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n
( !)
h i X
max L = U(C0 ) + δE U C̃1 + λ 1 − wi
C0 ,{wi }
i=1
n
" #
∂L ′
X
=0 =⇒ U (C0∗ ) = δE U ′
C̃1∗ wi∗ R̃i
∂C0
i=1
∂L
= 0 =⇒
∂wi
h i λ
δE U ′ C̃1∗ R̃i = ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
W0 − C0∗
Suppose that R̃i has negative correlation with U ′ C̃1∗
Implies that asset return tends to be high when marginal
utility of final consumption is low, and vice versa
Hence investor is likely to receive more consumption when
consumption is less valuable, and vice versa
Asset has undesirable payoff characteristics, so investor will
demand large risk premium for holding this “risky” asset
Conversely, if R̃i has positive correlation with U ′ C̃1∗ , then
investing in asset provides insurance against low consumption,
so investor is willing to accept negative risk premium
C 1−γ
U(C ) = =⇒
1−γ
!−γ " !#
C̃1∗ C̃1∗
M̃ = δ = δ exp −γ ln
C0∗ C0∗
µM = ηE e −γ ν̃ = η 1 + π ϕ−γ − 1
2 2 2 2
µM 2 = η 2 e γ σc E e −2γ ν̃ = η 2 e γ σc 1 + π ϕ−2γ − 1
2 √ 1
σM −γ 2
≈ e π(ϕ −1) − 1 ≈ π ϕ−γ − 1
µM