Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29 Sep 1966.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:

Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning 'and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Facts:
In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” calculated to
drum up patronage for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to participate,
no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Neither a purchase of Caltex products is required. Entry forms
were available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can was provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the mediator
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, in view of
sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. Such overtures were formalized in a
letter to the Postmaster General, dated 31 October 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of
the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico Palomar opined that
the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster
General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of
the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.
Ruling:
No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For, construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application
to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance,
in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit.
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest does not violate the Postal Law. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-50320, 31 Jul 1981.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The Supreme Court confirms that construction is the same with interpretation. There is no distinction between
interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and
scope of a statute, he is interpreting it.
Facts:
In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set
of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union
filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective
agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September
1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank-and-file
employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to
take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential
Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.
The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of
P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to
consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of
PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was
already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which
were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing
PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525)
is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the
company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred
the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a
new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that
agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977
which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The
union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
WON the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.
Ruling:
The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in
force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the
records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall
within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a
perfected contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite
the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was
based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the
parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with
inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations
were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only
agreed upon on 3 September 1977).
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123,
and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied.
There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where
one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of the
Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also
unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered
the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage
increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.
WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE DECISION OF THE
RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO PAY, IN ADDITION TO THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN P.D. 1123, THE
NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASE OF P0.80 DAILY EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1977 AS WELL AS ALL OTHER
WAGE INCREASES EMBODIED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, TO ALL COVERED
EMPLOYEES. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO, ORDERED.
Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 Apr 2014

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.
Facts:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players
and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2,
1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond
ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value
of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired
without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged (estafa) with 4 years and 2
months of Prision Correctional in its medium period as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period as maximum.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision
of the RTC with modification on the imposable prison term, 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7
years.
Issue:
WON applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court may, rather than declare the relevant statutory
penalties unconstitutional, determine the legislative intent with respect to them and, accordingly, adjust the
amount of the present fraud to its 1932 equivalent and impose the proper penalty.
Ruling:
NO. The Court cannot modify the range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. The
legislature's failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through the
Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law
is clear as to its intent and purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently,
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 102858, 28 Jul 1997.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
any interpretation or even construction; Where a law speaks in clear language, there is no room for
interpretation, there is room only for application.
Article 10 of the Civil Code - In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters
of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC)
No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. However,
during the pendency of his petition, Abistado died. Hence, his heirs – Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado – represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. It was found that the applicants
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring publication of notice of initial hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation. Initial Hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is merely procedural, hence dispensable. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied.

The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory.
Ruling:
YES. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of notice of initial hearing both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation shall be followed. The Land Registration Case is an
in rem proceeding, meaning the applicant must prove his title over the land against all persons appearing to
have an interest in the land including the adjoining owners so far as known, and ‘to all whom it my concern.’ He
must prove his title against the whole world. The notice of initial hearing shall also require all persons
concerned to appear in court to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration
upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said term denotes an
imperative and this indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, thisCourt has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there
is room only for application. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court granted the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for
registration of Land Title to the respondents without prejudice.

Secretary of the DPWH and District Engineer Contreras v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 21 Apr 2015.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is the application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell,
it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and
jurisprudence, would open varying interpretations of economic policies - a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Facts:
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated
December 15, 1994, respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject
parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering
District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square
meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current
fair market value.3 Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents-
movants. Respondents-movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00)
per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum.
Petitioners thus elevated the matter to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. The only issue resolved
by the Court in the assailed decision is the amount of just compensation which respondents-movants are
entitled to receive from the government for the taking of their property. Both the RTC and the CA valued the
property at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, plus six percent (6%) interest
from the time of the filing of the complaint until full payment.
Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby move for the reconsideration of said decision on the following
grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT MAY LOOK INTO THE "JUSTNESS" OF THE MISERABLE AMOUNT OF
COMPENSATION BEING AWARDED TO THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS; and
THE HONORABLE COURT MAY SETTLE FOR A HAPPY MIDDLE GROUND IN THE NAME OF
DOCTRINAL PRECISION AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
Issue:
WON the just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940 and not
at the time of payment
Ruling:
YES. The Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that
is controlling for purposes of compensation. With that, the payment of just compensation was reckoned from
the time of taking.
“The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings.” For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property
may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the
property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property
at the time it is taken.
Regarding Interest, the uniform rule of this Court, is that this compensation must be, not in the form of rentals,
but by way of ‘interest from the date that the company [or entity] exercising the right of eminent domain take
possession of the condemned lands, and the amounts granted by the court shall cease to earn interest only
from the moment they are paid to the owners or deposited in court.
The Court held that the government agency’s illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period
of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate
compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest
(6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment. This is based on the
principle that interest “runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as
good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking.”

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 Aug 1967.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case
The law is clear that there is no exemption for a secret Agent. “Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that the application is impossible or inadequate, the court need not squabble over
what the law meant. No construction or interpretation is necessary.
Facts:
Defendant Mario Mapa was accused and on a violation of Sec. 878 in connection Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by C.A No. 56 and as further amended by R.A No.4 which is the illegal
possession of firearm of one home-made revolver (paltik) Cal.22 without serial number, with six rounds of
ammunition.p
Defendant admitted the possession of firearms, provide his evidences for his appointment as secret agent of
Hon. Feliciano Leviste, Governor of Batangas, and cited the case of People v. Macarandang as his defense.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime illegal possession of firearms and
sentencing him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years.
The appeal was elevated to the supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor
would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition?
Ruling:
No, the court held that the law is explicit and clear. No provision is madefor a secret agent to legally possess a
firearm. The accused reliance on people v. Macarandang is misplaced since Macarandang was a secret agent
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaign which sufficiently put him within the category of a
statutory provision for the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. “Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. Thus, the conviction of the accused must stand.
Wherefore, the judgement appealed from is affirmed

People v. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, 18 Jan 1996.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The duty of the Court or other inferior courts is merely to interpret and apply the law. Any modification or
amendment of the law is exclusive to legislation. DURA LEX SED LEX—sympathy for any accused has no
room in the court. The courts’ decision and application is entirely dependent on what is stated in the provisions
of the law.
Facts:
In 1989, Amigo murdered Benito Suy in the public where many people have seen the act firsthand. Amigo
stabbed Uy with a knife several times. Suy was still delivered to the hospital, but unfortunately died after three
weeks of confinement due to Sepsis.
The Court a quo convicted Amigo for murder with evident premeditation and intent to kill. Amigo was therefore
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with death penalty as its maximum punishment pursuant to Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Amigo wanted to have the decision reversed arguing that the trial court made an error in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He argued that under the 1987 Constitution death penalty (or capital punishment) has
been abolished;
Hence, Amigo argued that the computation of penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and
not from death penalty. In other words, Amigo implicates that the appropriate penalty for him is deducible from
reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal since death penalty does not take effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made an error in the imposition of penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the fact
that Sec. 19 (1) of Art. III of the 1987 constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
Ruling:
No. The court held that there is nothing which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it, and if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
Amigo, the accused-appellant, claims that reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads the court for
sympathy.
However, Courts are not the setting to plead for sympathy. DURA LEX SED LEX. It should be noted that
penalties are prescribed by statutes and are essentially and exclusively legislative. The court can only interpret
and apply the law, disregarding any feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. Hence, the Court can do
nothing but apply the law pursuant to Sec. 19 (1) Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, as confirmed in Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed.

Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, 22 Jun 2010.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature and as a general rule, the
Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate such power since it is unconstitutional. Although the power to make
laws cannot be delegated, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Facts:
Petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. was the second nominee named under the certificate of nomination filed on March
29, 2007 by the Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), an organized group duly registered under the
party-list system of representation that manifested an intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections.
However, prior to the elections, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, who was also the
first nominee, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list previously submitted,
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin and two others and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. Said certificate resulted in naming Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee, instead of
being the third nominee on the certificate previously filed.
On June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) transmitting therewith
the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin and the substitution of Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion
seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. Such motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued a resolution whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the
validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and two others and the substitution of Borje for proper
disposition and hearing.
On July 18, 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution proclaiming CIBAC as entitled to an additional
seat.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin and
proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as
a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.
Such proclamation was contested by Lokin alleging that Section 13 of the Resolution No. 7804, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (otherwise known as Party-List
System Act), expanded Section 8 of the said Act since it provided an additional ground wherein a party-list
organization could substitute another person in place of the nominees whose names were already submitted to
the COMELEC.
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 enumerated only three grounds, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. However,
Section 13 of the IRRs provided an additional ground: when his nomination is withdrawn by the party.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC can issue IRRs that provide additional ground, not written in the Republic Act No.
7941, for the substitution of a party-list nominee.
Ruling:
No, the COMELEC cannot expand the provisions provided by the Republic Act No. 7941 through its issuance
of the IRRs.
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and
enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature.
The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law and administrative regulation cannot
extend the law or amend a legislative enactment.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the
license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs issued should
always accord with the law implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law.
Hence, the Court declared that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is invalid and of no effect and ordered the
COMELEC to proclaim Lokin as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 Oct 1990.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
Legal Ethics A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics
CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS
Facts:
1. The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Castellano, the legal counsel of the accused-
petitioner, with finality, as the MR did not contain the certified true copies of the assailed order.
2. Atty Castellano filed a complaint in the Office of the President accusing all the five Justices of the Court’s
Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or
resolution”, believing that it is the fault of the Justices of the Supreme Court that the dismissal of petition was
based more on money reasons and were so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation of
genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant.
Issue:
WON Atty Maglasang violated Canon 11
Ruling:
The court ruled on the affirmative. It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano
irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the
counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases.
CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just
to keep the confidence of his client. It is emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."
Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents" is but a last-minute effort to
sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPERCONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY
within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos,
or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to
pay the fine seasonably, and
SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more
severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other
Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallaria ,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 Nov 1998.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
It appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying
votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the
two months preceding a Presidential election and are like those which are declared election offenses in the
Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the
so-called “midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado
Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection,
became no more than a “caretaker” administrator whose duty was to “prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President.”
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, the President signed appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as Judges of
RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be
expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The appointments were received at the chief justice chambers on May 12, 1998.
The issue was raised at the JBC meeting March 9, 1998
Appointments were signed on March 11, 1998 the day before the commencement of ban.
Issue:
WON the President can appoint positions to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public
service.
Ruling:
No. The President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years.: (1) those made for buying votes and
(2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are like those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called
“midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal
as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no
more than a “caretaker” administrator whose duty was to “prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President.
Therefore, in this case the Supreme court moved to resolve and DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by
His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, and to order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to forthwith CEASE AND
DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on March
30, 1998.

De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191149, 17 Mar 2010.

Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary. Statutory Construction: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so—they could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
Stare decisis means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless
and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The [Supreme]
Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided, but is not controlled by precedent.
Facts:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno will have his compulsory retirement by 17 May 2010. It occurs seven (7) days
after the 2010 presidential election which is on 10 May 2010. The President will then appoint his successor.
But because of the Sec. 15, Article VII (Executive) of the Constitution, the provision prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the election and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4, Article VIII (Judiciary) mandates, on the other hand, the appointment of a successor for the Chief
Justice position be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of vacancy.
On 18 January 2010, JBC passed a resolution wherein the Council unanimously agreed to commence the
process to fill up the CJ position. The Council called for applications or recommendations.
The position is not yet vacant but the Judicial and Bar Council began the process of nomination pursuant to its
rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President because of the dilemma posed. Several petitions were filed and
consolidated with regards to the case.
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to
the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from
conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition
that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department.
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a
ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to
the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 191342, which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners
Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern
Luzon and Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment during the period provided for in
Section 15, Article VI.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela), by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. The
doctrinal pronouncement in Valenzuela was abandoned by the Court in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the incumbent President has the appointing power during the election ban the successor of CJ
Puno when he retires on 17 May 2010?
Whether or not the JBC has violated any constitutional provisions when the Council commenced the process to
fill the position to be vacated?
Whether or not the Court made an error in abandoning Valenzuela under the principle of stare decisis?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 15, Art. VII prohibition against presidential appointments does not extend in the appointments in the
judiciary. It is devoted to the Executive Department, as well as Sec 14, 15 and 16. Article VIII, on the other
hand, is dedicated to the Judicial Department. Sec. 4 and 9 provide particularly for the appointment of the SC
Justices. If the framers intended to extend the prohibition in Art. VII to the judiciary, they could have explicitly
done so. The usage of “shall” in Sec. 4, Art. VIII constitutes that the appointment for a vacant position in the SC
within 90 days from occurrence is an imperative duty of the President. The Constitutional Commission intended
to make Sec 4. Art. VIII independent from other provisions. The enactment should be construed with reference
to its intended scope and purpose.
No. JBC has the mandate to submit a list of names of nominees to the President, as stated in Sec. 8, 9, Art.
VIII. And since the JBC has already commenced the process, mandamus was not necessary. The duty of the
JBC to submit a list fall under their ministerial functions. Its selection of candidates lies within their discretionary
functions. JBC has no discretion to withhold the submission of the list of nominees to the President.
No. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the
Court is not obliged to blindly follow a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. The Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. Valenzuela case ruling
was reversed because it undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the three
branches of the Government in recognition of the principle of separation of powers. The 90-day limitation fixed
in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special
provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by
mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
“couched in stronger negative language.” Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the
records of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be
allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition
for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before
May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and
submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.