Villegas Vs.

Hiu Chiong Case Digest

Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong
86 SCRA 270
No.L-29646
November 10, 1978

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of
the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business
or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila
and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application
is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a
regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of
the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of
life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down
any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members of
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the
ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or
both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
 Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared
for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it
fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it,
i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the
ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc., v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al
G.R. No. 160756. March 9, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA), an
association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines, questioned the validity of
Section 27(E) of the Tax Code which imposes the minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations.

Under the Tax Code, a corporation can become subject to the MCIT at the rate of 2% of gross
income, beginning on the 4th taxable year immediately following the year in which it commenced
its business operations, when such MCIT is greater than the normal corporate income tax. If the
regular income tax is higher than the MCIT, the corporation does not pay the MCIT.

CREBA argued, among others, that the use of gross income as MCIT base amounts to a
confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain.

CREBA also sought to invalidate the provisions of RR No. 2-98, as amended, otherwise known as
the Consolidated Withholding Tax Regulations, which prescribe the rules and procedures for the
collection of CWT on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets, on the grounds that
these regulations:

 Use gross selling price (GSP) or fair market value (FMV) as basis for determining
the income tax on the sale of real estate classified as ordinary assets, instead of the entity’s net
taxable income as provided for under the Tax Code;
 Mandate the collection of income tax on a per transaction basis, contrary to the Tax Code provision
which imposes income tax on net income at the end of the taxable period;
 Go against the due process clause because the government collects income tax even when the net
income has not yet been determined; gain is never assured by mere receipt of the selling price;
and
 Contravene the equal protection clause because the CWT is being charged upon real estate
enterprises, but not on other business enterprises, more particularly, those in the manufacturing
sector, which do business similar to that of a real estate enterprise.

Issues: (1) Is the imposition of MCIT constitutional? (2) Is the imposition of CWT on income
from sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets constitutional?

Held: (1) Yes. The imposition of the MCIT is constitutional. An income tax is arbitrary and
confiscatory if it taxes capital, because it is income, and not capital, which is subject to income
tax. However, MCIT is imposed on gross income which is computed by deducting from gross sales
the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct
expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.

Various safeguards were incorporated into the law imposing MCIT.

Firstly, recognizing the birth pangs of businesses and the reality of the need to recoup initial major
capital expenditures, the MCIT is imposed only on the 4th taxable year immediately following the
year in which the corporation commenced its operations.

Secondly, the law allows the carry-forward of any excess of the MCIT paid over the normal income
tax which shall be credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately succeeding
years.

Thirdly, since certain businesses may be incurring genuine repeated losses, the law authorizes the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the imposition of MCIT if a corporation suffers losses due to
prolonged labor dispute, force majeure and legitimate business reverses.

(2) Yes. Despite the imposition of CWT on GSP or FMV, the income tax base for sales of real
property classified as ordinary assets remains as the entity’s net taxable income as provided in the
Tax Code, i.e., gross income less allowable costs and deductions. The seller shall file its income
tax return and credit the taxes withheld by the withholding agent-buyer against its tax due. If the
tax due is greater than the tax withheld, then the taxpayer shall pay the difference. If, on the other
hand, the tax due is less than the tax withheld, the taxpayer will be entitled to a refund or tax
credit.

The use of the GSP or FMV as basis to determine the CWT is for purposes of practicality and
convenience. The knowledge of the withholding agent-buyer is limited to the particular
transaction in which he is a party. Hence, his basis can only be the GSP or FMV which figures are
reasonably known to him.

Also, the collection of income tax via the CWT on a per transaction basis, i.e., upon consummation
of the sale, is not contrary to the Tax Code which calls for the payment of the net income at the
end of the taxable period. The taxes withheld are in the nature of advance tax payments by a
taxpayer in order to cancel its possible future tax obligation. They are installments on the annual
tax which may be due at the end of the taxable year. The withholding agent-buyer’s act of
collecting the tax at the time of the transaction, by withholding the tax due from the income
payable, is the very essence of the withholding tax method of tax collection.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from singling out a
particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate
industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently from other business enterprises.

What distinguishes the real estate business from other manufacturing enterprises, for purposes
of the imposition of the CWT, is not their production processes but the prices of their goods sold
and the number of transactions involved. The income from the sale of a real property is bigger
and its frequency of transaction limited, making it less cumbersome for the parties to comply with
the withholding tax scheme. On the other hand, each manufacturing enterprise may have tens of
thousands of transactions with several thousand customers every month involving both minimal
and substantial amounts.

City of Baguio v De Leon (1968)

City of Baguio v De Leon

GR No. L-24756, October 31, 1968

FACTS:
The City of Baguio passed a license fee on any person, entity or corporation doing business in the City.
The ordinance
sourced its authority from RA 329, thereby amending the city charter empowering it to fix the license fee
and regulate businesses, trades and occupation as may be established in the City. De Leon was assessed
for P50 annual fee it being shown that he was engaged in property rental and deriving income therefrom.
The latter assailed the validity of the ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires for there is no statutory
authority which expressly grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax and that there it imposed double
taxation and violates the requirement of uniformity.

ISSUE:
Is the ordinance valid?

RULING:
Yes. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code empowering
the City Council not only to impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, thus the
ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires for there is more than ample statutory for the enactment
thereof.
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state
and the other imposed by the City.
Third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
obnoxious in the requirement that license fees of taxes be enacted with respect to the same occupation,
calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivision thereof.
 City of Baguio vs. De Leon
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. DE LEON
25 SCRA 938
GR No. L-24756, October 31, 1968

"There is no double taxation where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city."

FACTS: The City of Baguio passed an ordinance imposing a license fee on any person, entity or corporation
doing business in the City. The ordinance sourced its authority from RA No. 329, thereby amending the city
charter empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate businesses, trades and occupations as may be established
or practiced in the City. De Leon was assessed for P50 annual fee it being shown that he was engaged in property
rental and deriving income therefrom. The latter assailed the validity of the ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires
for there is no statury authority which expressly grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax, and that there it
imposed double taxation, and violates the requirement of uniformity.

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendant-appellant tenable?

HELD: No. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code empowering
the City Council not only to impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, thus the ordinance
cannot be considered ultra vires for there is more than ample statury authority for the enactment thereof.
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and
the other is imposed by the city, so that where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute
must be sustained even though double taxation results.
And third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling
or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MICHEL J.

LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP, INC. G.R. No. 150947. July 15, 2003
FACTS:

On 1991, the CIR issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91, which was clarified by RMO
No. 43-91 imposing a 5% lending investors tax on pawnshops. It held that the principal activity of
pawnshops is lending money at interest and incidentally accepting personal property as security for
the loan. Since pawnshops are considered as lending investors effective, they also become subject to
documentary stamp taxes.

On 1997, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an Assessment Notice against Lhuillier
demanding payment of deficiency percentage.

Lhuillier filed an administrative protest with the Office of the Revenue Regional Director contending
that neither the Tax Code nor the VAT Law expressly imposes 5% percentage tax on the gross income
of pawnshops; that pawnshops are different from lending investors, which are subject to the 5%
percentage tax under the specific provision of the Tax Code; that RMO No. 15-91 is not implementing
any provision of the Internal Revenue laws but is a new and additional tax measure on pawnshops,
which only Congress could enact, and that it impliedly amends the Tax Code, and that it is a class
legislation as it singles out pawnshops.
On 1998, the BIR issued Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against Lhuilliers property for the
enforcement and payment of the assessed percentage tax.

When Lhuiller's protest was not acted upon, they elevated it to the CIR which was also not acted upon.
Lhuiller filed a Notice and Memo on Appeal with the CTA.

On 2000, the CTA held the the RMOs were void and that the Assessment Notice should be cancelled.

The CIR filed a motion for review with the CA which only affirmed the CTA's decision thus this case in
bar.
ISSUE: Whether pawnshops included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the
5% percentage tax under the NIRC.
RULING:
No.
The held that even though the RMOs No were issued in accordance with the power of the CIR, they
cannot issue administrative rulings or circulars not consistent with the law sought to be applied. It
should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the
law.
In the NIRC, the term lending investor includes all persons who make a practice of lending money for
themselves or others at interest. A pawnshop, on the other hand, is defined under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 114 as a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money on personal property delivered
as security for loans.
While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they are not considered
lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes citing the following reasons:
1. Pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments as per the NIRC.
2. Congress never intended pawnshops to be treated in the same way as lending investors.
3. Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273, subjects to percentage tax dealers in
securities and lending investors only. There is no mention of pawnshops.

4. The BIR had ruled several times prior to the issuance of the RMOs that pawnshops were not subject
to the 5% percentage tax imposed by Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977. As Section 116 of the NIRC of
1977 was practically lifted from Section 175 of the NIRC of 1986, and there being no change in the law,
the interpretation thereof should not have been altered.
Abra vs Hernando (1981)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the

properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop
claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for
declaratory relief. A summary judgment was made granting the
exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.
Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-
exempt.
Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the
exemption of religious property from taxes as tehy should not only be
“exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious
purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the
Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an
allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which
should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province
rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop.
Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that
if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There
must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and
improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted
from taxation.
The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.

Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104

(1981) G.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981
Fact: First, there was a denial of a motion to dismiss an action for declaratory relief by
private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from
a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such exemption, without
even hearing the side of petitioner, wantonly violated the rights of petitioner to due
process, by giving due course to the petition of private respondent for declaratory relief,
and thereafter without allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged
the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due
process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law,
which goes into the competence of the Honorable Presiding Judge.” It was the
submission of counsel that an action for declaratory relief would be proper only before a
breach or violation of any statute, executive order or regulation. Moreover, there being a
tax assessment made by the Provincial Assessor on the properties of respondent Roman
Catholic Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under
Presidential Decree No. 464 before filing such court action. Further, it was pointed out
to respondent Judge that he failed to abide by the pertinent provision of such
Presidential Decree.

Issue: Whether Tax exemption is presumed in favor of the claimant?

Held: No, Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely
compared the provisions of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935
Charter on the tax exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements.” There is a
marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution: “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.” The present Constitution added “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-
profit cemeteries” and required that for the exemption of “:lands, buildings, and
improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually and “directly”
used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The
change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past
decisions would have sufficed were the words “actually” as well as “directly” not added.
There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and
improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero: “From 1906, in Catholic
Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of
Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is
not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,
hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris.” In Manila Electric
Company v. Vera, a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated, reference being made
to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; Commissioner of
Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Co. & CTA; and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Customs.
Churchill v Concepcion (1916)

Churchill v Concepcion
GR No 11572, September 22, 1916

FACTS:
Section 100 of Act 2339 imposed an annual tax of P4 per square meter upon electric signs, billboards, and
spaces used for posting or displaying temporary signs, and all signs displayed on premises not occupied
by buildings. The section was amended by Act 2432, reducing the tax to P2 per square meter. Francis A.
Churchill and Stewart Tait, co-partners in Mercantile Advertising Agency, owned a billboard to which
they were taxes at P104. The tax was paid under protest. Churchill and Tait instituted the action to recover
the amount.

ISSUE:
Is the statute and the tax imposed void for lack of uniformity?

RULING:
No, the tax is valid.

Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property, of the same class, shall be
taxed at the same rate. It does not mean that all lands, chattels, securities, incomes, occupations,
franchises, privileges, necessities, and luxuries shall all be assessed at the same rate. Different articles
may be taxed at different amounts provided the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere, with all
people, at all times.
Herein, the Act imposes a tax of P2 per square meter or a fraction thereof upon every electric sign,
billboard, etc. Wherever found in the Philippine Islands. The rule of taxation upon such signs is uniform
throughout the islands. The rule does not require taxes to be graded according to the value of the subjects
upon which they are imposed, especially those levied as privilege or occupation taxes.

Francis Churchill vs James Rafferty

FACTS: The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the
defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property
the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the
property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be,
offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure
the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision in the internal revenue law prohibiting the courts from
enjoining the collection of an internal revenue tax is invalid

RULING: NO. A provision in an internal revenue law prohibiting the courts from enjoining the
collection for an internal revenue tax is not invalid as opposed to the due process and equal
protection of the law clauses of the bill of rights of the Organic Act. Such legislation has been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court

Nor is such a provision of law invalid as curtailing the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippine
Islands as fixed by section 9 of the Organic Act; a) because jurisdiction was never conferred
upon Philippine courts to enjoin the collection of taxes imposed by the Philippine Commission;
and b) because, in the present case, another adequate remedy has been provided by payment
and protest

American Tobacco v. Camacho (2008)

G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Lessons Applicable: Court of Tax Appeals Jurisdiction, Regional Trial Court Jurisdiction, Equal
Protection and Uniformity of Taxation (constitutional issue), BIR Power to Conduct Resurvey and
Reclassification (delegated by express legislation)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

 June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky Strike, Lucky Strike
Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed excise
tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])
 February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of the current net retail
price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of the establishing and updating
their tax classification
 March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail
prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products
 August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands
introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based on the survey of their current net retail
prices. This increased the excise tax to P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P
10/pack. This cause petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with
prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and
6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in violation of the
equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
 RTC: Dismissed
 While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among
other took effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased petitioners excise tax to P25/pack
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to the petition for
review assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a downward classification of Lucky
Strike products at the bracket taxable at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based
on their price as of October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than petitioner's product
price.
 Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp., Mighty Corp. and
JT International Intervened.
 Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
decision of the BIR in tax disputes
ISSUE:

1. W/N the RTC rather than the CTA has jurisdiction.

2. W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
3. W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its amendment by RA 9334
can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey and reclassification.
HELD:
1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CTA id defined in RA 1125 which confers on the CTA jurisdiction to
resolve tax disputes in general. BUT does NOT include cases where the constitutionality of a law or
rule is challenged which is a judicial power belonging to regular courts.

2. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. If the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if rational in character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta:
"it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation" SC previously held: "Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation"

Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection challenge,
must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. The classifications must be reasonable
and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being
equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the
same class.

Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the price is not
the only factor that affects competition.
3. NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a
prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the former. These are however modified
by RA 9334.