Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ARC2020.SCD2017-2018 Cases in Legal and Judicial Ethics
ARC2020.SCD2017-2018 Cases in Legal and Judicial Ethics
Q – During the hearing of an administrative case against the wife of a judge, he seated beside his
daughter, the lawyer of his wife and assisted his daughter in the hearing. Is he guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge since he unabashedly introduced himself as counsel for the counsel? Why?
ANS: Yes. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting
would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law.
The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court
proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of
legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings (Ziga v.
Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 361, 368). To the Court, then, the judge engaged in the
private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in
making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer (Decena v. Judge Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2217, April 8, 2013, Bersamin, J).
Q – May a Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school be admitted to the Philippine Bar
Examination? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Section 5 of B.M. 1153 provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall
be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or
accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the
Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government” (Bar Matter
Q – A lawyer together with a paralegal went to a hospital several times to convince complainant to hire
their services. Is the act a case of malpractice where the SC can suspend the lawyer? Explain.
ANS: Yes. The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers are reminded to avoid at all times any
act that would tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including,
among others, the manner by which he makes known his legal services.
A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner. They are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. The CPR
explicitly states that “a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.” Corollary to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive
or interest. Thus, “ambulance chasing,” or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.
In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers, the lawyer
indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the court’s disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions (Palencia v. Atty. Pedro
Linsangan, et al., A.C. No. 10557, July 10, 2018).
Suspension of Lawyer
Q – An administrative complaint was filed against a lawyer. He was required to file a comment in
numerous resolutions but failed to do. He was cited in contempt. He was arrested and detained upon
order of the Court. To escape detention, he filed a motion for extension to file comment which was
granted. However, several years have passed and he has yet to file such comment. Is he guilty of willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of the SC, as well as gross misconduct? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
Q – A lawyer was suspended when he received money for the purpose of filing a case but failed to file it.
Can he be penalized? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Respondent’s failure to return the money to complainants despite failure to use the same for the
intended purpose is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on
him. His unjustified withholding of money belonging to the complainants warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money. was spent for the intended purpose. Conversely, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to the client
(Meneses v. Atty. Macalino, 518 Phil. 378, 385 [2006]; Segovia, et al. v. Atty. Rolando S. Javier, A.C. No. 10244,
March 12, 2018, Peralta, J).
Q – A lawyer’s services were engaged to register a title under the name of the client but despite
registration, he did not deliver it to the owner or representative. He fraudulently mortgaged the same.
Can he be penalized? Explain.
ANS: Yes. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary; it demands great fidelity and
good faith on the part of the lawyer. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) requires
lawyers to account for all money and property collected or received for and from their clients. In addition, Rule
16.03 mandates that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
He was guilty of abused of his client’s trust and confidence. Canon 17 of the CPR directs a lawyer to be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him (Gonzales v. Atty. Frisco B. Santos, A.C. No. 10178, June 19,
2018, Jardeleza, J).
Q – A lawyer was suspended for having failed to return money received by him for his client. Can he be
penalized? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds
for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own
use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client (Punla v. Maravilla-Ona,
A.C. No. 11149, August 15, 2017).
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great
fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client (Navarro v. Atty. Solidum, Jr., 725 Phil. 358, 368
[2014]). Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this
case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client (Adrimisin v. Atty. Javier, 532 Phil. 639, 645-646 [2006]; Yuzon v. Atty. Arnulfo M.
Agleron, A.C. No. 106684, January 24, 2018, Peralta, J).
Q – A lawyer was suspended due to his failure to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. In an
administrative complaint against him, a young daughter of the complainant testified that the lawyer
invited her and her mother to sleep with him on the same bed. From the bathroom, she saw the lawyer
emerged clad in a towel and suddenly entered the room. His defense was that, he could not have
committed immoral conduct, he being a respectable family man and civic leader and that he was merely
assisting the woman in the custody case over the child between the husband and wife. While the case
was pending, the complainant passed away. Will the case continue? Why?
ANS: Yes. The case can proceed in spite of complainant’s death and the apparent lack of interest on the part of
complainant’s heirs. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they are intended and
undertaken primarily to look into the conduct of behavior of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to
exercise the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any misconduct or misbehavior
which deviates from the mandated norms and standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which
are needful and necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the legal profession. Because not chiefly or
primarily intended to administer punishment, such proceedings do not call for the active service of prosecutors
(Gonzales v. Atty. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 482 [2006]; See also Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
Q – A lawyer was suspended for his failure to perform his duties for his client. After the decision in a
labor case by the NLRC ordering the client to pay, and despite receipt of the decision, he did not inform
the client and did not elevate it to the CA. The reason given by the lawyer was that the client has no
properties and money. May the lawyer be suspended because of negligence in the performance of his
duties? Explain.
ANS: Yes. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Lawyers
are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability
without the need to be reminded by either the client or the court.
Clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Therefore, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action (De Leon v. Atty.
Antonio A. Geronimo, A.C. No. 10441, February 14, 2018, Peralta, J).
Q – A lawyer was charged due to infidelity to the cause of his client by not appearing in the scheduled
hearings, thus, contributing to the delay of the case. Can she be penalized? Why?
ANS: Yes. A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter’s genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his/her rights (Camara v. Atty. Reyes, 612 Phil. 1, 7 [2009]).
An attorney is expected to exert his/her best efforts and ability to preserve his/her client’s cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his/her client, likewise, serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to
the bar and to the public (Cabuello v. Atty. Editha Talaboc, A.C. No. 10532, November 7, 2017, Peralta, J).
Q – May a lawyer be suspended for failure to pay an obligation to the vendor. She was the vendee in a
contract of sale of a realty but there was an unpaid balance of the purchase price which she refused and
failed to pay. Explain.
ANS: Yes. As a lawyer, an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all her dealings and
emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the practice of the legal
profession, but in her personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his
behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the
public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their
relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or
in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court (Ong v. Atty.
Delos Santos, 728 Phil. 332, 339 [2014]; Yap v. Atty. Grace Buri, A.C. No. 11156, March 19, 2018, Peralta, J).
Q – May the son of a lawyer purchase a property subject of litigation where his father is the lawyer?
Explain.
ANS: Yes. Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession. Here, however,
respondent lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in litigation. For, in point of fact, it
was his son Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the subject property. The rationale advanced for
the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these
persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the
records would show that complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated on
ATTORNEY’S FEES
DISBARMENT
Q – May the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigate government lawyers who are charged with
administrative offenses in relation to their official duties? Explain.
ANS: No. The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary
authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. [1]). The Office of the
Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability of
government officials "in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people" (Sec. 13, R.A. No. 6770). In Samson v. Restrivera, A.C. No. 8168, October 12, 2016
the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 11 kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure. Consequently, acts or
missions of public officials relating to the performance of their function as government officials are within the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman (Alicias, Sr. v. Atty. Myrna Macatangay,
et al., A.C. No. 7478, January 11, 2017, Carpio, J).
Q – What is the role of the Integrated Bar of the Phils. in the SC’s power to discipline lawyers? Explain.
ANS: The authority of the court to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law, where it
ruled that parenthetically, it is the SC that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.
(Constitution [1987], Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional power of the SC. Its recommended penalties are also, by
its nature, recommendatory. (A.C. No. 10537, p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]).
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that “proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines … upon the verified
complaint of any person.” However, this authority is only to assist the Court with the investigation of the case,
to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
(Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 &
10584, February 18, 2015; Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537 p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]).
Q – State the effect if a lawyer appeared as counsel while serving suspension. Explain.
ANS: A lawyer serving suspension when she represented her husband in a pending case may be suspended
again because of willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney of a party without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
She would have deserved a harsher penalty, but the Court recognized the fact that it is part of the
Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family
member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that her actuation was prompted by her affection
to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to
mitigate the severeness of her penalty. (Feliciano v. Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, March 11,
2015).
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final
resolution and the final decision of this Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary
proceeding against petitioner became a matter of public concern considering that it arose
from his representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the internet. The
interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as
counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related
to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility involving the controversy (Atty. Harry Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of
Staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, et al., G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Leonen, J).
Q – May a prosecutor who was convicted of the crime of bribery be disbarred? Explain.
ANS: Yes. A prosecutor was convicted of the crime of direct bribery can be disbarred because the crime of direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the
grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been
“done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It must involve an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.” (Re: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 366, 371; Catalan, Jr.
v. Sivosa, A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 352).
Q – A lawyer was charged in a disbarment case for having drafted a fake decision of the CA making it
appear that her client was acquitted and delivered the decision to her client for consideration of P1M.
The Justices filed a complaint for disbarment for representing herself as a lawyer who can influence
Justices of the CA to secure the acquittal of the accused and for defrauding the relatives of the client to
a amass a large sum of money. May the lawyer be disbarred? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings. Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or
malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship (Luna v. Atty. Gal arr it a, 763 Phil. 175, 184 (2015)).
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar
him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney. However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the bar, the Court have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through
substantial evidence (Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, et al., v. Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon, A.C. No. 12415,
Q – A complaint for disbarment was filed against a lawyer alleging that he sent demand letter in order
to interpose threats that should he fail to pay the sum of P18M the remaining balance of the purchase
price of a property, he will file a criminal, civil and administrative complaint. According to the
complainant, those acts are tantamount to blackmail or extortion. Is the contention correct? Explain.
ANS: No. These demands were based on a legitimate cause or issue. The lawyer was merely acting in compliance
with his lawyer’s oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client. There is nothing in the demand letters to
show that the same was maliciously made with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid
and justifiable cause. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his
client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his
client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period (Malvar v. Atty. Freddie B. Fiez, A.C. No. 11871, March 5, 2018, Peralta, J).
Q – State the requirements in case a dual citizen wants to practice law in the Philippines. Explain.
ANS: A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to resume the practice
of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the
Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. Adherence
to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law (In re: Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege
to Practice law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012).
WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE
Q – A lawyer may withdraw from a case he was handling. State the rule that he has to comply with in the
withdrawal of counsel. Explain.
ANS: Under the Rules, an attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without
the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that
he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to
the adverse party (Rule 138, Sec. 26, Rules of Court; Chang v. Atty. Jose Hidalgo, A.C. No. 6934, April 6, 2016,
Leonen, J).
Q – The complainants engaged the services of the lawyer as their counsel in a case. He served as such
counsel and with his assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half
of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to
counsel as his legal fees. Can he be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters
subsequent to the termination of the case like registration of the land? Explain.
ANS: No. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the
complainants had no right to assume that his legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of
indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client. His alleged failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to
provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his
engagement in the case did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come
under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of the case. (Campugan, et al. v. Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., et al., A.C. No. 8261; Campugan, et al. v. Atty. Caluya, et al., A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015,
Bersamin, J).
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Champertous contract.
Q – Practice of law is not a business, but the services of a lawyer should be paid. Explain.
ANS: It is beyond question that considerable amount of time was exerted by the lawyer in ensuring the
successful defense of the client’s cause. He deserves to be awarded attorney’s fees.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to
preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial
protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part
of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also its duty to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his
skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself
would not get his due. (Rosario, Jr. v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013).
NOTARIAL LAW
Q – May a notary public who notarizes a document even without the presence of the party be
suspended? Explain.
ANS: Yes. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the
truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein
are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names
should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document
into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from the records of this case, effectively proclaimed
to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known
to him; (c) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness
of execution of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and
freely executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge
his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat. Having failed in this regard, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of
his professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without
requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the
performance of duty as a notary public. (Salita v. Atty. Reynaldo Salve, A.C. No. 8101, February 4, 2015, Perlas-
Bernabe, J).
Q – A lawyer-notary public notarized the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping in a petition
even if the complainant was abroad. In an administrative case filed against him he contended that he
was not informed that the complainant was abroad. Is he guilty of violation of the rule on Notarial
practice? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with public interest and
only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Q – A lawyer notarized a Deed of Sale even if the parties have long been deceased. Can he be disbarred?
Explain.
ANS: Yes. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very
same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what
are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the
notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. His act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to
have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof
that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons who executed the document. When he then
solemnly declared that such appeared before him and acknowledged to him that the document was the
vendor's free act and deed · despite the fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased, the
lawyer deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, the lawyer violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when
he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a
notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility
to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned
as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated
by public policy and impressed with public interest (Zarcilla, et al. v. Atty. Jose Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, March
13, 2018).
Q – What is the Bar Matter 2012 or the Mandatory legal aid service? Explain.
Ans.: The mandatory legal aid service mandates every practicing lawyer to render a minimum of 60 hours of
free legal aid services to indigent litigants yearly. Said 60 hours shall be spread within the period of 12 months,
with a minimum of 5 hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the
practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than 5 hours in one month, the excess hours may be
credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding periods (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a], par. 1).
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Q – There was an anonymous letter-complaint' charging Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice
Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in casinos, "selling" decisions, and
immorally engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-complaint was initially filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would
allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to
"selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.
The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship,
claiming that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit
in Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly,
the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her whole
family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.
Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs showing Justice
Pizarro sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.
He was required to file a comment.
He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend;
and that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities
introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by
people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early retirement.
He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed,
again, a parlor game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a
dying man because, prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.
May he be penalized for his conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Justice Pizarro violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which pertinently provides:
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. l. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done
(Canon 2).
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all
the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office (Canon 4).
Q – A Judge issued resolutions in the exercise of his adjudicative functions. If he committed errors may
such acts be corrected through administrative proceedings? Explain.
ANS: No. Such acts must be corrected through judicial remedies (Maquirare v. Grageda, 491 Phil. 205 [2005]).
A party’s recourse, if prejudiced by a judge’s orders in the course of a trial, is with proper reviewing
court and not with the OCA, through an administrative complaint (Biado v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-
1891, February 15, 2017; Atty. Eddie Tamondong v. Judge Emmanuel Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18,
2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant
or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith (Biado v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891,
February 15, 2017; Atty. Eddie Tamondong v. Judge Emmanuel Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017,
Leonardo-De Castro, J).
The Court also expounded in Flores v. Abesamis, 341 Phil. 299, 312-313 [1997] that:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error
in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of
a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition
for change of venue, as the case may be.
Q – Is fusing disbarment and disciplinary action against a judge a violation of right to due process?
Explain.
ANS: No. In disbarment cases, a lawyer is entitled to due process. The rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge
with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such,
her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC or “Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative
Cases Against Justices of the CA and SB. Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Court Officials Who are
Lawyers As Disciplinary Proceedings” without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative
of her right to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity
to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her
(In fact, she was made to show cause why she should not be disbarred).
The Court further said that it will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer
who has fallen short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. Any conduct that violates the norms of public
accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system must be condemned (Dagudag v.
Paderanga, A.M. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008, 555 SCRA 217, 237). No act or omission by a Judge or Justice that
falls short of the exacting norms of holding the public office of dispensing justice can be condoned, for the most
important thing for every Judge or Justice is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary as
well as in the individuals who dispense justice. The image of the Judiciary must remain unsullied by the
misconduct of its officials. The Court will not shirk from its duty of removing from the Bench any Judge or Justice
who has stained the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu,
MTC, Branch 47, Pasay City, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, & companion cases, November 22, 2016).
Q – In a case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave
while the trial was ongoing, respondent Judge declared in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor
should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Can the judge be penalized?
Explain.
ANS: Yes. A judge may be penalized due to impropriety if during the hearing of a case, where a party stepped
out of the courtroom to take a call and exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the
court, and the judge suddenly explained that the party ha to excuse himself for an important appointment.
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. (Canon 4).
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts
that have the appearance of impropriety. This is because appearance is as important as reality in the
performance of judicial functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must
also be above suspicion. (Dionisio v. Escaño, 362 Phil. 46 [1999]).
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety
or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 [Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange Commission], 586 Phil. 321
[2008]). Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be
free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal
behavior and everyday life. (Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352 [2008]; Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
IMPARTIALITY
Q – May a judge who raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to party litigants
or witnesses be penalized? Explain.
ANS: Yes, for failure to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, (A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC [2004]) which provides that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, (De la Cruz v.
Carretas, 559 Phil. 5 (2007) citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil. 335 [1979]), viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control.
The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12,
2015).
Q – After a judicial audit in the court where the judge was assigned, the following were found:
1) The judge indiscriminately dismissed criminal case despite finding probable cause and
even if they were already set for pre-trial;
2) He decided actions for nullity of marriages prematurely;
3) He granted bail in non-bailable cases without hearing on petition for bail.
The judge in the administrative case never denied such acts and even apologized for the
procedural lapses. Is he guilty of serious misconduct? Explain.
Q – A judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct for rendering judgment
without citing the required factual and legal bases in violation of the Constitution. In a murder case, he
downgraded it to homicide even without evidence of mitigating circumstances; he also appreciated the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense even if there was no
evidence. He apologized for having committed such acts and denied others. The Court likewise found
out that there are several administrative charges against him for gross ignorance of the law. May the
judge be penalized? Explain.
ANS: Yes. It is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and
duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases (Andrada v. Judge Banzon, 592 Phil. 229, 233-234 [2008]).
However, when the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or
principle, the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he
is too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of
authority (DOJ v. Judge Mislang, 798 Phil. 225, 235 [2016]). Here, the attendant circumstances would reveal
that the acts of Judge Dumayas contradict any claim of good faith. And since the violated constitutional
provision is so elementary, failure to abide by it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without even a need for
the complainant to prove any malice or bad faith on the part of the judge (OCA v. Judge Winlove Dumayas, A.M.
No. RTJ-15-2435, March 6, 2018).
Q – State the quantum of evidence to prove gross misconduct, ignorance of the law. Explain.
ANS: To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with
fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. The judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants arc entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the Justice they expect (Lai v. People, 762 Phil.
434, 443 [2015]; See also: OCA v. Judge Hector Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018).
Q – May a judge be sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal?
Explain.
ANS: Yes. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or
alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in· nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission
or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock
trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot
be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another
order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision
does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision. Applying the
aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is
always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary
rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without
violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double
Q – Respondent was subjected to a quo warranto proceeding before the SC basically questioning her
eligibility for the position of Chief Justice. She refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the SC but opted
to defend herself in public through speeches and interviews, discussing the merits of the case making
comments thereon to vilify the members of Congress, cast aspersions of the impartiality of the SC,
degrade the faith of the people in the judiciary and falsely impute ill motives against the government
that it was orchestrating the charges against her. In her answer, she argued among others:
(1) Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent
standards set forth in the CPR and the NCJC, emphasizing that her
participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge but as
a party-litigant.
(2) The imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant the Court's
exercise of its power of contempt in accordance with the "clear and
present danger" rule. Respondent avers that she cannot be faulted for the
attention that the quo warranto case gained from the public considering
that it is a controversial case, which involves issues of transcendental
importance.
(3) Assuming arguendo that the CPR and the NCJC apply, respondent argues
that in addressing the matters of impeachment and quo warranto to the
public, she was in fact discharging her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to
uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the law and legal
processes pursuant to the said Codes.
(4) Assuming arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR
and the NCJC in her public statements, the same does not warrant the
exercise of the Court's power to discipline in view of the attendant
circumstances, to wit: (a) no less than the Solicitor General repeatedly
made personal attacks against her and publicly discussed the merits of the
case, hence, she had to respond to such accusations against her; and (b)
she was not given her right to due process despite her repeated demand.
May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as
regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?
ANS: Yes. First. The Court cannot subscribe to respondent's position that she was merely a party-litigant in the
quo warranto case, not a counsel nor a judge, hence, should not be judged on the exacting standards expected
of a member of the Bar or of the Court.
The high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing are expected and required of members of the Bar.
Lawyers must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere
and at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large. Lawyers may be disciplined
for acts committed even in their private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession
or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. There can be no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in lawyers' private lives or in their professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. "Any departure from the path which a
lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of law" (Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17 [2000]).
For the same reasons, judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for they should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, hence, their conduct should be above reproach
(Barrios v. Atty. Martinez, 485 Phil. 1, 14 [2004]; Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in
G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
Q – Respondent argued that the public statements attributed to her must have created a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant punishment.
According to respondent, the public utterances in question did not create such effect of a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice; did not, in any way, prevent or delay the
Court from rendering its judgment; and criticism and public reaction remained within the bounds of
proper debate and despite widespread dissent, no violent protest erupted after the decision was
promulgated. Further, respondent averred that considering that the quo warranto case in itself was
already controversial and of transcendental importance, her public statements and actions cannot be
blamed for the natural attention that it gained from the public.
Did she violate the sub judice rule?
ANS: Yes. Sub Judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under
judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending
judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in general, and most
especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.
Discussions regarding sub Judice often relates to contempt of court. In this regard, respondent correctly
pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be applied in determining whether, in a particular
situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised to maintain the independence and integrity of the
Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-protected freedom of speech should be upheld. Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan
v. Atty. Diokno, et al., 726 Phil. 642 [2014], the Court explained:
The sub Judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, xx x.
xx xx
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This
form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it
clear that he intended to commit it (Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11,
2018, in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and present
danger" to the administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub Judice rule to be
considered punishable under the rules of contempt (Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018,
in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
In the quo warranto case decision, the Court took judicial notice of the undeniably manifest detrimental
effect of this open and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule, which is a clear manifestation of the evil sought
to be prevented by the said rule, i.e., "to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice” (Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep.
v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
Q – She claimed that she merely echoed her arguments in her pleadings submitted before the Court and
that the same could not have influenced the outcome of the case nor caused obfuscation of the issues
therein since the issues to which the utterances relate are the very same issues raised by the parties in
their pleadings invoking P/Supt. Marantan, 726 Phil. 624 [2014], wherein the Court ruled that therein
respondents' statement of their opinion were mere reiterations of their position in a related case,
which according to the Court was not malicious and does not even tend to influence the court. Is the
contention correct? Explain.
ANS: No. She directed her statements to the merits of the quo warranto case, to influence the public and the
Members of the Court, and to attack the dignity and authority of the institution.
She cannot justify her attacks against the Court under the guise of merely discharging her duties as a Justice
and a member of the Bar. No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his cause or what he believes
in, he must not forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal
profession, and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the courts (Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora
v. Atty. Rona/do Antonio V. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018). As the nation's then highest-ranking
judicial official, it is with more reason that respondent is expected to have exercised extreme caution in giving
her opinions and observed genuine confidence to the Court's processes.
As aptly and eloquently concluded by Justice Marvic M. V.F. Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion in the
quo warranto case, respondent, not only as a member of the Bar, but more importantly, as Chief Justice of the
Court, must exemplify the highest degree of leadership, and must refrain from activities that will tend to cause
unwarranted attacks against the Court (Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No.
237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
Q – It was respondent's position that her act of speaking in public was justified since there was a series
of onslaught on her integrity over the media coming from no less than the Solicitor General himself.
Further, respondent insisted that newsman, Jomar Canlas, publicized information to condition the
minds of the public that she should be removed from office. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No. The tenor of the statements made by the Solicitor General, as well as the newsman, was never made
to challenge the Court's authority or to undermine its ability to pass judgment with impartiality. Neither were
those statements aimed at criticizing the professional competence and responsibility of the magistrates as well
as the Court as a collegial body. Those statements had nothing to do with assailing the capacity of the Court to
render justice according to law, which is what the respondent has been doing through her public speeches.
At most, the Solicitor General's statements are the harmless statements contemplated in the case of
P/Supt. Marantan, i.e., mere reiterations of the Republic's position in the quo warranto case.
On the other hand, the newsman's questioned statements are nothing but a publication of reports on
the status of the case, whether true or not, which on its face notably comes within the purview of the freedom
of the press. An ordinary citizen's action cannot be judged with the same standard on this matter as that of a
member of the Bar and Bench. Also, whether or not the Solicitor General or any newsman attacked respondent
finds no relevance to her liability for her violative actions and statements. At the risk of being repetitive, it bears
stressing that lawyers, as first and foremost officers of the court, must never behave in such a way that would
diminish the sanctity and dignity of the courts even when confronted with rudeness and insolence (Re: Show
Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July
17, 2018, Tijam, J).
ABRC Family