Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc., v. The Hon.

Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo

G.R. No. 160756. March 9, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA), an association of real estate
developers and builders in the Philippines, questioned the validity of Section 27(E) of the Tax Code which imposes
the minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations.

Under the Tax Code, a corporation can become subject to the MCIT at the rate of 2% of gross income, beginning on
the 4th taxable year immediately following the year in which it commenced its business operations, when such
MCIT is greater than the normal corporate income tax. If the regular income tax is higher than the MCIT, the
corporation does not pay the MCIT.

CREBA argued, among others, that the use of gross income as MCIT base amounts to a confiscation of capital
because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain.

CREBA also sought to invalidate the provisions of RR No. 2-98, as amended, otherwise known as the Consolidated
Withholding Tax Regulations, which prescribe the rules and procedures for the collection of CWT on sales of real
properties classified as ordinary assets, on the grounds that these regulations:

Ø Use gross selling price (GSP) or fair market value (FMV) as basis for determining

the income tax on the sale of real estate classified as ordinary assets, instead of the entity’s net taxable income as
provided for under the Tax Code;

Ø Mandate the collection of income tax on a per transaction basis, contrary to the Tax Code provision which
imposes income tax on net income at the end of the taxable period;

Ø Go against the due process clause because the government collects income tax even when the net income has not
yet been determined; gain is never assured by mere receipt of the selling price; and

Ø Contravene the equal protection clause because the CWT is being charged upon real estate enterprises, but not on
other business enterprises, more particularly, those in the manufacturing sector, which do business similar to that of
a real estate enterprise.

Issues:

(1) Is the imposition of MCIT constitutional?

(2) Is the imposition of CWT on income from sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets constitutional?

Held:

(1) Yes. The imposition of the MCIT is constitutional. An income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital,
because it is income, and not capital, which is subject to income tax. However, MCIT is imposed on gross income
which is computed by deducting from gross sales the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the
cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.

Various safeguards were incorporated into the law imposing MCIT.

Firstly, recognizing the birth pangs of businesses and the reality of the need to recoup initial major capital
expenditures, the MCIT is imposed only on the 4th taxable year immediately following the year in which the
corporation commenced its operations.

Secondly, the law allows the carry-forward of any excess of the MCIT paid over the normal income tax which shall
be credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately succeeding years.

Thirdly, since certain businesses may be incurring genuine repeated losses, the law authorizes the Secretary of
Finance to suspend the imposition of MCIT if a corporation suffers losses due to prolonged labor dispute, force
majeure and legitimate business reverses.

(2) Yes. Despite the imposition of CWT on GSP or FMV, the income tax base for sales of real property classified as
ordinary assets remains as the entity’s net taxable income as provided in the Tax Code, i.e., gross income less
allowable costs and deductions. The seller shall file its income tax return and credit the taxes withheld by the
withholding agent-buyer against its tax due. If the tax due is greater than the tax withheld, then the taxpayer shall
pay the difference. If, on the other hand, the tax due is less than the tax withheld, the taxpayer will be entitled to a
refund or tax credit.

The use of the GSP or FMV as basis to determine the CWT is for purposes of practicality and convenience. The
knowledge of the withholding agent-buyer is limited to the particular transaction in which he is a party. Hence, his
basis can only be the GSP or FMV which figures are reasonably known to him.

Also, the collection of income tax via the CWT on a per transaction basis, i.e., upon consummation of the sale, is not
contrary to the Tax Code which calls for the payment of the net income at the end of the taxable period. The taxes
withheld are in the nature of advance tax payments by a taxpayer in order to cancel its possible future tax obligation.
They are installments on the annual tax which may be due at the end of the taxable year. The withholding agent-
buyer’s act of collecting the tax at the time of the transaction, by withholding the tax due from the income payable,
is the very essence of the withholding tax method of tax collection.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from singling out a particular class for taxation, or
exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly
treated differently from other business enterprises.

What distinguishes the real estate business from other manufacturing enterprises, for purposes of the imposition of
the CWT, is not their production processes but the prices of their goods sold and the number of transactions
involved. The income from the sale of a real property is bigger and its frequency of transaction limited, making it
less cumbersome for the parties to comply with the withholding tax scheme. On the other hand, each manufacturing
enterprise may have tens of thousands of transactions with several thousand customers every month involving both
minimal and substantial amounts.
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Facts:

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution.

Held:

Yes. The ordinance violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
Victorias Milling Co. vs. Municipality of Victorias
GR L-21183, 27 September 1968
En Banc, Sanchez (J): 9 concur

Facts:

Ordinance 1 (1956) was approved by the municipal council of Victorias by way of an amendment to 2 municipal
ordinances separately imposing license taxes on operators of sugar centrals and sugar refineries. The changes were:
(1) with respect to sugar centrals, by increasing the rates of license taxes; and (2) as to sugar refineries, by increasing
the rates of license taxes as well as teh range of graduated schedule of annual output capacity. Victorias Milling
questioned the validity of Ordinance 1 as it, among others, allegedly singled out Victorias Milling Co. since it is the
only operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance 1 is discriminatory.

Held:

The ordinance does not single out Victorias as the only object of the ordinance but is made to apply to any sugar
central or sugar refinery which may happen to operate in the municipality. The fact that Victorias Milling is actually
the sole operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery does not make the ordinance discriminatory. The ordinance
is unlike that in Ormoc Sugar Company vs. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, which specifically spelled out Ormoc
Sugar as the subject of the taxation, the name of the company herein was never mentioned in the ordinance.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. CTA

GR Nos. L-48886-88, 1993-07-21

Facts:

Campos Rueda imported 46 cartons or 27,000 pieces of Tungsol flashers. Before the goods arrived at the port of
Manila, Campos Rueda filed with the Collector of Customs of Manila a request for value information for the
declaration of the imported flashers under Tariff Heading No. 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 30% ad
valorem duty, for classification purpose. The Customs appraiser however, re-classified the goods under Tariff
Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad valorem.

When the goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos Rueda immediately filed a Customs Import Entry and
Internal Revenue Declaration under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad valorem
but, under protest and paid duties and taxes on the goods, also under protest. It then filed a timely protest against the
re-classification resulting in the payment of additional customs duty and advance sales tax and prayed for the refund
of the said.

The Collector of Customs dismissed the protest. Campos Rueda appealed to the Commissioner but was denied, and
then appealed to CTA which modified the Commissioner’s decision by ordering the refund to Campos Rueda of the
sum of the additional customs duty but not the advance sales tax. The Commissioner now appeals via petition for
review the said decision.

Issue:

W/N Campos Rueda should pay 30% or 50% ad valorem duty

Held:

30%. TH No 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:

85.09. Electrical lighting and signalling equipment and electrical windscreen wipers, defrosters and demisters, for
cycles or motor vehicles ad val. 30%.

On the other hand, the same Code provides under TH No. 85.19:

85.19. Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits, for the protection of electrical circuits, or for
making connections to or in electric circuits (for example, switches, relays, fuses, lighting arresters, surge
suppressors, plugs, lamp-holders and junction boxes); resistors, fixed or variable (including potentiometers), other
than heating resistors, printed circuits, switch boards (other than telephone switchboards) and control panels:

In finding for Campos Rueda, CTA found that it has adduced sufficient evidence to establish the general purpose or
predominating use to which flashers are applied, and for which petitioner imported them, is precisely as electrical
equipment for signalling purposes for motor vehicles; that is, to signal or indicate a right or left hand turn by means
of electrical flashes in front and at the rear of motor vehicles and not merely as electrical apparatus as the
Commissioner claims.
It is the predominating use to which articles are generally applied or used that determines their character for the
purpose of fixing the duty, and not the specific or special use which any particular importer may make of the articles
imported.

Parts of machines, apparatus of appliances which are suitable for use solely or principally with a particular kind of
machine or with a number of machines falling within a specific heading, as a rule, are to be classified with the
machines in the same heading. Also, the law does not provide that an article imported for electrical lighting and
signalling equipment for motor vehicles falling under Tariff Heading No. 85.09, if imported alone, shall be
classified under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 as ‘electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits that
provision should not be read into the law per the circular of the former Acting Customs Collector. Petition denied.
CTA decision affirmed.
CIR vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric (G.R. No. L-23771. August 04, 1988)

Ponente: SARMIENTO

FACTS:

The respondent taxpayer operates an electric power plant serving the adjoining municipalities of Lingayen and
Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise granted it by their respective
municipal councils, under Resolution Nos. 14 and 25 of June 29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) assessed against and demanded from the private respondent deficiency franchise taxes and
surcharges for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross receipts from March 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1954 as prescribed in Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as
provided in the municipal franchises. Respondent submits that R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional insofar as it
provides for the payment by the private respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts, while other
taxpayers similarly situated were subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, thereby
discriminatory and violative of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation. Court of tax Appeals ruled in favor of
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843, assuming it is valid, could be given retroactive effect so as to render
uncollected taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment.

HELD:

YES. Appealed decision was affirmed.

RATIO:

A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.
Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike The Legislature has the inherent
power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never been deemed
violative of the equal protection clause. It is true that the private respondents municipal franchises were obtained
under Act No. 667 of the Philippine Commission, but these original franchises have been replaced by a new
legislative franchise, i.e. R.A. No. 3843.

Given the validity of said law, it should be applied retroactively so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question
which were assessed before its enactment. The question of whether a statute operates retrospectively or only
prospectively depends on the legislative intent. In the instant case, Act No. 3843 provides that “effective … upon the
date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per centum
on the gross receipts … shall be collected, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding.” Republic Act No. 3843
therefore specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law.
Punsalan vs Municipal Board of the City of Manila

G.R. No. L-4817, May 26, 1954

Facts:

Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section
18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said
ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in
various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the
ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to
double taxation.

Held:

The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or
select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may
not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that
there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the
ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp

Facts.

This case challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. (Jones & Laughlin) engaged in unfair labor practices by firing employees involved in union
activity. Jones & Laughlin failed to comply with an order to end the discriminatory practices. The NLRB sought
enforcement of its order in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the order was outside of the range of
federal power. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).

Issue.

Does the federal government have the power to regulate local employment practices in companies whose business
effects interstate commerce?

Held.

Yes. Judgment reversed.

The Supreme Court found that Jones & Laughlin does significant business outside of the state of Pennsylvania. The
majority of its products were sold outside of the state. Congress retains the power to control and regulate interstate
commerce. Although the employee discharges may be an intrastate activity, the repercussions from such discharges
have the potential to significantly affect interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress has the power of legislation over
such activities.
Shell Co. vs Vano (1954)

February 15, 2013

Facts:

The municipal council of Cordova, Cebu adopted Ordinance 10 (1946) imposing an annual tax of P150 on
occupation or the exercise of the privilege of installation manager; Ordinance 9 (1947) imposing an annual tax of
P40 for local deposits in drums of combustible and inflammable materials and an annual tax of P200 for tin can
factories; and Ordinance 11 (1948) imposing an annual tax of P150 on tin can factories having a maximum annual
output capacity of 30,000 tin cans. Shell Co., a foreign corporation, filed suit for the refund of the taxes paid by it,
on the ground that the ordinances imposing such taxes are ultra vires.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance 10 is discriminatory and hostile because there is no other person in the locality who exercise
such designation or occupation.

Held:

The fact that there is no other person in the locality who exercises such a “designation” or calling does not make the
ordinance discriminatory and hostile, inasmuch as it is and will be applicable to any person or firm who exercises
such calling or occupation named or designated as “installation manager.”
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. CITY OF BUTUAN

GR No. L-22814, August 28, 1968

"The classification made in the exercise of power to tax, to be valid, must be reasonable ."

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola sought to recover the sums paid by it under protest, to the City of Butuan, and
collected by the latter, pursuant to its Municipal Ordinance No. 110 which plaintiff assails as null and void because
it partakes of the nature of an import tax, amounts to double taxation, highly unjust and discriminatory, excessive,
oppressive and confiscatory, and constitutes an invlaid delegation of the power to tax. The ordinance imposes taxes
for every case of softdrinks, liquors and other carbonated beverages, regardless of the volume of sales, shipped to
the agents and/or consignees by outside dealers or any person or company having its actual business outside the
City.

ISSUE:

Does the tax ordinance violate the uniformity requirement of taxation?

HELD:

Yes. The tax levied is discriminatory. Even if the burden in question were regarded as a tax on the sale of said
beverages, it would still be invalid, as discriminatory, and hence, violative of the uniformity required by the
Constitution and the law therefor, since only sales by "agents or consignees" of outside dealers would be subject to
the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales,
and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established
outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the disputed tax.

It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or
equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation. The classification made
in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this requirement is not deemed
satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to
future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those
who belong to the same class.
ASSOCIATION OF CUSTOM BROKERS, INC. vs. MUNICIPAL BOARD

G.R. No. L-4376 May 22, 1953

FACTS:

The Association of Customs Brokers, Inc., which is composed of all brokers and public service operators of motor
vehicles in the City of Manila challenge the validity Ordinance No. 3379 on the ground that (1) while it levies a so-
called property tax it is in reality a license tax which is beyond the power of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila; (2) said ordinance offends against the rule of uniformity of taxation; and (3) it constitutes double taxation.

The respondents contend on their part that the challenged ordinance imposes a property tax which is within the
power of the City of Manila to impose under its Revised Charter [Section 18 (p) of Republic Act No. 409], and that
the tax in question does not violate the rule of uniformity of taxation, nor does it constitute double taxation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is null and void

RULING:

The ordinance infringes the rule of the uniformity of taxation ordained by our Constitution. Note that the ordinance
exacts the tax upon all motor vehicles operating within the City of Manila. It does not distinguish between a motor
vehicle for hire and one which is purely for private use. Neither does it distinguish between a motor vehicle
registered in the City of Manila and one registered in another place but occasionally comes to Manila and uses its
streets and public highways. This is an inequality which we find in the ordinance, and which renders it offensive to
the Constitution.
Vera vs. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-33693-94

FACTS:

Private respondents (the companies) are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local
filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein
plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section
169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.

The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue required the companies to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with a warning of action if they failed.

Section of the Tax Code is as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in
whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines
shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are
marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with
other equivalent words.

The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained the CIR from requiring private respondents to
print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words.

Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for
preliminary injunction. Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further
proceeding from the action filed by the Philippine Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement,
mislabeling and/or misbranding. That petitoners' milk was not labeled as an imitation of cow's milk.

Both cases was heard jointly.

Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair Trade Board from requiring respondent-
companies to print on the labels on the filled milk products.

ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.

RULING:

Yes. Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It was enacted together with Sections 141 and
177, which were already repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax
purpose, or a penal sanction.
It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk. Following ejusdem generis, the provision
specifically stated skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes of milk.

Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts:

In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the
United States and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case
seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.

Held:

The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At
the time of the taxing ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot
be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant
appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364,
and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and
enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held:

Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is
a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with
it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions
of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the
enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to
said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is
also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.