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Thought
Matthew Landauer
Introduction
3 The Greek roots are 'pan' (all) and 'rhesis' or 'rhema' (speech).
4 Isocrates, Aeropagiticus, in the Loeb Isocrates, Vol. 2, trans. G. Norlin (Cam
bridge, MA, 1929), para. 20.7. Citations of Isocrates in this paper come from the
three-volume Loeb edition, with some translations modified.
home ... and were now in fact living as free citizens'.11 By and large,
ature on parrhesia and democratic Athens offers an attractive pictu
Athenian demos adhering to a popular ideology with a strong, partic
critical ethic of parrhesia at its core. Even scholars critical of some a
this picture, or sceptical of how well parrhesia actually functioned, a
its important place in democratic ideology.12
The flourishing research on parrhesia's relationship to democracy
been matched, however, with sustained consideration of its plac
democratic regimes.13 This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, o
t"~" " —— ...νν..τ.ν.ν ..xxwxx " w xV~v.^ vui;
15 Here I depart somewhat from D.M. Carter's claim that parrhesia was merely an
'attribute', 'something that the citizen of one city was more likely to display than that of
another', and a characteristic that Athenians displayed merely as 'a sort of side effect of
their political enfranchisement'. See D.M. Carter, 'Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A
Conceptual Difference Between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech', in
Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, ed. Sluiter and Rosen, pp. 198-9.1 agree with Carter
that it would be wrong to conceive of parrhesia as a 'right', given that it was not abso
lutely protected by law. Yet parrhesia was also more than just a citizen attribute, since it
was conceived of not merely as a 'side effect' of political enfranchisement, but as some
thing that could be granted and encouraged (or forbidden and discouraged) by the
regime. Moreover, as 1 explore below, many Athenians expected that granting and
encouraging parrhesia would have positive effects. As I argue throughout this article,
the word parrhesia could refer both to a privilege of free speech that could be promoted
or restricted by the regime, and also to a practice or attribute that could be exercised by
citizens, whether or not the privilege of parrhesia was well protected (although, to be
sure, where it was not well protected one might expect to find less of it).
Parrhesia in Autocracies
Peisistratus saw someone working an area that was all stones, and, being
surprised, told his attendant to ask what the land produced. 'Aches and
pains,' the farmer replied; 'Peisistratus ought to take his 10 per cent of the
aches and pains too.' The man made the reply not knowing that he was
speaking to Peisistratus, while the latter was delighted at his frankness
[parrhesia] and industriousness, and exempted him from all taxation.16
Scholars who have commented on this passage tend to downplay its impor
tance or quickly move to interpret it within the context of democratic Athens.
Sara Monoson sees it as playing on the incongruity of parrhesia being found
in a tyranny at all, while Arlene Saxonhouse believes it to reveal more about
the values of Aristotle's fourth-century Athenian contemporaries than the
prevalence of 'frank speaking' under Peisistratus' fifth-century tyranny.17 On
one level, Saxonhouse is surely right. If we take the story as a tale that
fourth-century Athenians told themselves, it says as much or more about their
own self-image as it does about how parrhesia might have functioned in tyr
annies: the Athenians are proud of their reputation for boldness and frank
ness. We cannot extrapolate much from this anecdote. Aristotle presents the
story in the context of a discussion of the moderateness of Peisistratus' tyr
anny; and given the farmer's ignorance of his conversational partner's real
identity, it is questionable whether the farmer's quip should count as an exam
ple of parrhesia at all. Yet the story also opens the question of parrhesia's
function in non-democratic regimes and of the attitudes of autocrats towards
its practice. The tyrant in Plato's Republic thought parrhesia a danger to his
regime, a practice he could not tolerate. Why in contrast did Peisistratus find
the farmer's frankness delightful?
Yet in recounting the story of Diodotus, who took it upon himself to prac
tice parrhesia even in an inhospitable context, Isocrates offers another, dis
tinct possibility: an adviser can speak up for the best even in situations where
here.25 It is true that he is keen to portray his own relationship with Nicocles as
one marked by frankness, not flattery. This can be contrasted with Isocrates'
advice to his pupils, in the Antidosis and elsewhere, that it might sometimes be
necessary to 'pay court' to the demos at Athens, to practise therapeia, flattery.
Indeed, in the Antidosis, Isocrates notes that one of his pupils, the general
Timotheus, failed in his trial before the demos precisely because he refused
to flatter them.26 Yet it would be a mistake to take Timotheus's relationship
to the demos as exemplary of the orator-demos relationship while taking
Isocrates' description of his own relationship with Nicocles as exemplary of
the adviser-autocrat relationship more generally. This would be to overlook
the degree to which Isocrates, throughout his advice to Nicocles and Antipater,
remains aware that the problem of flattery is ever present in, and even built
into the adviser-autocrat relationshio. For everv Timotheus. who ultimatelv
failed at democratic politics because of his refusal to pay court to the demos,
Isocrates offers a Diodotus, whose parrhesia and refusal to flatter autocrats
caused him equal amounts of trouble.
Isocrates has thus offered two possible solutions to the problem of flattery
in autocracies, engendered by the autocrat's position as unaccountable deci
sion maker. But it is not yet clear how this discussion of parrhesia in autocra
cies might bear on the democratic experience. After all, much seems to
differentiate the practice of parrhesia in democracies and autocracies. Not the
least important is the institutional context in which parrhesia is deployed: in a
democracy, the Assembly is the decision-making body, while in an autocracy,
a single man decides. There is also the question of who gets to speak with
parrhesia: it is likely that the circle of advisers to an autocrat would be smaller
than the set of possible advisers to a democratic Assembly, even accepting the
fact that the right to speak at the Assembly, while guaranteed to all citizens,
would have been exercised by relatively few. Moreover, Isocrates' recom
mendation to Nicocles to grant parrhesia to those with good judgment, and
not to all his subjects, reinforces the idea that parrhesia in an autocracy may
well have been more limited in scope than in a democracy.27 Given these dif
ferences, it might be argued that Isocrates, in keeping with his constitutional
pluralism, was simply engaged in transferring some Athenian political know
how to a foreign regime or two — if parrhesia had been so successful at
25 Cf. Κ. Morgan, 'The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates', in Popular
Tyranny, pp. 181-213. In her view, according to Isocrates, 'the king-advisor relationship
is marked by freedom, whereas the orator-demos relationship is marked by flattery
(p. 186).
26 On Timotheus, see Isocrates, Antidosis, 130-3. See also Morgan, 'Tyranny of the
Audience', pp. 186-7.1 accept Morgan's claim that Isocrates tells his pupils to flatter the
demos, at least sometimes, but do not agree with her that he does not recognize the same
need in autocratic contexts.
27 Although, as I argue below, this is not a clear-cut issue — the Attic orators often
claim that they, and speakers like them, are not granted parrhesia either.
until they were tried; and among them was Callixeinus. Callixein
found guilty, and although he escaped before his trial during the tum
period of oligarchic revolution, he is reputed to have starved to deat
his return to Athens, apparently universally detested for the role he p
the affair. It is uncontroversial that the demos was responsible for the
to try the generals collectively; indeed, the Assemblymen's resp
Euryptolemus that they should not be prevented from doing what the
suggests that the members of the Assembly viewed themselves as the
sible agents, at least at this point in time. Nonetheless, when the decision
the generals collectively comes to be recognized as a poor oiie, the d
not held accountable. Rather, the demos holds others to account: acc
ity is borne solely by the proposers of the decree, who are charg
deceiving the people.44
Aeschines' claims for the comprehensiveness of Athenian instituti
accountability notwithstanding, the analogy to tyranny — at least with
to this issue — was not inapt. The crucial point was not whether accoun
was central to Athenian democratic theory and practice (it was),
answer to the following question: who at Athens was accountable to
In both the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy, institutions
to hold citizens participating in politics accountable to the polis; and f
mid-fifth century on, accountability to the polis increasingly meant
ability to the people, in the Assembly and in the Courts, even while
participating in these forums were themselves unaccountable.45
In keeping with Otanes' description of 'rule by the majority', mag
were subject to a number of procedures before, after, and, in excep
cases, during, their term of office. At the dokimasia ton archon, a po
magistrate selected by election or sortition could subsequently be reje
not meeting citizenship or age requirements, or if he had been found
a crime punishable with atimia (loss of citizenship rights). Held befo
ular jury, the dokimasia procedure also allowed any citizen to come
and require the prospective magistrate to explain and defend his past
voting in the ekklesia and the large panels of citizen Jurors were u
able, both individually and collectively. Citizens could not be cal
explain their votes in either forum, nor could they be held responsible
they voted. While decisions of the Assembly could be overturned, t
dure for doing so (as with the graphe paranomon) assigned responsib
the poor decision to the orator who made the proposal, not the demos
of the demos) that voted for it (as we saw in Xenophon's account of
math of Arginusae). Thus, at least on the level of formal institutio
prominent political actors — the Assemblyman and the Juror — wer
hold political actors to account without themselves being made acco
Why this should have been so is an interesting question with multi
sible explanations. Hansen and others have sought to explain it by inv
epistemic assumption central to democratic ideology about the superi
the judging demos: the demos is never blamed, individually or colle
because it is very unlikely — or impossible — that it is truly at faul
given case of bad decision-making.51 Yet quite apart from any episte
fication of the practice, blaming the demos or juries for poor decis
well have been considered incompatible with the Athenian understa
democracy as a system that empowered the people. On this view, th
leged position of the judging demos within the institutions of account
Athens was consonant with — perhaps required by — the basic
democracy. It is also possible that the Athenians did not believe that
vidual's voting behaviour could be so egregious as to rise to the level
ishable offence.52 And if it would not have made sense to hold any i
accountable for his vote, neither would it have been particularly fe
hold the demos or a jury collectively responsible. First, most, if not
anisms of accountability at Athens were directed at holding ind
rather than corporate bodies, accountable; this principle was what m
collective trial of the generals after Arginusae so shocking and so u
teristic.53 Nor is it clear how one could effectively hold the Assembly
collectively accountable; to punish thousands of citizens for how th
I know that it is hazardous to oppose your views and that, although this
is a free government [demokratia], there exists no 'freedom of speech'
[parrhesia] except that which is enjoyed in this Assembly by the most
senseless orators, who care nothing for you [tois aphronestatois kai meden
humonphrontizousin], and in the theater by the comic poets.57
Isocrates identifies the cause of this state of affairs in the preceding passages
of the speech, echoing the language of his warnings to Nicocles and Antipater.
The Athenians have refused to hear speeches from anyone except those 'who
accede in what [they] desire'.58 They recognize the dangers 'flatterers [ton
kolakeuontonY pose in their personal lives but place 'greater confidence in
them [mallon toutois pisteuontesY than in their franker fellow citizens 'when
it comes to public matters'.59 As Isocrates argues:
You have made the orators care for and investigate, not what will be advan
tageous for the city, but how they can speak to win your favor. And the
majority of them are now inclined to speak in that way. For it is clear to all
that you will take pleasure in those calling you to war rather than in those
counseling peace.60
Thus, just as in autocratic regimes, a vicious circle arises, with political advis
ers telling the demos what they think it wants to hear, and the demos reinforc
ing this habit by only listening to those speakers. Isocrates had advised
Nicocles to 'grantparrhesia' to trusted advisers; in noting that 'there exists no
parrhesia' in Athens, he stresses that the demos has failed to do so. The con
sequences for the democracy are potentially grave: in the case Isocrates has in
mind, the Athenians refuse to listen to those speakers advocating peace with
their enemies, and instead are persuaded to carry on a costly war. The institu
tional context is also worth stressing: Isocrates claims that parrhesia does not
exist because the demos — freed like the autocrat from the burdens of being
held accountable, and able to punish and reward its advisers at will — has
67 The claim that the demos will only listen to flatterers finds perhaps its most famous
exposition in Plato's Gorgias, where Socrates identifies rhetoric as a 'part of flattery' and
argues that this kind of persuasive speech finds its natural home in the presence of large,
uninformed audiences (Plato's characterization of the dikasteria and ekklesia)·, see
Gorgias, 459a-466a. I am not merely arguing that the flattery of the orators has to be
understood within the context of the asymmetric accountability relationship between
demos and orator; I am also arguing that parrhesia, at least in its manifestation as risky
speech, has to be understood as arising from this same context. The risky practice of
parrhesia is an alternative to flattery, and a potential remedy to it, but its very riskiness
underlines the fact that it is a product of the institutional circumstances that too often pro
duce flattery, not frank speech.
68 Demosthenes, Orations, 8.34.
69 Ibid., 3.3.
70 Ibid., 3.22.
Conclusion
The contrast between flattery and parrhesia, and the parallels between the
institutional positions of the tyrant and the demos, complicate our understand
ing of the conceptualization and practice of parrhesia in Athens. Far from
marking off a clear boundary between tyrannical and democratic regimes, the
discourse surrounding parrhesia in Athens often highlighted the similarities
between the demos and the autocrat. While both the autocrat and the demos
could 'grant parrhesia' to their advisers, such freedom was not a foregone
conclusion. Absent this privilege, advisers could still practise the virtue of
risky parrhesia in addressing their audiences, but parrhesia in this sense is
therefore a remedial mode of advising unaccountable decision makers who
have the power to hold their advisers to account. The above analysis thus
emphasizes the ways in which the practice of parrhesia in many contexts was
predicated on inequalities and asymmetries of power. Our understanding of
parrhesia's egalitarian, democratic overtones should be accordingly modified.
Placing that power asymmetry at the centre of the analysis of parrhesia
suggests a distinction important for our understanding Athenian Assembly
debate more generally. Parrhesia is less a norm for deliberation than it is a
norm for counsel. Athens was not a deliberative democracy but a democracy
76
Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, para. 6.