Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v.

NLRC and De Guzman,

G.R. No. 118978
May 23, 1997

Facts:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
“Supernumerary Project Worker,” for a fixed period. Under the Reliever Agreement which
she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated
upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, private respondent’ s services as
reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon
who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their
Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.
When petitioner(Pt&t) supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January
15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had
not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced
by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference, private respondent volunteered the information, and this
was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to
remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note
for that amount in favor of petitioner. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and
with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter
being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing
private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been
discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is valid.

Ruling: NO.
The Constitution, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. Corollary, pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor
and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including
an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers.

Article 136 of Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of the
right against discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by
no less than the Constitution.
It is clearly from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the
branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty(of not remitting her collections). In the termination notice sent to her by the
same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance
from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status
but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against
marriage
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act
the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment which private respondent admitted, but that is an altogether different story.
The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital
status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds.

Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried
could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace.

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege
that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may
even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage
as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of
the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only
in order but imperatively required.

Duncan v. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004

Factual Antecedents:

Pedro A. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as medical

representative on October 24, 1995. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.

Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. His superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them
would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him because
he was performing his job well.

Tecson explained to his superiors that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge
with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy
package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated.
 In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that
since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated but his application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible”
policy.

In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan

del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was
denied. The issue was elevated to their Grievance Committee but Glaxo remained firm in
their decision.

· Tecson defied the transfer order and during the pendency of the grievance proceedings,
Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were
competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in
product conferences regarding such products.

Issue/s: Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid

1. WON Glaxo’s policy is valid and does not violate the equal protection clause?

2. WON there was constructive dismissal when Tecson was reassigned to the Butuan
CitySurigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area?
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees is reasonable because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of
Held: the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against
the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

1. YES, Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
exercise of management prerogative.
companies is valid and said policy does not violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management
has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands
of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color
of its authority. From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor companies. What the company merely
seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may
arise out of such relationships.
The
2. policy being
NO, there is questioned is not
no constructive a policyinagainst
dismissal marriage.
this case. An employee
The Court finds no meritof the
in
fi
company remains
petitioners’ freethat
contention to marry
Tecsonanyone of his or her
was constructively choosing.
dismissed when The policy
he was is not aimed
transferred
atfrom
restricting a personal
the Camarines prerogative that
Norte-Camarines Sur belongs
sales area only
to tothethe individual.
Butuan However,
City-Surigao City-an
Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending
employee’s personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising the company’s
seminar on prerogatives
management new productsto which
ensurewere directlypro
maximum competing with similar
t and business success.products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable,
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not
show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.

Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol

FACTS

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading –

principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is the Manager of the Personnel and
Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. Respondents
Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella)
were all regular employees of the company.

He was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also
an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage,
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, viz.: 1. New applicants will not
be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of
relationship, already employed by the company.

As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker
Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her
pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship
with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met
an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for
twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that
her name was on-hold at the gate.

She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where
one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being
dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was
on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The
management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company.

Due to her urgent need for money she later submitted a letter of resignation in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that
the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
ISSUE

Whether the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights

towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code

RULING

YES. These courts find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the
employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception
that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that
the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying
employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the
same office.

Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands
of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better
available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the
employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two
factors:

(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential

operation of the job involved; and,

(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’

sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.

Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of
Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married
Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere
fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to
security of tenure. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in
one company.

Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business

necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management
prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned
voluntarily has become moot and academic. As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that her resignation letter was written
in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid.

Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We
have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s)
to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an
office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign
and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the
part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is declared
illegal.

Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital, G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2017

FACTS: Cadiz was the human resource officer of the respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006 due to her
unprofessionalism and unethical behavior resulting to unwed pregnancy. It appears that
Cadiz became pregnant by wedlock (not married), and Brent imposed the suspension of
Cadiz until she marries her boyfriend in accordance with the law. After which she filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, and
Non-payment of wages and damages with a prayer of reinstatement.

The Tribunal Court ruled in favor of Brent as it was an institution of the Episcopal Church
operating both hospital and College and that the dismissal of Cadiz is not illegal because
there was just cause of her suspension as she had committed pre-marital sex resulting
to her pregnancy out of wedlock. The LA also ruled that she was not entitled to
reinstatement "at least until she marries her boyfriend," to backwages and vacation/sick
leave pay.

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the
LA decision. She then elevated the case to CA, but it was dismised due to technical
defects in the petition.

Cadiz contends that getting pregant out of wedlock is not grossly immoral and she also
lambasts that brent's condition for reinstatement is a violation against the stipulation of
marriage under Article 136 of the Labor Code. Finally, Cadiz contends that there was
substantial compliance with the rul of procedure, and the CA should not have dismissed
the petition. Meanwhile, Brent argues that Cadiz cause of dismissal is a violation of the
norms, beliefs, and teachings of Brent as a Church instituion of the Episcopal Church in
the Philippines.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting
pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality.
(2) Whether or not the marriage as a condition for reinstatement is valid.
RULING: To resolve the Court makes reference to the case of Leus vs. St. Scholastica's
College wherein;

The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful
or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society
generally considers moral and respectable.

In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward. The
labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They
also sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, Cadiz should have been the
epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent community.

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz
committed acts of immorality. There is no proof adduced by Brent to support such
sweeping conclusion that there is pre-marital sex engaged between Cadiz and her
boyfriend. The Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital sexual relations between
two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently,
conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS.

(2) The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall
of employees." In this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she subsequently
contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated. According to Brent, this
is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that
would subvert the sacrament of marriage."

Marriage as a condition of reinstatement is not valid. With particular regard to women,

Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women protects women against
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to
choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.
Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent's condition is
coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons
and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in
her as an intangible and inalienable right. Cadiz therefore, is entitled to reinstatement.
there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and
— pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral. The fact that Brent is a
sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality.
HERMOSISIMA vs. CA
G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in
Cebu, and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became
a life insurance underwriter in Cebu City, where intimacy developed among her and the
Hemosisima, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached
as an apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised the petitioner that she was
pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was
born on June 17, 1954. However, on July 24, 1954, the Hermosisima married Romanita
Perez.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad filed with the court an action against Francisco for
recognition of paternity of their child, Chris Hermosisima, and for moral damages for
alleged breach of promise to marry. Hermosisima admitted the paternity of the child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry
the complainant. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and even increased the award for damages. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He
exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – That being
said, the award for moral damages is proper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under Philippine law, for breach of
promise to marry.

HELD:

No. Court held that the breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong as has been
definitely decided in the precedent. [case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. ] the
action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced… upon the faith of such
promise. Further, in the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not
to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made
by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable.

The Court of Appeals, rely its decision on the award of moral damages on paragraph 3
of Article 2219 of the Civil Code: . . .

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx (3)
Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

However, the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not exist in the present case. The Court ruled that
petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten
(10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but also because, the court of first instance found the complainant "surrendered
herself" to the petitioner because she was "overwhelmed by her love" for him, and she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit
of clergy."

Wassmer vs Velez G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Preparations were made including the following: obtaining a marriage license;; printing and distribution of invitations to relatives,
friends, and acquaintances;; purchasing the bride to be’s trousseau;; preparing the dresses of those who are part of the entourage;;

Dear Bet — and buying a matrimonial bed and its accessories, among others. Bridal showers were given and gifts were also received

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.

On June 21, 1955, defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition
for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day
his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for
relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City —
the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two
weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying the defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court.

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong, and whether
defendant be held answerable in moral and exemplary damages in accordance with
Article 21; and
(2) Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages to petitioner in being declared to be in default;

Ruling:
(1) No. Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage." A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.

(2) No. Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, the defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
the defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

Guevarra v. Banach

G.R. No. 214016, November 24, 2021

FACTS:

Banach, a German citizen, met Guevarra through a pastor. He went on to court Guevarra,
visiting her almost every day, giving her gifts, and eventually telling her that he intended
to marry her. However, Banach did not tell Guevarra that he had still been married to his
third wife then. Instead, he told her that he was a divorced man. He also concealed his
true identity and made Guevarra and her family believe that his name was Roger Brawner.
Eventually, Guevarra submitted to Banach’s wooing as he offered her a better life.
Banach sent Guevarra P500,000.00 to buy a lot for their conjugal home. Yet, Guevarra
broke up with him after she found out about his lies and deception.

Due to the breakup, Banach sued Guevarra and her parents for damages before RTC
anchored on the Human Relations provisions in the Civil Code. He claimed that her acts
amounted to fraud, or at the very least, unjust enrichment. Likewise, he claimed moral
damages for the alleged “moral suffering, anguish, anxiety, and sleepless nights” he
suffered from her and prayed for attorney’s fees for having been constrained to litigate to
protect his rights.

Guevarra, on the other hand, argued that the money Banach sent her was a gift, the
return of which was not actionable, and applying the law on natural obligations.

RTC found Guevarra and her parents liable to Banach for actual damages and also
awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees.

CA similarly ordered Guevarra and her parents to return P500,000.00 to Banach under
the principle of unjust enrichment, but removed the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees. It ruled that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that
he did not have the purest intentions in expressing his desire to marry Guevarra. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order to return the P500,000.00 is proper

RULING:

No. The order to return the P500,000.00 is not proper.

A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of

such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In any case, the
party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith.

The court, citing Wassmer v. Velez, allowed the recovery of damages as a result of a
canceled marriage. Preparations for the wedding had already been made only to have
the wedding canceled just two days before its intended date. The award was not based
on the breach of promise to marry, but on Article 21 of NCC. It ruled that, while a breach
of promise to marry was not actionable unlike walking out of a wedding two days prior
after all had been prepared. The defendant’s act was deemed “palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs”, for which the award of damages was proper because the party
who sought damages did not perpetrate lies, fraud, or deception, which would have
barred recovery.
In this case, the petitioner called off the engagement after she had discovered
respondent’s lies and deception, such acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation
and reasons enough to conclude bad faith.

Banach did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under NCC. The unjust
enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies if the property is acquired without legal
grounds. The respondent gave Guevarra P500,000.00 as a gift to help her and her family
with their possible eviction from their home. The petitioner is correct that she cannot be
compelled to return the amount given to her as being a gift.

The right to marry is a fundamental human right. Marriage is a social institution that
creates a permanent bond between individuals, and the law grants them rights and
obligations unique to married couples. The choice of whether to marry and necessarily,
whom to marry is a personal decision that a person makes for themself and must be made
free from external pressures, without any fear of legal retribution or liability, without the
pressures of a possible civil suit should a person realize that their intended partner is not
right for them. It is not within the courts’ competence to reach too far into intimate relations
and must, as much as possible, refrain from meddling in these personal affairs.

Thus, the petition is granted. The award of actual damages worth P500,000.00 is deleted.

Balogbog vs CA
GR No. 83598
March 7, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961. They had an older brother,
Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought action for
partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, were entitled to one-third share of Gavino in the estate
of their grandparents.

Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged brother Gavino died single
and without issue in their parents' residence. At start, they claimed properties of estate
had been sold to them by their mother when she was alive, but withdrew this.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Trazo (then mayor of Asturias), Matias Pogoy (a
family friend), and Catalino Ubas as witnesses to prove that the marriage existed between
Gavino and Catalina, that there was a wedding, that they had 3 children, and Gavino died
in the residence of Matias which contradicts petitioner’s claim.
Private respondents produced a certificate from Office of the Local Civil Registrar that
Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina,
certificate from Office of the Treasurer which shows no record of birth of Ramonito.
Records were presumed to have been lost/destroyed during war.

On the other hand, petitioner Leoncia still asserts that Gavino died in their family
residence in Asturias, that Gavino had no legitimate child, she did not know private
respondents before this case, and also she obtained certificates showing no record of
marriage between Gavino and Catalina.

Witness Jose Narvasa testified Gavino died single in 1935 and Catalina lived with another
man after war, although he did not know whether they were legally married.

CFI rendered judgement in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. Petitioners filed for
reconsideration but was denied. They appealed to CA but it just affirmed CFI’s decision.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N Ramonito and Generoso is entitled to one-third of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva

Ruling: Yes, CA’s decision is affirmed.

Arts. 53 and 54 as contended by petitioners never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules
of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
the contrary.

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence
may be presented to prove marriage.

Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina
were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of
the marriage cannot be presume

An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the
witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have
a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation
of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.

Ablaza v. Republic
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner (Isidro Ablaza) filed before RTC of Masbate, a petition
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. Petitioner alleged
that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at
any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio

Issue: Whether or not Isidro Ablaza may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old
Civil Code?

Ruling: Yes

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.

There is a limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime
of the Civil Code.

ITO MUNA BASAHIN SA RECIT

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties
to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of
the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC [which is husband and wife only under
this rule] had absolutely no application to the petitioner because its was enacted
only on March 4, 2003

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. However, that the absence of a provision in the old and
new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The plaintiff must still be the party
who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,
for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper
interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest,
or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental
interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case
is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment
in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the
laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate

children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the
late Cresenciano's surviving heir.

Cresenciano was indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action
will definitely affect.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated
under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity; hence, her
participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether
the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage
might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She
was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein.

Underany and all conditions, her presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action
should be dismissed."

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled “Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza” which an action to determine who between the
parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same
rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any
party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just.

The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

Eugenio Sr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August28, 1988
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in1987 and
was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residencein Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitionerrefused to
surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpsecannot be
subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died ofheart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered thatthe body
should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed thelack of
jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctlyawarded
to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased
was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of theburial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he isthe spouse
as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does notrecognize
common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitatedto contract
marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

Falcis v. Civil Registrar

FACTS

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure dated May 18, 2015.
He raised the issue on declaring article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional,
hence Articles 46 (4) and 55(6) of the Family Code null.

He had identified himself as a member of the LGBTQI+ community hence he

claimed that the Family Code has a "normative impact" on the status of same-sex
relationships in the country.

He was also allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to
marry the same-sex which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. He also
acclaimed that the case is of transcendental importance and that the mere passage of
the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, procedural niceties must be set aside

ISSUE

Whether or not the self-idenfication of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a

member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him the standing to challenge the Family Code;

Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is

warranted; and

Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are
cognates of the right to life and liberty.

RULING

FIRST ANSWER NO - Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case”
is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with
standing.

Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”; “impairment” of his “ability to find

and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as injury to his
“plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”; or influence
over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be
recognized by this as sufficient interest.
 Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships” and “to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”
does not constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court
will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted inability to
find a partner. Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger
that the Family Code poses to him.

His assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the
imputed cause, the existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is
the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur

SECOND ANSWER NO - In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear

threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. We explained that the
decisive factor in whether this court should permit the invocation of transcendental
importance is not merely the presence of “special and important reasons” but the nature
of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no
disputed facts, and the issue raised should only be questions of law.

THIRD ANSWER YES - Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-
sex relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh
out the many issues that may arise. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through
a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core.

Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot
be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law.
Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right
to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal
framework.
fi
fi
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the
complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples,
whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families
formed by sterile couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have children,
among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender
stereotypes within the family
Petitioner would have this Court impliedly amend all such laws, through amere declaration of unconstitutionality of only two (2) articles in a single
statute. This Court cannot do what petitioner wants without arrogating legislative power unto itself and violating the principle of separation of power.
Thus, he failed in his burden of demonstrating to this Court the precise extent of the relief he seeks.
The Family Code was enacted in 1987. This Petition was led only in 2015. Clearly, the petitioner did not raise the unconstitutionality of Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code at the earliest possible opportunity. The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from the same procedural in rmity.
The Court cannot do what Falcis wants without arrogating legislative power unto itseltand violatine the princible on separation of powers

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner Romel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the RTC. Petitioner alleged that he was born male and registered
as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual,
that is "anatomicaly male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted
several doctors in US and underwent transgender operation in a woman. Petitioner lived
as a female and was in fact engaged in a marriage. He then sought to have his name
changed into "Mely" and his sex from "male" to "female" on his birth certificate.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner as there is no opposition to the petition made.
The Republic through OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate. The CA rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

RULING: No. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error
Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.

In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
certificate of the petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

—
Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676

September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During
her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed
that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According
to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in
her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name
be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE:
WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective
because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or
claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private
respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance
of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing
in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care
in view of thedelicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court
brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us
say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.

It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,

genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest
tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine
courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant
case, there is no denying that evidence points that the respondent is male. In determining
respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The
Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like the respondent, is
fixed.

The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

Loria v. Felix
G.R. No. L-9005
June 20, 1958

Facts: It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding
territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of
legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1
visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista,
Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living
with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union
according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the
confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan
Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied,
and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the
burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving
forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
That is why petitioner led a petition to review the validity of marriage in articulo mortis between Matea and Felipe

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe
Apelan Felix is valid; and
(2) Whether or not the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a
cause for nullity. Failure to sign marriage certi cate is not ground for void or
voidable marriage. Its only irregularity to formal requisites
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act
No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1,
3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There
is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both
declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been
executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question
at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of
marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the
Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid."
And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record
on Appeal.)
(2) Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage
Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required,
but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes
for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the
legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife" — which in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage
contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the
act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite
— not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of
marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one
or several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies
of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would
not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's
omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the
liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by
sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no
serious consequences to the married pair, especially where as in this case, it was caused
by the emergency.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if
a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613), this marriage
should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who
have lived publicly in a state of concubinage, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to
be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the
plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or
sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Alcantara v. Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Resituto Alcantara and Rosita A. Alcantara met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro. They got married on the same day,
December 8, 1982. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall. They were
issued a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
indicating that the couple had procured a marriage license. Neither party was a
resident of Carmona.

In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto then found a mistress with
whom he had 3 children. This caused Rosita to file a case for concubinage against him.
In response, Restituto filed for annulment of their marriage.
 Restituto submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. Assuming a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario, but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to
be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or Not the marriage is void for lack of marriage license

2. Whether or Not the marriage is void for absence of authority of the
solemnizing officer fixer

NO. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity
of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license
as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

For the marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage

license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in
fact issued to the parties herein.

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an
officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Despite not being a resident of Carmona, Cavite, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar is a mere typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not
detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which
he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that
the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." Petitioner is an educated person.
He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the
Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or
suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.

2. NO. With regard to the fixer who arranged everything for them and facilitated the
ceremony before the Rev. Navarro, the Court holds that the authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties
had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Sempre praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the

validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
—-

Abbas vs Abbas
GR No. 183896
January 30, 2013

Facts:

A petition was filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas with RTC. Syed alleged absence of a marriage license, as
provided in Article 4 of the Family Code, as ground for the annulment.

At trial court, Syed, a Pakistani, testified he met Gloria, a Filipino in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December 1992 then in January 1993 at his mother-in-law’s residence,
Felicitas arrived with two men. he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of nature of it.
During ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed he did not know
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified he did not go to
Carmona to apply for a marriage license, he never resided in the area.

In 2003, he went to Office of Civil Registrar of Carmona to check marriage license, and
was asked to show a copy of marriage contract wherein marriage license number could
be found. Municipal Civil Registrar Encarnacion, issued a certification to effect that the
marriage license number appearing in marriage contract he submitted, was number of
another marriage license issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

On cross-examination, Syed testified Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002, that he had gone to Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, o get certification
whether or not there was a marriage license. He also presented Norberto Bagsic
(employee of MCRC) brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo and Myra. He testified that certification from Encarnacion
was true and their office had not issued any other license of same serial number to any
other person.

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Rev. Dauz testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed and Gloria and Atty. Sanchez
and Ceriola were the witnesses/sponsors. Dauz further testified Atty. Sanchez gave him
marriage license day before actual wedding, marriage contract prepared by his secretary.
After the solemnization, it was registered with Local Civil Registrar of Manila, Rev. Dauz
submitted marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
Atty. Sanchez (sponsor) testified he requested a certain Qualin to secure marriage license
for the couple, and Qualin secured license and gave it to him. He did not know where
marriage license was obtained.

Felicitas Goo testified wedding ceremont happened in her house, sought help of Atty.
Sanchez for the license, and a bigamy case was filed by Gloria against Syed in RTC.

Mary Ceriola, one of the sponsors of the wedding, seen in the wedding photos and
corroborates testimony of Felicitas and Atty. Sanchez.

Lastly, Gloria testified Syed is her husband, presented marriage contract bearing their
signatures as proof. She and mother Felicitas asked Atty. Sanchez to be a sponsor and
help with the license. Further, she had a daughter with Syed and she filed a bigamy
against Syed because he married someone else during existence of their marriage.

RTC held no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona in favor of Gloria and Syed. Therefore, in absence of a formal requisite, their
marriage was void ab initio.

Gloria appealed to CA. CA granted her appeal and ruled there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married. Hence this
petition by Syed.

Issue: W/N marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio for lacking a valid marriage
license

Ruling: Petition is granted and RTC’s decision is reinstated

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. Such
certification was allowed by Sec 28, Rule 132 of ROC which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

The civil registrar conducted a diligent search but found that marriage license was for
another couple. To addition, certification of a civil registrar has probative value, thus, their
marriage lacks a valid marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA (testimonies of sponsors, mother of Gloria, Gloria herself)
to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.

Republic v. Albios
G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo
in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her,
the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only contract marriage the American to
acquire American citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his
consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state and complying with their marital obligations and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The court even
sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab
initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do
not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to
enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose
of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify
a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of
the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

Cosca v. Palaypayon, A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Facts: Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without
the requisite marriage license. The following couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence
of a marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly
had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages
involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Judge contends that (1)the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage
license requirement.(2)He gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the
couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the
latter failed to do so.(3) In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage
contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages
alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of
marriage (4)The copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. (5)The alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license. (6)The marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order
to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.

Issue: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon Jr. were valid

Held: No. The marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon Jr. were not valid. The
Supreme Court ruled that on the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Article 4 of the Family Code provides that “in the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio
whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.

_________

Navarro v. Domagtoy

FACTS

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law. · The first allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy is that the latter solemnized marriage
of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that
the groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated.

It was told that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home and has not returned
and been heard for almost seven years. · The second allegation of the plaintiff was that
the said Judge likewise solemnized marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa
located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct,
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law?

RULING

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the
latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage was
solidified as valid, Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to solemnize the marriage
of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the Family Code with regard to
irregularity of formal requisites of marriage.

In addition, article 4 par 3 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Hence, Domagtoy
was held administratively liable because of the latter’s failure to apply the legal principles
applicable in these cases, the Court find Domagtoy have acted in gross ignorance of the
law and because of this he was suspended for a period of six months.

Beso v. Daguman, A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint wherein respondent Judge stands charged

with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a complaint affidavit, Beso charged Judge
Daguman with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and neglecting not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the Office of Local
Registrar. The solemnizing of marriage happened in the Judge's residence in Calbayog
City, Samar.

Beso was abandoned by her husband without any reason at all so she inquired about her
marriage contract at the office of Civil registrar and discovered that their marriage was
not registered. She wrote a letter to the respondent Judge and she was informed that all
the copies of their marriage contract were all taken by Bernardito, her husband.

In his Comment, the civil marriage was held outside his territory as municipal Judge
because he was indisposed and unable to report to his station, that without prior
appointment, Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to his residence, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first because Beso was
scheduled to fly abroad on the same day; second, marriage would be expensive and
would entail serious problems; third, Beso would be out of the country for too long and
their marriage license would lapse; fourth, it would complicate her work abroad, if the
parties beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage.
The respondent Judge averred that after a few days following the wedding, respondent
gathered all the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search
in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing.
Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing
documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman’s claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge may solemnize marriage outside the area of his
jurisdiction.

RULING: No. The presiding Judge has the authority to solemnize marriage limited only
to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction. There are only three instances as provided by Article 8 of Family Code
wherein marriage may be solemnized outside his chamber, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made
by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside
his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso
and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e
believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law
so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."

A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office, should
be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority
or jurisdiction of his court. Thus the respondent Judge should be reminded that a
priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as
the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond.

Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

——-

Aranes V Occiano, A.M No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charges the respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur. On 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador
Orobia without
the requisite Marriage License and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction. Since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia were not recognized. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed
against the respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

Respondent judge avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by the petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did
not possess the requisite Marriage License, he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent judge that they would give
the license to him, but they failed to comply.
.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a
marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, a fine was imposed on him.

ISSUE:

WON Respondent Judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license

and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD: YES
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with.

However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to
administrative liability." (Navarro vs. Domagtoy)

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
Marriage License. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance
of the Marriage License is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided
by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. In this respect, the respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.

People v. Bustamante, G.R. No. L-11598, January 27, 1959

Facts: The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one
Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Pangasinan (Exh.
"A", pp. 9-11, t.s.n.). A little over a year later, or on September 16, 1955, he contracted a second
marriage with Demetria Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan,
Pangasinan, who was then acting as Mayor of the said Municipality (Exh. "B"), while the first
marriage was still subsisting. Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a month,
after which a time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the first wife, Maria Perez. In
the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered from the Binalonan municipal authorities
the previous marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.
Defendant did not testify in his behalf during the trial. the main problem poised in this appeal
concerns the authority of Francisco Nato to solemnize the second marriage.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On September
16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-mayor was
designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his absence; and
Nato was acting in this capacity when he performed the second marriage of Bustamante with
Demetria Tibayan.

Issue(s):
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is valid; and
(2) Whether or not the Vice Mayor Nato has the authority to solemnize marriages.

Ruling:
(1) Yes. The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Mapandan, Pangasinan, while the marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the
testimonies of witnesses indicate clearly that it was performed by Francisco Nato. The wrong
averment, if at all, was unsubstantial and immaterial that need not even be alleged, for it matters
not who solemnized the marriage, it being sufficient that the information charging bigamy alleges
that a second marriage was contracted while the first still remained undissolved. The information
filed in this case which properly states the time and place of the second wedding, was sufficient
to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither procedural prejudice nor error was
committed by the lower court in finding appellant guilty.

(2) Yes. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties of the office of the mayor
by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because the latter is the Acting Mayor
or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the duties and wields the power
appurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,1 48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec. 2195, Revised
Administrative Code). As correctly observed by the lower court, that case even concedes and
recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor whenever the
latter is in an acting capacity. The word "acting" as held in the case of Austria vs. Amante,2 45
Off. Gaz., 2809, when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character or
nature of the same.

Vda De Chua V CA
GR. No. 116835, March5, 1998

FACTS

Roberto Chua and Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock from 1970 to 1981 and bore two
illegitimate sons, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On 1992,
Chua died intestate in Davao City.

Thereafter, respondent Vallejo filed in a RTC Cotabato City a petition for declaration of
heirship and guardianship of persons and properties to their minor sons. On July 1992,
petitioner Antonietta Chua represented herself as the surviving spouse of deceased Chua
and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at
the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
Vallejo opposed the motion and argued that deceased Chua died as a bachelor, and was
only to the abovementioned children; that petitioner is a mere pretender to the estate, a
not the surviving spouse of deceased Chua as the latter did not contract any marriage
with any woman. However, petitioner submitted a photocopy of their alleged marriage
contract, certificate of titles, resident certificate and income tax return as a proof of their
alleged marriage.

The trial court however, rendered a decision appointing respondent Florita Vallejo as the
guardian of the persons and properties of the two minor children. Petitioner Chua filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Chua was the wife of deceased Chua?

HELD: NO. Petitioner Chua was not able to prove her status as the wife of the
decedent.

[Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.]

The best proof of marriage is an authenticated marriage contract where petitioner

failed to produce. A certificate of title and other similar documents does not hold water.
Moreover, a photocopy of the marriage certificate which petitioner Chua presented is a
violation of the “best evidence rule.”
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is
not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or
otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:

Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration – Any interested person, may by

filing a written opposition, contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of the
person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the
contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself,
or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.

Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antoinetta Chua is hereby
denied.

______

Trinidad vs CA
GR No. 118904
April 20, 1998

Facts: In August 1978, Arturio Trinidad filed with CFI, an action for partition of 4 parcels
of land, claiming he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was original owner of the lands. Patricio died in 1940, leaving the lands to
his 3 children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, Arturio demanded from Felix and
Lourdes (Trinidads) to partition the land into 3 equal shares and to give him 1/3 share of
his father, but Felix and Lourdes (defendants) refused.

In their answer, defendants denied plaintiff was son of Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth. Defendants
also denied plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed parcels of land described in
complaint had been in their possession since death of their father in 1940 and they had
not given plaintiff share produce of the land.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of 23.

Plaintiff side presented 3 witnesses namely: Jovita Gerardo, Isabel Meren, Arturio
Trinidad. For the defendants side they also presented 3 witnesses namely: Pedro
Briones, Lourdes Trinidad, and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon. For rebuttal evidence/witness of
Arturio, he presented Isabel Meren and himself. He was not able to present a marriage
contract of his parents but instead a certification issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the
Japanese time.

In CFI, it rendered a decision in favor of Arturio acknowledging that he is a legitimate son

of Inocentes Trinidad. However, in CA, Arturio was not acknowledged as a legitimate child
due to insufficient evidence.

Issue: W/N petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he
is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad

Ruling:

This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus,
the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not
fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren,
who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May
5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple
deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old
barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers'
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she
lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house
when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party
held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation
respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C)
in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection

from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate
child.

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly
written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove
his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their
personal credibility. Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly
held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor.

______

Sy v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then
22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll
who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber
and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses
lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their
son Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May
15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. The
Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their
children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by
him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking
to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; (YES)
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of
said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. (YES)

Ruling:
• The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974
• The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent
• These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day
of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.(it was only 1 year after
the marriage when marriage license and certificate have been issued.)
• A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
 numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
• From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license (therefore void in the beginning) Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record.
• The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need
no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner
to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.

Delgado Vda. de La Rosa v. Heirs of Mariciana Rustia Vda. de Damian G.R. No.
155733, January 27, 2006

FACTS:

Josefa Delgado was one of the five children of Felisa Delgado with one Lucio Campo.
Felisa and Lucio lived without the benefit of marriage. Felisa also had a child with one
Ramon Osorio, named Luis Delgado. This time, their relationship was in dispute. Josefa
died intestate and was survived by Guillermo Rustia, her husband, and petitioners who
are her nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces. Guillermo and Josefa had no
children, so they took home Guillermina Rustia and Nanie Rustia, their children who were
never legally adopted (ampun ampunan). Guillermo was able to file a petition for their
adoption. However, Guillermo managed to father an illegitimate child, Guillerma Rustia,
with one Amparo Sagarbarria. Guillerma alleged that Guillermo treated her as his
daughter and his own flesh and blood. Like Josefa, Guillermo died without a will and was
survived by respondents who are his sisters and the children of his predeceased brother
The petitioners contend that Josefa and Guillermo lived together as husband and wife but
were never married. Respondents, however, contend that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not necessarily mean that no marriage existed. Respondents also contend
that Guillerma had no interest in the estate of Guillermo since she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child.

ISSUES:

1. May the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia inherit from Josefa Delgado?

2. May Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, inherit from her?

3. May Guillerma Rustia inherit from Guillermo Rustia?

4. May Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, inherit from Guillermo
Rustia?

HELD:

1. YES, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa Delgado. Article 972
of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Also, under Article 1001 of the
same code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half. The petitioners are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death. They
have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters
(or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of
the new Civil Code. Hence, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa
Delgado.

2. YES, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, may inherit from her. The law
prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems
that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate
child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of halfblood relation. Here, the above-named
siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her
half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each
other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. Therefore, Luis
Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, may inherit from her.

3. NO, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo Rustia. Under the old Civil Code
(which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary
rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which
granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they
were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent. Under the new law, recognition may
be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (1)
in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception; (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status
of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father; (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not
constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia. Therefore, Guillerma
Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo Rustia.

4. NO, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, may not inherit from
Guillermo Rustia. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which created between
two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid
down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.
The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person
claiming its existence. The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon
the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. Therefore, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan,
may inherit from Guillermo Rustia. *Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are
no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and
nephews.

Sevilla v. Cardenas

FACTS

Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by
machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her
father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a
minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no
marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila.

Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20,
1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found. On
the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime
and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at
a church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were
alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking
the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the
parties based on the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented
before a solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of the
formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning.

This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila
that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious. Respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the
marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due effort
as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had
already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that
Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties,
sufficient to declare the marriage void from the beginning?

RULING

NO Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be
found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of
lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
 Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar,
that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy
that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation
is not the concern of the family members alone.

Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica)
on the ground that their marriage was solemnized without the requisite marriage license.
According to Raquel, his parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon to arrange and
prepare whatever necessary papers required for the marriage of Raquel and Veronica.
The couple thereafter exchanged vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he never went
to the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to apply for a marriage license and had not seen any
documents in connection thereto. Thus, their marriage is void ab initio. Raquel presented
as evidence a Certification from the LCR that there is neither record nor copy of the
marriage license issued to Raquel and Veronica. Veronica opposed Raquel’s allegations
by claiming that their marriage was celebrated with a marriage license, though she cannot
present any evidence to support her claim.

The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite marriage license when his marriage to Veronica
took place. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, holding
that there is a presumption a marriage license was issued in the absence of any indication
in the marriage certificate on the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the
applicable law in the present case, provides that a marriage license is one of the requisites
to be complied with in order for a marriage to be validly solemnized, except for some
instances of marriages of exceptional character. Now, for a marriage to be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that its absence
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage was issued to the parties.

In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to
show that there was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
Raquel was able to present a Certification issued by the LCR attesting that neither a
record nor a copy of any marriage license was ever issued in favor of Raquel and
Veronica. Thus, on the basis of such certification, the presumed validity of the marriage
of Raquel and Veronica has been overcome and it becomes the burden of Veronica to
prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity.

The Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.

Vitangcol v. People of PH
GR 207406

Facts:
Norberto Vitangcol was convicted by the RTC Manila for Bigamy. CA affirmed and the
prosecution avers that it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid marriage
with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they entered into. Prosecution also found
that his [first] marriage with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, he contracted second marriage with Alice, who later filed the criminal
complaint for Bigamy upon discovering that he had a previous marriage with Gina.
Norberto counters that the 1st element of bigamy, that offender has been legally married,
is absent. He presents the Certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar that the Office
has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his 1st wife Gina,
hence, prosecution failed to establish legality of his 1st marriage.

Issue: WON certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto and his first wife Gina proves nullity of
petitioner's first marriage and exculpates him from the Bigamy charge.

Held:

He is guilty of Bigamy. The prosecution was able to provide the elements of the case.
While it is true that the civil registrar issued such certification, that the license now cannot
be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued. The parties clearly
identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. The marriage contract
between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of the
petitioner's first marriage which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the marriage.
DIAZ-SALGADO vs. ANSON; G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

TOPIC:

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each
other as husband and wife, shall also state:

(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in
marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to
send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after
the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.
Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in
his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of
the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Article 8, FC.
The marriage shall be solemnized publicly
1. in the chambers of the judge or in open court,
2. in the church, chapel or temple, or
3. in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
a.) in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
b.) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or

c.) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Relation to topic:

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the
[M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San
Juan.

In the case at bar, it was indicated in their marriage contract that no marriage license was
exhibited for being an exceptional character.

Though they executed an affidavit instead of securing a marriage license prior to their
wedding, it was filed in the municipal hall and Luis was not even sure to what specific
office the affidavit was filed.

Their marriage was solemnized in the house of their Mayor friend.

The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x

x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage
license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional
character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x

FACTS:

1. Luis Anson and Severina de Asis-Anson were common-law husband and wife before
their marriage was solemnized. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa married to Gasto Maya.
(Spouses Maya)
2. Severina also had another daughter from a previous relationship named Jo-ann, who
was wed to Gerard Salgado. (Spouses Salgado)

3. Luis and Severina's marriage was held on December 28, 1966, prior to the effectivity
of Family Code (E.O. 209 - effectivity: August 03, 1988) and 2 days prior to Maria Luisa's
1st birthday. It was solemnized by their mayor friend in the latter's house witnessed by
the Chief of Police.

5. During Luis and Severina's marriage, which was still governed by the Civil Code, they
acquired several real properties and according to Luis, because there was no marriage
settlement between them, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. However, after their cohabitation ended, Luis went to the USA and married
another and had a son with her while Maria was left under the care of Severina.

6. However, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23,
2002 transferring 3 properties (covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109) in favor of
Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties, without Luis'
knowledge and consent.

7. Severina died on September 21, 2002.

8. After Severina died, the Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No
Record of Marriage (CENOMAR)( Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office. Maria Luisa Anso-Maya also executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25,
2002 adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.

9. Luis alleged that as the surviving spouse, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina because of
the preceding acts. Thus, he filed for the annulment of the said 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale
and Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate.

10. Jo-ann (Spouses Salgado) countered that they were not aware of the marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a
common-law relationship that they both acknowledged and formally terminated through
a Partition Agreement executed in April 1981 and implemented by another Partition
Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties
apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement.

11. The properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and
she was described therein as single without reference to any husband.

12. Spouses Maya corroborated Spouses Salgado's claim. Maria cognizes that Luis and
Severina are common-law husband and wife which was terminated upon the partition
agreement, and not that they were married.

13. During trial, and Luis gave testimony and presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract without a marriage license number inputted. The lower court ruled in
favor of Luis citing the case of Geronimo v. CA wherein the marriage was still declared
valid despite the absence of the marriage license no. in the marriage contract.

14. The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the
consent of her husband, Luis.

15. They appealed to CA but CA affirmed RTC's decision. Thus, Spouses Salgado
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Spouses Salgado LUIS

Petitioned that marriage between Luis
and Severina is null and void for want
of marriage license based on the
Marriage Contract presented by Luis
which has adequately established its
absence.
The petition raises a question of fact,
which cannot be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. He also countered
that the Spouses Salgado did not
present any evidence to support their
theory.64 If the existence of the
marriage license is in issue, it is
incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado
to show the lack of marriage license by
clear and convincing evidence
ISSUE:

1. Whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage
contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on
account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

2. Whether or not Luis and Severina's marriage is valid without a marriage license (and
the subject lands as conjugal properties.)

RULING:

1. YES. The absence of marriage license may be proven with the marriage contract as
prima facie evidence.

In the case at bar, Luis and Severina's marriage was declared as VOID AB INITIO.

Luis and Severina's marriage (December 28, 1966) was contracted before the effectivity
of the Family Code and is thus covered by the Civil Code.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and
the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character;

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein.

The marriage contract, being a public document, is prima facie proof that at the
time of their Luis and Severina's marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional
character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall
no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that:

(1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and

(2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Since the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony
between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite,
practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, their marriage does not fall
under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code.

The requisites of Art. 77 are:

a. prior civil marriage between the parties and

b. a ratifying religious ceremony

were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of
an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's
marriage to be valid.

The trial court erred by relying in Geronimo v. CA, because in that case, despite the
absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein
petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage
is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased
and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the
deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the
National Archives and Records Section where the marriage license number
appears.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the:

1. absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or

2. at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.

Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract
itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character,
and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other
than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid
marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

As held in In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, a marriage solemnized without a

marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is
void. Instead of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false
affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the
notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with.

The Court also noted that while Luis contends the validity of his marriage to Severina, he
knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad casting doubt on his credibility. He
went to the USA in 1981 and until Severina's death in 2002. Much less reconciled with
her. All those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even
their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. Thus, he failed to prove the validity of
their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

-------------------------

2. Luis and Severina's marriage is not valid without a marriage license.

With regard to the subject properties, the Partition Agreement which Luis and Severina
executed in November 1980 which divided their properties between them without court
intervention is VALID.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at
the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning
for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."

"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household.

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the
partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079
of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of
a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be
divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code
is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be
valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and
Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
-----

THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES IN LUIS

It is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license. However,
instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their
marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption
does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face
has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there
was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract
was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was
presented. No other witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the
best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one,
and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall.

It was also established during the cross-examination that prior to going to the house of
their friend Mayor for the solemnization of their marriage, they did not obtain a marriage
license.