Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v.

NLRC and De Guzman,

G.R. No. 118978
May 23, 1997

Facts:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
“Supernumerary Project Worker,” for a fixed period. Under the Reliever Agreement
which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, private respondent’ s
services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one
Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26,
1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.
When petitioner(Pt&t) supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January
15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had
not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for
illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference, private respondent volunteered the information, and this
was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to
remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note
for that amount in favor of petitioner. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and
with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter
being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in
dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she
had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company rules.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is valid.

Ruling: NO.
The Constitution, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. Corollary, pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor
and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers.

Article 136 of Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of
the test of the right against discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
It is clearly from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the
branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty(of not remitting her collections). In the termination notice sent to her by the
same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her
married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's
policy against marriage
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act
the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her
from employment which private respondent admitted, but that is an altogether different
story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her
marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds.

Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried
could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace.

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege
that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements,
terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient the same should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital
bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the
land is not only in order but imperatively required.

Duncan v. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004

Factual Antecedents:

Pedro A. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as medical

representative on October 24, 1995. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of
employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies
and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest,
to resign from the company.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that
area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.

Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. His superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of
them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him
because he was performing his job well.

Tecson explained to his superiors that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge
with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her
company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated.

In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that
since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated but his application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible”
policy.

In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan

del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was
denied. The issue was elevated to their Grievance Committee but Glaxo remained firm
in their decision.

· Tecson defied the transfer order and during the pendency of the grievance
proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which
were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included
in product conferences regarding such products.

Issue/s:

1. WON Glaxo’s policy is valid and does not violate the equal protection clause?

2. WON there was constructive dismissal when Tecson was reassigned to the Butuan
CitySurigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area?

Held:

1. YES, Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid and said policy does not violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play. The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled
principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. From the wordings of the contractual
provision and the policy in its employee handbook, Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor
companies. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between
the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.

2. NO, there is no constructive dismissal in this case. The Court finds no merit in
petitioners’ contention that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the
company’s seminar on new products which were directly competing with similar
products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or
when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by
reason of such transfer.

Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol

FACTS

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading

– principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is the Manager of the Personnel
and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E.
Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company.

He was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit,
also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the
marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, viz.: 1. New
applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker
Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her
pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship
with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met
an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for
twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out
that her name was on-hold at the gate.

She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where
one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was
being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because
she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain.
The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company.

Due to her urgent need for money she later submitted a letter of resignation in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred
that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the
Labor Code.

ISSUE

Whether the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights

towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code

RULING

YES. These courts find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the
employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general
perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business.
They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a
rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.

Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands
of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better
available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the
employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two
factors:

(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential

operation of the job involved; and,

(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’

sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.

Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of
Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married
Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere
fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to
security of tenure. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in
one company.
 Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable
business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and
Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic. As to respondent Estrella,
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that her
resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was
voluntary and thus valid.

Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We
have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal
reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of
relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is illogical for
Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of
sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary,
Estrella’s dismissal is declared illegal.

Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital, G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2017

FACTS: Cadiz was the human resource officer of the respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006 due to her
unprofessionalism and unethical behavior resulting to unwed pregnancy. It appears that
Cadiz became pregnant by wedlock (not married), and Brent imposed the suspension of
Cadiz until she marries her boyfriend in accordance with the law. After which she filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, and
Non-payment of wages and damages with a prayer of reinstatement.

The Tribunal Court ruled in favor of Brent as it was an institution of the Episcopal
Church operating both hospital and College and that the dismissal of Cadiz is not illegal
because there was just cause of her suspension as she had committed pre-marital sex
resulting to her pregnancy out of wedlock. The LA also ruled that she was not entitled to
reinstatement "at least until she marries her boyfriend," to backwages and vacation/sick
leave pay.

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed
the LA decision. She then elevated the case to CA, but it was dismised due to technical
defects in the petition.

Cadiz contends that getting pregant out of wedlock is not grossly immoral and she also
lambasts that brent's condition for reinstatement is a violation against the stipulation of
marriage under Article 136 of the Labor Code. Finally, Cadiz contends that there was
substantial compliance with the rul of procedure, and the CA should not have dismissed
the petition. Meanwhile, Brent argues that Cadiz cause of dismissal is a violation of the
norms, beliefs, and teachings of Brent as a Church instituion of the Episcopal Church in
the Philippines.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and the
resulting pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality.
(2) Whether or not the marriage as a condition for reinstatement is valid.

RULING: To resolve the Court makes reference to the case of Leus vs. St.
Scholastica's College wherein;

The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct is

disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an
assessment of the said circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct,
i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward. The
labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They
also sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, Cadiz should have been
the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent
community.

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz
committed acts of immorality. There is no proof adduced by Brent to support such
sweeping conclusion that there is pre-marital sex engaged between Cadiz and her
boyfriend. The Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital sexual relations
between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and
secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

(2) The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and
recall of employees." In this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she
subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or
common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage."

Marriage as a condition of reinstatement is not valid. With particular regard to

women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women protects women against
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right
to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent. Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent's condition
is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. It forces Cadiz to marry for economic
reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that
inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right. Cadiz therefore, is entitled to
reinstatement.
—

HERMOSISIMA vs. CA
G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960

FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in
Cebu, and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became
a life insurance underwriter in Cebu City, where intimacy developed among her and the
Hemosisima, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached
as an apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised the petitioner that she was
pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was
born on June 17, 1954. However, on July 24, 1954, the Hermosisima married Romanita
Perez.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad filed with the court an action against Francisco for
recognition of paternity of their child, Chris Hermosisima, and for moral damages for
alleged breach of promise to marry. Hermosisima admitted the paternity of the child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry
the complainant. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and even increased the award for damages. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He
exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – That being
said, the award for moral damages is proper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under Philippine law, for breach of
promise to marry.

HELD:

No. Court held that the breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong as has been
definitely decided in the precedent. [case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. ] the
action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced… upon the faith of such
promise. Further, in the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not
to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made
by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable.

The Court of Appeals, rely its decision on the award of moral damages on paragraph 3
of Article 2219 of the Civil Code: . . .
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx (3)
Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

However, the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not exist in the present case. The Court ruled that
petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten
(10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but also because, the court of first instance found the complainant "surrendered
herself" to the petitioner because she was "overwhelmed by her love" for him, and she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit
of clergy."

Wassmer vs Velez G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September
2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today. Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.
Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.

On June 21, 1955, defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it
cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility
of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear
"the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following
day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de
Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying the defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court.

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong, and whether
defendant be held answerable in moral and exemplary damages in accordance with
Article 21; and
(2) Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages to petitioner in being declared to be in default;

Ruling:
(1) No. Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage." A mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 aforesaid.

(2) No. Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, the defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent
is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances
of this case the defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances
of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.

Guevarra v. Banach

G.R. No. 214016, November 24, 2021

FACTS:

Banach, a German citizen, met Guevarra through a pastor. He went on to court

Guevarra, visiting her almost every day, giving her gifts, and eventually telling her that
he intended to marry her. However, Banach did not tell Guevarra that he had still been
married to his third wife then. Instead, he told her that he was a divorced man. He also
concealed his true identity and made Guevarra and her family believe that his name
was Roger Brawner.

Eventually, Guevarra submitted to Banach’s wooing as he offered her a better life.

Banach sent Guevarra P500,000.00 to buy a lot for their conjugal home. Yet, Guevarra
broke up with him after she found out about his lies and deception.

Due to the breakup, Banach sued Guevarra and her parents for damages before RTC
anchored on the Human Relations provisions in the Civil Code. He claimed that her acts
amounted to fraud, or at the very least, unjust enrichment. Likewise, he claimed moral
damages for the alleged “moral suffering, anguish, anxiety, and sleepless nights” he
suffered from her and prayed for attorney’s fees for having been constrained to litigate
to protect his rights.

Guevarra, on the other hand, argued that the money Banach sent her was a gift, the
return of which was not actionable, and applying the law on natural obligations.

RTC found Guevarra and her parents liable to Banach for actual damages and also
awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees.

CA similarly ordered Guevarra and her parents to return P500,000.00 to Banach under
the principle of unjust enrichment, but removed the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees. It ruled that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and
that he did not have the purest intentions in expressing his desire to marry Guevarra.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order to return the P500,000.00 is proper

RULING:

No. The order to return the P500,000.00 is not proper.

A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of

such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In any case,
the party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith.
The court, citing Wassmer v. Velez, allowed the recovery of damages as a result of a
canceled marriage. Preparations for the wedding had already been made only to have
the wedding canceled just two days before its intended date. The award was not based
on the breach of promise to marry, but on Article 21 of NCC. It ruled that, while a breach
of promise to marry was not actionable unlike walking out of a wedding two days prior
after all had been prepared. The defendant’s act was deemed “palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs”, for which the award of damages was proper
because the party who sought damages did not perpetrate lies, fraud, or deception,
which would have barred recovery.

In this case, the petitioner called off the engagement after she had discovered
respondent’s lies and deception, such acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation
and reasons enough to conclude bad faith.

Banach did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under NCC. The unjust
enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies if the property is acquired without
legal grounds. The respondent gave Guevarra P500,000.00 as a gift to help her and her
family with their possible eviction from their home. The petitioner is correct that she
cannot be compelled to return the amount given to her as being a gift.

The right to marry is a fundamental human right. Marriage is a social institution that
creates a permanent bond between individuals, and the law grants them rights and
obligations unique to married couples. The choice of whether to marry and necessarily,
whom to marry is a personal decision that a person makes for themself and must be
made free from external pressures, without any fear of legal retribution or liability,
without the pressures of a possible civil suit should a person realize that their intended
partner is not right for them. It is not within the courts’ competence to reach too far into
intimate relations and must, as much as possible, refrain from meddling in these
personal affairs.

Thus, the petition is granted. The award of actual damages worth P500,000.00 is
deleted.

Balogbog vs CA
GR No. 83598
March 7, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961. They had an older brother,
Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought action for
partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, were entitled to one-third share of Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents.

Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged brother Gavino died
single and without issue in their parents' residence. At start, they claimed properties of
estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was alive, but withdrew this.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Trazo (then mayor of Asturias), Matias Pogoy (a
family friend), and Catalino Ubas as witnesses to prove that the marriage existed
between Gavino and Catalina, that there was a wedding, that they had 3 children, and
Gavino died in the residence of Matias which contradicts petitioner’s claim.

Private respondents produced a certificate from Office of the Local Civil Registrar that
Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina,
certificate from Office of the Treasurer which shows no record of birth of Ramonito.
Records were presumed to have been lost/destroyed during war.

On the other hand, petitioner Leoncia still asserts that Gavino died in their family
residence in Asturias, that Gavino had no legitimate child, she did not know private
respondents before this case, and also she obtained certificates showing no record of
marriage between Gavino and Catalina.

Witness Jose Narvasa testified Gavino died single in 1935 and Catalina lived with
another man after war, although he did not know whether they were legally married.

CFI rendered judgement in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. Petitioners filed for
reconsideration but was denied. They appealed to CA but it just affirmed CFI’s decision.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N Ramonito and Generoso is entitled to one-third of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva

Ruling: Yes, CA’s decision is affirmed.

Arts. 53 and 54 as contended by petitioners never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former
Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent
proof to the contrary.
Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage.

Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in
infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their
children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument that
the existence of the marriage cannot be presume

An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the
witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to
have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to
notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern.

Ablaza v. Republic
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner (Isidro Ablaza) filed before RTC of Masbate, a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
Petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother
of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio

Issue: Whether or not Isidro Ablaza may bring an action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of
the old Civil Code?
Ruling: Yes

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule,
the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.

There is a limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code.

ITO MUNA BASAHIN SA RECIT 😁️️

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC [which is husband and wife
only under this rule] had absolutely no application to the petitioner because its
was enacted only on March 4, 2003

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage, and when. However, that the absence of a provision in the old
and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring
an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The plaintiff must still be the
party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment
of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving
heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by
any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the
Civil Code.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate
children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the
late Cresenciano's surviving heir.

Cresenciano was indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this
action will definitely affect.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated
under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity; hence, her
participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on
whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the
marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein.

Underany and all conditions, her presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court that
the action should be dismissed."

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
91025 entitled “Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza” which an action to determine who
between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present
action, however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that
neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.
The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under
the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on
motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just.

The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

Eugenio Sr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August28, 1988
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in1987 and
was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residencein
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but
petitionerrefused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a
corpsecannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single,
died ofheart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court
ordered thatthe body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed thelack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctlyawarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides: Persons charged with duty of burial- if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of
theburial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he
isthe spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does
notrecognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitatedto contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

Falcis v. Civil Registrar

FACTS

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure dated May
18, 2015. He raised the issue on declaring article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional, hence Articles 46 (4) and 55(6) of the Family Code null.

He had identified himself as a member of the LGBTQI+ community hence he

claimed that the Family Code has a "normative impact" on the status of same-sex
relationships in the country.

He was also allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to
marry the same-sex which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. He also
acclaimed that the case is of transcendental importance and that the mere passage of
the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, procedural niceties must be set aside

ISSUE
 Whether or not the self-idenfication of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a
member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him the standing to challenge the Family
Code;

Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is

warranted; and

Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are
cognates of the right to life and liberty.

RULING

FIRST ANSWER NO - Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this

case” is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow
him with standing.

Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”; “impairment” of his “ability to find

and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as injury to his
“plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”; or influence
over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be
recognized by this as sufficient interest.

Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships” and “to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”
does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This
Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner. Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate,
inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him.

His assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the
imputed cause, the existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code
is the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur

SECOND ANSWER NO - In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear

threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. We explained that the
decisive factor in whether this court should permit the invocation of transcendental
importance is not merely the presence of “special and important reasons” but the nature
of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no
disputed facts, and the issue raised should only be questions of law.

THIRD ANSWER YES - Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where

same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it
may thresh out the many issues that may arise. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered
into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at
its very core.

Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry

cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of
the law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a
result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to
establish this legal framework.

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the

complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples,
whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families
formed by sterile couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have
children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain
gender stereotypes within the family

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Romel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. Petitioner alleged that he was born male and
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is "anatomicaly male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's
body, he consulted several doctors in US and underwent transgender operation in a
woman. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged in a marriage. He then
sought to have his name changed into "Mely" and his sex from "male" to "female" on
his birth certificate.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner as there is no opposition to the petition made.
The Republic through OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that there is
no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate. The CA rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

RULING: No. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical
Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
certificate of the petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the
Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination
of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676

September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During
her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed
that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According
to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in
her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name
be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE:
WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
HELD:

The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective
because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or
claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private
respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish
on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial
compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with
utmost care in view of thedelicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the
Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the
condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY
applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.

It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,

genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest
tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine
courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant
case, there is no denying that evidence points that the respondent is male. In
determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The
Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like the respondent,
is fixed.

The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

Loria v. Felix
G.R. No. L-9005
June 20, 1958

Facts: It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two
young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father
Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the
penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both
parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon
the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy
Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her
marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving
forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe
Apelan Felix is valid; and
(2) Whether or not the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a
cause for nullity.

Ruling:
(1) Yes. The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act
No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1,
3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There
is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that
both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they
took each other as husband and wife."
Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been
executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question
at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of
marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the
Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage
invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14,
34, Record on Appeal.)
(2) Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage
Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required,
but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the
causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of
them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the
legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife" — which in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage
contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing
the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential
requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The
fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one
or several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies
of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it
would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by
sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring
no serious consequences to the married pair, especially where as in this case, it was
caused by the emergency.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required
for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now
then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613), this
marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who
have lived publicly in a state of concubinage, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to
be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the
plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or
sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Alcantara v. Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Resituto Alcantara and Rosita A. Alcantara met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro. They got married on the same day,
December 8, 1982. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall. They were
issued a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
indicating that the couple had procured a marriage license. Neither party was a
resident of Carmona.

In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto then found a mistress with
whom he had 3 children. This caused Rosita to file a case for concubinage against him.
In response, Restituto filed for annulment of their marriage.

Restituto submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. Assuming a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario, but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for
their marriage license number.

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to
be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a
prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or Not the marriage is void for lack of marriage license

 2. Whether or Not the marriage is void for absence of authority of the
solemnizing officer fixer

NO. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity
of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

For the marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage

license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.

In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in
fact issued to the parties herein.

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a
marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Despite not being a resident of Carmona, Cavite, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar is a mere typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not
detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which
he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that
the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." Petitioner is an educated person.
He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the
Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his
taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to
make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.

2. NO. With regard to the fixer who arranged everything for them and facilitated the
ceremony before the Rev. Navarro, the Court holds that the authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly
issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Sempre praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the

validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

—-

Abbas vs Abbas
GR No. 183896
January 30, 2013

Facts:

A petition was filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas with RTC. Syed alleged absence of a marriage license,
as provided in Article 4 of the Family Code, as ground for the annulment.

At trial court, Syed, a Pakistani, testified he met Gloria, a Filipino in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December 1992 then in January 1993 at his mother-in-law’s residence,
Felicitas arrived with two men. he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
nature of it. During ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed he did not
know ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified he did not
go to Carmona to apply for a marriage license, he never resided in the area.

In 2003, he went to Office of Civil Registrar of Carmona to check marriage license, and
was asked to show a copy of marriage contract wherein marriage license number could
be found. Municipal Civil Registrar Encarnacion, issued a certification to effect that the
marriage license number appearing in marriage contract he submitted, was number of
another marriage license issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

On cross-examination, Syed testified Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002, that he had gone to Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, o get certification
whether or not there was a marriage license. He also presented Norberto Bagsic
(employee of MCRC) brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo and Myra. He testified that certification from Encarnacion
was true and their office had not issued any other license of same serial number to any
other person.

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Rev. Dauz testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed and Gloria and Atty.
Sanchez and Ceriola were the witnesses/sponsors. Dauz further testified Atty. Sanchez
gave him marriage license day before actual wedding, marriage contract prepared by
his secretary. After the solemnization, it was registered with Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, Rev. Dauz submitted marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
that office.

Atty. Sanchez (sponsor) testified he requested a certain Qualin to secure marriage

license for the couple, and Qualin secured license and gave it to him. He did not know
where marriage license was obtained.

Felicitas Goo testified wedding ceremont happened in her house, sought help of Atty.
Sanchez for the license, and a bigamy case was filed by Gloria against Syed in RTC.

Mary Ceriola, one of the sponsors of the wedding, seen in the wedding photos and
corroborates testimony of Felicitas and Atty. Sanchez.

Lastly, Gloria testified Syed is her husband, presented marriage contract bearing their
signatures as proof. She and mother Felicitas asked Atty. Sanchez to be a sponsor and
help with the license. Further, she had a daughter with Syed and she filed a bigamy
against Syed because he married someone else during existence of their marriage.

RTC held no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona in favor of Gloria and Syed. Therefore, in absence of a formal requisite, their
marriage was void ab initio.
Gloria appealed to CA. CA granted her appeal and ruled there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married. Hence this
petition by Syed.

Issue: W/N marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio for lacking a valid marriage
license

Ruling: Petition is granted and RTC’s decision is reinstated

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued.
Such certification was allowed by Sec 28, Rule 132 of ROC which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

The civil registrar conducted a diligent search but found that marriage license was for
another couple. To addition, certification of a civil registrar has probative value, thus,
their marriage lacks a valid marriage license.

All the evidence cited by the CA (testimonies of sponsors, mother of Gloria, Gloria
herself) to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

Republic v. Albios
G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge
Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According
to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only contract marriage the
American to acquire American citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in
exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an
answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab
initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the
case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in

consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose
of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit
for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify
a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of
the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

Cosca v. Palaypayon, A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Facts: Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without
the requisite marriage license. The following couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence
of a marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts,
called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the
marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages. Respondent Judge contends that (1)the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt
from the marriage license requirement.(2)He gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so.(3) In order to solve the problem, the
spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that
the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not
contain the date and place of marriage (4)The copies of these marriage contracts are in
the custody of complainant Sambo. (5)The alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since
he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license. (6)The marriage of
Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due
to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that,
at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the
present.

Issue: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon Jr. were valid

Held: No. The marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon Jr. were not valid. The
Supreme Court ruled that on the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Article 4 of the Family Code provides that
“in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.

_________

Navarro v. Domagtoy

FACTS

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. · The first allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy is that the latter
solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994
despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated.

It was told that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home and has not returned
and been heard for almost seven years. · The second allegation of the plaintiff was that
the said Judge likewise solemnized marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma
G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct,

inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law?

RULING

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the
latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided
in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage was
solidified as valid, Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to solemnize the
marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the Family Code with
regard to irregularity of formal requisites of marriage.

In addition, article 4 par 3 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that
formal requisites shall not affect the validity of marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Hence, Domagtoy was held administratively liable because of the latter’s failure to apply
the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court find Domagtoy have acted in
gross ignorance of the law and because of this he was suspended for a period of six
months.

Beso v. Daguman, A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint wherein respondent Judge stands charged

with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a complaint affidavit, Beso charged
Judge Daguman with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and neglecting not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the Office of Local
Registrar. The solemnizing of marriage happened in the Judge's residence in Calbayog
City, Samar.

Beso was abandoned by her husband without any reason at all so she inquired about
her marriage contract at the office of Civil registrar and discovered that their marriage
was not registered. She wrote a letter to the respondent Judge and she was informed
that all the copies of their marriage contract were all taken by Bernardito, her husband.

In his Comment, the civil marriage was held outside his territory as municipal Judge
because he was indisposed and unable to report to his station, that without prior
appointment, Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to his residence, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first because Beso was
scheduled to fly abroad on the same day; second, marriage would be expensive and
would entail serious problems; third, Beso would be out of the country for too long and
their marriage license would lapse; fourth, it would complicate her work abroad, if the
parties beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage.
The respondent Judge averred that after a few days following the wedding, respondent
gathered all the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search
in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing.
Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing
documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman’s claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge may solemnize marriage outside the area of his
jurisdiction.
RULING: No. The presiding Judge has the authority to solemnize marriage limited only
to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Calbayog City is no longer within his area
of jurisdiction. There are only three instances as provided by Article 8 of Family Code
wherein marriage may be solemnized outside his chamber, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was
at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request
made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized
outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record
is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of
Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent
realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,
"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of
the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."

A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office, should
be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the

authority or jurisdiction of his court. Thus the respondent Judge should be
reminded that a priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond.

Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

——-

Aranes V Occiano, A.M No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charges the respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur. On 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador Orobia without
the requisite Marriage License and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction. Since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the
"vast
properties" left by Orobia were not recognized. Petitioner prays that sanctions be
imposed against the respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.

Respondent judge avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by the petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did
not possess the requisite Marriage License, he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity
for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent judge that they
would give the license to him, but they failed to comply.
.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a
marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, a fine was imposed on him.

ISSUE:

WON Respondent Judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license

and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD: YES

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law
are complied with.

However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to
administrative liability." (Navarro vs. Domagtoy)

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite Marriage License. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded
the issuance
of the Marriage License is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. In this respect, the
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

People v. Bustamante, G.R. No. L-11598, January 27, 1959

Facts: The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one
Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Pangasinan (Exh.
"A", pp. 9-11, t.s.n.). A little over a year later, or on September 16, 1955, he contracted a
second marriage with Demetria Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of
Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as Mayor of the said Municipality (Exh. "B"), while
the first marriage was still subsisting. Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a
month, after which a time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the first wife, Maria
Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered from the Binalonan municipal
authorities the previous marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.
Defendant did not testify in his behalf during the trial. the main problem poised in this appeal
concerns the authority of Francisco Nato to solemnize the second marriage.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and vice-
mayor, respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On
September 16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-
mayor was designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his
absence; and Nato was acting in this capacity when he performed the second marriage of
Bustamante with Demetria Tibayan.

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is valid; and
(2) Whether or not the Vice Mayor Nato has the authority to solemnize marriages.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Mapandan, Pangasinan, while the marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the
testimonies of witnesses indicate clearly that it was performed by Francisco Nato. The wrong
averment, if at all, was unsubstantial and immaterial that need not even be alleged, for it matters
not who solemnized the marriage, it being sufficient that the information charging bigamy
alleges that a second marriage was contracted while the first still remained undissolved. The
information filed in this case which properly states the time and place of the second wedding,
was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither procedural prejudice nor
error was committed by the lower court in finding appellant guilty.

(2) Yes. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties of the office of the mayor
by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because the latter is the Acting
Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the duties and wields
the power appurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,1 48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec.
2195, Revised Administrative Code). As correctly observed by the lower court, that case even
concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor
whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. The word "acting" as held in the case of Austria vs.
Amante,2 45 Off. Gaz., 2809, when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the
temporary character or nature of the same.

Vda De Chua V CA
GR. No. 116835, March5, 1998

FACTS

Roberto Chua and Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock from 1970 to 1981 and bore two
illegitimate sons, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On 1992,
Chua died intestate in Davao City.

Thereafter, respondent Vallejo filed in a RTC Cotabato City a petition for declaration of
heirship and guardianship of persons and properties to their minor sons. On July 1992,
petitioner Antonietta Chua represented herself as the surviving spouse of deceased
Chua and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged
that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
Vallejo opposed the motion and argued that deceased Chua died as a bachelor, and
was only to the abovementioned children; that petitioner is a mere pretender to the
estate, a not the surviving spouse of deceased Chua as the latter did not contract any
marriage with any woman. However, petitioner submitted a photocopy of their alleged
marriage contract, certificate of titles, resident certificate and income tax return as a
proof of their alleged marriage.
The trial court however, rendered a decision appointing respondent Florita Vallejo as
the guardian of the persons and properties of the two minor children. Petitioner Chua
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Chua was the wife of deceased Chua?

HELD: NO. Petitioner Chua was not able to prove her status as the wife of the
decedent.

[Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.]

The best proof of marriage is an authenticated marriage contract where petitioner

failed to produce. A certificate of title and other similar documents does not hold water.
Moreover, a photocopy of the marriage certificate which petitioner Chua presented is a
violation of the “best evidence rule.”
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is
not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or
otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:

Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration – Any interested person, may by

filing a written opposition, contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of the
person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the
contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself,
or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antoinetta Chua is hereby

denied.

______

Trinidad vs CA
GR No. 118904
April 20, 1998

Facts: In August 1978, Arturio Trinidad filed with CFI, an action for partition of 4 parcels
of land, claiming he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of 3 children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was original owner of the lands. Patricio died in 1940, leaving the
lands to his 3 children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, Arturio demanded from
Felix and Lourdes (Trinidads) to partition the land into 3 equal shares and to give him
1/3 share of his father, but Felix and Lourdes (defendants) refused.

In their answer, defendants denied plaintiff was son of Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth.
Defendants also denied plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed parcels of land
described in complaint had been in their possession since death of their father in 1940
and they had not given plaintiff share produce of the land.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of 23.

Plaintiff side presented 3 witnesses namely: Jovita Gerardo, Isabel Meren, Arturio
Trinidad. For the defendants side they also presented 3 witnesses namely: Pedro
Briones, Lourdes Trinidad, and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon. For rebuttal evidence/witness of
Arturio, he presented Isabel Meren and himself. He was not able to present a marriage
contract of his parents but instead a certification issued by one Remedios Eleserio of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of
births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed
during the Japanese time.

In CFI, it rendered a decision in favor of Arturio acknowledging that he is a legitimate

son of Inocentes Trinidad. However, in CA, Arturio was not acknowledged as a
legitimate child due to insufficient evidence.

Issue: W/N petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that
he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad

Ruling:

This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus,
the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is
not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel

Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes
on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the
couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-
year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-
teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a
week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by
Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's
baptismal party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of common
reputation respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal
certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's
father and mother

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without

objection from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes'
legitimate child.

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one

side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if
awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner
failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where
the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. Applying this rule, the trial
court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioner's favor.

______

Sy v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were
then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber
and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses
lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However,
their son Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila
on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of
property. The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the
custody of their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked
by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was
talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court,
she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and
the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony;
(YES)
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of
said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. (YES)

Ruling:
 The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974
 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent
 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day
of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.(it was only 1 year after
the marriage when marriage license and certificate have been issued.)
 A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the
marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
 From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license (therefore void in the beginning) Nowhere
do we find private respondent denying these dates on record.
  The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need
no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner
to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.

Delgado Vda. de La Rosa v. Heirs of Mariciana Rustia Vda. de Damian G.R. No.
155733, January 27, 2006

FACTS:

Josefa Delgado was one of the five children of Felisa Delgado with one Lucio Campo.
Felisa and Lucio lived without the benefit of marriage. Felisa also had a child with one
Ramon Osorio, named Luis Delgado. This time, their relationship was in dispute. Josefa
died intestate and was survived by Guillermo Rustia, her husband, and petitioners who
are her nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces. Guillermo and Josefa had
no children, so they took home Guillermina Rustia and Nanie Rustia, their children who
were never legally adopted (ampun ampunan). Guillermo was able to file a petition for
their adoption. However, Guillermo managed to father an illegitimate child, Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. Guillerma alleged that Guillermo treated her as
his daughter and his own flesh and blood. Like Josefa, Guillermo died without a will and
was survived by respondents who are his sisters and the children of his predeceased
brother The petitioners contend that Josefa and Guillermo lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. Respondents, however, contend that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not necessarily mean that no marriage existed. Respondents
also contend that Guillerma had no interest in the estate of Guillermo since she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.

ISSUES:

1. May the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia inherit from Josefa Delgado?

2. May Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, inherit from her?

3. May Guillerma Rustia inherit from Guillermo Rustia?

4. May Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, inherit from Guillermo
Rustia?

HELD:

1. YES, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa Delgado. Article
972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Also, under
Article 1001 of the same code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half. The petitioners are already
the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Therefore,
the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her
intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records
not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado
in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code. Hence, the petitioners and
Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa Delgado.

2. YES, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, may inherit from her. The law
prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It
seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category
between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the
children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different
persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children
of halfblood relation. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to
her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were
all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado. Therefore, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother,
may inherit from her.

3. NO, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo Rustia. Under the old Civil Code
(which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent. Under the new law,
recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; (2) when the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father; (4) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary
recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed
the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground
by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of
the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right
to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia.
Therefore, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo Rustia.

4. NO, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, may not inherit from
Guillermo Rustia. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which created
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an
absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
[proven] by the person claiming its existence. The same misfortune befalls the ampun-
ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses
and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. Therefore, Guillermina and
Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, may inherit from Guillermo Rustia. *Under Article
1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

Sevilla v. Cardenas

FACTS

Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated
by machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and
her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a
minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no
marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila.

Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20,
1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of
Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter
married at a church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the
parties based on the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented
before a solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of
the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning.

This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila
that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious. Respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the
marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due
effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar
had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that
Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties,
sufficient to declare the marriage void from the beginning?

RULING

NO Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be
found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of
lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of

Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar,
that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica)
on the ground that their marriage was solemnized without the requisite marriage
license. According to Raquel, his parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon to arrange
and prepare whatever necessary papers required for the marriage of Raquel and
Veronica. The couple thereafter exchanged vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he
never went to the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to apply for a marriage license and had
not seen any documents in connection thereto. Thus, their marriage is void ab initio.
Raquel presented as evidence a Certification from the LCR that there is neither record
nor copy of the marriage license issued to Raquel and Veronica. Veronica opposed
Raquel’s allegations by claiming that their marriage was celebrated with a marriage
license, though she cannot present any evidence to support her claim.

The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite marriage license when his marriage to
Veronica took place. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s
decision, holding that there is a presumption a marriage license was issued in the
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate on the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the
applicable law in the present case, provides that a marriage license is one of the
requisites to be complied with in order for a marriage to be validly solemnized, except
for some instances of marriages of exceptional character. Now, for a marriage to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
its absence must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage was issued to the parties.

In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to
show that there was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, Raquel was able to present a Certification issued by the LCR attesting that
neither a record nor a copy of any marriage license was ever issued in favor of Raquel
and Veronica. Thus, on the basis of such certification, the presumed validity of the
marriage of Raquel and Veronica has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
Veronica to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity.

The Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.

Vitangcol v. People of PH
GR 207406

Facts:
Norberto Vitangcol was convicted by the RTC Manila for Bigamy. CA affirmed and the
prosecution avers that it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid marriage
with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they entered into. Prosecution also
found that his [first] marriage with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first
marriage was subsisting, he contracted second marriage with Alice, who later filed the
criminal complaint for Bigamy upon discovering that he had a previous marriage with
Gina. Norberto counters that the 1st element of bigamy, that offender has been legally
married, is absent. He presents the Certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his 1st
wife Gina, hence, prosecution failed to establish legality of his 1st marriage.

Issue: WON certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto and his first wife Gina proves nullity of
petitioner's first marriage and exculpates him from the Bigamy charge.

Held:

He is guilty of Bigamy. The prosecution was able to provide the elements of the case.
While it is true that the civil registrar issued such certification, that the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued. The
parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. The
marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the
existence of the petitioner's first marriage which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the marriage.
DIAZ-SALGADO vs. ANSON; G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

TOPIC:

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each
other as husband and wife, shall also state:
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in
marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and
to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days
after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing
officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall
retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the
marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the
affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in
place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Article 8, FC.
The marriage shall be solemnized publicly
1. in the chambers of the judge or in open court,
2. in the church, chapel or temple, or
3. in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
a.) in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
b.) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or

c.) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.

Relation to topic:

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of
the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of
San Juan.

In the case at bar, it was indicated in their marriage contract that no marriage license
was exhibited for being an exceptional character.

Though they executed an affidavit instead of securing a marriage license prior to their
wedding, it was filed in the municipal hall and Luis was not even sure to what specific
office the affidavit was filed.

Their marriage was solemnized in the house of their Mayor friend.

The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in

favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me,
this marriage being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act
386; x x x

FACTS:

1. Luis Anson and Severina de Asis-Anson were common-law husband and wife before
their marriage was solemnized. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa married to Gasto
Maya. (Spouses Maya)

2. Severina also had another daughter from a previous relationship named Jo-ann, who
was wed to Gerard Salgado. (Spouses Salgado)

3. Luis and Severina's marriage was held on December 28, 1966, prior to the effectivity
of Family Code (E.O. 209 - effectivity: August 03, 1988) and 2 days prior to Maria
Luisa's 1st birthday. It was solemnized by their mayor friend in the latter's house
witnessed by the Chief of Police.

5. During Luis and Severina's marriage, which was still governed by the Civil Code, they
acquired several real properties and according to Luis, because there was no marriage
settlement between them, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. However, after their cohabitation ended, Luis went to the USA and married
another and had a son with her while Maria was left under the care of Severina.

6. However, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23,
2002 transferring 3 properties (covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109) in favor
of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties, without Luis'
knowledge and consent.

7. Severina died on September 21, 2002.

8. After Severina died, the Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No
Record of Marriage (CENOMAR)( Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office. Maria Luisa Anso-Maya also executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25,
2002 adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.

9. Luis alleged that as the surviving spouse, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina because of
the preceding acts. Thus, he filed for the annulment of the said 3 Unilateral Deeds of
Sale and Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate.

10. Jo-ann (Spouses Salgado) countered that they were not aware of the marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a
common-law relationship that they both acknowledged and formally terminated through
a Partition Agreement executed in April 1981 and implemented by another Partition
Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties
apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement.
11. The properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only
and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband.

12. Spouses Maya corroborated Spouses Salgado's claim. Maria cognizes that Luis and
Severina are common-law husband and wife which was terminated upon the partition
agreement, and not that they were married.

13. During trial, and Luis gave testimony and presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract without a marriage license number inputted. The lower court ruled in
favor of Luis citing the case of Geronimo v. CA wherein the marriage was still declared
valid despite the absence of the marriage license no. in the marriage contract.

14. The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the
consent of her husband, Luis.

15. They appealed to CA but CA affirmed RTC's decision. Thus, Spouses Salgado
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Spouses Salgado LUIS

Petitioned that marriage between Luis
and Severina is null and void for want
of marriage license based on the
Marriage Contract presented by Luis
which has adequately established its
absence.
The petition raises a question of fact,
which cannot be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. He also countered
that the Spouses Salgado did not
present any evidence to support their
theory.64 If the existence of the
marriage license is in issue, it is
incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado
to show the lack of marriage license by
clear and convincing evidence

ISSUE:
1. Whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a
marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

2. Whether or not Luis and Severina's marriage is valid without a marriage license (and
the subject lands as conjugal properties.)

RULING:

1. YES. The absence of marriage license may be proven with the marriage contract as
prima facie evidence.

In the case at bar, Luis and Severina's marriage was declared as VOID AB INITIO.

Luis and Severina's marriage (December 28, 1966) was contracted before the effectivity
of the Family Code and is thus covered by the Civil Code.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and
the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character;

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein.

The marriage contract, being a public document, is prima facie proof that at the
time of their Luis and Severina's marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional
character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall
no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and
any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that:

(1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and

(2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Since the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony
between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite,
practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, their marriage does not fall
under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code.

The requisites of Art. 77 are:

a. prior civil marriage between the parties and

b. a ratifying religious ceremony

were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not
of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's
marriage to be valid.

The trial court erred by relying in Geronimo v. CA, because in that case, despite the
absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein
petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the
deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband
of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with
the National Archives and Records Section where the marriage license number
appears.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the:

1. absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or

2. at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.

Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage
contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible
conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated
without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

As held in In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, a marriage solemnized without a

marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is
void. Instead of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false
affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the
notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with.

The Court also noted that while Luis contends the validity of his marriage to Severina,
he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad casting doubt on his credibility.
He went to the USA in 1981 and until Severina's death in 2002. Much less reconciled
with her. All those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not
even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. Thus, he failed to prove the
validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

-------------------------

2. Luis and Severina's marriage is not valid without a marriage license.

With regard to the subject properties, the Partition Agreement which Luis and Severina
executed in November 1980 which divided their properties between them without court
intervention is VALID.
In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at
the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the
beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their
property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage
license."

"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household.

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the
partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079
of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of
a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be
divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil
Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the
agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly
done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
-----

THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES IN LUIS

It is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage
license. However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them
at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of
marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and
Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither the
original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also
testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding
its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the
documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall.

It was also established during the cross-examination that prior to going to the house of
their friend Mayor for the solemnization of their marriage, they did not obtain a marriage
license.