"The Aesthetic Attitude" in the Rise of Modern Aesthetics

Author(s): Jerome Stolnitz

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Summer, 1978, Vol. 36, No. 4
(Summer, 1978), pp. 409-422
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/430481

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 JEROME STOLNITZ

"The Aesthetic Attitude"

in the Rise of Modern Aesthetics

MR. DICKIE'S recent animadversions1 on my in the analysis and classification of the writ-
account of the rise of modern aesthetics go ings of this period. The two issues ride tan-
substantially like this: Dickie accepts my dem, however. So I devote myself chiefly
contention that the concept, "aesthetic dis- to showing that the theory models formu-
interestedness," is logically central to and lated by Dickie are both raggedly stated
distinctive of the era, viz., the eighteenth and internally inconsistent and that, fur-
and early nineteenth centuries, in which thermore, they fail to carve at the joints the
modern aesthetics arose. Nor does he contest thought both of the British and of Schopen-
my analysis of the theoretical ramifications hauer. I therefore urge that Dickie's analy-
of this concept, notably, that it defined the sis signally misrepresents their thought. But
subject matter of a new and autonomous if this be true, it follows that Dickie's ap-
field of study, relegated "beauty" to a fairly plication of his meta-theory generates a lop-
secondary place among the analytic and sided account of the "historical priorities."
value categories, and encouraged extraordi- On neither count should Dickie's argument
nary catholicity in the denotation of "aes- be allowed to go unchallenged.
thetic object."2 Dickie argues at length,
I.
however, that the concept, "the aesthetic
attitude," which is defined in terms of dis- The two kinds of theory set out by Dickie
interestedness, is not stated fully until are "the theory of taste," which he finds in
Schopenhauer. Therefore my imputation the British, whatever their individual differ-
of the concept to the eighteenth-century ences, from the beginning of the eighteenth
British thinkers is "anachronistic" (63). century to its end, and "the aesthetic atti-
Since the kind of aesthetic theory that is tude theory," which, he holds, appears,
elaborated upon this concept is markedly wholly and paradigmatically, for the first
different from that found in the British, I time in Schopenhauer.
have, Dickie argues, confused two quite dif- Though the structures of these theories
ferent kinds of theory. Dickie undertakes are radically different, they have in com-
to distinguish these theories. mon "disinterestedness." Indeed, this con-
Though the issue of "historical priorities" cept is, Dickie says, "central" (59) to both
(55) is by no means inconsequential for taste and aesthetic-attitude theories. Yet he
historical understanding, I share Dickie's claims that the concept functions differently
view that it is less important than distin- within these two kinds of theory. The first
guishing the theory models we are to use question of all, then, is the meaning of
"disinterestedness" in taste-theory (hence-
JEROME STOLNITZ is professor of philosophy at Leh- forth T-theory) and in aesthetic-attitude-
man College, The City University of New York. theory (henceforth A-theory).

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 410 STOLN I TZ

For reasons that will shortly become ap- not employ it. Thus "disinterestedness" cir-
parent, we can begin most readily with A- cumscribes the field of study and generates
theory. The meaning Dickie assigns to "dis- the categories requisite to analysis of the
interestedness" within A-theory is brought field.
out in the literature he quotes. In summar- All this is more or less straightforward.
izing Schiller, a precursor of A-theory, Dickie Dickie's exposition of T-theory is another
equates "disinterested attitude" with "we matter.
love it for itself and no other reason" (74). He first enumerates the ideas that make
Schopenhauer's full-fledged account charac- up such theory: ordinary perception, where-
terizes disinterested perception in the fol- as A-theory, by contrast, distinguishes such
lowing ways: a) abandoning "the common perception from that governed by the aes-
way of looking at things"; b) the perceiver thetic attitude; a "specific kind of object"
devotes himself wholly to perception; c) he which, uniquely, possesses aesthetic proper-
cannot distinguish himself from the percep- ties; the faculty of taste, which reacts to
tion; d) he does not perceive things in re- ordinary perception of this kind of object;
lation to his will; e) he ignores the spatial, finally, the feeling of pleasure produced by
temporal, and causal relations among things this reaction.5 Dickie then goes on to the
(75-76). a) - e) sum up what, Dickie says, theory's "background assumptions," as he
"it means in Schopenhauer's theory to be calls them, which need to be "made clear,"
disinterested" (76). We might add two other viz., that "the pleasure must be disinter-
descriptions, which Dickie omits, in the ested" and that the perceiver must be "in
classic passage in World as Will and Idea, a certain frame of mind, calm, attentive,
sec. 34, from which he has quoted: f) "(look- and not under the influence of . . . distort-
ing) simply and solely at the what";3 g) ing associations . . ." (56). Dickie means,
abandoning conceptual thought. Dickie's presumably, that the British do not affirm
paraphrase of Schiller is recognizably close these two propositions explicitly, but since
to a), b), d), and f). Setting aside the local that is demonstrably not the case,6 to speak
nuances of meaning in Schopenhauer's sys- of "background assumptions" is, at the
tem, these four characterizations, taken to- least, quixotic. To the present point of the
gether, give, I think, a fair though sketchy meaning of "disinterestedness," however,
approximation of the orthodox meaning of the sense in which pleasure is disinterested
"aesthetic disinterestedness" (c), e), and g) is not defined or explained in the passage
are considerably more peculiar to Schopen- just quoted. Thereafter, it is taste which is,
hauer) . for the first time, said to be disinterested
On this meaning of the concept, "aes- (59). There may be no incompatibility in
thetic disinterestedness" is, Dickie says, thinking that both pleasure and taste are
"central" to A-theory. In such theory it disinterested,
is though it is difficult to decide
predicated of, indifferently, perception, con-without some instruction in the term's mean-
sciousness, or contemplation (57). The ing. Yet this is, mirabile dictu, not to be
concept is "fundamental" because when and found in either of the passages just cited or,
only when perception is disinterested does indeed, anywhere else in the exposition of
it provide awareness, not of the garden T-theory. Are we to suppose that "disinter-
variety world, but of aesthetic objects or estedness"
the has the same meaning in T-
aesthetic properties of objects.4 Disinter- theory as in A-theory? Dickie has said that
estedness is accordingly integral to the defi- "disinterestedness" is "central" to both
nitions of "aesthetic attitude," "aesthetic (though he also says that the faculty of
perception" ("consciousness," "contempla- taste is the "central element" (55) in T-
tion"), "aesthetic object," etc. Moreover, theory). But in the Schopenhauer epitome,
Dickie holds, as we will see shortly, that a), b), d), and f) refer to "ways of look-
the
concept is also "central" because its use ing." And Dickie insists that the British
renders "unnecessary" a large number of do not have the idea of disinterested per-
ideas that are found in theories which do ception. Accordingly, though he refers to

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 The Aesthetic Attitude 411

some half dozen British thinkers, Dickie and involuntarily. It is because the pleasure
notes not a single occurrence of "disinterest- is felt "without any knowledge of [its] cause"
edness" in their writings comparable to thatand without the "prospect" (expectation)
in Schopenhauer. of "advantage" (="interest") to be gained
When we go to the next chapter, how-from the object.7 The first of these is not
ever, we come upon, in the context of a very close to the usual meaning of "dis-
wholly different problematic, the first inti- interestedness"; the second, however, is so.
mation of the concept's meaning witlhin T-"Interestedness" designates ulterior purpose
theory. Dickie alludes briefly to the Britishin apprehending an object. It is the desire
T-theorist, Francis Hutcheson. For Hutche- or hope that the object will prove profitable
son, the faculty of taste, Dickie points out,in future. As we will later see in greater
resembles the senses because it "reacts im- detail, only when interestedness is absent
mediately, involuntarily, and instinctively, can the internal sense respond to beauty.
and is therefore disinterested" (81) . Moreover, Hutcheson largely subsumes cog-
"Therefore" being ambiguous as it is, ancd nition under interestedness: ". . . nor does
the author saying no more than this, we the most accurate knowledge increase this
need to pause over this sentence. First, givenpleasure of beauty, however it may super-
the common pre-theoretical understanding add a distinct rational pleasure from pros-
of "disinterested," we cannot believe that pects of advantage" (Inq., 11, cf. 37; cf. PA,
this is the "therefore" of intensional equiv- 28, 60).
alence. Not that the T-theory model would It now appears that the "therefore" in
be uncongenial to this reading. Dickie has it our sentence has the sense of something like
that the faculty of taste is "triggered" by the
presupposition and that "disinterested" has
appropriate object and in turn "produces"the sense of something like "devoid of con-
pleasure. The "reactive" meaning would cern for future self-interest." If this be true,
square perfectly with this account and can"disinterestedness" must be predicated of
be predicated equally of taste and pleasure.desire or purpose, which can also be inter-
Moreover, since the above adverbs do not ested, and only secondarily and in some de-
define any kind of attitude, Dickie's central
rivative meaning, of taste and pleasure,
historical contention would thereby be im-which cannot be other than disinterested.
plemented. Still, Dickie cannot think thatHutcheson writes: "Our sense of beauty
these "reactive" terms exhaust the meaningfrom objects, by which they are constituted
of the mooted concept. good to us, is very distinct from our desire
Before going on to more plausible read- of them when they are thus constituted...."
ings, let us remark a notable feature of (Inq., 12).
taste and pleasure as they are described by It now begins to look as though "dis-
Dickie: they cannot function otherwise than interestedness" is indeed, as Dickie holds,
immediately and involuntarily. Hence, common to both T- and A-theories but at
whatever the meaning of "disinterested," the cost, to Dickie, that the rupture between
they can only be disinterested. Yet in pre-these models is not as drastic as he makes
theoretical understanding, in Schiller andit out to be, in support of his historical
Schopenhauer, as we have seen, and also inthesis. The term now seems to designate
the British, as we will soon see, "disinter-one among alternative attitudes toward a
estedness" is defined by reference to its op-perceived object. This tentative inference
posite. What, then, is the meaning of "in-needs to be examined at some length. Hence
terestedness" and of which mental state is in sec. II below, I put the question, Do the
it predicated? British analyze and employ "disinterested-
Dickie does not document his reference ness," predicated of an attitude governing
to Hutcheson but it is clear that he is allud- perception (consciousness, contemplation),
ing to those passages in which Hutcheson with a meaning recognizably and substan-
explains why the "internal sense" of beauty tially like that in Schiller and Schopen-
(the faculty of taste) functions immediately hauer? The affirmative answer I will detail

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 412 STOLNITZ

erases the distinction on which Dickie's ar- kind of object," possessing a distinctively
gument rests. aesthetic property. Hence A-theory severs
For it is, according to Dickie, from their any "shred of contact with the external
antithetical treatments of perception - T- world" (58). Yet Dickie distinguishes
theory recognizing only ordinary perception,within A-theory a "weak" version on which
A-theory distinguishing aesthetic percep- disinterested perception is "a necessary con-
tion - that all of the further differences be- dition for the apprehension and apprecia-
tween the two theories follow. This is said tion of the aesthetic character which an
to be because "disinterested perception" object possesses independently of that mode
renders "unnecessary" for A-theory the of perception ..." (57-58). But then what
categories of taste, a particular kind of ob-is said of A-theory tout court is denied of
ject, and pleasure. So instead of the compli- this species of such theory. A-weak-theory
cated structure of T-theory, A-theory em- is not "completely subjectivized," as all A-
ploys just the one category (57) .8 theory is said to be. Indeed, A-weak-theory
I will deal here with pleasure and the seems to be much closer to T-theory in re-
spect to the existence though not the ap-
object. (Because, as we will see later, Dickie
equivocates on "taste," that category must prehension of the distinctive object. Dickie
be treated separately.) Dickie's failure, if remarks of A-weak-theory that it is com-
I read him rightly, to explain in which mitted to "various kinds" of beautiful ob-
sense, precisely, "pleasure" is "unnecessary"jects, rather than a "specific kind." But the
to A-theory seems to create another lacuna in British often, indeed typically, affirm "vari-
his argument. An A-theorist might, pre- ous kinds" of beauty and whether A-weak-
sumably, choose to ignore the hedonic and theory holds to one or many kinds of beau-
affective components of aesthetic experi- tiful things, the category of the beautiful
ence, but then we would probably say that object is clearly not "unnecessary" to it.
he does not have a complete theory of such The "strong" version of A-theory does
experience. A theory grounded on aesthetic not suffer from this inconsistency. Now
perception does not, typically, confine itself "independent" properties are unquestion-
to such perception but rather essays a de- ably "unnecessary." For on this version, aes-
scription of the generic elements of the thetic perception "imposes," elsewhere "de-
total experience. Then "pleasure" (or termines" the aesthetic character of " (any)
something like it) becomes "necessary" to object." Dickie employs these locutions be-
the theory. Yet Dickie holds that A-theory cause he ties A-strong-theory to the Kantian
limits itself to just the one and only one or Idealist view that the knower invests the
category. Quite likely he means that object with properties arising from his
whereas pleasure is necessarily aroused by cognitive faculties (70-71, 74, 77). Dickie
the faculty of taste, there is no causal neces- thereby imports into A-strong-theory a par-
sity of its occurrence according to A-theory. ticularistic doctrine that limits severely the
But if an A-theory begins with disinterested applicability of his theory model. Thus it
perception, does that preclude the causal turns out that Schopenhauer is the sole in-
necessity of the arousal of pleasure? It is stance cited by Dickie of the strong version,
not clear, in logic, that it does. When we not only in the period under discussion, but
come to Schopenhauer, the very model of thereafter. All of the recent A-theorists cited
an A-theorist, in sec. III below, our logical by Dickie (Bullough, Vivas, Stolnitz, and
doubt will be confirmed. Aldrich) he takes to be exponents of the
The category of the object is more thorny, weak version. But I will show later that
so much so that Dickie's discussion creates, neither does Schopenhauer instance the
I judge, an internal inconsistency in his strong version.
meta-theory. Because, on A-theory, any ob- If the preceding arguments are sound,
ject whatever is aesthetic "if only" it is they confirm the earlier claim that the de-
perceived disinterestedly, such theory, un- cisive distinction between T- and A-theory
like T-theory, has no need for a "specific is the absence or presence of "disinterested

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The Aesthetic Attitude 413

perception." In respect of this category, found

not in the fact that Dickie takes Kant (in
those of pleasure or an independent ob- the Critique, not the Beobachtungen) to be
ject(s), the two models are logically op- a T-theorist (69). Moreover, what Dickie
posed. Therefore, to show that the Britishcalls (oddly, we will see) the "Platonic
employ this concept is to show that T-theory Form" is largely identical with Hutcheson's
misrepresents their thought far beyond the "uniformity in variety," which is, beyond
usual slippage and patching one expects in question, based upon it. Both are external,
adjusting the idealities of theory models to non-sensory properties that arouse taste.
the complexities of theory. The textual evi- Yet Dickie considers Hutcheson a paradigm
dence will also enable us to arrive at a more of T-theory. Shaftesbury is not, in truth, a
responsible judgment on the "historical T-theorist, but not for these two factitious
priorities" and, no less interesting, the his-reasons.

torical continuities. Let us begin with some texts that not

only express but are a likely historical
11.
source of Schiller's idea of disinterested-
ness, as put by Dickie, viz., " (loving) it for
1. Dickie grants that, in lightitself of my andpre-
no other reason." The generic
viously published studies of Lord Shaftes- meaning of "disinterestedness" in Shaftes-
bury, "It might at first seem reasonable to bury is the contradictory of "interested-
begin a discussion of actual theories of ness or self-love." In this sense, i.e., not
taste with a discussion of Shaftesbury's motivated by self-regard, Shaftesbury ap-
views" (59). He does not do so on the plies the term to a broad range of human
grounds that Shaftesbury, unlike the later, activities, such as appraisal or judgment,
empiricist British aestheticians, identified religiosity, and moral action. The accretion
beauty with its "Platonic Form" and that he of meaning which renders "disinterested"
disdained observation and introspection as positive and specific comes from its con-
methods of inquiry. Shaftesbury does not junction with the noun it qualifies and
accordingly exemplify T-theory. therefore with the structure and purpose
It needs first to be remarked that this of the activity it is used to describe. In
characterization of Shaftesbury is mislead reflective appraisal, self-concern must be
ingly one-sided. Were Shaftesbury so stren- excluded because it obstructs judging the
uously metaphysical as Dickie makes him issue on its merits. Religion involves a dif-
out to be, it would be difficult to explain ferent sort of activity. Shaftesbury opposes
Shaftesbury's extraordinary popularity and to " (serving) God . . . for interest mleerely"
influence in England across the century.9 the "disinterested love of God," which is
Throughout his writings, Shaftesbury elabo- actuated solely by "the excellence of the
rates discursive, introspective descriptions object."12 Again, the moral person is such
of the man of aesthetic refinement, which if and only if he acts out of the love of
are anything but alien, in manner or con- goodness "for its own sake, as good and
tent, to his successors.10 Because of the inti- amiable in itself" (I, 274). So the Schiller
mate relation between Shaftesbury's ethics notion is unmistakably here, though not yet
and aesthetics, Sidgwick's judgment, applied to aesthetic experience.
"Shaftesbury is the first moralist who dis- Dickie has it - this is his basic historical
tinctly takes psychological experience as the contention - that none of the eighteenth-
basis of ethics," n is very much to the century British distinguish ordinary from
present point. But even if Dickie's charac- aesthetic or disinterested perception. Were
terization of Shaftesbury were accurate, his this true, the nature of perception could
exclusion of Shaftesbury would rest on an not answer the question put throughout the
illegitimately special reading of T-theory, century (though it is hardly mentioned by
as he himself has earlier defined it. The Dickie) ,3 Why does not taste react com-
method of inquiry is no part of that theory. monly or universally to beautiful things?
If any further proof were needed, it is to be The reply suggested by Dickie's account is

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 414 STOLNITZ

that the faculty of tasteconverge here, ironically,

is largely or wholly despite their anti-
lacking in many men. This
theticalanswer does
metaphysical not
tempers, the one an
exemplar
suffice for the British, for of cosmic optimism,
Shaftesbury leastthe other, of
of all. For crucial to his polemic against pessimism. For both Shaftesbury and Scho-
Locke's conventionalism and construction- penhauer consider aesthetic contemplation
alism, which render our ideas of goodness the sole or almost the only surcease from the
and beauty "unnatural,"l4 is Shaftesbury's restless instability of the incessant efforts of
certitude that our capacity to respond to interestedness.
the aesthetic and moral goodness in things In the single respect in which, I have
is inherent in and "natural" to human argued, T- and A-theories are mutually
beings,'5 who are "made for contemplation" exclusive, Shaftesbury is an A-theorist. Then
(II, 97). his aesthetic can run together, without in-
Having argued that nothing is ugly consistency,
(II, elements of both theories to
122), Shaftesbury raises the question produce a model that is, I urge, far more
why
most men fail to appreciate beauty. His apt for the analysis of the early-century
answer is, in part, that men commonly lookBritish.
at the world interestedly. Perception does According to Shaftesbury, when but only
not usually dwell on its object; rather it when we see and hear disinterestedly (else
serves and is constrained by anticipatory men would respond uniformly to beauty),
concern for the self. Thus Shaftesbury re- beauty is apprehended or enjoyed. Yet it is
currently opposes contemplation - the term not apprehended by the external senses.
Dickie assigns, appropriately, to A-theory - Whether beauty be that of "the ordinary
to interestedness. Things perceived with bodies . . . of sense" or moral character (I,
"eager desires, wishes, and hopes" are not 251), it is "known and acknowledged" (II,
for that reason objects of the "refined con- 137) by an "inward eye" (common to all
templation of beauty" (II, 127-128). Con- men). This "plain internal sensation" (II,
templation or "mere view" is not directed 63) is immediate and involuntary. Shaftes-
and limited by the purpose of sensual or bury's concept of the "inward eye" is thus
economic possession. It is "seeing and ad- the historical source of the faculty of taste
miring only."'6 Even apparently "ghastly in the later British. Unlike that taste, it is,
and hideous" objects in nature can be seen in Dickie's terms, "cognitive" as well as
to be "beauteous in themselves" (II, 122- "reactive." This does not affect the telling
126) . Similarly, contemplation of the mathe- historical fact that Shaftesbury bequeathes
matical proof is wholly divorced from "any to his followers (in both senses) the decisive
private interest of the creature" and would insight that the functioning of this faculty
be impossible were it not. The joy that ac- requires what Dickie ascribes to A-theory
companies the perception "turns wholly alone, viz., "a certain mode of perception
upon what is exterior and foreign to our- or consciousness" and that this mode of
selves" (I, 296). By contrast, those who consciousness is described by Shaftesbury as
are incessantly covetous "are not so taken disinterested in precisely the sense of the
out of themselves, but that they still look term which Dickie, properly, attributes to
towards their end."'7 Schopenhauer.
Shaftesbury's statement of "aesthetic dis- Though he denies that Shaftesbury is a
interestedness" is less explicit and official T-theorist (without, of course, taking him
than Schopenhauer's. Yet in the former, to be an A-theorist either), Dickie com-
more originally, as in the latter, is the ments that Shaftesbury is close to T-theory
salient idea of the perceiver devoting him- insofar as he "makes the specific Form of
self wholly to contemplation. Perception is Beauty the object of contemplation" (77),
then freed from its usual subservience to thereby limiting aesthetic experience to
will and is concentrated upon the object one "specific kind" of object. I have pointed
for its own sake. The perceiver is thus out that the category of this kind (s) of ob-
"taken out of himself." The two thinkers ject is not peculiar to T-theory, for it is

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 The Aesthetic Attitude 415

entailed by Dickie's own statementbreak of A- away from T-theory. Since the argu-
weak-theory as well. Hence Dickie's remark
ment must rest on the texts, my discussion
cannot be sustained by his meta-theory. But authors will necessarily be of some-
of these
what larger compass than Dickie's (a few
further, the remark, like some of its neigh-
bors, imperils our understanding of Shaftes-
sentences each).
bury, since it is not sustained by the Ontext
the sufficiently obvious point that Ad-
either. dison is "much more the essayist than the
Lacking any elucidation, one presumes
philosopher,"19 Dickie and I are agreed.
that Dickie means by "the specific Form"
Yet in an age when the two occupations
what Shaftesbury repeatedly callswere
"har-
less divorced from each other, the
mony," "proportion," and "order." But likely borrowings from Shaftesbury by Ad-
Shaftesbury takes pains to deny that thesedison, "always a close reader of the Char-
terms denote just a single property, moreacteristics,"20 are substantial:
particularly a property that is static, acheve:
A man of a polite imagination is let into a great
". . . the beautifying, not the beautified, is
many pleasures, that the vulgar are not capable
the really beautiful" (II, 131). "Real" of receiving. He . . . often feels a greater satis-
beauty is processual, the "plastic power" of faction in the prospect of fields and meadows,
a designing mind working itself out in art than another does in the possession. It gives
and nature. The product of such creativity him, indeed, a kind of property in every thing
he sees, and makes the most rude uncultivated
is another kind of beauty, the "beautified." parts of nature administer to his pleasures: so
Inanimate things are such products. Human that he looks upon the world, as it were in an-
beings, in their lives and communities, em- other light, and discovers in it a multitude21 of
body both the dynamic and its result. They charms, that conceal themselves from the gener-
ality of mankind.22
are "the forms which form" (II, 132). And
finally, the "sovereign beauty," which forms Beauty is ubiquitous in things but men
all minds and progressively informs the often fail to appreciate it; the man who
universe. The two latter classes are of su-
can do so is distinguished by his pleasures
perior worth because they possess different and his perception ("prospect," "sees,"
kinds of beauty. That Shaftesbury does not "looks upon"); he is thereby set off from
therefore satisfy the demand of T-theory the man who owns things; hence his
for a single "specific kind" of object is the"kind of property" is more extensive; it
lesser side of the coin, since the application
includes even landscapes generally found
of that model to Shaftesbury has been more uninviting-point for point, this passage
basically impugned in my previous discus-parallels the like discursive, eulogistic
sion. It would be far more regrettable if
description of aesthetic refinement in
Shaftesbury's striking, pluralistic conception those pages in Shaftesbury (II, 125-128),
of beauty were obscured for the contem-in which the essence of such refinement is
porary reader by the spurious constraints of said to be the attitude of disinterestedness.
T-theory. There is even more occasion for This fact does not establish but it suggests
regret in Dickie's use of the phrase, "the that the latter concept is at work in Addison
Platonic Form," with its connotations of also.
immobility and causal powerlessness, against One who discerns beauty (and other aes-
which Aristotle inveighed, and which, as thetic values) in all of the objects around
we have just seen, exactly distort Shaftes-him "looks upon the world in another
bury's thought. But finally, Shaftesbury no- light." Dickie says that this phrase sounds
where uses the phrase, "the Platonic Form."like A-theory but he dismisses it as "an iso-
2. Of the later British, Dickie refers to lated and undeveloped remark" (64).
Addison, Hutcheson, Hume,'8 Burke, and
Dickie's characterization is substantially cor-
Alison. I will argue that the early-century
rect, though it does not follow that what Ad-
authors are read more justly on the model dison says here should simply be dismissed,
of disinterested perception cum T-theoryparticularly in view of the affinities to
first found in Shaftesbury. Burke and AlisonShaftesbury. And there are one or two

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 416 STO L N I T Z

other passages in the Essays apposite to that(PA, 171). Hutcheson cannot mean here
just quoted. Economic ownership is a clear that the inner sense might have "ideas of
case of the involvement of the self and its property." That sense, by definition, re-
anticipatory concerns. So too appreciation sponds to uniformity only and can experi-
is generally precluded when the landscape ence only the idea of beauty (Inq., 80, PA
is dangerous but not when it is viewed 5). Rather, since inner sense is second-order,
without a sense of threat to the self. Then it functions only when consciousness is not
we can "look on" and take delight in it dominated by personal concern. Ordinary
(354). Thus it is not that a "specific kind"perception of things possessing uniformity
of object, by virtue of its properties, simply(everything does) does not "necessarily"
"triggers" aesthetic response. Rather, one produce the idea of beauty. It does not
and the same object may or may not do so, when the object is seen as serving interest.
depending on whether perception is affectedThus inner sense functions "instinctively"
by motives of interestedness. It may be that only if consciousness is disinterested in
Addison is also distinguishing aesthetic Shaftesbury's meaning. Similarly, reason
from instrumental perception when hecan function either interestedly or disin-
sets
it off from "our more serious employments" terestedly. It often engages in causal inquiry
(325), notably acquiring knowledge (324) which serves an ulterior purpose and is
or "our searches after truth" (349). thereby distinguished from the appreciation
3. "Uniformity amidst variety," a non- of beauty (Inq., 11, 37). Sometimes, how-
sensory property, is ubiquitous in things ever, men practice deductive reasoning
(Inq., 70 ff., PA, 171) ;23 the internal sense, simply for "the immediate pleasure of con-
which experiences ideas of beauty when templating the beauty" of the proof (Inq.,
objects possessing this property are per- 35). The object is then a cause but it is not
ceived, is commonly present in human be- considered by the perceiver as a cause.
ings (Inq., 74 ff.; PA, xi); the idea occurs The exclusion of association is not, as
"necessarily" and involuntarily (Inq., 11) - Dickie says, in the "background." It is quite
in these basic propositions, Hutcheson emu- explicit: ". . . the casual conjunctions of
lates Shaftesbury. Hutcheson concludes, ideas may give a disgust, where there is
though with some misgiving (Inq., xv-xvi), nothing disagreeable in the form itself"
that the experience of beauty is "universal." (Inq., 73; cf. PA, 102). Hutcheson would
So far, Hutcheson appears to be a paradigm apparently proscribe all association on the
of T-theory. ground that it is alien to contemplation of
Like his predecessors, however, Hutche- "the form itself." Yet his examples are
son must grapple with diversity of response. chiefly of self-concern. Like Shaftesbury and
He therefore details the conditions which Addison, he cites objects such as "ravenous"
prevent aesthetic experience. First, when animals and a stormy sea. When the self-
the perceiver is motivated by "prospect of concern which they arouse is, like that of
advantage." In the Inquiry, Hutcheson property, overcome, these things, "really
states as a fact that such motivation is ab- beautiful enough," can be appreciated
sent from the "contemplation" of uniform- (Inq., 72-73). Again, men often fail to
ity (78). Later it is said to be inimical to respond to the beauty of a thing because
contemplation. Like Shaftesbury and Addi- they have "seen or expected greater beauty"
son, Hutcheson singles out possession or (Inq., 70). Such expectation seems to be a
ownership as the clear case of interested- further instance of "prospect of advantage."
ness. The "proprietor" is opposed to the 4. Burke vigorously repudiates any re-
"spectator" (PA, 172), an inexplicable con- active faculty of taste,24 such as inner sense,
trast if both view the world in the only and thereby the "central element" in T-
way
in which, according to T-theory, the world theory. Dickie fails to note this fact ex-
can be viewed. Further, Hutcheson writes, plicitly; he does, however, move to another
"it is necessary to keep the sense [of beauty] meaning of "taste." Dickie says that, in
free from foreign ideas of property ..." Burke, the faculty of taste is "simply the

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The Aesthetic Attitude 417

disposition to respond" to beauty (61). What Alison means by "sign or expres-

Dickie thereby places Burke in T-theory, by sion of mind" has to be understood in light
altering, not the victim, as in his dealing of the breakdown of the century-long at-
with Hutcheson, but rather the bed, as with tempts to reconcile with the theorist's pre-
Shaftesbury. In this quite different and conceptions or to explain away the facts of
broader sense, "taste" is by no means pecu- diversity of response. So Alison holds that
liar to the British or to T-theory. As we will the "original sense" of Shaftesbury and
see, it occurs, without inconsistency, in what Hutcheson must fall to these facts (II, 303-
Dickie takes to be an A-theory. 304). Since they are not to be explained
5. Dickie does, however, raise large ques- away, the facts must be explained. The
tions about the concepts, "beauty," and properties of things apprehended by the
"disinterestedness," in Alison. senses are known pan-humanly (I, 8). Yet
I have argued that Alison, at the close of it is not these properties that are themselves
the century, abandons the efforts of all of the source of beauty (I, xiii, xxiii). The
the century's major thinkers to identify the experience of beauty requires association
properties common and peculiar to beauti- with these properties. These associations
ful things.25 Dickie rejects this view, since may be peculiar to the upbringing or so-
he finds in Alison as well the typical at- ciety of the beholder. They may even be,
tempt of T-theorists to "isolate the specific again without prejudice to the aesthetic
kind of object" (66). He therefore cites character and value of the experience,
passages which locate beauty in "expressions wholly personal, idiosyncratic, "casual or
of mind or signs of qualities of mind" (67) . accidental." Given a purely personal recol-
In works of art, the mind is that of the lection, the object becomes the "sign" of
artist, in nature, that of God. Hence all it; this affective association produces "the
possible aesthetic objects are thought to be same emotion" of beauty as do widely shared
subsumed under the formula just quoted. associations (II, 192-193); the experience
Yet to stop here, as Dickie does, is no is one of authentic beauty (II, 198). Thus
service to historical understanding. To say material qualities are "the sign of some
that a thing is a sign or expression of mind quality capable of producing emotion"
does not mean, for Alison, that it has a either "from nature" or "from accident"
property (like harmony or uniformity) (II, 415). Indeed, to be such a sign means
fixed into it by artistic design26 or in any ("in other words") to arouse an emotion
other way. Alison cites an autumnal scene (II, 266). Hence even purely personal as-
which excites a feeling of melancholy and sociations can be "solely" responsible for
then a "train of thought," which retains this the fact that an object - any object - is
affective quality, of the "decay of life" (I, "expressive of" "qualities of mind" and
17). Such arousal of a "simple emotion" and therefore beautiful (II, 421-422). More
of the associations it colors is integral to the "uniform" beauty is more "permanent," but
experience of beauty, for Alison. Again, the not uniquely aesthetic. And even these
Springtime excites cheerfulness and associ- beauties are relativized by differing predilec-
ations not at all those of "decay" (I, 75). tions, so that some qualities "are never the
These are the clearest cases (I, 16-17) of foundation of beauty to us, however much
"expressions" that are stable and widespread they may be to others" (II, 285; cf. II,
in aesthetic experience. Yet one might not 419-422). Similarly, works of art, which are
have these feelings and associations; one designed to fix some expressive characteristic
might, indeed, have precisely the opposite into the object, are open to personal asso-
response, as when the Springtime scene ciations, and the experience is, yet again,
arouses a feeling and thoughts of sadness not un-aesthetic for that reason (I, 84-85,
(I, 91); and yet, Alison is (repetitiously) 286-287).
explicit, one's response would not therefore We can now put the point simply: Given
be any the less aesthetic, would be no less that x is beautiful, can we infer the proper-
an experience of beauty. ties of x? In Shaftesbury, we can; they are

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 418 STO LN ITZ

proportion and/or beautifying. Inrequisite

expression" Hutche- to beauty is not some
son, it is uniformity in variety; in Burke, "aspect of the external world" like its sen-
smallness or delicacy or . . ., and so on. The sory properties. It is, rather, the arousal of
inference cannot be drawn in Alison. There some emotion which these properties suggest
is no limit in principle to the properties either "from nature" or "from accident."
possessed by beautiful things or to such So, in the Autumn landscape, the decay of
things. Therefore there is no "specific kind flowers or the dimming of the sun (I, 16-17)
of object" in Alison as demanded by T- arouses a feeling of melancholy or, as we
theory. have found, of its precise opposite. Does
We ought to be clear about this, in order Alison distinguish the mode of attention
to insure not only fidelity to the text but requisite to such feeling from other modes
also a just estimate of Alison's historical im- of attention or, specifically, disinterested
portance. He employs beauty as almost the from interested attention? Clearly, the griev-
sole value-category (of the categories prolif- ing person, preoccupied with his suffering,
erated by the century, he retains only sub- is not attending to the external world, and
limity) while cutting its traditional ties to Alison therefore excludes him as an aes-
objective properties, either formal or ma- thetic percipient. But what makes Dickie
terial. Moreover, he attempts to understand think that husbandmen are, as a class, un-
beauty in terms of the later increasingly happy or unconscientious or both? "The
influential concept of expression. And he husbandman . . . goes out to observe the
clearly draws the implication that when state of his grounds . . ." (I, 95). He is
"beauty" is thus radically reinterpreted, no attending closely to the world, but inter-
limits can be set to the evolution of the estedly. Hence he is not "open" to the
arts (II, 430 if.). Alison's thought thereby feeling and the "reverie" colored by feeling
prefigures some of the major dialectical ad- that constitute aesthetic response. That
vances and tensions of nineteenth- and twen- Alison explicitly excludes attention thus
tieth-century aesthetics. We would blind constrained by ulterior purpose is evidenced
ourselves to the originality and richness of in many passages. He speaks of a man who
his thinking if we took it to be still another settles in the country. "The aspect in which
specimen of eighteenth-century T-theory he now sees [the objects around him], is
(supposing there were any such theory). solely that in which they are calculated to
But whether an object arouses feeling and produce emotion." Clearly, Alison is not
a "train of thought" depends on how it is using "aspect," like Dickie, to denote a
perceived, which brings us back to disinter- property or properties, but rather a way of
estedness. looking or of being seen. Why is it that the
The experience of beauty requires, Alisonstreams and other rural objects become "un-
affecting" to the country dweller? Is it be-
says, that one should be "open to all the im-
pressions which the objects that are before uscause he simply does not attend to these
can produce" (quoted, 68). In this, Dickie objects? Alison replies that it is, on the
urges, Alison is not distinguishing some contrary, because "he is forced to consider
mode of attention peculiar to aesthetic ex- them in very different lights [cf. "aspects"].
perience: ". . . there is attention to aspects They are useful to him for some pur-
of the external world and inattention to poses....' So " (they) become boundaries
such aspects" (69). These "aspects" are, as or landmarks" which abet knowledge and
practical behavior (I, 102-104). Similarly,
before, the signs or expressions of the artist's
mind. Thus, Dickie holds, Alison's ex- the proprietor (as in Shaftesbury, Addison,
amples of non-aesthetic experience - some- and Hutcheson), for whom the objects he
one grieving or in pain, or the husbandman owns are not elegant. This is because he
- illustrate inattention to these aspects. "must . . . see them in different lights" (v.
Dickie's earlier error in construing the Addison). For him, these objects "serve
meaning and range of "signs or expressions some end, or answer some purpose," and
of mind" is perpetuated here. The "sign or are not, for this reason, "objects of taste" (I,

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The Aesthetic Attitude 419

105). Again, the art historian or curator in the classic passage quoted earlier. There
"may attend to" the physical condition are,
orhowever, very real questions whether
history of the sculpture but he cannot there- this concept renders the T-categories of
fore feel its "timidity" or "dignity" (I,taste, 97- pleasure, and specific kinds of objects
98). In all these passages, attention in "unnecessary."
the I have conjectured Dickie
interest of forward-looking purpose is set they are so in A-theory because they
thinks
off from that which is not and is therefore are not there inplicated in the causal mech-
"open" to the object. Most generally, where anism of the aesthetic experience and there-
there is some antecedent desire, such as fore need not be included in the examina-
curiosity or hunger, its gratification is tion of such experience. I now want to show
pleasure. Such pleasure is wholly un-aes- that every one of these concepts is no less
thetic (I, 170-171). "necessary" to Schopenhauer than they are
T-theory may arguably bring out the to the soi-disant T-theorists.
structure of the Essays by Addison, the least The aesthetic object (s): Begin by recall-
systematic of the British thinkers. Applied ing Dickie's statement of A-strong-theory:
to the other authors cited by Dickie, it dis- disinterested "perception or consciousness
torts and obscures their thought. T-theory imposes" or, alternatively, "determines" the
therefore "raises a dust" over both their aesthetic character of its object.27 The itali-
genuine intramural continuities and their cized sentence just quoted from Alison is
historical originality in articulating "dis- an exemplar of such theory. Except that, as
interested perception" and its manifold con-
Dickie proceeds, he ties "impose" and "de-
sequences for aesthetic theory. T-theorytermine"
is to the Kantian doctrine of the
most ineptly unhelpful in dealing with constitutive activity of the knowing mind.
Alison. He makes disinterestedness a con- As applied to Schopenhauer, this is unex-
dition of the experience of beauty; he re- ceptionable in dealing with the spatiotem-
pudiates belief in a "specific kind of object";poral and causal properties of things. Yet,
and he rejects a faculty, such as inner sense, as Dickie notes, aesthetic perception and
corresponding to this object. Indeed, so far knowledge are set off from perception of
from being a T-theorist, Alison is, in the phenomenal. In aesthetic perception,
Dickie's scheme, closest to just the opposite and only then, we know the Platonic Idea
pole, A-strong-theory: of the object (or, better, of the species of the
object).
Wherever the appearances of the material world
are expressive to us of qualities we love or ad- As the structure of the classic sentence
mire, wherever, from our education, our con- from sec. 34 suggests, such cognition is, at
nections, our habits, or our pursuits, its quali- least conceptually, distinguishable from the
ties are associated in our minds with affecting
description of the aesthetic attitude spelled
or interesting emotion, there the pleasures of
beauty and sublimity are felt, or at least are out in the first half of the sentence. Now, if
capable of being felt. Our minds, instead of be- such pivotal terms as "will" and "object" in
ing governed by the character of external ob- the first half were disentangled from their
jects, are enabled to bestow upon them a char- metaphysical allegiances in Schopenhauer's
acter which does not belong to them. . . . (II,
philosophy, the resulting account of aes-
428; italics added).
thetic perception would not be logically
III. bound up with Platonic Ideas. More gen-
erally, any "specific kind (s) of object"
Schopenhauer, whom Dickie classifies, might then be "unnecessary" to an aes-
uniquely, as an A-strong-theorist, instead, thetic theory, disinterestedness being neces-
like the British, combines A- and T-theories sary and sufficient for the existence of an
so intricately that he, like the British, con- aesthetic object. Our hypothetical thinker
founds the distinction between these might then hold (ignoring "taste" and
theories. "pleasure" for the moment) to an A-strong-
There is no question but that Schopen- theory. But Schopenhauer is not such a
hauer propounds "the aesthetic attitude" thinker. For Schopenhauer, aesthetic con-

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 420 STOLNITZ

templation has, in all cases, a unique and "tied to Platonic ideas, but not to any par-
exclusive object, the Platonic Idea. The ticular one." Then, since everything ex-
relation is not contingent. It is, logically, presses some Idea, "Platonic ideas place no
impossible that it should not obtain. Dis- restriction on the operation of aesthetic
interestedness and cognition of Ideas are contemplation," from which, again, it is
conceptually distinguishable but they are supposed to follow that "contemplation
"necessary correlatives" (I, 271) and there- determines the beautiful" (77).
fore the "two inseparable constituent parts" This argument is wretched. Certainly the
of aesthetic contemplation (I, 253). More- Platonic Idea is of a different nature in the
over, music, which Dickie does not refer to, various "grades" of being. But the issue is
affords, again necessarily, still another dis- whether once Schopenhauer affirms that
tinctive "kind of object" to contemplation. contemplation is and must be of the Idea,
One sees that Dickie wishes to adduce an and of nothing else, he has thereby "placed
example of A-strong-theory but it is difficult no restriction" on contemplation. To point
to see how he could have made a less feli- the issue, is contemplation free to dwell
citous choice than Schopenhauer. on all or any of the phenomenal properties
Yet Dickie says of A-theory generally (and of the particular thing? Nor is the salient
thus, inconsistently, of A-weak-theory) that "restriction" affected by the universality of
it gives up any "shred of contact withbeauty; the it holds whether some or all things
external world." Are Platonic Ideas "im- express Ideas. But given Dickie's present
posed" upon the object by the knower? argument, it might be noted that Shaftes-
Dickie quotes Schopenhauer saying that the bury, Addison, and Hutcheson also claim
object apprehended aesthetically "becomes the universality of beauty (or aesthetic
. . . the Idea" (76). But though Schopen- value) and moreover distinguish several
hauer creates familiar difficulties within his kinds of beauty; therefore. . . . Indeed,
system in allowing non-phenomenal cogni- Dickie out-Herods Herod. There are clear
tion, there is no doubt that Platonic Ideas indications in the second edition that
and, in the case of music, a fortiori, will, are Schopenhauer himself had misgivings about
metaphysically of a very different order from the narrowness of his official doctrine. So
space and causality. We need to remind he makes the lame remark that painting, in
ourselves of the reiterations that the Idea is addition to expressing Ideas forthrightly,
"that which alone is really essential to the possesses a "subordinate kind of beauty"
world" (I, 238), immutable (I, 228) and not "essential" to the art. This beauty is
therefore authentically real (I, 235), in sum, created by such properties as "the mere har-
"Platonic." What Schopenhauer calls mony of the colors" (III, 197).
"beauty in the objective sense" (I, 260) is The oddness of Dickie's handling of
the expression of such an Idea. Moreover, Schopenhauer can be focussed in his render-
Schopenhauer also speaks of a higher de- ing of the passage which he quotes as (I
gree (I, 272) or a different sense (I, 261) interpolate "a)," "b)," and the primes)
of objective beauty, viz., the especially clear "a) everything is the expression of an Idea;
and vivid expression of the Idea. Such b) it follows that everything is also beauti-
beauty "compels" aesthetic appreciation (I, ful.' Dickie takes this to mean ("That is")
272). On neither sense of "beauty" is the that "a') anything may become an object
concept, as Dickie would have it, "com- of aesthetic contemplation, and b') may,
pletely subjectivized." therefore, be beautiful" (76). But even if
Dickie is, within limits, aware of the a) implies a'), the two sentences do not
trouble Schopenhauer's theory makes for have the same meaning, quite apart from
him. He remarks that the "objective pole" the difference in their modalities, and the
of contemplation, viz., the Ideas, seems to modality of b) is not that of b'). In the
move Schopenhauer into T-theory, which total sentence (I, 271) from which Dickie
is "tied to a specific feature of the world." quotes in part, a') is stated independently,
The way out is that Schopenhauer's view is as distinguished from a). The modality of

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The Aesthetic Attitude 421

the conclusion, b), is that of a), not a') ; b')

in seeking to utter itself. Take it all in all
is not Schopenhauer's conclusion. Men may
and it is not easy to resist robust skepticism
sometimes perceive the world aesthetically;
of Dickie's revisionism.
the world is beautiful. But because A-theory
is "completely subjectivized," Dickie com-1 George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca,
pletely subjectivizes Schopenhauer. 1974), ch. 2. All parenthetical page references to
Taste: Already in dealing with the Dickie
Brit- in the text are to this work. In quotations
from Dickie and all other sources, italics are in
ish, we have seen, Dickie has to give up this
the original except where otherwise indicated.
concept with the meaning of an "inner,"
2 Cf. Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Significance of
"reflex" sense. He then takes it more broad-
Lord Shaftesbury in Modemrn Aesthetic Theory."
ly as equivalent to "the disposition to re- Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 43 (April,
spond with . . . pleasure" to beauty (61). 1961), 97-113; "'Beauty': Some Stages in the His-
On either meaning, "taste" is supposedly tory of an Idea," Journal of the History of Ideas,
Vol. XXII, No. 2 (April-June, 1961), 185-204; "On
"unnecessary" to A-theory. Yet Schopen-the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness,'" JAAC,
hauer's concept of genius, which goes un- Vol. XX, No. 2 (Winter, 1961), 131-143; "Locke
mentioned in Dickie, has (applied to the and the Categories of Value in Eighteenth-Century
non-artist) substantially this second mean- British Aesthetic Theory," Philosophy, Vol.
ing. It is the capacity for aesthetic contem- XXXVIII, No. 143 (January, 1963), 40-51.
'Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and
plation, without which men "would have Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp (London, 1957), I, p.
no susceptibility for the beautiful" and 231.
would be "capable of no aesthetic pleasure 4 In his exposition of A-theory, Dickie speaks of
at all" (I, 251-252). disinterested perception being directed upon, al-
ternatively, the "aesthetic character" of objects or
Pleasure: Neither is "aesthetic pleasure"
"kinds of objects" (58).
referred to, though it is also ubiquitous inI omit "judgment," the one category common
Book III. I can see one way this might be to T- and A-theories.
justified. Since aesthetic contemplation is 'Cf. below, pp. 416, 418-19.
7 [Francis Hutcheson], An Inquiry into the Ori-
will-less, and Schopenhauer often holds
ginal of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 4th ed.
that pleasure is the absence of will and
(London, 1738), pp. xi, 4, 11-12; [Francis Hutche-
therefore of pain, one might argue that aes- son], An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the
thetic pleasure is just aesthetic perception Passions and Affections (London, 1728), pp. 27-29.
under a different description (cf. I, 254, The former work will henceforth be referred to
as Inq.; the latter, as PA.
280). But this probably cannot take us very 8Cf. above, n. 5.
far, for throughout the analyses of the sev- 9Cf. R. L. Brett, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury
eral arts (secs. 42-51), the aesthetic pleasure (London, 1951), pp. 56, 186; Ernest Tuveson, "The
which consists in or results from the stilling Importance of Shaftesbury," ELH, Vol. XX, No. 4
of the will is contrasted with that which is (December, 1953), 267, n. 1. So too Prof. Boulton,
in his Introduction to Burke's Inquiry: "That
due to the comprehension of the Ideas.
[Shaftesbury] was a popular and influential writer
If taste is actualized and pleasure aroused cannot be disputed." Edmund Burke, A Philo-
in aesthetic experience, according to T- sophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of
theory, so too is it on Schopenhauer's theory. the Sublime and Beautiful, cd. Boulton (London,
1958), p. lxvi.
If these concepts are therefore "necessary"
"?Cf. below, p. 415.
to the analysis of aesthetic experience in the 11 Alfred Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of
first theory, they are no less so in the sec-Ethics, 6th ed. (London, 1946), p. 190.
ond. 12 Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics
Given Schopenhauer's philosophical emi- of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc., ed. Rob-
ertson (London, 1900), II, 55-56. All parenthetical
nence, relative to the British, and the greater page references to Shaftesbury in the text are to
internal complexity of his aesthetic, the dis- this work.
tortion he suffers when A-theory is applied 13 Except in relation to Hume on taste (62-63) .
is not less grievous than that visited upon 14 Shaftesbury, Life, Unpublished Letters, and
Philosophical Regimen, ed. Rand (London, 1900),
the British by T-theory. But even prior to its
p. 403.
application, we have found that this meta- 16I, 260; cf. Philosophical Regimen, p. 403.
theory is, at strategic points, incoherent just "II, 267; Philosophical Regimen, p. 245.

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 422 STOLNITZ

'Philosophical Regimen, p. 113; cf., also, I, 327. is part of Addison's claim in Spe
18 For some unexplained reason, Dickie confines God has so endowed "almost every
himself to the essay, "Of the Standard of Taste" substantive question remains why
(54, n. 2). But any serious discussion of Hume on beneficence, "the generality of m
the structure of aesthetic experience would have experience "pleasures of the im
to go to his analyses of the beauty of form and passage quoted above from no. 4
utility in the Treatise. single out the conditions of perce
29"On the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterested- 28My discussion of Hutcheson i
ness,"' 140. beauty and, within beauty, to "ab
20 Brett, op. cit., p. 61. 24 Burke, op. cit., pp. 26-27, xxxi
25"'Beauty': Some Stages in the
1 There is an unfortunate typographical error
in Dickie at this point (63) which I have cor- Idea," 200 ff.
rected above. 26 Dickie misleads himself in eq
22 Spectator 411, in The Works of Joseph Addi- expressions of mind with expressi
son, ed. Greene (New York, 1856), VI, 325. My of the artist or "Divine Artist." For
earlier quotation from this passage ("On the Ori- expression is a sub-class of a sub-c
gins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'," 142) is fol- eric notion of signs or expressio
lowed by the sentence, "Hence 'almost every thing Archibald Alison, Essays on the N
about us' can arouse a pleasure of the imagination ciples of Taste, 4th ed. (Edinburgh
(no. 413, p. 334)." Dickie helpfully points out mny 423.
error in failing to indicate that the latter phrase 27 Cf. above, p. 412.

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