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4, October iggg
I
I shall first concentrate on what I am sure is the most plausible twentieth-century
version of the aesthetic attitude theory discussed by Dickie, that due to Stolnitz.3
This is the theory that when we are aesthetically engaged with a work of art, for
example, this fact is not to be explained in terms of the special nature of the
qualities perceived, but in terms of a special attitude which we take up, the
aesthetic attitude. Our normal attitude is pragmatic, driven by practical interest or
purpose; it thereby tends to select only those features of the object relevant to the
interest or purpose. Thus Schopenhauer speaks of relational and non-relational
perception: relational perception is that which is directed by a concern with
causal relationships between the object and something else (this is what Kant
means by saying that in aesthetic experience we care nothing for the 'real
existence' of the object). Because of this, normal, interest-driven attention tends
to be engaged only long enough to identify the interesting feature; it does not
dwell upon things, or contemplate them. It is restless. It notes the relevant facts
1
George Dickie, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. I (1964), pp. 54-64.
2
There is a good book on the subject, 77ie Aesthetic Attitude, by David Fenner (Humanities Press,
1996); for discussion of Dickie, see pp. 98-110. Fenner is reviewed by Nick McAdoo in this
journal, vol. 37, no. 4 (October 1097). In the past three years, however, no article whose principal
concern is the aesthetic attitude appears in either the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism or the
British Journal ofAesthetics. This contrasts with the recent plethora of articles on aesthetic properties.
3
J. Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, i960),
pp. 32-42-
and moves on. Whereas in the picture gallery, at least sometimes, we stand
arrested, transfixed: we gaze upon the object without our attention being motiv-
ated or directed by any identifiable practical concern. Thus, according to Stolnitz,
the aesthetic attitude is the attitude of disinterested attention—attention to the object
which is not driven by an interest—which is also 'sympathetic', and 'for its own
sake alone'.
Dickie focuses on the disinterestedness requirement; I shall follow him in
ignoring the requirement that the attention be 'sympathetic', but I shall return
briefly to the idea that aesthetic attention is attention to the object 'for its own
II
But Dickie's contention that the notion of interested attention collapses into that
of distraction or partial attention is surely mistaken. This is clearest where the
object attended to is a work of art. It seems straightforward that there can be cases
offull attention to a work of art which is not the sort of attention exercised in
aesthetic experience. There is a distinction to be drawn amongst cases of full
undistracted attention to the work of art that is too evident simply to be denied,
which must therefore be accommodated or reconstructed in some way or other.4
For example, a music student might listen closely to a piece in order to identify
key modulations or rhythmic groupings. This is not a case of distraction, not a case
of not attending to the music. Yet it is not an aesthetic attitude either, as the strug-
gling music student will attest (we murder to dissect). It would be a diversion
from the potential aesthetic experience but not diversion from the music.
Now in fact Dickie does consider examples of this kind. What he says is this:
That is, perhaps the attention is the same, but the purpose differs. But what exactly
does Dickie infer from this? He does not say explicitly what conclusion we are
On this point see also Dickie's exchange with Elmer Duncan in the letters section of the Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. XXIII, no. 4 (1965), pp. 517-518, and Dickie's Aesthetics: An
Introduction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1971), pp. 48-61.
The 1966 exchange between Dickie and Virgil Aldrich on this issue is frustrating because it is
framed entirely in terms of perception. See Aldrich, 'Back to Aesthetic Experience', Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. XXTV, no. 3 (1966), pp. 365-371 and Dickie, reply to Aldrich, Journal
ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. XXV, no. 1 (1967), pp. 89-91.
GARY KEMP 395
nothing to undermine it. With things put that way, it does not matter if Dickie is
right to say that the interested/disinterested distinction cannot be purely a per-
ceptual distinction. To be sure, the notion of the aesthetic attitude is meant to'
characterize a kind of experience, but not all experiential distinctions are pure
perceptual distinctions.
Alternatively, Dickie might say that the music student's attention, since it
focuses so narrowly upon one aspect of the music, necessarily excludes other
aspects or properties which may be essential to an understanding or aesthetic app-
In his reply to Aldrich (see preceding note) Dickie acknowledges this, but takes the point as
showing that if we have the notion of an aesthetic property, then there is no need to posit an
aesthetic attitude.
Fenner (/{esthetic Altitude, pp. 104-105) aptly denies the cogency of such a move on the grounds that
no demarcation of the class of aesthetic properties is possible that does not refer essentially to
experiences of those properties. I suspect, however, that an attitude-theorist—at least one inspired
by Kant—ought really to deny that the notion of an aesthetic property makes sense.
396 THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE
Ill
In this last section I want to develop a bit further this last point concerning the
place of the aesthetic attitude in aesthetics generally.
Dickie's criticism of Stolnitz's theory of the aesthetic attitude pretty clearly
fails. The real problem with that theory, I think, is messier. Take a slightly
different kind of case. A man attends his daughter's first concert performance as a
solo pianist. He listens intently and is pleased as she negotiates the intricate
counterpoint of Mozart's K. 533. His close attention is motivated partly by his
natural aesthetic receptivity but also, more efficaciously, by his concern for his
daughter's career. Nothing could help it more than that she should perform well
tonight. His listening is interest-driven: there is a clear sense in which he listens
closely because of a practical concern. But his attention is not thereby distracted or
partial, or need not be. The thought of his daughter's career may come to mind
during the performance, but it does not seem as if it has to, in order that his
attention be motivated by that concern. There is no reason to say that that kind of
Nick Zangwill, in 'UnKantian Notions of Disinterestedness', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 32,
no. i (January 1992), points out that Kant's claim is that aesthetic judgement is based upon dis-
interested pleasure, not upon a disinterested attitude or experience. Aesthetic experience might be
defined simply as that in which disinterested pleasure takes place, but it is not clear that Kant's
account actually delivers the concept of an aesthetic attitude, if by an attitude we mean not a type of
experience but something like a stance, something which can be activated at will. I think that the
philosophically most important aspect of the aesthetic attitude theory is independent of the
volitional question: the philosophically most important question is whether there is a specially
aesthetic type of experience, and if so, whether it should be explained entirely from the subjective
side, and not in terms of the distinctive sorts of objects or properties apprehended in aesthetic
experience. The cogent substance of the aesthetic attitude theory consists in its affirmative answers
to both questions. For more on the volitional question see Fenner (Aesthetic Attitude) and McAdoo's
review of same (see n. 2 above).
GARY KEMP 397
the idea can help with the pianist's father. In fact it can actually take over for
disinterestedness itself, and do the job better. In Art and Imagination, Roger
Scruton says that an interest in an object X for its own sake is
S. Kemal, Kant's Aesthetic Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). For a recent historical treatment
of the concept of disinterestedness which includes further references to the issue considered
historically, see A. Berleant, 'Beyond Disinterestedness', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 36, no. 3
(July 1994).
For an excellent discussion of the importance of explanation in aesthetic theory, as opposed to
mere extensional adequacy, see Nick Zangwill, 'Groundrules in the Philosophy of Art', Philosophy,
vol. 70 (1995).