Article#2

Title: The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes

Author: Rainer Forst
Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/

Differentiation of Toleration:
Distinctions are crucial between a general concept and more specific interpretations of
toleration. The general concept embodies the following aspects:
1. It hinges on the idea that the tolerated beliefs or practices are deemed objectionable and
morally wrong. If this objection element is absent, it's not 'toleration' but 'indifference' or
'affirmation.'
2. The objection is balanced by an acceptance element, which doesn't negate the negative
judgment but provides positive reasons that outweigh the negative ones in the given
context. This addresses the paradox of toleration, where the practices or beliefs are
wrong but not intolerably so.
3. Tolerance has its limits defined at the point where reasons for rejection become stronger
than reasons for acceptance, without specifying the intervention method (the rejection
component).
These reasons can be of the same kind, such as religious, or vary across moral, religious, and
pragmatic considerationsAdditionally, it's crucial to emphasize that within this interpretation of
toleration, there exist two distinct boundaries:
1. The first boundary separates the realm of practices and beliefs that align with one's
agreement from the domain of practices and beliefs that one acknowledges as wrong
but can still endure.
2. The second boundary delineates this latter domain from the realm of the absolutely
intolerable, which is categorically rejected.
As a result, we encounter three normative realms within the context of toleration, not merely
two.Lastly, it's essential to note that the term "toleration" applies when it's practiced willingly and
not under compulsion. Otherwise, it would merely be a case of "suffering" or "enduring" things
one disapproves of but cannot change. However, it's incorrect to infer from this that the tolerant
must possess the ability to actively prohibit or intervene in the practices they tolerate. Even a
minority lacking such power can exhibit tolerance by holding the belief that, if given the authority,
they wouldn't employ it to suppress others.

Paradoxes of Toleration

First Paradox:
The first paradox, known as the "tolerant racist" paradox, pertains to the objection component.
Occasionally, there's an argument that someone who holds prejudiced beliefs about the
inferiority of certain racial groups and doesn't act on these beliefs should be deemed "more
tolerant." In this view, the racist would be labeled as tolerant if they refrained from
discrimination, perhaps for strategic reasons. This scenario creates a paradox when considering
tolerance as a moral virtue because it suggests that an immoral stance can be incorporated into
a virtue. Furthermore, the paradox implies that the more intense a racist's prejudiced feelings
are, the more "tolerant" they would be if they simply refrained from acting on those feelings.
From a moral standpoint, demanding that a racist should be tolerant has a significant flaw: it
treats the racist's objection to others as an ethical concern that can be mitigated by adding
certain reasons for acceptance. In essence, it transforms an unjustifiable prejudice into an
ethical judgment. Consequently, it follows that the grounds for objection must possess a minimal
level of reasonability; they need not be universally acceptable but should not be rooted in
irrational bias and hatred. Therefore, the racist cannot exemplify the virtue of tolerance nor
should they be asked to practice tolerance; rather, it is imperative that they overcome their racist
beliefs. This illustrates that there are situations in which tolerance is not the remedy for
intolerance.

Second Paradox:
Secondly, we are confronted with the paradox of moral tolerance, a conundrum closely tied to
the acceptance component of tolerance. The paradox unfolds when both the reasons for
objection and the reasons for acceptance are labeled as "moral." In this context, it seems to
suggest that it is morally right or even morally obligatory to tolerate actions or beliefs that are
morally objectionable. To unravel this paradox, it becomes necessary to establish a clear
distinction between different categories of "moral" reasons. Some of these reasons must
transcend the ordinary moral considerations, serving as reasons of a higher order that both
underpin and circumscribe the act of toleration.
In essence, resolving the paradox of moral tolerance calls for a nuanced understanding of
morality itself, distinguishing between moral reasons that guide our actions within the bounds of
tolerance and those higher-order moral principles that define the limits and boundaries of what
can be tolerated without compromising fundamental ethical principles. This subtle distinction
becomes pivotal in navigating the complex terrain of moral dilemmas that arise in the practice of
tolerance.

Third Paradox:
Thirdly, we confront the paradox of setting boundaries, relating to the rejection component. This
paradox revolves around the notion that toleration hinges on reciprocity, suggesting that those
who are intolerant should neither be tolerated nor can they be. This idea is prevalent in classical
texts on toleration.However, a cursory examination of these texts, and even more so, historical
practices, reveals that the slogan "no toleration of the intolerant" is not merely devoid of
meaning but potentially perilous. This is because categorizing certain groups as intolerant is
often itself the outcome of one-sidedness and intolerance.A deconstructive interpretation of this
paradox, as proposed by Fish (1997), leads to a troubling conclusion: If toleration inherently
involves delineating boundaries against the intolerant and the intolerable, and if every such
boundary-setting is, to some extent, arbitrary and intolerant itself, then toleration collapses as
soon as it commences—once it is defined by an arbitrary division between "us" and the
"intolerant" and "intolerable."This paradox can only be resolved if we distinguish between two
forms of "intolerance" that the deconstructive critique conflates. First, there is the intolerance of
those who lie beyond the bounds of toleration because they fundamentally reject toleration as a
norm. Second, there is the lack of tolerance exhibited by those who refuse to tolerate the denial
of the norm by others. Tolerance can only function as a virtue if this distinction can be
established, presupposing that the limits of toleration can be established in a non-arbitrary,
justifiable manner.