Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Student Name: BhoXz_Daryl@21

Class Schedule: Wednesday / 5-9 p.m.
Professor: Atty. Jaliel Basay

COURSE OUTLINES

Opening Prayer for Online Class.

Heavenly Father, we come to you today in prayer, asking for your guidance and wisdom as we begin this online
class. Help us to stay focused and attentive as we learn and grow together. Give us the strength to stay motivated
and the courage to ask questions when needed. We thank you for the opportunity to learn and grow in
knowledge. May our minds be open to new ideas and our hearts be filled with understanding. These all things
we pray In Jesus’ name, Amen.

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H. The Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State

a. State
A state refers to a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite
portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing an organized government to
which the great body of inhabitants renders habitual obedience.
Elements of a State
1. People
2. Territory
3. Sovereignty
4. Government

a) People
A community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the continued
existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law.

Different Meanings of “People” as used in the Constitution:

1. Inhabitants
2. Electors
3. Citizens
4. Sovereign. The people organized collectively as a legal association is the state which
sovereignty resides.

b) Territory
The territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the
state. Territory as an element of a state means an area over which a state has effective control.

c) Sovereignty

The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed.

In auto-limitation terms: It is the property of a State-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal determination and restriction.
  Kinds:
1. Legal
2. Political
3. Internal
4. External

Legal Sovereignty.
Cruz: Legal sovereignty is the authority which has the power to issue final commands. In our
country, the Congress is the legal sovereign.

Bernas: Legal sovereignty is the supreme power to affect legal interests either by legislative,
executive or judicial action. This is lodged in the people but is normally exercised by state
agencies

(Bernas: Political writers distinguish between legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. The
former is described as the supreme power to make laws and the latter as the sum total of all
influences in a state, legal or non-legal, which determine the course of law. Sinco prefers not to
make the distinction and places legal sovereignty in the state itself considered as a juridical
person.)

Political Sovereignty
Sum total of all the influences of a State, legal and non-legal which determine the course of law.

Internal Sovereignty
It refers to the power of the State to control its domestic affairs. It is the supreme power over
everything within its territory.

External Sovereignty
Also known as Independence, which is freedom from external control. It is the power of State to
direct its relations with other States.

Characteristics of Sovereignty
It is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible.

d) Government
Government. That institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are impose upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or
authority of prescribing them.

b. Separation of Powers
Essence. In essence, separation of powers means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to
the executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is prevented from invading
the domain of others. (Bernas, Commentary 656, 2003 ed.)
Division and Assignment. Its starting point is the assumption of the division of the functions of the
government into three distinct classes—the executive, the legislative and the judicial. Its essence
consists in the assignment of each class of functions to one of the three organs of government.

Theory. The theory is that “a power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can
neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another
department or agency.”

Reason. The underlying reason of this principle is the assumption that arbitrary rule and abuse of
authority would inevitably result from the concentration of the three powers of government in the
same person, body of persons or organ.

More specifically, according to Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is

intended to:
1. Secure action
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism
4. To obtain efficiency

Limitations on the Principle

1. System of Checks and Balances
2. Existence of overlapping powers

Blending of Powers
Instances when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or
shared by several departments, e.g. enactment of general appropriations law.

 Belgica v. Ochoa Jr., GR No. 208566

Findings: Supreme Court nullifies PDAF Articles on 2013 General Appropriations, stating
among others that the 2013 PDAF Article as well as other provisions of the law which
similarly allows legislators to wield any forms of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of a budget, unrelated to congressional oversight as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

Said PDAF Article insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individuals,

violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriations which is lodged in the Congress.

Facts:
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents.
 Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks
and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

Rulings:
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that
the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the
Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
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Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be
confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

 MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, GR No. 171947-48, 18

December 2008

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government
agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about
the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES:

• Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents?
• Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners
to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and
clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according
to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
 The petition is DENIED.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

 Checks and Balances
The Constitution fixes certain limits on the independence of each department. In order to
observe these limits, the Constitution gives each department certain powers by which it
may restrain the other from exceeding their authority. A system of checks and balances is
thus formed.

• Examples
To carry out the system of checks and balances, the Constitution provides:

1. The acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive

for approval or disapproval. – signing of acts
2. The executive department may veto the acts of the legislature if in its
judgment they are not in conformity with the Constitution or are detrimental to
the interests of the people. – veto powers
3. The courts are authorized to determine the validity of legislative measures or
executive acts. – Judicial Review
4. Through its pardoning power, the executive may modify or set aside the
judgments of the courts. - Pardons
5. The legislature may pass laws that in effect amend or completely revoke
decisions of the courts if in its judgment they are not in harmony with its
intention or policy which is not contrary to the Constitution. – Legislative Intent
6. President must obtain the concurrence of Congress to complete certain
significant acts. – Concurrence of Congress for Priority Bills
7. Money can be released from the treasury only by the authority of Congress. –
Releasing of Public funds thru enactment of laws.

Q: What is the theory and justification of Judicial Review?

A: Note that when the Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or
invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what is upholds is not its own superiority but
the supremacy of the Constitution

Test to Determine whether a given power was validly exercised by a department.

i. WON the power questioned, has been constitutionally confered upon the
department claiming its exercise.
1. Doctrine of Implication:
a. Theory that a grant of express power carries with it all other
powers that may reasonably conferred from it.

d. Political Question
a. When matter falls under the discretion of another department or especially the people
themselves, the decision reached is under the political category.
b. Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
 people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
c. “The term ‘political question’ connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
e. Justiciable Questions
A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.”
a. Judicial Review
The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of
their conformity with the Constitution.
Q: What are the requisites of Judicial Review?
A: No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with what are known as the requisites of judicial inquiry, which are the
following:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.

f. Principle of Non-Delegation of Powers

a. Potestas Delegata non Delegari Potest – what has been delegated cannot be delegated.
b. Doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative powers: The rule is delegata potestas non potest
delagari- what has been delegated cannot be delegated. The doctrine rests on the ethical
principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another.
c. Rationale of the Doctrine of Non-delegability:
i. Based on the separation of powers. (Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightaway remerge on their own notion?)
ii. Based on due process of law. Such precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to
private persons.
iii. And, based on the maxim, “degelata potestas non potest delegari” meaning what has
been delegated already cannot be further delegated.

 Permissible delegation
Valid delegation of legislative powers

General Rule: Legislative power cannot be delegated

Exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff power to the President
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President
(Article 12, Sec. 17)
Conditions:
 a. There must be a war or other national emergency
b. Delegation must be for a limited-time only
c. Subject to restriction as the congress may prescribe
d. Emergency powers must be carry-out a national policy declared by
Congress.
(3) Delegation to LGU’s
(4) Delegation to the people at large
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies
Power of Subordinate Legislation. It is the authority of the
administrative body tasked by the legislature to implement laws to promulgate rules and
regulations to properly execute and implement laws.

Contingent Legislation
The standby authority given to the President to increase the value added tax rate in the
VAT Law, R.A. 9337 was upheld as an example of contingent legislation where the
effectivity of the law is made to depend on the verification by the executive of the
existence of certain conditions.

g. Tests for valid delegation

 Completeness test
 Sufficient standard test
. Requisites for a valid delegation of rule-making power or execution: (2005 Bar Question)

(1) The delegating law must be complete in itself – it must set therein the policy to
be carried out or implemented by the delegate.

(2) The delegating law must fix a sufficient standard- the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions.

Importance of Policy. Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law.

Importance of Standard. Without a standard, there would be no means to determine with

reasonable certainty whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make law,
but also to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained
by the Act of Congress. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)

I. Doctrine of Incorporation1 or Adoption Doctrine

Every state is bound by its membership in the family of nations by the generally accepted
principles of international law, which are automatically part of its own laws. This is the doctrine of
incorporation.

J. Civilian Supremacy Clause

1
 SECTION 3., Article 2, Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is
to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

That civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military is implicit in a republican system. Still,
it was felt advisable to expressly affirm this principle in the Constitution to allay all fears of a military
take-over of our civilian government.

It was also fittingly declared that the President, who is a civilian official, shall be the commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines.

Q: Does this mean that civilian officials are superior to military officials?
A: Civilian officials are superior to military official only when a law makes them so.

 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 198554

FACTS:
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and
violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline)
for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth
for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Article 29.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-
fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended
by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year
detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010
after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his
quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame
Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court
martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years,
at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated
that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from
ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and
(2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance
with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution
 RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within
which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word
and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
“[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and
execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of
confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

K. Separation of Church and State

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

A. Rationale
“Strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea is to delineate boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of
the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions.

B. Who is Prohibited from Interfering

Doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical
affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. (Cruz)

C. Separation of Church and State is Reinforced by:

• Freedom of Religion Clause (Article III, Section 5)
• Religious sect cannot be registered as a political party (Article IX-C, Section 2(5))
• No sectoral representatives from the religious sector. (Article VI, Section 5 (2))
• Prohibition against appropriation against sectarian benefit. (Article VI, 29(2)).

D. Exceptions
• Churches, parsonages, etc. actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes shall
be exempt from taxation. (Article VI, Section 28(3)).
 • When priest, preacher, minister or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal
institution or government orphanage or leprosarium, public money may be paid to them.
(Article VI, Section 29(2))
• Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students. (Article XIV,
Section 3(3)).
• Filipino ownership requirement for education institutions, except those established by
religious groups and mission boards. (Article XIV, Section 4(2)).

a. Non-Establishment Clause
SECTION 5, Bill of Rights - Philippines Constitution- No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be ed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

L. Social Justice
a. Old concept
Social Justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization
of the laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. (Calalang v. Williams)

Social justice simply means the equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with
special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the balance of social forces by favoring the
disadvantaged in life.

b. New concept (Section 9, Article 2, 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.

M. Academic Freedom
(Art. 14, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution)
Section 5.
(1) The State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall
encourage local planning in the development of educational policies and programs.

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements.

(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non-teaching
academic and non-academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the State.

(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
In addition, the petitioner University as an educational institution enjoys academic freedom - a guarantee
that enjoys protection from the Constitution. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. Indeed, the Constitution allows merely the State's regulation and supervision of educational
institutions, and not the deprivation of their rights.

The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom' encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be
taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. Undeniably, the school's prerogative to provide standards
for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with
academic freedom that gives the educational institution the right to choose who should teach. In Peña v.
National Labor Relations Commission,

a. Schools
 University of San Agustin v. CA, GR No. 100588
Facts:

Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and
Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA)
who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of... school
year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in
Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Its persistent refusal to re-
admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and... finish a college degree
and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the
difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for
mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,... to command petitioner USA to re-admit
them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for actual and moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them.

Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean
Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma.
Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private... respondents from
finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in
pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major
Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed... enrollment in the
following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80%
performance rating. To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the
Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of... students to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation,
except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2)
thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the... right to determine on academic grounds
who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and
research.

Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for
mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which
 has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to... re-admit
them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and
duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to
academic freedom.

Issues:

The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention policy of
the school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in two minor
subjects. May they compel the school to allow them to complete their... course?

Ruling:

When petitioning students enrolled at respondent university, they and their parents/ guardians
signed agreements of admission wherein they

"When petitioning students enrolled at respondent university, they and their parents/ guardians
signed agreements of admission wherein they bound themselves to abide by the policies of the
school, otherwise to discontinue. This is also provided for in the Nursing Catalog of respondent
university.

"These petitioning students have been given warnings of their sub?standard performance after
and before examination periods and informed of their efficiency and performance ratings. During
the evaluation and promotional meetings, some of the students were advised to... discontinue
while those on the boarder (sic) line were, for humanitarian reasons (sic), allowed to sign
promises to improve, otherwise they agreed to withdraw from the course. Respondents'
judgment not to readmit petitioning students was based on sound reasons and good... faith."

 Isabelo v. Perpetial Help College of Rizal, 227 SCRA 595, G.R. No. 103142
November 8, 1993
Facts:
Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus addressed to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior
graduating student of respondent Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR), and for the latter to re-
admit him as a senior graduating student for March, 1992

Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal ("PHCR") for the degree of Bachelor
of Science in Criminology. He was elected Public Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student
Council some time in August 1990. Until September 1991, he was the hold-over PRO and the
acting Secretary of the student council. In this capacity, he was invited to attend a meeting with
PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. Prior to said meeting, he was asked by the Vice President for
Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement, among
other things, a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. 2 Manuelito refused to
sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow
officers. 3
During the scheduled 08 May 1991 meeting, the student council presented to PHCR a 9-point
proposal. With an assurance that the request of the student council would be considered
favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105.

The student council filed with the DECS a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the students'
motion, the DECS, in its letter of 28 August 1991 addressed to the President of PHCR, advised that
the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending the resolution of (the)
matter." 5

In the meantime, the CMT commandant furnished PHCR a memorandum, dated 20 August 1991,
containing a list of PHCR CMT students (Manuelito included) who were dropped during the first
semester of school year 1991-1992, with a recommendation that appropriate action be taken on
said students.6

On 04 September 1991, the school administration circulated a memorandum 7 to the effect that
Manuelito had been dropped from PHCR's list of students.

The petitioner claims that the real reason why PHCR has voided his enrollment as a senior
graduating student had been because of his active participation in opposing PHCR's application
for tuition fee increase with the DECS.

The private respondent, on the other hand, invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the
petitioner from its roll of students. It argues that the petitioner has only been allowed to enroll
"conditionally" during the first semester of school year 1991-92 pending the completion of his
remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.

Issue:
The petitioner questions PHCR's act of voiding his enrollment.

Ruling:
The rule in this jurisdiction since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, 12 reiterated in Tangonan
vs. Paño, 13 has been to uphold the rule that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right,
on the part of the student.

In this instance, it would seem that the principal reason forwarded by the private respondent in
dropping the petitioner from its roll of students was his failure to complete some remaining units
in the CMT course. He was unceremoniously dropped from the roll when the semester was about
to end some time in October. He took special training during the semestral break (which was the
most reasonable time to comply), and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still refused to give him
that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.

The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some
deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant
petition. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has
strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition
fee increase.
 This Court, not being a trier of facts, 23 must remand this matter to the DECS for its own
evaluation and final determination.

 Cudia v. The Superintendent of the PMA, GR No. 211362

Facts:
Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. On November
19, 2013, a Delinquency Report (DR) was issued alleging that Cudia was late for his ENG412 class
five days prior. Cudia claimed to have been dismissed late from his prior OR432 class. However,
Maj. Rommel Dennis Hindang, Cudia’s CTO, found that the OR432 professor never dismissed her
class late. On January 7, 2014, Maj. Hindang reported that Cudia had violated the PMA’s Honor
Code for lying.

From January 20-21, 2014, the PMA Honor Committee (HC) held a hearing on Cudia’s honor
violation, the result of which was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. After a chambering session,
Cadet 1CL Dalton John Lagura, the lone dissenter among the voting members, changed his
stance, resulting in a 9-0 guilty verdict. On February 10, 2014, then PMA Supt. Vice Adm. Edgar
Abogado
approved Cudia’s dismissal.

Later that month, new PMA Supt. Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez referred Cudia’s case to the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) for review.
On February 28, 2014, Cudia’s parents filed a complaint before the CHR-CAR alleging human
rights violations against him. While the CRAB upheld Cudia’s dismissal, the CHR issued a
resolution holding that Cudia’s human rights were violated. However, on June 11, 2014, the Office
of the President sustained the former and the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the PMA, HC, and CRAB, in dismissing Cudia, committed grave abuse of discretion by
holding that Cudia lied.
2. Whether the CHR investigation carries weight.
3. Whether the PMA's academic freedom authorizes it to impose suitable disciplinary measures
and punishment.

HELD:1. NO.
Although Cudia was free to leave his OR432 class and proceed to ENG412, he stayed behind
totalk to his professor. Later, he deliberately manipulated the words “class” and “dismiss”
todefend his tardiness. Therefore, Cudia’s intent to deceive in his excuse constitutes a clear honor
violation.
2. NO.
The CHR’s constitutional mandate only extends to the investigation,
and not adjudication, ofhuman rights cases. It can only present recommendations on
Cudia’s case, and not settle it.

3. YES.
As an academic institution, the PMA has the right to promulgate rules necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, in accordance with Section 3(2), Article XIV of the
 Pimentel v. LEB, GR No. 230642 & 242954. SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS:

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform
Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting
a system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and
establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine
Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the
petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the
practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school
aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of
RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education
unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise
and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but a
composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a
specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal
education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches.

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and
supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate
legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of
law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in
the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate
upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body
that regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
 As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice
of law and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not
support the argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely
provides academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate
and supervise the education of its citizens and this includes legal education.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to
determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the
Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal
education but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct
encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to
the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the
power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch
as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power
to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-
professors as the teaching of law is considered the practice of law.

4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to
guide law schools in measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other
admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the
PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The
PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be
admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional.

b.Faculty
c. Students
 Villar v. TIP, 220 Phil 379, GR No. 69198, 1985-04-17

The academic freedom enjoyed by “institutions of higher learning” includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students.
Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced,
their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
 FACTS:

Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco were all refused
enrollment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners cannot
be barred from enrollment for the exercise of their freedom of assembly. In opposition to the petition
filed by petitioners, the respondent made reference to the academic records of petitioners, invoking
the constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning.
Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr., and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while petitioners Villar,
Salcon, Guilatco, and Recitis met their requirements for retention in the said institute, entitling them
to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for the exercise of their freedom of
assembly.
2. Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit students with failing grades under the
constitutional provision on academic freedom regarded to the institution of higher learning.

HELD:

1. NO.
Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College.

2. YES.
The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students.
Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced,
their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. To that extent, therefore, there is
justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic
deficiency.

 Non v. Dames II, 264 Phil 98, GR 89317, 30 May 1990

FACTS:

Petitioners are seeking for the annulment of the decision of the trial court for them to readmit / re-
enroll in Mabini Colleges Inc.

Petitioners were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading
or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.
The respondents, Mabini College, claimed that they reserve the right to deny admission of students
whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require the withdrawal of students
whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupt or interfere with the
efficient operation of the college.

Students, therefore, are required to behave in accordance with the Mabini College code of conduct
and discipline.
 ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court erred in ruling the case based on Alcuaz et al vs PSBA.
WON the respondent is allowed to deny the petitioner for the readmission without procedural
process regarding their violation.

RULING:
It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in
Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought.

It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions
conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.

Petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the February
1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of
procedural due process have been complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and
February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to
allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the
appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel
Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's
prescribed academic standards.

 Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

FACTS:

Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from
enrolling in the said university.

NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that,
o Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises;
o that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions,
Guzman et al incurred bad grades;
o that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll;
o that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners were denied due process by the school.

HELD:

YES.
Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which school
policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled. NU
failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to
determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.

Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”

Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation
of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be
imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules
and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed a sanction upon the
students without due investigation – such act is illegal.

The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process, and these are:

1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.