphere .
`The w r it e r , who can hontstly say that he
has never dumped gas from a B-25, owes it all
to an old glove, d y e d red and placed over the
pitch levers anytime t h o s e transfer switches
were on . That old red glove, sticking up and
looking r i d i c u 1 o u s , makes it impossible to
forget .
D. L. F. Lambeth, F!L
RCAF Statlon Lachine
[EO 05-55B-L S~ction III Para L outlinzs the
method of refuelling t h e Mitchell . Your sug-
gestion parallels the EC~ except for the auxiliary
tanks . Para 5 of t h e " c a u t i o n" covers the
"topping off" ; therefore the results wouldbe the
same . Inthe accident wereferredto, the cap-
tain stated that the contents gauges showed full
tanks prior to takeoff .
W e are more than pleased to see our pilots
s o sharp on fuel systems . It pays dividt~nds .
-- Ed
24
DFS LIBRARY'
FLIGHT
LIBRARY COPY-this
COMMENT pub must be
returned .
ISSUEp BY
llIRE("fOR .4TE OF FLIGHT SAFETI'
R .C,A .F, HEADQUARTERS . OTTAWA . CANADA
As any guy (even with 20/400
vision~ can see from this page,
we are doing our Ava Gardnerest
5EPTE~1iRER a OCTOBFR 1958 to get you to spend some time
with "Flight Comment" .
Maintenance Pulls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . i
r We hope you will manage some-
how to pass this spot, because
pages one to twenty " four are
Good Show, . . . . . . ., . . , . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . 5 designed to keep you around long
enough to enjoy your pension, the
devotion of your grandchildren,
Disorientation in Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . , . 6 and-we trust --all the pin-ups you
can handle from now until then .
Heads-Up Flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . li
Clobbered on the Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
T-33 Icing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Near Miss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Arrivals and Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Thrust 'n' Par . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . 2g
c
i -- Y
STAFF LIBRARY COP Y - thas
'
. pu.b ~ttust e retr~ rned.
Edrtor-in-Chief . Squ ader George heahan
Editor . Mr .lack E. Nugent
Circulation . Flight Lieuteaant Peter Hremner
Mr . lean A. Dubord
Artist~ .
Mr . Harry K. Hamee
Editorial Aasiataat ~ Mrs. Nancy L. Chenier
OFFICIAL INFORMA~'ION- The printinq of thie pub-
lication has been approved bp the Miniater, Department of
Natioaal Defence, Contributiona are welcome, ae are comment
and criticiam. Addres, all correapoadence to the Editor, Flight s
Comment, Directorate of Flight Safety, RCAF Headquartere,
Ottawa, Ontario. The Editor reaervea the riqht to make any
changea in the manuecript which he believea will improve the
material without altering the inlended meaninq, Service organi-
utione maq reprint articles from Fiight Commeat without further
authorization. Non-Service organizationa muet obtain official
i
permiasioa-in writinq-from RCAF Headquartera bafora re-
printing any of the contenta of this publicatioa . The opinioae
e:presaed in Fliqht Comment are the pereonal viewa of con-
tributing writere; they do not necesaarilp reflect the official
opinion of the Aoyal Canadian Air Force. Unleee othemise
stated, coateate ehould not be conetrued ae regulationi, ordera or
directivQe .
Published every two months, Flight Comment
may be purchased from The Queen's Printer,
Department of Public Printing and Stationery,
Ottawa, Ont . Single copy 50 cents; 1 year
subscription $2 .
 D F S LIBRARY
LI B RAR Y COPY - this SNOW . . . . . . . . ICE . . RAIN . . SLEET
pub must 1-, `t.j;1-r . . "_- -
Every winter we are faced with the same hazards --but
ani~Trw+~ s
this year let's prepare ourselves ahead of time . Plan now
.
to switch your technique when these hazards arise.
Remember, IT'S WINTER! Things are DIFFERENT!

40M~

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