G.R. No. 224849.

June 06, 2018

The Facts

The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales (Jayme), who was
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, designated as Lot No. 9217-A, and
located at Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag City. The subject property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-37139, more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 9217-A, Psd-01-062563, being a portion of Lot 9217, Cad. 195, Laoag
Cadastre, L.R.C. Rec. No. 1212), situated at Brgy. Sto. Tomas, City of Laoag, Prov. of Ilocos
Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along Line 1-2 by A.M. Regidor St. (8.00 m.w.); on
the SW., along line 2-3 by Provincial Road (15.00 m.w.); on the NW., along line 3-4 by Lot 9217-B
of the subd. plan; on the NE., along line 4-1 by Lot 9218, Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre. Beginning at
a point marked "1" of Lot 9217-A on plan, being N. 51 deg. 18' E., 154.84 m. from BLIM No. 2,
[5]
Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre.

[6]
The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales, another
one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property.
They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of
the subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.

For clarity of the discussion, the heirs of Jayme and his wife, Telesfora Garzon, who both died
intestate, were their four (4) children:

1. Vicente Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein deceased defendant Ernesto
Morales (substituted by his heirs who are now petitioners herein); (b) Abraham Morales (also
deceased); (c) former plaintiff and, eventually, defendant Lydia Morales (now also deceased);
and (d) original defendant Angelita Ragasa;

2. Simeon Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein respondent Astrid Morales
Agustin; (b) Leonides Morales; (c) Geraldine Morales-Gaspar; and (d) Odessa Morales;

3. Jose Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) Victoria Geron; (b) Vicente Morales; (c);
Gloria Villasenor; (d) Amalia Alejo; (e) Juliet Manuel; (f) Rommel Morales; and (g) Virgilio
Morales (now deceased);

4. Martina Morales-Enriquez, who was survived by her children: (a) Evelina Lopez; (b) Emeterio
Enriquez; (c) Elizabeth Somera; and (d) Bernardita Alojipan.[7]

In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which
admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition, "provided
that their present positions on the subject property are respected."[8]

On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with
Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no
cause of action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a
complaint for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his
wife; and (2) herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property
because the same has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein
petitioners) by the respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.[9]

Meanwhile, per the Order of the RTC dated April 22, 2009, summons to the heirs of Martina
Morales-Enriquez, who were at that time residing abroad, were allowed to be served
 [10] [11]
personally. They were subsequently declared to be in default. In response, one of Martina
Morales-Enriquez's heirs, Emeterio Enriquez, filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not furnished with a copy of the
[12]
Amended Complaint.

In the hearing dated February 8, 2012, the RTC heard the testimony of the respondent. There
being no other witnesses to be presented, the respondent manifested that she was ready to
submit her formal offer of exhibits.[13]

After a protracted hearing on motions and other incidents of the case, the RTC rendered its
decision on November 22, 2013 via a summary judgment in favor of herein respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the Court finds preponderance
of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs and judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) Decreeing the partition of Lot No. 9217-A above-stated in the following mannfer (sic) and
proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share each each (sic) of the direct heirs of the late spouses
Jayme Morales and Telesfora Garzon, namely: (1) Vicente Morales, who was succeeded by right
of representation by his children Ernesto Morales (duly substituted by his heirs), Abraham
Morales, Angelina Ragasa and Lydia Morales; (2) Simeon Morales, who was succeeded by right
of representation by his children Odessa A. Morales, Geraldine Morales Gaspar, Leonides A.
Morales and Astrid A. Morales-Agustin; (3) Jose Morales who was succeeded by right of
representation by his children, Ronnel Morales, Morales, (sic) Victoria Morales, Vicente Morales,
Manuel Morales, Gloria Morales, Virgilio Morales, Amelia Morales and Juliet Morales; (4)
Martina Morales, who was succeeded by right of representation by her children, Emeterio
Morales-Enriquez, Evelina Morales Enriquez-Lopez, Elizabeth Morales Enriquez-Somera and
Bernardita Morales Enriquez-Alojipan;

(2) Adjudicating in favor of the above-named heirs by right representation (sic) their respective
one-fourth (1/4) share each of the group of heirs by right of representation over the above-
stated Lot No. 9217-A; and

(3) Ordering the parties to submit their common project of partition of the subject lot with
utmost dispatch for approval by the Court;

(4) To pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without
need of any settlement or administration proceeding;[15] and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully
rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying
for the application of the rules thereon.[16]

Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the RTC Decision on August 13, 2015.

The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late spouses Jayme and Telesfora
is "of no moment in the instant case of partition"[17] because the respondent was "asserting her
right as a co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased
father Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and
Telesfora Morales."[18]

Further, the CA ruled that an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is an action
quasi in rem, and thus, "jurisdiction over the impleaded defendants-heirs is not required since
the trial court has jurisdiction over the res or the subject property which is the subject matter of
[19]
the action for partition."

Finally, the CA ruled that summary judgment in this case is proper despite the absence of any
motion from any of the parties. In support hereto, the CA ratiocinated that the parties prayed for
resolution of all "pending motions/incidents" during the hearing on September 18, 2013, and
acceded to the RTC pronouncement therein that its resolution "shall be considered as a
decision in the said case for partition."[20]

The fallo of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, Laoag City dated November 22, 2013 is AFFIRMED.

Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its decision via a Resolution
[21]
dated April 21, 2016.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioners anchor their prayer for the reversal of the CA decision and resolution based on
the following grounds:

(1) THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL
COURT WERE VOID CONSIDERING THAT NOT ALL THE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE EVER SERVED WITH SUMMONS IN VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS.

(2) THE [CA] MANIFESTLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE NECESSITY OF HAVING THE
ESTATE OF THE PARTIES' INTESTATE PREDECESSORS (i.e. SPOUSES JAYME AND
TELESFORA MORALES) BE DETERMINED AND SETTLED FIRST BEFORE THE
DISTRIBUTION AND/OR PARTITION OF ANY OF THE PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF
SAID ESTATE.

(3) THE [CA] MOST UTTERLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH IT WAS UNDISPUTABLY RENDERED WITHOUT ANY PRIOR
MOTION AND HEARING THEREFOR, AND IN THE FACE OF PENDING INCIDENTS WHICH
INCLUDE THE: (a) MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT EMITERIO ENRIQUEZ ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON ROOTED ON THE LACK OF
SUMMONS SERVED UPON HIM, (b) THE NON-SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO DEFENDANT
ANGELITA RAGASA, AND (c) THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFF (HEREIN RESPONDENT).[22]

In essence, the Court is called upon to rule on the following issues: (1) whether or not the
partition of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the settlement of the estate of
the deceased registered owner thereof; (2) whether or not the RTC could motu proprio apply the
rule on Summary Judgment; and (3) whether or not the RTC could validly render a decision even
in the absence of proof of proper service of summons to some of the real parties in interest in a
quasi in rem proceeding.
The Court's Ruling

After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the evidence submitted, the Court finds
partial merit in the petition.

First, on the Procedural Issue of Improper Service of Summons

The petitioners question the acquisition by the RTC of the jurisdiction to decide on the instant
case. After a judicious study of the relevant factual antecedents, the Court rules against the
petitioner and in favor of the findings of the RTC and the CA.

The partition of real estate is an action quasi in rem.[23] Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that, for the court to acquire jurisdiction in actions quasi in rem, it is necessary
[24]
only that it has jurisdiction over the res. In the case of Macasaet vs. Co, Jr., the Court stated
that "[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the
court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acqmres jurisdiction over the res that is
[25]
the subject matter of the action."
[26]
In the case of De Pedro v. Romansan Development Corporation, the Court clarified that while
this is so, "to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and
[27]
quasi in rem actions is required." Thus, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service
of summons is imperative and that a decision rendered without proper service of summons
[28]
suffers a defect in jurisdiction.

According to De Pedro, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or
[29]
constructively seizing or placing it under the court's custody. In the landmark case of El
Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca,[30] the Court has already ruled that:

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the
law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the filing of the complaint before the RTC which sought to partition the subject
property effectively placed the latter under the power of the court. On this front, none of the
parties challenged the RTC's jurisdiction.

But more than this, in compliance with De Pedro, there is in this case proper service of
summons to the defendants. In no uncertain terms, the CA found that: (1) the heirs of Vicente
Morales received summons, filed an Answer, and actively participated in the trial; (2) the heirs of
Jose Morales filed their Answer and admitted to the allegations in the complaint; and (3) the
heirs of Martina Morales were duly served with summons, copies of the complaint, and actively
participated in the trial.
GR NO. 232579, SEPTEMBER 8, 2020

FACTS:

Rosie Larlar Treyes died intestate and without a child. Rosie’s siblings sent a letter to Dr. Nixon
Treyes, the husband of Rosie, inviting him for a conference for the settlement of estate of Rosie.
Treyes ignored the letter and executed two affidavits of self-adjudication which he registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental, transferring
unto himself 14 properties, as sole heir of his decedent-spouse. After sending a second letter, it
was found out by the siblings that the properties of Rosie were already transferred to Treyes.

The siblings Larlar filed an action for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs,
reconveyance of ownership
and possession, partition, and damages, before the RTC of Negros Occidental.

A first service of summons was served on Treyes, which he filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. A re-service of summons was served
to Treyes which then he filed another Motion to Dismiss arguing that the private respondents’
Complaint should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription;
and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and, corollarily, lack of real parties in interest, arguing that the petitioners have
not established their right to succession and thus lacking the personality to file the complaint;
prescription on the ground that the action for recovery of properties of the heirs has prescribed,
and improper venue for the complaint was filed before the RTC of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental.

The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting Treyes to file before the Court of Appeals (CA)
a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, however, denied the same.

ISSUE

1) Whether the action should be dismissed for improper venue

No, the action cannot be dismissed for improper venue. Invoking rule 73 to allege improper
venue is entirely inconsistent with Treyes’ assertion that the complaint filed is not a special
proceeding but an ordinary civil action. Rule 9, Section 1 of the rules provides that all defenses
and objections not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in an answer shall be deemed as a
waiver with exception to the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, prescription,
res judicata, litis pendentia. Likewise under Rule 15, Section 8, it provides that a motion
attacking a pleading, order, judgment shall include all objections available, else such objection
not raised shall be deemed waived (exception: the 4 grounds of motion to dismiss).
 In this case, in the first motion to dismiss, Treyes only raised lack of jurisdiction over the
petitioner. The defense for improper venue was very much available at the time of filing. Thus,
raising the defense of improper venue although would not have been prejudicial to the petitioner,
there is no valid justification for the failure to invoke such defense.

2) Whether the action has prescribed

No, the defense of prescription of the complaint has no merit. Treyes invoked prescription on
the basis of Rule 74 is inconsistent with his main theory that the complaint is an ordinary civil
action and not a special proceeding. The provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or
heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such
extrajudicial partition is applicable only:

1. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and
2. when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.

The court held that both requirements are absent in this case; thus, the prescriptive period on
constructive trust under the Civil Code, particularly under implied constructive trust, applies, and
not the prescription on Special Proceedings.

The Civil Code identifies 2 kinds of Trusts:

1. Implied – by operation of law

2. Express – by intention of the parties

Under Implied Trust, there are two more categories:

1. Resulting Trust
– disposition of property which raises an inference that he does not intent the person holding
the property to have any beneficial interest
2. Constructive Trust
– subject to equitable duty to convey to another, on ground that he would be unjustly enriched if
he were permitted to retain it
– The duty to acquire property arises because of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake,
3. wrongful disposition, breach of fiduciary duty.

In an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust, the law provides a
prescription of 10 years from issuance of the torrens title over the property, which is based in
article 1144 of the civil code. This issuance of title operates as a contructive notice to the whole
world, which the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of such issuance.

3) Whether there is a need for prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding prior to
filing an action for recovery of ownership and possession of property

No. Treyes contends that the petitioners have not established their right as legal heirs and is a
prerequisite to an ordinary suit; hence, their action for reconveyance should be dismissed.

HELD

The court held that the establishment of right of the heirs is conferred by law and there is no
need for judicial confirmation to establish petitioners as heirs. It was already established by the
petitioners that they are heirs ipso facto jure, thus there is no need for any judicial confirmation.
The complaint alleges that their rights over the properties is by virtue of their being siblings of
the decedent.

In Article 777 of the Civil Code, it substantially provides that rights of succession is transmitted
upon the moment of death of the decedent. This much to say that the title or rights is
immediately passed to the heirs upon death. Thus, the heirs have legally been deemed to have
acquired ownership over the estate of the decedent, without need of any declaration.

In partition, even before a property is judicially partitioned, heirs are already deemed owners and
without need for prior separate judicial declaration of their heirship.

In a summary settlement of estates, heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of estate
of decedent amongst themselves through execution of a public instrument without prior
declaration in separate judicial proceeding that they are heirs of the decedent.

Article 1001 likewise provides that brothers and sisters or their children who survive with the
widow or widower are entitled to one-half of the inheritance, the other half to the surviving
spouse.

Here, the petitioners have already established their filiation with the decedent and therefore
there is no need for a declaration of heirship through special proceedings. The need to instittue
a sperate special proceeding for determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake
of practicaility as when parties in a civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. Further, in this case, the
plaintiffs do not really seek to establish their right as an heir but seek the enforcement of their
rights brought about them being heirs by operation of law, as provided under Article 777, in
relation to Article 1001 of the Civil Code.

Hence, the petition is denied.

GR NO. 208912 AND 209018 DECEMBER 7, 2021

FACTS Miguel Aquino (Miguel) died intestate leaving personal and real properties. The estate of
his first wife, Amadea Aquino (Amadea), was already settled. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie
Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo Aquino (Rodolfo), his sons
with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier.
Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo Aquino (Arturo). On July 2,
2003, Amadea Angela Aquino (Angela) moved that she be included in the distribution and
partition of Miguel’s estate. She alleged that she was Arturo’s only child as evidenced by a
hospital Certification stating that she was Arturo and Susan Kuan’s daughter.

Angela stated Arturo died before she was born on October 9, 1978. While her parents were not
married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry. Her parents were planning to marry
before Arturo died.

Angela further claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother’s expenses during
her pregnancy with her. Angela also lived with her mother and the Aquino family at their
ancestral home. Since her birth, her father’s relatives had continuously recognized her as
Arturo’s natural child. Abdulah, her father’s brother, was even her godfather. In support of this,
Angela presented her baptismal certificate stating that she was Arturo’s daughter.

Angela even claimed that Miguel provided for her needs and supported her education. Miguel
also further instructed the distribution of his properties, wherein Angela was among the heirs
who would receive portions of Miguel’s estate. Miguel gave her a commercial lot, which rentals
were now paid to her.

Later, Angela filed a Motion for Distribution of Residue of Estate or for Allowance to the Heirs.
She alleged that as Arturo’s natural child, she has a legal right to a monthly allowance like those
given to Miguel’s other heirs.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Angela’s motions. Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA) which was denied. Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the RTC’s
orders before the CA, claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela
could not inherit from Miguel ab intestato. The CA rendered a decision in favor of Abdulah.

ISSUES

(1) Can Angela, an alleged nonmarital child of Miguel’s marital child, inherit from her
grandfather’s estate?

(2) Can Angela automatically inherit from Miguel’s estate?

RULING
 (1) YES. Intestate succession is based on the decedent’s presumed will. Article 992 of the Civil
Code assumes that the decedent’s disposition of their property would not have included any
nonmarital children, due to a supposed hostility between the marital family and the nonmarital
child because the latter was the outcome of an extramarital affair. However, a nonmarital child
is not defined that way. Nonmarital children or “illegitimate children” as used under Article 165
of the Family Code are “children conceived and born outside a valid marriage.” The phrase
“outside a valid marriage” does not necessarily mean an extramarital affair. Parents may
choose not to get married despite having no legal impediment to marry. If there is a legal
impediment, it does not necessarily follow that the impediment is that either or both parents are
married to another person. It is entirely possible that one or both of them are below
marriageable age. Another reason why a child could have been born “outside a valid marriage” is
because their mother was a victim of sexual assault who did not marry the perpetrator. There
are also times when the father of an unborn child may have died before being able to marry the
child’s mother, as what has been alleged in Angela’s case.

Children born from these circumstances are also considered “illegitimate.” Yet, there may be no
“antagonism or incompatibility,” “hate,” or “disgraceful looks” to speak of. If Art. 992 of the Civil
Code merely recognizes existing conditions, then it should be construed to account for other
circumstances of birth and family dynamics.

The Court abandoned the presumption that nonmarital children are products of illicit
relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the
marital family. The Court is not duty bound to uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties,
to mirror and amplify oppressive and regressive ideas about the status of children and family
life. The best interest of the child should prevail.

The Court adopts a construction of Art. 992 of the Civil Code that makes children, regardless of
the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants-such as their
grandparentby their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born
from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants.

This interpretation likewise makes Art. 992 of the Civil Code more consistent with the changes
introduced by the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of
blood relatives.

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in
their grandparent’s estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. The said article provides:
ARTICLE 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall
be divided among the latter in equal portions.

The language of Art. 982 of the Civil Code does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to
the birth status of the “grandchildren and other descendants” granted the right of representation.
Moreover, to allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to
inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent;
otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other
areas of the law on succession.

This ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their
parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the
nonmarital child may inherit by themself. The Court is not ruling on the extent of the right of a
nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case.

(2) NO. The application of Article 982 does not automatically give Angela the right to inherit
from Miguel's estate. Angela must still prove her filiation.

Jurisprudence dictates illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition under Article 285 of the Civil Code for a period of up to four (4) years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the passage of the Family Code.

Hence, Angela, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to prove
that she was her father’s daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from
attaining the age of majority. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years
old. Angela attained majority on October 9, 1999. She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her
right to prove her filiation with Arturo. Thus, when she moved to be included in the distribution
and partition of Miguel’s estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from claiming her
filiation.

However, resolving several factual matters raised in the parties’ pleadings and during the oral
arguments requires receiving additional evidence, which the Court is not equipped to do.
Documents may need to be presented and authenticated; witnesses’ testimonies received and
examined; and DNA testing ordered and conducted, to determine the truth or falsity of the
allegations raised by the parties before the Court. The Court finds it prudent to remand the
cases to their court of origin for reception of evidence, in conformity with the legal principles
articulated in the present case.
GR NO. L-14003, AUGUST 5, 1960

FACTS: Testator Yance died. Petitioner Francisco Azaola submitted for probate her holographic
will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, respondent Singson.

Francisco Azaola, was also the sole witness presented to testify on the handwriting of the
testatrix. He testified that he had seen the holographic will about one month before the death of
the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife and that he recognized all the signatures
appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix. Francisco presented
presented documents to reinforce his statement.

The probate was opposed. Subsequently, the probate was denied on the ground that under
Article 811 of the Civil Code the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested and
because the lone witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature
of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE/S: WON Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD: Permissive since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not
required to produce more than one witness. But even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator in holographic wills. This is because
no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.

As such, if there are no competent witness available, the court may resort to expert evidence.
The law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed. Hence, the rule requiring production
of three witnesses in holographic wills must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are
to be avoided.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to
construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion,
by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert
witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
GR NO. 237133, JANUARY 20, 2020

FACTS Maria Lolita A. Echague (Echague) filed a Petition for the allowance of the will of the late
Amparo Ferido Racca (Amparo) and issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. She averred
that Amparo executed a notarial will before her death and bequeathed an undivided portion of a
parcel of land in favor of her grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido (Migdon). She also
named Migdonio Racca (Migdonio) and Miam Grace Dianne Ferido Racca (Miam), Amparo's
husband and daughter, respectively, as Amparo's known heirs.

The hearing for the petition proceeded but Migdonio and Miam failed to appear, hence, they
were declared in default. Subsequently, Migdonio and Miam filed a Motion to Lift Order of
General Default on the ground of excusable negligence. They alleged that Migdonio received a
copy of the Notice of Hearing only two days before the scheduled hearing. Since Migdonio is
already 78 years old, and not in perfect health, he could not immediately act on the notice within
such a short period of time.

Miam, on the other hand, did not receive any notice. Due to their ignorance of procedural rules
and financial constraints, they were not immediately able to secure a counsel to represent their
interest. They also manifested in the motion that Amparo was mentally incapable to make a will
based on the medical certificate issued by her attending physician.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) released an Order denying the motion. It held that the
jurisdictional requirements of publication and posting of notices had been substantially
complied with. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed but the RTC denied the same.
Hence, the present appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE

Are Migdonio and Miam still entitled to notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 despite the
publication of the notice of hearing?

RULING YES. Notice to the designated and known heirs, devisees and legatees under Section 4,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. Publication of notice of hearing is not sufficient
when the places of residence of the heirs, legatees and devisees are known.

Notable that Sections 3 and 4 prescribe two (2) modes of notification of the hearing: (a) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation or the Official Gazette; and (b) by personal
notice to the designated or known heirs, legatees and devisees.

Under Section 3, publication of the notice of hearing shall be done upon the delivery of the will,
or filing of the petition for allowance of the will in the court having jurisdiction. On the other
hand, personal notice under Section 4 shall be served to the designated or known heirs, legatees
and devisees, and the executor or co-executor, at their residence, if such are known. It should be
stressed that the rule on personal notice was instituted in Section 4 to safeguard the right to
due process of unsuspecting heirs, legatees, or devisees who, without their knowledge, were
being excluded from participating in a proceeding which may affect their right to succeed in the
estate. Here, Miam was indicated as a known heir of Amparo in the petition filed by Echague.
While her status as a compulsory heir may still be subject to confirmation, the petition, on its
face, had already informed the probate court of the existence of Miam as one of Amparo’s heirs.

The petition also provided Miam’s residence. By Echague’s own averments, Miam is entitled to
the notice of hearing under Section 4. As regards the notice sent to Migdonio, the Court also
finds that the same fell short of the procedural requirements laid down by Section 4. There was
no evidence that the notice of hearing addressed to him was deposited in the post office at
least 20 days before June 21, 2017.

Even if it were assumed that the notice of hearing was personally served to Migdonio, the same
cannot be said to be substantial compliance. Based on records, Migdonio received a copy of the
notice on June 19, 2017 or two (2) days prior to the hearing. This is short of the 10-day period
fixed by Section 4. Hence, the notice served to Migdonio did not satisfy the requirement
provided by Section 4.

Moreover, the Court cannot expect Migdonio, an ailing 78-year-old who is not knowledgeable of
legal procedures, to intelligently and promptly act upon receipt of the notice of hearing.
GR NO. 130371 AND 130855 AUGUST 4, 2009

FACTS: RTC acting as a probate court a in Special Proceeding, issued an Order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon filing of bond by the Marcos. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration in so far as the RTC Order
granted letters testamentary to respondents. This motion was denied by the RTC. Petitioner
filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court,
questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
But this Court referred the petition to the CA since it was the latter who has jurisdiction
concurrent with this Court over the Case. Subseuqently, CA issued a Decision, dismissing the
referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal. CA’s basis was Supreme Court
Circular 2-90. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Petitioner then files this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE/S:
1) WON it was proper for the petitioner to appeal the case directly to SC.
2) WON respondents Marcos can act and serve as executors

HELD:
1) NO. Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
provides the instances for a direct appeal to the Supreme court from the RTC and all those
instances provide that the subject matter involved must be a question of law only and no
questions of fact. In the present case, petitioner Republic seeks to determine of whether or not
respondents should be disqualified to act as executors. This subject matter is a question of fact.
Also, the above-mentioned provision clearly shows that the other subject matter of therein
petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within
any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court.

Furthermore, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will
not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
Hence, the proper remedy of petitioner Republic was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.

2) YES. Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those grounds. Respondent Marcos does not
specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and “conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude” (these are the grounds raised by the petitioner) since there are no evidence on record,
oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation that respondent
Marcos have been convicted of a number of cases.
Also, the cases filed against Imelda Marcos has been reversed by this Court. Hence, the so-
called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor.

As to the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos, CA acquitted respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges. He appealed his conviction appealed his conviction
relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC hence those cases should not serve as a
basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly,
even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to
disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

GR NO. L-2538

Facts:

1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of
the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again
the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in
the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent
relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
GR NO. 176422 MARCH 20, 2013

Facts:
The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga) alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went to Gregoria
when Leonor died after. Gregoria died intestate, and thereafter, respondent, who is Leonor’s
sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and
Gregoria.

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their
behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal. The RTC granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance but on appeal to the CA, however, reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners and also denied their
motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

1. Won the CA grievously erred in holding that the subject properties are not reservable
properties, coming as they do from the family line of the petitioners Mendozas. - NO

2. Won CA grievously erred in holding that the petitioners Mendozas do not have a right to the
subject properties by virtue of the law on reserva troncal. - NO

Held:

1. The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on Reserva
Troncal is not applicable. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: (1) The ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title; (2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property; (3)
The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. It was also
immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties
and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of
being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties as inheritance.

2. Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered reservees/ reservatarios as they are not

relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from
whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the
line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is
Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins.
First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article
891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom
the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)
who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
GR NO. 189776 DECEMBER 12, 2010

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano
(Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the
validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of
petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate
by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court found
the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus
went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which
reads:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.

ISSUE: Is the property donated to petitioner subject to collation? Should the property of the
estate have been ordered equally distributed among the parties?
HELD: The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation
by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary
estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative
title by the testator during his lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The
primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory
heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate
parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are
those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-
collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares.