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volume 2
By
Toivo J. Holopainen
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∵
Contents
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
Part 1
The Single Argument
Part 2
The Historical Context
Part 3
The Exercise in the Proslogion
Bibliography 225
Index 232
Preface
The idea of writing this book emerged before the turn of the millennium. Its
prehistory goes back to the 1980s, when I wrote a Master’s thesis ‘The Single
Argument in Anselm’s Proslogion’ (in Finnish). The thesis later evolved into
a chapter in my Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century (University of
Helsinki, 1995; Brill, 1996). I was quite happy with the chapter, but then I at-
tended my first Anselm conference in Rome in 1998. I realized that it is ex-
tremely difficult to persuade the scholarly community of any new ideas of the
Proslogion, as there is so little common ground that one can take for granted.
Because I thought I had some good points, I thought I should nevertheless try.
My analysis of the single argument has remained essentially the same
throughout the project, but I have had difficulty in achieving a coherent idea
of some other issues central for understanding the Proslogion. I have discussed
the same topics in a number of previous publications, as indicated in the foot-
notes of this study. At this point I would like to mention the article ‘Anselm’s
Argumentum and the Early Medieval Theory of Argument’, Vivarium 45 (2007),
1–29, the content of which I extensively utilize in Chapters 2–4.
I am deeply grateful for the encouragement that I have received from a num-
ber of people over the years. I would like to mention especially Simo Knuuttila,
Helmut Kohlenberger, Coloman Viola, Marilyn Adams, Bernd Goebel, and an
anonymous reader in 2017.
T. J. H.
Maununneva, Helsinki, March 2020
Chapter 1
Introduction
1 See especially the following recent studies: Ian Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion:
The History of Anselm’s Argument and its Significance Today (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009);
A. D. Smith, Anselm’s Other Argument (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014);
Richard Campbell, Rethinking Anselm’s Arguments: A Vindication of his Proof of the Existence
of God (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2018). Campbell’s book appeared too late to be taken into ac-
count in this study. The amount and nature of the secondary literature on the Proslogion
makes providing useful references difficult. I try to mention the more important recent stud-
ies in English in the course of the book, but I readily admit there are lacunae in my reading.
2 John Hick and Arthur C. McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the
Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (New York: Macmillan, 1967). See especially
McGill’s article ‘Recent Discussions of Anselm’s Argument’, 33–110, in particular, 50–69. For
the mainstream (philosophical and rational) interpretation, see also M. J. Charlesworth,
St. Anselm’s Proslogion with a Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and the Author’s Reply to
Gaunilo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) and Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St.
Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972). For the fideistic interpretation,
see also Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W. Robertson (London:
SCM Press, 1960) (German original 1st ed. 1931, 2nd ed. 1958).
3 For example, the majority of articles in Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge
Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Sandra Visser and
Thomas Williams, Anselm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
4 The recent fideistic readings of Anselm include Daniel Deme, The Christology of Anselm of
Canterbury (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) and David S. Hogg, Anselm of Canterbury: The Beauty
of Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). There are strong mystical emphases in Gregory
Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings (West Lafayette, IN:
Purdue University Press, 1994) and Eileen C. Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire
for the Word (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012).
Introduction 3
The reading of the Proslogion proposed in this study agrees with the conven-
tional reading in holding that Anselm meant to introduce a rational argument
for God’s existence. At the same time, the study takes seriously the intuition of
those who are convinced that Anselm must have had a particular reason for
presenting his inference within the framework of a devotional exercise and
works out a historical explanation for this fact. What results is a complex story,
but there is nothing intrinsically difficult within that story: all its elements are
easy to understand even by a secular mind. I promise that the story will also be
an intriguing one. Contrary to what is sometimes suggested, there is material
for a Hollywood film in Anselm’s life, and some of the material is relevant for
understanding the Proslogion.
By way of an introduction, I offer two brief discussions that start from some
common ideas about the Proslogion and then work towards a different analysis.
The first discussion concerns the identification of the entity that can be called
‘Anselm’s argument’, and the second deals with the idea that the Proslogion
could be characterized as an apologetic work.5
It is generally conceived that there is something in Proslogion 2 or
Proslogion 2–3 that can be called ‘Anselm’s argument’. The most common view
of it goes something like this: Anselm’s argument is an argument for God’s ex-
istence that Anselm presents in Proslogion 2. This argument is a version of the
ontological argument for God’s existence. It starts from the concept of God, de-
fined as ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, makes use of a reductio
ad absurdum, and concludes with the affirmation that God exists.
A reading of Proslogion 2–3 shows that this way of putting the matter is
problematic. To begin with, the train of reasoning in Proslogion 2 does not start
from having the concept of God but from the uttering of the expression ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’. Anselm’s inference moves from an
expression being uttered and heard to a thing existing in the understanding
and in reality, there being no equivalent to the notion ‘concept’ in Proslogion 2.
Moreover, the inference in Proslogion 2 does not end with the affirmation that
God exists. Instead, it ends with the affirmation that that than which a greater
cannot be thought exists, both in the understanding and in reality. Proslogion 3
continues from where Proslogion 2 ended and argues that that than which a
greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not
to exist. It is only in the middle of Proslogion 3 that there comes a conclusion
about God, and the conclusion is not about the fact of his existence but about
the manner of his existence: he exists so truly that he cannot be thought not
5 As the relevant aspects of the Proslogion will be treated more fully later in the study, only a
light documentation is provided in these introductory discussions.
4 Chapter 1
to exist. Hence, Proslogion 2 and the early part of Proslogion 3 constitute one
continuous train of reasoning to establish a conclusion about the manner of
God’s existence.6
A consideration of the relation between Proslogion 2 and Proslogion 3 shows
that one should not be too quick to identify Proslogion 2 as Anselm’s argument,
if one wants to be faithful to how Anselm looked at his own work. Nevertheless,
amending the situation by extending ‘the argument’ to Proslogion 3 is not
enough. There is a particular reason why the identification of ‘Anselm’s argu-
ment’ is perceived to be vital for a historically grounded understanding of the
Proslogion: Anselm gives us to understand in the preface that he wrote the work
to introduce the ‘single argument’ (unum argumentum) that he had discov-
ered, and the preface makes clear that it is a central feature in the treatise. In
popular discussions of the Proslogion, it is often assumed that Anselm’s unum
argumentum is an inference on God’s existence. It is true enough that God’s
existence is one of those things that the single argument should establish, but
its scope is much larger. The single argument should prove not only God’s exis-
tence but also ‘that he is the supreme good needing no other yet needed by all
for their existence and well-being, and whatever we believe about the divine
substance.’7 That is to say, the scope of the single argument is to prove both
God’s existence and everything that the Christians believe about the divine es-
sence. It follows that no inference about God’s existence in Proslogion 2–3 can
be legitimately identified as Anselm’s single argument.
In the more specialized literature of the recent decades, it has been widely
perceived that the single argument should establish both God’s existence and
that which is believed about God’s essence. There is also some consensus that
Anselm derives these notions from the characterization of God as ‘that than
which a greater cannot be thought’.8 However, the remarks about the single
argument are typically either brief and vague or brief and tentative, the focus
continually being on the inference(s) on God’s existence.
Elucidating the single argument is one of the main tasks that a historical
introduction to the Proslogion must undertake. In the present context, some
brief remarks will have to suffice. Anselm’s single argument is not at all a piece
of argumentation or a piece of text that was actually written down somewhere
in the Proslogion. Instead, the single argument is a means of argumentation
6 See Proslogion 2–3, S I, 101.3–104.4. The references to Anselm’s works are to S. Anselmi can-
tuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, vols. I–VI, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh:
Nelson, 1946–1961). I give volume, pages, and lines, e.g., ‘S I, 101.3’ means ‘ed. Schmitt, vol. I,
page 101, line 3’ (in some cases, only volume and pages).
7 Proslogion, preface, S I, 93.6–10. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
8 See, for example, Hick and McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument, 3.
Introduction 5
that one can use to construct pieces of argumentation. Basically, the single
argument is the expression or notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’. A clear distinction between the single argument and the concrete
pieces of argumentation based on it is a precondition for any proper under-
standing of the Proslogion. Anselm’s argument in Proslogion 2 is one of those
pieces of argumentation.
Those who hold that the Proslogion contains a rational argument for God’s
existence usually also hold that the Proslogion has an apologetic aim, even
though the issue is seldom explicitly treated. There are at least two different
senses in which the Proslogion could be taken to be a work of Christian apolo-
getics. First, it could be understood as a work that directly addresses unbeliev-
ers and, appealing to their reason, tries to convince them of God’s existence
and some other claims about God. In current literature, this view often appears
as the assumption that Anselm wrote the Proslogion in order to prove God’s
existence to the fool, the atheist of the psalms (Psalm 14:1). Alternatively, it
can be suggested that the Proslogion is an apologetic work in the sense that it
supplies Christian believers with rational arguments in order that they can use
them when they encounter unbelievers.
It is rather clear that Anselm did not expect atheists to read the Proslogion.
The work is a devotional exercise that Anselm composed for Christian believ-
ers. When he replied to the criticism that Gaunilo had put forward ‘on behalf
of the fool’, Anselm directed the reply to Gaunilo as a ‘Catholic’, that is, an or-
thodox Christian, and not to the fool. The suggestion that Anselm composed
the Proslogion to supply Christian believers with rational arguments that they
can use for apologetic purposes stands up better. The preface to the Proslogion
encourages us to believe that Anselm composed the treatise in order to in-
troduce his single argument, and even though Anselm replies to Gaunilo as a
Christian, the content of the reply indicates that he thought the single argu-
ment could be used for proving God’s existence to the fool. It can be said that
the Proslogion in its final and complete form has an apologetic aspect.
However, the Proslogion in its original form gives a different impression.
At that stage, it was a devotional exercise without any commentary material
other than the title Faith Seeking Understanding. Not only are the appendices
at the end of the treatise a later addition but so is the preface, and without the
preface, the reader does not know to look for Anselm’s single argument. Even
though there is an emphasis on the rational arguments in the final form of the
Proslogion, the absence of that emphasis in the original Proslogion means that
the treatise cannot be aptly characterized as a work of Christian apologetics.
What should we make of the relation between the original form of the
Proslogion and the final and complete form of it? This issue has seldom been
6 Chapter 1
∵
Chapter 2
argument before they read any of Anselm’s text. There is the common mis-
understanding that the inference about God’s existence in Proslogion 2 (or
Proslogion 2–3) is Anselm’s single argument. Actually, there is a double mis-
understanding here. First, there is a misunderstanding about the burden and
scope of Anselm’s argument, a false idea about what the single argument does
establish or ought to establish. Second, there is a misunderstanding about the
kind of entity that Anselm’s argument is: it is assumed that Anselm’s argumen-
tum is an argument in the usual contemporary sense of the word ‘argument’.
That is to say, it is assumed that Anselm’s argumentum is an inference which
consists of a set of premises and a conclusion (or some conclusions) and some
inferential steps between them. The double misunderstanding strongly affects
the way in which the Proslogion is read nowadays. Even when it is recognized
as a misunderstanding, it is not easy to free oneself from it because it is difficult
to find a more convincing alternative perspective.
As already explained in the introduction, there is one obvious reason
why any inference about God’s existence in Proslogion 2–3 cannot be iden-
tified as Anselm’s argumentum. Anselm makes it clear that the burden and
scope of his argumentum is to establish both God’s existence and every-
thing that the Christians believe about the divine essence. The inference in
Proslogion 2–3 deals with God’s existence alone and hence fails to fulfil this
criterion. Obviously, one should look beyond chapters 2–3 of the Proslogion
(actually, beyond chapters 2–4 because chapter 4 is also part of the treatment
on God’s existence) to perceive Anselm’s argument. However, this is more eas-
ily said than done—especially if one assumes that Anselm’s argumentum is an
‘argument’ in the usual sense of the word. The actual text of the Proslogion con-
sists of twenty-six chapters. Even if we choose to ignore chapters 1 and 24–26
as an ‘opening invocation’ and ‘closing invocation’, respectively, there are still
nineteen chapters to consider: chapters 5–23. It is easy to spot pieces of ‘philo-
sophical’ argumentation within these nineteen chapters, but they are embed-
ded in a devotional exercise and it is not clear at first glance which particular
features of the text are part of the actual argument and which are due to the
specific application.2 Moreover, nowhere in the actual text of the Proslogion is
there a word about ‘the single argument’! Usually, the best way to get a good
grip on ‘the argument’3 in a work is to take the work, read it carefully, scrutinize
the central passages in it, and do some thinking. In the case of the Proslogion,
this method unhappily fails. On the basis of reading the Proslogion proper, that
2 There is a similar problem in Proslogion 2–4 as well but one can more easily overlook the
problem there.
3 The reader should note that the word ‘argument’ has different connotations here.
The General Idea of the Argument 13
is, on the basis of reading the twenty-six chapters of the Proslogion, it is very
difficult indeed to get a proper grasp of the unum argumentum in it.
Anselm did not only leave us the twenty-six chapters but also some addi-
tional material. A few years after the publication of the work, he provided the
Proslogion with a preface. There are also the well-known appendices at the end
of the work. It appears that someone, traditionally identified as Gaunilo, a monk
of Marmoutier, wrote a short piece criticizing Anselm’s argument for God’s ex-
istence. Anselm composed a rejoinder to this criticism and ordered that the
criticism together with the rejoinder should be appended to the manuscripts
of the work. Anselm’s rejoinder has the title Quid ad haec respondeat editor ip-
sius libelli (What the Author of That Treatise Replies to These Objections); I refer
to this rejoinder as ‘the Responsio’.4 Both the preface and the Responsio contain
some pieces of information which are highly valuable from the point of view of
understanding the argumentative structure in the Proslogion. There are some
other important sources of information as well. Anselm starts the preface to
the Proslogion by referring to his first treatise, the Monologion, and the chain
of many arguments in it. It is against the background of the Monologion that
the single argument is to be seen. It is also important to note that the word
argumentum was a technical term in early medieval logic or dialectic.
It is the burden of this first part of the study to provide an accurate ac-
count of Anselm’s argumentum. This chapter seeks to convey the general ar-
gumentative idea on which Anselm’s single argument is based.5 Chapter 3
continues from there and addresses the question of what exactly the entity
that Anselm refers to with the expression ‘single argument’ is. In Chapter 4,
some ideas within the early medieval theory of argument are used to elucidate
Anselm’s remarks about the argument. To begin with, attention is drawn to a
specific pattern of argumentation which Anselm uses in several passages in
the Proslogion.
discussion about the argumentum and the general argumentative idea relat-
ed to it. First, Anselm introduces here the idea that God is ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’.6 Second, he provides an argument in two stages
to demonstrate that such a being exists in reality.7 Third, within the said argu-
ment, he introduces a specific pattern of argumentation which recurs in the
Proslogion: a reductio ad absurdum which gets its force from the significance of
the expression ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’.
In the beginning of Proslogion 2, Anselm starts his argumentation about
God in three carefully thought-out short sentences:
6 Anselm uses several slightly differing formulations of the notion ‘that than which a greater
cannot be thought’ (id quo maius cogitari non potest): in front of quo we can have either
aliquid (‘something’) or id (‘that’) or no pronoun at all; maius can be replaced by melius (‘bet-
ter’); the negation can be expressed in different ways (with the aid of the adverb non, with
the aid of the pronoun nihil or nil, or with the aid of the verb nequit); the modal expres-
sion can appear in different forms (potest, possit, nequit, valet). In my understanding, there
is no systematic difference in meaning between the different formulations. I usually use the
formulation ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. The discussion in 2.2 leans on
Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘Anselm’s Argumentum and the Early Medieval Theory of Argument’,
Vivarium 45 (2007), 1–29, at 3–5.
7 Note that the argument on God’s existence also includes a third stage, which is in Proslogion 3.
The two stages in Proslogion 2 already establish, in Anselm’s view, that that than which a
greater cannot be thought exists.
8 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.3–7.
9 The second request also apparently connects with the sentence that immediately follows, as
this sentence expresses something ‘we believe’ about ‘what’ God is, but this is coincidental.
In the overall architecture of the Proslogion, the feature that God is ‘that than which a greater
The General Idea of the Argument 15
the second sentence, Anselm introduces the starting point for the train of
reasoning that he is going to present: we believe that God is ‘something than
which nothing greater can be thought’ (aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit).
Anselm introduces the idea that God is something than which a greater can-
not be thought as an item of belief. In the third sentence, finally, Anselm gets
to the topic to be discussed in Proslogion 2–4 by referring to the fool of the
psalms who ‘has said in his heart: there is no God’ (Psalm 14:1). Because of the
fool’s statement, Anselm asks whether there is ‘no such nature’, that is to say,
whether there is nothing of such a nature as ‘something than which nothing
greater can be thought’. The question is about the existence of God so that God
is perceived as that than which a greater cannot be thought.
To establish that God or that than which a greater cannot be thought ex-
ists in reality, Anselm presents an argument in two stages. In the first stage,
he argues that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists at least ‘in
the understanding’ (in intellectu), because when someone hears the expression
‘something than which a greater cannot be thought’, he understands it, and
whatever is understood is in the understanding. This applies even to the fool
who denies God’s existence:
But surely this same fool, when he hears what I say, ‘something than which
nothing greater can be thought’, he understands what he hears; and what
he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand
it to exist. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding, and
another thing to understand a thing to exist. … Even the fool, then, is
convinced that something than which nothing greater can be thought is
at least in the understanding, since he understands this when he hears it,
and whatever is understood is in the understanding.10
Thus, even the fool needs to admit, on the basis of Anselm’s argument, that
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ exists in the understanding.
In the second stage, Anselm further argues that ‘that than which a greater
cannot be thought’ also exists in reality:
But surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only
in the understanding. For if it were only in the understanding, it could
be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. Therefore, if that
cannot be thought’ is not among the items that Anselm seeks to explain but instead is the
starting point for the explanation.
10 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.7–15.
16 Chapter 2
In this passage, for the first time, Anselm makes use of the distinctive pattern
of argumentation related to his single argument. To give a concrete idea of this
pattern, let me draw attention to four central features of the inference in the
passage:
1. The inference represents the type of reasoning known as indirect proof
or reductio ad absurdum. In an indirect proof, one proceeds as follows: If
you want to prove conclusion c, take the negation of c as an assumption
and try to deduce a contradiction. If you succeed, you can infer that the
negation of c is false and that c is true. In the inference under consider-
ation, the conclusion to be proved is that that than which a greater can-
not be thought does not exist only in the understanding but exists both
in the understanding and in reality. The negation of this conclusion is
that it exists only in the understanding. The contradictory statement that
Anselm deduces is that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought is
that than which a greater can be thought.’ Because this is impossible, it is
not true that that than which a greater cannot be thought is only in the
understanding, and hence it is true that it exists both in the understand-
ing and in reality.
2. The contradiction deduced is, basically, that that than which a greater
cannot be thought is not that than which a greater cannot be thought.
The same contradiction can also be expressed in other ways. For exam-
ple, it can be expressed by saying that that than which a greater cannot
be thought is not what it is said to be, or, as in Proslogion 2, by saying that
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater
can be thought’.
3. The contradiction derives from a comparison between that than which a
greater cannot be thought as having a certain attribute or predicate and
that than which a greater cannot be thought as not having that attribute
or predicate. In the inference under consideration, the comparison is be-
tween that than which a greater cannot be thought ‘being only in the
understanding’ and ‘not being only in the understanding’.
11 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.15–102.3.
The General Idea of the Argument 17
The argument in this passage, which is the third stage in Anselm’s infer-
ence about God’s existence, shares the same features as the second stage in
Proslogion 2:
1. The inference represents the type of reasoning known as indirect proof
or reductio ad absurdum.
2. The contradiction deduced is that that than which a greater cannot be
thought is not that than which a greater cannot be thought.
3. The contradiction derives from a comparison between that than which a
greater cannot be thought as having a certain attribute or predicate and
that than which a greater cannot be thought as not having that attribute
or predicate. Here, the comparison is between that than which a greater
cannot be thought ‘being able to be thought not to exist’ and ‘not being
able to be thought not to exist’.
4. The comparison that Anselm makes is in terms of greatness. Anselm
assumes that ‘not being able to be thought not to exist’ is greater than
‘being able to be thought not to exist’.
In the middle of Proslogion 3, Anselm again identifies that than which a greater
cannot be thought as God:
The ‘modal ontological argument’, as it is called, may be interesting in its own right, but
it is rather clear that Anselm did not mean to present such an argument in Proslogion 3.
Anselm clarifies how the expression ‘cannot be thought not to exist’ should be construed
in Responsio 1, S I, 131.18–132.2 and Responsio 4, S I, 133.21–134.6. However, the viability of
the argument in Proslogion 3 does not require that the reader shares Anselm’s analysis of
what kind of existence is involved. It suffices that the reader concedes that it is possible
to conceive something that cannot be thought not to exist and that such a thing would be
greater than what can be thought not to exist.
14 Proslogion 3, S I, 103.1–4.
The General Idea of the Argument 19
the same argumentative idea. In Proslogion 5, Anselm proves that God is the
sole creator of all other things as follows:
What, then, are you, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be
thought? But what are you except that which, as highest of all things,
alone existing through itself, made all other things from nothing? For
whatever is not this, is less great than can be thought. But this cannot be
thought about you.15
In Proslogion 15, Anselm famously proves that God is ‘something greater than
can be thought’:
Therefore, Lord, not only are you that than which a greater cannot be
thought, but you are something greater than can be thought. For since it
is possible to think that there is something of this kind, if you are not this
being, something greater than you can be thought, which cannot be.16
How then, Lord, are you all these things? Are they parts of you, or is it
rather the case that each one of them is the whole of what you are? For
whatever is composed of parts is not altogether one but in a way many
and different from itself, and it can be broken up either actually or by
understanding. But this is foreign to you, than whom a better cannot be
thought. Therefore, there are no parts in you, Lord, nor are you many, but
you are so much one and the same with yourself that in no way are you
dissimilar with yourself. Indeed, you are unity itself, not divisible by any
understanding.17
Here, the reductio ad absurdum is expressed by saying that a certain set of char-
acterizations ‘is foreign to you, than whom a better cannot be thought’; there-
fore, the opposites of these characterizations will be valid. (As stated, ‘better’
and ‘greater’ are interchangeable in Anselm’s reductio.) What is at issue is the
unity of the divine essence, but the argument could have been more clearly
formulated. Anselm assumes that there is a link between indivisibility and
15 Proslogion 5, S I, 104.11–14.
16 Proslogion 15, S I, 112.14–17.
17 Proslogion 18, S I, 114.17–24.
20 Chapter 2
greatness. He fails to articulate the link here, but he makes it explicit in Epistola
de incarnatione Verbi:
Since Anselm himself, it has been customary to regard the Monologion and
the Proslogion as a pair.19 The works are connected thematically in the respect
that both of them deal with the divine essence and its attributes. However, the
Monologion also covers a number of other topics. There is a conspicuous dif-
ference in the mode of presentation used in the works, expressed in their titles:
one is a monologion, a ‘soliloquy’, in which the person disputes with himself (or
herself) by reflection alone, whereas the other is a proslogion, an ‘address’, in
which the person prays and addresses God as well as his (or her) own soul.20 In
the chapters that follow, we will often have the opportunity and need to make
reference to the Monologion. This initial discussion seeks to give a general idea
of the nature and content of the treatise as well as introduce some topics that
are useful to keep in mind while discussing the single argument.
The preface and chapter 1 of the Monologion contain some clear and em-
phatic remarks about the rational method to be used in the treatise. Anselm
begins the preface by disclosing that he had orally presented to his fellow-
monks some considerations about meditating on the divine essence and other
related themes. The brothers had then asked him to write out a model text for
their use, and they had given precise instructions about the form to be used in
the model meditation. The brothers had prescribed that Anselm should not
assert anything in the meditation on the authority of holy writings; he should
offer rational grounds instead. Anselm’s description of the rational method is
somewhat convoluted, but three key ideas emerge: the presentation should be
simple and commonsensical, Anselm should provide valid proof for whatever
he claims, and it should all be made evident by the clarity of truth. The broth-
ers had also asked Anselm to refute the possible objections that occurred to
him, even those that appeared simple and foolish.21 Anselm says that to the
best of his ability, he followed the prescribed method.22 Towards the end of the
preface, Anselm tells us that he will adopt the role of someone who disputes
with himself by reflection alone and investigates things that he has not previ-
ously considered, as those who had asked him to write the treatise desired.23
In Monologion 1, Anselm claims that a person who is ignorant of those things
that the Christians necessarily believe about God and his Creation could, to
a great extent, persuade himself of these matters by means of reason alone
(sola ratione), provided that he is of at least average intelligence. The investiga-
tion in the Monologion is an example of how this can be done. Anselm men-
tions two alternatives concerning the reason for the ignorance of the tenets
of Christianity: either the person has not heard of them, or has heard but has
not believed.24
The comments that Anselm makes in the early parts of the Monologion
make it quite clear that he intended to follow a rational method in his first trea-
tise. He wanted to ground his claims on rational arguments and not to appeal
to scriptural authority. The perspective from which Anselm writes the treatise
accentuates the method: he adopts the role of someone who has never even
heard of the tenets of the Christian faith, and he wishes hence to construct an
argument that such a person could also possibly conceive and would inevitably
accept. At the same time, Anselm wants to eliminate the suspicion that he has
some quarrel with the authoritative writings. In the preface, he claims that he
has re-examined the work several times and has not been able to find anything
there that would be inconsistent with the writings of the Church fathers, espe-
cially those of Augustine. Therefore, he asks those readers to whom it seems
he has said either something altogether new or something which differs from
the truth that they should first carefully inspect Augustine’s On the Trinity, and
then judge the Monologion on the basis of it.25 In Monologion 1, Anselm then
says that if he argues for something that a greater authority does not confirm,
he does not want it to be taken as ‘absolutely necessary’; rather, it should only
be said that for the time being, it is able to appear as necessary.26 These cau-
tions do little to qualify the purported rationality of Anselm’s method. Even if
his conclusions can be found in the authoritative writings, or at least should be
consistent with their content, Anselm’s intention is to prove these conclusions
with the aid of reason alone.
The Monologion consists of eighty chapters, and they have carefully formu-
lated chapter headings. One can get a quite good idea of the content of the
work by merely reading the list of chapters.27 Even though there are some dif-
ferences in the headings, the first four chapters aim to prove a single point:
there is something that is the highest of all existing things, that is, a Supreme
Being. In Monologion 1, Anselm argues that all things that are good are good
through one thing which is good through itself, and this one thing is supremely
good, that is, the highest of all existing things. In the following two chapters, the
same line of argument is continued: the things that are great are great through
one thing which is great through itself and is supremely great, and the things
that exist exist through one thing that exists through itself. Anselm also argues
that these considerations all point to the same thing, which is the highest of all
existing things. The argument in Monologion 4 is based on the idea that exist-
ing things can be graded according to excellence. There must be some thing or
nature to which all other things or natures are inferior, and this is, again, the
highest of all existing things.28
Chapters 5–14 of the Monologion take up some aspects of creation and con-
servation. Anselm first provides some clarifications concerning the idea that
the Supreme Being exists through itself and from itself, and all others exist
through and from the Supreme Being.29 He then turns to an issue that is the
starting point for a series of investigations later in the Monologion. Anselm
claims that the Supreme Being speaks within itself of the things that it will
bring about, as a craftsman first tells himself what he is going to make.30 He
then argues that the utterance (locutio) with the aid of which the Supreme
Being speaks the things to be brought about is none other than the Supreme
Being.31 This is the basis for Anselm’s investigations of a Trinitarian structure
in the Supreme Being. Anselm postpones, however, the elaboration of the idea
to a later phase of the treatise. Monologion 13 is about conservation: the cre-
ated things continue to exist because they are sustained by the Supreme Being.
Monologion 14 claims that the Supreme Being ‘exists in all things and through
all things; and all things exist from it, through it, and in it’.32
Chapters 15–28 of the Monologion deal with the properties of the Supreme
Being. Among the themes to be discussed are: what can be substantially predi-
cated of the Supreme Being and how it is to be understood;33 the relation of
the Supreme Being to space and time;34 the applicability of the notions of ac-
cident and substance to the Supreme Being;35 the unique mode of being of
the Supreme Being, contrasted to the relative non-being of the creatures.36 An
elaboration of the Trinitarian structure in the Supreme Being then follows in
Monologion 29–63: the Supreme Spirit and the Word that it begets love each
other with a Love that is as great as the Supreme Spirit. Even though Anselm
uses more than thirty chapters to elaborate on this theme, I will only mention
the detail that Anselm strives to establish that the names ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and
‘Spirit’ can be applied to the three somethings in the Trinitarian structure.37 In
Monologion 64–65, Anselm raises certain questions related to methodology. In
Anselm’s understanding, investigating the Supreme Being is a peculiar kind of
exercise in that you really cannot know the exact meanings that some of the
words that you employ in the investigation have in that context, even though
you know their meanings in another context. However, Anselm is confident
that the arguments that he presents are nevertheless valid.38
But if someone will deem it worthy to read my two small works, namely
the Monologion and the Proslogion, which have been written especially
in order to show that what we hold by faith regarding the divine nature
and its persons, excluding the Incarnation, can be proved by necessary
reasons without appealing to the authority of Scripture …44
In this remark, Anselm speaks of the Monologion and the Proslogion jointly,
and it may already be noted here that Anselm saw no fundamental differ-
ence in the mode of argumentation in the two works: both of them proceed
‘by necessary reasons without appealing to the authority of Scripture’. When
it comes to Anselm’s joint characterization of the subject matter of the two
works, one can observe that it is not very precise. Anselm fails to mention that
the Monologion deals with themes other than ‘divine nature and its persons’,
and he fails to note that the Proslogion does not really deal with the three per-
sons of the Trinity (except for a very summary discussion in Proslogion 23). It
should be noted that the context in which Anselm presents his characteriza-
tion of the Monologion and Proslogion is a discussion about the Trinity and the
Incarnation.
To complete our initial discussion of the Monologion, let us deal with three
issues that are relevant for the single argument in the Proslogion. In the pref-
ace to the Proslogion, Anselm refers to an interconnected chain of many argu-
ments in his first treatise. In popular discussions of ‘Anselm’s argument’, this
is sometimes taken as a reference to Monologion 1–4, the idea being that these
chapters offer four arguments for God’s existence and that the single argument
will replace them. This is not helpful for two reasons. First, the single argument
is not primarily an argument for God’s existence. Second, even though the
first four chapters of the Monologion are concerned with an existence claim,
Anselm did not regard them as four arguments for God’s existence. Instead,
their function is to fix upon a certain thing or nature that will be the subject of
the examinations that follow. It is only at the end of the investigation, in the
last chapter of the Monologion, that this thing is identified as God.45 Anselm,
hence, first builds up a full picture of a Supreme Being and only in the end an-
nounces that it is God. The Monologion as a whole is to be seen as an argument
for God’s existence and the first four chapters are just an initial phase in that
argument.
Secondly, note that Anselm in Monologion 15 offers a systematization of
the attributes of the divine essence that points in the direction of his unum
argumentum. Anselm introduces the theme by asking which predicates ap-
plicable to created beings could apply to the supreme nature substantially
(substantialiter).46 The word ‘substantially’ has a background in early medieval
dialectic, in which it is the opposite of ‘accidentally’ (accidentaliter). One can
45 Anselm deliberately avoids using the word ‘God’ in the Monologion. It appears once in the
first chapter, before the beginning of the actual argument: Monologion 1, S I, 13.8. After
that, it is next used in Monologion 80, S I, 86–87.
46 Monologion 15, S I, 28.3–5.
26 Chapter 2
Finally, for a rational nature being rational is nothing other than being
able to distinguish just from not just, true from not true, good from not
good, more good from less good.50
quite explicitly speaks of the single argument, any attempt to determine what
Anselm’s argumentum is and how it functions must ultimately depend on the
information that Anselm provides in the preface. In addition, there are two al-
most explicit references to the single argument in the Responsio. In Responsio 5
and Responsio 10, Anselm uses formulations which clearly refer to the descrip-
tion of the single argument given in the preface, and the remarks that Anselm
makes in these passages elucidate the description in the preface. The passage
in Responsio 5 plays a crucial role in the effort to find out what exactly is the
entity that Anselm calls unum argumentum (see especially 3.4). Responsio 10,
for its part, is the most important in determining the general argumentative
idea related to Anselm’s argumentum, which is our present concern.51
In the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm begins by making reference to his
first treatise, the Monologion (which did not yet carry the title Monologion; cf.
below). Anselm juxtaposes the Monologion and the Proslogion in the preface
and points out certain differences between them. The preface begins as follows:
Anselm continues by talking about his desperate search for the argument and
about his joy when he finally discovered it (cf. 2.1). He then comments on the
work that he wrote in the following way:
Judging, then, that what I rejoiced to have discovered would afford plea-
sure, if it were written down, for those who might read it, I wrote the fol-
lowing short work on this and various other topics, in the role of someone
endeavouring to elevate his mind to the contemplation of God and seek-
ing to understand what he believes.53
Anselm wrote the Proslogion ‘on this’ (de hoc ipso), that is, on the single argu-
ment that he had discovered, and hence it can be said that the treatise serves
to introduce the single argument. The treatise also deals with ‘various other
topics’, but Anselm fails to point out what these other topics are. There is also a
remark on the perspective from which Anselm composed the new treatise; we
will turn to it in a moment. The preface ends with remarks about the publica-
tion of the two treatises and the history of their titles. The original title of the
first treatise was An Example of Meditating on the Reason in Faith (Exemplum
meditandi de ratione fidei), and the second treatise originally carried the title
Faith Seeking Understanding (Fides quaerens intellectum). At a little later stage,
says Anselm, he was urged by several people to prefix his own name to the
titles of the work. In order that it could be done more fittingly, Anselm ex-
plains, he gave new titles to the works: ‘Monologion, that is, a soliloquy’, and
‘Proslogion, that is, an address’.54
In the juxtaposition of the Monologion and the Proslogion, Anselm makes
some comparisons between the two works and, equally important, fails to
make some other comparisons. The best known of the comparisons con-
cerns the complexity of argumentation: the Monologion was ‘composed of
an interconnected chain of many arguments’ whereas the Proslogion aims at
introducing ‘a single argument’. Here, it seems to me that it is no use trying
to identify any exact reference to the ‘interconnected chain of many argu-
ments’ in the Monologion. As already indicated, Anselm does not mean to refer
to Monologion 1–4 (see 2.3). If we suppose that the many arguments in the
Monologion are to do the same job as the single argument in the Proslogion
should do, that is, that of proving God’s existence and the truths about the
divine essence, we should look for the ‘many arguments’ in Monologion 1–28.
However, Anselm does not say that the many arguments do the same job that
the single argument does. The remark about the chain of many arguments
is best understood as referring to the complexity of the arguments in the
Monologion as a whole.
An important comparison that Anselm fails to make concerns the point of
departure in the argumentation. When Anselm points out a difference in the
complexity of argumentation and fails to mention a difference in the point
of departure, the reader will assume that there is no difference regarding this
latter, more fundamental issue. In other words, the preface to the Proslogion
induces the reader to think that the single argument will be based ‘on reason
alone’ in the same way as the many arguments in the first treatise, and this is
the way Anselm wanted it to be. It was already pointed out (2.3) that Anselm in
Epistola de incarnatione Verbi offers a joint characterization of the Monologion
and the Proslogion: they aim to show that what the Christians believe about
the divine essence and the three Trinitarian persons can be proved by neces-
sary reasons without appealing to the authority of Scripture. From this it fol-
lows that the Monologion and the Proslogion share the same rational point of
departure. The Monologion and the Proslogion appear as two parts of the same
project with a common objective and a common methodology.
However, what about the fact that the Proslogion is a devotional exercise?
Does it not follow that the point of departure will be different? This brings us to
the other important comparison between the Monologion and the Proslogion
that Anselm makes in the preface to the latter work. The Monologion was writ-
ten ‘in the role of someone who by silently reasoning with himself investigates
things that he does not yet know’, whereas the Proslogion was written ‘in the
role of someone endeavouring to elevate his mind to the contemplation of God
and seeking to understand what he believes’. That is to say, the two treatises are
different in the respect that the subject matter in them is treated from a differ-
ent perspective. However, the preface to the Proslogion makes one think of this
difference as a difference in the mode of presentation. As far as this preface is
concerned, one could freely switch the modes of presentation in the two works
or instead use some other form (say, write a dialogue). The ‘point of departure’
in the Proslogion is different from that in the Monologion in that the two works
were composed from a different perspective, but this does not prevent there
being a common point of departure on a deeper methodological level. Even
though Anselm chose to introduce his single argument by using it in a devo-
tional exercise, it does not follow that the validity of the argument relies on the
devotional context or that the argument is dependent on the context in any
other significant way.55
55 Part 3 includes an extensive discussion of the Proslogion as a devotional exercise and the
function of the single argument in that exercise.
The General Idea of the Argument 31
suffice by itself to establish (1) that God truly exists, (2) that he is the
supreme good needing no other yet needed by all for their existence and
well-being, and whatever we believe about the divine substance.
56 The verb astruere has a background in the art of dialectic or logic. See 4.2 and 4.3.
57 The inference in Proslogion 2–3 seeks to establish both the fact and the manner of God’s
existence, but Anselm fails to draw a conclusion about the fact of God’s existence at the
end of Proslogion 2.
32 Chapter 2
needed by all for their existence and well-being.’58 However, there is no argu-
ment for this claim in Proslogion 22. It was already presented in Proslogion 5
where Anselm proves that God is the creator to whom all other beings owe
their existence and well-being.59 In Proslogion 22, Anselm is only rounding up
his discussion about the ‘divine substance’.
The second clarification about item (2) is that the ‘divine substance’ should
here be understood as referring to the divine essence or the one Godhead, as
opposed to the three Trinitarian persons. In the Monologion, Anselm’s ambition
was to provide a rational demonstration for both what the Christians believe
about the divine essence and what they believe about the Trinitarian persons
(excluding the topic of incarnation). The Proslogion, for its part, does not aim
to establish claims about the Trinity. There is only a short statement of some
aspects of the Trinitarian doctrine in Proslogion 23, and in it, the Trinitarian na-
ture of God is not argued for but assumed.60 The single argument is about the
divine essence only; it need not be able to prove anything about the Trinitarian
doctrine.
Third, one needs to make a distinction between ‘what is believed about
the divine substance’ and ‘what is predicated substantially of the divine sub-
stance’. The latter formulation, adapted from Monologion 15, applies to the
theistic attributes. In that chapter, Anselm seeks to produce a systematization
of the theistic attributes and comes to the conclusion that the divine essence
is ‘whatever is unconditionally better than “not it”’, for example ‘living, wise,
powerful and omnipotent, true, just, blessed, eternal’.61 In Proslogion 5—which
proves to be one of the key chapters in the treatise—Anselm arrives at a simi-
lar conclusion through a different argument. As the creator of all that is good,
God must have all the good attributes:
What good, then, is lacking in the supreme good, through which every
good exists? Thus you are just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better
to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just, blessed than
not blessed.62
The theistic attributes that this systematization concerns are predicated sub-
stantially (substantialiter) of the divine essence, as Anselm makes clear in
Monologion 15, and they are an important part of what is traditionally believed
about the divine essence. However, there are also other relevant beliefs about
the divine essence. For example, it is believed that the divine essence is the
‘supreme’ (summum) of all things. In Monologion 15, Anselm points out that
the predicate ‘supreme’ is a relational one, and no relational predicate is predi-
cated substantially of anything.63 Actually, all the predicates applied to God
which refer to some other beings than God (that is, which refer to creatures)
are relational and are hence not predicated ‘substantially’ of God. The predi-
cate ‘the creator (of all other things)’ is a central predicate of that kind. Item (2)
in Anselm’s description of the single argument hence splits into two parts. On
the one hand are the theistic attributes that are predicated substantially of
God. On the other hand, there are the other things that are believed about the
divine essence, and the idea that God is the creator of all other things is one
of them. The first group is clearly defined, at least in principle, whereas the
second is more likely to be open-ended.
The fourth point of clarification is of a different type. Even though we do
not yet have a precise understanding of the single argument and we do not yet
have a complete picture of how Anselm uses it in the Proslogion, enough has
been said for a certain concern to arise. In the discussion of Anselm’s reductio
argument (2.2), it was claimed that there are five instances of that pattern of
argumentation in the Proslogion. Assuming that the reductio argument is es-
sential to Anselm’s single argument, is there not a discrepancy between how
Anselm describes his single argument, especially its item (2), and how he actu-
ally proceeds in the treatise? Raising this concern can help us towards an ap-
propriate understanding of the single argument and of its relation to the text
of the Proslogion. Anselm’s single argument is not a piece of argumentation
that Anselm would present in the course of the Proslogion. It is not a piece of
argumentation at all. Instead, the single argument is a means of argumenta-
tion: it is something that will make it possible for us to construct pieces of
argumentation. For the introduction of the single argument, it is sufficient that
Anselm shows the way in which it is possible to prove a number of claims about
God with the aid of one means of argumentation. He need not actually prove
all those claims in the Proslogion.
Proceeding now to a treatment of the general argumentative idea related to
Anselm’s argumentum, I first consider the traditional theistic attributes, which
are a central part of what is believed about the divine essence. Anselm thought
that it was possible to systematize these attributes in a certain way: the divine
essence is ‘whatever is unconditionally better than “not it”’ (Monologion 15) or
If that than which a greater cannot be thought were not wise, it could be
thought to be wise, which is greater.
Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought were not wise,
then that than which a greater cannot be thought would be that than
which a greater can be thought.
But this is impossible.
Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is wise.
This inference is modelled on the last part of Proslogion 2 and the first part of
Proslogion 3, and it shares the four features that are typical of Anselm’s reductio
argument (see 2.2). The inference is an indirect proof or reductio ad absurdum.
The contradiction that is derived is that that than which a greater cannot be
thought is not what it is said to be. The contradiction is deduced by making a
comparison between that than which a greater cannot be thought as having
a certain attribute and not having this attribute. The comparison is made in
terms of greatness. Because it holds true of the traditional theistic attributes
that each and every one of them is ‘better than “not it”’, this kind of inference
can successfully be applied to any of them.
The theistic attributes are a central part of what is believed about the divine
essence, but the single argument should be able to establish other things as
well. It should make it possible to prove God’s existence, and it should make
it possible to prove whatever the Christians believe about the divine essence.
Is it possible to prove these things using the strategy of argumentation that
applies to the theistic attributes? We already know that Anselm makes use
of the same argumentative idea in his inference about God’s existence.64 We
also know that, in the Proslogion, Anselm uses the same idea to establish some
claims about the divine essence that are not about the theistic attributes (in
Proslogion 5, 15, and 18). For example, in Proslogion 5 Anselm uses the argu-
mentative idea to establish that God is the creator. Can we affirm that one can
prove in this way ‘whatever we believe about the divine substance’, as Anselm
requires of his single argument?
64 However, the reductio is used in the second stage of the argument in Proslogion 2, whereas
the first stage is based on a different idea (see 3.2).
The General Idea of the Argument 35
In Anselm’s opinion, we can. This is clear on the basis of Responsio 10, which
also confirms the understanding about the functioning of the single argument
that has been outlined. Anselm’s main concern in the Responsio, apparently, is
to answer the objections presented by Gaunilo and to point out some mistakes
in Gaunilo’s reading of his text. In the last section, however, Anselm offers a
more general comment on the Proslogion. Given that Anselm’s outspoken ob-
jective with the publication of the treatise was the introduction of the single
argument, it is natural that he comments on this argument in the concluding
remark.
The first lines of Responsio 10 contain Anselm’s judgement on the validity of
his argument for God’s existence in Proslogion 2 (or Proslogion 2–3) and on the
force of the criticisms presented by Gaunilo.
In the following lines, however, the perspective is widened. The remark which
follows is not only about a proof dealing with existence but also about proofs
dealing with whatever is believed about the divine essence.
65 Responsio 10, S I, 138.28–30: ‘Puto quia monstravi me non infirma sed satis necessaria ar-
gumentatione probasse in praefato libello re ipsa existere aliquid, quo maius cogitari non
possit; nec eam alicuius obiectionis infirmari firmitate.’
66 Responsio 10, S I, 138.30–139.8: ‘Tantam enim vim huius prolationis in se continet signifi-
catio, ut hoc ipsum quod dicitur, ex necessitate eo ipso quod intelligitur vel cogitatur, et
revera probetur existere, et id ipsum esse quidquid de divina substantia oportet credere.
Credimus namque de divina substantia quidquid absolute cogitari potest melius esse
quam non esse. Verbi gratia: melius est esse aeternum quam non aeternum, bonum quam
36 Chapter 2
In this passage, Anselm offers a condensed description of how his single ar-
gument functions. The starting point of the argument is the utterance ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’. The outcome is that that than which
a greater cannot be thought ‘exists in reality’ and is ‘whatever should be be-
lieved about the divine substance’. Anselm is obviously here referring to his
description of the single argument in the preface, even though the formula-
tions are different. In addition, Anselm presents an explicit statement about
what it is that should be believed about the divine substance: ‘we believe about
the divine substance whatever can be thought better to be than not to be, un-
conditionally’. It turns out that the systematization that was earlier presented
in connection with the theistic attributes applies, perhaps slightly modified,
to all those predicates that are believed to be true of the divine essence.67
As a consequence, the strategy of argumentation that was explained can be
successfully applied to those predicates that are believed to be true of the
divine essence.
To conclude, appealing to the signification of the utterance ‘that than which
a greater cannot be thought’, it should be possible to establish that that than
which a greater cannot be thought both exists in reality and is ‘whatever should
be believed about the divine substance’. Anselm’s reductio can obviously be
used for deriving the relevant conclusions. This general idea related to Anselm’s
argumentum has actually been recognized quite often in the Anselmian schol-
arship of the recent decades.68 However, the full significance of the idea for the
interpretation of the Proslogion has not been properly perceived, and there is
unclarity about what exactly should be identified as the single argument here.
non bonum, immo bonitatem ipsam quam non ipsam bonitatem. Nihil autem huiusmodi
non esse potest, quo maius aliquid cogitari non potest. Necesse igitur est “quo maius cogi-
tari non potest” esse, quidquid de divina essentia credi oportet.’
67 Anselm anticipates this in Monologion 15, S I, 29.10–15: he hints that some relative terms
may be included in his classification of two kinds of predicates, but he does not discuss
the matter because no relative term is predicated ‘substantially’.
68 Especially Jasper Hopkins has drawn attention to the idea in many of his writings. See,
for example, Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, Anselm of Canterbury, vol. I:
Monologion, Proslogion, Debate with Gaunilo, and a Meditation on Human Redemption
(Toronto-New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1974), 153, note 29, and Jasper Hopkins, ‘Anselm
of Canterbury’, in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), A Companion to the
Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 138–51, at 139–41. See 3.1 for
some further references.
Chapter 3
The first task in interpreting the Proslogion is that of acquiring an accurate un-
derstanding of the single argument, the discovery of which Anselm announces
in the preface. Identifying the general argumentative idea related to Anselm’s
effort (2.4) is a major step in this direction.1 However, Anselm presumably
had a specific entity in mind when he composed the description of the single
argument.2 What is that entity? What is the thing that the expression ‘single
argument’ refers to? Clarifying this issue is the main objective in the present
chapter, but at the same time, I also seek to elucidate the significance of the
matter for the interpretation of the Proslogion.
The initial difficulty in the attempt to identify the single argument is that
one cannot know at the outset what kind of entity one is looking for. Assuming
that the general argumentative idea described in the preceding chapter is cen-
trally related to Anselm’s single argument, at least six candidates for the single
argument can be suggested. The single argument could be:
A) a comprehensive ‘piece of argumentation’ in which some of the argu-
ments are based on the general argumentative idea described,
B) an argument form which captures the structure of Anselm’s argumenta-
tive idea,
1 Even though the centrality of the argumentative strategy has been widely recognized in
recent specialized studies, there are also many exceptions. In particular, Sandra Visser and
Thomas Williams, Anselm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), implicitly claim that
the argumentative idea described is not central to Anselm’s procedure in the Proslogion
(109). They maintain (73–93) that the single argument is an argument for God’s existence
that Anselm does not explicitly present until the Responsio but that nevertheless underlies
the argument in Proslogion 2; this argument is a version of the ‘modal ontological argu-
ment’. Gregory Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings (West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1994), acknowledges the argumentative idea (126) but
claims that the single argument is an argument for God’s existence that ‘spans Proslogion 2–3’
(165–68). Eileen C. Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word (Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 147, barely mentions the argumentative idea
and supposes that ‘the exact reference of argumentum’ does not make much difference.
2 Anselm obviously did not have any specific entity in mind when he started looking for a
single argument. However, he had already discovered the argument when he wrote the pref-
ace to the Proslogion.
C) the argumentative idea itself conceived in some less technical way than
in alternative B,
D) the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’,
E) the definition of ‘God’ as ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, or,
F) the sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’.
Obviously, some of the alternatives are overlapping (B and C, D and E, and
E and F). I next present brief comments on the different alternatives for the
purpose of reducing the initial attractiveness of some of them and directing
attention to issues that I deem to be important.3
According to alternative A, Anselm’s single argument is a comprehen-
sive piece of argumentation which includes, as its parts, arguments based
on Anselm’s reductio technique.4 It can, in principle, come in two versions.
First, the single argument could be a comprehensive argument that Anselm
actually presents in the Proslogion. There are five passages based on the reduc-
tio pattern in the Proslogion (see 2.2), and it can be suggested that the single
argument is a comprehensive argument that centres on these five passages.
However, it is doubtful whether the argumentation Anselm actually presents
in the Proslogion has the kind of internal unity that the single argument ought
to have (see also 3.2). The other version of alternative A is that the single argu-
ment is a comprehensive argument that Anselm does not explicitly present
but which lies beneath the surface of the argumentation in the Proslogion. To
develop this alternative, one would need to spell out a reasonable argumenta-
tive structure based on the reductio pattern which can be shown to underlie
the actual argumentation in the Proslogion.
Alternative A appeals to modern readers because it takes the single argu-
ment to be an ‘argument’ in our sense of the word, that is, a piece of argu-
mentation. If that cannot be achieved, it may be felt that the single argument
3 For a discussion of some ways in which the single argument has been identified in the anglo-
phone, German and French discussions of the past decades, see Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic
and Theology in the Eleventh Century (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 133–35. For my earlier efforts to
pin down the single argument, see Dialectic and Theology, 133–45, and Toivo J. Holopainen,
‘Anselm’s Argumentum and the Early Medieval Theory of Argument’, Vivarium 45 (2007),
1–29.
4 This roughly corresponds to what Jasper Hopkins appears to have in mind when he pro-
poses ‘a single line of reasoning’ as a translation for unum argumentum. See Jasper Hopkins
and Herbert Richardson, Anselm of Canterbury, vol. I: Monologion, Proslogion, Debate with
Gaunilo, and a Meditation on Human Redemption (Toronto-New York: Edwin Mellen Press,
1974), 153, note 29, and Jasper Hopkins, Anselm of Canterbury, vol. IV: Hermeneutical and
Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm (Toronto-New York: Edwin Mellen
Press, 1976), 3, 110. In addition, see Ian Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of
Anselm’s Argument and its Significance Today (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 125–27.
A Specific Identification of the Argument 39
5 See Richard R. La Croix, Proslogion II and III: A Third Interpretation of Anselm’s Argument
(Leiden: Brill, 1972), 123–25, 130; Brian Leftow, ‘Anselm’s Perfect-Being Theology’, in Brian
Davies and Brian Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 132–56, at 140–41. See also Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion,
125–27.
6 Alternatives D to F have jointly found quite many supporters in recent scholarship. However,
scholars sometimes fail to state their position accurately. For example, Karl Barth, Anselm:
Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W. Robertson (London: SCM Press, 1960), 13–14, claims
that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is the unum argumentum (which here is
alternative D), but when continuing the discussion, Barth in practice assumes that the argu-
mentum is a revealed definition of God (which falls under E) or an article of faith (which falls
under F). It appears that some scholars prefer to leave several alternatives open. For example,
40 Chapter 3
alternative D, it can be pointed out that Anselm claims that his argumentation
in the Proslogion, or at least in Proslogion 2–3, is based on the force that the
signification of the utterance ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
has.7 On the other hand, the burden of the single argument is to prove a num-
ber of statements about God. To apply the proofs about that than which a
greater cannot be thought to God, it seems that an identification of that than
which a greater cannot be thought as God is required. This is the motivation
for alternatives E and F. The endeavour to identify the single argument revolves
around D, on the one hand, and the different versions of E and F, on the other.
Alternatives E and F are closely related. For a large part, they are two differ-
ent ways of speaking about the same thing. Both E and F can be divided into
three distinct versions, which correspond to each other. In the first version of
E, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is taken to be the definition
of ‘God’ roughly in the same way as ‘unmarried man’ is the definition of ‘bach-
elor’. The relation between the two expressions is assumed to be obvious to any
rational person who has the required linguistic competence. Correspondingly,
the sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can be taken
to be a conceptual truth which anyone should concede without argument.8
In the second version of E, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is
taken as a revealed definition of God (a ‘name’ of God), and as such it need not
be obvious to every—or any—rational person. Correspondingly, the sentence
G. R. Evans, ‘Anselm’s Life, Works, and Immediate Influence’, in Davies and Leftow (eds.), The
Cambridge Companion to Anselm (2004), 5–31, at 12–13, relates the story of Anselm’s discovery
and ends as follows: ‘There is a case for saying that the “argument” he believed he had discov-
ered was a notion or principle which could be applied in a sequence of argumentation or set
like a jewel in a passage of prayer.’ In addition to suggesting that unum argumentum can be
translated as ‘a single line of reasoning’ (see note 4 above), Jasper Hopkins has also proposed
the translation ‘a single consideration’. See Hopkins, Hermeneutical and Textual Problems, 3;
Jasper Hopkins, ‘Anselm of Canterbury’, in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), A
Companion to the Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 138–51, at 140.
7 Responsio 10, S I, 138.30–139.3. Many other German scholars besides Karl Barth have identified
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ as the single argument, for example, Franciscus
Salesius Schmitt, ‘Einführung’, in Anselm von Canterbury, Proslogion (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962), 9–65, at 47–50, and Jörn Müller, ‘Ontologischer Gottesbeweis?
Zur Bedeutung und Funktion des unum argumentum in Anselm von Canterburys Proslogion’,
in Roberto Hofmeister Pich (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109): Philosophical Theology
and Ethics (Porto: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), 37–71,
at 38–45. Richard Campbell, From Belief to Understanding: A Study of Anselm’s Proslogion
Argument on the Existence of God (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1976), 10,
tentatively claims that the single argument is ‘a single formula’.
8 The first version of E and F is an obvious development of the conventional reading of the
Proslogion.
A Specific Identification of the Argument 41
‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can be taken as an article
of faith.9 These two versions of E and F have the shortcoming that it is difficult
to see what sense they can make of the requirement that the single argument
ought to be such that it ‘would need no other [argument] for proving itself
than itself alone’.10 There are two sides to this requirement. On the one hand,
the single argument must not need any other argument for its proof. On the
other hand, it ought to be possible to use the single argument to ‘prove itself’, to
back itself up in some significant way. If the sentence ‘God is that than which
a greater cannot be thought’ is supposed to have an axiomatic status, it is dif-
ficult to see what the latter side of the requirement could mean in its case.
The third versions of E and F avoid this difficulty. ‘That than which a greater
cannot be thought’ can be initially taken as a potential definition of God, and
the sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can be taken
as a thesis which does not have an axiomatic status in the beginning. This
opens up a way of explaining the requirement that the single argument should
be able to ‘prove itself’, as it will be possible to argue for the identity of God and
that than which a greater cannot be thought by showing that that than which
a greater cannot be thought necessarily has all the predicates that are believed
to be true of the divine essence. Many scholars seem to think that presenting
such an argument is part of what Anselm is doing in the Proslogion.11 This is an
interesting idea and needs to be examined further.
It might be possible to apply the same idea for the view that the mere no-
tion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is Anselm’s single argument
(D). However, in Responsio 5, Anselm claims that the notion ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ has the capability of ‘proving’ things ‘about itself by
means of itself’ (de se per seipsum probat),12 and what is at issue is not the iden-
tity of God and that than which a greater cannot be thought. Some features of
the passage suggest that Anselm’s aim here is to explain what the remark about
the single argument being able to ‘prove itself’ means.
This chapter makes a case for holding that Anselm’s single argument is the
mere notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ (D), and not this
notion taken as a definition of God (E) or the sentence ‘God is that than which
a greater cannot be thought’ (F). First, Anselm’s argumentation about God
in the Proslogion is discussed from the perspective that it is a contingent ap-
plication of the single argument (3.2). Then we enquire into the relationship
between ‘God’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ in the con-
text of Anselm’s argument (3.3). The last section offers an explanation of what
Anselm’s remark about the single argument ‘proving itself’ means and makes a
case for identifying the argument (3.4).
In the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm offers a short description of the pur-
pose of the treatise and the mode of presentation to be used in it:
Judging, then, that what I rejoiced to have discovered would afford plea-
sure, if it were written down, for those who might read it, I wrote the fol-
lowing short work on this and various other topics, in the role of someone
endeavouring to elevate his mind to the contemplation of God and seek-
ing to understand what he believes.13
Thanks to you, good Lord, thanks to you, because what I first believed
through your giving, I now so understand by your illumination that even
if I did not want to believe it, I would not be able not to understand that
you exist.15
The main burden of Proslogion 2–4 is to prove God’s existence, and that task is
brought to an end by the closing lines of chapter 4.
Anselm’s inference about God’s existence in Proslogion 2–3 has already
been discussed at some length (see 2.2). In Proslogion 2, Anselm introduces the
idea that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, saying that ‘we
believe’ this to be the case. Referring to the fool, Anselm raises the question
whether there is such a being. There then follows an argument in two stages
in favour of the conclusion that that than which a greater cannot be thought
exists in reality. In the first stage, Anselm argues that that than which a greater
cannot be thought is in the understanding. In the second stage, Anselm makes
use of the reductio technique for the first time and argues that that than which
a greater cannot be thought exists in reality as well. Proslogion 3 continues
from where Proslogion 2 ended. Anselm adds a third stage to his inference on
God’s existence and uses the reductio strategy to establish that that than which
a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not
to exist. In the middle of Proslogion 3, the conclusion of the argument is ap-
plied to God. The conclusion is formally about the manner of God’s existence,
but the fact of his existence has also been established: God not only exists but
exists in such a way that he cannot even be thought not to exist.
In the middle of Proslogion 3, when Anselm identifies that than which a
greater cannot be thought as God, this is a matter of course.16 Anselm next
proceeds to present some remarks about the appropriateness of the conclu-
sion reached. In a way, these remarks also serve to show the appropriateness
of the identification of God with that than which a greater cannot be thought:
And this is rightly so. For if some mind could think something better than
you, the creature would rise above the creator and pass judgement on the
creator, which is quite absurd. And indeed, whatever there is, except you
alone, can be thought not to exist. Therefore, you alone exist most truly
of all and, hence, have existence to the highest degree; for whatever else
there is does not exist as truly and so has existence to a lesser degree.17
16 Proslogion 3, S I, 103.1–4.
17 Proslogion 3, S I, 103.4–9.
18 Cf. Anselm Stolz, ‘Anselm’s Theology in the Proslogion’, trans. Arthur C. McGill, in Hick
and McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument (1967), 183–206 (German original 1933);
Arthur C. McGill, ‘Recent Discussions of Anselm’s Argument’, in Hick and McGill
A Specific Identification of the Argument 45
In the last part of Proslogion 3, Anselm points out the fool’s folly: even
though God exists most truly of all, the fool denies his existence.19 Proslogion 4
discusses the problem involved in the fool’s denial: if God exists so truly that he
cannot be thought not to exist, how is it possible that the fool thinks God does
not exist? Anselm solves the problem by distinguishing two ways of thinking
about a thing: ‘in one way a thing is thought when the word signifying it is
thought, and in another way when that which the thing is is understood.’20
While elucidating the latter way, Anselm refers to his strategy of proving state-
ments about God starting from the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot
be thought’:
Indeed, no one who understands that which God is can think that God
does not exist, even though he may say these words in his heart either
without any signification or with some strange signification. For God is
that than which a greater cannot be thought. Whoever understands this
properly, surely understands this very thing to exist in such a way that not
even in thought can it not exist. Therefore, whoever understands God to
exist in this way cannot think that he does not exist.21
The point in this passage is parallel to a point that Anselm makes in Responsio 10:
If one understands the signification of the utterance ‘that than which a greater
cannot be thought’, one will also understand that that than which a greater
cannot be thought not only exists but exists in such a manner that it cannot be
thought not to exist. But this being is God. If one thinks of God as something
that cannot be thought not to exist, one cannot think that he does not exist.
(eds.), The Many-Faced Argument (1967), 33–110, at 40, 47–48; Campbell, From Belief to
Understanding, 19–23, 126–50.
19 Proslogion 3, S I, 103.9–11.
20 Proslogion 4, S I, 103.18–19.
21 Proslogion 4, S I, 103.20–104.4.
22 Responsio 10, S I, 138.30–139.3.
46 Chapter 3
Before concluding the discussion about Proslogion 2–4, there is one more ob-
servation to be made. It could be suggested that Anselm should have proved
the existence of God or that than which a greater cannot be thought as follows:
If that than which a greater cannot be thought did not exist, it could be
thought to exist, which is greater. Therefore, if that than which a greater
cannot be thought did not exist, then that than which a greater cannot
be thought would be that than which a greater can be thought. But this
is impossible. Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought ex-
ists. (N. B. This is not Anselm’s text.)
There is an obvious reason why Anselm did not argue like this: he thinks that
one cannot think of that than which a greater cannot be thought as not exist-
ing. Anselm probably felt that he had better avoid nonsensical premises.23 The
two-stage argument in Proslogion 2 evades this problem: Anselm first presents
an independent argument for the claim that that than which a greater cannot
be thought ‘is in the understanding’ and only after that uses the reductio to
show that it exists in reality as well. Anselm’s procedure in Proslogion 2 speaks
against the idea that either the reductio form or the general idea related to it
(alternatives B and C) could be identified as the single argument, as Anselm
cannot prove the existence of that than which a greater cannot be thought by
simply applying the reductio technique to the predicate ‘exists’ or ‘exists in re-
ality’. The same criticism does not apply, say, to alternative D, for the first stage
in Anselm’s inference is also based on the force that the signification of the
utterance ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ contains.
Moving on to consider the part of the Proslogion in which Anselm discusses
God’s essence, it was suggested above that the discussion in Proslogion 5–22 be
divided into three parts: chapters 5–14a, chapters 14b–17, and chapters 18–22.
The division is based, on the one hand, on a thematic interconnectedness. On
the other hand, some structural features support the division: each of the three
parts begins with a combination of two elements. First, the person who speaks
in the Proslogion turns to God and asks ‘what are you?’ (quid es?).24 A little
later, Anselm establishes a major claim about God by applying his reductio
23 If ‘God exists’ is a meaningful statement that is necessarily true, someone might infer that
‘God does not exist’ is a meaningful statement that is necessarily false. On the other hand,
if ‘God does not exist’ is nonsensical, someone might infer that ‘God exists’ must also be
nonsensical. Anselm perhaps did not fully appreciate the logical difficulties that his infer-
ence on God’s existence involves.
24 In Proslogion 5, Anselm simply states the question, whereas in Proslogion 14 and 18 there
is a devotional passage related to it. Cf. below.
A Specific Identification of the Argument 47
argument. The question ‘what are you?’ and the use of this argumentative pat-
tern come together in Proslogion 5–22. However, it is not entirely clear whether
this is coincidental or a designed feature of the work.25
The first part of the discussion about the divine essence deals with God as
the creator and his various attributes. This part begins in Proslogion 5 and ends
around the middle of Proslogion 14. Anselm starts Proslogion 5 by asking his
first ‘what are you?’ question and immediately replying to it by using the reduc-
tio argument to establish a complicated general claim about God:
What, then, are you, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be
thought? But what are you except that which, as highest of all things,
alone existing through itself, made all other things from nothing? For
whatever is not this, is less great than can be thought. But this cannot be
thought about you.26
In the second half of Proslogion 5, Anselm establishes a rule about the attri-
butes of the divine essence that we already are familiar with:
What good, then, is lacking in the supreme good, through which every
good exists? Thus you are just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better
to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just, blessed than
not blessed.27
On the basis of Responsio 10 (see 2.4), it is clear that Anselm could have proved
each of the attributes of the divine essence using the reductio argument, but
that is not what he is doing here. Instead, he establishes a general rule about
the attributes on the basis of the conclusion that he has established with the
aid of the reductio argument in the first part of the chapter. Because God is
‘that which, as highest of all things, alone existing through itself, made all other
things from nothing’, he can be characterized as ‘the supreme good, through
which every good exists’, and as such no ‘good is lacking’ in him and he is ‘what-
ever it is better to be than not to be’.
In Proslogion 6–11, Anselm addresses problems related to some attributes
that God must have because he is whatever it is better to be than not to be,
25 When reflecting on this, one should take into account the possibility that Anselm may
have composed some major parts of the Proslogion before he discovered the single argu-
ment and that Proslogion 15 may be an addition. See 9.1.
26 Proslogion 5, S I, 104.11–14.
27 Proslogion 5, S I, 104.12–17.
48 Chapter 3
But, certainly, whatever you are, you are through none other than your-
self. You are therefore the very life by which you live, the wisdom by
which you are wise, the very goodness by which you are good to the good
and the wicked, and likewise for similar attributes.30
On the basis of Responsio 10 it is, again, clear that Anselm could have proved
any of these conclusions directly with the aid of his reductio argument, for ‘it is
better to be … goodness itself than not goodness itself’. Again, Anselm chooses
a different procedure. And as the argument in the latter part of Proslogion 5 de-
pends on that in the first part of Proslogion 5, so the argument in Proslogion 12
appears to depend on the argument in the first part of Proslogion 5. Because
God is that which ‘alone exist[s] through itself’, he is whatever he is ‘through
none other than’ himself.
At the beginning of Proslogion 13, Anselm establishes two further attributes
of the divine essence:
But all that is in any way confined by place or by time is less great than
that which no law of place or time constrains. Therefore, since nothing is
greater than you, no place or time restricts you, but you are everywhere
and always. And because this can be said of you alone, you alone are un-
limited and eternal.31
Here, the first sentence testifies that we are speaking of predicates to which
Anselm’s reductio can be applied. Strictly speaking, however, Anselm does not
28 Proslogion 6, S I, 104.20–24.
29 Proslogion 11, S I, 110.1–3.
30 Proslogion 12, S I, 110.6–8.
31 Proslogion 13, S I, 110.12–15.
A Specific Identification of the Argument 49
apply his reductio argument here: he does not appeal to the fact that nothing
greater than God can be thought but to the fact that nothing is greater than
God. In a way, this inference can also be said to depend on the argument in the
first part of Proslogion 5: because God is the ‘highest of all things’, nothing is
greater than God.
The first part of Anselm’s discussion about the divine essence ends in the
early part of Proslogion 14, which is strongly devotional. Anselm offers a précis
of the argument so far:
Have you found, my soul, what you were seeking? You were seeking God,
and you found him to be something which is the highest of all, than
which nothing better can be thought, and you found this to be the life
itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity,
and to exist everywhere and always.32
Starting from these findings, Anselm moves to his next major theme. The strat-
egy of argumentation that Anselm uses in Proslogion 5–13 appears to be the fol-
lowing. He first establishes a general claim about the divine essence with the
aid of his reductio argument (first part of Proslogion 5). He then proves further
claims about the divine essence on the basis of this general claim (latter part
of Proslogion 5 and Proslogion 12–13), even though it would have been possible
to prove these claims directly with the aid of his reductio. In between, there
is a long discussion, Proslogion 6–11, that addresses special issues related to a
number of attributes.
The second part of the discussion about the divine essence, in Proslogion
14–17, deals with divine incomprehensibility and those features of God that
are beyond human understanding. Anselm starts to develop this theme in
Proslogion 14. What bothers the person who speaks in the exercise is why he
cannot sense or feel (sentire) God if what he has found in the course of the ex-
ercise indeed is God. The second ‘what are you?’ question comes in the middle
of Proslogion 14, within a lengthy devotional passage: ‘Lord my God, my maker
and my renewer, tell my desiring soul what else you are other than what it has
seen, so that it may see clearly what it desires.’33 Towards the end of the chapter,
Anselm discusses the overwhelmingness of the divine being when compared
to human intellectual abilities.34 In a short chapter, Proslogion 15, he then ap-
plies his reductio argument to establish a claim related to this: God is not only
that than which a greater cannot be thought but also something greater than
can be thought.35 The following two chapters deal with some features of the
divine essence that are beyond human understanding. Proslogion 16 explains
what it means that God dwells in ‘the inaccessible light’.36 Proslogion 17 draws
attention to attributes such as fragrance and softness that are present in God
‘in his own ineffable manner’.37
The third part of the discussion about the divine essence, Proslogion 18–
22, revolves around God’s unity. Proslogion 18 begins with a devotional pas-
sage that ends with a series of ‘what are you?’ questions: ‘What are you, Lord?
What are you? What shall my heart understand you to be?’38 The problem that
Anselm wants to address here is how the various things that have been proved
to belong to the divine essence are related to each other. Anselm argues that
there are no parts in God and that he is ‘unity itself’.39 Even though Anselm
does not make the reductio as explicit as in Proslogion 5 and Proslogion 15, it
can be shown that this is also an instance of the same technique (see 2.2).
God’s unity is the central theme in the chapters that follow. Proslogion 19–21
discusses God’s eternity and his relation to space and time,40 and Proslogion 22
accentuates the absolutely unitary nature of his being.41
In the end of Proslogion 22, Anselm rounds up the discussion as follows:
And you are who you are in a proper and unqualified sense, because you
have neither past nor future but only present existence, nor can you be
thought not to be at any time. And you are life and light and wisdom and
blessedness and eternity and many goods of this kind. Nevertheless, you
are only one supreme good, altogether sufficient unto yourself, needing
no one but needed by all for their existence and well-being.42
This is a conclusion not only to the line of thought which begins in Proslogion 18
but also to Anselm’s discussion about the divine essence in general. Anselm
will repeat the last sentence almost word for word in his characterization of
the single argument in the preface: ‘needing no other yet needed by all for
their existence and well-being’. The grounds for the claim were presented in
Proslogion 5 where the discussion about the divine essence began (see 2.4).
From another point of view, Proslogion 23, which deals with the Trinity, can
also be counted as part of the line of thought that begins in Proslogion 18, as the
emphasis in Proslogion 23 is on the unity in the Trinity.43
In conclusion, Anselm’s argumentation about God in the Proslogion is a
highly contingent application of the single argument. If it is assumed that
the single argument is a means of argumentation (alternatives D, E, and F),
it can be said that the actual introduction of it takes place in the part that
deals with God’s existence (Proslogion 2–4). In the part that deals with God’s
essence (Proslogion 5–22), the argument is used in a very contingent fashion.
Only three passages in this part offer instances of Anselm’s reductio pattern,
in Proslogion 5, 15, and 18, and in 18 the use of the technique is rather implicit.
Anselm clearly could have applied the same technique in several other pas-
sages but he does not. Proslogion 6–11 offers a long treatment of problems re-
lated to a number of theistic attributes, and Proslogion 14, 16, and 18 include
discussions that get their motivation from the devotional exercise in the work
(see also 8.5). It should also be mentioned that no trace of a proof for the iden-
tity of God and that than which a greater cannot be thought can be found
in the part on God’s essence. Except for a fleeting moment in Proslogion 14,44
Anselm takes it for granted that God is that than which a greater cannot be
thought, and even in that passage, the identity is immediately again assumed
without any proof being presented. Establishing ‘whatever we believe about
the divine substance’ was for Anselm an end in itself and nothing in the text of
the Proslogion suggests that he would have wished to build an identity proof
on this basis.
is an article of faith that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought
(see also 3.1). These views are related to two opposed understandings of what
Anselm’s argumentation in the Proslogion aims at. The conventional under-
standing is that Anselm wanted to produce arguments that will convince any
rational person about the validity of some claims. Barth’s fideistic interpreta-
tion, by contrast, maintains that Anselm addresses Christian believers only
and strives to elucidate the internal consistency of the Christian doctrine by
using one article of faith to deduce other articles of faith from it.45
Barth’s fideistic interpretation of the Proslogion is in many ways far removed
from the conventional understanding of the treatise. In some respects, how-
ever, the two interpretations are markedly similar. They approach the ques-
tion about the relation between ‘God’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot
be thought’ in a rather similar way. Both interpretations maintain that there
is a necessary relation between these notions; what they disagree about is the
kind of necessity involved. To put it differently, both interpretations maintain
that the sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ has an
axiomatic status, but they disagree about the grounds for why this is the case.
Consequently, the two interpretations should, in principle, be able to arrive
at a common understanding about the structure of Anselm’s argumentation
in the Proslogion. Even if the nature of the axiom is interpreted differently,
this need not affect the way in which other claims are deduced from it. In the
controversy between the proponents of the conventional understanding and
the Barthian understanding, the initial evaluation of the sentence ‘God is that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ is taken to have a crucial importance.
If it expresses a conceptual truth, the whole enterprise will have a philosophi-
cal character. If it expresses an article of faith, the whole enterprise will be said
to be internal to faith.
Neither the conventional view nor the Barthian view about the relation
between ‘God’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can appeal
to solid evidence. The conventional interpretation can produce some rather
strong grounds for the claim that Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion must
have a rational starting point, but the evidence speaks against the idea that
Anselm would have taken ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
to be a definition of ‘God’. Anselm presents a nominal definition of God
in Monologion 80, but it is a different one,46 and he obviously held that no
real definition of God is possible.47 The Barthian interpretation, for its part,
can appeal to two passages in which it is implied that God’s being that than
which a greater cannot be thought is part of what the Christians believe.48
However, these passages do not have much weight as arguments for the idea
that Anselm’s enterprise would be purely fideistic. In addition, one might as-
sume that only claims that are included in central Christian teaching can be
called articles of faith. The sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot
be thought’ was not part of central Christian teaching before Anselm.49
The attempt to solve the difficulty by claiming that Anselm sought to pro-
duce evidence for the identification of that than which a greater cannot be
thought as God by proving that it has the attributes that the divine essence is
believed to have is not successful. There is no hint in the part of the Proslogion
where Anselm discusses God’s essence that he aims at justifying that that than
which a greater cannot be thought is God (see 3.2), and there is no hint in the
Responsio that Anselm had entertained the idea of presenting such a proof of
identity.
To clarify the relation between ‘God’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot
be thought’ in the context of Anselm’s argument, I first take up some general
points and then present remarks about how we should understand Anselm’s
actual procedure in the Proslogion. In the end, I suggest that it can perhaps be
said that the sentence ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ will
acquire an axiomatic status as a result of the Proslogion.
In the debates about the Proslogion, scholars have usually found it impor-
tant that that than which a greater cannot be thought is identified as God.
Many commentators appear to assume that Anselm’s argument is deficient
and incomplete if this identification is not made.50 However, it seems that
the concern about the matter often arises from the common misunderstand-
ings about what Anselm’s argument consists of and aims at. If it were the
case that Anselm’s argument is a proof for God’s existence that he presents in
Proslogion 2 or 2–3, then the concern about the identification would indeed
The burden and aim of Anselm’s argument is to prove God’s existence and to
prove all those claims that the Christians believe to be true of the divine es-
sence. In an apologetic context, this aim is achieved if it is shown that there
exists a being that has all the properties that the divine essence is believed to
have. One need not identify this being as ‘God’. The identification becomes rel-
evant if one wants to establish some further claims about the same being, but
then one is moving beyond the scope of the single argument.
In the actual text of the Proslogion, Anselm first introduces the idea that
God is something than which a greater cannot be thought by saying that ‘we
believe’ (credimus) God to be such.51 Here, the use of the expression ‘we be-
lieve’ need not imply that the idea introduced would have been a well-known
tenet of Christianity (even though Anselm perhaps wanted the audience to
take it in this way). It may be that the very first audience of the Proslogion at
the monastery of Bec was familiar with the notion ‘that than which a great-
er cannot be thought’ because it is possible that Anselm had already made
oral use of it, but in the tradition preceding Anselm, the notion appears only
rarely.52 Anselm can use the expression ‘we believe’ because the idea that he
introduces has a Christian appearance and it will soon turn out that it highly
coheres with the traditional teaching about God. In addition, Anselm needed
to introduce the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ in one
way or another, and he needed to do it smoothly.
Anselm’s strategy in the Proslogion is not to problematize the relation be-
tween ‘God’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. In the first in-
troduction of the idea, he may be stretching the truth when he creates the
impression that the reader should already be familiar with the notion ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ and have a positive attitude to it. In
the three-stage argument for God’s existence, Anselm refers to the thing that
he talks about as ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. When it is again
identified as God, in the middle of Proslogion 3, this is a matter of course. If
some readers should have doubts, on closer inspection they could find that in
Proslogion 3, Anselm has established that that than which a greater cannot be
thought has a distinctive characteristic of God: all other beings except for God
can be thought not to exist.53 In the latter part of Proslogion 3, there is even an
implicit argument for the identification of God and that than which a greater
51 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.4–5.
52 See note 49 above.
53 In the Responsio, Anselm explicitly states that ‘not being able to be thought not to exist’
is a distinctive characteristic of God. Responsio 4, S I, 134.16–17: ‘Sic igitur et proprium est
deo non posse cogitari non esse, …’
A Specific Identification of the Argument 57
cannot be thought on this basis.54 If the reader still entertains doubts, they
should disappear in Proslogion 5 at the latest: Anselm argues there that God or
that than which a greater cannot be thought is the sole creator of everything
else (and consequently the only being of its kind). As already stated, however,
there is no argument for the identity of God and that than which a greater
cannot be thought either here or later in the Proslogion. The notion ‘that than
which a greater cannot be thought’ surfaces in a few passages, and in them it is
used as an epithet of God.
In the above discussion, the idea that Anselm would seek to prove that
that than which a greater cannot be thought is God was rejected as incorrect.
On the other hand, it was argued that the sentence ‘God is that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ does not have an axiomatic status in the sense that
its truth would already be beyond dispute at the outset. Nevertheless, it can
perhaps be said that this sentence will acquire an axiomatic status as a result
of the Proslogion. Let me explain how.
Anselm’s argument would not be possible if it were not the case that the
predications about God can be systematized in a certain way: God is whatever
it is better to be than not to be. This systematization is closely dependent on
both faith and reason. The Christian faith teaches many claims about God, for
example, that he is good, that he is wise, that he is just, that he is goodness
itself, and so on. It is these accepted claims that the systematization presented
by Anselm tries to capture, and they can be seen as the starting point for it.55
However, reason evidently has an indispensable role in forming the systemati-
zation. Anselm maintains that the ability to make correct value judgements
belongs to the essence of rationality.56 In Monologion 15, he takes it for granted
that reason has the capability of discerning the predicates which are great-
making from predicates which are not. The direction of Anselm’s argument
in that chapter is from a distinction between different kinds of predicates to
a statement about what is predicated ‘substantially’ about the Supreme Being
(see 2.3). In the background, apparently, there is an inverse inference that
can be characterized as inductive. When believers consider the traditional
54 Hence, commentators like Stolz, McGill and Campbell are not entirely wrong. See note 18
in 3.2. However, the implicitness of the argument needs to be accentuated.
55 There are passages in both Christian and non-Christian sources that imply a similar
systematization. It would appear, as far as the Christian tradition is concerned, that the
individual predications about God ought to be primary and the systematization should
be seen as derivative. The situation may actually be more complex: the systematization
affects what is predicated of God and the actual predications about God affect what is
considered great-making.
56 Monologion 68, S I, 78.21–23. See also 2.3.
58 Chapter 3
predications about God with the aid of their reason, they should observe a
certain pattern: the predicates that hold true of God are great-making. The sys-
tematization of the predications about God depends on reason in that it is
based on the reason’s ability to recognize the great-making predicates.
There is a close connection between the systematization of the predications
about God and the identification of God as that than which a greater cannot
be thought. Because of the systematization, it is possible to use a simple reduc-
tio argument to show that that than which a greater cannot be thought must
have each and every one of the predicates that the divine essence is believed
to have. In a way, the identification of God as that than which a greater cannot
be thought encapsulates the systematization and makes it redundant: in the
foreground is the utterance ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ and
the force that its signification contains, and the systematization of the predica-
tions is background information. When the believers reflect about ‘that than
which a greater cannot be thought’ in relation to their Christian understanding
of God, they will soon start to perceive the sentence ‘God is that than which
a greater cannot be thought’ as a fundamental basic truth. This truth is inti-
mately connected to their faith: it encapsulates what they believe about the
divine essence. At the same time, the truth is rational insofar as it is based on
the reason’s ability to make correct value judgements. It can also be character-
ized as conceptual: ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ recommends
itself as a possible explication of what ‘God’ signifies. In this way, the sentence
‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ will acquire an axiomatic
status as a result of the Proslogion, and it will be both ‘an article of faith’ and ‘a
conceptual truth’ for someone who shares Anselm’s assumptions about reason
and God.
At the beginning of this chapter, six main alternatives for the single argument
were listed (A to F). In what follows, I make a case for choosing alternative D:
the single argument is the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’.
The case is based on a synchronized reading of three important passages in
which Anselm comments on the single argument: the preface to the Proslogion,
Responsio 10, and Responsio 5. These passages jointly support the idea that
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is the single argument, and they
jointly make it difficult for any of the other alternatives to qualify as the single
argument.
Anselm’s description of the single argument in the preface to the Proslogion
is the only legitimate starting point for the identification of the single argument
A Specific Identification of the Argument 59
because it is the only passage which quite explicitly speaks of the argument
in question. The passage places two requirements on the single argument:
(1) it will ‘need no other [argument] for proving itself than itself alone’, and
(2) it will ‘suffice by itself’ to establish a number of claims about God, includ-
ing God’s existence and ‘whatever we believe about the divine substance’.57
Responsio 10 is related to the latter requirement: it explains how and why the
single argument will ‘suffice by itself’ to establish some claims. Responsio 5 is
related to the former requirement: it explains how the single argument will
‘need no other [argument] for proving itself than itself alone’.
The passage in the preface and Responsio 10 comment on what is factually
the same argument, but it is described from different points of view. In the
preface, Anselm describes the burden and task of the single argument, but
he does not provide any hint about what the argument is. In Responsio 10, by
contrast, Anselm does not indicate what the task of the single argument is,
but he explains how the single argument functions and how it can fulfil its
task. Because the task of the single argument is to prove some things about
God, Anselm needs to use the word ‘God’ in the description in the preface.
At the same time, the word ‘God’ is not required in the explanation given in
Responsio 10, because the functioning of the single argument as such does not
depend on the identification of that than which a greater cannot be thought
as God (see 3.3).
Responsio 10 makes it clear that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
meets one of the two requirements expressed for the single argument in the
preface: this notion ‘suffices by itself’ to prove the things that the single argu-
ment should be able to prove. Nothing else than the force that the significa-
tion of the utterance ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ contains
is needed for the required claims to be proved of that than which a greater
cannot be thought, and this is produced ‘by the mere fact that it is understood
or thought of’.58 At the same time, the passage serves as evidence against the
other alternatives listed. Because Responsio 10 obviously aims at clarifying
what the single argument is about, it is reasonable to expect that Anselm will
there mention the entity that is the single argument. The only other alternative
that is present in Responsio 10 is the general argumentative idea (C). However,
the general idea merely appears in the passage, whereas there is positive evi-
dence for the identification of ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
as the single argument insofar as Anselm indicates that it ‘suffices by itself’ to
prove the things that the single argument should prove.
The requirement that the single argument will ‘need no other [argument]
for proving itself than itself alone’ has received only limited attention in the
debates about the interpretation of the Proslogion. It appears that many schol-
ars do not see this as a separate requirement; instead, it is taken to mean the
same thing as the clause ‘suffice[s] by itself’ in the description of the burden
and task of the argument. However, there is no reason to think that this is the
case. The requirement includes two parts: the argument needs no other argu-
ment for proving itself, and it itself can be used for proving itself. The first part
can perhaps be equated with the ‘suffice[s] by itself’ clause, but the second
part certainly includes a separate condition. Anselm’s description of the single
argument includes the idea that the single argument can be used for prov-
ing itself. This sounds odd, but it is nevertheless part of the central evidence.
Further, we are entitled to believe that the requirement is related to some cen-
tral feature in the functioning of the single argument, for otherwise Anselm
would not have included it in the brief description of the single argument.
There is no obvious answer to how a comprehensive piece of argumenta-
tion (A) or a form of argument (B) could prove itself. As for the general argu-
mentative idea (C) or a definition (E) or a sentence (F), it could be suggested
that the requirement about ‘proving itself’ means that Anselm intends to prove
that that than which a greater cannot be thought is God. This is a sensible
suggestion, but it does not meet with the facts. There is no indication in the
Proslogion that Anselm entertained the idea of presenting such a proof.
As for the view that the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
is the single argument, there is a way in which the requirement about ‘proving
itself’ can be connected to Anselm’s reductio argument. This idea comes up in
the other passage of the Responsio that comments on the description of the
single argument in the preface: Responsio 5. It also includes other features that
support the identification of ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ as
the single argument. For one thing, Anselm there explicitly uses the term ‘ar-
gument’ (argumentum) for entities like ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ and ‘(that which is) greater than all (else)’ (maius omnibus).59 What is
more, it turns out that the purpose of Responsio 5 is to point out the difference
between an argument/notion that needs some other argument for its support
and an argument/notion that needs no other argument than itself alone for
proving itself. The notion ‘(that which is) greater than all (else)’ is an example
of the former type, whereas the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ represents the latter type.
59 Responsio 5, S I, 135.18–26.
A Specific Identification of the Argument 61
[Y]ou often repeat that I say that that which is greater than all is in the
understanding, and if it is in the understanding, it also exists in reality, for
otherwise the greater than all would not be greater than all. Such a proof
cannot be found anywhere in what I have written. For ‘greater than all’
and ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ are not equally effec-
tive when it comes to proving the real existence of what is said.60
Here Anselm claims that there is an important difference between the notions
‘greater than all’ and ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, when it
comes to proving the existence of the thing. The difference, as will become ap-
parent, is that one needs another argument for its support, whereas the other
does not.
Anselm begins by considering, once again, the notion ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’. If someone should claim that that than which a
greater cannot be thought does not exist, or that it is able not to exist, or that
it can be thought not to exist, this person can be easily refuted. Anselm thinks
that the three claims are connected to each other in such a way that proving
the last point is enough. This can be done by using the reductio argument often
cited above: if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought
not to exist, it is not what it is said to be (which is, of course, impossible).61
However, Anselm claims, it seems that you cannot use such a simple proof in
the case of greater than all. If someone says that the greater than all can be
thought not to exist, you are not entitled straightaway to infer that it is not
greater than all. Anselm argues that ‘greater than all’ cannot be used as an ar-
gument to back itself up but needs another argument for its support:
However, it seems that it is not as easy to prove this about what is called
‘greater than all’. … For what if someone should say that something is
greater than all existing things but that it can nevertheless be thought not
to exist, and that something greater than it can be thought, even if this
does not exist? Would it in this case be possible to infer that it obviously
is not greater than all existing things, as in the other case it would quite
obviously be declared that it is not that than which a greater cannot be
thought? The former inference stands in need of another argument (alio
indiget argumento) in addition to what is called ‘greater than all’, but in
the latter no other [argument] is needed (non est opus alio) than the one
that resounds, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’.62
However, Anselm thinks that Gaunilo’s version can also be saved, and this can
be done by using the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ as
an argument:
62 Responsio 5, S I, 135.8–20: ‘Hoc autem non tam facile probari posse videtur de eo quod
maius dicitur omnibus. … Quid enim si quis dicat esse aliquid maius omnibus quae sunt,
et idipsum tamen posse cogitari non esse, et aliquid maius eo etiam si non sit, posse
tamen cogitari? An hic sic aperte inferri potest: non est ergo maius omnibus quae sunt,
sicut ibi apertissime diceretur: ergo non est quo maius cogitari nequit? Illud namque alio
indiget argumento quam hoc quod dicitur “omnibus maius”; in isto vero non est opus alio
quam hoc ipso quod sonat “quo maius cogitari non possit”.’
63 Responsio 5, S I, 135.20–23: ‘Ergo si non similiter potest probari de eo quod “maius om-
nibus” dicitur, quod de se per seipsum probat “quo maius nequit cogitari”: iniuste me
reprehendisti dixisse quod non dixi, cum tantum differat ab eo quod dixi.’
A Specific Identification of the Argument 63
In this passage, Anselm suggests that ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ can be used as an argument to prove that the greater than all exists in
reality. Using the reductio technique, it is easy to prove that that than which a
greater cannot be thought is the greater than all, and therefore the conclusions
which apply to the former also apply to the latter.65
The discussion in Responsio 5 is of critical importance for the identification
of Anselm’s single argument. First, the passage makes it clear that Anselm is
willing to apply the term ‘argument’ (argumentum) to entities like ‘that than
which a greater cannot be thought’ or ‘greater than all’. This is a way of using
the word ‘argument’ that we are not accustomed to, but we can certainly make
sense of it. As Anselm says in Responsio 10, his strategy of argumentation is
based on the force that the signification of the utterance ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ contains, and all that is required is that ‘it is un-
derstood or thought of’. The argument is that which convinces one of some-
thing, and in this case what should convince one is the notion ‘that than which
a greater cannot be thought’. Second, even though Anselm does not use the
exact formulation in Responsio 5 that he used in the preface, it is clear that
here he comments on what it means that the single argument ‘would need
no other [argument] for proving itself than itself alone’. Anselm argues that
‘greater than all’ will need an argument different from itself in order that some
claims about it can be proved, whereas ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ needs no other argument than itself in order that the same claims
64 Responsio 5, S I, 135, 24–31: ‘Si vero vel post aliud argumentum potest, nec sic me debuisti
reprehendere dixisse quod probari potest. Utrum autem possit, facile perpendit, qui hoc
posse “quo maius cogitari nequit” cognoscit. Nullatenus enim potest intelligi “quo maius
cogitari non possit” nisi id quod solum omnibus est maius. Sicut ergo “quo maius cogi-
tari nequit” intelligitur et est in intellectu, et ideo esse in rei veritate asseritur: sic quod
maius dicitur omnibus, intelligi et esse in intellectu, et idcirco re ipsa esse ex necessitate
concluditur.’
65 Anselm’s analysis of the situation is not satisfactory. True enough, if it can be proved that
(the thing called) ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ cannot be any other than
(the thing called) ‘greater than all’, it generally follows that what applies to the former
also applies to the latter. However, such an inference need not be valid in intensional con-
texts. For example, if someone understands (the phrase or the notion) ‘that than which
a greater cannot be thought’, it does not follow that he must therefore understand (the
phrase or the notion) ‘greater than all’.
64 Chapter 3
can be proved about it. The way in which ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ can be used for proving claims about itself is, of course, Anselm’s re-
ductio technique: you can prove claims about that than which a greater cannot
be thought by appealing to the signification of the expression ‘that than which
a greater cannot be thought’. This is what Anselm’s statement in the preface
that the single argument ‘would need no other [argument] for proving itself
than itself alone’ strives to convey. The statement is opaque, but that could
hardly be avoided, given that Anselm wanted to be brief and found it better not
to disclose yet what the single argument actually was. In Responsio 5, he makes
the issue a bit clearer. Third, Responsio 5 not only elucidates what the require-
ment in the preface means, but it also makes it clear that ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ is an argument that ‘need[s] no other [argument]
for proving itself than itself alone’.
Before concluding, it may be noted that the way we identify the single ar-
gument affects the way we are to interpret Anselm’s remark in the preface to
the Proslogion about the ‘many arguments’ in the Monologion (see also 2.4).
It should be possible to interpret the word ‘argument’ in the same manner in
these two instances, for the impression is that Anselm wants to replace ‘many
arguments’ with ‘one argument’.66 Hence, when ‘that than which a greater can-
not be thought’ is taken to be the single argument, the many arguments in the
Monologion should be taken to be some entities of a similar kind. The complex
manner in which Anselm formulates the remark about the ‘many arguments’
fits well with such an idea: ‘it was an interconnected chain of many arguments’,
or, more literally, ‘it was woven together (contextum) by a chaining together
(concatenatione) of many arguments (multa argumenta)’.67 The ‘many argu-
ments’ here need not be ‘pieces’ of argumentation but they can be any kind of
‘means’ of argumentation instead. The remark is certainly compatible with the
identification of the single argument here proposed.
Overall, Responsio 5 and Responsio 10 jointly offer sufficient evidence for
declaring that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ is the entity that
Anselm had in mind when he composed the description of the ‘single argu-
ment’ in the preface to the Proslogion. To achieve a deeper understanding of
these issues, we next turn to the early medieval art of dialectic and its theory
of argument.
66 This is not to say that the word argumentum should always be taken to have the same
meaning in Anselm’s works. See 4.3.
67 Proslogion, preface, S I, 93.4–5: ‘… considerans illud esse multorum concatenatione con-
textum argumentorum, …’
Chapter 4
Berengar also says other things to justify his use of dialectical notions and
principles in a discussion concerning the Eucharistic doctrine. For example,
he cites passages from Augustine’s works eulogizing the art of dialectic and
reason.2 Anselm would never make such a bold statement but he, nevertheless,
basically shares Berengar’s reliance on the power of dialectic and reason. This
is not due to some historical influence between the two, even though there are
reasons for thinking that Anselm knew some of Berengar’s earlier writings (see
5.3). The central position of dialectic is an essential and distinctive feature of
the intellectual culture in the latter period of the early Middle Ages. Some of
the best minds in the eleventh century, from Gerbert of Aurillac (died 1002) to
Peter Abelard (born 1079), spent major parts of their lives studying dialectic.3
This chapter deals with some aspects of early medieval dialectic with a twofold
aim: to give an idea of the significance of dialectic for Anselm’s thought and for
4 For Boethius and his influence on early medieval thought, especially logic, see John Marenbon,
Boethius (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); John Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Boethius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Marenbon, ‘Logic
before 1100’; Lewry, ‘Boethian Logic’, 90–108.
The Argument and Dialectic 67
5 See Christopher J. Martin, ‘The Logic of Negation in Boethius’, Phronesis 36 (1991), 277–304;
Marenbon, ‘Logic before 1100’, 15–18.
68 Chapter 4
expressions according to the types of entities that they signify. There are ten
categories, but Aristotle mainly concentrates on the first four in the Categories:
substance (for example, ‘man’, ‘horse’), quantity (‘two cubits long’), quality
(‘white’, ‘grammatical’), and relation (‘double’, ‘greater’). Despite the unpromis-
ing appearance, the doctrines of predicables and categories jointly embrace
a metaphysical theory, the basic ingredients of which include a distinction
between essential and accidental features of things and an account of an es-
sential hierarchical structure in being (the so-called ‘Porphyrian tree’). The
traditional theory of definition is based on the doctrine of predicables: the def-
inition consists of a genus and one or more differentiae, for example, a ‘man’ is
a ‘rational mortal animal’. Many of the maximal propositions in topics concern
the relations between the different predicables.
Some factors external to dialectic contributed to its central position in the
intellectual culture at the end of the early Middle Ages. One of these was the
limited availability of other philosophical texts. Apart from the sources of dia-
lectic, the early medieval thinkers acquired philosophical influences from a
variety of sources. The works of Cicero and Seneca contain many philosophi-
cal discussions. Some of Augustine’s works are rather philosophical in nature.
Of Boethius’s works, we should not forget The Consolation of Philosophy or
the theological tractates (the Opuscula sacra). A partial translation of Plato’s
Timaeus was available at least in some places, and so on. However, none of
the other, heterogeneous philosophical influences could effectively compete
with dialectic for the status of the representative of reason. The situation
would change in the course of the twelfth century when, among other things,
Aristotle’s scientific and philosophical works became available.
Importantly, some of the non-dialectical sources helped to reinforce the sta-
tus of dialectic. Both Augustine and Boethius make significant use of dialectic
in their theological works.6 In addition, there are passages in Augustine’s works
in which he explicitly deals with dialectic and its usefulness in theological dis-
cussion. In On Christian Teaching, he affirms the great value of the art for treat-
ment of theological issues:
6 The best known examples are Boethius’s theological tractates and Augustine’s On the Trinity.
7 Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, 31, 48.
The Argument and Dialectic 69
… that discipline of disciplines which they call ‘dialectic’? This art teaches
how to teach, and it teaches how to learn. In it, reason itself shows itself
and reveals what it is, what it wishes, and what it is capable of. It knows
how to know, and by itself it not only wishes to make men knowledgeable
but also can make them so.8
Clarendon Press, 1967) and Desmond Paul Henry, Commentary of De grammatico: The
Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm’s (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974).
14 In addition, the collection of drafts known as Philosophical Fragments or Lambeth
Fragments can be characterized as largely dialectical. These fragments, not included in
Schmitt’s Opera omnia edition, are edited in the Memorials of St. Anselm, ed. R. W. Southern
and F. S. Schmitt, Auctores Britannici medii aevi 1 (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), 334–51.
15 Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a12–15; 4, 1b27–2a4; 8, 10a29–32. See Aristotle, Categoriae vel
Praedicamenta, Translatio Boethii & Editio composita, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello,
Aristoteles Latinus I.1–5 (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961). Paronyms can also be
called denominatives (denominativa in Latin).
16 De grammatico 1, S I, 145.4–6.
17 De veritate, preface, S I, 173.6.
The Argument and Dialectic 71
However, since you know how strongly the dialecticians in our times con-
tend about the question you have proposed, I do not want you to cling to
what we have said to such a degree that you would hold to it obstinately
even if by more cogent arguments someone else could destroy it and es-
tablish something different.18
lead to that conclusion and the clarity of truth would openly manifest it
to be the case.21
Anselm warns his audience that the work at hand will be strenuous reading.
The reader should expect concise argumentation in which Anselm establishes
a series of conclusions by proving them with the aid of rational arguments.
Because of the mode of presentation, dialectical influence is omnipresent in
the Monologion. Anselm strives to make his arguments formally valid accord-
ing to dialectical standards, and he strives to start from premises that any ratio-
nal person would be compelled to accept.
As already intimated (2.3), one of Anselm’s objectives in the Monologion
is to critically discuss the applicability of dialectical notions in the treatment
of the divine essence. For the most part, the discussions directed to this end
are included in Anselm’s treatment of the properties of the Supreme Being
in Monologion 15–28. The metaphysical theory contained in the doctrines of
predicables and categories was designed for discussing the natural world and
the things in it. Anselm argues in the Monologion that the Supreme Being dif-
fers from natural entities in important ways: the ontological framework en-
tailed in the theories of predicables and categories does not apply to it. In
Monologion 16–17, Anselm points out some peculiarities of the attributes of
the Supreme Being. In the theory of predicables, there is a distinction between
predications in respect of what a thing is (in eo quod quid) and in respect of
what it is like (in eo quod quale). It would appear that saying that the Supreme
Being is wise would be a statement ‘in respect of what it is like’. Anselm argues
that all true substantial predications about the Supreme Being are ‘in respect
of what it is’. For example, it is not said to be wise because it has wisdom but
because it is wisdom itself. Further, Anselm argues that the things that can
be predicated of the Supreme Being are not separate things but one and the
same thing.22 The outcome of Monologion 16–17 is that the essential constitu-
tion of the divine essence is altogether different from that of created beings.
In Monologion 18–24, Anselm discusses the relation of the Supreme Being
to space and time. Even in this respect, it proves to be quite unlike created
beings.23
In Monologion 25, Anselm investigates whether the Supreme Being is mu-
table by virtue of accidents. The main point is that the Supreme Being does not
and cannot have any accidents that would imply some change in it. However, it
the main body of the work, and even though there are many tightly reasoned
passages in it, there are no technical terms related to the dialectical theory
of argument.29 Superficially, the Proslogion is the least dialectical among
Anselm’s treatises, but the appearance of the Proslogion is deceptive. We have
seen that there is a single argument in the Proslogion with the aid of which it
should be possible to prove everything that the Christians believe about the
divine essence. In what follows, I seek to show that Anselm looked at this argu-
ment within the framework of the dialectical theory of argument.30
Of the parts of dialectic that are directly concerned with argumentation, syl-
logistics is focused on the validity of the inference form, and topics is focused
on discovering and confirming the premises in the inference. In its Boethian
form, the theory of topics assumes that there are self-evident universal propo-
sitions, called maximal propositions, that can be used to prove other propo-
sitions. The main part of topics consists of a discussion of various maximal
propositions, grouped under a number of headings called differentiae.31 Before
presenting such a discussion, however, Boethius offers a general treatment
of issues in the theory of argument. The following presentation is based on
Boethius’s treatment in book I of In Ciceronis Topica, that is, the commentary
on Cicero’s Topics.32 ‘Argument’ (argumentum) is one of the basic terms in the
Boethian theory of argument. Other basic terms are ‘maximal proposition’, ‘dif-
ferentia’, ‘Topic’, ‘thing in doubt’, ‘question’, and ‘argumentation’.
Topics was principally conceived as a heuristic technique for uncovering
arguments. In the text that Boethius comments on, Cicero compares finding
29 I am thinking here of the main text of the Proslogion, leaving aside the preface and the
exchange with Gaunilo. Nevertheless, there is a rather dialectical discussion of divine om-
nipotence in Proslogion 7, S I, 105–106.
30 For earlier versions of the discussion that follows, see Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology,
135–45; Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘Anselm’s Argumentum and the Early Medieval Theory of
Argument’, Vivarium 45 (2007), 1–29, at 10–29.
31 This use of ‘differentia’ should not be confused with the use of the term in the theory of
predicables.
32 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica, ed. J. C. Orelli and I. G. Baiter (Zurich: Fuesslini, 1833), 270–
388. English translation: Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, translated, with notes and an intro-
duction by Eleonore Stump (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1988). I use Stump’s
translations. For a general discussion of Boethius’s works on the topics, see Niels Jørgen
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia,
1984), 39–82.
The Argument and Dialectic 75
arguments to finding hidden things. You can find a hidden thing easily if the
place (locus in Latin, topos in Greek) where you should look for it is indicated
to you. In the same way, you can find arguments easily if you know the ‘places’
where it pays to look for them.33 In topics, the places where arguments can be
found are simply called ‘places’, loci; the English technical term is ‘Topic’ (with
a capital T).
The traditional Ciceronian definition of a ‘Topic’ says that it is ‘the seat of
the argument’ (sedes argumenti). According to Boethius’s account, the tra-
dition contains two competing ideas about what kinds of things Topics are:
the Aristotelian view says that maximal propositions are Topics, whereas the
Ciceronian view holds that differentiae of maximal propositions are Topics.34
The maximal propositions are universal, self-evident propositions that are
‘known and manifest to such an extent that they need no proof but rather
themselves provide proof for things that are in doubt’, such as ‘Every number is
either even or odd’ and ‘If equals are subtracted from equals, equals remain’.35
The differentiae, for their part, are the headings under which the maximal
propositions are grouped. For example, there are some maximal propositions
that are related to definitions, and these are situated under the differentia ‘from
the definition’ (a definitione) or ‘from the whole’ (a toto). Correspondingly,
those maximal propositions that concern the genus are situated under the dif-
ferentia ‘from the genus’ (a genere), and so on.36 From a practical point of view,
it makes little difference whether you use the term ‘Topic’ to refer to maximal
propositions or to the differentiae of the maximal propositions.
‘Argument’ (argumentum) was defined by Cicero as ‘a reason that produces
belief regarding a thing in doubt’ (ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem).37 As Boethius
construed this definition, the central expression in it is ‘thing in doubt’ (res
dubia), which he understood as a technical term. Boethius starts from the as-
sumption that arguments are produced for the purpose of solving ‘questions’.
‘Question’ (quaestio) is also here a technical term, and it is defined as ‘a propo-
sition in doubt’. Not all interrogative sentences are questions in this sense. A
question asks whether or not something is the case, for example ‘Is heaven
spherical?’ Boethius claims that a question, in a way, includes a contradiction:
it contains an affirmation and a negation. For example, the question ‘Is heav-
en spherical?’ contains the affirmation ‘Heaven is spherical’ and the negation
33 Cicero, Topica 2, 7.
34 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 282–83. Trans. Stump, 36.
35 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 280. Trans. Stump, 33.
36 See Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 281. Trans. Stump, 34.
37 Cicero, Topica 2, 8. Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 276–77.
Trans. Stump, 29, modified.
76 Chapter 4
‘Heaven is not spherical’. These two propositions are called by Boethius the
‘parts’ of a question. Now, the term ‘thing in doubt’ (res dubia) is defined as ‘a
part of a question’ (pars quaestionis). The expression ‘thing in doubt’, hence,
can be used to refer to the affirmation and negation that a question contains.38
However, when ‘a thing in doubt’ is understood in this way, the definition of ‘ar-
gument’ will say that an argument is a ‘reason’ that produces belief regarding
either the affirmation or the negation that are contained in a question:
38 See Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 277. Trans. Stump, 30.
39 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 277–78. Trans. Stump, 30.
40 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 278. Trans. Stump, 31.
41 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 282. Trans. Stump, 35.
The Argument and Dialectic 77
Ciceronian view, Boethius points out four possible ways of interpreting the
terms ‘argumentation’ and ‘argument’ and argues that in all four cases the dif-
ferentia of maximal propositions is ‘the seat of the argument’. In two of the
cases, the term ‘argument’ is interpreted in the same way, the difference being
in the signification of the term ‘argumentation’. As a result, the passage in-
cludes three possible interpretations for the term ‘argument’:
1. the argument is ‘the thought and meaning of the syllogism’;
2. the argument is ‘the expression of the reasoning together with the maxi-
mal propositions and the meaning of the syllogism’;
3. the argument is ‘the maximal proposition’.42
On the basis of the comments that Boethius makes earlier, it appears that he
prefers the first interpretation, but he fails to say it in this context. The signifi-
cation of the term ‘argument’ that is relevant for Anselm’s argument, however,
is not among the three explicated by Boethius. Some passages in In Ciceronis
Topica suggest a fourth interpretation: the term ‘argument’ can be used to refer
to the middle term of the syllogism.
To appreciate the idea that a middle term can be called an argument, it is
important to recognize, first of all, the central role of terms in early medieval
dialectic (or in Aristotelian logic). Dialectical sentence analysis starts from
the analysis of a simple sentence by terms: a simple sentence consists of two
terms, the subject and the predicate. In categorical syllogistics, terms have a
constitutive role. A categorical syllogism consists of three simple sentences,
which contain three different terms (S, P, and M), each of which appears in two
sentences: the predicate of the conclusion (P) also appears in the first premise;
the subject of the conclusion (S) also appears in the second premise; the third
term is the middle term (M), which appears in both of the premises. The clas-
sification of valid syllogisms starts from a division of them into four figures
on the basis of how the terms S, P, and M are situated in the premises (that
is to say, whether they are in a subject position or in a predicate position).
The subject and predicate of the conclusion are called ‘the extreme terms’ or
‘extremes’ (extremi).43
42 See Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 282. Trans. Stump,
35–36.
43 The main sources for categorical syllogistics were Boethius’s textbooks Introductio ad
syllogismos categoricos (Patrologia Latina 64, 761–94) and De syllogismis categoricis
(Patrologia Latina 64, 793–832). In the early Middle Ages, the letters S, P, and M were not
yet used to refer to the three terms in the syllogism. Instead, the expressions ‘the lesser
term’ (= S), ‘the greater term’ (= P), and ‘the middle term’ or ‘the common term’ (= M) were
used.
78 Chapter 4
The idea that there is at least a close connection between an ‘argument’ and
the middle term of a syllogism comes up in a passage where Boethius explains
how a syllogism functions. The ‘question’ that Boethius uses as an example in
this passage is ‘Whether a man is a substance or not’. Boethius chooses to de-
fend the affirmative part of the question, that is, the part ‘Man is a substance’.
Thus, this is the ‘thing in doubt’ that he aims at confirming with the aid of an
argument, and at the same time it is the conclusion of the syllogism that he
will construct. The subject term in it is ‘man’, and the predicate term is ‘sub-
stance’. To be able to construct a syllogism that proves his conclusion, Boethius
needs to find a middle term. He explains the procedure as follows:
So in order for us to join man and substance, we must find a middle term
that might unite both terms. Let this be animal and let this be one prem-
ise: ‘Every man is an animal’. In this proposition animal is the predicate,
and man is the subject. Then I add ‘But every animal is a substance’. In
this proposition animal is now the subject and substance is the predi-
cate. And in this way I conclude, ‘Every man is a substance’. … Thus the
extreme terms are united by insertion of a middle term, and in this way
the members of the question are coupled with each other and the doubt
is resolved by the proof employed. Hence an argument is nothing other
than the discovery of an intermediate, for an intermediate will be able to
conjoin the extremes, if an affirmation is being maintained, or to disjoin
them, if a negation is being asserted.44
It is noteworthy that Boethius also describes the syllogistic procedure from the
point of view of terms, and from this point of view, of course, the middle term
will play the central role. In Boethius’s description, the middle term (medius
terminus) is a term that ‘unites both terms’ (qui utrosque copulet terminos), and
when a syllogism is formulated with the aid of it, ‘the extreme terms are united
(copulantur) by insertion of a middle term’. In this way, the middle term ‘will be
able to conjoin the extremes’, in the instance where you argue for the affirma-
tive part of the question, ‘or to disjoin them’, if you argue for the negative part.
The power of the syllogism is, hence, based on the power of its middle term.
The centrality of the middle term for the argument also appears in Boethius’s
statement that ‘an argument is nothing other than the discovery of an interme-
diate’ (nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio). It should also be
noted that Boethius’s explanation of the functioning of a syllogism includes a
44 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 7–2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 279. Trans. Stump, 32,
slightly modified.
The Argument and Dialectic 79
45 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 8], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 283–84. Trans. Stump, 37.
46 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica I, [2, 9], ed. Orelli and Baiter, 288, and [2, 10], 289–90 and 291.
Trans. Stump, 42, 45, and 47.
47 Peter Abelard, Super Topica glossae, ed. Mario Dal Pra, Scritti di logica, 2nd ed. (Florence:
La Nuova Italia, 1969), 294. For the doctrine of the topics in the tenth to twelfth centuries,
see Green-Pedersen, Tradition of the Topics, 139–221, here especially 171–72.
80 Chapter 4
call neither the propositions nor their meaning ‘the argument’, but in-
stead those things or terms in the preceding propositions—as that in
which the probative force resides—which we call ‘Topics’. For example,
when we say that Socrates is a man, wherefore he is an animal, they call
man—which is the Topic—‘the argument’.48
Hence above, where you [Berengar] wanted to prove that the bread and
the wine of the altar do not undergo an essential change at the consecra-
tion, you adopted two [sentences] as Topics for arguments, of which I
proved with the aid of manifest reasons that one was yours only, and the
other was no one’s. Here, you made a grave error. For what was yours was
the question. It is this that we are querying: we endeavour to tear down
and smash it with all the weight and impact of arguments. Moreover,
no question can be a Topic for an argument. A Topic for an argument
has to be either certain in itself or proved by means of certain grounds.
Therefore, what was only yours, should not at all have been adopted to
prove a thing in doubt.51
Among the basic terms of topics included in the passage are the following:
Topic, argument, argumentation, question, and, a thing in doubt. The discus-
sion of De corpore in Part 2 will establish that this treatise is highly problematic
as a source, but the passage quoted nevertheless makes clear that the author of
the treatise was familiar with the dialectical theory of argument.
Third, even though Anselm makes little use of terminology pertaining to
topics, even outside the Proslogion, there is some evidence to show that he
is familiar with the dialectical theory of argument. In De grammatico 1, the
Student describes the question discussed in the work with terms reminiscent
of some passages in the sources of topics:
The idea that a ‘question’ consists of two mutually exclusive ‘parts’ derives
from the tradition of topics, and the verbs astruere and destruere are used as
a pair in Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica.53 In De grammatico 4, Anselm empha-
sizes the centrality of the middle term (here called ‘a common term’) in an
inference:
T. See, then, whether they [that is, two sentences intended as premises]
have a common term, without which they cannot accomplish anything.
S. I see that they do not have a common term and, hence, that nothing
follows from them.
…
T. Does it seem to you, then, that nothing can be concluded from these
sequences of yours?
This passage confirms that Anselm shared the view that what is central in the
argument is the middle term.
Anselm was familiar with the Boethian theory of argument, and there is
no reason to doubt that he was also familiar with the contemporary discus-
sions about this part of dialectic. Even though Abelard’s description of the dif-
ferent interpretations of the term ‘argument’ need not reflect the situation in
Anselm’s environment, Anselm must have been familiar with the fact that the
terms ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’ were used in a variety of different ways
in the Boethian sources. Anselm himself usually does not make any systematic
distinction between ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’,55 and he usually does not
use the term ‘argument’ of expressions that function as a middle term. There
appears to be one exception: the description of the single argument in the
preface to the Proslogion and the comments on it in the Responsio.
In the preceding chapter, a favourable case was made that ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ is to be identified as Anselm’s single argument. The
theory of argument described in this chapter makes this initially unexpected
view more understandable. Boethius’s account of how a syllogism functions
accentuates the centrality of the middle term, and some of his remarks suggest
that the middle term can be called an ‘argument’. One of the roles that ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ has in Anselm’s argumentation is that
it functions as the middle term in some inferences (see below). In Responsio 5,
Anselm explicitly uses the term argumentum to refer to notions like ‘that than
that Anselm has in mind is ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. Using
this term as a middle term, it is possible to construct a categorical syllogism for
any of those sentences that the single argument should prove. For example, we
can prove that ‘God is wise’ as follows:
This kind of categorical syllogism is certainly not the most important thing re-
lated to the single argument. Anselm does not actually spell out any such syllo-
gism in the Proslogion or in the Responsio. Nevertheless, the idea is undeniably
there. Anselm proves notions of that than which a greater cannot be thought
in order that the conclusions can be applied to God (Proslogion 2–3), and he
proves notions of God on the basis that he is that than which a greater cannot
be thought (Proslogion 5, 15, 18). A reconstruction of such arguments with the
aid of tools that were used in early medieval dialectic will naturally include a
categorical syllogism.59
Using a reductio ad absurdum is a more important and more interesting part
of Anselm’s argumentation. As shown previously (2.4), Anselm could argue for
sentences like ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought is wise’ by present-
ing reductio inferences for their support:
If that than which a greater cannot be thought were not wise, it could be
thought to be wise, which is greater.
Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought were not wise,
then that than which a greater cannot be thought would be that than
which a greater can be thought.
But this is impossible.
Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is wise.
How should such a reductio be analysed with the aid of early medieval tools? If
we apply the approach that Boethius suggests in book I of In Ciceronis Topica,
we should look for terms, that is, expressions that function as subjects and
predicates in the sentences in the reductio. Because ‘that than which a greater
cannot be thought’ and the predicate in question (say, ‘wise’) are the subject
59 It should be emphasized, however, that the functioning of the single argument as such
does not depend on the identification of that than which a greater cannot be thought as
God. See 3.3.
The Argument and Dialectic 85
and predicate of the conclusion, they are also to be treated as terms in the
preceding sentences. If we leave them out, there is little in the reductio that
could qualify as a ‘term’: there are expressions like ‘can be thought’ and ‘great-
er’, but none of these plays the central role that the middle term is assumed to
play. The most central term in the reductio is no other than ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’, on the signification of which the reductio hinges.
As Anselm says in Responsio 10, the ‘signification of this utterance’ contains ‘so
much force’ that ‘what is said is necessarily … proved both to exist in reality
and to be whatever should be believed about the divine substance.’60
A Boethian reconstruction of Anselm’s argument can, hence, be presented
as follows. You want to present a proof for a number of sentences about God.
You prove these sentences with the aid of categorical syllogisms in which ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ is used as a middle term. To confirm
one of the premises in the syllogism, you again use the term ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ as a (quasi) middle term, but this time not in a cat-
egorical syllogism but in a reductio argument. There is a psychological aspect
in the Boethian approach: the middle term of a syllogism has the power of
conjoining or disjoining the extreme terms (that is, the subject and the predi-
cate of the conclusion) not only logically but also in the mind of the one who
considers the syllogism, so that the doubt is removed. The psychological as-
pect makes it possible to apply the analysis designed for categorical syllogisms
to an inference like Anselm’s reductio. Because the consideration of the term
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ forces the mind to see the rela-
tion of the extreme terms (say, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
and ‘wise’) in a certain way, this term can be characterized as a (quasi) middle
term and as an ‘argument’. In the same way, it is useful to think of the verb
‘prove’ and other similar verbs in a psychological manner: ‘proving’ is bringing
it about that the relation of the extreme terms will be seen in a certain way. The
notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can function as the single
argument because it contains ‘so much force’ that it will be able to ‘prove’ a
number of statements without bringing in any other notions that would serve
as arguments.
Anselm’s discussion of ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ and
‘(that which is) greater than all (else)’ in Responsio 5 (see 3.4) fits well with
the Boethian reconstruction of the single argument, and it confirms that the
reconstruction closely corresponds to Anselm’s own way of looking at the mat-
ter. Even though Anselm does not say it in so many words, ‘greater than all’ and
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ are two rival middle terms that
can be used in categorical syllogisms to prove sentences about God. The no-
tion ‘greater than all’ can function as a middle term in a categorical syllogism
exactly in the same way as ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can:
What makes the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ superior
to ‘greater than all’ is that it is capable of supporting its own status as a middle
term if this should be questioned. The discussion in Responsio 5 is connected
to the claim in the preface that the single argument ‘would need no other [ar-
gument] for proving itself than itself alone’. The main thrust in Responsio 5 is
to point out the difference between an argument that needs some other argu-
ment than itself for proving itself and an argument that needs no other argu-
ment than itself for proving itself. The argument ‘greater than all’ is an example
of the former type, whereas the argument ‘that than which a greater cannot
be thought’ is an example—in Anselm’s opinion, the unique example—of the
latter type:
For what if someone should say that something is greater than all existing
things but that it can nevertheless be thought not to exist, and that some-
thing greater than it can be thought, even if this does not exist? Would
it in this case be possible to infer that it obviously is not greater than all
existing things, as in the other case it would quite obviously be declared
that it is not that than which a greater cannot be thought? The former
inference stands in need of another argument (alio indiget argumento)
in addition to what is called ‘greater than all’, but in the latter no other
[argument] is needed (non est opus alio) than the one that resounds, ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’.61
A little later, Anselm suggests that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’
can be used as an argument (argumentum) to prove that certain predicates
apply to the greater than all.62 Using the reductio argument, it is easy to prove
that that than which a greater cannot be thought is the greater than all, and
therefore the conclusions which apply to the former also apply to the latter.
In this way, ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can function as a
61 Responsio 5, S I, 135.8–20.
62 Responsio 5, S I, 135.24–31.
The Argument and Dialectic 87
middle term that brings together the term ‘greater than all’ and the predicates
that apply to the divine essence.
The Boethian theory of argument can be used to account for Anselm’s confi-
dence that his argument is unique. Anselm ends Responsio 5 with the following
remark:
Do you see, then, how rightly you compared me to that stupid person
who wanted to affirm the lost island’s existence merely on the ground
that its description would be understood?63
I reply with confidence that if anyone should find for me something ex-
isting either in reality or only in thought, in addition to that than which a
greater cannot be thought, to which the logic of my argumentation could
be applied, then I will find the lost island and give it to that person, no
longer to be lost.64
63 Responsio 5, S I, 135.31–136.2.
64 Responsio 3, S I, 133.6–9.
88 Chapter 4
The principal objective in Part 1 of the study has been to uncover and de-
scribe the single argument that Anselm had discovered and wished to pres-
ent to his audience in the Proslogion. Essentially, this objective has now been
achieved. Anselm’s single argument is the notion ‘that than which a greater
cannot be thought’. The signification of this notion contains so much force
that it ‘need[s] no other [argument] for proving itself than itself alone’ and
‘suffice[s] by itself to establish that God truly exists, that he is the supreme
good … and whatever we believe about the divine substance’. A correct analysis
of the single argument, when carefully applied, will make it possible to un-
ravel many of the puzzles and misperceptions that have vitiated the discussion
about the interpretation of Anselm’s treatise. However, procuring an accurate
idea of the single argument is not the only task that a historical introduction to
the Proslogion needs to accomplish. The analysis of the single argument itself
presented here gives rise to a major interpretive issue—a question that I call
‘the puzzle of the Proslogion’.
In the preface to the treatise, Anselm gives us to understand that he com-
posed the Proslogion in order to introduce the single argument. However, it
turns out that the Proslogion is not particularly suited for the purpose. On the
basis of the actual text of the Proslogion, that is, the twenty-six chapters in
the work, it is rather difficult to get a good idea of the argument—or to get
any idea of it, for Anselm fails to indicate in the actual text that there is a sin-
gle argument to look for. The material that Anselm added later (the preface,
some passages in the Responsio) helps towards an identification of the single
argument, but Anselm does not spell out what the argument actually is there,
either. The Proslogion is a radically contingent application of the single argu-
ment, and Anselm could have introduced the argument in question equally
well in some other way, say, by writing a dialogue or another monologion. There
emerges, hence, the following question: If Anselm’s aim in the Proslogion was
to introduce the single argument, why did he do his job so badly? Why did he
The Argument and Dialectic 89
introduce the single argument in such a way that many readers would have dif-
ficulties in recognizing the argument, when it would have been easy for him to
introduce it in a clear and lucid manner?
One possible solution to the puzzle would be to say that Anselm greatly
overestimated the intelligence of his fellow humans. There may be some truth
in this supposition. However, a more interesting explanation also presents it-
self. Even if Anselm’s outspoken aim in the Proslogion was the introduction of
the single argument, it may be that he had some other unmentioned aims that
were more important, and the pursuing of these other aims affected the way
in which the outspoken aim was pursued. In what follows, I elaborate on this
idea, but before that can be done, we need to become thoroughly acquainted
with the historical context in which the Proslogion was composed.
Part 2
The Historical Context
∵
Chapter 5
Providing the relevant information about the context in which the Proslogion
was composed and published is not a straightforward task, because the current
scholarship suffers from a number of misperceptions.1 These misperceptions
concern such matters as Lanfranc’s role in Anselm’s education, the gen-
eral evaluation of Lanfranc’s intellectual contribution, the evaluation of the
Eucharistic treatise De corpore et sanguine Domini, and the exchange between
Anselm and Lanfranc in connection with the publication of the Monologion.
It is not possible to treat all these matters adequately here (in Part 2), but I will
give my reasons for disagreeing with the conventional account(s) and sketch
an alternative explanation.
Several factors have contributed to the defect in the current scholarship, but
I would like to point out three. First, some biases are common among scholars:
they are predisposed to think highly of some historical figures and less highly
of some others.2 Both Lanfranc and Anselm are among those who are looked
at appreciatively, whereas few scholars have sympathy for Berengar. Second,
the texts in the background of the Proslogion cannot be properly understood
without an advanced knowledge of several aspects of eleventh-century cul-
ture. Third and most important, one of these texts was specifically designed to
mislead those who read it. Of course, the target audience of those who com-
posed the text was among their contemporaries, but as an unintended side
effect, they have misled and continue to mislead the scholarly world of a much
later time.
1 Scholars often rely on the relevant passages in the current standard biography, R. W. Southern,
Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In
addition, see G. R. Evans, ‘Anselm’s Life, Works, and Immediate Influence’, in Brian Davies
and Brian Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 5–31; Margaret Gibson, Lanfranc of Bec (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1978); H. E. J. Cowdrey, Lanfranc: Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003); Giles E. M. Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
2 For a large part, this is a matter of academic tradition, but the religious or national back-
ground of different scholars can also be relevant here.
3 Lanfranc of Canterbury, De corpore et sanguine Domini, Patrologia Latina (= PL) 150, 407–42.
The collations published in Jean de Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger: la controverse eucharis-
tique du XIe siècle (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1971), 540–45 are to be used for
amending the text in PL. In the citations in notes, the word ‘amended’ will be used to indi-
cate such improvements. The early historical parts (407–409C, 410C–412A, 412D–413D) of De
corpore have been edited in Serta mediaevalia, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum,
Continuatio Mediaevalis 171 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 239–46. The English translation
On the Body and Blood of the Lord, trans. Mark G. Vaillancourt, The Fathers of the Church,
Mediaeval Continuation 10 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), is
to be used with discretion, as there are serious mistakes in many central passages.
4 In anglophone scholarship, the appreciative evaluation of Lanfranc has been sustained,
above all, by the influential studies by Richard Southern. See R. W. Southern, ‘Lanfranc of
Bec and Berengar of Tours’, in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin, and R. W. Southern (eds.), Studies
in Medieval History presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948),
27–48; R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1963), 12–26; Southern, Anselm: A Portrait, 14–32, 39–59. The idea that Lanfranc used
the Aristotelian notions of substance and accident to analyse the Eucharistic conversion
originates with Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’, 39–41. See also Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and
Theology in the Eleventh Century (Leiden: Brill, 1996), especially the chapters on Lanfranc
(44–76) and Berengar (77–118), and Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘“Lanfranc of Bec” and Berengar of
Tours’, in David Bates (ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies 34. Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2011
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 105–21, which includes a summary treatment of some of
the main issues discussed in this chapter and Chapter 6.
Anselm and Lanfranc—the Early Years 95
carefully crafted rhetorical text and that it is rhetorical to such an extent that it
is doubtful whether it can be seen as a serious theological contribution at all.
The following chapter offers an extensive analysis of De corpore to validate a
reappraisal of the treatise from this perspective.
The re-evaluation of De corpore transforms the picture of the background of
the Proslogion. It affects our understanding of Lanfranc’s intellectual contribu-
tion and his stance regarding the method that should be used in theological
inquiry. Because De corpore is highly rhetorical in nature and, at least at some
points, aims at misleading the audience, one must be careful in using this trea-
tise as evidence for its author’s putative views. In addition, even though De cor-
pore is firmly attributed to Lanfranc, this does not mean that Lanfranc was the
real author of the treatise, for the attribution to Lanfranc could be a rhetorical
device. Related to this, I make a case for the claim that Anselm, Lanfranc’s clos-
est associate in the early 1060s, was involved in the composition of De corpore
(see 5.3). This prospect, for its part, further complicates the attempt to delin-
eate the background of the Proslogion: the re-evaluation of De corpore not only
changes the ‘landscape’ in the background of Anselm but also suggests that the
line between the ‘portrait’ of Anselm and the ‘landscape’ behind him needs to
be drawn again.
In the current discussions about Lanfranc’s intellectual heritage, some ideas
in De corpore have been used to exemplify the kinds of things that Anselm
learned in the school that Lanfranc was running at the monastery of Bec.5
The considerations presented above make this kind of approach problem-
atic. There is more, however. The grounds for the common supposition that
Anselm’s relation to Lanfranc should be seen as that of a pupil to a teacher
generally turn out to be meagre. There are several misperceptions related to
this topic in the literature.
It is the burden of Part 2 to provide essential information about the histori-
cal context in which the Proslogion was composed and published. This chapter
deals with Anselm’s relation to Lanfranc in the early 1060s when they both
lived at the monastery of Bec. Chapter 6 discusses the background, content,
nature, and aims of De corpore, and Chapter 7 discusses the faith and reason
issue from De corpore up to the eve of the publication of the Proslogion as well
as Anselm’s relation to Lanfranc in this framework.
5 Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’, 39–43; Southern, Anselm and His Biographer, 21–24.
96 Chapter 5
There are some well-known similarities in the life of Anselm and the life of
Lanfranc. They were both born in north-western Italy. Lanfranc was born in
Pavia c. 1010, and Anselm was born in Aosta in 1033 (or 1034). They both left
their home country when they were young, moving to Burgundy and then to
France. Lanfranc crossed the Alps around 1030–35, when he was 20–25 years
old, and Anselm did the same in 1056, when he was 23. They both ended up
in Normandy and the Benedictine monastery situated in Bec. Lanfranc came
to Bec at some date between 1042 and 1047, Anselm in 1059. They both be-
came monks at Bec and each served a lengthy term as prior of the monastery,
Lanfranc from the late 1040s until 1063, Anselm from 1063 to 1078. After their
tenures as prior, they both became abbots: Lanfranc was the founding abbot
of St. Stephen’s at Caen (1063–70) and Anselm became abbot of Bec (1078–
93). They both ended their careers in the see of Canterbury in the newly con-
quered England. Lanfranc was the first Norman archbishop there (1070–89),
and Anselm succeeded him (1093–1109) after an interval of some years when
the see was vacant.6
There was a close personal relationship between Anselm and Lanfranc for
thirty years, from Anselm’s arrival at Bec in 1059 till Lanfranc’s death in 1089,
but it was only the first four years or so (from 1059 to 1063) that Anselm and
Lanfranc lived in the same place. It is on the basis of these four common years
at the monastery of Bec that Anselm’s relationship to Lanfranc is character-
ized as that of a pupil to a teacher. This understanding of the nature of their
relation is traditional. The idea that Lanfranc was Anselm’s teacher is taken for
granted in the current literature. One important strand in the scholarly tra-
dition maintains that Lanfranc was an eminent dialectician and puts an em-
phasis on this aspect of his teaching activity.7 On the other hand, Lanfranc’s
role in Anselm’s formation is often described in more general terms as well.
All along, I assume that the characterization of Anselm as ‘Lanfranc’s pupil’
and of Lanfranc as ‘Anselm’s teacher’ requires that Lanfranc had a substantial
6 For Lanfranc, see Gibson, Lanfranc; Cowdrey, Lanfranc; Jean-Hervé Foulon, ‘The Foundation
and Early History of Le Bec’, in Benjamin Pohl and Laura L. Gathagan (eds.), A Companion
to the Abbey of Le Bec in the Central Middle Ages (11th–13th Centruries) (Leiden-Boston: Brill,
2018), 11–37, at 27–30. The conventional dating for Lanfranc’s arrival at Bec is 1042 and for his
accession to the priorate 1045; Foulon dates Lanfranc’s arrival around 1046–47 and accession
to the priorate around 1049–50. For Anselm, see Evans, ‘Anselm’s Life’, and Southern, Anselm:
A Portrait, especially xxvii–viii.
7 Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’; Southern, Anselm and His Biographer, 12–26; Southern, Anselm:
A Portrait, 39–66.
Anselm and Lanfranc—the Early Years 97
After passing almost three years from this time [that is, from the time
Anselm crossed the Alps], partly in Burgundy, and partly in France, he
went to Normandy to see, to talk to, and stay with a certain master by the
name of Lanfranc, a truly good man and one of real nobility in the excel-
lence of religious life and wisdom. His lofty fame had resounded every-
where and had drawn to him the best clerks from all parts of the world.
Anselm therefore came to him and recognised the outstanding wisdom,
which shone forth in him. He placed himself under his guidance and in
a short time became the most intimate of his disciples. He gave himself
up day and night to literary studies, not only reading with Lanfranc those
things which he wished, but teaching carefully to others the things which
they required.10
Lanfranc was running a school at Bec, and Anselm was in Lanfranc’s school.
What would be more natural than to conclude that Anselm was one of those
persons who received their education in Lanfranc’s famous school?
As natural as this conclusion might appear, on second thought it proves to
be highly questionable. If Anselm had been a young boy when he came to Bec,
then the conclusion would be plausible. However, he was in fact far beyond
the normal age even for advanced education when he arrived at Bec: he was
already 25 or 26. We can assert that Anselm was educated in Lanfranc’s school
only if we can also assert that Anselm had managed to get so far without re-
ceiving any proper schooling. As someone from a well-off family in a northern
Italian town, this idea is initially implausible and would require some good
evidence for its support.
When a young man goes to meet a schoolmaster, the reason for this can
be that he is looking for education. However, there can also be other reasons.
He could be looking for job opportunities. Eadmer’s description suggests that
Anselm came to Bec for this purpose. Anselm did not come to Lanfranc to
take classes with him but ‘to see, to talk to, and stay with’ this master (videre,
alloqui et cohabitare volens). To put it differently, Anselm came to Lanfranc to
offer him his services and to become Lanfranc’s associate. There is nothing in
the passage to suggest that Anselm felt a need for education or suffered from a
lack of education when he came to Bec. The passage fails to indicate whether
Anselm took classes in the school at Bec, but there is a rather explicit state-
ment that he taught in the school. Even though Eadmer uses the word ‘disciple’
of Anselm, the emphasis is on Anselm’s special status as compared to the other
young men at the school: Anselm became Lanfranc’s closest associate. In addi-
tion, when Eadmer says that Anselm was ‘reading with Lanfranc’, this can be a
reference to some kind of tutoring, but it can equally well be a partly masked
reference to a joint literary venture in which Anselm and Lanfranc were in-
volved (cf. 5.3). All in all, the passage suggests that Anselm’s principal role in
Lanfranc’s school was that of a teacher, and it is an open question whether or
not Anselm received some further education while he was in the school of Bec.
There is one passage in Vita Anselmi that directly concerns Anselm’s edu-
cation before he came to Bec. The passage offers a summary description of
Anselm’s life between 15 and 23 years of age. The passage is preceded by a story
about Anselm’s attempts to become a monk when he ‘had not yet reached the
age of fifteen’ and how these attempts were frustrated.11 This is what Eadmer
has to say about Anselm’s life after this episode and before the events that led
to his decision to leave Italy, according to the current standard translation:
From that time, with health of body, youth and worldly well-being smil-
ing upon him, he began little by little to cool in the fervour of his desire
for a religious life—so much so that he began to desire to go the way of
the world rather than to leave the world for a monastic life. He gradually
turned from study, which had formerly been his chief occupation, and
began to give himself up to youthful amusements.12
Finally, it should be remembered that the attitude towards monastic life and
the attitude towards studying are two different things. The passage can per-
haps be used as evidence for the idea that Anselm’s youth was misspent from
a monastic point of view, but it does not show that he failed to use the op-
portunities for intellectual development. The impression that one gains is that
there was a long period of time in Anselm’s youth when, instead of leaving ‘the
world’ for a monastic life, he went ‘the way of the world’ and studying was his
chief occupation, but as he grew older, he increasingly took part in extracur-
ricular activities as well.
The two passages that have been quoted are the only passages directly rel-
evant to Anselm’s education in Vita Anselmi. These passages do not support
the notion that Anselm did not receive any notable schooling before he came
to Lanfranc. On the contrary, they suggest that Anselm had already been edu-
cated in Italy, making him ‘a useful acquisition’ to the ‘little school’ at Bec, as
a recent commentator has put it.16 Eadmer’s account of Anselm’s life suggests
that Anselm received his education in Italy before 1056 and served as teacher at
Bec after 1059. Even though Eadmer fails to say what Anselm did in Burgundy
and France between 1056 and 1059, it is plausible to think that he spent much
of his time teaching and studying, as Lanfranc had done in the corresponding
phase of his career.
There are also other grounds for holding that Anselm got the major part of
his education in Italy. From the usual discussions of Anselm and Lanfranc, one
may acquire the impression that Lanfranc’s school was in the forefront of the
study of the liberal arts at that time. This was certainly not the case. Lanfranc’s
school was an important institution in its own environment, that is, Normandy
and the surrounding area, because there were few schools offering similar edu-
cation in that part of Europe. However, the forefront was elsewhere—in the
places where Lanfranc received the most important part of his own education.
The best education in the liberal arts in Anselm’s youth would have been avail-
able in the schools of his home country.17 It appears that Anselm made good
use of that opportunity. He had skills and competence that he could hardly
have acquired at Lanfranc’s school. Anselm had a superb command of Latin
and he was capable of using a rhetorical style which resembles the style of
Italian authors like Peter Damian. These are skills that demand years of regular
18 S uzanne J. Nelis, ‘What Lanfranc Taught, What Anselm Learned’, Haskins Society Journal 2
(1990), 75–82. See also Gibson, Lanfranc, 49.
19 Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘Future Contingents in the Eleventh Century’, in Vesa Hirvonen et al.
(eds.), Mind and Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 103–20, especially 113–19.
20 Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’; Southern, Anselm and His Biographer, 12–26; Southern,
Anselm: A Portrait, 39–66.
102 Chapter 5
Lanfranc taught Anselm a responsible way of applying this art in the service
of theology, but this idea proves to be unfounded as well. When we look at
how Lanfranc applies the techniques and doctrines of dialectic in theological
contexts, the results are meagre. In his commentaries to Paul’s epistles, there
are some modest examples of argument analysis and a few miscellaneous
comments here and there.21 Lanfranc’s celebrated rebuttal of Berengar’s logi-
cal arguments in De corpore 7 turns out to be an example of sophistic misuse
of dialectic,22 and the evidence for the claim that Lanfranc’s analysis of the
Eucharist is based on the distinction between substance and accident can-
not withstand scrutiny.23 The analysis of De corpore to be presented below
(Chapter 6) suggests that the author of the treatise was actually deeply con-
scious of some basic dialectical considerations, but it also makes clear that De
corpore represents irresponsible and dishonest use of the liberal arts. There is
no reason, however, to think that De corpore reflects the general practices at
Lanfranc’s school.
Eadmer’s Vita Anselmi is a portrait of a person whom the author would like
to see canonized as a saint. As in much of the modern scholarship, there is
a strong bias towards Anselm in Vita Anselmi, and it is combined with a bias
towards Lanfranc and towards Canterbury. When Eadmer describes the years
Anselm and Lanfranc spent together at Bec, he makes sure that the two future
archbishops of Canterbury appear in a favourable light. This bias affects the
way Eadmer tells his story, but it also affects the choice of material. In the usual
modern description of Anselm’s relation to Lanfranc, the treatise De corpore
takes pride of place.24 In Eadmer’s presentation, this treatise is conspicuously
absent: there is not a single word about De corpore or about the Eucharistic
controversy with Berengar in the context mentioned or anywhere else in Vita
Anselmi. The omission is significant, and the re-evaluation of De corpore makes
it understandable why Eadmer kept silent about the issue. Eadmer himself was
an intelligent person, and he probably could appreciate the kind of rhetorical
21 See Gibson, Lanfranc, 50–54; Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 46, 47–59; Ann Collins,
Teacher in Faith and Virtue: Lanfranc of Bec’s Commentary on Saint Paul (Leiden-Boston:
Brill, 2007), 104–12.
22 See Gibson, Lanfranc, 84–88; Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 59–67. See also 6.3.
23 See Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 69–72, for a critical discussion. See also note 5 in
6.1 and note 33 in 6.3.
24 Evans, ‘Anselm’s Life’, is an exception: she does not mention De corpore.
Anselm and Lanfranc—the Early Years 103
game that De corpore represents. However, telling the truth about the nature
of the treatise would have compromised Lanfranc’s integrity, and saying some-
thing else might have provoked unwanted comments. What is more, it was not
only Lanfranc’s integrity that was at stake, but there is a very real possibility
that Anselm was involved in the composition of De corpore, and Eadmer was
in a position to know that.
According to Eadmer’s account, Anselm came to Bec because he wanted
‘to see, to talk to, and stay with … Lanfranc’. A plausible interpretation of this
is that Anselm wished to become Lanfranc’s associate and came to offer him
his services. As explained in the preceding section, Anselm soon became in-
volved in teaching in the school of Bec. However, Anselm’s arrival at Bec coin-
cides with the events in the immediate background of De corpore, which raises
the question about any possible connection.25 A synod in Rome in the spring
of 1059 had dealt with Berengar’s teaching on the Eucharist. After the synod,
Berengar composed a short piece known as Scriptum contra synodum in which
he fiercely attacks the synod’s decision.26 Berengar accuses the synod of pro-
claiming a vulgar view of the Eucharist, a view that he also characterizes as
‘the opinion, or rather folly, of the rabble, of Paschasius, and of Lanfranc’.27 The
Paschasius who is mentioned here is the ninth-century theologian Paschasius
Radbertus.28 Thus, Lanfranc is the one contemporary thinker that Berengar
singles out as a proponent of the vulgar view, and he had presented similar al-
legations before. Berengar composed Scriptum contra synodum soon after the
synod and it was in circulation during the latter half of 1059. This is, roughly,
when Anselm came to Bec. Did Anselm come to Lanfranc only to offer his ser-
vices as a teacher, or was there also something else that he was willing to do
for his compatriot? Moreover, when Anselm ‘gave himself up day and night to
literary studies … reading with Lanfranc those things which he wished’,29 what
exactly was he doing? The evidence that there is does not allow definitive an-
swers. There is the intriguing possibility that Anselm came to Lanfranc to offer
his services in the fight against Berengar, but there is little to go by to argue
25 Southern, Anselm and His Biographer, 20, surmises that ‘the reputation which Lanfranc
was making in this controversy [with Berengar] … drew Anselm to Bec.’ For reasons which
will be discussed later in this section, it is unlikely that this was the case.
26 See Gibson, Lanfranc, 63–71; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 59–64.
27 The relevant passage is quoted by Lanfranc in De corpore 4, 412D, ed. Huygens, 244, lines
152–54. See also 6.2, where the background of De corpore is discussed.
28 Gibson, Lanfranc, 74–76; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 60.
29 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 5, ed. and trans. Southern, 8. See also 5.2.
104 Chapter 5
this point.30 However, a case can be made for the claim that Anselm was in-
volved, and even heavily involved, in the composition of De corpore.
De corpore makes it eminently clear that the treatise should be attributed
to Lanfranc. In the opening of the treatise, the ‘author’ identifies himself as
‘Lanfranc, through God’s mercy Catholic’,31 and ‘Lanfranc’ is also the name
that the ‘author’ takes on in the peculiar kind of ‘disputation’ between him-
self and Berengar that constitutes the main part of the treatise.32 Historical
evidence firmly connects De corpore to Lanfranc of Bec, and it can hardly
be disputed that he is the moral author of the treatise. However, it does not
follow that the historical Lanfranc is the sole author—or even the principal
author—of De corpore because the attribution of the treatise to him can be a
rhetorical device.
Lanfranc composed and published De corpore sometime between 1059 and
1070, but scholars disagree about the exact year(s). The terminus post quem is
determined by the synod in which Berengar’s view had been condemned, and
we have to allow some weeks between the synod in Rome and Lanfranc’s being
informed of the text that Berengar wrote against the synod. Hence, the compo-
sition of De corpore may have started in the summer of 1059 at the earliest. The
treatise was not completed before the summer of 1061, since Pope Nicholas
and Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida are mentioned there as deceased.33
Because reacting to a current polemical text like Scriptum contra synodum be-
comes less and less meaningful as time elapses, it would appear reasonable
to believe that De corpore was completed not much later than 1061.34 On the
other hand, the latest definitive terminus ante quem for the treatise is as late as
1070. It is based on a letter which Lanfranc sent to Pope Alexander II in 1072.
The pope had requested Lanfranc to send a copy of De corpore to him, and in
the letter which accompanies the copy, Lanfranc states that he had sent the
text in question to Berengar when he still was abbot at Caen.35 For this reason,
30 We do not know when exactly Anselm arrived at Bec, and we do not know how widely
Berengar circulated Scriptum contra synodum. If Anselm was in France in the summer of
1059, he might have learned about the Scriptum when it was still fresh.
31 De corpore 1, 407A, ed. Huygens, 239, lines 1–2: ‘Lanfrancus misericordia dei catholicus
Beringerio catholicae aecclesiae adversario.’
32 De corpore 2–17, 409D–430A. See also 6.2–6.4.
33 See Margaret Gibson, ‘Letters and Charters Relating to Berengar of Tours’, in P. Ganz,
R. B. C. Huygens, and F. Niewöhner (eds.), Auctoritas und Ratio. Studien zu Berengar von
Tours (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990), 5–23, at 14 and 16.
34 Gibson, ‘Letters and Charters’, 14 and 16. See also Southern, Anselm: A Portrait, 43–44.
35 Lanfranc, Ep. 4, to Pope Alexander II, in The Letters of Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury,
ed. and trans. Helen Clover and Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 56:
Anselm and Lanfranc—the Early Years 105
many scholars date De corpore to the period when Lanfranc was at Caen, that
is, between c. 1063 and 1070.36
However, Lanfranc’s letter to Alexander is problematic as evidence. When
we read it closely, it turns out that Lanfranc does not say anything about when
De corpore was composed, or published for the first time. He only states that
he ‘sent’ (transmisi) the text in question to Berengar within a certain period of
time. It is also remarkable that Lanfranc does not assert his authorship of De
corpore here: the focus is on the sending and not on the composing. Lanfranc,
of course, had good reason to distance himself from De corpore when he sent
it to Pope Alexander. De corpore had been composed for a local audience in
Normandy and the surrounding area. Lanfranc did not want anyone in the
papal entourage to think that he aspired to mislead the elite of the Church
through the treatise published in his name. If its nature was not already known
in the curia, a specialist like Cardinal Hildebrand, who knew the history of the
Berengarian affair and had given thought to the doctrinal aspects of the matter,
would not need more than one reading to find out its true nature.37 As for the
dating implied in the letter to Alexander, one need not put much weight on it.
If Anselm was involved in the composition of De corpore, Lanfranc perhaps
intentionally gave the wrong idea of the date to protect his friend. It is also pos-
sible to seek a compromise between Lanfranc’s letter and the other evidence
by maintaining that De corpore was composed at Bec between 1059 and 1063
but published only after Lanfranc moved to Caen to supervise the foundation
works of a new monastery there. It is reasonable to believe that De corpore was
composed, at least for the most part, when Lanfranc was at Bec.
De corpore does not fit into the general picture of Lanfranc’s literary and
other activity. Even though Berengar had continually singled out Lanfranc as
the proponent of the vulgar view among his contemporaries, Lanfranc was not
an active agent in the Berengarian affair either before De corpore or after it.
A decade earlier, by 1049, Berengar had already acquired the impression that
Lanfranc supported the view he opposed, but there appears to be no histori-
cal evidence about what Lanfranc had done to give rise to this impression.38
Significantly, the report on the history of the affair that is given in De corpore
‘Epistolam quam Beringerio scismatico dum adhuc Cadomensi cenobio praeessem trans-
misi paternitati uestrae sicut precepistis transmittere curaui.’
36 For example, Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 196–97, 249.
37 Cardinal Hildebrand, the future Pope Gregory VII, had directed the investigation into
Berengar’s teaching at the synod of Tours in 1054. See Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger,
149–62.
38 Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 53–56; Gibson, Lanfranc, 64–67; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 38–
40, 59–61.
106 Chapter 5
makes no mention of this. Instead, the report claims that Lanfranc gave an
improvised statement of his Eucharistic views in a synod in Rome (?) in 1050
(?), but there is reason to be suspicious of this part of the report.39 There is
no evidence that Lanfranc had any notable role in any other synod related
to the matter,40 and De corpore is his only writing on the affair. When he was
archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc showed unwillingness to engage in dis-
cussion about Berengar’s views. At some date between 1073 and 1078, three
French churchmen sent him a letter and expressed their wish to come to
England to discuss Berengar’s views on Christology with Lanfranc. Lanfranc
dissuaded them from coming, using his busyness as an excuse.41 The compo-
sition and publication of De corpore is an isolated and unexpected event in
Lanfranc’s career.
What is more, there is a striking qualitative difference between De corpore
and other works that Lanfranc has left. De corpore has been characterized as
‘Lanfranc’s only excursion into theology proper’.42 There are theological re-
marks in his commentaries on Paul’s epistles and elsewhere, but De corpore
is the only one of his publications that includes an extended discussion of
a theological issue. The range of authoritative writings that are used is con-
siderably larger in De corpore than in the commentaries on Paul. In face of
the qualitative difference between De corpore and the Pauline commentaries,
a suggestion has been made recently that the latter should be considered as
a very early work, deriving from the period when Lanfranc had just entered
39 De corpore 4, 413A–B, ed. Huygens, 244–45, lines 155–82. Lanfranc’s account is impressive
but vague. For example, Lanfranc fails to specify where and when the synod he is talking
about was held. No other source confirms Lanfranc’s account. See Holopainen, ‘“Lanfranc
of Bec” and Berengar of Tours’, 117, note 47.
40 Lanfranc was present at the synod of Vercelli in September 1050 but without any par-
ticular role. Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 64–83; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 61–62. As for the
1059 synod of Rome, Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 43–44, and Gibson, Lanfranc, 69–70,
argue that Lanfranc was not present, whereas Southern, Anselm: A Portrait, 25–28, argues
that he was, and Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 42, concludes that Lanfranc’s presence is ‘on balance,
more likely than not’. Contrary to what Southern and Cowdrey assume, it is not impor-
tant whether Lanfranc had the correct idea about the details of how Berengar’s condem-
nation took place. The crucial piece of evidence is that Berengar treats Lanfranc as an
outsider who depends on reports that he has received, not as an eyewitness. Berengar
of Tours, Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum I, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum,
Continuatio Mediaevalis 84 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), 35, line 15: ‘quod mendaciter ad te
pervenit’. Even if Lanfranc were present in Rome in 1059, he did not have any notable role
in the proceedings.
41 Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 65–66.
42 Gibson, Lanfranc, 62.
Anselm and Lanfranc—the Early Years 107
monastic life (c. 1042–45).43 This is not a workable solution because other con-
siderations support a much later date, but the qualitative difference which has
prompted the suggestion is a real issue. As a matter of fact, the qualitative dif-
ference between De corpore and Lanfranc’s other publications is greater than
scholars have suspected because they have not been aware of the complex rhe-
torical aspirations of De corpore.
One more consideration which speaks against Lanfranc being the sole au-
thor of De corpore is that of the leisure needed for a demanding literary work.
De corpore is a carefully crafted treatise the composition of which must have
taken a considerable amount of work and time.44 Lanfranc’s busyness did
not begin when he entered the see of Canterbury. In the early 1060s, he was
already one of the most influential persons in Norman ecclesiastical circles
and an adviser to Duke William. After 1063, he supervised the construction of
a new monastery, but there were extensive building projects going on at Bec
as well. The school of Bec was at its height in the early 1060s and Lanfranc
is supposed to have been teaching there.45 How did he simply find time to
compose De corpore?
As such, these difficulties do not yet establish that Lanfranc did not compose
De corpore alone. However, when we combine the considerations mentioned
with the fact that Lanfranc had a highly qualified associate working with him
in the early 1060s, we start to have the ingredients for a case. The associate in
question was, of course, Anselm. It was argued above (5.2) that Anselm was
already a mature scholar when he came to Bec. Even if this was not the case,
he was nevertheless a bright young man with exceptional intellectual ability,
and it did not take long before he was capable of acting as a teacher. Anselm
would also, later in life, publish many works that discuss complex theological
issues within a rational framework. In addition to his talent and his compe-
tence, Anselm could offer to Lanfranc his time, which Lanfranc could use as
he desired.
Because Anselm was Lanfranc’s closest associate in the early 1060s, it is dif-
ficult to see how he could have avoided becoming involved in the composition
of De corpore. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that De corpore was born
as a fruit of the collaboration between Lanfranc and Anselm. This includes,
43 Collins, Teacher, 196–202. One of Collins’s main arguments is that Lanfranc must have
adopted a definitive point of view on the Eucharist by the mid-1050s and ‘the commen-
tary does not demonstrate an author capable of such pronouncements on such a highly
charged issue’ (199).
44 De corpore is meant to give the impression of a hastily written spontaneous work but it
actually is a calculated rhetorical attack.
45 Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 15–24.
108 Chapter 5
49 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 5, ed. and trans. Southern, 9: ‘Necdum eram edomitus …’
Chapter 6
Reappraisal of De corpore
The next step in the endeavour to describe the background of the Proslogion
is to have a close look at the treatise De corpore et sanguine Domini attributed
to Lanfranc.1 It is important to achieve a good understanding of this treatise,
for two reasons. First, it is essential for being able to analyse some central is-
sues in the immediate background of the Proslogion: how the faith and reason
issue was perceived in Anselm’s environment at the time when he composed
the Proslogion, and what happened between Anselm and Lanfranc in connec-
tion with the publication of the Monologion. These topics will be pursued in
the following chapter. Second, even though De corpore and the Proslogion are
quite different works, they have in common that they cannot be properly un-
derstood without taking into account the viewpoint of rhetoric. The analysis
of De corpore shows that the author of this treatise was capable of carrying
through a very complex rhetorical undertaking. Familiarity with this under-
taking makes it easier for us to take into account and appreciate the possibil-
ity of rhetorical argumentation in and around the Monologion and Proslogion.
Even though I find it probable that Anselm was involved in the composition of
De corpore (5.3), I speak much of the time as if Lanfranc was the sole author of
the treatise. This should be seen as a literary device which is used for the sake
of simplicity.
The observation that there are rhetorical features in De corpore is not a
new one. Margaret Gibson in particular has drawn attention to this aspect of
Lanfranc’s treatise. Lanfranc works to undermine the credibility of his oppo-
nent, Berengar, by presenting unsubstantiated accusations concerning the lat-
ter’s methods, wits, and morals. Lanfranc misinterprets his opponent’s sayings
so often and so badly that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he does it
on purpose. Gibson has also pointed out the parallelism between De corpore
and Anselm of Besate’s Rhetorimachia, a treatise she sees as elucidative of the
spirit of the Italian schools at the time. According to Gibson’s evaluation, many
of Lanfranc’s manoeuvres in De corpore can be explained as ‘the accepted rhe-
torical practice of the time’ (85), but there are also passages where ‘Lanfranc is
1 For the editions of De corpore and the mode of referencing them as well as Vaillancourt’s
English translation, see note 3 in 5.1.
guilty of sharp practice by his own standards as much as ours’ (86). A case in
point would be the celebrated passage where Lanfranc criticizes Berengar for
having presented an invalid syllogism; the syllogism that Lanfranc criticizes
turns out to be of his own making.2 However, it has been believed that these
rhetorical features are only superficial and there is a sound core underneath.
The seriousness of De corpore as a theological contribution has not been
questioned. I seek to show that the effects of a dubious way of using rheto-
ric in De corpore go much deeper than previously conceived, into the core of
Lanfranc’s contribution.3
There is some circumstantial evidence that casts doubt on the seriousness
of De corpore as a theological contribution. Even though De corpore is directly
related to the transactions of a papal synod in Rome in 1059, Lanfranc failed to
send the treatise to the papal curia on his own initiative. When he was asked
to send it, he did comply but he also distanced himself from his treatise. When
Eadmer describes the common years of Anselm and Lanfranc at Bec in Vita
Anselmi, he neglects mentioning the Eucharistic affair. Anselm of Canterbury
never refers to De corpore in his extant writings, and he is careful not to say
anything about what happens to the Eucharistic elements at the consecration.
(For these points, see 5.3.)
The real test for the rhetorical reading of De corpore, however, is in the anal-
ysis of the treatise itself. To establish that Lanfranc plays a rhetorical game in
De corpore, I offer an analysis of De corpore which describes some central fea-
tures of the game. Because of the complexity of the aspirations of the treatise,
the analysis will be far from exhaustive. The focus is on two topics. On the one
hand, I analyse De corpore as a reply to Berengar’s Scriptum contra synodum,
that is, his attack against the synod of Rome in 1059. On the other hand, the
focus is on the interpretation of Eucharistic doctrine, especially the ontologi-
cal aspects of it. These topics are closely interconnected.
In the current literature, there are competing accounts of Lanfranc’s view
of the Eucharistic doctrine. Richard Southern famously claimed that Lanfranc
made pioneering use of the Aristotelian notions of substance and accident to
describe the change in the Eucharistic elements and that Lanfranc was actually
4 R. W. Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours’, in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin, and
R. W. Southern (eds.), Studies in Medieval History presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 27–48, at 39–41; R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His
Biographer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 21–22; Southern, Saint Anselm: A
Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 47–50.
5 Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 69–
72. See also 6.3, note 33. Jean de Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger: la controverse eucharistique
du XIe siècle (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1971), 447, note 5 (continued on 448),
rejects Southern’s analysis, whereas Gibson, Lanfranc, and H. E. J. Cowdrey, Lanfranc: Scholar,
Monk, and Archbishop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), fail to comment on it.
6 Gibson, Lanfranc, 88–91. Lanfranc presents his official statement on the Eucharist in De cor-
pore 18, 430A–C. The passage will be analysed in 6.5.
7 Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 346–91. Montclos’s analysis has been followed, more or less
closely, by Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 67–68; by Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 70–73; and by
Mark G. Vaillancourt, ‘Introduction’ to his translation of De corpore, 3–25, at 4–11.
Reappraisal of De corpore 113
8 For remarks concerning the Eucharist in Lanfranc’s other works, see Montclos, Lanfranc
et Bérenger, 326–40. See also note 69 in 6.5.
9 For the doctrinal background of the Berengarian controversy, see Montclos, Lanfranc et
Bérenger, especially 22–29, 448–60; Radding and Newton, Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics,
1–31; Gibson, Lanfranc, 71–81; Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 59–60.
10 See especially Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 590, ‘Formulation ultra-réaliste de la croy-
ance eucharistique’, with references to earlier parts of the work. On page 25, it is called
114 Chapter 6
The antagonists, then, [that is,] the rabble and Paschasius and Lanfranc
and whoever there are who rave with the rabble, assert the following
case: the bread and wine remain on the altar until the consecration, but
through the force of the consecration the bread and wine are changed
through their own destruction or consumption in a sensory fashion
into a small portion of Christ’s flesh and blood. My case or rather that
of the scriptures is as follows: the bread and wine on the Lord’s table
‘la formulation carnaliste’. According to Montclos, the ultrarealist view appears in many
early medieval authors and texts, including Paschasius Radbertus, Durand of Troarn and
other early anti-Berengarian writers, the 1059 synod of Rome, and Lanfranc.
11 This was taken to be a central point in the Paschasian teaching. Montclos, Lanfranc et
Bérenger, 448–51.
12 See, for example, Durand of Troarn, Liber de corpore et sanguine Christi, Patrologia Latina
149, 1375–424, especially 1418–21 (Part 8), which includes several reports of such alleged
miracles. Durand wrote his treatise c. 1053.
13 See Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 30–162; Gibson, Lanfranc, 64–69; Cowdrey, Lanfranc,
38–40, 59–63.
Reappraisal of De corpore 115
It is not clear how this text was meant to be interpreted. It does not explicitly
say that the bread is no longer there after the consecration. On the contrary,
one gains the impression that the synod makes statements about the conse-
crated bread: it is affirmed to be not only a sacrament but also the body of
Christ. The text uses the word ‘body’ (corpus) and not the word ‘flesh’ (caro)
of the Christ present on the Eucharistic table, which suggests that the whole of
Christ’s body is present and not just a piece of his flesh. On the other hand, the
text is very emphatic about the sensory nature of the presence: Christ’s body
is handled and broken by the hands of the priests and ‘crushed by the teeth of
the faithful’. Rightly or wrongly, Berengar understood that the synod wanted to
uphold the carnalist view that he criticized.
At the actual synod, Berengar was too frightened to defend his case. After
the synod, he soon regained his spirit. He wrote the short text known as
Scriptum contra synodum, in which he attacked the oath that he had been
forced to read, arguing that it was (1) internally inconsistent and (2) against
the true doctrine of the Church. When it comes to the first point, Berengar
18 See Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 162–71; Gibson, Lanfranc, 69–70; Cowdrey, Lanfranc,
63–64. See also Berengar of Tours, Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum I, ed. R. B. C. Huygens,
Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 84 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), 66–68,
lines 1112–65.
19 The text is reproduced by Lanfranc in De corpore 2, 410C–411B, ed. Huygens, 241, lines
84–105, here 84–100. For a translation of the whole oath, see Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 63–64.
My translation here includes some modifications.
Reappraisal of De corpore 117
claimed that the synod’s intention had been to deny the continued existence
of the bread and wine after the consecration but it failed in this because it
authorized statements that entail their continued existence. When it comes
to the second point, Berengar presented a renewed statement of his idea of
the Eucharist as a sacrament, quoting passages from authoritative writings,
mainly from Augustine’s works. Berengar’s Scriptum has not survived as an
independent text, but Lanfranc’s De corpore includes twenty-two quotations
from it.20 When one reads the quotations there one after another, at least the
first thirteen quotations appear to form a continuous and coherent text.21 As
for the rest, it is difficult to say whether Lanfranc has left something out, but it
is possible that the whole text of the Scriptum is reproduced in De corpore. The
following two sections will be dedicated to analysing how Lanfranc replies to
Berengar’s two main claims in the Scriptum: that the synod’s teaching is incon-
sistent (6.3) and that it is contrary to the true doctrine of the Church (in 6.4).
De corpore is a carefully crafted rhetorical text which tries to give the im-
pression of being a spontaneous outburst—the outburst of a pious erudite
who is angry. The shortage of explicit thematic structure in the treatise fits
well with this impression. The main part of it, De corpore 2–17, is presented as
a criticism of the Scriptum.22 Before that, there is an introductory discussion
(De corpore 1).23 At the end of the treatise, there is some further discussion that
can be divided into three parts: Lanfranc’s official definition of the Eucharistic
doctrine and the grounds for it (De corpore 18–19), criticism of some additional
Berengarian arguments (De corpore 20–21), and a discussion that appears to be
meant as a general refutation of the Berengarian teaching (De corpore 22–23).24
When it comes to literary form, De corpore is a hybrid of a letter and a dia-
logue. The opening salutation identifies the treatise as a letter which Lanfranc
sends to Berengar: ‘Lanfranc, through God’s mercy Catholic, to Berengar, an
20 The first quotation is in De corpore 2, 409D, the twenty-second in De corpore 17, 426D.
I identify the quotations by using the symbol # and a number, for example #1 and #22.
Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 181–82, speaks of twenty-three quotations because he also
counts a remark in De corpore 15, 426A.
21 In Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum, which is his reply to De corpore, Berengar offers a run-
ning commentary of the early parts of De corpore and subjects those parts to a critical
scrutiny. Even though Berengar often criticizes Lanfranc for distorting his views, he never
criticizes the latter for misquoting him or for leaving out something that should have
been quoted. See Rescriptum, ed. Huygens, book I and the beginning of book II, pages
35–101.
22 De corpore 2–17, 409D–430A. The historical passages in De corpore 2 and 4 can be found
in ed. Huygens, 241–46, lines 73–203.
23 De corpore 1, 407A–409D, ed. Huygens, 239–41, lines 1–72.
24 De corpore 18–19, 430A–435D; De corpore 20–21, 436A–440B; De corpore 22–23, 440B–442D.
118 Chapter 6
enemy of the Catholic Church’.25 The main part of it (the reply to the Scriptum
in De corpore 2–17) consists of an uneven ‘disputation’ between ‘Lanfranc’ and
‘Berengar’. One of the main points in the introductory discussion that Lanfranc
offers in De corpore 1 is to create a justification for the procedure in the follow-
ing chapters. Right at the beginning, after the salutation, Lanfranc describes
the wholesome effects that a disputation between him and Berengar would
have: either both Berengar and his followers would return to the true faith, or
if Berengar remained obstinate in his heresy, his followers would nevertheless
return to the faith of the Church. However, Lanfranc has lost hope of a live
debate with Berengar: he claims that Berengar is not willing to meet him or
any persons who could judge between his views and Lanfranc’s views.26 The
disputation in De corpore 2–17 appears as a substitute for a live disputation
between Lanfranc and Berengar, and what is at stake is the eternal salvation of
Berengar’s followers. Lanfranc explains the procedure that he will use: he will
insert the names ‘Berengar’ and ‘Lanfranc’ to indicate who is speaking.27
As mentioned, I find it quite possible that the twenty-two extracts preserved
in De corpore contain the whole text of the Scriptum. It does not follow from
this, however, that Berengar’s voice is properly heard in De corpore. On the con-
trary, Lanfranc presents Berengar’s text only to twist its meaning beyond recog-
nition. The ‘dialogical’ or ‘disputational’ structure which Lanfranc devised for
De corpore 2–17 was designed to serve this purpose. Lanfranc cuts Berengar’s
text into such small slices that it is virtually impossible for the reader to get
any adequate idea of it, particularly when Lanfranc’s own comments, placed
in between, point in wrong directions.
(#8) For the one who says, ‘The bread and wine on the altar are merely
sacraments’, or, ‘The bread and wine on the altar are merely the true body
and blood of Christ’, establishes the survival of the bread and wine in
every way. (#9) For as the one who says, ‘Christ is the supreme corner-
stone’, does not take away Christ but in every way establishes Christ’s
existence, in the same way the one who says, ‘The bread on the altar is
merely a sacrament’, or, ‘The bread on the altar is merely the true body of
Christ’, does not deny that there is bread on the altar but confirms that
there is bread and wine on the Lord’s table, (#10) for the affirmation as a
whole cannot stand if a part is removed—and this, as blessed Augustine
says in the book On Christian Teaching, persists indissolubly in the very
truth of eternity, which is God. (#11) Now this [statement] which asserts,
‘The bread and wine which are placed on the altar are merely sacra-
ments’, is an affirmation, consisting of its well-known parts, the predicate
and the subject, …28
28 De corpore 5, 414D (#8); 6, 415D–416A (#9); 7, 416D (#10); 8, 418C (#11).
29 It should be noted that the subject and predicate of a sentence can be linguistically com-
plicated, like ‘the bread and wine on the altar’ or ‘the true body and blood of Christ’.
30 Aristotle, Categories 10, 13b27–33.
120 Chapter 6
31 De corpore 5, 414D–415D; 6, 416B–C; 7, 417B–D; 8, 419B–C: ‘… Caetera namque dixit, adver-
bium solummodo nequaquam posuit.’
32 See also Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 275–76.
33 Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’, 39–41; Southern, Anselm and His Biographer, 21–22; Southern,
Anselm: A Portrait, 47–50. Southern’s construal of Lanfranc’s Eucharistic theory begins
with two appearances of the word essentia in De corpore 7, in 417D: ‘in principalibus
Reappraisal of De corpore 121
‘Having abandoned the sacred authorities, you take refuge in dialectic’, begins
Lanfranc’s answer.35 There is no particular reason why Lanfranc should make
this claim at this point in his reply to the Scriptum. He has already spent several
chapters discussing Berengar’s logical argument. It should also be emphasized
that Lanfranc’s claim is quite unfounded. Berengar’s ambition was to strive to-
wards a better understanding of the Christian faith by intelligent interpreta-
tion of the authoritative writings, and these writings have a very central role
in the Scriptum as well. Berengar’s method is basically the same as that of the
academically-minded among his contemporaries, also including Lanfranc in
his better moments. However, Lanfranc finds it useful to create the impression
that there is a fundamental difference in their methodologies. Commenting on
the method also creates a suitable context for the passages in which he appar-
ently offers a refutation of Berengar’s argument(s) with the aid of logical tools.
In the first part of De corpore 7, Lanfranc presents a statement of policy re-
garding the use of dialectic in the treatment of theological matters:
essentiis permanere’, and in 418D: ‘qui … res ipsas in principalibus ac secundis essentiis
condidit’. Neither the term ‘substance’ nor the term ‘accident’ appears in these passages,
and the latter passage does not concern the Eucharist in any way. Southern needs to make
a number of questionable assumptions to be able to arrive at the claim that Lanfranc
‘distinctly described the change in the Eucharistic elements in terms of the Aristotelian
categories of substance and accidents’. See Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 69–72,
for a detailed analysis. Nevertheless, it can perhaps be said that Southern’s interpretation
of De corpore 7 is highly consonant with Lanfranc’s intentions in the chapter. Namely, it
may be that Lanfranc deliberately planted the expressions that Southern’s construal starts
from to create the impression that there may be some sophisticated philosophical idea
related to his Eucharistic theory.
34 De corpore 7, 416D.
35 De corpore 7, 416D: ‘LANFR. Relictis sacris auctoritatibus, ad dialecticam confugium
facis.’
122 Chapter 6
we should endeavour to respond to these things too, lest you think that
I cannot meet you in this part because of the lack of the art. It may look
like bragging to some people, and it may be imputed to ostentation
rather than necessity. But God is my witness, and my conscience, that
in the treatment of the sacred writings I do not wish to propose dialecti-
cal questions or provide solutions to questions proposed. Even when the
subject matter discussed is such that it can be more clearly explained
with the aid of the rules of this art, I hide the art as far as I can by equi-
pollency of propositions,36 so that it does not appear that I rely more
upon the art than upon the truth and the authority of the holy fathers—
although blessed Augustine in some of his writings and especially in the
book On Christian Teaching praises this discipline most abundantly and
confirms its great strength in all matters that are investigated concerning
holy writings.37
The passage includes three different strands. First, Lanfranc makes it clear
that the use of logic can, in principle, be very helpful in theological discus-
sion. Second, Lanfranc emphasizes that his own policy is to keep to arguments
based on sacred authorities as much as possible and to attempt to disguise the
use of the art when using it cannot be avoided. Third, he makes it clear that
his explicit treatment of Berengar’s arguments is a special case. Related to this,
Lanfranc next offers a precedent to what he is doing by making reference to
(pseudo-)Augustine’s use of logic against Felicianus, an Arian heretic. Lanfranc
states that the heretic could not stand ‘the implicit and entangling connec-
tions of the Topics (locorum) and syllogisms (syllogismorum)’ and eventually
cried aloud: ‘You fight me with Aristotelian subtlety, and like a storm wave you
tear down everything that I say.’38
In the two passages that follow, Lanfranc attacks Berengar with the aid
of tools deriving from the two branches of early medieval dialectic dealing
with argumentation, namely, topics and syllogistics (see 4.1). The first pas-
sage, already quoted earlier (in 4.3), makes use of a large number of terms and
36 Southern, ‘Lanfranc of Bec’, 41–43, and Anselm and His Biographer, 22–23, claims that the
mention of ‘equipollency of propositions’ should be read as a reference to a specific ar-
gument technique. Southern’s idea is still often repeated, but he himself no longer sub-
scribed to it in Anselm: A Portrait, 51–52. See Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 50–52,
for a critical discussion.
37 De corpore 7, 416D–417B (amended). The passage from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana,
II, 31, 48, was quoted in 4.1.
38 De corpore 7, 417 B. The reference is to Vigilius Thapsensis (pseudo-Augustine), Contra
Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis 4 and 10, Patrologia Latina 42, 1159, 1164.
Reappraisal of De corpore 123
principles that pertain to the theory of argument within topics.39 The second
passage, related to syllogistics, reads as follows:
You strive to prove with yet another argument that the bread and wine
persist in the principal essences40 after the consecration, saying: Non
enim constare poterit affirmatio omnis parte subruta [either: ‘The affirma-
tion as a whole cannot stand if a part is removed’, or, ‘Not every affirma-
tion can stand if a part is removed’]. To prove the claim you ought not
to have produced the particular negation, which proves nothing in the
question at hand, but rather the universal negation, which says: ‘No affir-
mation can stand if a part is removed’. Well, your negation is a particular
one, ‘Not every affirmation can stand if a part is removed’ (non omnis
affirmatio constare poterit parte subruta). On the other hand, your minor
premise is: ‘“The bread and wine on the altar are merely a sacrament”, or,
“The bread and wine on the altar are merely the true body and blood of
Christ”, both are affirmations.’ With these two particular statements as
premises, can you conclude according to rules that the affirmation can-
not stand? Far from it! For in none of the syllogistic figures is some con-
clusion logically inferred from two particular premises. Therefore, you
have set up the argument badly.41
The impression that the readers are likely to get from these passages is that
Lanfranc succeeds in pointing out some elementary mistakes in Berengar’s
argumentation. Those with some imagination can almost hear Berengar’s dis-
tant voice crying as Felicianus had done.
However, the impression of Lanfranc’s victory over Berengar on the battle-
field of dialectic is only an impression. To begin with, the syllogism which
Lanfranc criticizes in the syllogistic passage is of his own invention.42 Lanfranc
accuses Berengar of having presented a categorical syllogism in which both the
premises are ‘particular’ statements (as opposed to ‘universal’ statements).43
He is right in maintaining that no such syllogism can be valid because none of
the syllogisms in the four Aristotelian figures has two particular statements as
premises. However, Berengar did not present any categorical syllogism in the
Scriptum. To be able to present his criticism, Lanfranc deliberately misreads
Berengar’s sentence non enim constare poterit affirmatio omnis parte subruta.
The word omnis can mean both ‘every’ and ‘(the) whole’. When Berengar wrote,
non … poterit affirmatio omnis, he meant: ‘the affirmation as a whole cannot’.
Lanfranc reads it ‘not every affirmation can’, which may be a possible read-
ing as such but is definitely nonsense in the context of the Scriptum. Reading
Berengar’s sentence as ‘Not every affirmation can stand if a part is removed’,
Lanfranc is able to put together an allegedly Berengarian syllogism in which
this ‘particular negation’ is one of the two premises.
The passage related to topics does not fare any better. Lanfranc repeats in
it his criticism against the two statements which Berengar used to explain his
logical argument against the synod of Rome. The criticism is beside the point,
and making use of the terms of topics does not make it any stronger. Lanfranc
does not use the tools of logic to reply to Berengar’s logical argument but to
mislead the audience about the content of what Berengar says and to create
the impression that he has offered a definitive refutation. De corpore 7 also
serves to enforce the feeling, gradually developed in the course of De corpore,
that Lanfranc is a true erudite whereas Berengar is an impostor.
To complete his treatment of #10, Lanfranc puts the reader on the wrong
track about Berengar’s allusion to Augustine’s On Christian Teaching. Berengar
meant a passage saying that ‘the validity of logical sequences has not been es-
tablished by men, but is observed and noted by them’.44 His point was simply
to underline that his logical argument against the synod of Rome is a valid
inference. Lanfranc lets the audience understand that Berengar wants to say
that all truths have a divine anchor insofar as God foreknows all things and
creates the things which make statements true. By misidentifying Berengar’s
allusion, Lanfranc gets an opportunity to criticize Berengar’s use of authorita-
tive writings.45
In De corpore 8, Lanfranc deals with quotations #11–13. He accuses Berengar
of being unnecessarily repetitious and uses this as an excuse for moving swiftly
onward. He lets us understand that he has already offered a definitive refuta-
tion of Berengar’s arguments against the synod’s formulations, and he repeats
some of his earlier remarks. Lanfranc also surmises that the sole reason for
Berengar’s using dialectical terms like ‘affirmation’, ‘predicate’, and ‘subject’ is
that he hopes, in this way, to cause the unlearned in the audience to perceive
44 Augustine, De doctrina christiana II, 32, 50. See Berengar, Rescriptum I, ed. Huygens, 93,
lines 2054–60.
45 De corpore 7, 418A–C.
Reappraisal of De corpore 125
To show that the text authorized by the synod of Rome is ‘against the Catholic
truth’ (#1),47 Berengar presents in the Scriptum an account of the Eucharist
(#14–20) which largely consists of citations from Augustine’s works. The key-
note idea is that of a sacrament as a sacred sign:
(#17) Of which blessed Augustine says in the book On the City of God: ‘A
sacrament is a sacred sign.’ He defines a sign in the book On Christian
Teaching: ‘A sign is a thing which, over and above the appearance which
it presents to the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as
a consequence of itself.’48
Berengar builds his interpretation of the Eucharistic doctrine around this idea.
He maintains that the bread and wine on the altar are not destroyed at the con-
secration but receive a new status in that they become a sacrament. Berengar
distinguishes between the sacrament (sacramentum) and the thing of the
sacrament (res sacramenti). The bread and wine are the sacrament, whereas
Christ’s body is the thing of the sacrament. The sign, the bread and wine, is
visible, whereas the thing signified, Christ’s body, is invisible for us because of
its current location in heaven. There is a similarity between the sacrament and
the thing of the sacrament, and in a manner, the sacrament is the thing of the
sacrament: we can say that the bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood.49
In a concluding remark (#22), Berengar rejects as impossible the suggestion
that the Eucharistic ‘breaking of the bread’ could be performed by physically
breaking up Christ’s body because Christ’s body is absolutely incorruptible and
remains in heaven until the restitution of all things.50
Lanfranc deals with Berengar’s account of the Eucharist in De corpore 9–17.
Like in De corpore 2–8, one of Lanfranc’s central aims is to mislead the audience
about the content of what Berengar says. He also strives to reinforce the pic-
ture, first introduced in De corpore 1, that Berengar’s use of the authoritative
writings is faulty in a fundamental way. Related to this, he is careful to incorpo-
rate all of Berengar’s authoritative references among the evidence in support
of his own position.
The idea of a sacrament as a sacred sign is central in Berengar’s analysis of
the Eucharist. Lanfranc takes this understanding of ‘sacrament’ from Berengar,
but in Lanfranc’s hands, the idea of the Eucharist as a sacrament is thoroughly
transformed. For one thing, Lanfranc makes a distinction between the ap-
pearance (species) and the essence (essentia) in the Eucharistic elements.
What is more, when Berengar makes a distinction between ‘Christ’s body’ and
‘Christ’s flesh’ in order to deny the appropriateness of the latter notion in the
Eucharistic context (unless it is taken to mean Christ’s body), Lanfranc makes a
distinction between ‘Christ’s body’ and ‘Christ’s flesh’ in order to designate two
different entities involved in the Eucharist: ‘Christ’s body’ is Christ’s historical
body which once suffered on the Cross and is now situated in heaven, and
‘Christ’s flesh’ is a piece of flesh which is hiding under the appearance of the
bread on the altar. For Lanfranc, the piece of flesh on the altar is a sacrament
or sacred sign signifying Christ’s historical body.51 Lanfranc offers his fullest
exposition of this idea in De corpore 14. The chapters that precede, that is, De
corpore 9–13, prepare the reader for it by introducing various elements in it as
well as creating a motivation for it.
In De corpore 9, Lanfranc replies to quotation #14 from the Scriptum:
BERENGAR. Through the consecration on the altar, the bread and wine
become a sacrament of religion, not so that they cease to be what they
were, but ‘so that they are what they were and change into something
else’, as blessed Ambrose says in the book On the Sacraments.52
51 For Lanfranc’s view of the sacrament in the Eucharist, see also Montclos, Lanfranc et
Bérenger, 392–416.
52 De corpore 9, 419C. Ambrose, De sacramentis IV, 4, 15.
53 De corpore 9, 419C–420C.
54 De corpore 9, 420C–421A.
55 De corpore 1, 408A–409A, ed. Huygens, 239–40, lines 23–35; 5, 414D–415D; 7, 418B–C.
Reappraisal of De corpore 127
presents his most vigorous attack against Berengar related to this issue. The
reason for this, obviously, is that Lanfranc is now moving to the part of the
Scriptum which mainly consists of citations from the authoritative writings.
Lanfranc finds it important to convince the audience that Berengar can only
apparently claim the support of the authoritative writers for the elaboration of
the doctrine that he presents. Placing this attack in De corpore 9 also has the
advantage that it helps to hide the fact that Lanfranc’s own interpretation of
Ambrose’s statement is baseless.
In #14, Berengar offers an exact citation from Ambrose’s De sacramentis.
How is it possible that Lanfranc can use this citation to accuse him of falsely
attributing his views to the authoritative writings? Medieval writers did not
have quotation marks at their disposal, and Berengar obviously had not used
any other technical device to show where the citation from Ambrose begins.
This made it possible for Lanfranc to claim that Berengar had intended a lon-
ger citation than actually is the case: he pretends to understand that the cita-
tion includes not only the phrase ‘so that they are what they were and change
into something else’ but at least as much as follows: ‘not so that they cease
to be what they were, but so that they are what they were and change into
something else’. On these grounds, Lanfranc offers a long rhetorical passage
which starts with a triple exclamation—‘O senseless mind! O man who lies
without shame! O punishable heedlessness!’56—and ends with the accusation
that even among the heretical thinkers in the history of Christianity, it would
be hard to find anyone worse than Berengar when it comes to appealing to
authoritative writings.57
After these preparations, Lanfranc takes up the passage in De sacramentis
that Berengar had cited and imposes an interpretation on it. This is the passage
in De corpore where Lanfranc first introduces the distinction between ‘appear-
ance’ (species) and ‘essence’ (essentia), a distinction central to his elaboration
of the Eucharistic doctrine. He introduces it by imputing to Ambrose the idea
that the bread and wine ‘[are] what they were when it comes to the visible
appearance and change into the nature of things that they previously were
not when it comes to the interior essence’.58 There is nothing in Ambrose’s
text to suggest this interpretation.59 Lanfranc simply postulates that the pas-
sage should be interpreted the way he does, but the other things he says in the
same chapter make sure that very few would dare to entertain doubts about
what he says.
In De corpore 10–13, Lanfranc goes through quotations #15–18 from the
Scriptum, which include a number of citations from Augustine’s works. He
bends these citations to support the idea that a piece of Christ’s flesh hid-
ing under the appearance of the bread is a sacrament in the sense of a sa-
cred sign. While doing this, Lanfranc often resorts to ambiguous and vague
expressions.60 He also creates a motivation for distinguishing Christ’s flesh and
Christ’s body by dwelling on the question of how it is possible that Christ’s
flesh is eaten and his blood drunk on earth (cf. John 6:53–56) and Christ never-
theless remains whole and living at the right hand of the Father.61
Even though Lanfranc presents his official definition of the Eucharistic
doctrine in De corpore 18 (see 6.5), the most important individual chapter in
De corpore for understanding his elaboration of this doctrine is not chapter 18
but chapter 14. In it, Lanfranc explicates some important ideas which are ei-
ther implicit or absent in Lanfranc’s official statement. The starting point is
quotation #19 from the Scriptum:
Berengar understood this passage to say that the sacrament of Christ’s body,
that is to say, the bread, is ‘in a certain manner’ Christ’s body in that it can figu-
ratively be called Christ’s body. Lanfranc will agree with Berengar in holding
that the sacrament of Christ’s body is figuratively called Christ’s body. However,
the interpretation which he imposes on the Augustinian passage is entirely dif-
ferent from Berengar’s because he identifies the sacrament differently:
LANFRANC. The sacrament of Christ’s body, as for the matter that the
Lord Christ himself was immolated on the Cross, is his flesh, which we
receive in the sacrament covered under the form of bread, and his blood,
which we drink under the appearance and taste of wine. For the flesh is
the sacrament of the flesh, and the blood is the sacrament of the blood.
By the flesh and blood, both of which are invisible, intelligible, spiritual,
is signified the visible and palpable body of the Redeemer, which is mani-
festly full of every grace and virtue and the divine majesty. When one of
these is broken and divided up for the salvation of the people and the
other shed from the chalice and received by the mouth of the faithful, his
death on the Cross and the springing of the blood from his side is figura-
tively expressed.63
Therefore, the flesh and blood, which we eat daily to obtain God’s mercy
for the sake of our sins, are called Christ’s body and blood, not only be-
cause they are essentially the same (essentialiter idem), while very dif-
ferent in their qualities, but also according to that mode of speaking in
which we call the thing that signifies with the name used for the signified
thing. And if this flesh and this blood are sacraments of themselves when
taken in this way and that way, there is no reason for anyone to be dis-
turbed by this, because the very Lord Jesus, after his resurrection, acted as
a type and figure of himself regarding different time points.65
63 De corpore 14, 423D–424A. When Lanfranc characterizes Christ’s flesh and blood as ‘intel-
ligible’ and ‘spiritual’, he can be interpreted as implying that they can only be grasped by
the intellect or the spirit. See Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 382–83.
64 Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 402–403, asserts that the remarks in this passage also
apply to Christ’s historical body as presently existing in heaven. However, Lanfranc is,
deliberately, vague about this. See also 6.5.
65 De corpore 14, 424B: ‘Caro ergo et sanguis, quibus ad impetrandam pro peccatis nostris
Dei misericordiam quotidie alimur, Christi corpus ac sanguis vocantur, non solum quia
essentialiter idem sunt, qualitatibus plurimum discrepantes, verum etiam eo locutionis
130 Chapter 6
The first sentence makes it clear that the flesh and blood on the altar are en-
tities different from Christ’s historical body and are only figuratively called
‘Christ’s body and blood’. Lanfranc here gives two grounds for using this figura-
tive mode of speaking: the flesh and blood have the same essence as Christ’s
historical body, and the flesh and blood are a sign which signifies the historical
body. In the second sentence, there is a vague formulation which appears to
identify the two entities. However, Lanfranc does not assert the identity of the
two things but speaks about it conditionally: if the sign and the thing signified
are two different aspects of the same thing, this should not disturb anyone.66
(See also 6.5.) The closing remark in the chapter again makes a sharp distinc-
tion between the flesh on the altar and Christ’s historical body:
Therefore, as the heavenly bread, which is Christ’s true flesh, is in its own
way called Christ’s body, when it really is the sacrament of Christ’s body,
namely the body which hung on the Cross visible, palpable, and mortal,
and the very immolation of the flesh itself in the hands of the priest is
called Christ’s suffering, death, and crucifixion, not in the real truth but
in the signifying mystery, in the same way, the sacrament of faith, which
is baptism, is faith.67
Even though the flesh of Christ on the altar has the same essence as the flesh
in Christ’s historical body, the flesh on the altar and the historical body are two
distinct entities, and the former is a sacred sign signifying the latter.
modo quo res significans significatae rei solet vocabulo nuncupari. Nec juste quisquam
movebitur, si eadem caro, idemque sanguis sui ipsorum sacramenta existant secundum
aliud atque aliud accepta, cum ipse Dominus Jesus, post resurrectionem suam, sui ipsius
diversa temporum ratione typum gesserit et figuram.’
66 Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 396, 408–409, does not take into account the conditional
nature of Lanfranc’s statement. Lanfranc’s theory of the Eucharist requires that the flesh
on the altar and Christ’s body in heaven are two distinct entities, as Montclos also ac-
knowledges (e.g., 383–90).
67 De corpore 14, 425A (amended): ‘Sicut ergo coelestis panis, quae vera Christi caro est, suo
modo vocatur corpus Christi cum revera sit sacramentum corporis Christi [PL omits: cum
revera sit sacramentum corporis Christi], illius videlicet quod visibile, palpabile, mortale,
in cruce est suspensum; vocaturque ipsa carnis ipsius immolatio, quae sacredotis mani-
bus fit, Christi passio, mors, crucifixio, non rei veritate, sed significanti [PL: significante]
mysterio, sic sacramentum fidei, quod baptisma intelligit, fides est.’ As explained in note
3 in 5.1, the collations published in Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 540–45 are to be used
for amending the text in Patrologia Latina.
Reappraisal of De corpore 131
As Jean de Montclos has pointed out, the idea that the bread converts into
a piece of Christ’s flesh and the wine into a small amount of Christ’s blood
was popular among some theologians in the closing period of the early Middle
Ages (‘carnalism’ or ‘ultrarealism’).68 Even though this idea appears peculiar
or even offensive to many modern readers, the audience De corpore was pri-
marily addressing would largely perceive it as part of the traditional Christian
teaching. The innovativeness of the Eucharistic theory in De corpore does not
lie here. It lies in the way in which the carnalist position is combined with
the idea of a sacrament as a sacred sign: the flesh and blood of Christ which
are hidden under the appearances of the bread and wine are said to be a sac-
rament signifying Christ’s historical body. Regarding this central feature, the
theory of the Eucharist in De corpore is distinctive and idiosyncratic.
However, there are reasons for being cautious in imputing this theory to
Lanfranc (cf. 6.1). The strongly rhetorical character of De corpore means that
the usual methods for interpreting theological texts cannot be straightfor-
wardly applied to it. There are reasons for believing that Lanfranc did not
compose De corpore to express his thoughts; rather, he composed it—or had it
composed—to create some impressions that suited his purposes (and to pro-
duce some other opportune effects). In what follows, I make a case for ques-
tioning the sincerity of what Lanfranc says about Christ’s flesh as a sacrament.
If the case succeeds, to some notable degree at least, this constitutes a reason
to be suspicious about the seriousness of De corpore as a theological contribu-
tion in general.
The discussion of De corpore 9–17 in 6.4 already reveals one major reason
for questioning the sincerity of what Lanfranc says about Christ’s flesh as a
sacrament. Lanfranc presents these chapters as a reply to quotations #14–22
from the Scriptum. Among other things, Berengar had presented a string of
citations from various works of Augustine (in #16–20) as proof texts for his
own view. Lanfranc creates the impression that the texts quoted by Berengar
support the idea that a piece of Christ’s flesh masked under the appearance of
the bread is a sacred sign which refers to Christ’s historical body suffering on
the Cross. Even though Lanfranc does not explicitly say that he is offering an
interpretation of Augustine’s statements, any normal reader will take him as
doing just that. The duplicitous manner in which Lanfranc creates an apparent
Augustinian justification for his idea of Christ’s flesh as a sacred sign makes the
sincerity of this idea questionable.
I next take up two more major considerations that speak against the sincer-
ity of Lanfranc’s theory of the Eucharist in De corpore. If Lanfranc’s intention
had been to offer his genuine and considered view on the topic, then surely
he would have attempted to convey this to the audience. Rather surprisingly,
it appears that Lanfranc did not want the audience to get a clear understand-
ing of what his explication of the Eucharistic doctrine actually was. Further,
when querying the sincerity of ideas that are presented in a polemic context,
one scenario to be taken into account is that the view presented is adopted
merely because of its usefulness in the particular contest. It can be shown that
the theory of the Eucharist in De corpore serves extremely well in the rhetori-
cal mission against Berengar of Tours, and this is due to some features of the
theory that Lanfranc does not mention in his other writings.69
Lanfranc develops his elaboration of the sacrament in the Eucharist in the
course of his reply to Berengar’s Scriptum, in particular in De corpore 9–14.
Because the main focus of this part of the treatise is elsewhere and because
Lanfranc often resorts to ambiguous and vague expressions, it is unlikely that
the general reader will get a clear understanding of Lanfranc’s theory at this
stage. Lanfranc presents his official statement of the Eucharistic doctrine in
De corpore 18, and this is the part of the treatise that the reader is expected
to consult for an orthodox explanation of the issue.70 However, it turns out
that De corpore 18 does not give a clear exposition of his theory either. Here is
Lanfranc’s official statement:
69 For discussions concerning the Eucharist in Lanfranc’s other writings, some of them ear-
lier and some later than De corpore, see Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 326–40. Among
features that appear and, by implication, were endorsed by the historical Lanfranc are:
that the bread and wine convert into a piece of Christ’s flesh and a small amount of his
blood, and that the Eucharistic celebration is a sacrament which refers to what once hap-
pened to Christ’s historical body. Among features that do not appear are the distinction
between the sacrament and the thing of the sacrament, and the idea that the piece of
Christ’s flesh on the altar is a sacred sign signifying Christ’s historical body. The theory of
the Eucharist elaborated in De corpore is, in its main lines, compatible with what Lanfranc
says in his other writings, but some of the most salient features of the theory appear only
in De corpore.
70 See De corpore 18, 430A–B.
Reappraisal of De corpore 133
the things remaining, as well as some other qualities, in order that [the
receivers] would not be horrified by receiving them raw and bloody, and
in order that the believers would receive more abundant rewards for the
faith—the Lord’s body itself existing in heaven at the right hand of the
Father, immortal, inviolate, whole, undefiled, and unharmed. Thus, it can
be truly said that what is received both is the very body taken from the
Virgin and is not it. It is it, as far as the essence and the character and
power of its true nature are concerned. It is not it, if you look at the ap-
pearance of the bread and wine, and so forth as apprehended above.71
The position expressed in this passage consists of elements which are familiar
from the earlier parts of De corpore, and the remark at the end suggests that the
passage could be read as a summary of what has already been treated earlier.
However, the statement is clearly deficient because the idea of ‘sacrament’ as
a ‘sacred sign’ is conspicuously absent. In fact, there is only one reference to
‘sacrament’ as a ‘sacred sign’ in the later part of De corpore:
Again ‘sign’, ‘mystery’, ‘sacrament’, and whatever like terms, are names
used for designating the Lord’s suffering, assuming that ‘sacrament’ is
taken to mean a ‘sacred sign’, as blessed Augustine defines it in On the
City of God.72
However, the sign Lanfranc speaks of here is a sign of Christ’s suffering and
not of Christ’s body (both ideas appear in De corpore 14), and he fails to specify
what it is that is a sign in this sense. In addition, it is noteworthy that ‘sacra-
ment’ appears here in a list of terms, as if Lanfranc were saying that the term is
not particularly important.
Let us note some points related to Lanfranc’s official statement. First, when
the idea of a sacrament as a sacred sign is not mentioned, what remains is basi-
cally the carnalist theory that the bread converts into a piece of Christ’s flesh.
71 De corpore 18, 430B–C (amended): ‘Credimus igitur terrenas substantias, quae in mensa
Dominica, per sacerdotale ministerium [PL: mysterium], divinitus sanctificantur, inef-
fabiliter, incomprehensibiliter, mirabiliter, operante superna potentia, converti in es-
sentiam Dominici corporis, reservatis ipsarum rerum speciebus, et quibusdam aliis
qualitatibus, ne percipientes cruda et cruenta, horrerent, et ut credentes fidei praemia
ampliora perciperent, ipso tamen Dominico corpore existente in coelestibus ad dexteram
Patris, immortali, inviolato, integro, incontaminato, illaeso: ut vere dici possit, et ipsum
corpus quod de Virgine sumptum sumere, et tamen non ipsum. Ipsum quidem, quan-
tum ad essentiam veraeque naturae proprietatem atque virtutem; non ipsum autem, si
spectes [PL: species] panis vinique speciem, caeteraque superius comprehensa; …’
72 De corpore 20, 437C.
134 Chapter 6
In De corpore 18, Lanfranc wants to create the impression that he is only restat-
ing the position that the audience is already accustomed to. He does not take
back what he has said in De corpore 13–14, but by not mentioning it, he implies
that it is not important. Second, as in De corpore 13–14, Lanfranc here does his
best to balance between treating Christ’s flesh and Christ’s historical body as
two different entities and between treating them as one. Lanfranc’s statement
makes it clear that the piece of flesh on the altar and Christ’s historical body
are two distinct entities: they are in different locations and have different prop-
erties, ‘the Lord’s body itself existing in heaven’. At the same time, Lanfranc
works to emphasize the ‘essential’ unity of the two entities. When Lanfranc
states that ‘the earthly substances … are … converted … into the essence of
the Lord’s body’, this actually means that the bread converts into something
which has the same essence as Christ’s body; it does not convert into Christ’s
very body. It ‘can be truly said’ that the communicants receive ‘the very body
taken from the Virgin’ ‘as far as the essence and the character and power of
its true nature are concerned’. The emphasis on the essential identity of the
two entities virtually hides from view their numerical distinctness. Third, in
De corpore 18, Christ’s historical body is considered in a different perspective
than earlier in the work. In De corpore 13–14, Christ’s historical body is treated
as suffering on the Cross, whereas it is treated as presently existing in heaven
in De corpore 18. Lanfranc fails to mention that the body now in heaven is the
same as the body that once suffered on the Cross. He had good reasons for
being vague about this. The idea that the piece of flesh which is broken under
the appearance of the bread is a sacred sign of Christ’s suffering body is already
plausible by virtue of its piety, but Christ’s present existence elsewhere com-
plicates the picture. Even though Berengar upheld that the consecrated bread
is a sacred sign of Christ’s body in its present existence, nowhere in De corpore
does Lanfranc address the question whether the piece of flesh on the altar is a
sign referring to Christ’s body now in heaven.
Lanfranc’s official statement of the Eucharistic doctrine in De corpore 18 does
not, therefore, help the reader to a clear understanding of what Lanfranc’s ex-
plication of the doctrine actually includes. On the contrary, Lanfranc strives to
hide some central features of the model that he developed in De corpore 9–14:
he works to obscure that the piece of flesh on the altar is an entity distinct from
Christ’s historical body, and he leaves unsaid that the piece of flesh is a sac-
rament or a sacred sign of Christ’s historical body. Why did Lanfranc present
his elaboration of the Eucharistic doctrine at all, if he did not want the audi-
ence to get a clear understanding of it? The answer is related to the rhetorical
objectives of De corpore and the circumstance that the primary audience of
Reappraisal of De corpore 135
De corpore consists of two radically different parts. The main part of the au-
dience is the clerical and monastic audience in Normandy and its surround-
ings. In addition, there is the formal recipient of the treatise, Berengar of Tours.
With the aid of De corpore, Lanfranc wants to bring about different kinds of
effects in the two parts of the audience.
Lanfranc’s overall aim in De corpore was to create the impression—to his
chosen general audience, that is to say—that he, Lanfranc, not only offers a
definitive refutation of Berengar’s Scriptum but also defeats the Berengarian
heresy for once and for all. To achieve this, he systematically misleads the
audience about the content of what Berengar had said to make him appear
illogical and to be able to present imposing criticisms of his (alleged) ideas
and arguments. Lanfranc also systematically misleads the audience about the
facts of the Berengarian affair and about the state of the Eucharistic doctrine
at the time. He uses different kinds of rhetorical accusations and insinuations
to undermine Berengar’s credibility and builds a picture of himself as a true
erudite who is also an ardent defender of the one true faith. Lanfranc suc-
ceeded in all this remarkably well. When the first audience of De corpore, the
local audience in Normandy and its surroundings, became acquainted with
the treatise, it would inescapably get the general impressions that Lanfranc
wanted it to have. However, few persons among that audience would be able
to reconstruct the underlying theory of the Eucharist in De corpore. This did
not diminish the effectiveness of the treatise. Even otherwise, De corpore is
replete with statements that the ordinary reader will not fully understand, but
this only serves to reinforce the picture that the author is a highly learned and
very intelligent person.
My suggestion is that Lanfranc devised his theory of the Eucharist for the
formal recipient of the treatise, Berengar of Tours. Many of the details in
De corpore have been specifically designed for Berengar’s eyes. Berengar was
a formidable opponent in literary warfare. The events in 1059 showed that he
could be intimidated in a synod, but they also showed that he would not give
up easily (see 6.2). Lanfranc expected that Berengar would try to reply to De
corpore, as he had replied to the synod in Rome by composing the Scriptum.
Berengar did as might be expected: he wrote Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum. It
is a long treatise, at least four of five times as long as De corpore, and Berengar
must have spent a considerable amount of time in writing it. Significantly,
however, he never published his rejoinder. Why not? Obviously, Lanfranc had
succeeded in making his rhetorical case in De corpore so strong that, in the end,
Berengar came to the conclusion that replying served no purpose: he would
never be able to offer a reply that would convince Lanfranc’s chosen audience,
136 Chapter 6
73 For an analysis of Berengar’s Rescriptum, see Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 77–118,
chapter 4, ‘Berengar of Tours: Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum’. I was only partly aware of
the rhetorical aspects of Lanfranc’s De corpore when writing this.
74 See Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 80–92.
75 See also Holopainen, ‘“Lanfranc of Bec” and Berengar of Tours’, 112–16.
Reappraisal of De corpore 137
76 Books II and III of the Rescriptum, ed. Huygens, 101–211, include numerous quotations
from what were considered authoritative writings, often with extensive analysis or short
analytical remarks.
77 See also Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger, 276–77, 284–88.
138 Chapter 6
When the appellation ‘bread’ is used, this takes place in the accustomed
fashion of the sacred writings, where some things are frequently called
with the names of those things of which they are made, or which they
are supposed to be but are not, or to which they are similar in some re-
spect. … In this way Christ’s body is also called ‘the bread’, either because
it is made of bread, or because it looks like bread to the eyes of those who
watch, when it is flesh, or because it is connected to the corporeal and
visible bread by some kind of similarity.79
Even though Lanfranc speaks here misleadingly of ‘Christ’s body’, the point he
wants to establish is that the piece of Christ’s flesh on the altar can be figura-
tively called ‘the bread’. If we read Lanfranc’s theory into the text of the 1059
synod, imposing a new interpretation on it, it starts to seem that the synod did
not, after all, present any affirmative claims about the bread and wine after
the consecration. Even though the synod appears to be presenting such affir-
mations, these should be understood to be about a piece of flesh and a small
amount of blood which are figuratively called ‘the bread and wine’. Lanfranc
does not directly claim that this is what the synod meant, but it does follow
from the assumption that Lanfranc and the synod represent the same teaching
about the Eucharist.
Lanfranc’s reply to Berengar’s logical argument is an important example of
the double strategy that he employs in De corpore. Lanfranc has something to
offer to the local audience in Normandy, and he has something to offer to the
formal recipient of the treatise. His strategy for the local audience is to mislead
it about the content of what Berengar says, to repudiate the suggestion that the
synod’s text could be in any way inconsistent, and to create the impression that
he has offered a definitive refutation of Berengar’s argument(s). Lanfranc real-
izes this strategy in De corpore 2–8, and the main audience of De corpore will
not bother about the logical argument after that—if it has ever got the idea
of what it really is about. As for Berengar, Lanfranc uses an entirely different
strategy. There appears to be no direct reference to the logical argument after
De corpore 8, but Lanfranc knew that Berengar would analyse De corpore, try-
ing to figure out what entities are involved, what properties they have, and
what predications Lanfranc makes about them. Using this method, an intel-
ligent reader—Berengar or Jean de Montclos—will arrive at the underlying
theory of the Eucharist in De corpore. The intelligent reader will also relate
Lanfranc’s theory to the other statements on the Eucharist that are relevant
in the context. Lanfranc could count on Berengar checking whether his the-
ory of the Eucharist is compatible with the text of the synod. When impos-
ing Lanfranc’s theory on the synod’s text, Berengar would notice that it can
be done. The resulting interpretation of the text is artificial but it is neverthe-
less a coherent one. What is more, it will be difficult for Berengar to criticize
Lanfranc for imposing this artificial interpretation on the synod’s text because
Lanfranc is careful not to explicitly suggest that the synod’s text needs to be
interpreted in a special way. If Lanfranc adopted the idea of Christ’s flesh as
a sacred sign because of its usefulness in anti-Berengarian polemics, this puts
the whole effort of De corpore in a rather peculiar light.
Chapter 7
When Anselm first published the text of the Proslogion, he gave it the title Faith
Seeking Understanding. Obviously, Anselm meant the work as a contribution
to reflection about the relationship between faith and reason. One of the main
problems in modern Anselm scholarship has been that of spelling out the con-
tent of Anselm’s contribution regarding the topic, and widely differing inter-
pretations of Anselm’s position have been proposed. Anselm’s contribution to
the faith and reason issue in the Proslogion will be a major underlying theme in
the remaining parts of the present study. Part 3 analyses some relevant aspects
of the Proslogion itself. The present chapter creates the historical context for
the effort by describing the background of the Proslogion regarding the topic:
the conflicting views about theology and faith and reason in the immediate
environment.
The reappraisal of the treatise De corpore et sanguine Domini attributed to
Lanfranc makes it necessary to think again about how the faith and reason
issue behind the Proslogion ought to be construed. How should we see the
role of De corpore in the discussion when it turns out that this treatise does
not reflect Lanfranc’s genuine views at all points? Should we just ignore it, as
Eadmer does in his discussion of Anselm’s relation to Lanfranc in Vita Anselmi
(see 5.3)? Furthermore, the view that there was a conflict between Anselm and
Lanfranc about the Monologion also rests on the assumption that De corpore
can serve as a guide to Lanfranc’s views. When we drop that assumption, it
becomes necessary to think again about the purpose and tone of the exchange
between Anselm and Lanfranc. In the end, the role of the Monologion in the
background of the Proslogion needs to be reconsidered. Anselm wanted the
two treatises to be seen as a pair, but they are a peculiar pair and it is not im-
mediately clear how they relate from a methodological point of view.
Ignoring De corpore in the present context would not be a viable solution.
We know that De corpore cannot serve as a guide to Lanfranc’s views, and
Anselm and Lanfranc knew as much, but the case was different for the main
part of Anselm’s first audience. Anselm wrote his early treatises at the monas-
tery of Bec in Normandy, and De corpore had been written in the same place
some fifteen years earlier.1 The primary audience of Anselm’s early treatises is
the same as the audience of De corpore: the local monastic and clerical audi-
ence in Normandy and its surroundings in the 1060s and 1070s (after 1066 also
including England, which became part of the Norman realm). That audience
would see De corpore as a guide to Lanfranc’s views, and many would see it as
a guide to the orthodox understanding of what theology is. Hence, De corpore
was an important part of the social reality in which Anselm was working when
he composed his early treatises. De corpore represented Lanfranc’s heritage
regarding theological methodology, and compared to it, Lanfranc’s genuine
views on faith and reason are and were of minor importance.
De corpore advocates an understanding of faith and doctrine which leaves
little room for rationally oriented theological inquiry (see 7.2 below). For rea-
sons explained in a previous chapter (see 5.3), it is probable that Anselm and
Lanfranc worked together to create De corpore, and this also applies to the
position on faith and reason that was expressed in the treatise. The position
served their short-term interests in the rhetorical attack on Berengar of Tours.2
However, the heritage of De corpore became a burden to Anselm in the long
run and he wanted to free himself from it. It seems that one of the motives
behind the Monologion is that of undoing some of the damage that De cor-
pore had caused in respect to rationally oriented theology, and I will maintain
that Anselm sought Lanfranc’s help in publishing the treatise and that they
worked together to counteract ‘Lanfranc’s heritage’. In this construal, there is
no conflict between Anselm and Lanfranc about the Monologion but instead
cooperation in its publication. There was tension in the air, nevertheless, and
at some moments Anselm and Lanfranc could not take the other’s willingness
to cooperate for granted (see 7.4).
Anselm completed the Monologion a little before he composed the
Proslogion, and the former treatise is obviously an important part of the back-
ground for the latter. As was said, however, it is not immediately clear what
the relation between the two treatises is, and it is easy to misunderstand their
relation, especially if one misunderstands the exchange between Anselm and
1 If it should be the case that Lanfranc composed De corpore only after he had moved to Caen
(cf. 5.3), this does not significantly change the situation. The primary audience would have
been the same anyway.
2 If it should be the case that Lanfranc composed De corpore single-handedly, only some minor
details in the story need to be changed. If Anselm was not involved in the composition of
De corpore himself, he still did not have any illusions about the nature of the treatise, and
Lanfranc knew that.
142 Chapter 7
3 Cf. Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘Logic and Theology in the Eleventh Century: Anselm and Lanfranc’s
Heritage’, in G. E. M. Gasper and H. Kohlenberger (eds.), Anselm and Abelard: Investigations
and Juxtapositions (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006), 1–16.
4 For publishing in the eleventh-century context, see Richard Sharpe, ‘Anselm as Author:
Publishing in the Late Eleventh Century’, The Journal of Medieval Latin 19 (2009), 1–87. When
Anselm at an early stage sent the Monologion to Abbot Rainaldus, he advised the abbot to
give the treatise only to reasonable and peaceful persons in order to avoid unsubstantiated
criticism. Ep. 83, S III, 207–208. The publication history of the Monologion will be discussed
in 7.3–7.4 and 9.1.
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 143
Anselm seeks in the Proslogion to justify that method in the view of a conserva-
tive audience (see Part 3). Even though the Proslogion was composed after the
Monologion, it can be said that it prepares the ground for the publication of the
Monologion: the Monologion was allowed to have wider circulation only after it
was complemented by the Proslogion as its companion.
The following two sections discuss some relevant aspects of De corpore and
Monologion, respectively (7.2 and 7.3). There then follows a discussion of the
first publication of the Monologion and the exchange between Anselm and
Lanfranc related to it (7.4). The chapter will end with some reflections on how
the conflicting views about faith and reason called for the publication of some
text like the Proslogion (7.5).
5 For an analysis of Berengar’s views on the method in his main work, Rescriptum contra
Lanfrannum, see Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century (Leiden:
Brill, 1996), 108–18.
144 Chapter 7
6 De corpore 1, 407A–B, ed. Huygens, 239, lines 9–17; 4, 414A; 22–23, 440D–442D. For the editions
of De corpore and the mode of referencing them, see note 3 in 5.1 above. For Lanfranc’s views
about Church and faith, see also H. E. J. Cowdrey, Lanfranc: Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 68.
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 145
Christians is that they believe what the Church teaches, and they will get a
reward for their faith. There are some perverted persons, heretics like Berengar,
who are not satisfied with simple faith but pry into things that are beyond
human capacity. Instead of living by faith, as the righteous person does, they
want to have rational grounds for everything. Heretic thinkers argue for their
false views and mislead simple people through their arguments.7 Catholic
thinkers like Lanfranc argue against the heretics. They can appeal to reason
to show the absurdity of the views of the heretics, but generally they should
only use authority arguments.8 When it comes to synods, there is no need for
theological reflection in them. The fathers who are present in the synod will
pronounce the true faith. The decisions of the synods immediately become
part of the authoritative writings of the Church.9
The attitudes just described are part of Lanfranc’s rhetorical attack on
Berengar of Tours. Berengar took it for granted that theological disagreements
in the Church should be solved through intelligent interpretation of the au-
thoritative writings by learned persons like himself and Cardinal Hildebrand.
In Berengar’s model, both authoritative writings and rational argument have
an important role.10 In his rhetorical reply, Lanfranc makes a number of subtle
moves. First, he strives to create the impression that there simply cannot be
any significant disagreement within the Church. Consequently, there is no
need for a method for solving theological disagreements. Second, Lanfranc
makes the authority issue appear in a different perspective. Of course, he does
not question the authoritativeness of the sacred writings. However, the im-
mediate authority is not in the writings but in the teaching and preaching of
the Church. Lanfranc shares in the authority of the Church and he can speak
for the Church. He can also tell Berengar how the one true Church interprets
the writings. Third, Lanfranc does not question the validity of reason on a
general level, but he makes it clear that following reason can be highly dan-
gerous. The readers should distrust rational arguments and be satisfied with
simple believing.11
The discussion about logic and theology in De corpore 7 is related to the
same framework. Lanfranc creates here the impression that he and Berengar
make use of strongly opposing methodologies: Berengar relies on the art of
7 De corpore 1, 407A–409B, ed. Huygens, 239–40, lines 3–51; 10, 421D; 17, 427A–B.
8 De corpore 4, 413B, ed. Huygens, 245, lines 175–80; 7, 416D–417A.
9 De corpore 1, 408B–C, ed. Huygens, 240–41, lines 51–64; 4, 414D.
10 See Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, 108–18.
11 See also Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘“Lanfranc of Bec” and Berengar of Tours’, in David Bates
(ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies 34. Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2011 (Woodbridge:
Boydell Press, 2012), 105–21, at 119–20.
146 Chapter 7
logic, whereas Lanfranc relies on sacred authority.12 The contrast between logic
and authority is, obviously, related to the contrast between reason and rational
grounds, on the one hand, and authority and faith, on the other. However, the
relation between reason and logic in this context is not as straightforward as
might appear. At the closing period of the early Middle Ages, many people saw
logic or dialectic as the representative of reason (cf. 4.1), but this does not apply
to the kind of audience that De corpore mainly addresses. Many members of
this audience only had elementary knowledge of logic, and they would have an
ambivalent attitude towards this art. They would appreciate logic because of
its rationality, but at the same time they would distrust logic even more than
they would distrust reason in general because they did not fully understand
logical techniques and because some people were apparently capable of prov-
ing anything whatsoever with the aid of logic. Logic was associated with ratio-
nality, but it was also associated with sophistry and deception.
In the Scriptum, Berengar presented his logical argument against the text
of the 1059 synod. There are some weaknesses in the way Berengar present-
ed the argument, but the actual point he makes is a strong one. If a person
presents an affirmative claim about an object, then that person certainly as-
sumes that the object in question exists (in the relevant sense of existing).
Berengar’s logical argument posed a genuine challenge to Lanfranc, and the
strategy that Lanfranc used in meeting the challenge included various strands
that have been discussed above (6.3 and 6.5). De corpore 7 is an important part
of Lanfranc’s reply. The discussion in it serves to mislead the audience about
what Berengar’s argument actually is. Further, it creates the false impression
that Lanfranc successfully refutes Berengar’s argument(s) on logical grounds.
At the same time, Lanfranc works to strengthen the distrust that the audience
already feels towards the use of logic, and he creates the impression that his
method is the very opposite of Berengar’s method when it comes to the use of
logic (see 6.3).
The picture that De corpore 7 gives is the following.13 In his argumentation,
the heretic Berengar abandons the sacred writings and appeals to logic alone.
What is more, it turns out that Berengar’s use of logic is mere sophistry and
aims at deceiving the audience. Fortunately, there is Lanfranc who can show
this. Lanfranc is able to meet Berengar on the latter’s favourite ground and
show the ineptness of Berengar’s procedure. Lanfranc’s own method is differ-
ent. His chosen way is to appeal to the authoritative writings and not make
use of techniques that would be recognized as logical. The reason is not that
he does not master the art. Lanfranc assures us that he knows logic at least as
well as Berengar, and his expertise in this area becomes clear from his remarks
that are so erudite that the ordinary reader should not expect to be able to
understand them. In principle, there is nothing wrong in the use of logic, and
Augustine also affirms its usefulness for theological discussion. However, it is
not appropriate to make explicit use of logic in treatments of sacred matters.
One can make the required points without resorting to logical presentation,
and often it is possible to quote authoritative writings instead. Even though
Lanfranc will use the tools of logic to tear down Berengar’s arguments in
De corpore 7, the reader should understand that this is an exception and that it
is Berengar’s fault that Lanfranc has had to make that exception. As a rule, the
explicit use of logic in discussion of sacred matters is out of place.
In sum, De corpore endorses an authoritarian and conservative attitude to-
wards matters of faith. De corpore has little tolerance for theological reflec-
tion or the intelligent interpretation of the sacred writings. The Catholic truth
is what the Church has always preached everywhere, and there is no need to
go beyond that. What is expected of Christians is that they believe what the
Church teaches and they will get a reward for their faith. As Berengar’s exam-
ple shows, asking for rational grounds can be conducive to heresy. The use of
logical tools in the treatment of theological topics is simply not appropriate.
Anselm’s Monologion and the explicitly rational method he applies there have
already been treated in Part 1 of the study (see especially 2.3 and 4.1). The dis-
cussion that follows will complement the previous treatment in that it takes
into account the historical context and is more sensitive to rhetorical con-
siderations. In this section, the focus is on the relation that the Monologion
has to ‘Lanfranc’s heritage’ on the faith and reason issue, that is to say, to the
kind of attitudes that De corpore would endorse in the audience. The follow-
ing section (7.4) discusses the exchange between Anselm and Lanfranc about
the Monologion and the first publication of the treatise. In this connection,
it is important to take into account that it is possible to distinguish at least
three subsequent early versions of the treatise. First, there is the text that
148 Chapter 7
Anselm sent to Lanfranc for inspection, presumably towards the end of the
year 1076.14 Second, there is what appears to be the first published version of
the Monologion, preserved in one early manuscript. Anselm completed this
version towards the end of 1077 or a little later.15 Third, around 1085 at the lat-
est there was in existence a text that is rather similar to the Monologion as
we usually know it.16 It is the two first-mentioned versions that will mainly
concern us here.
The manuscript that Anselm sent to Lanfranc for inspection has not come
down to us. However, it is possible to make plausible conjectures about it by
comparing the first published version of the Monologion to the later versions
of the treatise and by relating them to the other historical evidence. To begin
with, it appears that the main bulk of Anselm’s argumentation in the treatise
remained stable. As is well known, Anselm declined Lanfranc’s suggestion
that he should improve his text in particular ways.17 In addition, there is only
one significant change between the first published version and the later ver-
sions after chapter 1 of the treatise.18 Anselm was not processing the main part
of the treatise (from the middle of chapter 1 to chapter 80) at this stage, even
though there may be some occasional additions and corrections here and
there.19 Further, the well-reflected division into chapters is an integral feature
of the treatise, and there are only a few minor changes in the list of chapters
between the first published version and the later versions.20 It is plausible to
think that the division into chapters was part of the original manuscript, but
it may be that there were only numbers in the margin to indicate the division
and not yet any chapter headings. It is possible that even the chapter numbers
did not yet exist and the division was only indicated through typographical
means, such as special initials.
There are some major differences in the beginning of the treatise between
the first published version and the later versions, and some major differences
can be postulated between the manuscript that Anselm sent to Lanfranc and
14 Anselm sent the manuscript to Lanfranc together with Ep. 72, S III, 193–94.
15 The early manuscript is BNF lat. 13413 fols. 1–57 (Schmitt’s manuscript S). See S I, 3 (Index
siglorum), the apparatus for the earlier recension (Prior recensio) in S I, 7–15, and Sharpe,
‘Anselm as Author’, 23, 80 and 86.
16 Sharpe, ‘Anselm as Author’, 86, calls it ‘Monologion as published’ and gives the date ‘in or
after 1083’.
17 See Ep. 77, S III, 199–200 and 7.4 below.
18 See the apparatus for the earlier recension in Monologion 3, S I, 16. Schmitt reports some
fifteen changes later in the treatise, but they are all quite small.
19 Some remarks concerning the method and the nature of the work may be additions. See
note 41 below.
20 S I, 9–12 (Capitula).
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 149
the first published version. At least six components are relevant here: the letter
of dedication, the preface, the list of chapters, the title, the author’s name, and
the introduction. Of these, only the list of chapters might be a constant ingre-
dient if it was included in the original version. The manuscript that Anselm
sent to Lanfranc did not include a letter of dedication. Instead, the manuscript
was accompanied by a separate covering letter (Letter 72). The letter of dedi-
cation was added to the first published version (see 7.4), and it was included
in some early manuscripts of the later Monologion as well, but then it was
dropped.21 The manuscript that Anselm sent to Lanfranc did not include a pref-
ace, for several features of the preface indicate that it was composed only after
Lanfranc’s criticism and after Anselm’s reply to that criticism in Letter 77.22 It
did not include a title, for Anselm asked Lanfranc to give it a title.23 The first
published version of the treatise carried the title Exemplum meditandi de ra-
tione fidei (An Example of Meditating on the Reason in Faith), and in the later
versions Anselm changed it to Monoloquium de ratione fidei (A Soliloquy on
the Reason in Faith) and subsequently to Monologion.24 In the first published
version, Anselm’s name appeared only in the letter of dedication, but later he
started to append his name to the title of the treatise.25 Finally, in the first
published version there is a short introduction between the list of chapters
and the beginning of chapter 1. In the later versions, this introduction became
merged into chapter 1.26 There probably was a similar short introduction in the
21 See the apparatus in S I, 5–6 (Letter to Archbishop Lanfranc); Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 211;
Sharpe, ‘Anselm as Author’, 16. Because the letter of dedication includes a substantial ref-
erence to the preface, it cannot have been added before the preface.
22 See Monologion, Prologus (in the earlier recension called ‘Prooemium’), S I, 8–9;
Ep. 77, 199–200. If the preface had already been included in the manuscript submitted
to Lanfranc, Lanfranc could hardly have made the suggestion that Anselm should add
references to the authoritative writings at some points. Also, Anselm would refer to the
preface in Ep. 77, and he would not need to explain how what he treats is based on the
writings of the Church fathers, especially Augustine’s De trinitate. See also 7.4 below.
23 Ep. 72, 193.15–18.
24 See the apparatus for Monologion 1 in S I, 13. See also Proslogion, preface, S I, 94.2–13 and
Ep. 109, S III, 242.7–12. For the history of the titles, see also 9.1 below.
25 Monologion, Letter to Archbishop Lanfranc, S I, 5.4–5: ‘frater ANSELMUS Beccensis, vita
peccator, habitu monachus’. In Proslogion, preface, S I, 94.8–13, Anselm explains that sev-
eral persons, including Archbishop Hugh of Lyon, had asked him to add his name to the
titles of his two first treatises. Anselm’s saying this invites the inference that the treatises
were first circulated anonymously. See, for example, Sharpe, ‘Anselm as Author’, 17–19.
However, the earliest surviving version of the Monologion was not anonymous in any real
sense, as the author’s identity is clearly indicated in the letter of dedication.
26 See the apparatus for Monologion 1 in S I, 13–14. The number ‘I’ in the margin, to indicate
the beginning of the first chapter, was at 14.5: ‘Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint …’
150 Chapter 7
27 Sharpe states in ‘Anselm as Author’, 17, that when Anselm sent his first treatise to Abbot
Rainaldus, it was ‘still untitled’. That is to say, Sharpe is implying that before the first sur-
viving version of the Monologion there was one still earlier version that Anselm circu-
lated. Anselm’s letter to Rainaldus, Ep. 83, S III, 207–208, does not actually give grounds
for any inference about the title or lack of title of the treatise. It is natural to assume
that the copy made for Rainaldus carried the title Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei.
See also Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘On the Two Versions of the Proslogion’, Śląskie Studia
Historyczno-Teologiczne 47 (2014), 10–30, at 18–19.
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 151
28 Monologion 1, S I, 14.5–11. In the earlier recension, the end of the passage (lines 10–11)
reads: ‘… nonne ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem
sola ratione persuadere?’
152 Chapter 7
destiny of a human being depends on his or her relation to the Supreme Being.
In the last chapter, the Supreme Being is identified as God. Anselm appeals
to what people who postulate one or more gods mean by the word ‘god’ and
argues that the Supreme Being is the only being that can adequately meet this
description (see 2.3).
When we look at the methodological aspects of the Monologion against the
background of the impressions that De corpore creates, it is illuminating to
compare the views about authority and reason in general, the role of logic or
dialectic in theology, and the role of faith. Here also, I leave the preface to the
Monologion out of account.
Neither De corpore nor the Monologion elaborates on the respective roles
of authority and reason in theology. There are both similarities and conspicu-
ous differences between these works or the impressions they give. The works
have in common that they rest on an undifferentiated notion of authority,
even though the motivation for this may well be different. In the Monologion,
the authority is only implicitly present (except for the first sentence). It is the
Christian idea of reality that will be reconstructed, and the actual readership is
familiar with it because it has ‘heard’ and ‘believed’.29 There is an idealized pic-
ture of the unitary teaching of the Church here, as in De corpore. (The preface
to the Monologion gives a different idea; see 7.4.)
When it comes to the respective roles of authority and reason in theologi-
cal presentations, De corpore and Monologion endorse quite different attitudes.
De corpore recommends simple believing and warns of applying reason in mat-
ters of faith. Relying on reason easily leads to heresy. The orthodox thinkers
usually appeal to sacred authority only, even though reason can legitimately
be used as well in some contexts, for example, in confuting the arguments of
heretics. Anselm’s procedure in the Monologion is in stark contrast with the
methodology that De corpore recommends. Anselm builds his presentation on
rational arguments alone and does not at all appeal to authority within the ar-
gument. While De corpore views reason as a threat to faith and sound doctrine,
the Monologion views it as a friend and an ally.
The same basic constellation applies to the art of logic or dialectic. De cor-
pore strives to strengthen the distrust that the audience already feels towards
the use of logic. Nevertheless, the audience rejoices in Lanfranc’s showpiece-
like use of logic against Berengar, being unable to detect the sophistic nature of
that use. The Monologion, for its part, is based on a sincere but non-ostentatious
use of logic. To begin with, the mode of presentation in the treatise comes from
the art of logic: Anselm seeks to make his arguments formally valid according
to the then current standards, and he seeks to start from the kind of premises
that would be considered as acceptable. What is more, some theories of dialec-
tic that can be characterized as ontological or metaphysical play a prominent
role in the Monologion. When Anselm treats the properties of the Supreme
Being, he offers critical discussions about how far the theories of predicables
and categories, which are metaphysical theories, apply to it (see 4.1). Regarding
the use of logic or dialectic in theology, the Monologion is on an entirely dif-
ferent level from De corpore. The last-mentioned treatise plays on the general
impressions that a half-educated audience has about the art. The Monologion
offers detailed critical discussions about how the metaphysical theories
in dialectic apply to the divine essence and, to some extent, to the three
Trinitarian persons.
There are differences between De corpore and the Monologion in the way
in which faith ( fides) is conceived. The conception of faith in De corpore can
be characterized as cognitive and authoritarian. The faith is a content, a set
of beliefs, that the fathers have handed down and the Church preaches. The
holding true of that set of beliefs can also be called faith. Believing is an act of
obedience towards an authority, and believers are entitled to receive a reward
for their faith. Anselm’s discussion about the relation of beings of a rational
nature to the Supreme Being in Monologion 66–78 sets faith in a different per-
spective. Also in the Monologion, the holding true of a set of beliefs is called
faith. As far as the framework of the Monologion is concerned, however, the
person has arrived at the relevant set of beliefs through his own efforts, and
not by listening to an authority. What is more, Anselm maintains that faith as
mere holding true is ‘dead faith’ ( fides mortua). What makes faith alive is love.
The ‘living faith’ ( fides viva) is based on the holding true of a set of beliefs, but
it is made alive by loving and striving: loving the Supreme Being and striving
towards it, and loving the good and just and striving to put it into effect.30 It is
for the loving and striving that the believer will get his or her reward and not
for the mere holding true.31 What Anselm says about faith in the Monologion
perhaps need not be in contradiction with what De corpore teaches, but the
emphasis is certainly in a different place.
To conclude, the Monologion is based on a very optimistic view of reason
and logic and the usefulness of their application in matters of faith. Anselm
is convinced that much of the content of the Christian teaching can be recon-
structed from a purely rational starting point. There may be cases in which rea-
son and the Christian teaching appear to be in conflict, but reason, sharpened
by the art of logic, has the capability of correcting itself and qualifying its own
principles. Anselm’s optimistic view is in stark contrast with the heritage of
De corpore, which puts emphasis on authority and simple believing and en-
dorses a reserved attitude towards reason and logical arguments.
Perhaps during the latter half of 1076, Anselm completed the original manu-
script of the Monologion. He did not hurry to publish the text. It had taken
him a long time to put together the complex and tightly interwoven argument
in the work, and there was no need for hurry. Besides, Anselm had reason to
fear that the audience would not welcome his treatise. In the potential audi-
ence, there were many who knew neither logic nor theology well enough to
be able to appreciate his argumentation. Much in the treatise would be sim-
ply incomprehensible to them. Further, it could be expected that some peo-
ple would object to Anselm’s strong reliance on reason and logic. One of the
motives behind the Monologion was to show that reason could have a truly
constructive role in the treatment of sacred matters (see also 9.3). What if the
audience were to see Anselm as another Berengar who, if we are to trust De
corpore, endorses heretical views and deceives the audience through sophistic
use of logical arguments? In that case, the publishing of the Monologion would
not help in undoing the damage that De corpore had caused to the prospect of
rationally oriented theological inquiry; quite the contrary, and Anselm himself
would get into serious trouble.
One possible precaution against adverse reactions that the Monologion
might elicit was to restrict its circulation. Anselm did that: for quite some time
he tried to make sure that only persons who could appreciate the Monologion
would have access to it.32 However, he did not let the treatise have any circu-
lation (beyond his own associates) before he had taken another measure: he
tried to obtain the patronage of an esteemed ecclesiastic for his work. This is
the reason why Anselm turned to Lanfranc and sent the manuscript to him for
inspection.33 There are several reasons why Anselm turned to him specifically.
Lanfranc was his friend. As archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc was one of the
most esteemed churchmen within the Norman realm. Lanfranc was known as
the author of De corpore, and the approval of the author of De corpore would
be particularly valuable to Anselm. Lanfranc was also thoroughly familiar with
the background and nature of De corpore, and he was one of the very few per-
sons who could fully appreciate Anselm’s situation.
Anselm sent the manuscript of the Monologion to Lanfranc at Canterbury
by means of a messenger. The treatise was accompanied by a covering letter
(Letter 72), in which Anselm asks Lanfranc’s authorization for the treatise. If
Lanfranc approves the treatise, he should give it a title. If he disapproves of
it, he should have it destroyed. Anselm insists that Lanfranc himself should
decide the fate of the work; he did not wish for Lanfranc to delegate the matter
to someone else.34
The letter in which Lanfranc replied has not been preserved, but its main
content can be inferred from Anselm’s next letter to Lanfranc (Letter 77).
Lanfranc had not given his approval to the treatise, but he had not disapproved
of it either. He had listed some statements that in his view needed further con-
sideration, and apparently he had suggested that Anselm should cite authori-
tative writings at some points where reason fails. Lanfranc had been worried
that his admonitions would affect their personal relations. It also appears that
he had expressed his wish to be able to discuss the treatise with Anselm face
to face. In his reply, Anselm asserts that he has already considered the state-
ments in question to the best of his ability and that he has not alleged anything
that could not be readily defended by the authoritative writings, in particular
Augustine’s On the Trinity. He renews his request that Lanfranc either approve
or disapprove the treatise. He assures Lanfranc that the incident has not affect-
ed their relations, and he agrees about the desirability of discussions between
him and Lanfranc about the treatise.35
Because of Letter 77, it has often been claimed that the exchange between
Anselm and Lanfranc ended in an impasse. Anselm was not willing to make
at 599–600, 602; Eileen C. Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 61–63.
34 Anselm, Ep. 72, S III, 193–94. Together with Ep. 72, addressed to Lanfranc, Anselm sent
other letters. One of them, Ep. 74, S III, 195–96, is addressed to Maurice, a monk of Bec
staying at Canterbury. Anselm had asked Lanfranc to return the manuscript to Maurice
(unless he judges it should be destroyed), and he gives Maurice instructions about what
to do in different cases. For example, if Lanfranc makes corrections in the manuscript,
either Maurice himself should bring the manuscript to Anselm, or, if he cannot do this for
some time, he should find a reliable messenger to carry it as soon as possible.
35 Ep. 77, S III, 199–200.
156 Chapter 7
To his venerable and much loved lord and father and teacher, Lanfranc,
archbishop of Canterbury, primate of the English, much cherished by our
mother the Catholic Church because of his faith and his usefulness—
brother Anselm of Bec, a sinner by life, a monk by habit.
36 See also Holopainen, ‘The Proslogion’, 600; Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury, 61.
37 Ep. 77, S III, 200.33–36.
38 Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 207, 211.
39 See Cowdrey, Lanfranc, 211; Holopainen, ‘The Proslogion’, 600; Sweeney, Anselm of
Canterbury, 61.
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 157
Since all things are to be done with advice, but not every advice, as it
is written: ‘do all things with advice’ [cf. Sirach 32:24, Vulgate], and ‘let
your advisers be one in a thousand’ [Sirach 6:6], I have chosen one whom
you know, not from a thousand, but from among all mortals, to have be-
fore everyone else as my counsellor in what is doubtful, my teacher in
what is unknown to me, my amender in what is faulty, my approver in
what is done right. Even though I am not able to use him to the extent I
would desire, I am nevertheless determined to use him to the extent that
I can. For even though there are very many besides your prudence from
whose experience I could derive advantage, inexperienced as I am, and
under whose judgement my immaturity compels me to put myself, yet
I do not know anyone under whose teaching and ruling I would put my-
self with similar trust and gladness than to yours and who would show
me so much fatherly compassion, if the matter needed it, or rejoice with
me, if the matter demanded. Therefore, since whatever is bestowed on
me from your fatherly breast is chosen by wisdom, confirmed by author-
ity, and seasoned by love, when I drink something from that source, it
both delights me with its pleasantness and satisfies me with its safety. But
because I am speaking to one who knows these very things, I leave them
aside and disclose why I have mentioned of them.
Certain brethren who are your servants and my fellow servants have
compelled me with their many and frequent requests to agree to write
for them something, in the way you can learn from the preface to the
writing in question. With this work it happened against expectations that
not only those at whose insistence it had been produced but also many
others wanted not only to read it but also make a copy. Hesitating, then,
whether I ought to deny or allow what they want, lest they either deem
me inimical and hate me or realize I am a fool and laugh at me, I therefore
have recourse to my unique adviser and send that writing to be examined,
so that by the authority of your judgement either what is unsuitable be
held back from sight or be corrected and offered to those who want it.40
Given the epistolary exchange between Anselm and Lanfranc about the
Monologion, the content of this letter may appear odd, since Anselm has al-
ready proved immune to the criticism that Lanfranc could offer. It is impor-
tant to note that the letter of dedication is not really a letter from Anselm to
Lanfranc. Instead, it is a rhetorical piece with the aid of which Anselm aims
at creating some impressions in the audience, with Lanfranc’s permission. To
begin with, Anselm wants to offer the image that he is not a troublemaker but
a reasonable person who is aware of his limitations and will readily accept
criticism. Further, he removes as far as possible the idea that he has any prob-
lem in relation to Lanfranc or Lanfranc’s views: he offers an exalted picture of
Lanfranc, makes it clear that he has a special relation to the archbishop, and
would willingly submit any of his doings to Lanfranc’s judgement and evalua-
tion. As for the treatise itself, Anselm creates the impression that he has com-
posed it at the request of others and has no desire to circulate it; however, it has
turned out that others want to make copies of the treatise and hence he sub-
mits it to Lanfranc for judgement. Even though there is nothing in the letter of
dedication to indicate that Lanfranc has actually approved Anselm’s treatise,
the readers would normally assume that it has Lanfranc’s approval (given that
there is no evidence to the contrary). And even if some readers were to have
doubts about that, they would certainly get the impression that it is Lanfranc
who should evaluate the treatise. This impression serves to deter public criti-
cism of the treatise from anyone within the Norman realm. A person who criti-
cizes the Monologion not only censures an intimate friend of the archbishop,
he also runs the risk of treading on the toes of the archbishop himself.
When Anselm had sent the manuscript of the Monologion to Lanfranc for
inspection, it did not yet have a title. The first published version of the treatise
had the title Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei. There are two noteworthy
things in this title. First, the title suggests that Anselm’s treatise actually belongs
to the genre of meditation. The beginning of the preface to the Monologion en-
dorses the same idea.41 This suggestion is problematic. The Monologion is quite
unlike the other meditations that Anselm composed and it has customarily
not been included in the collections of Anselm’s Prayers and Meditations. The
suggestion that the Monologion should be seen as a meditation strives to point
to a legitimate place for Anselm’s treatise in the monastic context. Second,
the expression ratio fidei is noteworthy. It does not appear in the text of the
Monologion; it was invented for the title. The relation of faith (fides) and reason
(ratio) was a controversial issue, and from De corpore one may easily gain the
impression that faith and reason are opposites. The expression ratio fidei sug-
gests that this need not be the case. There is ‘the reason of faith’ (that is what
ratio fidei literally means) or ‘the reason in faith’, an internal logic or intelligible
41 Monologion, preface, S I, 7.1–7. Previously, in Ep. 77, S III, 199.18, Anselm referred to it as a
disputatio, not a meditatio. If the characterization of the work as a meditation emerged af-
terwards, the passages in which the word ‘meditation’ is used, Monologion 6, S I, 19.12–20
and Monologion 8, S I, 23.3–4, should be seen as additions. It is noteworthy that both the
passages also refer to the usefulness of replying to possible objections.
Anselm and Lanfranc ’ s Heritage 159
structure in the content of faith (or in the object of faith), and this reason in
faith is open to treatment by reason. The introduction of the expression ratio
fidei is, in itself, a contribution to a discussion about faith and reason.
The preface to the Monologion also includes a number of claims and im-
plications which aim at influencing the way in which the treatise and its au-
thor are seen. The idea that the treatise belongs to the genre of meditation
is forcefully presented in the first paragraph of the preface. Anselm explains
that ‘certain brethren’ had asked him to compose a text which could serve as a
model meditation (exemplum meditationis). A little later Anselm refers to the
commendable probity of their intent; meditating on God is certainly an ap-
propriate thing for a monk to do.42 However, the brothers not only asked that
Anselm write a meditation. They also presented detailed instructions about
the methodology to be used in it. The brothers wanted Anselm not to appeal to
the authoritative writings at all but instead to base his conclusions on strictly
rational arguments. They demanded that he make use of an austere unembel-
lished style. They wanted him to deal with any possible objections to his argu-
ments that occur to him. In the end, they also prescribed that Anselm should
adopt the viewpoint of a person who does not yet know the things that will be
established in the treatise.43 Overall, Anselm makes ‘certain brethren’ respon-
sible for the methodology used in the treatise. Anselm admits, though, that he
had orally presented considerations of a related kind to the same brothers be-
fore they had made their request. Nevertheless, Anselm’s remarks produce the
impression that he has only tried to accomplish what other people have asked
him to do. Consequently, the audience should not blame Anselm if it does not
like the method in the Monologion. Interestingly, Anselm is vague about the
scope of the ‘meditation’ that he was asked to compose. The remarks about the
requests of the brothers are part of Anselm’s attempt to protect himself from
potential criticism. One should not infer on the basis of these remarks that
Anselm does not genuinely stand behind the treatise; his reaction to Lanfranc’s
initial criticism shows that he was quite serious about it.
The idea that Anselm composed the Monologion at the request of some
brothers was already mentioned in the letter of dedication. Both the letter of
dedication and the preface also include another role for some of Anselm’s fel-
low monks. Anselm claims in both of these texts that not only the brothers
who had requested the composition of the treatise but also others wanted to
read the treatise and make copies of it. Anselm lets us understand that he him-
self had had no intention whatsoever of circulating the text; on the contrary,
In the immediate background of the Proslogion, there are two treatises endors-
ing radically different views on faith and reason. The Eucharistic treatise De
corpore et sanguine Domini attributed to Lanfranc puts an emphasis on author-
ity and simple believing and endorses a very reserved attitude towards reason
and logical arguments. Anselm’s first major work, the Monologion, is based on a
very optimistic view of reason and logic and the usefulness of their application
view. The new text should provide a justification for that quest, and preferably
it should be a pious one. The Proslogion corresponds to these requirements.
Part 1 of this study focused on the single argument in the Proslogion. It
ended with what I called the puzzle of the Proslogion. If Anselm composed
the Proslogion to introduce the single argument that he had discovered and
if that argument was meant to be strictly rational, why is it the case that he
introduced the argument in an opaque way by using it in a devotional exer-
cise? At the end of Part 1, it was already anticipated what the reason might be:
the introduction of the single argument was not Anselm’s ultimate aim but
served some more important end. The discussion of the background of the
Proslogion in this Part 2 suggests what the more important end might be. After
the Monologion, there was a call for a text like the Proslogion because Anselm
needed to present a pious and rhetorically persuasive justification for the ra-
tional method that he had introduced in his first treatise. Part 3 seeks to elu-
cidate how the use of a strictly rational argument in a devotional exercise can
serve this purpose.
Part 3
The Exercise in the Proslogion
∵
Chapter 8
The earlier parts of the study have been focused on two issues that are
important for understanding the Proslogion. Part 1 sought to illustrate one
notable feature in the treatise, namely, the single argument that Anselm an-
nounces in the preface, and Part 2 aimed at clarifying the historical context
in which Anselm composed and published the work. A number of comments
about the nature and purpose of the work have already been presented in dif-
ferent contexts, but a more extended discussion of these issues is still needed.
The last part of the study, Part 3, seeks to provide a general understanding
of the nature of the Proslogion and Anselm’s intent in composing and publish-
ing the treatise. Analysing the devotional exercise in the work will be a central
constituent in the effort. It is important to note, however, that the devotional
exercise proper is part of a more complex exercise also involving the material
that Anselm added later, like the preface and the Responsio, and that no precise
line can be drawn between the exercise proper and the more complex under-
taking related to it.
The current secondary literature does not give much help in an attempt to
understand the Proslogion as an exercise: the more complex undertaking in the
work is beyond the horizon of most scholars, and the remarks about the devo-
tional exercise are typically shallow or biased. The conventional approach to
the work concentrates exclusively or almost exclusively on Anselm’s argumen-
tation about God. The scholars representing this approach are mainly inter-
ested in Proslogion 2–4 as well as the exchange between Anselm and Gaunilo.
It may be acknowledged that the Proslogion is a prayer, but this is judged to
be a secondary feature of the text which does not affect the interpretation of
the arguments and need not be taken into account in academic discussion,
even though it may be personally important to some scholars. On the other
hand, there is a family of approaches in which the devotional nature of the
Proslogion has been seen as essential for the interpretation of its arguments.
The fideistic and mystical interpretations of the Proslogion by Karl Barth and
Anselm Stolz, respectively, are classical examples of such approaches, and vari-
ous interpretations along these lines have been presented in recent decades.4
4 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W. Robertson (London: SCM Press,
1960) (German original 1st ed. 1931, 2nd ed. 1958); Anselm Stolz, ‘Anselm’s Theology in the
Proslogion’, trans. Arthur C. McGill, in John Hick and Arthur C. McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced
Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), 183–206 (German original ‘Zur Theologie Anselms in Proslogion’, Catholica,
2 (1933), 1–24). Barth’s contribution is well known in its own right, whereas Stolz owes his
reputation to McGill’s article ‘Recent Discussions of Anselm’s Argument’, The Many-Faced
Argument, 33–110, where Stolz appears as the main proponent of the mystical interpretation
of Anselm (64–69). Among recent major studies with strong mystical emphases are Gregory
The Devotional Exercise 169
However, even though many scholars are firmly convinced that the devotional
framework must affect the interpretation of the arguments in the Proslogion, it
is difficult to perceive any emerging consensus about how it does this, and the
remarks on the topic usually remain vague.5
The analysis of the single argument presented in Part 1 makes it clear that
the conventional reading of the Proslogion is right in emphasizing the rational
character of some of the arguments in the work. Even though Anselm intro-
duces the single argument by using it in a devotional exercise, he considers it
to be a rational argument in the same way as the arguments in the Monologion
are meant to be rational. The significance of the devotional framework is not
that it would somehow qualify the central arguments in the Proslogion or lift
them to a new plane, as it were. The single argument stands or falls quite in-
dependently of the devotional framework. The conventional approach is basi-
cally correct regarding this point, and the fideistic and mystical approaches,
as characterized above, are correspondingly mistaken. At the same time, the
conventional approach is plainly deficient as well because it does not even
attempt to offer any substantial account of the exercise in the Proslogion. A
proper analysis of the Proslogion requires that an account is given of how the
combination of argumentation and devotion serves to bring about effects of a
particular kind in the audience.
The elucidation of the historical context in Part 2 has a twofold significance
for understanding the exercise in the Proslogion. First, the discussions pre-
sented in Part 2 establish that there was need for a subtle attempt to influence
the audience’s views about faith and reason at the time when the Proslogion
was published. Lanfranc’s De corpore was an influential treatise, and one of its
objectives was to mould the attitudes that the monastic and clerical audience
in Normandy would have towards the use of reason within theology. Anselm’s
Monologion is based on a methodological stance that is in sharp contrast with
the attitudes that De corpore had endorsed, and the topic was hot because
methodological issues were intimately tied to questions of orthodoxy and
Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings (West Lafayette, IN:
Purdue University Press, 1994) and Eileen C. Sweeney, Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire
for the Word (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012). See also Robert
McMahon, Understanding the Medieval Mystical Ascent: Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, and
Dante (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
5 Nevertheless, there are some studies that give a largely correct general idea of how the vari-
ous facets of Anselm’s contribution are related to each other. See, for example, G. R. Evans,
Anselm (London: Geoffrey Chapman, and Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989); Marilyn
McCord Adams, ‘Anselm on Faith and Reason’, in Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (eds.), The
Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32–60.
170 Chapter 8
heresy. Combining argumentation and devotion can offer means for treating
methodological issues in a discreet way. It was suggested (see 7.1 and 7.5) that
Anselm’s aim in the Proslogion is to defend and support the kind of rational
method that he had used in the Monologion. The discussion in this Part 3 seeks
to explain how the introduction of a rational argument within a devotional
exercise can serve such purposes.
Second, the discussions in Part 2 provide contextual information of anoth-
er kind that is vital for the interpretation of the Proslogion. In the immediate
background of the work we meet a culture in which learned writers make con-
scious use of rhetorical devices to influence the audience’s views about differ-
ent kinds of things. Anselm’s Monologion is a bold attempt at reconstructing
a major fragment of the Christian view of reality on the basis of reason alone,
and Anselm was rightly worried about the reception that the treatise would
get. When he first published the work, he made well-thought-out use of rhe-
torical devices to make the audience benign and to preclude different kinds of
criticism. The title of the work, the preface, and the letter of dedication jointly
serve these purposes, and they testify of a high awareness of how it is possible
to shape the way in which the audience will look at things (7.4). De corpore,
a carefully crafted rhetorical attack against Berengar of Tours, offers a more
extreme example of the same awareness (see Chapter 6). I made a case for the
view that Lanfranc did not compose De corpore alone and that Anselm was
heavily involved in its composition (5.3). However, even if Lanfranc were the
sole author of De corpore, the treatise is part of the immediate background of
the Proslogion and testifies to the level of rhetorical expertise in Anselm’s close
surroundings.
Familiarity with De corpore is of great help in an attempt to arrive at an ad-
equate understanding of the Proslogion. De corpore and the Proslogion have in
common that they are rhetorical works that are based on a high level of crafts-
manship on the part of the author. De corpore includes a complicated rhetor-
ical manoeuvre to mislead an audience that consists of two different parts.
To mislead the monastic and clerical public, Lanfranc systematically builds
up a set of false impressions that suit his purposes. Lanfranc also strives to
lead astray Berengar of Tours, the formal recipient of the treatise, but for him
Lanfranc builds up a different set of impressions. It appears that the theory of
the Eucharist in De corpore was primarily meant for Berengar. Lanfranc does
not explicate what his theory is; whether the readers will become aware of
Lanfranc’s model and its implications depends on their diligence and analyti-
cal skill. De corpore also offers examples of how existing pieces of text (extracts
from Berengar’s Scriptum, patristic citations, the text of the 1059 synod) can
be made to have new meanings when commentary is added. The Proslogion
The Devotional Exercise 171
also includes a complicated rhetorical manoeuvre. There are ideas in the trea-
tise that Anselm leaves to the reader to figure out.6 Anselm does not say what
his single argument is but leaves it to the diligent reader to discover it. The
Proslogion includes a view about theological inquiry and the role of rational
analysis in it, but Anselm does not present an extended statement of his view.
Further, the Proslogion takes into account several kinds of audience. When
saying this, I am not suggesting that the audience of the treatise is divided
into believers and unbelievers. The fool is a literary character and not part of
the audience of the Proslogion (see 9.3). However, there are different kinds of
readers within the believing audience. Some readers are already sympathetic
towards the Monologion kind of approach while others are suspicious or hos-
tile. Some readers are able to figure out that which has been left unsaid while
others acquire impressions in less reflective ways. The Proslogion is meant to
produce some opportune effects in all kinds of readers. Finally, the strategy of
modifying the meaning of existing pieces of texts by adding commentary plays
a central role in the Proslogion. The devotional exercise gets new meanings
from the material that Anselm added around it, and the Monologion will look
different when it is accompanied by the Proslogion as its companion.
This and the following chapter aim at elucidating the peculiar combination
of argumentation and devotion in the Proslogion and the complex exercise
that it puts to the reader. The present chapter clarifies the devotional exercise
in the Proslogion without paying much attention to the material that Anselm
added later. An analysis of the actual exercise is offered at the end of the chap-
ter (8.5). Before that, three preliminary discussions are presented to provide
the context: what Anselm held about the possibility of seeing God and some
issues related to it (8.2), some similar topics in Augustine’s writings (8.3), and
the role of prayer in Anselm’s outlook (8.4). The following chapter discusses
the transformation that the Proslogion went through as Anselm added mate-
rial to it as well as the lessons related to the additions.
When Anselm says in the preface that he wrote the Proslogion ‘in the role of
someone endeavouring to elevate his mind to the contemplation of God and
seeking to understand what he believes’,7 he offers a twofold characterization
6 McMahon, Understanding, 3, correctly emphasizes that the Proslogion and other meditative
texts were meant to be read very intensively: they demand ‘deeply reflective rereading’.
7 Proslogion, preface, S I, 93.21–94.2.
172 Chapter 8
of the perspective in the treatise. I will argue that the devotional exercise in
this work contains a twofold endeavour (see 8.5). However, the relation be-
tween the twofold characterization and the twofold endeavour is not as
straightforward as one might assume, because the expression ‘contemplating
God’, or ‘contemplation of God’, is equivocal. To clarify the matter, it is useful to
begin with some remarks on the notion of understanding and the faith’s search
for understanding.
Being able to think of the meaning of a verbal expression is already one
kind of understanding. Understanding can also involve knowing the defini-
tions of words and things, and knowing the definition is related to knowing
the essence, for example, ‘man’ is a ‘rational, mortal animal’.8 Understanding
can be about knowing how different things are related to each other. Also, un-
derstanding can involve knowing that the things necessarily have to be in a
certain way. Finally, understanding is a kind of mental seeing, a seeing with
the ‘eye of the mind’.9 As bodily seeing, mental seeing also requires light, and
in the Augustinian tradition the light that makes understanding possible is of
divine origin (the doctrine of illumination). The notion of ‘reason’ (ratio) is
related to understanding in at least three ways. First, the faculty with the aid
of which one understands can be called ‘reason’. Second, when some grounds
are presented to show that the things are in a certain way, these grounds can be
called a ‘reason’. Third, ‘reason’ can refer to that which is intelligible in what is
sought to be understood, an intelligible structure or inner logic that the mind
can try to discover and unravel.
Even though Anselm in the Monologion adopts the perspective of a person
who is initially unfamiliar with the content of the Christian faith or at least is
not convinced of its truth, this treatise can be read as exemplifying the idea of
faith seeking understanding. Anselm advertises the treatise as an ‘example of
meditating on the reason in faith’. The ‘faith’ mentioned here is the Christian
faith, and the ‘reason’ which is ‘meditated’ on is the intelligible structure that
there is in the content of faith or in the object of faith. Anselm’s method in
the Monologion is to offer a reconstruction of the basic tenets in the Christian
outlook, excluding its historical aspects, on the basis of reason alone: Anselm
starts from notions that any rational person should in his view concede and
seeks to deduce some major parts of the Christian worldview from that start-
ing point. By using this method, Anselm aims at showing that these tenets of
the Christian view are not only true but are necessarily true: that they cannot
be in any other way. The Monologion aims at producing understanding in a
10 ur Deus homo, Commendatio operis, S II, 39.2–40.1: ‘… sancti patres … tot et tanta de
C
fidei nostrae ratione dicant …, ut nec nostris temporibus nec futuris temporibus ullum
illis parem in veritatis contemplatione speramus …,’ and Cur Deus homo I, 1, S II, 47.9:
‘… sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur, …’
174 Chapter 8
homo.11 There are also references to a direct vision of God in the Proslogion,
but Anselm does not use the words ‘contemplation’ or ‘contemplate’ in the rel-
evant passages. (We return to this in 8.5.) Here, we proceed to a discussion of
what Anselm held about the possibility of seeing God, using the Monologion
and Cur Deus homo as our main sources.
Towards the end of his reconstruction of the basic tenets of the Christian
outlook in the Monologion, Anselm explores what reason teaches about the re-
lationship between the Supreme Being and the creatures of a rational nature.
(See also 2.3 and 7.3.) Anselm argues that the creatures of this kind, like the
human soul, have been created in order that they love the Supreme Being. The
eternal destiny of each individual human soul depends on whether it succeeds
in fulfilling this task or not. If it does succeed, it will achieve eternal blessed-
ness, but if it does not, it will be eternally miserable. In Monologion 70, Anselm
argues that it is necessary that the Supreme Being gives a reward to those who
fulfil their task, and that the reward given is nothing less than the Supreme
Being itself.12 Because all the attributes of the Supreme Being are the same as
the Supreme Being,13 in giving itself it also gives all its attributes, including the
supreme blessedness. Anselm concludes that every soul loving the Supreme
Being ‘as it should’ will receive blessedness:
Therefore, nothing is truer than that every rational soul, if it devotes it-
self to longing for supreme blessedness as it should, shall at some time
receive that blessedness to enjoy, so that what it now sees in a mirror and
in a riddle, it shall then see face to face.14
Because of the allusion to Paul’s words about ‘now’ seeing ‘in a mirror and in
a riddle’ and ‘then’ seeing ‘face to face’ (1 Cor. 13:12), it should be rather clear to
Anselm’s Christian audience that he is here speaking of the reward that the
faithful will receive in heaven, even though no explicit distinction is made be-
tween this life and the life to come. In the Monologion, a state in which the
human soul will see the Supreme Being ‘face to face’ is the intended final goal
of human existence. Anselm brings out that the faith required for achiev-
ing the reward is a ‘living faith’ which ‘exercises itself in a great number of
works’: ‘what loves supreme justice can neither despise anything just nor allow
11 Augustine, De trinitate I, 8, 16–17. See 8.3 below. Cur Deus homo I, 16, S II, 74.20–21:
‘Rationalem naturam, quae dei contemplatione beata vel est vel futura est, …’
12 Monologion 70, S I, 80–81.
13 Monologion 17, S I, 31–32.
14 Monologion 70, S I, 80.19–81.1.
The Devotional Exercise 175
sin. In the current order of things, human beings can attain blessedness only
in the life to come, and their bodies will be resurrected in order to restore them
in their original state. The bodies of those who fail to receive the intended goal
will also be resurrected, and they will suffer eternal misery.19 In Cur Deus homo,
the beatific enjoyment of God, which is the end for which human beings have
been made, is firmly situated in the life to come, and it concerns both the body
and the soul.
That some number of human beings will enjoy God without end is a con-
stituent in a bigger plan. God created the universe with a particular purpose in
view: the realization of a heavenly city in which a perfect number of rational
creatures would enjoy the presence of God. Anselm offers a lengthy discus-
sion about how the number of human beings to be included in the perfect
number will depend on the number of good angels and fallen angels. The dis-
cussion that Anselm presents is partly tentative, but he firmly believes that
such a perfect number exists and that it will include both angels and humans.
Apparently, God’s primary plan was that the population of the heavenly city
would consist of all the rational creatures that are created. He created a certain
definite number of angels, and he would let the human race proliferate until
the perfect number is reached. The fall of both angels and humans meant that
this plan could not be carried through. Of angels, some fell, while others, the
good angels, persevered in righteousness. The good angels cannot fall any lon-
ger and they will be included in the perfect number, but it is strictly impossible
that the fallen angels could be restored and saved. In humans, the fall of the
first two, Adam and Eve, caused the whole human race to fall. However, it is
not impossible for God to save some of the fallen humans. To realize the heav-
enly city, God will save some of the humans and he will keep on saving them
until the perfect number is reached, the fallen angels also being replaced by
humans.20 Anselm’s reflections about the heavenly city give robust metaphysi-
cal reality to the notion that the enjoyment of God will take place in the life
to come.
It is not impossible that some of the fallen humans can be saved, but it is
by no means easy. To begin with, it requires the incarnation of God as a man.
By sinning, human beings have shown disobedience towards God, and even
the smallest disobedience by a creature is an infinite offense against God.21 In
order for reconciliation between men and God to be possible, a compensation
for the offense is needed. It should be an infinite compensation, and it should
Just as right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith
before we undertake to discuss them rationally, so it seems to me to be
negligence if, after we are confirmed in faith, we do not strive to under-
stand what we believe.25
Part of Anselm’s reason for saying this was, obviously, that rational discussion
of the matters of Christian faith was not looked on favourably in all quarters.
Defending the legitimacy of analysing ‘the reason in faith’ (ratio fidei) is a
major objective in the dedicatory letter of Cur Deus homo to Pope Urban II as
well. Without mentioning any names, Anselm points out that the ‘holy fathers’
laboured at this task and made many valuable points. However, the fathers did
not yet say everything that could be said; human life is short, and ‘the reason in
truth’ is so deep and so extensive that it is impossible for mortals to exhaust it.
Anselm presents himself as continuing the work of the fathers in theological
investigation. As for the purpose of the activity, Anselm calls attention to two
things. On the one hand, the investigation has an apologetic aim: the points
made can be used to try to win over those who are unbelievers. On the other
hand, the investigation has a purpose that is internal to the life of Christian be-
lievers: ‘to nourish those who, having hearts already cleansed by faith, delight
22 This is the main argument of Cur Deus homo. See especially Cur Deus homo II, 6, S II, 101.
23 See Cur Deus homo I, 19–20, S II, 84–88; De concordia III, 4, S II, 268.
24 See, e.g., Ep. 101, S III, 232–34.
25 Cur Deus homo I, 1, S II, 48.16–18.
178 Chapter 8
in the reason of our faith’. Anselm refers to this activity as ‘contemplating the
truth’ (veritatis contemplatio).26 To further substantiate the legitimacy of the
investigation of faith, Anselm cites the passage ‘Unless you believe you will not
understand’ (Isaiah 7:9, Old Latin version) and comments that it ‘manifestly
instructs us to stretch our effort towards understanding, because it teaches
how we ought to advance towards it’.27 In the end, there is a short statement
about how Anselm sees the search for understanding in relation to the ulti-
mate end of human life in the Christian outlook:
Here, ‘seeing’ (species) refers to the beatifying vision of God in the life to come,
whereas faith ( fides) and understanding (intellectus) belong to this life. In the
dedicatory letter of Cur Deus homo, Anselm sees understanding as a midway
(medium) between faith and the vision of God, which is the ultimate goal of
human existence. Anselm completed Cur Deus homo in 1098, some two de-
cades after the first publication of the Proslogion, but his views about faith,
understanding, and vision remained constant. Even though Anselm does not
say in the Proslogion that understanding is a midway between faith and seeing,
the devotional exercise in the Proslogion strives to convey a similar idea (8.5).
Anselm’s ideas about faith, understanding, and vision of God are, if not of
Augustinian origin, at least of Augustinian inspiration. However, Augustine’s
views about the issues in question underwent changes as his theological views
matured. The learned among medieval readers of Augustine can be expected
to have been at least partly aware of these changes. In the work Retractationes
(426–427), Augustine offers a critical chronological survey of his own pro-
duction that helps in delineating the developments in his thought, and some
… these words, ‘When he hands over the kingdom to God the Father’
[1 Cor. 15:24], are said as if it were said, ‘When he brings believers to the
contemplation of God, the Father’. … Before that take places, ‘we see now
in a mirror and in a riddle’, that is, in likenesses, ‘but then face to face’
[1 Cor. 13:12]. For this contemplation is held out to us as the end of all ac-
tions and the everlasting fullness of joy. For ‘we are God’s children, and
what we will be does not yet appear; but we know that when he appears,
we will be like him, for we will see him as he is.’ [1 John 3:2] … we will ar-
rive at his contemplation, but that contemplation is not yet, so long as
our joy is in hope. … For contemplation is the reward of faith, and our
hearts are purified by faith for that reward, as it is written, ‘Purifying their
hearts by faith’ [Acts 15:9]. And that our hearts are to be purified for this
contemplation is proved above all by this passage, ‘Blessed are the pure
in heart, for they will see God’ [Matt. 5:8]. And that this is life eternal,
God says in the Psalm, ‘With long life I will satisfy him, and show him my
salvation’ [Psalm 91:16].31
In the mature Augustine’s understanding, it is only in the life to come that the
faithful should expect to be able to see God ‘as he is’.
During the early phases of his career, Augustine had different ideas. Soon
after his conversion to Christianity, he composed a number of dialogues that
are philosophical in nature. One of these is Soliloquies, a dialogue between
‘Augustine’ and ‘Reason’, in which he enquires about the possibility and way
of knowing God from the viewpoint of what an endowed individual can hope
to achieve through ethical and intellectual training. Augustine presents one of
his earliest statements of the theory of illumination in this work, but the focus
of the discussion is not on epistemology in general but on suggesting a way in
which the human mind can come to know God. Augustine presents an anal-
ogy between seeing by means of bodily eyes and intellectual seeing by means
of the eye of the mind. In both cases, a source of light that illumines the object
to be seen is needed. As the sun illumines the objects seen by bodily eyes, God
illumines the things seen by the eye of the mind.32 In Soliloquies, Augustine
maintains that the mind will see God if it is capable of gazing at the ‘Sun’ that
illumines the truths of reason, and he is confident that the eye of the purified
mind will eventually be able to do it already in this life.33 A remarkable feature
of Augustine’s discussion about the possibility of knowing or seeing God in
Soliloquies is that he is almost exclusively concerned about the possibility of
knowing God in this life. There are remarks about the possibility of knowing
God in the life to come, but some of them are rather surprising: Augustine
aims at attaining God in this life, for we cannot know what awaits us in the
afterlife.34 At this stage of his intellectual career, Augustine did not see the
knowledge of God that can be achieved in this life as a pale image of the vi-
sion that will await the chosen in the life after. The soul can be happy in the
knowledge of God already in this life—a remark that he would later refute in
his Retractationes.35
By the time he composed the most important of his early dialogues, De li-
bero arbitrio,36 Augustine had already changed his view in important respects.
This dialogue offers an important point of comparison for the Proslogion, as
there are a number of clear parallelisms between its book II and Anselm’s
work. Augustine provides an argument for God’s existence, and in connection
with it God is characterized as ‘that which has nothing superior to it’.37 He re-
fers to the fool of the psalms and apparently assumes that his argument for
God’s existence could be used for convincing the fool.38 Augustine also under-
stands the relation between faith and understanding very much in the same
way as Anselm later does:
For unless believing and understanding were different and unless those
important and admirable things that we yearn to understand were first
to be believed, the prophet would say without cause, ‘Unless you believe
you will not understand.’ … Let us, therefore, earnestly continue our
search, obeying the Lord’s orders. For what we seek at his exhortation, we
will find as he himself shows it to us, so far as these things can be found
in this life and by persons like ourselves.39
But in those who choose in the light of the sun what they like to behold
and rejoice in beholding it, if there are perchance some with brisk and
healthy and powerful eyes, they like nothing better than looking upon
the sun itself which also illumines the other things in which the weaker
eyes find their pleasure. In the same way, when the strong and brisk gaze
of the mind has perceived a number of immutable truths by sure reason,
36 Augustine wrote the early part of the work in Rome in 387–388 and completed it in Hippo
between 391 and 395.
37 Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, 6, 14: ‘quo est nullus superior’, ‘quo nihil superius esse
constiterit’.
38 Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, 2, 5. See also 9.3.
39 Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, 2, 6.
40 See Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, 2, 6.
182 Chapter 8
let it aim towards the truth itself that makes all things known, and cling-
ing to the truth it will, as if forgetful of all else, enjoy all things at once in
the truth.41
Augustine seems to be saying that those with strong intellects should be able
to look at the source of all truth and enjoy it, as those with strong eyes should
be able to look at the sun.
Even though Anselm’s view about faith, understanding, and vision has a close
resemblance to Augustine’s mature view, being familiar with Augustine’s early
ideas is also helpful for understanding the Proslogion. To begin with, Anselm
most likely understood and meant that De libero arbitrio and Soliloquies would
serve as points of reference for the Proslogion.42 There are so many parallel-
isms between the Proslogion and book II of De libero arbitrio that the latter
must have suggested itself as a point of comparison to many readers of the
Proslogion. On the other hand, there are some manifest parallelisms between
the Proslogion and Soliloquies as well. The theme of contemplating God is
prominent in both works, and they both begin with a long prayer in which
seeking God plays an important role.43 The titles of the works—Soliloquia
and Proslogion and Monologion—sound rather similar and have in com-
mon that they are all words coined by the authors for this purpose.44 What
is more, Anselm explains that monologion can be Latinized as soliloquium, ‘a
soliloquy’. One of the reasons why Anselm introduced the titles Monologion
and Proslogion was, arguably, that he wanted to make reference to Augustine’s
Soliloquies.
Taking Soliloquies and De libero arbitrio as points of reference will pro-
vide interesting perspectives for some aspects of Anselm’s endeavour in the
Proslogion. Anselm stands out as a thinker with high confidence in what rea-
son can accomplish, but there are, in his judgement, also important limitations
to what reason can do. While Augustine in his Soliloquies was positive that a
beatifying vision of God can be achieved through intellectual ascent in this
life, one of the main points in the devotional exercise in the Proslogion is to
demonstrate that such attempts will be frustrated because the eye of the mind
cannot stand to look at God’s light. We will return to these issues in our discus-
sion of the attempt at contemplating God in the Proslogion (8.5).
It is a salient feature of the Proslogion that the actual body of it, that is,
chapters 1–26, is written in the form of a prayer. The title ‘Proslogion’ is related to
this feature: Anselm explains that the word signifies ‘an address’ (alloquium).45
The Proslogion is a proslogion because in it the person who speaks addresses
God and his own soul in front of God. The whole of the Proslogion is writ-
ten in this way. There is argumentation about God in the Proslogion, but it is
presented in the form of an address: the person who speaks argues about the
existence and properties of the divine being that he is addressing. Much of the
work is written in the second person singular. There are some passages written
in the third person, among them the inference about the existence of that than
which a greater cannot be thought in Proslogion 2–3, but these passages are
also embedded within larger passages of second person discourse.
The Proslogion is unique among Anselm’s treatises in that it has been writ-
ten in the form of a prayer, but it is not the only piece in prayer form by Anselm.
Anselm’s first published writings were prayers, and by the publication of his
first treatises he had already gained reputation as a man of prayer.46 In its final
form, his collection of Prayers or Meditations consisted of nineteen prayers and
three meditations.47 Anselm’s contribution to the development of the kind of
devotion that is typical of the later Middle Ages has been considered to be of
such importance that some scholars speak of ‘the Anselmian revolution’.48 The
majority of Anselm’s prayers address one or another of the saints. His prayers
are personal, intimate, and ardent. In many of them, the experience and emo-
tions of the person who prays, or of the saint addressed when he or she was
still on this earth, have a central role. Anselm did not write any treatise on
praying, but he attached to his prayers instructions about their use. There are
some elements which are present in most of Anselm’s prayers, including the
Proslogion. The first chapter of the Proslogion can be used to exemplify some
of the main ideas.49
Anselm’s prayers are intended for private as opposed to liturgical use,
and they are meant to be read in the peace of solitude. The opening lines of
Proslogion 1 are related to this idea. The reader of the Proslogion is expected
to ‘enter into the inner chamber’ of his mind,50 and this can be best achieved
when alone. Withdrawing oneself into solitude is not enough, however. The
human soul, aggravated by sin, suffers from dullness, and as a preparation for
praying it must be shaken awake. The expression ‘arousal of the mind’ (excita-
tio mentis), which appears in the heading of Proslogion 1,51 refers to this shaking
awake. To achieve this effect, Anselm in Proslogion 1 describes the deplorable
state of man in vivid language, for example:
How miserable man’s lot is when he has lost that for which he was made!
Oh how hard and cruel was that fall! Alas, what has he lost and what has
he found, what vanished and what remains? He lost the blessedness for
which he was made, and found a misery for which he was not made. …
Alas, the common grief of mankind, the universal lament of the children
of Adam! He burped with satiety; we sigh with hunger. He was wealthy;
we go begging. He happily possessed and wretchedly deserted; we un-
happily lack and miserably yearn, while, alas, remaining empty. Why did
he not keep for us, when he easily could have, that which we would so
heavily lack?52
Besides arousing the soul and making it responsive, a passage like this also
serves another end. One of the aims of Anselm’s prayers is that of producing
emotions of a certain kind. A central notion in Anselm’s teaching on praying is
that of ‘compunction’ (compunctio), a piercing of the heart, the outer expres-
sion of which is the shedding of tears.53 Two main kinds of compunction are
distinguished: the compunction of fear and sorrow, and the compunction of
love and joy. The first kind of compunction comes about when the persons
praying concentrate on their fallen and sinful state in front of God’s majesty.
The second kind is related to an experience of divine mercy and the longing
for the vision of God in heaven. The passage quoted from Proslogion 1 is related
to the first kind of compunction, but much stronger passages can be found in
Anselm’s other prayers. Among the passages that aim at producing the second
kind of compunction is the description of the joy of the faithful in heaven at
the end of the Proslogion, for example:
Love the one good in which are all goods, and it will suffice. Desire the
simple good which is every good, and it will be enough. For what do you
love, my flesh, what do you desire, my soul? It is there; whatever you
love, whatever you desire is there. If beauty delights you: ‘the just will
shine like the sun’ [Matt. 13:43]. If it is speed or strength or freedom of
the body which nothing can resist: ‘they will be like the angels of God’
[Matt. 22:30], for it is ‘sown as a natural body and will rise as a spiritual
body’ [1 Cor. 15:44] … If it is a long and sound life: there is a sound eternity
and an eternal soundness, because ‘the just will live forever’ [Wis. 5:16],
and ‘the salvation of the just is from the Lord’ [Psalm 36:39].54
Note that the two passages quoted (from Proslogion 1 and Proslogion 25) are re-
lated to Anselm’s grand narrative as sketched in Cur Deus homo (see 8.2 above).
If Adam and Eve had not fallen, the fate of the human race would have been
different. The joy of the faithful in the life to come concerns both the body and
the soul.
Even though compunction and emotions have a central role in Anselm’s
teaching on prayers, this aspect must not be overemphasized. Benedicta Ward
draws attention to the ‘sober moral basis’ of Anselm’s understanding of the life
of prayer: ‘he asks for the mercy of God and for this piercing of the heart, but
along with it go the living of a good life and the following of the will of God’
(56); ‘he is not concerned that the reader should like the prayers; he means his
heart to be changed by them’ (51). Prayers also aim at producing insight: ‘It is a
matter of seeing steadily and truly the real situation of man before his Creator,
the sinner before his Redeemer and Judge’ (54).55
One of the defects in current scholarship is that the rhetorical background of
Anselm’s prayers and meditations has not been sufficiently observed. Scholars
are well aware that Anselm’s prayers are polished literary products and have
some particular stylistic features. Ward describes them as follows:
The prayers are written in a rhymed prose which is mannered and elegant
to a fault; they are polished literary products, every word in its right place,
‘the whole consort dancing together’. There is antithesis, the use of paral-
lel grammatical constructions, the rhetorical question, the careful build-
up of each phrase and sentence to a climax, combined with balance
and form.56
After having presented this description, Ward lets us understand that these fea-
tures are typical of the ‘monastic school of “grammatica”’. The features rather
testify to the training in rhetoric that Anselm had received in Italy in his youth.
In addition to being concerned about eloquent style, the art of rhetoric was
and is an art of persuasive communication, of being able to bring about those
effects in the audience that one wishes to. Eileen Sweeney takes this into ac-
count and analyses how Anselm uses rhetorical devices to persuade the saints
he addresses and even to persuade God.57 It is important to note, however, that
Anselm’s prayers also have an audience that consists of human beings in this
world. Anselm wrote his prayers in order that other people would use them,
and they were designed to have effects on their users. They are best seen as
carefully crafted rhetorical texts that Anselm consciously employs as a vehicle
of Christian training. Scholars sometimes comment on Anselm’s prayers as if
they were indicative of how Anselm himself used to pray: in a prayer of his, we
have ‘a prayer exactly as a saint has prayed it, down to the intimate commu-
nications of his soul with God’.58 This need not be the case. Anselm’s prayers
indicate how he wanted the recipients of these writings to pray, but they need
not replicate his own praying.
In Cur Deus homo, the character ‘Anselm’ presents the following remark
about the function of prayer to his discussion partner, ‘Boso’:
For in this mortal life there should be such love and—to which prayer
belongs—such desire to attain that for which you were made, and such
sorrow that you are not yet there, and such fear that you might fail to
reach it, that you ought to find joy in nothing unless it helps or gives you
hope of attaining it.59
In this remark, prayer is related to the ‘desire to attain that for which you were
made’, that is to say, the desire to attain the end for which Boso and all humans
are made, namely, the beatifying vision of God in the life to come. In addition,
it is related to the other emotional attitudes that are mentioned after it: sor-
row of not yet being in the end state, fear of not reaching it, and only taking
pleasure in what helps in reaching it. The purpose of Anselm’s prayers, briefly,
is to help the believers keep going on the road that leads to their salvation. It is
not sufficient that believers are told under what principles the divine economy
of salvation functions, for they will not be saved for what they hold true (‘dead
faith’) but for how they live (‘living faith’).60 The main function of Anselm’s
prayers is to maintain in those who regularly consume them the kind of orien-
tation and the kind of emotions that make it possible to lead a life that pleases
God to the extent to which the life of a redeemed sinner can.
The grandest of Anselm’s prayers, the Proslogion, also helps the faithful per-
sistently keep going on the road that leads to the ultimate goal of human ex-
istence. The usual ingredients of Anselm’s prayers are present in it, but there
are also themes that are characteristic of the Proslogion. There is an endeavour
to achieve understanding of the fundamental truths about God’s essence and
existence. Because of this endeavour, there is a stronger academic aspect in the
Proslogion than in any of Anselm’s other prayers. The ultimate aim of human
existence receives a considerable amount of attention in the Proslogion.
Anselm describes the joy of the faithful in the life to come, offering an emo-
tionally appealing view of what it is that human beings should strive for. Third,
there is a theme that can be preliminarily put as a question about the relation
between the two issues mentioned: how does the intellectual endeavour to
understand what is believed about God’s existence and essence relate to the
ultimate goal of human existence and the road leading to it? Anselm does not
explicitly pose this question in the Proslogion, but this is nevertheless a central
underlying theme in it. It turns out that Anselm’s outlook in the Proslogion is
rather similar to what he later (partially) explicated in connection with Cur
Deus homo (see 8.2).61
Let me look upward to your light, if only from afar, if only from the
depths. … I do not attempt, Lord, to penetrate your heights, because my
understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand to
Catholic University, 2005), 185–95, and Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘The Proslogion in Relation to
the Proslogion’, The Heythrop Journal 50 (2009), 590–602.
62 Proslogion, preface, S I, 94.1: ‘… conantis erigere mentem suam ad contemplandum
deum …’ The heading of Proslogion 1, S I, 97.3: ‘Excitatio mentis ad contemplandum
deum.’
63 See the preceding note.
64 Proslogion 1, S I, 97.7–98.15: ‘… Denique ad te videndum factus sum, et nondum feci prop-
ter quod factus sum.’
The Devotional Exercise 189
some extent your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not
seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to under-
stand. For I believe also this: that unless I believe, I shall not understand.65
Therefore, Lord, you who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may
understand, to the extent you know advantageous, that you exist as we
believe, and that you are what we believe.66
It is in terms of faith seeking understanding that the devout exercise will pro-
ceed in this part of the Proslogion: Anselm will contemplate God by seeking to
understand the content of faith about God. He mentions two issues regarding
which understanding is sought: that God ‘exist[s] as we believe’, and that he
is ‘what we believe’. The first expression is related to Anselm’s treatment of
God’s existence in Proslogion 2–4. The request about understanding that God
is ‘what we believe’, for its part, is related to the treatment of the properties
of the divine essence that actually begins in Proslogion 5. On the other hand,
some readers may associate the latter request with the idea that comes in the
very next sentence and forms the starting point both for the treatment of the
divine existence and for the treatment of the divine essence: ‘we believe you to
be something than which nothing greater can be thought’.67
It was argued in Part 1 of this study that ‘that than which a greater cannot
be thought’ is the single argument the discovery of which Anselm announces
in the preface. It was also argued that Anselm was convinced this argument
would make it possible to present a strictly rational proof for the existence of a
65 Proslogion 1, S I, 100.8–19.
66 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.3–4.
67 Proslogion 2, S I, 101.4–5.
190 Chapter 8
being that has all the properties that the Christians believe the divine essence
to have (see Chapter 3). In the present context, this information needs to be
bracketed. The first readers of the treatise did not have the preface at their dis-
posal and consequently they did not know that they should take note of a sin-
gle argument. Even after the addition of the preface and the appendices at the
end of the Proslogion, an analytical effort by the reader would be required for
any precise idea of the single argument to emerge. Nevertheless, some things
would be clear for the first audience of the Proslogion as well. The centrality of
the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can hardly escape the
attention of any reader, and Anselm also gives, in Proslogion 2 and 3, two clear
examples of how it is possible to present reductio arguments that appeal to the
signification of this notion. The dependence of the inference about God’s ex-
istence on this argumentative idea is rather conspicuous, and the reader may
also be expected to perceive that the argument in Proslogion 15 is based on the
same idea.
At the end of Proslogion 4, the person who prays bursts to thank God for the
understanding that he has achieved regarding God’s existence:
Thanks to you, good Lord, thanks to you, because what I first believed
through your giving, I now so understand by your illumination that even
if I did not want to believe it, I would not be able not to understand that
you exist.68
Have you found, my soul, what you were seeking? You were seeking God,
and you found him to be something which is the highest of all, than
which nothing better can be thought, and you found this to be the life
itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity,
and to exist everywhere and always.70
For if you have not found your God, how is he this which you have found
and how is he what you have understood him to be with such certain
truth and true certainty? On the other hand, if you have found him, why
is it that you do not sense what you have found? Why does my soul not
sense you, Lord God, if it has found you?72
It is not quite clear how Anselm’s reasoning in this passage should be con-
strued. One of the starting points appears to be that ‘finding’ and ‘seeing’ can
be taken to mean the same; and without doubt the expressions ‘find’ (invenire)
and ‘see’ (videre) are often interchangeable when talking about intellectual
perception or intellectual insight. On the other hand, ‘seeing’ (videre) is a kind
of ‘sensing’ (sentire). Therefore, finding should result in sensing.
Anselm continues by pointing out that from the fact that the being that has
been found has been found to be light and truth it follows that the soul must
see it:
Has my soul not found that which it has found to be the light and the
truth? For how has it understood this except by seeing the light and the
truth? Could it have understood anything at all about you except through
your light and your truth [Psalm 43:3]? Therefore, if my soul saw the light
and the truth, it saw you. If it did not see you, it did not see the light and
the truth.73
Or is it that it saw both the truth and the light, but it did not yet see you,
because it saw you to some extent but did not see you as you are?74
We can speak of ‘seeing God to some extent’ (vidit te aliquatenus), and we can
speak of ‘seeing God as he is’ (vidit te sicuti es). This distinction is important
for understanding the devotional exercise in the Proslogion, and Anselm later
underlines its importance by entitling Proslogion 14 as ‘How and why God is
both seen and not seen by those who seek him’.75 However, the distinction is
not quite explicit, and it needs interpretation. The expression ‘see you as you
are (sicuti es)’ obviously alludes to 1 John 3:2 ‘we will see him as he is (sicuti est)’,
which was understood to refer to the vision to be achieved in the life to come.
Anselm is saying that this kind of direct vision of God has not been achieved.
The other member of the distinction, ‘seeing God to some extent’, refers, first
of all, to the seeing of God’s light that has just been discussed. However, not
far in the background is the seeing of some truths about God from which the
The soul sees that God’s truth is so immense that no creature can understand
it. Therefore, in Proslogion 15 the conclusion is drawn that God is something
greater than can be thought.78 In Proslogion 16, Anselm comments on the no-
tion that God ‘dwells in the inaccessible light’ in the context of the theory of
illumination:
Truly, Lord, this is the inaccessible light in which you dwell. For truly
there is nothing else which can penetrate it so that it might look upon
you there. Truly I do not see it, since it is too much for me, and yet what-
ever I see I see through it, as the weak eye sees what it sees by the light of
the sun, which it cannot look at in the sun itself.79
As part of its attempt to see more of God, the soul sees that God’s truth is great-
er than any creature can understand, and this truth or light is the inaccessible
light in which God dwells. Of this light it is said that anything other than God
cannot penetrate (penetrare) it so that it would see God therein. Anselm seems
to be saying that the light in which God dwells is and will be inaccessible. In
this way, the aspiration of the soul expressed in the first half of Proslogion 1 ap-
pears to be doomed to be a failure: there is no access to the inaccessible light.
This does not imply, however, that every attempt at contemplating God
as he is would remain frustrated forever. Man’s goal is the vision of God, and
the faithful will eventually achieve this end. This does not happen in this life,
but in the life to come in heaven. The last three chapters of the Proslogion,
24–26, offer some considerations about the life to come. Before that, Anselm
treats one more major theme about the properties of the divine essence: the
unity of the divine being (Proslogion 18–22). Like the first half of Proslogion 14,
the first half of Proslogion 18 elaborates further the soul’s search for God that
began in Proslogion 1.80 Anselm winds up his discussion of the divine essence
in the latter part of Proslogion 22.81 Proslogion 23 points out that the divine
being discussed is Trinitarian in nature and ends with the claim that the triune
God is ‘that one necessary thing (unum necessarium, Luke 10:42) in which is
every good’.82
Proslogion 24 offers ‘a surmise about the kind and quantity of this good’.
Proslogion 25 deliberates about ‘the kinds and quantity of goods for those who
enjoy this good’, and the treatment makes it clear that the goods in the life to
come concern both the body and the soul. Proslogion 26 asks ‘whether this
is the full joy that the Lord promises’.83 In these chapters, Anselm concen-
trates on the goodness of God and the joy that comes to those who enjoy it.
Anselm says very little about the vision of God as knowledge. One remark in
Proslogion 25 is related to God’s wisdom: ‘If it is wisdom [that delights you]: the
very wisdom of God will show itself to them.’84 In Proslogion 26, we have the
following passage:
But, surely, that joy in which your chosen ones will rejoice ‘neither eye has
seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man’ [1 Cor. 2:9].
Therefore, Lord, I have not yet said or thought how much your blessed
ones will rejoice. They will, no doubt, rejoice as much as they will love,
and they will love as much as they will know. How much will they know
you then, Lord, and how much will they love you? Surely ‘neither eye has
seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man’ in this life
how much they will know you and love you in that life.85
Anselm, hence, does not offer any specific description of the nature or content
of human knowledge in the state of beatific vision. Instead, he seems to be say-
ing that this is an issue which goes beyond human understanding in the pres-
ent life. It is clear, however, that there is a huge difference between the vision of
God in heaven and our understanding of some truths about God in the present
life. The last passage of the Proslogion shows that Anselm found progression in
the knowledge of God in this life to be possible, even though the fullness of this
knowledge will be achieved in the life to come.86
In conclusion, let us draw together some points. As the theme of contem-
plating God is forcefully present in the exercise in the Proslogion, it should
not be difficult for alert readers to recognize that this is one of the exercise’s
main themes, even if they did not yet have at their disposal the indications
that Anselm provided later. There is a twofold attempt at contemplating God
in the Proslogion. On the one hand, it is pointed out that the direct vision of
God is the ultimate goal of human existence. The person who prays longs for
attaining that end, but he gives up pursuing the goal because it is too elevated
for him. The same goal surfaces again later, leading to a discussion in which
the praying person realizes why he cannot achieve the goal in the present life.
To the extent that the believers’ endeavour to elevate their minds to the con-
templation of God is an attempt to achieve a direct vision of God, this attempt
fails. The attempt is nevertheless meaningful, because the believers should
long for their ultimate end and keep it constantly before their eyes. On the
other hand, the exercise in the Proslogion includes the believers’ attempt to un-
derstand their beliefs about God. Related to this, there is a successful attempt
at contemplating God in the Proslogion.
The devotional exercise in the Proslogion includes a number of features
which serve to advertise understanding as a suitable goal for a Christian
believer in the present life. The original title of the treatise, Faith Seeking
Understanding, directs the attention of the believer to this kind of endeav-
our. The first chapter presents the search for understanding as a devout and
humble endeavour which is intimately related to man’s ultimate goal: instead
of taking the haughty objective of ‘penetrating God’s heights’, the person who
prays in the Proslogion aims lower and ‘desires to understand God’s truth to
some extent’. In this context, Anselm also refers to the Augustinian idea that
believing can serve as a means of achieving understanding. Understanding is
joyful, and it is a gift of God already for the reason that all understanding is
based on divine illumination.
Searching for understanding is a truly modest goal, as there are important
limitations on what reason can achieve in this area. If some readers are famil-
iar with those writings of Augustine in which a vision of God is sought through
intellectual ascent (see 8.3), they will notice that Anselm disagrees: the eye of
the mind cannot look at the source of the divine light, as the bodily eye cannot
bear to look at the sun (Proslogion 16). The search for understanding does not
offer any shortcut to man’s ultimate purpose.
Anselm later declared his view to be that understanding (intellectus) is a
midway point between faith ( fides) and seeing (species). He does not say it
in so many words in the Proslogion, but the devotional exercise in the trea-
tise presupposes a similar view. On the one hand, there is an intimate internal
connection between achieving understanding and the ultimate goal of human
existence. On the other hand, the understanding that can be achieved in the
present life is radically different from the vision of God that awaits the faithful
in the life to come. The devotional exercise in the Proslogion recommends faith
seeking understanding as an attitude that a Christian person should adopt.
What is more, it aims at providing a gratifying initial experience of the fruits of
this approach for those who take part in the exercise.
Chapter 9
The main body of the Proslogion is a devotional exercise, but there is also a
more complex exercise within the work (see also 8.1). Anselm added commen-
tary material before and after the main body of the work, and the additional
material affected the way in which the devotional exercise would be under-
stood and seen. This last chapter aims at elucidating the more complex ex-
ercise within the Proslogion. We begin by considering the way in which the
Proslogion developed into the work that we know: how the main body of the
Proslogion came about, and how the Proslogion evolved from the first published
version into its final form (9.1). The next section seeks to clarify the effects that
the changes Anselm made to the Proslogion would have had on the way the
work was understood (9.2). Because the character of the fool, the atheist of the
psalms, plays a notable part in the appendices of the Proslogion, we also reflect
upon the role of believers and unbelievers in Anselm’s work (9.3). The study
ends with a concluding discussion about the purpose of the Proslogion (9.4).
In addition to Anselm’s own account of how the Proslogion was com-
posed in the preface to the treatise (see 2.1 and 2.4), there is Eadmer’s longer
account in Vita Anselmi. Like Anselm in his story, Eadmer begins with the
Monologion and provides a brief description of its content and methodology:
Here, putting aside all authority of Holy Scripture, he enquired into and
discovered by reason alone what God is, and proved by invincible reason
that God’s nature is what the true faith holds it to be, and that it could not
be other than it is.1
Then Eadmer reports that it occurred to Anselm to look for ‘one single
argument’:
Afterwards it came into his mind to try to prove by one single and short
argument the things which are believed and preached about God, that he
is eternal, unchangeable, omnipotent, omnipresent, incomprehensible,
1 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 19, ed. and trans. Southern, 29. I use Southern’s translation, unless
otherwise indicated.
just, righteous, merciful, true, as well as truth, goodness, justice and so on;
and to show how all these qualities are united in him.2
Eadmer, of course, had Anselm’s own account as well as the remarks in the
Responsio at his disposal, but in addition he had obtained oral information,
including from Anselm himself. It is not entirely clear how well Eadmer un-
derstood Anselm’s argument. Eadmer’s starting point seems to be the account
in Responsio 10 of how the attributes of the divine substance can be derived
from the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’,3 but he expands
Anselm’s few examples into an extensive list. It is noteworthy that Eadmer fails
to mention God’s existence among the things that the argument should prove,
but it is possible that he wanted to be pedagogical and deliberately simplified
matters. On the other hand, Eadmer includes the idea that the single argument
can be used for proving the unity of God’s being (Proslogion 18).4
Like Anselm, Eadmer also describes the difficult quest for the argument and
how it eventually bore fruit when ‘one night during matins the grace of God
illuminated his [Anselm’s] heart, the whole matter became clear to his mind,
and a great joy and exultation filled his inmost being.’5 Next, Eadmer presents
a curious story about writing tablets. Anselm wrote what he had discovered on
wax tablets and gave them to one of the monks for safe keeping. After a few
days he asked for the tablets, but they could not be found anywhere. Anselm
wrote another draft on wax tablets and gave them to the same monk. The next
day the monk found the tablets ‘scattered on the floor … and the wax which
was on them strewn about in small pieces’. Anselm pieced the wax together
and then ordered the text to be copied onto parchment.6 Then Eadmer de-
scribes the work that Anselm wrote from this draft:
2 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 19, ed. and trans. Southern, 29: ‘Post haec incidit sibi in mentem inves-
tigare utrum uno solo et brevi argumento probari posset id quod de Deo creditur et praedica-
tur, …’ Instead of ‘[are] preached’, praedicatur could also be translated as ‘[are] predicated’.
3 Responsio 10, S I, 139.3–8.
4 Proslogion 18, S I, 114.14–115.1.
5 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 19, ed. and trans. Southern, 30.
6 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 19, ed. and trans. Southern, 30–31.
7 Eadmer, Vita Anselmi I, 19, ed. and trans. Southern, 31. The translation is modified; Southern
here translates contemplatio as ‘speculation’.
The Exercise Continued 199
To complete his account of the birth of the Proslogion, Eadmer finally tells
the story of Anselm’s exchange with Gaunilo, to which we will return later
in this section.
Eadmer’s account of the process that led to the writing of the main text of
the Proslogion is consonant with Anselm’s own version, except that Eadmer
additionally describes the curious incidents of the wax tablets. Specifically, the
two versions agree in suggesting that Anselm was initially looking for a single
argument, and that the composition of the treatise took place only after the
argument had been discovered. In light of what has been discussed in previous
chapters, there is reason to suspect that the accounts are misleading regarding
this point. Even though the final composition of the main body of the treatise
could take place only after the discovery of the single argument, it is probable
that Anselm had already made preparations while he was looking for it. In fact,
most of the Proslogion may well have been written in advance.
The discovery of the single argument, whereby the ‘whole matter becomes
clear’, can plausibly be described as consisting of four main constituents: (1) fo-
cusing on the notion ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’; (2) dis-
covering the reductio argument based on the signification of this notion;
(3) observing that the reductio argument can be used for deriving ‘whatever
we believe about the divine substance’; and (4) finding some solution to the
special difficulties inherent in applying the reductio argument to prove God’s
existence (cf. 2.2, 2.4, 3.2, and 3.4). These four constituents are only relevant
for a limited number of chapters in the Proslogion. The reductio is used in five
chapters, namely, Proslogion 2, 3, 5, 15, and 18, and even among these its use is
rather inconspicuous in Proslogion 5 and 18 (see 2.2 and 3.2). The notion ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ or some of its variants are mentioned
in two more chapters: Proslogion 4 and 14 (see 3.2). In addition, some remarks
in Anselm’s discussion of how God’s being merciful relates to his being righ-
teous, in Proslogion 9–11, can be interpreted as alluding to the single argument,
even though no variant of Anselm’s notion appears.8
On the other hand, several long, carefully worked out chapters in the devo-
tional exercise in the Proslogion (see also 7.5) do not depend on the single ar-
gument. The single argument is not at all relevant for Proslogion 1 (the arousal
of the mind for contemplating God) and Proslogion 24–26 (the description of
the joy to be found in heaven). In addition to these, Proslogion 14–16 and 18 be-
long to the main line in the devotional exercise. Proslogion 16 does not depend
on the single argument. Proslogion 14 includes a reference to the argument,
but that reference could easily be dispensed with, and the remarks about
‘seeing the light’ or ‘seeing the truth’ that are crucial for the development of the
chapter could be presented in connection with any rational argument about
God. Between these two chapters lies Proslogion 15 with the claim that God
is greater than can be thought, a conspicuous application of the single argu-
ment. However, this chapter stands out from its environment stylistically, and
Proslogion 16 would make perfect sense even if Proslogion 15 were removed.
And even though Proslogion 18 can be interpreted as building on Anselm’s re-
ductio, this type of argument is implied rather than explicit, and Anselm could
have written a similar chapter before the discovery of the single argument as
well. Excluding Proslogion 15, Anselm could have written the main line of the
devotional exercise, that is, chapters 1, 14, 16, 18, and 24–26, without yet having
a precise idea of the single argument.
The chapters that have not been mentioned so far do not depend on the
single argument (see 3.2). This is the case with Anselm’s discussion on the
problems with some of the divine attributes in Proslogion 6–8. Anselm could
have used these chapters even if he had discovered some other way of estab-
lishing the divine attributes (and actually he does not use the single argument
for establishing the attributes in Proslogion 5 either: they are derived from the
notion that God as creator must have all the good qualities). And even though
some remarks in Proslogion 9–11 can be read as allusions to the single argu-
ment, this might be partly coincidental. The rest of the chapters (12–13, 17, 19–
23) do not directly depend on the single argument, even though they discuss
various claims belonging to ‘what we believe about the divine substance’ (with
the exception of chapter 23 on the Trinity). Anselm could have composed all
these chapters before the discovery of the single argument.
The examination of the different chapters in the Proslogion shows that most
of the treatise could have been composed before the discovery of the single ar-
gument. It is even possible that a complete draft of the treatise already existed
before Anselm’s discovery. In that case, the final composition of the Proslogion
would have consisted of Anselm integrating the new argument into the work
by making changes to the existing text: he would rewrite the part dealing with
God’s existence (Proslogion 2–4), add the argument for God’s being greater
than can be thought (Proslogion 15), and make some small adjustments to a
few passages (at least in Proslogion 5 and 14, probably in Proslogion 18, perhaps
in Proslogion 9–11 and some other chapters). In the earlier draft, the discussion
about God’s existence might have been based on some other argument(s), but
it could nonetheless have included various features of Proslogion 2–4 as we
now have them.9
9 To continue the thought experiment, let us suppose that Anselm had not invented any argu-
ment that he could advertise as a ‘single argument’. Sooner or later he would have published
The Exercise Continued 201
t he work anyway. In that case, we would have Anselm’s Proslogion without ‘Anselm’s argu-
ment’. Pointing to this possibility accentuates the contingent relation between the single
argument and the devotional exercise in the Proslogion. We could have the single argu-
ment without the Proslogion, but we could also have the Proslogion without the single
argument.
202 Chapter 9
The question about intermediate versions is more complicated. For the final
version, Anselm added the following features to the Proslogion: the preface,
the list of chapters including the chapter headings, the numbers in the margin
to indicate where each chapter begins, and the three appendices at the end,
Sumptum, Pro insipiente, and Responsio. In addition, he changed the title of
the work and probably made some changes to the main text. It is possible that
all these changes were made at the same time, that is to say, that Anselm at
some point published a new version in which all the new features were intro-
duced. On the other hand, it would be easy to construct four or five different
scenarios with four or five consecutive different versions of the Proslogion for
each, as the preface and the list of chapters do not depend on each other, the
chapter numbers could be introduced without chapter headings, the appen-
dices at the end do not depend on the additions in the beginning, and the
Pro insipiente and Responsio could have been added without the Sumptum.
However, it is plausible to treat the changes to the beginning of the work as
one set of items (also counting the chapter numbers in the margin within this
set), and the three appendices at the end as another set of items. The problem
lies in determining whether these two sets were added at the same time or at
different times.
Among the literary sources relevant for the evolution of the Proslogion from
the first published version to the final version are the preface to the work itself,
two of Anselm’s letters to Archbishop Hugh of Lyon, and Eadmer’s account
in Vita Anselmi. Towards the end of the preface, as previously explained (2.4),
Anselm offers an account concerning the publication of his two earliest trea-
tises and the development of their titles. He first circulated them under the
titles Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei and Fides quaerens intellectum with-
out the author’s name being attached to the titles. Later, Anselm was urged by
several people, Archbishop Hugh among them, to add his name to the titles,
and Anselm explains that he changed the titles of the treatises to be able to do
so more appropriately. The new titles were Monologion and Proslogion.15 Hugh
was Archbishop of Lyon from 1083,16 and hence the preface cannot be earlier
than that.
The two letters to Hugh, Letters 100 and 109, add some more details.
Anselm sent some of his works together with the first letter without indicating
which they were.17 In the second letter, it is revealed that the works were the
Monologion and the Proslogion. Anselm sent this letter at a point in time when
he had just coined these titles; the copies sent to Hugh turn out to have car-
ried the titles Monoloquium de ratione fidei (A Soliloquy on the Reason in Faith)
and Alloquium de ratione fidei (An Address on the Reason in Faith). Anselm asks
Hugh to change the titles and correct the relevant passage in the preface to the
Proslogion.18 The letters can be dated to c. 1083–85. Around 1085 can serve as
a terminus ad quem because Anselm indicates that he has not written other
works yet and it would be difficult to postpone the composition of De veritate
and De libertate arbitrii to much after 1085.19 The letters reveal an addition-
al detail not mentioned in the preface: before receiving their final titles, the
Monologion and Proslogion carried intermediate titles. Anselm’s request that
Hugh should make a specific correction to the preface shows that the pref-
ace already was in existence. Anselm does not mention the appendices of the
Proslogion, but this is not grounds for inferring that they did not yet exist. There
is no particular reason why Anselm should mention the appendices in the first
letter, and there is no particular reason why he should mention them in the
second letter. The argument from silence does not apply.
The story about the addition of the exchange with Gaunilo is related by
Eadmer. He tells us that the criticism composed by someone, that is, Pro in-
sipiente, was sent to Anselm by one of his friends. Anselm composed a reply,
the Responsio, and ordered that both the Pro insipiente and Responsio should
be appended to the end of the work in future copies.20 In two early twelfth-
century manuscripts of the Proslogion, the author of the Pro insipiente has
been identified as Gaunilo, a monk of Marmoutier.21 Eadmer fails to indicate
when the exchange with Gaunilo took place, and because he does not refer to
the other changes to the Proslogion, his account does not help clarify whether
the appending of the Pro insipiente and Responsio took place after the addition
of the preface and the list of chapters, or simultaneously with it, or before it.
Formally, the preface and the appendices do not presuppose each other.
In the appendices, there are no direct references to the preface. Furthermore,
there are no references to chapter numbers or chapter headings, and there are
no references to the Monologion. The appendices do not formally assume ac-
quaintance with any of Anselm’s work other than the body of the text in the
Proslogion itself.22 On the other hand, there is no reference to the appendi-
ces in the preface or in the list of chapters. If Anselm gave an order that the
Pro insipiente and Responsio should be appended to the copies of the work, the
natural place one would expect to find that order listed is in the preface, but it
cannot be found there or in any other place in Anselm’s oeuvre. As far as formal
references are concerned, it is possible that the appendices were added before
the material in the beginning, but it is also possible that they were added after
it or simultaneously with it.
Even though the preface and the appendices do not formally presuppose
each other, there are some interesting internal connections between them.
One of the main points in the preface is the announcement of the single argu-
ment that Anselm had discovered. The account is well known, and the readers
of the Proslogion often assume that they know what Anselm is talking about,
but the description of the single argument is more opaque than the commen-
tators usually realize. Studying the main body of the Proslogion does not neces-
sarily help in deciphering it, because Anselm fails to use many of the central
expressions in the description there: there is no mention of a ‘single argument’,
the formulation ‘whatever we believe about the divine substance’ is not used,
and no explanation is given of how an argument can be used for ‘proving itself’.
In the Responsio Anselm offers explanations of these things. The term ‘single
argument’ is not used there either, but Responsio 10 explains how the expres-
sion ‘whatever we believe about the divine substance’ should be construed and
how the formula ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can serve as a
means of proving everything that the single argument should prove. And in
Responsio 5 Anselm refers to ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ as
an ‘argument’ (argumentum) and compares it to another argument that can-
not be used for ‘proving itself’ (see 2.4, 3.4, and 4.4).
Anselm, then, offers an interesting but opaque description of the single ar-
gument in the preface, and in the Responsio he, as if inadvertently, offers ex-
planations for the opaque formulations that he had used in the preface. From
the point of view of understanding Anselm’s single argument, the preface
and the Responsio complement each other in a crucial manner. Of course, it
could be said that this is mere coincidence. However, Anselm was not only a
clever thinker but also a meticulous writer and a highly competent rhetori-
cian. The coordination of the remarks in the preface and the Responsio is best
understood as a move in a complex rhetorical undertaking. Anselm’s prayers
can be understood as rhetorical texts, and the devotional exercise in the main
body of the Proslogion as a prayer. The Proslogion is not an academic textbook
but an exercise that is designed to bring about certain effects in the partici-
pants. However, this does not apply only to the main body of the Proslogion.
The pieces of text that Anselm added before and after the devotional exercise
are material for continuing the exercise. Making the reader struggle with the
206 Chapter 9
single argument is a key element in this more complex exercise. Given that the
single argument is a very central feature of the Proslogion, the fact that both
the preface and the Responsio are needed for a proper understanding of the
argument constitutes grounds for believing that the preface and the Responsio
were added at the same time.
The manuscript tradition supports the view that there was no intermediate
published version between Fides quaerens intellectum and the final version of
the Proslogion. No early manuscript has been identified that includes the pref-
ace and the list of chapters but no appendices at the end, or that includes the
appendices but no preface and the list of chapters. There is one early manu-
script, Cambridge Trinity College B. 1. 37. (probably from the early 1090s), that
does not fit the general pattern: it includes the preface and the list of chapters
and the Sumptum but neither the Pro insipiente nor the Responsio.23 It is not
clear how this manuscript should be explained. It may be the result of defec-
tive copying. Because the addition of the Sumptum without the other appen-
dices does not make much sense, it is fairly clear that this manuscript does not
represent an intermediate published version of the Proslogion.24
To conclude the discussion of the development of the Proslogion after its
first publication, it appears that the customary way of distinguishing two ver-
sions of the Proslogion is justified. In the first phase, c. 1077–78, Anselm pub-
lished a devotional exercise with no commentary other than the title Fides
quaerens intellectum. In the second phase, c. 1083–85, Anselm published the
final version of the Proslogion, which included the preface, the list of chapters,
and the exchange with Gaunilo. The final version was initially called Alloquium
de ratione fidei and the title Proslogion was introduced a little later. There ap-
pear to be no grounds for postulating an intermediate published version that
did not include the exchange with Gaunilo. Even if there was such a version,
the lack of evidence related to it in the manuscript tradition indicates that it
can have circulated only for a very short time.
When considering the effects that the changes Anselm made to the Proslogion
have on the understanding of the text, an argument can still be made for sep-
arating the additions to the beginning from the appendices at the end. Just
because material is available does not necessarily mean that it is used. Even
after the publication of the final version, the devotional exercise in the main
body of the work continued to be the principal part of the whole. It can be
expected that any new reader would read the whole treatise at least once, but
after that the interests of the reader as well as chance factors would determine
how much attention the additional elements in the treatise received. Because
the appendices at the end are separate and clearly marked as appendices, it is
possible and even likely that some readers would pay considerably less atten-
tion to them than to the material added to the beginning.
As a consequence, many of the considerations that apply to the earliest au-
dience of the Proslogion apply, with some modifications, to the later audiences
provided they share the starting point that the devotional exercise is the most
important feature of the treatise.25 For two reasons, however, it can be instruc-
tive to pay special attention to the earliest audience. First, the effects of the
additions to the Proslogion can be described more distinctly because the first
audience genuinely did not have some of the material at its disposal for a peri-
od of several years. Second, the historical background described above in Part 2
specifically concerns Anselm’s first audience within the Norman realm, and it
is with this audience in mind that Anselm initially composed the treatise.
There are two critical effects of the additional material that particularly
apply to the first audience of the Proslogion, and both are related to the central
content of the preface. The first is the introduction of the single argument. The
earliest audience of Fides quaerens intellectum read the text for several years
without knowing that there is an ‘argument’ of a specific type there. The later
audiences did not have the opportunity to read the text in this way since the
remarks about the single argument in the preface can hardly escape the notice
of any reader.
The second critical effect of the additions is that Anselm’s first two treatises
begin to be perceived as a conjoined work. In the earliest phase of the circula-
tion of the Monologion and Proslogion, there was no connection between the
two works. The former had a restricted circulation under the title Exemplum
meditandi de ratione fidei. There is no direct evidence concerning the early
circulation of Fides quaerens intellectum, but there is no obvious reason why
Anselm would have wanted to restrict its circulation.26 In addition, this text
25 There have been audiences, both medieval and modern, that have not read the Proslogion
but only some excerpts from it. That is a different story.
26 Cf. Sharpe, ‘Anselm as Author’, 15–20. Sharpe claims that Anselm was for some years re-
luctant to circulate the two works in question, but he does not produce any evidence to
show that the circulation of Fides quaerens intellectum was restricted by Anselm.
208 Chapter 9
was similar in its external form to Anselm’s prayers: it consisted of a title and
a text in prayer form divided into paragraphs. In the preface to the Proslogion,
Anselm seeks to establish that the Monologion and Proslogion form a pair.
The changes in the titles serve to accentuate that the treatises belong togeth-
er. Whereas the original titles have only the word fides in common, both the
intermediate titles (Monoloquium de ratione fidei, Alloquium de ratione fidei)
and the final titles (Monologion, Proslogion) are strikingly similar, and they are
variations on a theme. The addition of the preface and the list of chapters to
the latter treatise also serves to separate it from Anselm’s other prayers and
make it resemble the Monologion in form. Presumably, the establishing of the
Monologion and the Proslogion as a pair was immediately reflected in the way
these works were circulated: the two works were meant to travel together. An
indication of this is that the last two paragraphs in the preface to the Proslogion
manifestly refer to the Monologion as well; the readers of this treatise were ex-
pected to know the history of its titles and that Archbishop Hugh had given his
approval to the work.27 Archbishop Hugh himself probably was the first recipi-
ent of the Proslogion with the preface, and Anselm sent him the Monologion
and the Proslogion at the same time. We do not know whether the two treatises
were copied into the same booklet in this case, but that is how the Monologion
and Proslogion were often circulated during the early stages.28
However, one should be careful not to read too much into the difference be-
tween the earliest audience and the later audiences. Knowing that one should
be aware of a single argument is not to be confused with having a clear un-
derstanding of the single argument, and perceiving that the Monologion and
the Proslogion form a pair is not to be confused with understanding the na-
ture of their relationship. The announcement of the single argument includes
an implicit task for the readers. It may be that some readers will intention-
ally formulate the question of what the single argument is and strive to clarify
the matter for themselves. For other readers, the awareness of there being a
single argument may function as a heuristic idea that is not particularly re-
flected upon. Most readers will have to read the whole Proslogion several times
and actively engage with what they read before any adequate understanding
of the single argument can emerge, and if one neglects the appendices, it is
more likely that the understanding of the argument will be either vague or
faulty. Understanding the relation between the Monologion and the Proslogion
in turn depends on understanding the single argument but includes other fac-
tors as well. There is a difference between the earliest audience and the later
audiences in that the earliest audience received the material in two different
phases, but in both cases the readers would have to actively engage with the
material provided by Anselm in order to understand some of the central fea-
tures of the treatise.
The nature of the additions that Anselm made to the Proslogion means that
there is a considerable amount of openness when it comes to continuing the
exercise in the treatise, and much will depend on the efforts and acumen of the
reader. However, it is possible to identify issues in which changes are likely to
take place and indicate what the nature of the changes is likely to be. If Anselm
indeed was an expert rhetorician, he considered such matters when he was
working on the additions. I concentrate here on three intertwined issues: the
role of rational arguments in Anselm’s project of faith seeking understanding,
the way in which the additions serve to deepen the effects of the devotional
exercise, and the relationship of the Monologion and the Proslogion.
As explained in the preceding chapter (see especially 8.5), one of the main
points of the devotional exercise in the Proslogion is that of recommending the
attitude of faith seeking understanding. The idea of faith seeking understand-
ing is introduced in the original title of the treatise. The twofold endeavour of
contemplating God in the work (see 8.2 and 8.5) creates an intimate connec-
tion between the search for understanding and man’s ultimate goal, which is
the vision of God ‘as he is’. The exercise in the Proslogion is focused, on the
one hand, on that which is believed, which the persona in the exercise seeks
to understand. On the other hand, it is focused on the seeking and the see-
ing and the emotions of the persona as he succeeds or fails in his aspirations.
There is not much in the Proslogion about the means to be used in achieving
understanding. In the devotional context, it is, of course, proper to ask for di-
vine assistance and special illumination. It is also suggested that believing can
serve as a means of striving for understanding,29 but at least in one important
point the understanding achieved is said to be independent of any parallel
believing.30 But what about the role of rational arguments?
Of course, there are arguments in the Proslogion that Anselm meant as
strictly rational. The analysis of the single argument in Part 1 of this study
shows that Anselm was convinced that this argument makes it possible to es-
tablish both God’s existence and ‘whatever we believe about the divine sub-
stance’ in a strictly rational manner. However, Anselm does not emphasize
this aspect of the matter in the course of the exercise. He does not explicitly
emphasize it in the material added later either. Nevertheless, various features
29 Proslogion 1, S I, 100.18–19.
30 Proslogion 4, S I, 104.5–7.
210 Chapter 9
in the added material indirectly call attention to the rational core in the argu-
mentation in the Proslogion. The remarks about the single argument in the
preface and in the Responsio obviously serve such a purpose, but let us begin
with some other features of the additions which require less analytical effort
on the part of the reader.
There is one addition to the Proslogion that is easily overlooked because of
its size, namely the Monologion. The existence of the Monologion preceding
the Proslogion affects the way in which the arguments in the Proslogion are
perceived. When Anselm relates the Proslogion to the Monologion in the pref-
ace to the former, he points out a difference in the complexity of arguments—
an interconnected chain of many arguments versus a single argument—but
does not mention any difference in the nature of the arguments. The natural
conclusion is that the Proslogion continues the strictly rational methodology
of Anselm’s first treatise at least as far as the single argument is concerned.
(See also 2.4.)
The appendices at the end of the Proslogion also serve to direct attention to
the rational aspects of the devotional exercise. The Sumptum, by its very exis-
tence, draws attention to the treatment of God’s existence in Proslogion 2–4. In
Pro insipiente, Gaunilo questions the cogency of Anselm’s argument for God’s
existence included in Proslogion 2–3 and presents a number of critical points
against it. Gaunilo assumes in his criticism that Anselm’s intention was to pro-
duce a strictly rational proof that does not depend on prior faith or on the
devotional context, and he lets us understand that he is speaking on behalf of
the fool, that is, the atheist of the psalms. Even though Anselm in the Responsio
directs his reply not to the fool but to the Catholic speaking on the fool’s behalf
(see 9.3),31 he nevertheless seeks to defend the argument in Proslogion 2–3 as
a rational argument. He also introduces a number of new arguments for the
existence of ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’, and they are also
meant to be based on reason alone.32 The appendices should leave no room
for error about the intended rational character of Anselm’s argument for God’s
existence, and the reader need not be able to analyse the single argument for
this effect to be achieved.
To turn now to the single argument, it was already pointed out (9.1) that
both the announcement in the preface and the explanations for some of its pe-
culiar formulations in the Responsio are needed for an adequate understand-
ing of the single argument. In both cases, the remarks related to the single
argument are embedded in a context which directs the reader to look for an
The discussions presented in this chapter and Chapter 8 should have made
it eminently clear that Anselm composed the Proslogion with a believing
audience in mind. Originally, the work was a devotional exercise with no
34 The heading of Proslogion 14, ‘How and why God is both seen and not seen by those who
seek him’, is also important for distinguishing two kinds of contemplation. See 8.5.
The Exercise Continued 213
commentary other than the title Fides quaerens intellectum. It was similar to
Anselm’s other prayers with regard to form, and it would have been circulated
like the prayers, starting from the monastic establishments in Normandy. The
real audience of Fides quaerens intellectum consisted of believers, and there
is no indication in the work that it would theoretically or rhetorically be di-
rected at any other kind of audience. With the additions that Anselm made
in connection with the republication of the treatise, c. 1083–85, the situation
changed, but only a little. The additions composed by Anselm have the same
target audience as the devotional exercise proper, and their primary function
is to provide material that makes it possible for the audience to continue the
exercise in ways that serve Anselm’s purposes. However, there is also a sugges-
tion that there might have been another kind of audience. Gaunilo makes it
clear that he is speaking on behalf of the fool, that is, the atheist of the psalms,
and it could be expected that Anselm would reply to the fool. In the Responsio,
Anselm declines to do that and directs his reply to the believers. To justify his
choice of approach, Anselm appeals to the fact that his opponent is not really
a fool but instead an orthodox Christian speaking on behalf of the fool.35 To
clarify what is going on here, let us reflect a little more on Anselm’s project
of faith seeking understanding and how unbelievers figure in the Monologion
and Proslogion.
The project of faith seeking understanding, obviously, is a project for be-
lievers. To be able to ‘seek to understand what one believes’, one must first
believe something. What Anselm seeks to understand and make understood
is the content of the Christian faith. In the Monologion and Proslogion he con-
centrates on some basic tenets of Christianity; in later works he proceeds to
more advanced topics. When Anselm seeks to understand the Christian faith,
the object of his inquiry is ‘the reason in faith’ (ratio fidei), that is, the inter-
nal logic or internal intelligibility that exists in the content of faith or in the
things that the faith is about (see also 7.4 and 8.2). In Anselm’s view, the reason
in faith is open to rational analysis to a considerable extent, and it can also
be partly reconstructed from a purely rational starting point. Perceiving how
the different constituents in what is believed are related to each other is an
important part of what ‘understanding’ is, but ‘understanding’ can also mean
that the person who understands sees that things necessarily have to be in the
way they are (8.2). Providing rational arguments for that which is believed can
help to engender this kind of understanding if the arguments are strong and
lucid. Anselm’s primary motivation in looking for rational arguments is inter-
nal to the life of Christian believers. As Anselm points out in some important
passages in Cur Deus homo, investigation of this kind makes it possible for be-
lievers to contemplate what they believe and ‘delight in the reason of [their]
faith’. Anselm points out that the rational considerations sought by believ-
ers can also be used for apologetic purposes: to try to win over those who are
unbelievers.36 The same arguments can serve a contemplative purpose on the
one hand, and an apologetic purpose on the other.
In the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm indicates that he will use the single
argument, which is a rational argument, for contemplative purposes. He says
that he wrote the work ‘in the role of someone endeavouring to elevate his mind
to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he believes’.37
The exercise in the Proslogion corresponds to this description. Anselm does
not use the single argument for apologetic purposes in the Proslogion. The
reason for this is not that it could not be applied for such purposes; Anselm
took for granted that it could. However, Anselm’s concern in the Proslogion is
not unbelievers but believers, and his concern for believers is not what they
should do with unbelievers. Instead, Anselm’s concern in the Proslogion is the
believers’ attitudes towards the kind of rational analysis of faith that he desires
to engage in. Anselm wants to bring about a change in how the issue of faith
and reason is seen in the monastic environment in which he was living and
working. Presumably, the change would also have repercussions in apologetics
in the long run, but that was not Anselm’s objective. His main goal in the trea-
tise is to advertise the idea of faith seeking understanding as well as to justify
and defend it. Because Anselm is justifying and defending what he himself
is engaged in, there is an apologetic quality in the Proslogion, but not in the
sense of ‘Christian apologetics’. Instead of trying to convince unbelievers about
the legitimacy of the Christian faith, Anselm was trying to convince believers
about the legitimacy of a certain way of approaching the Christian faith. The
Proslogion is an apology of reason and its use in the theological sphere.
Christian apologetics in the customary sense did not particularly interest
Anselm. None of his works is apologetic in a straightforward way. Anselm does
express a positive attitude towards using rational arguments to win over unbe-
lievers in Cur Deus homo.38 However, in this work there was need to defend the
rational approach, and the possibility of using rational arguments for apolo-
getic purposes would be considered as a good basis for adopting that approach.
Unbelievers remained a marginal audience for Anselm. It was the believers that
he wanted to address, and even among these he was more interested in those
36 Cur Deus homo, Commendatio operis, S II, 39.2–40.2; Cur Deus homo I, 3, S II, 50.16–20.
37 Proslogion, preface, S I, 93.21–94.2.
38 See note 36 above.
The Exercise Continued 215
for whom religion was or could become a profession. Simply having the right
beliefs is not enough, because faith of this kind is a ‘dead faith’, and the only
reward one can expect for it is eternal torment in hell. To reach their goal, the
beatific vision of God in heaven, believers ought to have a ‘living faith’, which
means that they should incessantly strive towards God and strive to fulfil the
will of God in everything they do.39 Anselm’s prayers are designed to sustain a
living faith in those who make regular use of them (8.4). Anselm’s theological
works partly serve a similar purpose, but he also has academic interests that go
beyond what being a real believer requires. He desired to achieve a thorough
understanding of what Christians believe, and for Anselm this meant, among
other things, that an effort be made to reconstruct the content of the Christian
faith from a purely rational starting point as far as possible.
Even though Anselm does not specifically address unbelievers in the
Proslogion, the possibility of addressing them is nonetheless present in this
work. The character of the fool (insipiens) is for Anselm an unbeliever of a spe-
cific kind, with two distinctive characteristics: he is an atheist, and his intellec-
tual gifts are rather modest. Related to the latter aspect, Anselm characterizes
the fool as ‘foolish’ or ‘stupid’ (stultus) in Proslogion 3, and in the Responsio he
wonders whether the fool would really be able to present certain criticisms.40
In the main body of the Proslogion, the idea of addressing the fool in an
apologetic fashion appears only in a much attenuated form. The fool makes
an appearance in Anselm’s treatment of God’s existence in Proslogion 2–4, and
the treatment as a whole does not present the fool as a potential interlocutor.
In Proslogion 3 and 4, the fool’s denial of God’s existence calls for an expla-
nation: how can the fool think that God does not exist, when God’s mode of
being is such that he cannot be thought not to exist?41 From Proslogion 3–4 the
reader easily gains the impression that the prospect of having any meaningful
discussion with the fool is minimal. The fool appears in a bit more positive
light in Proslogion 2, where Anselm maintains that the fool will understand
some things that he hears and will also be convinced that that than which
a greater cannot be thought exists at least in the understanding.42 This sug-
gests that the fool might be an interlocutor. It is not necessary to draw this
conclusion, though, because there is another reason for the fool’s appearance.
Anselm needs to launch his discussion of God’s existence somehow, and his
conviction that God cannot be thought not to exist puts limits on how he can
do it. The citation from the psalms (Psalm 14:1 or 53:1) proves a good starting
point for the treatment of God’s existence. Furthermore, Anselm can best
carry out the first stage in his inference by using a minimally rational person
as an example. Because the fool has just appeared on the stage, it is natural to
use him as a vehicle in the inference: when the fool hears the expression ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’, he will understand what he hears,
and consequently that than which a greater cannot be thought will be in his
understanding, because whatever is understood will be in the understand-
ing. Up to this point, there is no need to view the fool as an interlocutor. Next
comes the remark that the fool is convinced of the first stage in Anselm’s argu-
ment. The main body of the Proslogion does not aid in deciding what signifi-
cance this remark should be given from the apologetic point of view because
Anselm does not indicate what else the fool can be persuaded of. The fool’s
presence is no longer assumed after this point in the exercise. The discussion
in Proslogion 3–4 is not with the fool but about him, and the fool is not men-
tioned at all in Proslogion 5–26.
As mentioned, the Responsio addresses a believing audience. It is formally
directed to Gaunilo as a ‘Catholic’ and the real audience is the same as the
audience of the devotional exercise in the main body of the Proslogion. In the
Responsio, however, the possibility of using the single argument for apologet-
ic purposes comes out clearly: Anselm takes it for granted that his inference
about God’s existence can be used for persuading the fool that God exists. To
begin with, the way in which Anselm explains his choice of replying ‘to the
Catholic’ contains the assumption that he could have made a different choice.
Anselm says that because his critic is not really a fool but a Catholic speaking
on behalf of the fool, it ‘can suffice’ that he replies to the Catholic.43 It is as-
sumed here that Anselm could reply to the fool as well. Furthermore, in the
course of his reply Anselm indicates he thinks it is possible to reason with the
fool. In his defence of the first stage of the inference in Proslogion 2, Anselm,
interestingly, does not repeat his claims about what the fool can understand
or what he should be convinced of.44 Towards the end of the Responsio, how-
ever, Anselm makes remarks that show that his intention was to provide an
argument that could be used for proving things even to the fool. First, he ar-
gues that it was not unreasonable for him to introduce the expression ‘that
than which a greater cannot be thought’ to prove God’s existence ‘against the
fool’, because the fool will understand this expression to some extent whereas
he does not understand the word ‘god’ in any way.45 Second, Anselm offers a
lengthy exposition on how the meaning of the expression ‘that than which a
greater cannot be thought’ can be elucidated to the fool.46 These remarks make
no sense unless it is assumed that the inference in Proslogion 2 can be used for
persuading the fool of God’s existence.
In one important respect, the role of the fool in the Proslogion, including the
appendices, resembles the role that the fool plays in book II of Augustine’s De
libero arbitrio. As part of the preparation for the proof of God’s existence in this
work, Augustine reminds his interlocutor, Evodius, of the fool of the psalms
and asks whether Evodius would try to use arguments to persuade the fool of
God’s existence if the fool were willing to engage in such an effort. Evodius’
initial reaction is to seek to persuade the fool by appealing to the testimony
of the sacred writings, but Augustine reminds him of their ambition to under-
stand what they believe.47 After some remarks on faith and understanding,
the discussion proceeds to Augustine’s proof of God’s existence. Even though
the fool is not mentioned again, it is assumed that the proof presented could
also be used for persuading the fool. Anselm and Augustine have in common
that their primary motivation for producing a proof of God’s existence derives
from their desire to understand what they believe, but they both take it for
granted that the same proof could also serve an apologetic purpose. Unlike in
Anselm’s discussion, however, there is no suggestion in De libero arbitrio that
the fool of the psalms is impaired in his mental powers.
Because of the many parallels between the Proslogion and book II of De li-
bero arbitrio, it would be natural for those familiar with the latter work to think
of Anselm’s proof of God’s existence as directed to the fool. Even otherwise,
the idea of seeking to prove God’s existence to the fool does not appear far-
fetched, even though Proslogion 2–4 is ambiguous on this point. As explained
above (9.2), focusing on the inference in Proslogion 2–4 suits Anselm’s pur-
poses because it helps draw attention to the rational core of the devotional
exercise. For the same reason, it suits Anselm’s purposes to consider the infer-
ence in Proslogion 2 from the fool’s viewpoint, but Anselm’s way of doing it in
the Responsio is very cautious.
It should be mentioned here that it is not clear whether the author of Pro
insipiente, traditionally identified as Gaunilo of Marmoutier, was a real person
48 See Ian Logan, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of Anselm’s Argument and
its Significance Today (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 116 and 122; Toivo J. Holopainen, ‘The
Proslogion in Relation to the Proslogion’, The Heythrop Journal 50 (2009), 590–602, at
601; Giles E. M. Gasper, ‘Envy, Jealousy, and the Boundaries of Orthodoxy: Anselm of
Canterbury and the Genesis of the Proslogion’, Viator 41:2 (2010), 45–68, at 64 note 63.
49 Monologion 1, S I, 13.5–11; Monologion, preface, S I, 8.18–20.
The Exercise Continued 219
50 Proslogion 1, S I, 100.18–19.
51 See the apparatus for Monologion 1, S I, 13–14. See also 7.3–7.4.
220 Chapter 9
52 Anselm’s considered answer would be ‘yes and no’. In mature believers, not trying to un-
derstand what they believe indicates inattention towards what they believe. See 8.2.
53 Proslogion 4, S I, 104.5–7.
The Exercise Continued 221
same truth. The truth that faith proclaims has an intelligible structure, ‘the rea-
son in faith’, and believers ought to use their reason to explore and uncover that
structure as far as possible. As part of such an endeavour, Anselm sought ways
of reconstructing various aspects of what faith teaches from a purely rational
starting point. His first treatise, the Monologion, is a bold attempt at recon-
structing a number of basic tenets in the Christian view of reality by means of
reason alone (sola ratione). Anselm’s analysis of the principles determining the
destiny of rational creatures, towards the end of the Monologion, can be read
as a defence of the monastic vocation since it would be difficult for someone
who is not religious by profession to have the ‘living faith’ required for reaching
the goal of human existence, the beatific vision of God in the life to come. The
Monologion is a defence of the Christian view and of the monastic vocation,
but it is implicitly also a defence of reason and logic and the use of a rational
method in matters of faith, as Anselm strives to establish that a stringent use of
reason leads to a view that coincides with the Christian view.
Anselm’s confidence in what reason can accomplish is exceptional for a
mainstream Christian thinker. The idea that the revealed doctrine and human
reason must ultimately be in harmony is not special; on the contrary, were that
not the case, there would not be much point in theological reflection in the tra-
ditional sense. In addition, the writings of Augustine and Boethius offered au-
thoritative examples of how the intelligible structure in faith can be rationally
analysed and how some tenets of faith can be sought to be proved. However,
neither Augustine nor Boethius had attempted to give such an extensive argu-
ment ‘by means of reason alone’ as Anselm would offer in the Monologion.
Because of its boldness, Anselm’s rational endeavour would be likely to arouse
anxiety among devout believers in various environments, but in the Normandy
of the 1070s there were some special issues (see Chapter 7). Less than fifteen
years earlier, Anselm’s friend and predecessor as prior of Bec, Lanfranc, had
published a Eucharistic treatise De corpore et sanguine Domini, which is a care-
fully crafted rhetorical attack against Berengar of Tours. Lanfranc, or ‘Lanfranc’,
sought to create the impression that Berengar’s methodology is flawed in a fun-
damental way because he relies on reason and dialectic whereas the orthodox
method is to rely on authoritative writings and the authority of the Church.
Anselm could readily understand that publishing a text like the Monologion
was a hazardous enterprise, particularly in a methodological atmosphere in-
fluenced by De corpore, and a consultation with Lanfranc made him even more
aware of this. Nevertheless, Anselm did not want to give up publishing his trea-
tise. Providing the work with some new features that softened its impact—a
letter of dedication, a preface, and the title Exemplum meditandi de ratione
fidei—he let the work have restricted circulation. He did something else too.
222 Chapter 9
To make the full publication of the work possible, he began putting togeth-
er a new work that could serve as a companion to the first one—a work that
evolved into what we know as the Proslogion.
In the Proslogion, Anselm offers an indirect and highly discreet defence of
the rational approach that he had applied in the Monologion. Like De corpore,
the Proslogion is a carefully crafted rhetorical text, and even the way in which it
was published was carefully thought out. Its publication appears to have taken
place in two phases: the main body of the Proslogion was published c. 1077–78
under the title Fides quaerens intellectum, and the Proslogion roughly in the
form we now have it was published c. 1083–85.
When Anselm published Fides quaerens intellectum, the work did not have
any explicit connection with his first treatise. Nor was there any mention of
a ‘single argument’. Anselm had acquired a reputation as an author of devo-
tional writings and Fides quaerens intellectum continued that line of activity.
Anselm’s prayers are carefully wrought rhetorical texts that aim at sustain-
ing a ‘living faith’ in those who read them. The main body of the Proslogion
is like Anselm’s other prayers in many respects, but it also includes features
that gently help the reader towards appreciating the rational analysis of faith.
The devotional exercise in the work advertises understanding as a suitable goal
for the Christian believer in the present life. The ultimate objective of human
existence is the contemplation of God ‘as he is’ in the life to come. This kind of
contemplation is not yet possible in our earthly existence, maintains Anselm,
but it is possible to move towards it, and one way of doing so is to engage in
a more modest kind of contemplation, namely, the contemplation of truths
about God, and for that purpose the believers must seek to understand what
they believe about God. Anselm makes the readers pray that they might un-
derstand, go through arguments that produce understanding, and feel the joy
that results from achieving understanding. Anselm later declared that the un-
derstanding we acquire in this life is a midway point between faith and seeing,
that is, between faith and the vision of God ‘as he is’. This is what the Proslogion
also tries to convey, even though Anselm does not say it in so many words.
The search for understanding, thus, is intimately connected with the believers’
striving towards the ultimate goal, and the joy of understanding is a foretaste
of the joy of the faithful in heaven. The exercise in the Proslogion is meant
to give a gratifying initial experience of what faith seeking understanding can
be, as well as to point out a legitimate place for this kind of endeavour in the
believers’ lives.
Anselm let Fides quaerens intellectum have its effect for some time—perhaps
for around five or six years. At a second stage, he published the Monologion
The Exercise Continued 223
and the Proslogion as a pair of works. By juxtaposing the two treatises and by
adding new material, Anselm makes both the treatises appear in a new light.
The Proslogion in its final form gently helps the reader towards realizing that
uncovering and presenting rational arguments is a central constituent of what
Anselm means by ‘faith seeking understanding’. The devotional exercise in the
main body of the Proslogion says little about what reason’s role in the search
for understanding is, but Anselm does indicate that the functioning of reason
is based on divine illumination. In the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm draws
the reader’s attention to the fact that a single argument lies at the core of the
Proslogion. The exchange with Gaunilo serves to underline the rational char-
acter of some of the arguments in the treatise, and Anselm provides pieces of
information that should make it possible for a diligent reader to identify the
single argument. Reflecting on the single argument should also lead to a deep-
er understanding of the subject matter contemplated, namely, that which is
believed about the divine essence, and to a deeper understanding of how rea-
son can be used for elucidating faith. The titles Monoloquium de ratione fidei
and Alloquium de ratione fidei, and later Monologion and Proslogion, suggest
that the main difference between the treatises is in the mode of presentation;
the underlying methodology is the same. The careful juxtaposition of the trea-
tises in the preface to the latter makes the same point. As a result, the reader is
also encouraged to see the Monologion as an expression of faith seeking under-
standing as well, and, indeed, this is consonant with Anselm’s intentions when
writing the treatise.
To compose the devotional exercise in the Proslogion, Anselm wanted to
find a simple and effective rational argument that would have an extraordinary
capability of producing insight about the divine essence. He did discover one,
his unum argumentum. Contrary to what the preface to the Proslogion suggests,
introducing the single argument was not for Anselm an end in itself. The single
argument serves the exercise in the Proslogion: first the devotional exercise
in the main body of it, and then, even more importantly, the more complex
exercise that Anselm set for the readers when he republished the work. The
announcement of the single argument in the preface to the Proslogion is an im-
plicit assignment for the readers: they should do their best to find out what the
single argument is. Struggling with the single argument serves to deepen and
modify the effects that the exercise in the main body would have. However,
the Proslogion will have opportune effects even on those readers who cannot
uncover the single argument and who fail to perceive the underlying view on
faith and reason. The audience taking part in the devotional exercise should
at least come to see that seeking to understand the content of the Christian
224 Chapter 9
Anselm’s Works
S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, vols. I–VI, ed. Franciscus Salesius
Schmitt (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946–1961). Vol. I first printed in Seckau, 1938, vol. II in
Rome, 1940. Reprint: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968, 2 vols. (preserving
the pagination in six volumes).
Fragmenta philosophica, in Memorials of St. Anselm, ed. R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt,
Auctores Britannici medii aevi 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 334–51.
Augustine, Epistulae II (31–123), ed. Alois Goldbacher, CSEL 34.2 (Vienna: Tempsky,
1898).
Augustine, Epistulae III (124–184A), ed. Alois Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (Vienna: Tempsky,
1904).
Augustine, Retractationes, ed. Pius Knöll, CSEL 36 (Vienna: Tempsky 1902).
Augustine, Soliloquia, ed. Wolfgang Hörmann, CSEL 89 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-
Tempsky, 1986), 3–98.
Berengar of Tours, Purgatoria epistola contra Almannum, ed. Jean de Montclos in
Montclos, Lanfranc et Bérenger (1971), 531–38.
Berengar of Tours, Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 84
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1988).
Boethius, Contra Eutychen, in The Theological Tractates, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand,
and S. J. Tester, rev. ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1973), 72–129.
Boethius, De syllogismis categoricis, PL 64, 793–832.
Boethius, De trinitate, in The Theological Tractates, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and
S. J. Tester, rev. ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1973), 2–31.
Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica, ed. J. C. Orelli and I. G. Baiter (Zurich: Fuesslini, 1833),
270–388. English translation: Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, translated, with notes
and an introduction by Eleonore Stump (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press,
1988).
Boethius, Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos, PL 64, 761–94.
Catalogus librorum abbatiae beccensis circa saeculum duodecimum, PL 150, 769–782.
Cicero, Topica, ed. Wilhelm Friedrich, M. Tullii Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt
omnia 1.2 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912), 425–49.
Durand of Troarn, Liber de corpore et sanguine Christi, PL 149, 1375–1424.
Eadmer, The Life of St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury (Vita Anselmi), edited with
introduction, notes, and translation by R. W. Southern (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972).
Gaunilo, Pro insipiente, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt in S. Anselmi cantuariensis ar-
chiepiscopi opera omnia, vol. I (1946), 125–29.
Lanfranc of Canterbury, De corpore et sanguine Domini, PL 150, 407–42. The early his-
torical parts (407–409C, 410C–412A, 412D–413D) have been edited in Serta medi-
aevalia, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 171 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 239–46. English
translation: On the Body and Blood of the Lord, trans. Mark G. Vaillancourt, The
Fathers of the Church, Mediaeval Continuation 10 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 2009), 27–87.
Lanfranc of Canterbury, The Letters of Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, ed. and
trans. Helen Clover and Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
Bibliography 227
Peter Abelard, Super Topica glossae, ed. Mario Dal Pra, Scritti di logica, 2nd ed. (Florence:
La Nuova Italia, 1969), 205–330.
Peter Damian, De divina omnipotentia, ed. and trans. André Cantin, Sources chré-
tiennes 191 (Paris: Cerf, 1972).
Porphyry, Isagoge, Translatio Boethii, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles
Latinus I.6 (Leiden: Brill, 1966).
Seneca, Naturales quaestiones, ed. Harry M. Hine (Stuttgart-Leipzig: Teubner, 1996).
Serta mediaevalia, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 171 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000).
Vigilius Thapsensis (pseudo-Augustine), Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate
Trinitatis, PL 42, 1157–72.
Secondary Works
Logan, Ian, Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of Anselm’s Argument and its
Significance Today (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
Malcolm, Norman, ‘Anselm’s Ontological Arguments’, The Philosophical Review 69
(1960), 41–62. Reprinted in Hick and McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument
(1967), 301–20.
Marenbon, John, Boethius (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Marenbon, John, ‘Logic before 1100: The Latin Tradition’, in Dov M. Gabbay and John
Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance
Logic (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), 1–63.
Marenbon, John (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
Martin, Christopher J., ‘The Logic of Negation in Boethius’, Phronesis 36 (1991), 277–304.
McGill, Arthur C., ‘Recent Discussions of Anselm’s Argument’, in Hick and McGill
(eds.), The Many-Faced Argument (1967), 33–110.
McMahon, Robert, Understanding the Medieval Mystical Ascent: Augustine, Anselm,
Boethius, and Dante (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
Montclos, Jean de, Lanfranc et Bérenger: la controverse eucharistique du XIe siècle
(Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1971).
Müller, Jörn, ‘Ontologischer Gottesbeweis? Zur Bedeutung und Funktion des unum
argumentum in Anselm von Canterburys Proslogion’, in Roberto Hofmeister Pich
(ed.), Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109): Philosophical Theology and Ethics (Porto:
Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), 37–71.
Nelis, Suzanne J., ‘What Lanfranc Taught, What Anselm Learned’, Haskins Society
Journal 2 (1990), 75–82.
Radding, Charles M., and Newton, Francis, Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics in the
Eucharistic Controversy, 1078–1079: Alberic of Monte Cassino against Berengar of
Tours (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, ‘Einführung’, in Anselm von Canterbury, Proslogion
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962), 9–65.
Schufreider, Gregory, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings (West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1994).
Sharpe, Richard, ‘Anselm as Author: Publishing in the Late Eleventh Century’, The
Journal of Medieval Latin 19 (2009), 1–87.
Smith, A. D., Anselm’s Other Argument (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2014).
Southern, R. W., ‘Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours’, in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin,
and R. W. Southern (eds.), Studies in Medieval History presented to Frederick Maurice
Powicke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 27–48.
Southern, R. W., Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1963).
Bibliography 231
Abelard, Peter 65, 66, 79–80, 82 and dialectic 65, 68–9, 73, 122, 160–1
accidents and accidental 23, 25–6, 67–8, on sacraments 115–7, 125–6, 128–33 passim
72–3, 94, 102, 111–2, 120n–121n argument for God’s existence 181, 217
Adam and Eve 176, 184, 185 theory of illumination 172, 180, 190, 192,
Adams, Marilyn McCord 71n, 169n 193–4, 196, 223
affirmation and negation 75–6, 78–9, faith, understanding, and vision 178–
119–25 passim 83, 196, 221
Alexander II, Pope 104–5 Soliloquies 180–3, 212
Ambrose 126–7 De libero arbitrio 181–3, 212, 217
angels 24, 175, 176, 177, 185 On Christian Teaching 53n, 68, 119, 121,
Anselm of Besate 99, 101, 108, 110 122, 124, 125
Anselm of Canterbury On the Trinity 22, 68n, 73, 149n, 155,
life and education 8, 95–102, 109 160–1, 173–4, 179–80, 212
relation to Lanfranc 6, 8, 93–109, 110, 111, other works 53n, 69, 125, 133, 178, 179, 180
140–3, 147, 154–8, 161–2, 170, 221 letters 128, 179
relation to De corpore 8, 95, 102–9, 110, 111, Augustine, pseudo- 122n
140–3, 147, 152–4, 161–2, 169–70, 221 authoritative writings 21–2, 24–5, 30, 68,
De grammatico 70–1, 81–2 71–2, 106, 114–5, 117, 121–8 passim, 131,
Epistola de incarnatione Verbi 20, 24–5, 137, 138, 143–7 passim, 149n, 151, 152,
30, 42, 71 155, 159, 160, 197, 217, 221
Cur Deus homo 71, 173–4, 175–8, 185, see also Bible, citations and allusions
186–7, 213–4 authority and reason see reason and
other works 70, 71, 177n, 204 rationality
letters 142n, 148n, 149, 150n, 154n, 155–6,
158n, 177n, 203–4 Barth, Karl 1n, 39n, 41n, 51–3, 168
prayers and meditations 158–9, 183–7, Bec, monastery of 6, 8, 56, 95, 96–102, 107,
205, 207–8, 213, 215, 222 140–1, 156, 182n
see also Monologion; Proslogion; school of 95, 97–102, 103, 107
Responsio; single argument; dialectic; believers and unbelievers 5, 7, 21, 52, 55, 171,
reason and rationality; understanding 173, 177–8, 196, 197, 210, 212–20
appearance see essence Berengar of Tours 6, 65, 69, 80, 93, 94,
apologetics and apologetic 3, 5–7, 55–6, 102–47 passim, 152, 154, 161, 162, 170, 221
177, 212–8 on reason, dialectic, and theology 65,
argument 69, 94, 121, 143–4, 145
ambiguity of the term 12, 37–42, 60, 63, on the Eucharist 65, 69, 103, 114–9
74–80, 82–3, 85 passim, 125, 128, 134, 136
see also single argument his ‘logical argument’ 116–7, 118–25,
Aristotle or Aristotelian 66, 67, 68, 70, 75, 137–9, 143, 146
77, 94, 111, 119, 121n, 122, 123 use of authoritative writings 116–7, 121,
Asiedu, F. B. A. 161n 125, 137, 143–4, 145
atheist 5, 197, 210, 213, 215, 218 Lanfranc’s depiction of him 110–1, 117–8,
see also fool 121–7, 135, 144–7, 154, 162
Augustine or Augustinian 22, 53n, 65, 68–9, Purgatoria epistola contra
73, 115–33 passim, 147, 149n, 155, 160–1, Almannum 114–5
171–4 passim, 178–83, 189–96 passim, Scriptum contra synodum 103, 104, 111,
212, 217, 221, 223 116–39 passim, 143, 146, 170
Index 233
Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum (De sacra Christ’s historical body 112, 114, 125, 126,
coena) 65, 69, 106n, 116n, 117n, 124n, 128–31, 132n, 134, 137, 144
135–7, 143 body vs. flesh 112, 114–5, 126, 128–39
Bible, citations and allusions passim, 144
Psalm 14:1/53:1 5, 15, 216 see also Eucharist
Psalm 36:39 185 Church 143, 144–5, 147, 152, 153, 161, 221
Psalm 43:3 192 Cicero 66, 67, 68, 74–7
Psalm 91:16 180 Collins, Ann 102n, 107n
Isaiah 7:9 178, 181 compunction 184–5
Sirach 6:6 and 32:24 157 contemplating God 8, 29, 30, 42, 167, 171–83
Wis. 5:16 185 passim, 187–96, 198, 201, 209, 211–2, 214,
Matt. 5:8 179 222, 223
Matt. 10:16 167n council see synods
Matt. 13:43 185 Cowdrey, H. E. J. 93n, 96n, 97n, 103–16
Matt. 22:30 185 passim (in notes), 144n, 149n, 154n,
Luke 10:42 194 156n, 167n
John 6:53–6 128
Acts 15:9 179 Damian, Peter 100, 101
1 Cor. 2:9 195 Davies, Brian 1n
1 Cor. 13:12 174, 179 De corpore 2, 8, 69, 80–1, 93–5, 102–47
1 Cor. 15:24 179 passim, 152–63 passim, 167, 169–71,
1 Cor. 15:44 185 221–2, 224
1 Tim. 6:16 188 dating 104–5
1 John 3:2 179, 192 author 8, 95, 102–9, 110, 141, 167, 170
Boethius 65–88 passim, 221 background 103, 113–7
and early medieval dialectic 65–8, 70n, structure 117–8
74–82, 82–8 passim rhetorical nature 8, 94–5, 102–9 passim,
dialectic and theology 68, 73, 221 110–3, 117–47 passim, 161–3, 167, 170–1,
theory of argument 7, 67, 74–9, 79–88 221
passim use of dialectic 69, 80–1, 94, 102, 119–25,
In Ciceronis Topica 66, 67, 74–9, 80, 81, 137–9, 144–7, 152–3, 161, 221
84 see also Anselm; Eucharist; Lanfranc
The Consolation of Philosophy 68 definitions 38, 39–42, 51–3, 57–8, 68, 71, 73,
the theological tractates (Opuscula 75–6, 115, 172
sacra) 68, 73 Deme, Daniel 2n
see also dialectic Demetracopoulos, John A. 53n
Boschung, Peter 71n, 81n devotion see contemplating God;
Boso, as character in Cur Deus homo 177, meditations and meditating; prayers and
186–7 praying; Proslogion: devotional exercise
dialectic or logic
Campbell, Richard 1n, 40n, 45n, 57n importance at the time 65–9, 146
carnalism see Eucharist parts 66–8
categories, theory of 67–8, 72–3, 153 sources 66–7, 77n
chapter headings 8, 22, 148, 184, 188, 192, and theology 25–6, 65, 68–9, 71–4,
194–5, 203, 204, 211–2 80–1, 94–5, 101–2, 111–2, 118–25
see also list of chapters passim, 143–7 passim, 151–3, 160, 162,
Charlesworth, M. J. 1n 211, 212, 218, 221
Christ’s body or Christ’s flesh 112–6, 119–39 sophistic misuse of 102, 122–4, 146–7,
passim, 144 152, 154
234 Index
dialectic or logic (cont.) Evans, G. R. 40n, 93n, 96n, 100, 102n, 169n,
Berengar 65, 69, 94, 102, 111, 118–25 183n
passim, 143–6 passim Evodius 217
Lanfranc or De corpore 69, 80–1, 94–5,
96, 101–2, 111–2, 120–5, 144–7, 152–3, 221 faith 14, 21, 24, 57–8, 144–5, 147, 152–4,
Anselm 2, 7, 13, 20, 25–6, 64, 65–6, 70–4, 158–9, 171–83 passim, 187, 189, 190, 196,
81–8, 101–2, 151–3, 162, 211, 212, 218, 221 213–5, 218–24
see also Augustine; Boethius; categories; faith and reason see reason and
predicables; metaphysical ideas within rationality
dialectic; sentence analysis; syllogisms faith seeking understanding see
and syllogistics; topics understanding
differentia 67–8, 74–5, 76–7 reason in faith see reason and rationality
distinctive characteristic (proprium) 55–6, see also fideistic interpretations of the
67 Proslogion
divine see God the Fall 151, 175, 176, 184, 185
Durand of Troarn 114n Felicianus 122, 123
fideistic interpretations of the Proslogion
Eadmer 97–100, 102–3, 108–9, 111, 140, 1–2, 40–1, 51–3, 168–9
197–9, 201, 203, 204 figurative speech 128–30, 136–8
equipollency of propositions 122 the fool 5, 14, 15, 44, 45, 171, 181, 197, 210,
essence 212–18
and definition 26, 68, 172 Foulon, Jean-Hervé 96n
essence or substance 32, 73
essence vs. appearance 112, 126–34 Gasper, Giles E. M. 93n, 218n
passim Gaunilo 5, 13, 35, 61–3, 87–8, 168, 199–218
principal and secondary passim, 223
essences 120n–121n, 123 question of Gaunilo’s historicity 217–8
see also God: divine substance or essence Gerbert of Aurillac 65, 66
Eucharist 2, 6, 8, 65, 69, 93–5, 102–44 Gibson, Margaret 93–108 passim (in notes),
passim, 170, 221 110–2, 113n, 114n, 116n, 123n, 167n
carnalism (ultrarealism) 103, 113–6, 131, God, in the Monologion and Proslogion
133, 136–7 concept or definition of 3, 24, 38, 39–42,
the Berengarian controversy 6, 102–3, 51–3, 57–8
105–6, 111n, 113–7, 135–6 ‘name of God’ 40, 51
Lanfranc’s involvement in the controversy divine substance or essence 4, 7, 11–12,
103–9 14, 20, 26–7, 28, 31–6, 41, 43, 46–51, 58,
Berengar’s approach 65, 69, 103, 114–9 72–3, 173, 223
passim, 125, 128, 134, 136 God’s existence, arguing for 1–8 passim,
Lanfranc’s approach in De corpore 94, 12–18, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34–6, 37n, 43–6, 51,
102, 110–3, 125–39 passim, 143–4, 170 53–4, 56, 87–8, 187, 189–90, 198, 199,
Lanfranc’s approach elsewhere 132 200, 209, 210, 215–7
Anselm’s attitude towards 109, 111 God’s mode of being 3–4, 17–18, 23, 31,
transubstantiation 94, 102, 111–2, 115, 44–5, 50, 73, 215
120n–121n attributes or properties 23, 25–7, 32–6,
‘real presence’ 115 41n, 43, 47–56 passim, 57–8, 72, 73, 151,
sacrament 115–7, 125–6, 128–37 passim, 153, 174, 189–94 passim, 197–8, 200
143, 144 Trinity 23, 25, 30, 32, 43, 51, 55, 73, 151,
see also Berengar; Lanfranc; De corpore 153, 160, 177, 194, 218, 220
Index 235
‘greater than all’ (maius omnibus) 60–4, maius omnibus see ‘greater than all’
85–8 Malcolm, Norman 17n
great-making properties 27, 34, 57–8 manuscripts 13, 97n, 104, 147–50, 154–5, 158,
greatness 17 167, 202, 204, 206
Green-Pedersen, Niels Jørgen 74n, 79n BL Harley 203 202
BNF lat. 13413 148n
Hartshorne, Charles 17n Cambridge Trinity College B. 1. 37. 206
Henry, Desmond Paul 69n, 70n, 71n Marenbon, John 65n, 66n, 67n
Herluin 97 Martin, Christopher J. 67n
Hick, John 1n, 4n, 17n Maurice, monk 155n
Hildebrand (Pope Gregory VII) 105, 145 maximal propositions 67, 68, 74–5, 76–7
Hogg, David S. 2n McGill, Arthur C. 1n, 4n, 44n, 57n, 168n
Hopkins, Jasper 1n, 36n, 38n, 40n, 41n, 83n McMahon, Robert 169n, 171n
Hugh of Lyon 149n, 203–4, 208 metaphysical ideas within dialectic 66–8,
Humbert of Silva Candida 104 72–4, 153
meditations and meditating 21, 28, 29, 71,
identity of God as that than which a greater 149, 158–9, 172, 183, 185, 218
cannot be thought 17–18, 40–1, 43–4, method in theology 6–8, 21–2, 23, 30,
51–8, 59, 60, 84, 191 42–3, 71–2, 94, 95, 121–5 passim, 140–7
Incarnation 24–5, 32, 55, 151, 176–7 passim, 150–3, 159–63 passim, 169–73
indirect proof see reductio ad absurdum passim, 197, 210, 219, 221–4
middle term see terms
King, Peter 71n modal ontological argument 17n–18n, 37n
monastic life, vocation, audience, or
La Croix, Richard R. 39n, 41n environment 6, 20n, 98–100, 135, 141,
Lanfranc of Bec/Canterbury 2, 6, 8, 142, 158–9, 169, 170, 177, 186, 213, 214,
69, 80–1, 93–163 passim, 167, 218–9, 221
169–71, 221 Monologion 6–8, 11, 13, 17n, 20–30, 32–3,
life 96 36n, 42, 52, 54, 57, 64, 71–3, 93, 94, 110,
and Anselm’s education 8, 95, 96–102, 140–3, 147–63, 169–75, 180n, 182, 187,
109 197, 203–24 passim
and the publication of the rational method 6, 7, 8, 20–2, 24–5, 30,
Monologion 6, 8, 94, 140–3, 147–8, 32, 42, 71–3, 141–3, 147, 150–4, 159–63,
154–8, 162 169–73, 175, 197, 210–24 passim
‘Lanfranc’s heritage’ 140–7 content discussed 21–7, 57–8, 71–3,
commentaries on Paul’s epistles 102, 150–4, 174–5
106–7 compared to the Proslogion 7, 20, 24–5,
letters 104–5 28–30, 43, 140–3, 182, 207–24 passim
see also De corpore; Eucharist; dialectic early versions 147–50
Leftow, Brian 1n, 39n preface 21–2, 71–2, 149–50, 158–61, 170,
letter of dedication see Monologion 180n, 218, 221
Lewry, Osmund 65n, 66n letter of dedication 149–50, 156–60, 162,
list of chapters 22, 148–50, 161, 201, 203–4, 170, 221
206, 208 list of chapters 22, 148–50, 161, 208
see also Monologion; Proslogion publishing 28–9, 93, 110, 140–3, 147–50,
Logan, Ian 1n, 38n, 39n, 41n, 81n, 82n, 218n 154–63, 203–4, 207–8, 221–3
logic see dialectic titles of 29, 149–50, 158–9, 182, 203–4,
the lost island 87–8 207–8, 212, 221–3
236 Index
169–83 passim, 187–96 passim, 209–24 vs. ‘Anselm’s argument’ 3–5, 12, 25, 53–4
passim vs. many arguments 11, 25, 28–30, 64,
reason and dialectic 65–9, 71–3, 143–7, 210
150–4, 221 means of argumentation vs. piece of
by means of reason alone (sola argumentation 4–5, 33, 37–9, 51, 54,
ratione) 21, 30, 73, 170, 172, 175, 218, 221 64
reason in faith (ratio fidei) 28, 29, 149, announced in the preface 4, 5, 11, 27–9,
158–9, 172, 177, 204, 213, 218, 221 58–9, 63–4, 83, 88, 205–14 passim, 223
see also apologetics and apologetic; quest for and discovery of 11, 198, 199,
Monologion: rational method 201, 223
reductio ad absurdum 3, 14–20, 33–6, 37–58 requirements on 31, 41, 58–60, 64, 83, 86
passim, 60–4, 83, 84–7, 190, 199, 200 burden and scope 4, 12, 31–3, 40, 54, 56,
see also single argument: argumentative 59, 211
idea argumentative idea 4, 13–20, 33–6, 37–9,
relational terms 26, 33, 36n 57–8, 59–64, 82–8, 199, 211
Responsio 5, 8, 13, 18n, 28, 35–6, 37n, 40–6 rational nature 30, 42–3, 51–3, 57–64
passim, 53n, 56n, 58–64, 82–8, 168, 198, passim, 83–9 passim, 162–3, 169–70,
201–6, 210–7 passim, 223 173, 189–90, 209–17 passim, 223
context of composition 13, 204, 217–8 candidates for 37–42
audience 213, 216 identification of 42, 58–64, 82–8
rational nature 210, 216–7, 223 Responsio 10 28, 35–6, 40n, 45, 47, 48, 54,
see also Proslogion; single argument 58–9, 63, 64, 85, 198, 205, 211
rhetoric 6, 8, 94–5, 99, 100, 102–9 passim, Responsio 5 28, 41, 58–9, 60–4, 82–8,
110–3, 117–47 passim, 157–63, 167, 170–1, 205, 211
185–7, 201, 205–6, 209, 218, 219, 221, 222 and the Boethian theory of
see also De corpore; Monologion; argument 61n, 74–9, 82–8
Proslogion application in the Proslogion 13–20,
Richardson, Herbert 36n, 38n 42–51, 54, 56–7, 198–201
Roscelin 20 possible apologetic applications 42, 54–6,
88–9, 177–8, 213–7
sacrament see Eucharist see also Proslogion; that than which a
salvation 174–7, 187 greater cannot be thought
Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius 4n, 40n, 53n, Smith, A. D. 1n, 17n
70n, 148n, 202 sola ratione see reason and rationality
school of Bec see Bec sophistic misuse of dialectic see dialectic
Schufreider, Gregory 2n, 37n, 169n, Southern, Richard 93–106 passim (in
190n–191n notes), 111–2, 120, 121n, 122n, 123n, 154n,
Scriptum see Berengar: Scriptum contra 183n, 197n, 198n
synodum species (appearance) see essence
Seneca 53n, 68 Steiger, Lothar 81n
sentence analysis, dialectical 67, 74–9 Stolz, Anselm 44n, 57n, 168
passim, 83–8 passim, 118–25 passim, Stump, Eleonore 74n
137–8 subject and predicate see predicables; terms
Sharpe, Richard 142n, 148n, 149n, 150n, 183n, substance or substantial
202, 203n, 204n, 206n, 207n, 208n category of substance 66, 68, 70, 78
the single argument 4–5, 7–8, 11–89 passim, substantial predication 23, 25–7, 32–3,
163, 168–73 passim, 189–90, 197–216 36n, 57, 72
passim, 222–3 person as substance 73, 160
238 Index