ABRC2020.Remedial Law (Revised) With Insertions (With Additional) Revised (Segregate)

Survey of 2018-2019 SC Decisions in
REMEDIAL LAW
By: Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Jurisdiction
Real actions; jurisdiction depends upon assessed value.

An action for declaration of validity of a Deed of Sale and for specific performance was filed seeking to
recover the property is a real action because the ultimate objective is to recover title to or possession of the
property. Assessed value of the property determines the court that has jurisdiction. While it was claimed that
their amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of
Sale and for specific performance, the averments in their amended complaint and the character of the reliefs
sought therein reveal that the action primarily involves title to or possession of real property. An action
"involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such
property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself" (Padlan v.
Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 91, 100; Heirs of the Late Spouse Ramiro v. Sps. Bacaron,
G.R. No. 196874, February 6, 2019, Jardeleza, J).
Similarly in Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 256, 264, it was ruled
that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a
deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and
is, thus, deemed a real action. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the court which has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case is determined by the assessed value of the subject property (Hilario v. Salvador).
Boundary dispute an accion reivindcatura

The resolution of a boundary dispute whether or not the contested portion pertained to one or the
other of the parties is not within the province of the summary action of forcible entry under Rule 70 of the rules
of court. It can be taken proper cognizance of in the context of accion reivindicatoria.
The dispute did not primarily concern merely possessory rights, but related to boundaries, and could
not be summarily determined.
The the dispute did not concern mere possession of the area in litis but the supposed encroachment by
the petitioner on the portion of the respondents. In other words, the question focused on whether the property
being claimed and occupied by the petitioner had really been part of her registered properties, or of the
respondents' property. The proper resolution of such dispute in favor of the respondents could be had only
after a hearing in which the trial court was enabled through preponderant proof showing that, indeed, the
disputed area was not within the metes and bounds appearing and stated in the TCTs of the petitioner.
A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the action for forcible entry covered by rule
70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and
the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. If the
petitioner had possession of the disputed areas by virtue of the same being covered by the metes and bounds
stated and defined in her Torrens titles, then she might not be validly dispossessed through there of the action
for forcible entry. The dispute should be properly threshed out only through accion reivindicatoria. Accordingly,
the MCTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving the dispute as one for forcible entry
(Martinez v. Heirs of Lim, et al., G.R. No. 234655, September 11, 2019, Bersamin, C.J).
Defense of right to expropriate in a forcible entry case

In a case of forcible entry, the defendant may not interpose the defence of its right to expropriate the
property subject of the FE case, because the MTC has no jurisdiction over an expropriation proceeding being
an action beyond pecuniary estimation as it deals with the authority and right to take property for public use
(Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna, 450 Phil. 521 (2003).
An expropriation suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court because it is a case incapable
of pecuniary estimation. It deals with the government’s exercise of its authority and right to take property for
public use (Bardillion v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, 450 Phil. 524, 528 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban,
Third Division]).
The right of an expropriator to file a complaint for expropriation is not allowed in an action such as a
forcible entry or unlawful detainer suit. These actions are summary in nature. Therefore, in this case, this Court
cannot award expropriation (PLDT v. City Appliance MC Corp., G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019, Leonen, J).
Estoppel to question jurisdiction originated from equity.

Calimlim v. Hon. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 ,1982, Vasquez, J, unequivocally ruled that it is only when the
exceptional instances in Tijam are present should estoppel by laches apply over delayed claims:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
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matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead
a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
Requirements for the rule to apply.

Calimlim clarified the additional requirement that for estoppel by laches to be appreciated against a
claim for jurisdiction, there must be an ostensible showing that the claimant had "knowledge or consciousness
of the facts upon which it is based" (See also Figueroa v. People of the Philippine, 580 Phil. 58 (2008)).
In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:
(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter
jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant's
implicit waiver (Amoguis v. Ballado, et al., G.R. No. 18926, August 20, 2018, Leonen, J; Heirs of
Renato Dragon v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019, Leonen, J).
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
Hierarchy of courts, reasons

After the RTC denied a Motion to Quash, petition may not be filed directly with the Supreme Court. The
1987 Constitution vests the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. However, it is not only the Court that has the competence to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals and regional trial courts are equally capable of
taking cognizance of petitions for such writs.
Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction the Court shares with the Court of Appeals and regional trial
courts is not a license to immediately seek relief from the Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus must be filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy. In Aala v. Mayor
Uy:
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain
parties from directly resorting to the Court when relief may be obtained before the lower
courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for
the Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter," it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court
of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."
Applying this doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying levels act in
accord with their respective competencies. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, Leonen, J, noted
that "the doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by the Court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner” (Ha Datu Tawahig
(Roderick Samatra), et al. v. Lapinid, et al., G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019, Leonen, J).
Exceptions to the doctrine

Immediate resort to the Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1)
when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case
involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by the Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a
constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal
was considered as an inappropriate remedy (Ha Datu Tawahig (Roderick Samatra), et al. v. Lapinid, et al., G.R.
No. 221139, March 20, 2019, Leonen, J).
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Docket Fees/Jurisdiction
Rules in payment of docket fees

It is an established rule that the payment of the prescribed docket fees is essential for a court to acquire
jurisdiction over a case (Manchester Dev. Corp. v. CA, 233 Phil. 579 [1987]). Nonetheless, in Sun Insurance
Office v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280 [1989], the Court laid down the principles concerning the payment of docket
fees for initiatory pleadings:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within
a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Should the docket fees paid be found insufficient considering the value of the claim, the filing party
shall be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. The clerk of court involved, or
his or her duly authorized deputy, is responsible for making the deficiency assessment (Rivera v. Del Rosario,
464 Phil. 783 [2004]).
If a party pays the correct amount of docket fees for its original initiatory pleading, but later amends
the pleading and increases the amount prayed for, the failure to pay the corresponding docket fees for the
increased amount should not be deemed to have curtailed the court's jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 [1998]; International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. City
of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 185622, October 17, 2018, Leonen, J; Heirs of Renato Dragon v. Manila Banking Corp.,
G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019, Leonen, J).
When it is not shown that the party deliberately intended to defraud the court of the full payment of
docket fees, the principles enumerated in Sun Insurance should apply. In United Overseas Bank, 556 Phil. 178
[2000]:
In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment
of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket
fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the
strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.
Actions for sum of money; aggregate amount basis of docket fee

For actions involving recovery of money or damages, the aggregate amount claimed should be the basis
for assessment of docket fees. In Tacay, 259 Phil. 927 (1987):
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.
In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of the Court,
"specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a
claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being
claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although
as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of
the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where
the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and
here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the
prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the
court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set
in and consequently barred the right of action (Heirs of Renato Dragon v. Manila Banking
Corp., G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019, Leonen, J).
Payment of docket fees.

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
(Gochan v. Gochan, supra note 28 at 263, citing Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-
38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274). In resolving the issue of whether or not the correct amount of docket
fees were paid, it is also necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint. Having settled that the action
instituted by respondents is a real action and not one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basis for
determining the correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated
value thereof as alleged by the claimant (See also RULES OF COURT, Rule 141, Sec. 7 as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC). As already discussed, however, respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property in
their amended complaint. They also did not allege its estimated value. As a result, the correct docket fees could
not have been computed and paid by respondents and the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. All the proceedings before it are consequently null and void (Heirs of the Late Spouse
Ramiro v. Sps. Bacaron, G.R. No. 196874, February 6, 2019, Jardeleza, J).
RTC has jurisdiction over reversion cases

The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for reversion of land filed by the Republic of the Philippines.
The basic rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in
the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. [Padlan v. Dinglasan, GR. No.
180321, March 20, 2013.694 SCRA 91] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in the answer or motion to dismiss. [Sta. Clara Homes Owners Association u.
Gaston GR. No. 141961, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 396] otherwise, jurisdiction becomes dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of the defendant. [Commart (Phils) Inc. v. SEC. GR. No. 85318, June 3, 1991,
198SCRA73]
The Republic was not seeking the annulment of the judgment.

The factual setting in Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [GR. No. 192975, November 12,
2012] is similar to this case. Therein, the Republic filed a complaint for cancellation of titles and reversion
where the SC ruled that RTC has jurisdiction over the action for cancellation of titles and reversion.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action
are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force the time the complaint is
filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the
complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
Reversion case; action involving title or possession.

The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of
judgement of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, belong
to the class of cases that “involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein” and where
the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, no
grave abuse of discretion excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in denying RCAM’s motion to
dismiss.
The rulings in Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007, 537
SCRA 513, 528-529; Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343, 351 and
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126316, June 25, 2004, 432 SCRA 593, 597, the petitioner cited and relied
upon have no relevance herein. Therein, the Republic had instituted actions for the annulment, not actions for
the cancellation and reversion of title, like what happened herein. The Republic recognized therein that the
land titles subject of each action had been issued pursuant to final judgements rendered by the Land
Registration Court, and that such judgements must necessarily be first invalidated before the lands involved
could revert to the public domain. In contrast the Republic alleged herein that no judgement had ever existed
(Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 201821, September 19, 2018, Bersamin, J).
Rule 2 – Actions
Action for annulment of real estate mortgage, beyond pecuniary estimation

An action to annul a mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Bunayog v. Tunas, 106 Phil. 715
(1959); Russell v. Vestil, 364 Phil. 392 (1992). The plaintiff never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties
foreclosed during the auction sale or it never asserted its ownership and possession over them. Rather, it
assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage because it never received the proceeds of
the loan (Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Shemberg Marketing Corp., 540. 7 (2006).
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides Regional Trial Courts with exclusive,
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation" (First Sarmiento Property Holdings Inc. v. Phil. Bank of Communication, G.R. No. 202836, June 19,
2018, Leonen, J).
When action beyond pecuniary estimation.

Lapitan v. Scandia, 133 Phil. 526 (1968, Per JBL Reyes), instructed that to determine whether the subject
matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought
must first be established. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by examining the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought (Villagracia v. 5th Sharia District Court, 734 Phil. 239 (2014)
Leonen, J). Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Cruz, 512 Phil. 389 (2005) stated, thus:
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or
government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim is only a consequence of the remedy sought,
the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the
determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to
be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of
record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, 618 Phil. 395 (2009), likewise stressed that if the primary cause of action
is based on a claim of ownership or a claim of legal right to control, possess, dispose, or enjoy such property,
the action is a real action involving title to real property.
Jurisdiction, concept, etc.

Jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case" brought before it for
resolution.
Courts exercise the powers conferred on them with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: "(a)
the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy."
Jurisdiction over the thing or the res is a court's authority over the object subject of litigation. The court
obtains jurisdiction or actual custody over the object through the seizure of the object under legal process or
the institution of legal proceedings which recognize the power and authority of the court.
Jurisdiction over the parties is the court's power to render judgment that are binding on the parties.
The courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs when they file their initiatory pleading, while the defendants
come under the court's jurisdiction upon the valid service of summons or their voluntary appearance in court.
Jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case is the court's authority to hear and
determine cases within a general class where the proceedings in question belong. This power is conferred by
law and cannot be acquired through stipulation, agreement between the parties, or implied waiver due to the
silence of a party.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with Congress given the plenary power, for cases not
enumerated in Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, provided for the jurisdictional division between the first and second level courts by considering the
complexity of the cases and the experience needed of the judges assigned to hear the cases.
In criminal cases, first level courts are granted exclusive original jurisdiction to hear complaints on
violations of city or municipal ordinances and offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years. In contrast, second level courts, with more experienced judges sitting at the helm, are granted exclusive
original jurisdiction to preside over all other criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any other
court, tribunal, or body.
The same holds true for civil actions and probate proceedings, where first level courts have the power
to hear cases where the value of personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
P100,000.00 or P200,000.00 if in Metro Manila. First level courts also possess the authority to hear civil actions
involving title to, possession of, or any interest in real property where the value does not exceed P20,000.00 or
P50,000.00 if the real property is situated in Metro Manila. Second level courts then assume jurisdiction when
the values involved exceed the threshold amounts reserved for first level courtsor when the subject of litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation (First Sarmiento Property Holdings Inc. v. Phil. Bank of Communication,
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018, Leonen, J).

RULE 2 – ACTIONS
Reason for the rule against splitting of causes of action; not to vex more than once.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more
than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the
public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once,
in order that possible conflicting judgements may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status
of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not
be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be
determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis
pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be). (Marilag v. Martinez, 764 Phil 576 (2015); Lajave Agricultural
Management & Dev. Ent. Inc. v. Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018, Peralta, J).
Damages awarded in UD cases.

In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damages that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is
that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages
which could be recovered are those which that plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
cause by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered
but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. (Araos v. CA. 302 Phil 813 (1994;) C & S
Fish Farm Corp. v. CA et al. 442 Phil. 279 (2002); Dumo v. Espinas, 515 Phil 685 (2006)
No splitting causes of action.

In a case, insofar as the complaint for the collection of sum of money is concerned, it is not a simple
case of recovering the unpaid balance is proper, the correct amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the
intention and/or agreement of the parties as to the terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a correct
amount, among others. Indeed, the resolution of whether the lessee paid the correct rental fees and if there is
a deficiency in the payment of rentals requires a full-blown trial through the submission of documentary and
testimonial evidence by the parties which cannot be passed upon in a summary proceeding (Lajave Agricultural
Management & Dev. Ent. Inc. v. Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018, Peralta, J).
UD and sum of money cases cannot be joined.

Suffice it to say, an action for collection of sum of money may not be properly joined with the action
for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful
detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is
specifically enjoined by Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the conditions that the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special
rules (Sec. 5[b], Rule 2, Rules of Court) (Lajave Agricultural Management & Dev. Ent. Inc. v. Javellana, G.R. No.
223785, November 7, 2018, Peralta, J).
Rule 3 – Parties
Unauthorized complaint; effect

Every action must be presented in the name of the real party-in-interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Court provides that a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suits. Unless, otherwise, authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
There was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Ceniza’s supposed authority to
file and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The court cannot consider the mere mention in the Decision that
he was Gabriel’s attorney-in-fact as evidence that he was indeed authorized and empowered to initiate the
instant action against respondents. There was also no evidence of substantial compliance with the rules or even
an attempt to submit an SPA after filing of the complaint.
A complaint filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is unauthorized to do so is not deemed
filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. (Tamondong v. CA, 486
Phil.729 (2004) 694 Phil. 1 (2012); Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cerebro. et al., G.R. No. 222737 November 18,
2018, Peralta, J)
Purpose behind substitution of parties continued representation/protection.

For the court to have the authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing the
complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction.
The substitution of heirs in a case ensures that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. [Heirs of Hinog v. Hon.

Melico 495 Phil 422 (2005)] The purpose behind the rule on substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute
that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party by operation of law.
[Cardenaz v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191079. March 2, 2016] It is for the protection of the right of every party to due
process. Proper substitution of heirs is effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and
to obviate any future claim by any heir that he or she was not apprised of the litigation (Heirs of Hinog). From
the foregoing, Cañiza’s subsequent substitution as one of the Gabriel’s heirs did not cure the defect in the
complaint, i.e., when he signed the verification and certification against forum shopping without apparent
authority. To reiterate, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint.
Besides, the substitution merely ensured that Gabriel’s interest would be properly represented and that her
heirs were brought to jurisdiction of the court (Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cerebro, et al., G.R. No. 222737,
November 18, 2018, Peralta, J).
Rule 4 – Venue
Rules of venue if defendant is a corporation.

The Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the signature of respondent's representative
is the phrase, "Received the above goods in good order and condition.” Clearly, the purpose of respondent's
representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely to acknowledge that he or she has received the plastic
containers in good condition. He or she did not affix his or her signature in any other capacity except as the
recipient of the goods. To extend the effect of the signature by including the venue stipulation would be to
stretch the intention of the signatory beyond his or her objective. The Court, then, cannot bind respondent to
the other stipulations in the Sales Invoices.
Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the
venue of petitioner's personal action is governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since the defendant is a corporation, its residence is considered the place when its principal office is
located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation. The filing of the case in Manila is fatal as it is not the proper
venue (Hygienic Packing Corp. v. Nutri-Asia Inc. G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019, Leonen, J).
Additional on Venue
Venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at
the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed
waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
The venue of an action depends on whether the action is a real or personal action. Should the action
affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, it is a real action. The action should be filed in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated. If the action is a personal action, the action shall be filed with the proper court where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff (City of Lapu Lapu v.
Phil. Economic Zone Authority, 738 Phil. 37 (2014) Leonen, J).
An action for collection of sum of money is a personal action. Taking into account that no exception can
be applied in this case, the venue, then, is "where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, ... at the election of the plaintiff.” For a corporation, its
residence is considered "the place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation"
(Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017, Leonen, J).
Venue is for convenience of the plaintiff

While the rules on venue are for the convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give them unbounded
freedom to file their cases wherever they may please (Manila v. CA, 435 Phil. 870 (2002); Ang v. Ang, 693 Phil.
106 Phil. 106 (2012):
[T]he rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination of every
action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The
choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He [or she] may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not
allowed by the rules on venue (Ang v. Ang, 693 Phil. 106 (2012)).
Venue distinguished from jurisdiction

"Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In
addition to being conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action
is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted." This is markedly different from the concept of venue, which only pertains to the place or
geographical location where a case is filed. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,
[G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017 816 SCRA 397] the Court exhaustively differentiated these concepts, to wit:

Petitioner confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil.
Economic Zone Authority (Leonen, J), the SC said:
Jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action
may be filed only with the court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be
brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no jurisdiction over
the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.
Venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to
venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is
improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is

a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note – which reads "[a]ny action to
enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the]
National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office,
a[t] its sole option" – is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner
has a branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears
that venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on
(Hygienic Packing Corp. v. Nutri-Asia Inc. G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019, Leonen, J).
No dismissal motu proprio on ground of improper venue.

Even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu
proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity,
as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived. [Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. v. Nolasco, 799
Phil 598 (2016)] The Court's ruling in Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Nolasco is instructive on this matter,
to wit:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in
the Courts of First Instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails
to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, be cannot on appeal
or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed
waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the
venue cannot be truly said to have been improperlv laid, as for all practical intents and
purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules onvenue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. (Hygienic
Packing Corp. v. Nutri-Asia Inc. G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019, Leonen, J)
In sum, the RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's complaint before it. As such, the
complaint must be reinstated, and thereafter, remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Rule 9 – Default
Rights of party in default.

While, concededly, a defending party declared in default loses his standing in the trial court and his
right to adduce evidence and to present his defense (Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina Inc. v. LBP 479 Phil. 43
(2004)), this, however, does not impliedly suggest a loss of all his/her rights in the stages of the case after the
default judgment.
Even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings
(Alcaraz v. Judge Lindo, 471 Phil. 39 [2004]).
Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant, but to enforce the prompt filing of the answer
to the complaint (Luis Ent. Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., 729 Phil. 440 [2014]). Its existence is justified on the
ground that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the
plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay (Monarco Import Co. Inc. v. Villamena, 491 Phil. 457; Coombs
v. Santos, 24 Phil. 446 [1913]; Royal Plains View Inc. v. Mejia, G.R. No. 230832, November 12, 2018, J. Reyes, Jr.,
J).
In Lina v. Court of Appeals, 220 Phil. 311 (1985), the Court discussed the remedies available to a
defendant declared in default, one of which is to appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997

Rules of Court, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to (Indiana Aerospace Univ.
v. Com. On High Education, 408 Phil. 483 [2001]).
There is no question that a defaulted party may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. And
concomitant with the said right is the filing of the appellant's brief in order to be heard. The defaulting party
can appeal the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set
aside the order of default. However, a defaulting party is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of
the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the CA, for if it were otherwise, he would
thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was
declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated (Rural Bank of Sta.Catalina v. LBP, supra.).
Verily, if the defaulting party appealed his case and filed his appellant's brief in the process then there
is no reason to proscribe a defaulting party, who is an appellee, from filing an appellee's brief. There was
nothing from our present rules which provides that a party in default shall also lose his right to appeal if the
judgment should be favorable to him. As such, even if he is the winning party in the court below, he is not
precluded to file his appellee's brief on the same grounds as available to the losing party that was declared in
default by the trial court.
Rule 14 – Summons
Summons upon corporation.

In UCPB v. Sps. Ang. Sy, et al., G.R. No. 204753, March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J, Summons was served upon
the defendants by substituted service without any showing that efforts were resorted to effect service of
summons personally, hence, they moved to dismiss on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over them. Agreeing with their argument, the SC
Held: The argument is correct.
As regards the service of summons undertaken with respect to the defendant corporations, i.e., NGI
and NPGI, the CA was not mistaken in holding that since the summons were served on a mere OIC property
supply custodian, the services of summons undertaken were defective.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can
receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporation
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel is not valid
(Paramount Inc. Corp. v. Ordonez, Corp., et al., 583 Phil. 321 (2008); UCPB v. Sps. Ang. Sy, et al., G.R. No. 204753,
March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J).
There was no voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the part of respondents Sps. Sy, et
al.
Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. According to the Rules of Court, the defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. However, the inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance (Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 203298, January 17,
2018).
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is
considered voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
As held in the very recent case of Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (Interlink
Movie Houses, Inc.), the abovementioned general rule is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance,
such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
As explained by the Court in the aforesaid case, citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy, et al., a special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance
when the defendant explicitly and unequivocably poses objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person.
The Court in Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. explained that while at first glance, the therein respondents
may be seen to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by praying for an affirmative relief,
there was an explicit objection made by the parties, in an unequivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the court
on the ground of invalid service of summons. This convinced the Court that the therein respondents never
recognized and did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the RTC despite the fact that the said party prayed for
an affirmative relief.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, while it is true that respondents Sps. Sy, et al. did
pray in their Motion to Dismiss for a suspension of the proceedings due to a Stay Order issued by a different
court, which is an affirmative relief, such was not tantamount to a voluntary appearance as respondents
Sps. Sy, et al., in an explicit and unequivocal manner, posed vehement objections to the jurisdiction of
the RTC over their persons due to improper service of summons. Therefore, following what is already
settled jurisprudence, the general rule that asking for an affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court should not be applied in the instant case.

In supporting their view that respondents Sps. Sy, et al.'s raising of an affirmative relief cured the
defective service of summons, petitioner UCPB cites the Court's ruling in NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia)
Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, which in turn cited Philippine Commercial International Bank
v. Spouses Dy, et al. Petitioner UCPB placed much emphasis on the Court's pronouncement in the aforesaid cases
that "by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction.”
Regrettably, the petitioner UCPB failed to place the foregoing pronouncement of the Court in the
proper context.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, et al., it should be emphasized that the
pleading which contained certain affirmative reliefs "did not categorically and expressly raise the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue.”
Oppositely, respondents Sps. Sy, et al. plainly and unmistakably questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC
over their persons due to improper service of summons. Hence petitioner UCPB's theory lacks any
jurisprudential support.
Service of the Summons; requirement of due process

As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons. Substituted service is
the exception to this general rule. For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a detailed
enumeration of the sheriffs actions showing that a defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable
efforts. These details are contained in the sheriff’s return. Thus, the sheriff’s return is entitled to a presumption
of regularity. Courts may allow substituted service based on what the sheriff return contains [De Pedro v.
Romsan Dev. Corp., 758 Phil. 706 [2014], Leonen, J].
Failure to serve summons means that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Absent proper service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant unless
there is voluntary appearance, the filling of an answer and other subsequent pleadings is tantamount to
voluntary appearance (People’s General Insurance Corporation v. Guansing et al., G.R. No. 20475, November
14, 2018, Leonen, J).
Proper service of summons, an aspect of due process.

The rule requiring jurisdiction over the parties is based on due process. Due process consists of notice
and hearing. Notice means that persons with interest in the subject of litigations are to be informed of the facts
and the law on which the complaint or petition is based for them to adequately defend their interest. This is
done by giving the parties notifications of the proceedings. On the other hand, hearing means that the parties
must be given an opportunity to be heard or a chance to defend their interests. Courts are guardians of
constitutional rights, and therefore, cannot deny due process rights while at the same time be considered to be
acting within their jurisdiction (Manotoc v. CA, 530 Phil., 454 (2006); People’s General Insurance Corporation
v. Guansing et al., G.R. No. 20475, November 14, 2018, Leonen, J).
Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make decisions that are binding on them.
Jurisdiction over complaints or petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions, while
jurisdictions over the defendants or respondents is acquired through valid service of summons or their
voluntary submissions to court’s jurisdiction.
Violations of due process is a jurisdictional defect. Hence, proper service of summons is imperative. A
decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a jurisdictional infirmity. In the service of
summons, personal service is the preferred mode. As a rule, summons must be served personally on a
defendant (People’s General Insurance Corporation v. Guansing et al., G.R. No. 20475, November 14, 2018,
Leonen, J).
Duty of the sheriff.

Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals: 530 Phil. 454 (2006):
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the
plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to defendant in person, but
no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent an diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any, to the other party.” Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when
the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the
latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then
ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the
seriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days because at
the end of month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return
of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff Return provides data to the Clerk of
Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court

Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of the summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the
defendant.
For the substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several attempts” mean at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of the service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
he attempted personal service. The effort made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in details in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendants, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of the defendant all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial
Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 18 requires that “impossibility
of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
the failure of such efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left
with a person of “suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of summons. “Discretion is defined as “the ability
to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.” Thus, to be sufficient discretion, such person must know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the important of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the
person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the
defendant , ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of summons, the
sheriff must thereof determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically describe in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then
it should be served on a component person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as
the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligations of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return. [46]
No presumption of regularity.
The Sheriff’s Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious efforts to attempts to serve the
summons on the person of respondent Guansing.
Although Rule 131, Section 3 (m) of the rules of Court provides that there is a disputable presumption
that “official duty has been regularly performed,” in the case, presumptions of regularity does not apply.
To enjoy the presumption of regularity, a sheriff’s return must contain: (1) detailed circumstances
surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve the summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing
impossibility of service within a reasonable time. Based on these requirements, a sheriff’s return is merely pro
forma.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that the presumption of regularity in the issuance
of the sheriff’s return does not apply to patently defective returns. In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Return
contained no statement on efforts or attempts made to personally serve the summons, it was devoid of details
regarding the service of the summons. Thus, it was defective.
The sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt personal service before he resorted to
substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by a sheriffs failure to personally
serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this period, he or she must have had at least three
(3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the
sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful (Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. v CA et.al., G.R.No. 203298,
January 17, 2018).
Voluntary appearance when answer was filed.

By filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing is deemed to have voluntary submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction when
they participate in the proceedings despite improper service of summons.
The defendant’s voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance (Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of
Court).
In Navale et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.: 324 Phil. 70 (1976): La Naval v. Drug Corp v. CA, 306 Phil.
84 (2008)
Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filling of an answer to the
complaint, a defendant [cannot] be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting
to the court’s jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction
over its person if and when the judgement sustains its defense.
Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent to
service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person
(Carballo v. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 741 (1953)).
In G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017.
There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court without
qualifications, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction
due to improper service of summons.
Rapid City Realty Development Corporation v. Villa 626 Phil. 211 (2010) laid down the rules on
voluntary appearance as follows:
(1) Special appearance operated as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner, and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the lawyer, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to court for
resolution. 618 Phil. 346 (2009)
Motion filed for sole purpose of challenging court’s jurisdiction.

The Court held that the pleadings filed were “solely for special appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the [Sandiganbayan] over her person and that of her three children” and that all
throughout, she never abandoned her stance. Therefore, the parties did not voluntarily appear before the
Sandiganbayan. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of Clarita and
her children. The proceedings in the cases, insofar as she and her children are concerned, were declared void
for the lack of jurisdiction.
“The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
A plain and simple reading of the second sentence confirms that it pertains only to a motion to dismiss
and not to any other pleadings, thereby making it inapplicable. The provision is very clear, but the Court in
Garcia gave it an expanded meaning when it ruled that “Clarita never abandoned when she filed her motions
for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam…setting…forth
affirmative defense with a claim for damages.
Additionally, it is basic that a claim for damages constitutes a prayer for affirmative relief, which the
Court has consistently considered as voluntary appearance. It is incongruous to ask the court for damages while
asserting lack of jurisdiction at the same time.
Rule 16 – Motion to Dismiss
Complaint states no cause of action.

Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that
the pleading states no cause of action.
The case of Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran explains that:
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these
elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure

to state a cause of action. (Casa Milan Homeowners Assoc. Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 220042, September 5, 2018, Carpio, J.)
Note: Now, it is a mere affirmative defense.
Rule 17 – Dismissal by Plaintiff

Dismissal for failure to prosecute
In Ng Ching Ting v. Phil. Business Bank, G.R No. 224972, July 9, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J, an action for sum
of money was filed. MTD was filed but it was denied. For almost a year from the denial of the MTD, plaintiff
failed to actively pursue the case, prompting the court to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute based on Rule
17, Section 3, Rule of Court. Before the SC, it was explained that the resignation of the lawyer as in-house
counsel resulted in the failure to lose track of the proceedings. Expounding in the power of a court to dismiss,
the SC
Held: Dismissal based on failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. But
this discretion must not be abused, nay gravely abused, and must be exercised soundly. Deferment of
proceedings may be tolerated so that cases may be adjudged only after a full and free presentation of all the
evidence by both parties. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by the circumstances
surrounding each particular case. (BPI vs. Court of Appeals , 362 Phil. 362 (1999))
Full presentation of the parties' case should be favored over termination of the proceedings on
technical grounds. Ideally, "technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed." (Uy v. Villanueva, 553 Phil. 69
(2007)
The "invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will automatically compel the
Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights." In Daikoku Electronics Phils.,
Inc vs. Raza, (606 Phil. 796 (2009) it was stressed, thus:
To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with
the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of substantive justice. x x x The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid and
compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse.
In V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. vs. Municipality of Parañaque, (698 Phil. 338 (2012) the Court rejected the
petitioner's plea for relaxation of the rules on the reglementary period, specifically for failing to file the motion
for reconsideration on time due to lack of counsel. It ratiocinated, thus:
It is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel.
VCP knew since August 29, 2006, seven months before the CA rendered its Decision, that it had
no counsel. Despite its knowledge, it did not immediately hire a lawyer to attend to its affairs.
Instead, it waited until the last minute, when it had already received the adverse CA Decision on April
10, 2007, to search for a counsel; and even then, VCP did not rush to meet the deadline. It asked for an
extension of 30 days to file a Motion for Reconsideration. It finally retained the services of a new
counsel on May 24, 2007, nine months from the time that its former counsel withdrew her appearance.
VCP did not even attempt to explain its inaction. The Court cannot grant equity where it is clearly
undeserved by a grossly negligent party.
In the same way, in this case, the respondent cannot simply lay the blame on the resignation of its in-
house counsels since it is incumbent upon it, as the complainant, to promptly hire new lawyers to represent it
in the proceedings. Much vigilance and diligence are expected of it considering that it is the one who initiated
the action. Upon the resignation of its in- house counsels, it should have taken immediate steps to hire
replacements so it may be able to keep up with the pending incidents in the case. Surely, it cannot expect the
court to wait until it has settled its predicament. It must take prompt action to keep pace with the proceedings.
As it was, however, the respondent dilly-dallied for almost a year until the court, motu proprio, ordered the
dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.
It also did not escape the attention of the Court that the respondent simply narrated this contingency
in his motion for reconsideration but failed to mention what it did to address the matter. The allegations were
wanting of details exhibiting its response or how it acted to remedy the situation. Without these averments,
there is no basis to say that there was excusable neglect. While indeed there was a contingency, the respondent
was not without any means to resolve the same. It should have done something and not merely slack and
thereafter plea for the liberality from the court.
In Mayon Estate Corporation vs. Altura, the Court stressed:

Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest Court of the land.40 The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound

practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in
time. (483 Phil. 404 (2004))
Rule 18 – Pre-trial
Effect of failure to file Pre-trial brief and furnish adverse party; rule relaxed.
In Pimentel v. Adiao, et al., G.R. No. 222678, October 17, 2018, Caguioa, J, the notice of Pre-trial and
submission of pre-trial brief was received on February 12, 2014. Counsel failed to submit the pre-trial brief on
February 14, 2014. It pleaded that the rule should be relaxed. The court dismissed the case for failure to comply
with the rule. In reversing the ruling, the SC
Held: Section 6, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial of the Rules provide that the parties shall file with the court and serve on
the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of
the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others.
The Court in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando ( BPI), G.R. No. 177456, September 4, 2009, where
the issue concerned the application of Section 6 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 18 regarding the effect of the
failure to file the PT brief and serving on the adverse party in such manner as to ensure the latter's receipt
thereof at least three days before the date of the PT, laid down the following:
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, (452 Phil. 665 (2003) the Court restated the reasons that may provide
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (BPI v. Dando, 614 Phil. 533 (2009); See: Sps. Diaz v. Diaz,(387
Phil. 314 (2000))
Rule 23 – Deposition
Written interrogative under Rule 23 applied in a criminal case; a novel case.

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a novel question of law
where a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Velasco (Mary Jane) who was convicted of drug trafficking and
sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in
Indonesia was allowed, testify by way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation
of a witness by the accused. This is an exception to the general rule because of peculiar circumstances of
impossibility of Mary Jane appearing before the RTC in the Philippines due to her detention in Indonesia.
Pursuant to Rule 119, Section 15 of the Rules of Courtin order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is
either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither too sick nor infirm to
appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely. To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in
Indonesia for having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the
said state (People v. Sergio, et al., G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019, Hernando, J).
Reasons for the exception.

Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written interrogatories and
effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC ofSto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals
appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into
consideration the concomitant right to due process of Mary ane and the State as well as the prejudice that will
be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering the circumstances of Mary Jane, the
Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to happen and thus impaired the substantial rights. It was akin
to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish its case against the
respondents.
Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written interrogatories, the
appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the People of their right to due process by
presenting their case against the said accused. By its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it
totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane
to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her
innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply with the
conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane (People v. Sergio, et al., G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019,
Hernando, J).
Prosecution’s resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane’s testimony as a prosecution
witness proper.
We must always be guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Simply
put, rules of procedure should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They should not be strictly applied
causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case.

Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution
witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign
jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another
country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule
on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, it may be applied suppletorily in
criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the
Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the
pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the
Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to afford Mary Jane the
opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines (People v. Sergio, et al., G.R. No.
240053, October 9, 2019, Hernando, J).
Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the aim of ASEAN
MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters among signatory states including the
Philippines. The ASEAN MLA T is enforced precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane.
It recognizes the significance of cooperation and coordination among the states to prevent, investigate and
prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just like in the case of drug and
human trafficking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges that were filed against respondents.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no reason not
to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial
justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories
is in order.
No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness.

The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of
a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is
ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated under its Article
III, Section 14(2).
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing
circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample
opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose
of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file
their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by
the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of
Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would
be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in tum, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions
to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly
rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed
copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly
stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the
conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to
examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can
still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to
her both by the prosecution and the defense.
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded (People v. Sergio,
et al., G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019, Hernando, J).
Deposition, how taken; purpose.

In Martines v. Heirs of Somera, G.R. No. 210789, December 3, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J, there was an objection
to the taking of the deposition on the ground that there was no notice. The deposition taking was scheduled on
July 27, 2007, but it was actually taken on September 7, 2007. The counsel was properly informed of the
deposition taking. In fact, the counsel informed the court that the client was in the USA at the time the
deposition was supposed to be taken. Ruling against the contention of the petitioner, the SC
Held: Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as
a device for narrowing and clarifying the basic issues between the parties, as well as for ascertaining the facts
relative to those issues. The purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain

the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. Thus, in Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Judge
Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993, the Court ruled:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit
or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties;
requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical
and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant
facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the
latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case
to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that
their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant
facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a. rule be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section
1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. -- The examination of witnesses
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation.
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in
lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the
ground that it is hearsay: the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for cross-
examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-
examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness
stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional
situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 [now Rule 23] of the Rules of Court. x x x [21]
The trial court did not commit any error in allowing Avelina to take her deposition and those of her
witnesses and in subsequently admitting the same in evidence considering the allegations in the Motion that
she and her witnesses were residing in the United States. This situation is one of the exceptions for its
admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of
more than 100 kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that
his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.
Effect of defective notice in taking of deposition.

Section 29(a), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court states that "all errors and irregularities in the notice for
taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice."
Contrary to petitioner's contention that the right to object came into being only when respondents sought to
introduce the transcripts in evidence, petitioner should have objected to the perceived irregularity of the notice
immediately upon receipt thereof. To be sure, there is no impediment to petitioner raising the issue of belated
receipt of notice when he received the same after the depositions were already taken. It must be emphasized
that Section 29(a) refers to errors and irregularities in the notice without any reference to the depositions
taken by virtue of such notice. Hence, possession of the transcripts of the depositions is not a condition
precedent for challenging the validity of the notice for taking a deposition. Consequently, petitioner's objections
to the notice are already deemed waived considering that more than three years have already elapsed from
petitioner's receipt thereof.
In any case, petitioner is not without remedy. Section 9, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that "at
the trial or hearing, any party may rebut any relevant evidence contained in a deposition whether introduced
by him or by any other party." Further, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination
of its probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight
of evidence. Relevance and competence determine the admissibility of evidence, while weight of evidence
presupposes that the evidence is already admitted and pertains to its tendency to convince and persuade
(Martines v. Heirs of Somera, G.R. No. 210789, December 3, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J).
Rule 37
Second Motion for Reconsideration; rules.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court en banc (Sec. 3). The conditions that must concur in order for the Court to
entertain a second motion for reconsideration are the following, namely:

1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest of
justice;
2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;
3. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at
least three members of the Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and
4. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc's actual membership must be
mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted.
Granting the motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration has the effect of preventing
the challenged decision from attaining finality. This is the reason why the second motion for reconsideration
should present extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Indeed, allowing pro forma motions would indefinitely
avoid the assailed judgment from attaining finality (Flight Attendants & Stewards Assn. of the Phils. (FASAP) v.
PAL, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018, Bersamin, J).
Rule 38 – Petition for Relief from Judgment
Timeliness of petition for relief from judgement.

In Lasam v. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 207433, December 5, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J., the petitioner learned of the
judgment on February 23, 2010 and filed the petition for relief from judgment on July 23, 2018. Ruling that the
petition was out of time, the SC
Held: A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings is an equitable remedy which is allowed
only in exceptional circumstances. (Tuazon v. CA, 326 Phil. 169 (1996) The petition is the proper remedy of a
party seeking to set aside a judgment rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a
hearing, was prevented from taking an appeal, or a judgment or final order entered because of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. (Ampo v. CA, 517 Phil. 750 (2006)
However, as an equitable remedy, strict compliance with the applicable reglementary periods for its
filing must be satisfactorily shown because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the
part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order, or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
(Thomasites Center for International Studies v. Rodriqguez, 779 Phil. 536 (2016) As such, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the petition was filed within its reglementary periods, otherwise, the petition may
be dismissed outright. (Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc.v. Judge Arciaga, 232 Phil 402 (1987)
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed
within: (1) 60 days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (2) six
months from the entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Further,
these periods could not be extended and could never be interrupted. (Quelnan v. JAF Phils. 507 Phil. 75 (2005)
Rule 39 – Judgments
Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment; proof necessary.

Proof necessary in recognition.
What is indispensable in an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is the presentation of the
foreign judgment itself as it comprises both the evidence and the derivation of the cause of action. Further, the
above-cited rule provides that a foreign judgment against a person, i.e., an action in personam, as in this case,
is merely a presumptive evidence of rights between the parties. Such judgment may be attacked by proving
lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law. (Rule 39, Sec. 48.
Rules of Court) The burden is upon MIC to prove its allegations against the validity of the foreign judgment
sought to be enforced (Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., v. Yi, G.R. No. 234501, March 18, 2019, J. Reyes, Jr., J).
Contention of lack of notice.

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which is the State of California in this case. The Court
is well aware that foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. (Manufacturers Hamover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, 445 Phil. (2003)
An exception to this rule, however, is recognized in the cases of Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal,
(61 Phil. 471 (1935) and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, wherein it was ruled that the testimony
under oath of an attorney-at-law of a foreign state, who quoted verbatim the applicable law and who stated
that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, was sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. In Manufacturers Hanover Trust, it is necessary to state the specific law on which the
claim was based.
Indeed, pursuant to the above-proven law in the State of California, the service of summons by mail to
MIC, an entity outside its state, was valid. As such law was sufficiently alleged and proven, it is beyond the
province of the Court's authority to pass upon the issue as to the factual circumstances relating to the proper
service of summons upon MIC in the case before the State of California (Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., v. Yi, G.R.
No. 234501, March 18, 2019, J. Reyes, Jr., J).
Main consideration in recognition of foreign judgment.

The main consideration in an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is to put such judgment into
force. Verily, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.
(Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 648 Phil. 420 (2010)
Our rules provide that an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. (Rule 3, Sec. 7) The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and
in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. (Divinagracia v. Parilla 755 Phil. 783 (2015)
Alternatively put, it is necessary that an indispensable party must be impleaded so that a full resolution of the
case can be obtained.
Rule 39 – Execution of Judgment
Res judicata
In Casa Milan Homecomers Assoc., Inc., v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila et al., G.R. No.
220042. September 5, 2018, Carpio. J, while a parcel of land was under the name of Regalado, he donated it to
RCAM, which was approved by the Court. This was done while there was a pending application for segregation
of the lot which was subsequently approved. The Homecomers Assn. filed a petition to cancel the tiles of RCAM
and to restrain it from constructing a church which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. It contended
that there was no identity of parties and causes of action. In ruling against the contention, the SC
Held: The two cases, although involving different parties and different causes of action, have the same
underlying issue, that is, whether or not RCAM validly owns the subject property.
The determination of RCAM's right over the subject open space and RCAM's right to construct a parish
church on the subject open space hinges on the validity of the Deed of Donation executed by Regalado to RCAM.
Since the issue of ownership had been resolved in the case for the approval of the Deed of Donation, it cannot
again be litigated in the instant case without virtually impeaching the correctness of the decision in the former
case. Hence, RCAM, as the lawful owner of the subject open space by virtue of the Deed of Donation executed
by Regalado, has a better right to possess and own the lot in question as against petitioner whose claim of
ownership has been rejected with finality. The action is barred by litis pendentia.
No need for exact identity in res judicata.

It was contended that the reliefs prayed for in this petition are different from the reliefs prayed for by
RCAM. Thus, the action is not barred by litis pendentia.
For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity
of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the other. ( Feliciano V. CA 850 Phil. 499 (1998)
It is hornbook rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party
could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or relief sought. One test in
ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action is whether the same facts or
evidence would sustain both actions in that the judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
(Yap. V. Chua, 687 Phil. 392 (2012))
Appeal
Effect of appeal
Appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and thus, it is duty of the reviewing tribunal
to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. “The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law (People v. Florsita, G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Appeal, a statutory right.

In Leonor Rivera Avante v. Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 224137, April 3, 2019, Peralta J, after the defendant was
furnished with a copy of the judgment on June 15, 2015, she filed a motion for reconsideration on July 1, 2015.
Ruling that the MR was belatedly filed, the SC
Held: Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that
right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court which, among others, governs the procedure in the CA, clearly
provides:

Sec. 1. Period for filing. A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the
adverse party.
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within fifteen (15) days
from notice. The fifteen day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. If no
appeal or motion for reconsideration is filed within this period, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith
be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment as provided under Section 10, Rule 51 of the same
Rules.
In Ponciano Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al., 591 Phil. 194 (2008), the Court refused to
admit a motion for reconsideration filed only one day ate, pointing out that the Court has, in the past, similarly
refused to admit motions for reconsideration which were filed late without sufficient justification.
Indeed, there are cases where this Court allowed the liberal application of procedural rules, but these
are exceptions, sufficiently justified by meritorious and exceptional circumstances attendant therein. Not every
entreaty for relaxation of rules of procedure, however, shall b so lightly granted by the Court for it will render
such rules inutile. Certainly, the relaxation of the application of the Rules in exceptional cases was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
Petitioner's bare invocation of "the interest of justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights (Foculan Fudalan v. SPs. Ocial,
et al., 760 Phil. 815 (2015). Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Interlocutory order, not appealable.

Once again, the SC in Heirs of Gabriel v. Cerebro, et al., G.R No, 222737, November 2, 2018, Peralta, J.,
those had the occasion to say that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of appeal.
A final judgement or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the
Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits on which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right;
or a judgement or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules. Unlike a “final” judgement or order, which is appealable, an
“interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be
taken from the final judgement rendered in the case.
RULE 65/45 - APPEALS
Certiorari not a remedy to question CA decision.

In Pfleider v. CA – Cebu City, et al., G.R No. 196058, November 12, 2018, Caguioa, J, the basic question
is whether a special court action for certiorari is proper in questioning the CA’s decision. Ruling in the negative,
the SC
Held: It is a basic rule that where an appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for
certiorari will not be entertained; remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review, which
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general
rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken
under Rule 45. (Catindig v. Vda. De Meneses. 656 Phil. 361(2011)
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there is no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Jurisprudence has held that where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground raised is grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his
petition may be dismissed outright. (Artistria Ceramica v. Cuidad del Carmen Homeowner’s Assn., Inc., 635
Phil. 21 (2010)).
Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final
order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
a. If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse
is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court; and
b. If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC
to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of law are not reviewable by the said

court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of
an RTC shall be dismissed.
The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in establishing the rule that an
appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the CA shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright.
Assignment of errors; exceptions.

Once again in Igot v. Valenzona, et al., G.R. No. 230687, December 5, 2018, Tijam, J. the SC had the
occasion to say that:
Sec. 8 of Rule 51 provides that "[n]o error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceeding therein will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief,
save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors." Jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to
the general rule limiting the scope of the appellate court's review to the errors assigned and properly argued
in the appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned errors. As held in
Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. CA: (332 Phil. 206 (1996), the SC said there are exceptions:
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which
the lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent.
Pendency of petition before SC; proceedings before SB may continue.

In Cadang v. SB, G.R. Nos. 201164 and 206458, July 31, 2018, Leonen, J, the basic question is whether
proceedings in the SB may continue even during the pendency of a petition for certiorari absent any temporary
restraining order. Answering in the Positive, the SC
Held: The pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
Under Rule 65, section 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge.
Rule 47 – Annulment of Judgment
Action for annulment of judgment; an equitable recourse.

In Portal v. Taniguchi, G. R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018. Leonen, J, there was an action for nullity
of the marriage which the RTC granted. In an appeal to the CA, it was alleged that in the action, the plaintiff
placed a non-existent address of the defendant, thus, he was not served with summons hence, the judgement
is not valid. Ruling that appeal is not the proper remedy, but it should be based on Rule 47, Rules of Court, the
SC
Held: If indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner, then his remedy was to file a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of judgement
is an equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases, such as when
there is no more available or other adequate remedy (De Pedro v. Romasan Dev. Corp.148 Phil. 706 (2014),
Leonen, J).
A petition for the annulment of judgement of Regional Trial Courts may be given due course if it is
sufficiently proven that the “ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds for an
action for annulment or judgement: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud cannot
be considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 “if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.”

Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgement, if based on extrinsic fraud,
should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before
the action is barred by laches or estoppel.
Rule 60-Replevin
No recovery on replevin bond proper if case dismissed without prejudice.

The Regional Trial Court's dismissal for failure to prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice to re-
filing. Any writ of seizure, being merely ancillary to the main action, becomes functus oficio. The parties
returned to the status quo as if no case for replevin had been filed. Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it was
imperative for petitioner to return the van to Asuten. In Advent Capital and Finance Corporation v. Young, 670
Phil. 538 (2011) it was ruled that upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of
seizure, which is merely ancillary in nature, became functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no
adjudication on the merits, which means that there was no determination of the issue who has the better right
to possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain possession of the subject car considering that it was
not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy of replevin (Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018, Leonen, J).
When application against the bond proper.

De Guia v. Alto Surety & Insurance, Co., 117 Phil. 434 (1963), requires that any application on the bond
be made after hearing but before the entry of judgment. Otherwise, the surety can no longer be made liable
under the bond because the Rules are mandatory and require the application upon the bond against the surety
or bondsmen and the award thereof to be made after hearing and before the entry of final judgment in the case;
that if the judgment under execution contains no directive for the surety to pay, and the proper party fails to
make any claim for such directive before such judgment had become final and executory, the surety or
bondsman cannot be later made liable under the bond. The purpose of the aforementioned rules is to avoid
multiplicity of suits (Visayan Surety & Insurance Corp. v. Pascual, 85 Phil. 779 (1950); Del Rosario v. Nava, 95
Phil. 637 (1954), per JBL Reyes).
For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally decided,
resolved, or terminated. This condition is deemed incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the
surety, regardless of whether they failed to expressly state it. Under the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds,
(AM No. 04-7-02 SC (2004); Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018,
Leonen, J).
Case a rare instance due to failure to return the van.

This case is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved due to the dismissal without
prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has yet to be finally terminated by the Regional Trial Court.
The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to Asuten,
despite the dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or jurisprudence. In its
discretion, the Regional Trial Court proceeded to rule on the forfeiture of the bond. As a result, respondent paid
Asuten twice the value of the van withheld by petitioner. Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount from
petitioner, despite the van only being worth half the amount of the bond (Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018, Leonen, J).
Reason for the double amount of the bond in replevin

There is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ of seizure in a replevin be double the
value of the property. The bond functions not only to indemnify the defendant in case the property is lost, but
also to answer for any damages that may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in defendant's
favor. In Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 328 (1999):
A replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may
suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property
pending trial of the action. The same may also be answerable for damages if any when
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin
was issued and such judgment includes the return of the property to him. Thus, the
requirement that the bond be double the actual value of the properties litigated upon. Such is
the case because the bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff, which corresponds
to the value of the properties sought to be recovered and for damages, if any (Sagupay v. CA,
et al., 262 Phil. 506 [1990]); Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950,
August 15, 2018, Leonen, J).
Prior judgment required.

Any application of the bond in a replevin case, therefore, is premised on the judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant. Thus, the Rules of Court imply that there must be a prior judgment on the merits before
there can be any application on the bond (Rule 60, Sec.9).
Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant's
favor, and second, an application by the defendant for damages (Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018, Leonen, J).

Rule 58 – Injunction
Requirement of a right for injunction to issue.

In PCSO v. Hon. De Leon, et al., G.R. Nos. 236577 and 236597, August 15, 2018, Leonen, J, the SC had the
occasion to say that absent the showing of an existing right to be protected, a party's application for an
injunctive relief must necessarily be denied.
This case arose due to the claim of Pagcor’s exclusive right under the Amendment to Equipment Lease
Agreement which expired on August 21, 2018 but which was not proven to have been extended beyond such
period. Hence, it cannot claim that it has exclusive rights to be protected and it will suffer irreparable injury if
the PCSO would continue with the nationwide On-line Lottery System bidding for the next supplier of the On-
Line bidding.
Nature and purpose of a writ of preliminary injunction.

A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued "to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated." In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 435 Phil 112, (2002):
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive
remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or
preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction
may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, G.R. No.
132944, November 19, 2016, Leonen, J, the Court held that "[f]or a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued,
the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and substantial
invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury."
Replevin
Recovery of deficiency.
An action for replevin was filed with a prayer that in case the movable would not be delivered, the
defendant should pay the value of the same. The movable was returned to the plaintiff, hence, there was
foreclosure of the mortgage with a deficiency. The plaintiff may not recover the deficiency, because the prayer
was not cumulative or successive but alternative. The rule is that, a party is entitled only to such relief
consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto (Sps. Gonzaga v. CA, 483 Phil.
424 (2004)).
By praying for recovery of possession with a money judgement as a mere alternative relief and when
it did not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the proceedings in said case, including appeal,
petitioner led the courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a deficiency so long as it recovered
possession; after all, the basis of its alternative relief for collection of the outstanding loan is the same as that
of its prayer for replevin – the respondents’ unpaid obligation in the amount of Php2,604,604.97, plus interest
and penalty. Its actions were thus consistent with and limited to the allegations and relief sought in its
pleadings. This consistency in action carried on until the dump truck was foreclosed and sold at auction (Central
Visayas Finance Corp. v. Sps. Eleizer Adlawan et al., G.R. No. 212674, March 25, 2019, Del Castillo, J).
Loan with mortgage, there is single cause of action.

In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor –
the recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his single cause of action
by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
(Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287 [1939]).
In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors from pursuing both the remedies of a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, it was held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v.
Esteban Icarangal, et al. that a rule which would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the

debtor simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in
multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity, but also in subjecting the defendant
to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in
the place where the property lies. Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection
or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As petitioner had already
instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing
herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case
had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order (Central Visayas Finance Corp. v.
Sps. Eleizer Adlawan et al., G.R. No. 212674, March 25, 2019, Del Castillo, J).
Rule 65 – Petition for Certiorari
Errors of law, not within ambit of Certiorari

In Davao AFC Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang, G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J, the petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari questioning the alleged erroneous award of damages against its employees after
conviction in a criminal case. Ruling that the remedy of certiorari is not proper, the SC
Held: Such errors merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not jurisdiction, thus, putting them beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgement.
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgement would be void judgement. This cannot be allowed.
The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgement that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of
certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari (Vios v. Pataugco, Jr., 772 Phil. 470 (2015)).
Prohibition and Mandamus
Purpose of prohibition
Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered directing the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a
writ of prohibition is to prevent the performance of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished (Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas 716 Phil. 132 145 (2013).
Mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station” (Uy Kiao Eng
v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 206-207 (2010); Zabal et al. v. Duterte et al. G.R. No. 238467, February 12 2019 Del Castillo,
J).
Prohibition and mandamus may be invoked on constitutional issues.

The use of prohibition and mandamus is not merely confined to Rule 65. These extraordinary remedies
may be invoked when constitutional violations or issues are raised. As the Court stated in Spouses Imbong v.
Hon. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1 (2014), as far back as Tañada v. Angara, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and
countless others. In Tañada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.' Once
a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court, as in the instant case, it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide (Zabal et al. v. Duterte et al. G.R. No.
238467, February 12 2019 Del Castillo, J).
Rule 68 – Foreclosure of Mortgage
Personal notice to mortgagor in foreclosure proceedings; not necessary.

As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 313514 governing extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages only
requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in three public places; and 2) publication
of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation (Paradigm Dev. Corp. v. BPI, G.R. No. 191174, June 7,
2017).

Nevertheless, jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that despite the above provisions of the
law, the parties to a mortgage contract are not precluded from imposing additional stipulations. (Metropolitan
Bank of Trect Co. v. Wong 412 Phil.207 (2001) This includes the requirement of personal notification to the
mortgagor of any action relative to the mortgage contract, such as the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding.
Thus, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally
required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure
proceedings null and void. (Metrobank v. Wong)
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any action which
petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When
petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach
sufficient to render the foreclosure sale null and void (See: Global Holiday Ownership Corporation v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, (603 Phil. 850 (2009) Carlos Lim v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, (713 Phil. 24 (2013) and Ramirez v. The Manila Banking Corporation. (723 Phil. 674 (2013);
Planters Dev. Bank v. Lubiya Agro Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 207976, November 14, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J).
Rule 70/39
When forcible entry case may prosper.

For forcible entry, the one-year prescriptive period is generally reckoned from the date of actual entry
on the land (Sps. Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053 [2001]). However, if forcible entry is done through stealth,
the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the entry (Elave v. Court of Appeals, 254 Phil. 826
(1989). In marked contrast, the one-year period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last
demand to vacate (Sps. Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, 581 Phil. 337, 349 [2008]).
Thus, the three (3) elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper are
the following:
(a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that
the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned
of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property (Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil.
372, 381 [2014]; PLDT v. City Appliance MC Corp., G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019, Leonen,
J).
Actual prior physical possession a requirement.

The “fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases.” For an action
for forcible entry to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove that it was in prior physical possession of the
property before the defendant encroached on the property.
Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material possession, not legal
possession (Sps. Tirona v. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 299 [2001]). It is not required that the complainant is the owner
of the property (Sps. Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 304, 309 [1993]). If the issue of ownership is raised
the court may resolve this question only to determine the question of possession (Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling
Technopark III, 449 Phil. 181, 186 [2003]; Quizon v. Juan, 577 Phil. 470 (2008)).
Hence, in claiming that it had prior physical possession by virtue of its absolute ownership over the
land, respondent is mistaken (Sps. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 130, 140 [2008]). An allegation of
prior physical possession must be clearly stated in a complaint for forcible entry. It cannot equate possession
as an attribute of ownership to the facts of actual prior possession.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to rule that respondent’s allegation of prior physical possession
is sufficient, the action for forcible entry must still fail for being filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
Respondent insists on the Court of Appeals’ ruling that based on Elane, Ganancial, and Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of the last
demand to vacate.
The one-year time bar in forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery of the
encroachment, not from the date of the last demand to vacate.
In 1965 case of Ganancial v. Atillo, 121 Phil. 1249 (1965), Hilario Ganancial (Ganancial) filed a complaint
for forcible entry against Leonardo Atillo (Atillo) on April 24, 1961. He alleged that on February 6, 1960, Atillo
occupied his property through strategy, stealth, and force. When the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction was
questioned, Ganancial argued that the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from February 3, 1961,
the date when he sent the notice to vacate.
In resolving the case, this Court ruled that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment
suit because the reckoning point of the prescriptive period is the date of dispossession, not the date of demand
to vacate.
One-year prescriptive period in forcible entry.

In forcible entry suits, “the law does not require a previous demand . . . to vacate the premises, and . . .
the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the
property (Sps. Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, 581 Phil. 337 (2008)).

The prescriptive period in a forcible entry case is generally counted from the date of actual entry into
the land – except when this entry was made through stealth, in which case, the period is reckoned from the
time of discovery (Dela Cruz, 757 Phil. 9 (2015)). Similarly, in Diaz v. Sps. Punzalan, 783 Phil. 456 (2016):
In an action for forcible entry, the following requisites are essential for the MTC to
acquire jurisdiction over the case: (1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property; (2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth; and (3) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the date of actual entry on
the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from
the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical
possession of the property. It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to expressly use the
exact language of the law. For as long as it is shown that the dispossession took place under
said conditions, it is considered as sufficient compliance with the requirements.
One-year prescriptive period jurisdictional.

The one-year prescriptive period is a jurisdictional requirement (Sps. Barnachea v. Court of Appeals,
581 Phil. 337, 349 [2008]) consistent with the summary nature of ejectment suits (Diaz v. Sps. Punzalan, 783
Phil. 456, 462 [2016]). In Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968), this Court made a distinction between
unlawful detainer and forcible entry in discussing the implication of the one-year prescriptive period for
forcible entry cases. It stated:
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court – provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry
can prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will
merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in – and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
Here, a review of respondent’s own narration of facts reveals that it discovered the underground cables
and line in April 2003, when it applied for exemption from the parking slots requirement with the Cebu City
Zoning Board.
Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive period to file the forcible entry suit had already
lapsed sometime in April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for forcible entry was filed on October 1, 2004,
the period had already prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to
resolve the case.
Nature of action for ejectment.

An action for ejectment is a summary proceeding meant “to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right of possession of property” (Amoquis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018, Per
J. Leonen, Third Division). In this special civil action, the title to the property is not involved. The only matter
resolved is the question as to “who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto” (Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 183-184 [2001]).
Ejectment suits are designed “to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the
party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his (Pajuyo v. Court of
Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 580-581 (2004).” They discourage the parties deprived of possession of property to take
the law into their own hands. Thus, ejectment proceedings are summary in nature to provide for a speedy
settlement and action to recover possession, and quell social disturbance.
There are two (2) kinds of actions that fall under summary ejectment, namely: (1) forcible entry; and
(2) unlawful detainer.
In the earlier case of Dikit v. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44 (1951), [Per J. Feria, First Division]; See also
Buenaventura v. Uy, 233 Phil. 20 (1987), [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; Sps. Munoz v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil.
1001 (1992); [Per J. Medialdea, First Division]; and Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648 (2006) [Per J. Tinga,
Third Division], this Court made the distinction between the two (2) actions:
Forcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the material or actual possession of
a land or building or of taking possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, against the will or without the consent of the possessor; while unlawful detainer is the
act of unlawfully withholding the possession of a land or building against or from a landlord,
vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the detainer’s right to
hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied.
With respect to possession, in forcible entry, the possession of the intruder is illegal at the outset
because his or her “possession thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former possessor.”

In unlawful detainer, by contrast, the possession is previously legal but becomes unlawful upon the expiration
of one’s right to possess the property after, for instance, the termination or violation of a lease contract.
Another difference rests in terms of a demand to vacate: “in an action of forcible entry, no previous
demand to vacate is required by law before the filing of the action,” while such demand is required in unlawful
detainer.
The Court reiterated these differences in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 302 Phil 392 (1994), adding that
“in forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the property in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have prior physical possession of the property.
One year period to file action is reckoned from last demand.

In Leonor Rivera Avante v. Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 224137, April 3, 2019, Peralta, J, the lessor sent a
demand to vacate and pay dated May 22, 2006. Then, there was another letter dated September 22, 2007 which
was merely in the nature of a reminder or reiteration of the demand dated May 22, 2006. The controversy is
the reckoning point of the prescriptive period to file an unlawful detainer case. The SC
Held: The May 22, 2006 is the reckoning point of the one-year prescriptive period. Subsequent demands that
are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period
within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date
of the original demand (Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694 (2006). In Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation, 688 Phil. 616 (2012), it was held that where there were more than one demand
to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer case is from the last
demand. Sunvar, nonetheless, acknowledged that this principle is still subject to the rule that if the subsequent
demands are mere reiterations or reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an
ejectment suit would still be counted from the first demand.
MTC without jurisdiction to evict NTC.

It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a
public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land belonging
to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase
or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate
such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons
of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel. The proper recourse is for the ejectment
court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just
compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation
to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case
and determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the
Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 913631 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, the National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo or TRANSCO), a government agency, was created to assume the electrical
transmission functions of the National Power Corporation and is vested with the power of eminent domain
subject to the requirements of the Constitution and existing laws (National Transmisson Corp. v. Bermuda
Development Corp., G.R. No. 214782, April 3, 2019, Caguioa, J).
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Settlement of Estate
Personal notice to heirs is a matter of convenience; defect cured by publication

Personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is not a jurisdictional requirement. In Alaban v. Court of
Appeals, 507 Phil. 682, 695 (2005), the court explained that it is just a matter of personal convenience. Thus:
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent,
are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate
proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the
petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice
upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite
(Leriou, et al., v. Longa, et al., G.R. No. 203923, October 8, 2018, Leonardo, De Castro, C.J).
Nature of testate and intestate proceeding.

A testate or intestate settlement of a deceased's estate is a proceeding in rem (Pilapil v. Heirs of
Maximino R. Briones, 543 Phil. 184, 199 (2007), such that the publication under Section 3 of the same Rule, vests
the court with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein.
By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world, petitioners are deemed notified about
the intestate proceedings of their father's estate. As the Court elucidated in Alaban v. Court of Appeals:

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving
the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate
of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of
the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
Heirs deemed notified due to publication.

The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, where some of the heirs did not
receive any personal notice about the intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed notified through publication
since the intestate proceeding is in rem. The Court in Pilapil adjudged:
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving
siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of
estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in
the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence
of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose
of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
Preference in the appointment of administratrix; interest is primary consideration

As to whom the Letters of Administration should be issued, the Court, in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,
287 Phil. 459, 466-467 (1992), gave emphasis on the extent of one's interest in the decedent's estate as the
paramount consideration for appointing him/her as the administrator. The Court pronounced:
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate.
The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
Order of preference, not absolute.

Petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their choice of
administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth emphasizing
that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not absolute, and that the
appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. In Uy
v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673, 680 (2006), the Court decreed:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the order of
preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to
the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But if the person
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another
person. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below
was in error.
Effect if non-resident of the Phils; minors

Petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify them from administering the
decedent's estate pursuant to Rule 78, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondents are also disqualified by
reason of their minority. In view of the evident disqualification of petitioners and respondents and the lack of
any known creditors, the parties have no choice but to have somebody else administer the estate for them.
Petitioners nominated Juan Manuel Elizalde (Elizalde) but failed to give adequate justification as to why Letters
of Administration should be issued in Elizalde's favor. We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate
courts in choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde. Compared to Elizalde whose interest over the
decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-administratrix's interest is to protect the estate for the benefit of her
children with Enrique. Indeed, it is respondents who would directly benefit from an orderly and efficient
management by the respondent-administratrix. In the absence of any indication that respondent-
administratrix would jeopardize her children's interest, or that of petitioners in the subject estate, petitioners'
attempts to remove her as administratrix of Enrique's estate must fail.
Removal of administratrix
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator,
it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of
an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders
of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. Suffice it to
state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate. (Leriou, et al., v. Longa, et al., G.R. No. 203923, October 8, 2018, Leonardo, De Castro,
J)
Appointment/removal of special administration

Marilu Turla filed a petition for letters of administration claiming that she is the daughter of the late
Mariano Turla married to Rufina. Maria Turla Calma opposed the petition alleging that she is the surviving half-
sister of Mariano and that Marilu is not the daughter of Mariano, hence, the information in her birth certificate
is fraudulent. Maria filed a motion to order DNA testing as Maria’s relationship to Mariano has been put to issue.
It was granted. The DNA Test was conducted with the alleged siblings of Rufina which showed that Marilu was
not related to Rufina. Hence, the RTC, upon motion ordered the removal of Marilu as Special Administrator of
the estate of Mariano. Is the order correct? Why?
Held: No. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators (Co. v. Judge Rosario et al. 576 Phil. 223). Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over,
or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice
and legal principles. (Fule v. CA 165 Phil. 785 (1976)
The DNA test was ordered to prove Marilu’s paternity, but surprisingly, the test was conducted with
the alleged siblings of Rufina, which showed that Marilu is not related to Rufina. While Marilu was shown to be
not blood related to Rufina, however, the DNA result did not at all prove that she is not a daughter of Mariano,
as Maria claimed and which the RTC's order of DNA testing wanted to establish. Notably, Maria alleged that she
is Mariano's half-sister, but why she was not the one who underwent the DNA testing when such procedure
could satisfactorily prove her contention that respondent is not Mariano's daughter.
Grant of DNA Testing not automatic admission in evidence of component.

Moreover, Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of DNA
testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the
DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with
the Rules on Evidence. Therefore, the DNA test result is not a valid ground for the revocation of respondent's
appointment as Special Administrators and her removal as such. Respondent's removal was not grounded on
reason, justice and legal principle. (Calma v. Turla, G.R. No. 221684 July 30, 2018, Peralta, J)
Powers of the Administrator
Duties of administrators
In In Re: Intestate Estate of Miguelita Pacioles, et al. v. Emilio Pacioles, G.R. No. 214415, October 15, 2018,
Tijam, J, after the death of Miguelita, a petition for settlement of her estate was filed by her husband Emilio
where Emilio and Emmanuel were appointed co-administrators. One of the properties left was a foreign
currency single account under the names of Emilio and Emmanuel. Emilio filed a motion to allow him to
withdraw money from the account to defray the payment of taxes due on the properties of the estate. The court
granted the motion ordering the bank to release the amount sought to be withdrawn, but without the consent
of Emmanuel. Is the order correct? Why?
Held: No. The rule on foreign currency deposits is embodied in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, also
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines.
It is apparent that in ordering the branch manager or any representative of the bank to release the
money contained in a foreign currency deposit account, the intestate court committed a violation of the law,
which expressly provides that all foreign currency deposits as defined by applicable laws are not subject to any

form of attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body.
Moreover, the subject account is in the nature of a joint account. "[It] is one that is held jointly by two
or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are
joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proved” (Apique v. Fahnentich, 765 Phil. 915 (2015). In an "and" joint account, as in this case, the
depositors are joint creditors of the bank and the signatures of all depositors are necessary to allow withdrawal.
Thus, it is indispensable that all the persons named as account holders give their consent before any
withdrawal could be made.
Duties of the administrator.

One of the duties of the administrator is to administer all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the
proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon. (Sec. 1
(b) Rule 81)
The jurisdiction of a trial court, sitting as an intestate court, as regards the proper disposition of the
estate of the deceased. Such jurisdiction continues until after the payment of all the debts and the remaining
estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same (Vda.de Guerrea v. Suplico, 522 Phil. 295 (2006). Thus,
proper proceedings must be had before the intestate court so that the subject joint account should be
administered solely by Emilio, who is the lone administrator.
Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Nature of the writ of habeas corpus.

In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus of Michael Labrador Abellana v. Hon. Meinrado Paredes, et al., G.R. No.
232006, July 10, 2019, Caguioa, J, petition for habeas corpus, the SC once again
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice and to have it ascertained whether he is held under lawful authority. (Go v. Dimagiba, 499
Phil. 445 [2005])
Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto (Rule 102, Sec.1). Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of
illegal restraint.
Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal
which, having duly acquired jurisdiction was not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the
course of the proceedings. (De Villa v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 485 Phil. 368 [2004])
The writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence
sentence as to circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is
attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding
the sentence as such excess (Go v. Dimagiba). Here, petitioner is invoking the first circumstance.
When the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed (Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
147 Phil. 298 [2005]). Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the exceptional circumstances listed
above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not enough. The
violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. This, petitioner failed to show.
The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may
thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.
Indeed, the rule is that when there is a deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the court that
rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of his detention. The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed
by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the
person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The concern is not merely whether an error has been
committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render void
the judgment, order, or process in question. (Calvan v. CA, 396 Phil. 133 [2000])
Correction of Entries
Correction of misspelled name

Matron M. Ohoma (Matiorico M. Ohomna; petitioner) before the RTC on March 26, 2014, seeking the
cancellation of his Certificate of Live Birth. He averred that: (a) he was born on May 13, 1986 in Aguinaldo,
Ifugao; (b) his birth was belatedly recorded with the Local Civil Registrar of Aguinaldo, Ifugao (LCR-Aguinaldo)
on February 8, 2000 (second birth certificate); (c) unknown to him, his birth had been previously registered
with the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13, 1986 under the first birth certificate; (d) the first birth certificate

contained erroneous entries, i.e., (i) his first name was erroneously recorded as Matron instead of Matiorico
and (ii) his last name was erroneously recorded as Ohoma instead of Ohomna; (e) he has been using the first
name Matiorico and the last name Ohomna, and has been known by such first and last names both in his public
and private transactions; and (f) the second birth certificate reflects the true and correct data of petitioner;
hence, must be the one retained.
The RTC granted the petition but CA reversed ruling that there can be no valid late registration of
petitioner's birth considering that the same had already been lawfully registered with the LCR-Aguinaldo
within thirty (30) days from the time of his birth. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?
Held: No. While the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's first birth certificate and the
retention of his second birth certificate, the ultimate objective was to correct the erroneous entries pertaining
to petitioner's first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma to Matiorico Ohomna, as he claimed that people in
the community know him by the latter name rather than the former. Rule 108 implements judicial proceedings
for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. The
role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. (Rep. v. Mercadera,
652 Phil. 195 [2010])
The action filed seeks to correct a supposedly misspelled name, and thus, properly falls under Rule
108. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." Considering that
petitioner complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 108, the RTC had the jurisdiction to resolve
the petition which included a prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable x x x." A general prayer for "other
reliefs just and equitable" appearing on a petition enables the court to award reliefs supported by the complaint
or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these
reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the complaint (Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, G.R. No. 210475, April 11, 2018).
Consequently, the CA erred in holding that petitioner has to refile another petition before the trial court could
resolve his claim (Ohama v. Office of the Municipal Registrar of Aguinaldo Ifugao, et al., G.R. No. 239584, June
27, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Rule 108
Substantial entries, summary proceeding insufficient.

Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his record of birth and alleged that he was born
on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul Hospital in the City of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the civil
registry of Manila; that he had been using his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his lifetime; that when he
later secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he discovered that his name was entered as "Ramon Corpus
Tan Ko" instead of his true and correct name which is "Ramon Corpuz Tan"; that the aforesaid material errors
and mistakes in the entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence and error of the hospital
personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that "Ko," which was the first name of his father, was
inadvertently included in his last name; and that the mistake was not immediately rectified because he only
discovered the same, after having his own children.
It was denied by both RTC and CA on the ground that they are substantial entries to the extent of
affecting citizenship, hence, a petition was filed with the SC questioning the rulings of the lower courts. Are the
rulings correct? Why?
Held: Yes. The alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a readily apparent mistake. Contrary to
petitioner's claim, the correction sought would definitely have an effect on his filiation with the persons named
in his Certificate of Live Birth.
The name "Tan Ko" has been consistently used not only in the entries for petitioner's name, but also
for that of his parents. Verily, the "correction" of petitioner's name from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon
Corpuz Tan" would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the names of his parents as entered in his
Certificate of Live Birth.
Altering petitioner's surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan" would, in effect, be an adjudication that the first
name of his father is indeed "Ko" and his surname "Tan." Clearly, the correction would affect the identity of
petitioner's father. Moreover, there would be a need to correct his mother's name from "Trinidad Corpus Tan
Ko" to "Trinidad Corpuz Tan." This would require deleting the word "Ko" from "Tan Ko" and changing the letter
"s" to "z" in "Corpus." Following Benemerito, to effect the correction, it would be essential to establish that
"Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" and "Trinidad Corpuz Tan" refer to the same person. A summary proceeding would
certainly be insufficient to effect such substantial corrections.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia, 225 Phil, 408 (1986), the Court declared that a petition for
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court covers not only clerical errors, but also substantial
changes. The difference lies only on the procedure which would govern the correction sought. "If the correction
is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary." (Rep. v.
Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378 (2014); Ramon Corpus Tan v. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, et al., G.R. No.
211435, April 10, 2019, Reyes, J, Jr., J)
Substantial and clerical errors.

A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that
is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or

contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed (Rep. v. Benemerito, 469 Phil. 508 [2004]). Substantial and
controversial alterations include those which may affect the citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage. (Rep. v. Lugsanay Uy, 716 Phil. 254 (2013)
Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live Birth or any of the parents
indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial matters which would require an adversarial
proceeding.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Benemerito (Benemerito), the respondent Petronio L. Benemerito filed
a petition for the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of his son who was born on June 1,
1990. He claimed that his name was incorrectly entered in the Certificate of Live Birth as "Peter Laurente
Benemerito." He also sought to change the date of his marriage to his wife as entered in the birth certificate
from September 1, 1989 to January 25, 1998. The Republic argued that the changes sought by respondent are
substantial, and not innocuous. As such, an adversarial proceeding to fully ventilate respondent's allegations is
required.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Lugsanay Uy, the respondent sought the "correction" of her name in her
Certificate of Live Birth from "Anita Sy" to "Norma S. Lugsanay." She claimed that she was born on February 8,
1952, and the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. She argued that as an illegitimate child, her
surname should follow that of her mother's. She further alleged that she is known to her family and friends as
"Norma Lugsanay" and that her school records and other legal documents bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay
and are all Filipinos.
The entries sought to be corrected are substantial alterations, and not mere clerical errors, as they
touched upon respondent's filiation and citizenship. Changing respondent's surname from "Sy" to "Lugsanay"
would change her status from legitimate to illegitimate.
Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial proceeding under Rule
108.
Q - Petitioner claimed that even if the correction sought involves a substantial change, he has
substantially complied with the requirement of appropriate adversarial proceeding when he
impleaded LCR Manila and after he caused the publication of the notice setting his petition for hearing
in accordance with Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Republic, through the OSG, submitted
that indeed the petitioner has substantially complied with the procedural requirement of an adversary
proceeding. Both the petitioner and the Republic mentioned the cases of Barco v. Court of Appeals
(Barco) and Republic of the Philippines v. Kho (Kho) as authorities in support of their submission that
the failure to implead indispensable parties could be cured by compliance with the publication
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108. Is reliance on Barco and Kho correct? Explain.
Held: No. Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register,
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
In Barco, therein private respondent Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entry
in order to change the person named as the father in the birth certificate of her daughter. The local civil registrar
that recorded the subject birth certificate was impleaded along with Francisco Maravilla (Francisco), the
person originally named as the father, and Armando Gustilo (Armando), the person said to be the real father.
Notably, Francisco and Armando interposed no objection to the correction. Eventually, the trial court granted
the petition for correction of entry.
A petition was later filed before the CA seeking the annulment of the RTC Order. Milagros Barco
(Milagros) filed a petition-in-intervention before the CA arguing that she and her daughter have legal interest
in the annulment of the RTC Order. She explained that her daughter is also the child and heir of Armando, the
alleged real father in Nadina's petition for correction of entry. As such, she and her daughter should have been
impleaded therein, failing which, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction. The CA, however, dismissed the
petition and petition-in-intervention.
The Court concurred with the CA's conclusion that the failure to implead an indispensable party, such
as Milagros, in the petition for correction of entry was cured by the compliance with the publication
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108. The Court reasoned that it could not be established whether Nadina
knew of the existence of Milagros' daughter at the time the former filed the petition for correction. The Court
explained that doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the
parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. The Court stated, thus:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was
the daughter of Armando would affect her ward's share in the estate of her father. It cannot
be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy's existence at the time she filed the petition
for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108
would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition.
For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate
offspring of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to

implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as
quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which
requires notice by publication. (Barco v. CA, 465 Phil. 39 (2004)
On the other hand, in Kho, the private respondents who were siblings filed a petition for correction of
the entries in their respective birth certificates. They prayed, among others, that the word "married" opposite
the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" be deleted because their parents were not legally married. Private
respondent Carlito Kho, one of the siblings, also sought the correction of the entries in the birth certificates of
his children, specifically, the correction of the date of marriage between him and his wife from "April 27, 1989"
to "January 21, 2000," the latter date being the date appearing in their marriage certificate; and the correction
of the name of his wife's first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
The Republic opposed the corrections and contended that since the changes prayed for were
substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable
parties, such as Marivel and the private respondents' parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
The Court, however, dismissed the Republic's contentions ruling that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with, the appropriate adversary proceeding is satisfied. The Court
stressed that it is highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her
children's birth certificates considering that the notices, orders, and decision of the trial court were all sent to
the residence she shared with Carlito and their children. With respect to the private respondents' parents, the
Court noted that their father died in 1959. On the other hand, their mother was presented as a witness and
testified as to the material allegations of the petition for correction of entries.
From the foregoing, it is clear that there are circumstances which impelled the Court to excuse the
failure to implead indispensable parties in proceedings for cancellation or correction of entry. In Barco, it is the
supposed lack of knowledge or awareness of the petitioner of the existence of other persons who would be
affected by the corrections she sought. In Kho, it is the affected persons' inferred notice and actual awareness
of the proceedings for the correction of entries.
The circumstances in Barco and Kho are unavailing in this case. It could not be said that petitioner was
unaware of the existence of other persons who may be affected by the corrections sought. It is his own mother
who would be affected by the proceeding for correction of entry which he filed. His mother's name in the subject
birth certificate would necessarily be changed if the correction prayed for is granted. Further, petitioner's
mother has neither been shown nor alleged to have been living in the same residence with petitioner, unlike in
Kho. Thus, there was no showing or, at the very least, reason to believe that her mother was even aware of the
subject proceeding for correction of entry.
Contrary to the submissions by the parties, it is Lugsanay Uy, 716 Phil. 254 (2013), which finds
application to the present petition. In said case, the private respondent sought the "correction" of her name in
her Certificate of Live Birth from "Anita Sy" to "Norma S. Lugsanay," impleading the Local Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City as respondent. The Court ruled that respondent should have impleaded her parents and siblings
as the persons who have interest, and are affected by the changes or corrections she wanted to make. Simply
put, impleading and notifying only the local civil registrar is not enough, to wit:
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules
mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named
in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be
served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify
the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.
Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence
of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out. (Ramon Corpus Tan v. The
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 21143, April 10, 2019)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry
A petition was filed by Virgel which sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate.
Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Both copies reflect his
gender as "FEMALE" and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the
local civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born on May
12, 1976. Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth certificate as

follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his
month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."
The lower courts ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of the entry on his gender is
considered a substantial change, it is nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Is the decision correct? Why?
Held: It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a person, are considered substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule. (Republic v. Mercadera,
652 Phil. 195, 207 (2010), citing Chua Wee, et al., v. Republic, 148 Phil. 422, 428 (1971).
Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of substantial errors.
Substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings—
effectively limiting the application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors
(See Wong, etc., et al. v. Republic, et al., 201 Phil. 69, 78-79 [1992]). The Court's ruling in Republic v. Valencia, 225
Phil. 408 (1986), explained the adversarial procedure to be followed in correcting substantial errors in this
wise:
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(l) the civil registrar, and (2) all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of
the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for
the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the
opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings
(Rep. v. Virgie L. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018, Reyes, Jr. J; Rep. v. Coseteng-
Magpayo, 656 Phil. 550 [2011]; Rep. v. CA, 286 Phil. 811 [1992]).
The Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is limited to changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. The cited cases in the petition were
already superseded by much later jurisprudence (See Republic v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 383 (2014); Lee v. CA,
419 Phil. 392, 403 [2001]). Most importantly, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 in 2001, the
local civil registrars, or the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a
judicial order. This law provides an administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical
errors, essentially leaving the substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, the Republic did not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court were adversarial,
but merely insisted on the erroneous premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited to the correction of
harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry. Having established that the proper recourse for
the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the Court cannot
sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. It has long been settled in Republic v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378
(2014), that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections and
changes in the civil registry, such as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected,
viz.:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court
has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through
a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties
of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition,

if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.
The Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cited a specific rule of procedure that
Virgel failed to follow, In the absence of evidence refuting Virgel's assertion that he is indeed phenotypically
male, the correction of the entry on Virgel's sex in his birth certificate, from "FEMALE" to "MALE," was correctly
granted.
With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel" the Court did not agree with the CA that the
requirements under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court may be substituted with that of Rule 108. These remedies
are distinct and separate from one another, and compliance with one rule cannot serve as a fulfillment of the
requisites prescribed by the other (Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, citing Republic v. Judge Belmonte, 241 Phil.
966, 969 (1988). Nonetheless, the Court has settled in Republic v. Mercadera, 652 Phil. 195 (2010), that changes
in one's name are not necessarily confined to a petition filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the civil register that
may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie" may be corrected to "Virgel" as a necessary consequence
of the substantial correction on Virgel's gender, and to allow the record to conform to the truth.
With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagreed with the CA that the alleged date
(i.e., February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate indicates that he was born on
May 12, 1976, a date obviously different from that alleged in the petition for correction. As a public document,
the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is presumed valid and prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it.
Virgel bore the burden of proving its supposed falsity. (Baldos v. CA, et al., 638 Phil. 601, 608 (2010).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction and MTQ
Rape case not covered by Indigenous People Rights Act.

The [Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act] does not apply [to] the prosecution of a "dispute" such as this
case as it does not involve claims over ancestral domain nor it relates (sic) to the rights of indigenous
communities/people which would require the application of customary laws and practices to resolve the
"dispute" between the parties herein.
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of
criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of
petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view
of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the
context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot
work to undermine penal statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to
even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to
abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws.
A crime is "an offense against society.” It "is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large[.]"
(Baviera v. Prosecutor Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107 [2007]; Ha Datu Tawahig (Roderick Sumatra), et al. v. Lapinid,
et al., G.R. No. 22139, Marc 20, 2019, Leonen, J)
Rule 110
Allegations in the information control

Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the
technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information (Aquino v. People, G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018,
Leonen, J).
When the facts, acts and circumstances are set forth in the body of an information with sufficient
certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a
misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate
it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation of the offense and the
accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous designation may be
disregarded as surplusage. (Socrates v. SB, 324 Phil. 15 (1996))
Amendment of information
Amendment of the information to correct the total amount of the disbursement vouchers is a mere
formal amendment. The prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of its nature, so
long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the

second paragraph thereof. However, once the accused enters his plea during arraignment, the prosecution is
already prohibited from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly citing those that may prejudice the
rights of the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused. The
theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the
basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its
case on the basis of the same information. (Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 181 [2014]; People v. SB, et al., G.R. No.
240621, July 24, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J)
Nature of substantial amendment.

Substantial amendments consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court (Corpuz v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018; citing
Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag, 283 Phil. 956 [1992]). On the other hand, formal amendments which can be made at
any time do not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. Verily, they are amendments which merely state with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original Information, and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction of the crime charged. Hence, the following are considered as mere formal amendments:
(a) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (b) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in
the original one; (c) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (d) an amendment which does
not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. (People v. SB,
et al., G.R. No. 240621, July 24, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J)
Effect of failure to implead the People in an appeal

In People v. Go, G.R. No. 210816, December 10 2018 Reyes, A, Jr., J, the SC once again ruled that:
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provide that all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari before the CA which failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as a party thereto was defective. The true aggrieved party in criminal
prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality decency and
justice has been outraged.
The failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a
case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/ or such times as are just. If
the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to comply.” The court declared the
rationale for this exception in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder
and delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself,
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the
other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their
obvious duty.
Rule 111
Prejudicial question may exist even if both cases are civil in nature
In Alsons Development and Investmanet Corp. v. Heirs of Confesor, et al., G.R. No. 215671, September 19,
2018, Tijam, J, there was a leasehold contract between the DENR and petitioner over a large track of land in
Mindanao. Respondents contended that a part of the said land was owned by them, hence, it was outside of the
DENR’s jurisdiction. In the meantime, the DENR filed an action to nullify petitioners’ title and prayed for
reversion on the ground that the title is void. There was also an action for cancellation of the leasehold
agreement. It was contended that the civil action for nullity of the title is a bar to the prosecution of the
cancellation of the leasehold agreement on the ground of prejudicial question. The respondents contended
otherwise because a prejudicial question arises only if there is a criminal and a civil case. In the contention that
there is a prejudicial question correct? Why?
Held: Yes. Generally, a prejudicial question comes into play only in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed because the resolution of the civil action is determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case (Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern Univ. Inc., 495 Phil.
123 [2005]). This, however, is not an ironclad rule. It is imperative for the Court to consider the rationale behind
the principle of prejudicial question, i.e., to avoid two conflicting decisions. (Dreamwork Const. Inc. v. Janiola, et
al., 609 Phil. 245 [2009]).

In Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc., the principle of prejudicial question was applied even
when there was no criminal case involved therein. The cases involved were a case for nullification of election
of directors before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a civil case for damages and attachment
before the RTC. It was explained thus:
Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of in this case, if we are
to consider the general rule that a prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. However, considering the rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two conflicting decisions, prudence
dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar.
xxxx
In the present case, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions
are the de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the
RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants,
comprised of the "Castro faction," wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M from the account
of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas ofthe "Nicolas faction" is a duly
elected member of the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint
in behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would
finally determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank
and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI It is
petitioners' claim, and we agree, that the presence or absence of their liability for allowing the
withdrawal of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the "Castro faction"
is reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board. Since
the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is
crucial to the resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial court should suspend
its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings. (Alsons v. Dev. And Investment Corp.
v. Heirs of Confesor et al., G.R. No. 21567, September 19, 2018, Tijam, J)
Effect of Death of accused.

Once again, in People v. Sayo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J, the SC had the occasion to rule
on the effect of death of an accused during the pendency of a criminal case and
Held: Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is ·extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art. 89 (1), RPC)
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability is extinguished upon her death.
The rules on the effect of the death of the accused on civil liability pending appeal are summarized in
People v. Bayotas, 306 Phil. 266 (1994).
2. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
3. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
4. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section I, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
Applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of the accused extinguished her criminal
and civil liability inasmuch as she is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action is also
extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. (People v. Eggamao, 792, Phil. 500 [2016]
Rule 112 – Preliminary Injunction
Non-interference by courts in the conduct of preliminary investigation

The SC in People v. Go, G.R. No. 210816, December 10, 2018, Reyes, A. Jr., J, once again the occasion to say
that "being the real party interested in upholding public respondent's questioned rulings, private respondents
therefore have the duty to appear and defend in their behalf and in behalf of public respondent." It further
stated, "being merely a nominal party, public respondent thus should not appear against petitioner, or any
party for that matter, who seeks the reversal of her rulings that are unfavorable to the latter." Thus, the People,
through the OSG, was given the opportunity to refute respondent's arguments, but it refused in the belief that
it was merely a nominal party with little interest in upholding respondent's indictment for reckless
imprudence. Accordingly, it would be the height of injustice to sustain the People's claim of denial of due
process and to dismiss the petition for certiorari for a procedural defect.
Basis in determining probable cause

Jurisprudence has settled that probable cause for the filing of information is "a matter which rests on
likelihood rather than on certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on 'clear and convincing evidence’
(Marasigan v. Fuentes 776 Phil. 574 (2016). In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 582 Phil. 505 (2008) Leonen, J:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations
of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.
What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction (Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 223405, February 20
2019, Leonen, J).
Determination of probable cause; executive function.

Determining whether probable cause exists for the filing of an information is an executive function. It
is not a power that rests in courts. Generally, courts do not disturb conclusions made by public prosecutors.
This is due to the basic principle of separation of powers. Nonetheless, "grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutor's resolution if he [or she] arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause”
(Aguilar v. DOJ 717 Phil. 789 (2013). As such, in keeping with the principle of checks and balances, a writ of
certiorari may issue and undo the prosecutor's iniquitous determination. In Lim v. Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, 795 Phil 226 (2016):
As a general rule, a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause — that is,
one made for the purpose of filing an Information in court — is essentially an executive
function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to
this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce
becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. The rationale behind the
general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of
probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function, while
the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary,
through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to
determine whether or not grave abuse of discretion has been committed amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. It is
fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error
as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Corollarily, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. To note, the underlying principle behind the
courts' power to review a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure
that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse
the same. This manner of judicial review is a constitutionally-enshrined form of check and
balance which underpins the very core of our system of government.
Rule 113 – Arrest
When arrest without warrant valid

In Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 234196, November 21, 2018, A. Reyes, Jr., J, the accused and his
companions were flagged down during a checkpoint after the police officers noticed that the motor cycle they
were riding has no license plate and the riders were not wearing any helmet. Can there be arrest without
warrant? The SC
Held: No. the commission of a traffic violation does not justify arrest. It merely warrants the confiscation of the
offender’s driver’s license (Sec. 29, RA 4136).
In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph (a), the following elements must be present: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, in order for paragraph (b) to operate, at the time of the arrest,
an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the appellant had committed it. (People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511 (2013)
Effect of failure to question legality of arrest; waiver

The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails
to object to its validity before arraignment.
He did not move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by
counsel when he entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. In People v. Alunday, 586 Phil.
120 (2008):
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by
the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him
before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed
cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The illegal arrest of
an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused (Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, Leonen,
J).
Arrest and Search
When there is a valid search
Q – The police received a telephone call regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his
body. One of the police officers verified the report resulting in the arrest of accused. The officer did not
specify the reason for the arrest other than the fact that there was a report of a suspicious person. A
gun was found inside a bag in his possession together with some documents including the OR and CR of
a motorcycle which was reportedly stolen. Was there a valid arrest and search warrant?
Held: None. The search on the accused’s body and belongings as an incident to his warrantless arrest was not
valid.
Our constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any
purpose. Thus, there should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these
searches and seizures as valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court
recognizes as exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(b) seizure of evidence in plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e)
customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v.
Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 [1998])
The discovery of the stolen motorcycle's OR and CR in the possession of Marvin was the product of a
valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. For the search to become valid under this exception, the inquiry of the
Court should focus on the legality of the arrest. The arrest must not be used as a mere pretext for conducting
the search, and the arrest, to be lawful, must precede the search. Assuming that there was a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may only search the arrestee and the area within which he or she may reach for a weapon, or
for evidence to destroy. The arresting officer may also seize any money or property used in the commission of
the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee
the means of escaping or committing violence. (Sanchez v. People, 747 Phil. 552 (2014); Malacat v. CA, 341 Phil.
462, [1997]; Marvin Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J)
3 instances when there can be arrest without warrant.

Since accused was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under
the three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect
in flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot
pursuit" arrest; and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being

transferred from one confinement to another (Comerciante v. People, 764 Phil. 627 [2015]; Marvin Portera v.
People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J).
Requisites in flagrante delicto arrest.

An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
(People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511 [2013]). Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was
just committed, and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed
it. (People v. Villareal; People v. Cuizon, 326 Phil. 345 [1996])
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante
delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police
officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the
presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest,
the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any
fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested
has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on accused’s body and belongings is
likewise unjustified. The law requires that there should be a lawful arrest prior to the search. The process
cannot be reversed (Sanchez v. People, 247 Phil. 552 (2014). "[W]here a person is searched without a warrant,
and under circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest x x x upon a mere suspicion that he
has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime [was]
committed by him, then the search x x x of such person as well as his arrest are deemed illegal" (People v. Vuizon;
Marvin Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J).
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.
When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his
arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived (People v. Divina, 558 Phil. 390 [2007]).
Here, accused may no longer raise the issue regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in
the proceedings before the trial court. Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the
admissibility of the evidence obtained from the illegal warrantless arrest. (Homar v. People, 768 Phil. 195
[2015]).
As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession
of firearms are inadmissible. The documents supposedly seized from his possession cannot be considered as
part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution (Marvin Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20,
2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J).
Neither was the search of Marvin's body and belongings valid as a stop-and-frisk search.
A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband" (People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757 [2003]). Searches
under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of
searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer is required to introduce himself
properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual and suspicious
conduct. (People v. Chua)
In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of
an accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the
standard to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion
or a hunch (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017). Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law
enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the
case. (Comerciante v. People)
In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken
together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity (Manalili v. People, 345 Phil. 632 [1997]). This is
determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided

the police officers approaching him, (Manalili v. People) or when a person was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic
sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. (Esquillo v. People 643 Phil. 577 [1997]; Marvin
Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J)
Marvin's alleged admissions of guilt do not suffice to convict him for carnapping.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These
rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.
This principle is further reiterated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Under this statute, extrajudicial
confessions made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation must fulfill the following
requirements:
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his
counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
These safeguards are intended to prevent the practice of extracting coerced confessions, no matter
how slight, which could lead the accused to make false admissions. They are meant to insulate the accused from
"coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of [a custodial] investigation."
The trial court, in convicting Marvin for the crime of carnapping, relied on several circumstantial pieces
of evidence. There include his supposed voluntary admission to P/Insp. Villamer that the motorcycle is in the
possession of a certain Felix.74 This admission, as shown in the following testimony of P/Insp. Villamer, was
given after he was arrested and taken to the police station for further investigation:
At that time, Marvin was already under custodial investigation, having been placed in the custody of
the police, or deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner (People v. Dela Cruz, 346 Phil. 653 [1997]).
Thus, when the police officers asked him regarding the discovery of the motorcycle's registration documents
in his possession, Marvin's right to counsel automatically attached. Furthermore, his answer constitutes an
implied admission of guilt, which should have been done in writing, with the assistance of his counsel, or after
a valid waiver of these rights (Marvin Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J).
Independently relevant evidence
Q – Marvin admitted to the mother of the owner of the motorcycle that he was the one who carnapped
the same. Is the testimony admissible in evidence? Explain.
ANS: Yes. The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an
independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of
this testimony does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to
the substance of what she heard—not the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its
veracity. (People v. Silvano, 431 Phil. 351 [2002])
An extrajudicial confession is not a sufficient ground for conviction, unless it is corroborated by either
direct or circumstantial evidence (Rule 133, Sec. 8 (Rues of Court). If it is the latter, the accused may be convicted
when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived and proven;
and (c) the combination of jail the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
(People v. Quitola, 790 Phil. 75, [2016]; Marvin Portera v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr., J)
Rule 114 – Bail
Bail, when matter o right.

If after the prosecution presented evidence in a murder case, the defense filed a motion to file bail since
the evidence showed that the accused can only be convicted of the crime of homicide, the denial of the Motion
to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order
denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or
jurisdiction.
As a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail. However, persons charged
with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, accused filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground
that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict him of
Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its
judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the
CA thus erred in upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail (Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461,
December 5, 2018. Caguioa, J).
Rule 115 – Right to Counsel

Essence of right to counsel.
In Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, November 4, 2018, Peralta, J. the client blamed his counsel in his
conviction for invoking self-defense. He contended that the negligence of his counsel should not be binding
upon him. He further contended that the negligence of his counsel should not bind him. Ruling in the negative
the SC
Held: It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in
handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his
lawyer proceeded differently. [Pascual v. People, 606 Phil. 451 (2009)] An exception to this rule is consistently
enunciated in a number of cases, [People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686 (2007)] and that is when the negligence of
counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court.
It is true that the right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in
criminal prosecution and that such right is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused. (Ibañez
v. People, 779 Phil. 436 (2016) As to the essence of the right to counsel, the Court has held as follows:
x x x The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement
is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused
is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. (People v. Bermas, 365 Phil. 581 (1999)
Motion to Quash
Denial of MTQ not appealable.

As a general rule, the denial or a motion to quash is not appealable as it is merely interlocutory. Likewise,
it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the
appeal of a judgement of conviction. The adequate, plain and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones:
…In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the
accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s
decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to
quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter’s ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately
question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not
appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari
which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and
speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to
proceed to trial as discussed above.
Ordinary, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the process leading to trial.
The denial of a motion quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after
arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and
the reception by the court. Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity to meet the
charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of the accused and
all his suffering due to the charges can be most speedily acquired.
The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the immediate procurement of
substantive justice. In our general interpretation, therefore, the accused is normally invited to meet the
prosecution’s evidence squarely during trial rather than skirmish on procedural points (Cadang v. SB, G.R. Nos.
201164 & 206458, July 31, 2018, Leonen, J).
Rule 65 is the remedy as an exception.

A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the
general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past
cases, we have cited the interest of a “more” enlightened and substantial justice;” the promotion

of public welfare and public policy; cases that “have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;” or judgements on order
attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for a certiorari
(Cadang v. SB, G.R. Nos. 201164 & 206458, July 31, 2018, Leonen, J).
Rule 117
Defective information; remedy is amendment

If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured
by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment (People v. SB, et al. G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019, Peralta, J).
Rule 120 - Judgment
Effect of failure to appear during promulgation of judgment

In In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Michael Jabellana v. Hon. Meinrado Paredes, et al., G.R. No.
232006, July 10, 2019, Caguioa, J, accused failed to appear during the promulgation of the judgment. But his
lawyer filed a motion to defer the promulgation. He contended that he was deprived of the right to due process.
Is the contention correct? Why?
Held: No, because his lawyer and bondsman were informed of the promulgation of the judgment. He cannot
shift the blame to them.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)
Clearly, he lost the remedies available to him when he failed to appear at the promulgation of judgment
despite being notified of the same. He cannot shift the blame to his counsel, as he was out of line when he
deliberately did not appear at the promulgation "as a sign of protest," it was still incumbent on petitioner to
attend the same. Moreover, the rule provides that within 15 days from promulgation, the accused may still
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, after proving that his absence was for a
justifiable cause. However, the Court notes that petitioner, who was out on bail, failed to surrender himself as
he was then at large but he did not, hence, his claim of denial of due process is without merit.
The variance doctrine

Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the
technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information.
The Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set forth in the body of
an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of
the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the
information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation
of the offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous
designation may be disregarded as surplusage. (Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 (1996); Aquino v.
People, G.R. No. 217349, November 7, 2018, Leonen, J)
APPEAL
Extent of the power of the appellate court.

The settled rule that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. (Ramos v. People, 803 Phil.
775 (2017) The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law (People v. Aseniero, G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019, Caguioa, J; People v. Merril, G.R.
No. 233205, June 6, 2019, Caguioa, J; People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J).
Rule 45 issues of law are raised.

In Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, Leonen, J, the SC once again had the occasion to
say that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law. Parties may only raise issues that can be determined
without having to review or reevaluate the evidence on record. The Court generally gives weight to the factual
findings of the lower courts "because of the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony.” (People v. Macasinag, 255 Phil. 279 [1989]).
In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven. To prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the elements of
the crime charged (Macayan v. People, 756 Phil. 2002 [2015]) Leonen, J. Thus, the finding of guilt is essentially a
question of fact. For this reason, the entire records of a criminal case are thrown open for the Court's review.
In Ferrer v. People 518 Phil. 196 (2006):
It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide
open for review and that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be
found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.
The Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual findings of the lower courts, or even arriving at
a different conclusion, "if it is not convinced that [the findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and
to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses." (People v. Macasinag supra.) The lower court actual
findings will not bind the Court if facts that could affect the result of the case "were overlooked and disregarded.
(People v. Ortiz, 334 Phil. 590 (1997)
EVIDENCE
Terms of the contract bind the parties; when parole evidence admissible
By entering into the contract of sale without provision on the interest, the owner abandoned its
demand for payment of interest. It cannot rely on the letter demanding payment interest prior to the execution
of the deed of sale as it acquired in to the contract lacking the stipulation concerning the payment of interest;
hence, the court has no other alternative except to enforce the contract. Parole evidence cannot even be
presented to prove it.
Under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon. In Spouses Paras v. Kimwa
Construction and Development Corporation, the Court explained the rationale behind the prohibition on the
admission of extrinsic evidence in relation to the terms of a written contract, to wit:
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed,
"forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or
other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract."
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting parties'
articulated intent. In choosing to reduce their agreement into writing, they are deemed
to have done so meticulously and carefully, employing specific - frequently, even
technical - language as are appropriate to their context. From an evidentiary standpoint,
this is also because "oral testimony ... coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome
of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written
contract which speaks of a uniform language." (Norton Resources and Dev. Corp. v. All Asia Bank
Corp., 620 Phil. 381 [2009])
In other words, reliance on the terms of written contract is practicable because it is understood that
whatever stipulations appearing therein was a result of negotiation, posturing and bargaining between the
parties. Whatever is not included in the document is deemed waived or abandoned (Rep. v. Jose Gamir-
Consuelo Diaz Heirs Asso. Inc., G.R. No. 218732, November 12, 2018, J. Reyes, Jr., J).
Exceptions to the Rule.

The Parol Evidence Rule is not a hard-and-fast rule as it admits of exceptions. Under the same rule, a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written
agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement. In short, in order for parol evidence to be admitted, the following must be
established: (a) the existence of any of the four exceptions has been put in issue in a party's pleading or has not
been objected to by the opposing party; and (b) the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the
basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
The Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and respondent does not contain any provision
regarding the payment of interest. Petitioner agreed to convey its property upon full payment of the purchase
price without reservation for any claim of interest. No parol evidence can be admitted to support respondent's
claim of interest cause it never put in issue in its complaint the ambiguity or validity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, or its failure to reflect the parties' true intention.

Circumstantial evidence; requisites
In People v. Salga, et al., G.R. No. 233334, July 23, 2018, Bersamin, J, the SC once again had the occasion
to say that for conviction of the accused, circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient if the conditions fixed by
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are complied with, viz.:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance; and
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a
felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing
just one particular circumstance, for there must be a combination of several circumstances that when put
together reveals a convincing picture pointing to no other conclusion than that the accused was the author of
the crime. In People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002, the guidelines in appreciating the probative
value of circumstantial evidence were laid down, to wit: (a) the court should act upon the matter with caution;
(b) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) the facts must exclude every other
theory but that of guilt of the accused; and (d) the facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as
to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense (See also: People v. Floresita,
G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Damages evidenced by private documents; requirement.

The argument that official receipts of the medical and hospital bills are not competent evidence of the
actual damages allegedly sustained by the Bayaban Spouses for not having been authenticated lacks merit.
Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are those exclusively
enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. These include written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country; documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered there. When public documents are presented in evidence, they are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated there, and thus, need not be authenticated (Rule 132, Sec. 23).
As for private documents, i.e., those not enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19, they must be
authenticated, or their due execution and authenticity proven, per Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
(Example: ancient document)
Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those enumerated in Rule 132, Section
19. These official receipts, therefore, are private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting
as witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by presenting an evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In insisting that respondents should have presented as witnesses the persons who signed the official
receipts, petitioner ignored the first manner of authenticating private documents. Respondent testified as to
the circumstances of the accident and the expenses they had incurred as a result of it. The official receipts were
issued to them upon payment of the expenses. Since the official receipts were issued to respondent, her
testimony, therefore, is a competent evidence of the execution of the official receipts. With respondent
testifying as to the execution and issuance of the official receipts, they were duly authenticated, contrary to
petitioner's claim. There being no question that the official receipts were all in the original, they were the best
evidence of their contents, specifically, of the actual damages incurred by the Bayaban Spouses. The Regional
Trial Court correctly admitted the receipts in evidence (Imperial v. Heirs of Neil Bayaban, et al., G.R. No. 197626,
October 3, 2018, Leonen, J).
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Admission; effect.
The conviction of an accused charge with violation of BP 22 based on the admission during the pre-
trial of the genuineness and due execution of the demand letter is not correct.
While the other party mentioned that the defense admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
demand letter subject to their defense that the amount of the checks were all paid, there is no mention,
however, in the Order that the defense admitted that the accused received the demand letter. Besides, the

accused and her counsel did not sign the pre-trial order issued by the MTC. This being the case, any agreement
or admissions made and entered during the preliminary conference which was not signed by the accused and
her counsel cannot be used against said accused. In short, such admission as to the receipt of the demand letter
is not admissible in evidence against the accused. Further, the alleged admission by the accused that she
received the demand letter is not binding upon her since it appears that the same was not approved by the
Court in the pre-trial order (Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp., G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019, Cagioa, J).
Admissions made by the accused in the pleadings submitted in the same case do not require further
proof, especially so when such admission is categorical and definite. However, the accused executed the counter
affidavit at a time when the private complainant has already filed the complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against
her. It is unclear whether the accused came to know of the demand letter before the filing of the complaint
against her. By all indications, she may have known about the demand letter when she received the copy of the
complaint-affidavit and its annexes from the private complainant. In order to hold liable the accused for
violation of BP 22, it is necessary that the notice of dishonor or demand letter must be served upon the accused
before the filing of the complaint. Precisely, the purpose of the notice of dishonor is to give opportunity to the
accused to pay the amount of the bouncing checks to avert criminal prosecution. If such admission was made
after the filing of the complaint, any admission made by the accused in the pleadings without any referral as to
the time when she received the demand letter would not prejudice her. To be admissible against the accused,
the admission made must be categorical and definite. Likewise, reminders or oral demands are not sufficient
to bind the accused. The notice of dishonor or demand must be in writing as required under Sec. 3 of B.P. 22.
Statements in the answer are judicial admissions.

Statements in the Answer constitute judicial admissions which bind petitioner. A judicial admission is
an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which
dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions are a waiver
of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the
field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and is cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as
to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was
pleaded (Gonzales-Saldana v. Sps. Niamatali, G.R. No. 226587, November 21, 2018, J. Reyes, Jr., J).
Admissibility of electronic document.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility.
According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic document is admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules."
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document in any
legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets
forth the required proof of authentication:
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:
a. by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same;
b. by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or
c. by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of
the judge.
As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic
document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the
affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence
of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein (RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v.
Oracion, et al., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J).
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed
to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. As earlier
pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes
admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the
annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and they
cannot be given any probative value.

Section on "Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence requires authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness:
SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. - A memorandum, report, record or data
compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or
other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a
person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business
activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person,
the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and excepted from
the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint fall within the Rule on Hearsay
Evidence and are to be excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules (RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v.
Oracion, et al., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J).
In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They correctly regarded
the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry, and not
necessarily the original thereof. Being substitutionary documents, they could not be given probative value and
are inadmissible based on the Best Evidence Rule.
The Best Evidence Rule, which requires the presentation of the original document, is unmistakable:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office. (2a)
With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original writing,
instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which are the subject of the
inquiry. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is regarded as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight
or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. As defined, "electronic document" refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message" and the latter refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence identify the
following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:
1. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents,
all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
2. When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
3. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents,
or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by
mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent
of the original.
Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more copies are
executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3 above. If the copy is
generated after the original is executed, it may be called a "print-out or output" based on the definition of an
electronic document, or a "counterpart" based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the

testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a); (RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, et
al., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, Caguioa, J).
Parole Evidence
When parole evidence admissible to vary the terms of a contract.

The primary rule in interpreting contracts is that when an agreement is clear and unequivocal on its
face, the courts are bound to respect and uphold its tenor based on the stipulations' express language (Art.
1370, NCC). This is supported by the Rules of Evidence, where only the instrument may be presented to prove
the terms and conditions of a written agreement. Extraneous evidence is generally inadmissible. (Rule 130, Sec.
9 Rules of Court)
A party shall be allowed to prove an agreement's terms and conditions through evidence other than
the written contract itself when he specifically avers in his pleading that such written instrument does not
express the true intent and agreement of the parties (Philippine International Trading Corp. v. Threshold
Pacific Corp., et al., G.R. No. 209119, October 3, 2018, Leonardo de Castro, C.J).
Hearsay
Hearsay evidence, not admissible.

Once again in People v. CCC, G.R. No. 228822, June 19, 2019, Caprio, J, the SC ruled that a witness may
not testify on what she merely learned, read, or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read, or heard (People v. Cataytay,
746 Phil. 185 [2014]). Thus, the testimony as to what was told her has no probative value for being merely
hearsay.
Dying Declaration/Part of the Res Gestae
When dying declaration admissible.
Q – The house of Evelyn was set on fire. After she was carried out safely, she promptly accused and
pointed to appellant as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for setting the
house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that appellant hit her and [Alicia] with a baseball [bat] then
set them on fire. One witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo sa akin yang si Patrick [Mercado] dahil siya
ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng bahay." Another witness stated hearing the following
utterances from Evelyn: "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," referring to
appellant, and "ilayo nyo sa akin si Patrick [Mercado] dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still, another
witness claimed to have heard Evelyn say: "Ilayo nyo sa akin yan batang yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin.
Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan ang pumalo sa ulo namin."
While on board the ambulance on the way to the hospital, Evelyn repeated the name of
appellant as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned the house. Thus, she uttered: "Te, si
Patrick [Mercado] ang may gawa," "Si Patrick [Mercado] sinunog kami," and "Si Patrick ang pumalo sa
akin. Si Patrick [Mercado] ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay."
Patrick was accused with the crime of murder and convicted based on her dying declaration. Is
the conviction proper? Why?
Held: Yes, but the declaration was admissible as part of the res gestae.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement (People v. Salafranca, 682 Phil. 47 [2012]). The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as
to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony (People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018, Caguioa, J).
Hence, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the res gestae. The fire – which caused severe
injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-in partner – was undeniably a startling
occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly
suffering from the pain caused by her injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or
manufacturing a lie. The statements were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly
claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked her and Alicia, and thereafter set the house on fire. The
statements were thus certainly part of the res gestae.
A dying declaration is considered as "evidence of the highest order," and that, in any event, the
statements were part of the res gestae, as well as the principle that denial is an inherently weak defense (People
v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581 (2016), Court held that the CA did not err in affirming Mercado's conviction, as his guilt
was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to stress that the positive identification of the eyewitnesses
carries more weight than an accused's defense of denial. Mercado must thus be held liable for the killing of
Evelyn and Alicia.

Q – When is declaration admissible as dying declaration?
ANS: As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence because it is "evidence
of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation” (People v. Maglian, 662 Phil. 338 (2011). Accordingly, Section 37, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration.—The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
For a "dying declaration" to be admissible m court, the following requisites must concur:
a. That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death;
b. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness
of an impending death;
c. That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
d. That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is the victim (People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17,
2018, Caguioa, J).
Part of the res gestae; requisites.

In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations, they are
nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae.— Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances (People v. Peña, 427 Phil. 129 [2002]). The Court, in the early case of People v. Nartea,
74 Phil. 8 (1942), clarified when a statement may be deemed part of the res gestae:
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval
certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or
deliberate design in the formulation of their content. Whether a declaration is a part of the res
gestae depends upon whether the declaration was the facts talking through the party or the
party talking about the facts. (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec. 662, pp. 553, 556.) While as a general
rule the declaration sought to be proved as part of the res gestae must be contemporaneous
with the event established as the principal act, no fixed time from the main occurrence can be
arbitrarily set in order to determine what shall be part of the res gestae. The factual situation
in each instance will set its own pattern of time in this respect. (Id., sec. 669; see also Moran,
Law of Evidence, revised and enlarged edition, pp. 295-296.) "The marked trend of decisions
is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of
the res gestae. Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily
conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (20 Am. Jur., sec. 663, p.
557; People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018, Caguioa, J)
Evidence
Burden of Proof
Q – Contracts of loan were entered into between TPC and Cuales with Cuales as representative of TPC
and PITC as creditor. They tried to exonerate themselves from liability by contending that TPC was a
merely agent of ASPI. The testimony was along that line contrary to the notarized document of loan.
Rule on the contention? Explain.
ANS: The contention is not correct. Loan transactions are presumed fair, regular, and done observing the
ordinary course of business. A party may only overcome these presumptions by a preponderance of evidence.
Furthermore, loans embodied in notarized documents, enjoy the presumptions of authenticity, genuineness, and
regular execution, which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. (Quintos v. DBP, 766 Phil.
643 (2015); Rule 132, Sec. 30).
The court did not give much weight to his bare allegations and testimony inasmuch as these obviously
serve respondents' own interests. Respondents offered no proof to justify denial of liability other than his own
account and recollection of the transaction. Their disavowal of liability is "negative and self-serving evidence

that has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. (Reyes v. Century Canning Corp., 626 Phil. 470 [2010])
These loan instruments best represent the parties' actual intent and agreement. Respondent Cuales's
oral testimony, as it is purely composed of his personal recollections, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. (Peñaloza v. Santos, 416 Phil. 12 (2001)
The totality of respondents TPC and Cuales' evidence is not preponderant to sufficiently dispute the
legal presumptions of fairness, regularity, and observance of the ordinary course of business accorded to loan
transactions. All the more, their evidence is not clear and convincing to successfully overcome the prima
facie presumptions of authenticity, genuineness, and regular execution of notarized documents. (Quintos v.
DBP, Supra.)
Authentication of private document.

Private documents must first be authenticated before they could be admitted in evidence. To establish
their authenticity, the best proof available must be presented. In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp.,
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility
as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in
evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it
is claimed to be.
During authentication in court, a witness must positively testify that a document

presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither
spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress.
However, authentication may not be necessary where the document's genuineness and due execution
were admitted by the adverse party (Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 199451, August 15,
2018, Leonen, J).
Exception; when document is admitted

However, this rule presents a caveat in that the admission of the document's authenticity must be
categorical. Authentication is not necessary where the adverse party has admitted the genuineness and due
execution of a document.
Effect if evidence is not offered

Testimonial evidence was presented without first offering it in Amoguis v. Ballada, et al., G.R. No.
189626, August 20, 2018, Leonen, J. It was contended that the rule is that there must first be an offer mandatory
regardless of whether an opposing party timely objected or not. In ruling that the contention is not correct, the
SC
Held: Rule 132, Sections 34 to 36 of the Rules of Court govern the manner of offering and objecting to evidence:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Section 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer
must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing.
Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally must be made

immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless
a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Following these provisions, a witness' testimony must be offered at the start, when he or she takes the
stand for the first time and before questions are propounded to him or her. Documentary or object evidence,
on the other hand, must be orally offered after the presentation of a party's witnesses unless the court orders
or allows that a written formal offer is filed.
Reason for requisite of offer of evidence.

All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot consider them (Heirs of Pasag v.
Spouses Parocha, 550 Phil. 571, 581 [2007]). This rule ensures that judges will carry out their constitutional
mandate to render decisions that clearly state the facts of cases and the applicable laws (Article VIII, Sec. 14,
Constitution). Judgments must be based "only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit"
(People v. Franco, 336 Phil. 206 (1997). This rule also affords parties their right to due process by examining the
evidence presented by their opponent, and to object to its presentation when warranted. (Rep. v. Gimenez, 776
Phil. 233, (2016), Leonen, J; Amoguis, et al. v. Ballata, et al., G.R. No. 189626, August 18, 2018, Leonen, J)
Exception to the rule

Testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected to by an opposing party may be still
be considered by the court. The purpose of offering a witness' testimony is for the court to expertly assess
whether questions propounded are relevant and material, and if the witness is competent to answer. It is to aid
the court in ruling over objections made by opposing counsel. Catuira v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 424 (1994)
was instructive:
The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court
to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general
rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the
proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any
reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived.
Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is
opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections. (Amoguis, et al. v. Ballata, et al.,
G.R. No. 189626, August 18, 2018, Leonen, J)
Rule in Civil and Criminal case; the same

The rules on examination of witnesses and objecting to them are not separate for civil and criminal
cases. A witness, whether in a criminal or civil case, is presented to support and prove the allegations made by
the party presenting him or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her testimony must be relevant
and material. Whether the case is civil or criminal, objection or failure to offer the testimony of a witness must
be made immediately. (Rule 132, Sec.36; Amoguis, et al. v. Ballata, et al., G.R. No. 189626, August 18, 2018, Leonen,
J)
Chain of Custody
Nature of chain of custody; variation of the principle of real evidence

The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated
prior to its admission into evidence (United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73 [2010]). To establish a chain of custody
sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to
conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution
must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the
government claims it to be. Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established federal
evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to
alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. This was adopted in Mallillin v. People, 576
Phil. 576 [2008]) where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be
established that the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the
seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug
by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and
submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court (People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, G.R. No.
224290, June 11, 2018; People v. Amaro, 786 Phil. 139, 148 (2016); and People v. Enad, 780 Phil. 346, 358 [2016];
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, Peralta, J).
Absence of elected public official; effect

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by
an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and
an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
(People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018)

Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018 requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced.
In People v. Ameril, G.R. No. 22192, March 13, 2019, Leonen, J, the SC ruled that:
At the core of every prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the constitutional
mandate of the State to adduce proof on the identity and integrity of the seized illegal drugs.
The wisdom behind this burden is to ensure that the items seized were neither tampered nor
contaminated. Failure to overcome such burden calls for the acquittal of the accused. (Mallillin
v. People, 576 Phil. 576 [2008])
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, "stands only when no reason exists
in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.
While the chain of custody was not complied with as there was inadequacy in the marking of the
dangerous drugs and procedural lapses in handling the same, still the RTC convicted the accused, based on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. In brushing aside conviction of the accused
the SC
In People v. Segundo, G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017, Leonen, J, the SC ruled:
Moreover, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties cannot
work in favor of the law enforcers since the records revealed severe lapses in complying with
the requirements provided for under the law. "The presumption stands when no reason exists
in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty." Thus, this
presumption "will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of
an accused to be presumed innocent."
Moreover, in People v. Mirantes, 284-Phil. 630 (1992)

The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself
affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when
the prosecution's evidence is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to
pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
overcome this presumption, necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the court a quo must
be set aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon
the innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.
Consequences of non-compliance of chain of custody

Complete and utter noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements of Republic Act No. 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), inescapably leads
to an accused's acquittal. Conviction cannot be sustained by a mere presumption of regularity and the
approximation of compliance (People v. Royal, G.R. No. 224297, February 13, 2019, Leonen, J,).
Jurisprudence has been definite on the consequence of noncompliance. Non-compliance negates
whatever presumption there is on the regularity of the manner by which officers gained and maintained
custody of the seized items (People v. Navarrete, 665 Phil. 738 (2011); People v. Ulat, 674 Phil. 484 (2011).
IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object evidence-
shabu was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police
officers in the pursuit of their official duties. (People v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018, Leonen, J)
In Regalado v. People, G.R. No. 216632, March 13, 2019, Leonen, J, accused was charge with violation of
RA 9165. He was convicted by the RTC and on appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the CA. The appeal was
dismissed by the SC affirming the conviction of the accused and
Held: However, this Court laments the prosecution's apparent nonchalance in observing the procedure for the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia under
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640. It provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items

and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,

plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt
of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals
does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory:
Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon
completion of the said examination and certification[.]
These requirements under Section 21 were summarized in Lescano v. People, 778 Phil. 460 (2016) [Per
J. Leonen, Second Division]:
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2)
actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where
these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search
warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be
done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures,
these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the
physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s
from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a
representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the
first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were
seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her
counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place.
In People v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018, this Court explained how Republic Act No. 10640
relaxed the requirements under Section 21(1):
It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the
use of the conjunctive "and" indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the
following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":
First, a representative from the media;

Second, a representative from the Department of Justice; and
Third, any elected public official.
As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21 (1) uses the disjunctive "or,"
i.e., "with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media." Thus, a representative from the media and a representative
from the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.

Here, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21(1), as originally worded, was present during
the physical inventory of the seized items.
The prosecution has "the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives enumerated under Section 21 (1) of [Republic Act No.] 9165, or that there was a justifiable
ground for failing to do so."
Yet, not only did the prosecution fail to establish that earnest efforts were employed in securing the
presence of the three (3) witnesses; it did not even bother to offer any justification for the law enforcers'
deviation from the law's requirements. Since preliminaries do not appear on record, this Court cannot
speculate why the law enforcers neglected the simple rules in the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Nonetheless,
police officers are reminded that lapses like this—absent any justifiable ground—cast doubt on the integrity of
the seized items and can be fatal to the prosecution's cause.
Good Luck and God Bless to ALL

2021 BAR CANDIDATES!
We Are Praying for You.
ABRC Family

ABRC2020.Remedial Law (Revised) With Insertions (With Additional) Revised (Segregate)

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Survey of 2018-2019 SC Decisions in

Real actions; jurisdiction depends upon assessed value.

Boundary dispute an accion reivindcatura

Defense of right to expropriate in a forcible entry case

Estoppel to question jurisdiction originated from equity.

1 | ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Requirements for the rule to apply.

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Hierarchy of courts, reasons

Exceptions to the doctrine

2 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Rules in payment of docket fees

Actions for sum of money; aggregate amount basis of docket fee

Payment of docket fees.

3 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

RTC has jurisdiction over reversion cases

The Republic was not seeking the annulment of the judgment.

Reversion case; action involving title or possession.

Action for annulment of real estate mortgage, beyond pecuniary estimation

When action beyond pecuniary estimation.

4 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Jurisdiction, concept, etc.

5 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Damages awarded in UD cases.

No splitting causes of action.

UD and sum of money cases cannot be joined.

Unauthorized complaint; effect

Purpose behind substitution of parties continued representation/protection.

6 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Rules of venue if defendant is a corporation.

Venue is for convenience of the plaintiff

Venue distinguished from jurisdiction

7 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is

No dismissal motu proprio on ground of improper venue.

Rights of party in default.

8 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Summons upon corporation.

9 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Service of the Summons; requirement of due process

Proper service of summons, an aspect of due process.

Duty of the sheriff.

10 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

(2) Specific Details in the Return

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

Voluntary appearance when answer was filed.

11 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Motion filed for sole purpose of challenging court’s jurisdiction.

Rule 16 – Motion to Dismiss

Complaint states no cause of action.

12 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Note: Now, it is a mere affirmative defense.

Rule 17 – Dismissal by Plaintiff

In Mayon Estate Corporation vs. Altura, the Court stressed:

13 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Written interrogative under Rule 23 applied in a criminal case; a novel case.

Reasons for the exception.

14 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness.

Deposition, how taken; purpose.

15 |ABRC2020.Remedial Law (revised) with insertions (with additional)revised(segregate)/EVSA/crys

Effect of defective notice in taking of deposition.