G.R. No.

L-477 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing
the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by
the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island
of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and
there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts
and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and
joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and
engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine
Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and
in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to
Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except
that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is
that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of
personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the
enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the
accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he
drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the
accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese
garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the
mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of
treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part
in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills,
referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in
any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the
defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again,
on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration
means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine
military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his
will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to
accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance
with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to
eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with
the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies."
Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent
and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act
itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary,
except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle
or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in
the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It
furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his
courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and
his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference
from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance
from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on
the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on
it. We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of
authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same
overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness
to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that
the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes:
"The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and
exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different
acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and
Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now
the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the
same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal
Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting,
to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act,
movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported
by the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court.
To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors
of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our
treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely
restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of
evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is
believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge,
regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and
natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however
strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other
sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct
testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a
literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American
government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the
objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of
the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed
against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's
Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered
the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon
which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be
considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence
is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was
warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to
render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The
provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally
virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must
be understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and
rigidity as the American forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the
record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all
touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of
navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on
the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after
eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with
the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on
the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by
the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine
sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and
to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy
is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again
done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates
are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against
all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time
is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation
not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs
one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II,
Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according
to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the
effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such
as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things,
until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not
usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far
as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number,
Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were
meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of
the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the
civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar
in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must
necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in
the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the
necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United
States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S.
Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were
content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to
give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no
longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished
with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153
and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article
154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an
offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding
present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances,
that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be
offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the
crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the
women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed
as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge
of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the
offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of
both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. 116488 May 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ "SULPING" and EDGAR
VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at Barangay
Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen Armed Force
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely, Aaron Flores alias "Ronito",
Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias "Sulping" and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua, were charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention. The information charged as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with high powered firearms conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO
from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the
latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without proper
authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the present.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
All the four accused pleaded "Not Guilty" when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on the
testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent facts to be
undisputed.
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at the store
owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie
Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking
beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table. Sometime later, all the accused and the
victim left the store and walked towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters.
After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.2 That was the last
time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayam's mother and relatives, he
has not been found.
It was the prosecution's contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused hatched a
conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the detachment headquarters. They
allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not
released Samson Sayam. All the accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts
charged.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the prosecution failed to
show an apparent common design by and among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson
Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of
the four accused based on the degree of their participation in the commission of the offense
charged.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence that Samson Sayam was seen
being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since Samson
Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial court held that the three accused
were responsible for the former's disappearance.
As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the three (3) co-
accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none
of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those
who actively participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his
co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned
as Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive was
attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson
Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as to the kind
of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite
rifle,3 Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a short firearm.4
More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the
perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez
knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992,5 the original complaint filed before the
Municipal Circuit Trial court of Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992, which was based on the
affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the
respondents. The said affidavits merely mentioned an "unidentified member of the 7th IB,
Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment." At the time of the execution of the
affidavits, the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he
was a commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in
which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial court's mind.6
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar Villeran
and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being no proof that
Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to pay him jointly and severally, or in the alternative,
his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused ordered
confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular No.
2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.7
Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao raised the
following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO
OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE
267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU
SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO
THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE
FOR SAMSON SAYAM'S DISAPPEARANCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO
SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a joint
appeal based on the sole error that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND
EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we find that
accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against them.
The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the
offense are:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.8
Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the offender must be a
private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at
the time the alleged crime was committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. 9 It was composed of
civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well as to
respond to threats to national security. As such, they were provided with weapons, and given
the authority to detain or order detention of individuals.10
The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-appellants of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the appellants are not private
individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor General submits that, under the facts
alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and
penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch
as all the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question
that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved
that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,12 it was held that in the crime of illegal or arbitrary
detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved,13 just as the intent of the accused to
deprive the victim of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof.14 In the more
recent case of People v. Fajardo,15 this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there
must be uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as actual
confinement or restriction.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any manner
detaining and depriving him of his liberty.16 A careful review of the records of the instant case
shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-
appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking
with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of
evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam
has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not
prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that
Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go with them
when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment headquarters.
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses, namely, Carlito Manlangit and
his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangit's testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam
was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his
abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the
street alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed
Sayam and asked for his residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson
Sayam and brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw
Samson Sayam talking to the accused.17
It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove the stated purpose
thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment headquarters. To be
sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged, or coerced to go with
accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is
also no relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from
the clutches of accused-appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit
do not conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being
apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically explained why
Carlito Manlangit just went home,18 instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam. He
admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. 19 More telling is the
absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to the detachment
headquarters against his will, that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for
help, considering that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most
damaging is Carlito Manlangit's statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the
detachment headquarters with any or all of the accused. 20 In fine, Carlito Manlangit's testimony
failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the prosecution. According to him, he and
Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992.
At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry
Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told
him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to
accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda
Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told
his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified
that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.21
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they
dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend
or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the
residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony
comprised of hearsay evidence,22 which has no probative value.23 In summary, Jerry Manlangit's
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the four accused
as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He also stated
that following a heated argument, the accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went
towards the direction of the detachment headquarters. He said that the accused were "holding
and pulling" Samson Sayam "towards the road." Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single
gunshot followed by rapid firing.24
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement that the
accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he said he did not
hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson
Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging him, he did not do anything to help
Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.25
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez's testimony. First of all, he was
unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was
being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary detention. There is no showing
that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not free himself
from the grip of the accused, if he was indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired
in a public place, where there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is
puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to corroborate the
testimony of Nelson Golez.
The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material points, even
as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence the bare testimony
of Nelson Golez.
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be convicted of a
crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although the findings of fact made by
trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are substantial facts which were
overlooked but which may alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, such facts should
be taken into account by the appellate court.26 And where it appears that the trial court erred in
the appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court
may be reversed.27
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial evidence on the
scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution
grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or
arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson
Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented from communicating with
anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-
appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be
a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force,
because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.28
The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial, sufficiently
establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following circumstances:
1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellants, together
with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with
Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Later,
they were seen engaged in a heated argument.
2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by holding
and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution witness saw
accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.
3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.
4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment
followed by rapid firing.
5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.29
As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by clear and
convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the combination of all these
circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our
mind, the totality of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing
to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime
charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty, and inconsistent with
the possibility that they are innocent.30 Thus:
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.31
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete
sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. 32 It is
admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful night.
However, the circumstances that there was a heated argument among them, and that the
accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards the
direction of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant
testimony.
Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no relevancy to the
case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of the
detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at
least half a kilometer away from the center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters
itself was also some distance from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all
is quiet, loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every
direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location
where the gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on
such matters to the prosecution witnesses.
That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the trial court
to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no bearing in this case
because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one
relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with
Samson Sayam. However, said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously
abducted him, then arbitrarily detained him.33
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of accused-
appellants' alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict them. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence. 34 An uncorroborated circumstantial
evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious
doubt.35 The prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why accused-appellants would
arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading
to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence
do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the
Court must acquit the accused.36
In the recent case of People v. Comesario,37 we had occasion to rule that:
Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly
invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances
must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing
to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the
evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply
with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that
any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a
tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved. In the case
at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to
support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional precept of the presumed
innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for
reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove
that a crime had been committed.
There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution bears the
onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by accused-
appellants.38 It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof
which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed
to prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court
has often and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an
innocent one.40
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants are
ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, accused-appellants are
ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court,
within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time when accused-appellants are released
pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without
the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?
Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of highway
robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca, Quezon Province,
under an information1 dated February 8, 1989, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika Highway at
Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed and
pointed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force, violence, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away from one Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate
No. DW 9961 valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine currency,
belonging to the said Freddie Saavedra, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid amount; and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the
said accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
said Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to
see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the
latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that he will drive both accused to
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the
latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 o'clock a.m. of December 6,
1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such
inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was
discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they
proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab
wounds in different parts of his body.
Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was
sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos
Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they
brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano
Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case
and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their
conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in
the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss
of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they
sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of
P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched
a team to retrieve the same.
After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present
any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the
police who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for
safekeeping.
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their
headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the
latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery
cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing
inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce
the supposed confession to writing.2
Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged
and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido
to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido sought him at his house
and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. Upon proof
shown that it was indeed registered under Amido's name, he accompanied the latter to
Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. The
latter, thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom
the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.
Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by
occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some seven
kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mother's house. He
narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have participated in
the gruesome death of the latter.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson Tan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00).
Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges
against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby
ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito Amido, unless he is being
detained thereat for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.3
Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively
identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial
evidence that would overcome his innocence.
In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and
appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission
and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in
evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible against him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438),4 approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a
pertinent provision5 of which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for
any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the
rule begins to operate.6
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there
must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by
the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused
would thus not suffice.7
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.8
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel."9 To reiterate, in People v. Javar,10 it was ruled therein that any
statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel when he
made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on cross-
examination, thus:
Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you tell him that he is one
of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on December 5,
1988?
A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated at
Lucena Police Station. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson Tan.
Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson Tan to your custody in
connection with another case that happened in Lucena?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases because
Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a certain case,
is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is that what happened in
this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that
information?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded
questions to him?
A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.
Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him, did you
inform him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he is a
suspect in these two (2) cases?
A No, sir, because we were just conversing.11 (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning
at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will
not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment
he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even
if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always
insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua
non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."12
What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction.
Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant's investigation
which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to
acquit the appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON TAN y
VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered, unless there is any other lawful cause for continued
detention. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG,
NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE
LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO
TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO
GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and
FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren M Mercado and Alexander Padilla
for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray this Honorable Court:
1. To immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to appear and produce
the bodies of Dr. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA
MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, forthwith before
this Honorable Court and to make due return of the writ therewith;
2. To issue, in addition or in the alternative to the writ of habeas corpus, a writ of mandamus
compelling the respondents to disclose the petitioners' present place of detention and to order
the respondents to allow counsel and relatives to visit and confer with the petitioners;
3. Pending the determination of the legality of their continued detention, to forthwith release the
detainees on bail upon such terms and conditions as the Court may fix, and after hearing, to
order petitioners' immediate release; and
4. To grant petitioners such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.
The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6,
1982 at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led
by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after securing a Search Warrant No. S-
82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya conducted a
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid were Dra. Aurora
Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty
Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the
dining room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same
day.
The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita
Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day, July 7, 1982 by the same
PC teams.
On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, bearing Plate No. DAP
347, was seized by the PC authorities.
The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter referred to sometimes as petitioners) were all
detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982
until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly to
Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-
Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982. The mandamus
aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, and whereabouts of
petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it
was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest
were only armed with a search warrant (No. 3-82) issued by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and nowhere in said warrant was authority given to
make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized respondents to
seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and other subversive
paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant
and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be
seized (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383); that no criminal charges have as of yet been filed
against any of the detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees were initially held at the PC/INP
Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6 up to August 10, 1982, but were
subsequently transferred by helicopter in the morning of August 10, 1982 to a place or
safehouse known only to respondents; that there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from
a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true
that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was
shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have
not yet been given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether such
commitment order has in fact been issued.
It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to
counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during
their period of detention from July 6 to August 10, 1982 at the PC/INP Command in
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya; however, when a certain Major Cristobal and Lt. Marcos (alleged
to be from the Camp Crame Intelligence Units) took full control of the investigation, counsels
were allowed to visit only on weekends; that when the detainees were transferred on August 10,
1982 to a place known only to respondents, the detainees' counsels and relatives were not
notified, raising the apprehension that petitioners' constitutional rights to silence, to counsel and
against self- incrimination are being violated; that counsels have tried to locate if the detainees
were taken to Camp Crame or Camp Bago Bantay but to no avail; that Major Forondo of the PC
Command in Nueva Viscaya informed Mrs. Josefina Padilla that the detainees were transferred
to Tuguegarao, Cagayan, others to Echague, Isabela; that there seems to be a deliberate and
concerted effort by respondents to conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of
detention, raising the apprehension that respondents are using force, violence, threat,
intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to obtain confession and statements from the
detainees in violation of their constitutional rights.
In the resolution of this Court en banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of habeas corpus was
issued and respondents were required to make a return of the writ. Hearing on the petition was
set on August 26, 1982.
In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982. respondents, through the Solicitor General,
alleged, to wit:
I. AS TO HABEAS CORPUS
1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom Vasquez who was
temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982, are all being detained
by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI
No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January
17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No.
885. ...
2. The corresponding charges against the said detainees have been filed in court and before the
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they are pleading. A warrant of arrest against
detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of
Bayombong, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. ...
II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON HABEAS CORPUS
3. The persons named in the above-mentioned Presidential Commitment Order were arrested
and are being detained for offenses with respect to which under Proclamation No. 2045, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby revoke Proclamation No.
1081 (Proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104
(Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial
law throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be
in force and effect; and Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the
request of the residents therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shag continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also
continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposals
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance
or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts cannot inquire into
the validity and cause of their arrest and detention.
4. The power of the President in an emergency, such as that which necessitated the continued
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to order the detention of persons
believed engaged in crimes related to national security is recognized. (Aquino vs. Enrile, 59
SCRA 83; Luneta, et al. vs. Special Military Commission, No. 1, et al., 102 SCRA 56).
5. In the instant petition, petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla does not appear to have been
authorized by the thirteen (13) other detainees to represent them in the case at bar."
Accordingly, the petition was duly heard on August 26, 1982. After hearing, the Court issued the
following resolution, to wit:
G.R. No. 61388 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Insurance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los
Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan,
Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada and Tom Vasquez; Josefina Garcia-
Padilla vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Lt. Col.
Miguel Coronel.)- The return of the writ of habeas corpus and answer to the prayer for
mandamus filed by the Solicitor General for respondents in compliance with the resolution of
August 17, 1982 is NOTED.
At the hearing of this case this morning, former Senator Jose W. Diokno, Attorneys Alexander
A. Padilla and Efren H. Mercado appeared for petitioner. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
and Assistant Solicitor General Ramon A. Barcelona, appeared for the respondents. All of the
detainees, except Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, were present
in Court; Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda
de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty
Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. and Juanito Granada. Attorney Alexander A.
Padilla argued for the petitioner. Solicitor General Mendoza argued for the respondents. Former
Senator Diokno argued in the rebuttal. The Court Resolved to require the Solicitor General to
SUBMIT within five (5) days from date the documents relevant to the issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order. Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for
resolution.
As required, the Solicitor General submitted the documents relevant to the issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order on August 27, 1982, after which the case was submitted for
resolution.
The fundamental issue here, as in all petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus, is whether or not
petitioners' detention is legal. We have carefully gone over the claims of the parties in their
respective pleadings as well as in the oral argument during the hearing on August 26, 1982, and
We find that petitioners have not been illegally deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
neither in the manner of their arrest, nor by their continued detention, and that the
circumstances attendant in the herein case do not warrant their release on a writ of habeas
corpus.
1. At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6, 1982,
records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's
residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were
under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora
Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the
nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving in top of their
conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the
youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with
eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand
six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine
packed and ready for distribution, as sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were
then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees
fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically
provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing
jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed or actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence.
From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees
was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting
of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and
other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. In the language of Moyer vs. Peabody, 1 cited with approval
in Aquino, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, 2 the President " shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder
measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring
peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to
prevent the exercise of hostile power."
Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the
issuance of Presidential Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive. "When it comes to a
decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants
the substitution of executive process for judicial process." 3 What should be underscored is that
if the greater violation against life itself such as killing, will not be the subject of judicial inquiry,
as it cannot be raised as transgressing against the due process clause that protects life, liberty
and property, lesser violations against liberty, such as arrest and detention, may not be insisted
upon as reviewable by the courts.
3. Transcendentally important, therefore, is the question of whether the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of herein
detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses. This question has
to be set at rest promptly and decisively, if We are to break a seemingly continuous flow of
petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitioners being filed in this
Court one after the other.
The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any
warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the
legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the
power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need
therefor in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must
be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the
President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the
government and duly constituted authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of
"invasion," along which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which
contingency does not present a legal question on whether there is a violation of the right to
personal liberty when any member of the invading force is captured and detained.
The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to the life
of the Nation besets the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In the discharge
of this awesome and sacred responsibility, the President should be free from interference. The
existence of warlike conditions as are created by invasion, rebellion or insurrection, the direst of
all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond dispute, against subjecting
his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or interference from whatever source. If freedom from
judicial review is conceded in the exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and
of granting pardon, denominated as political powers of the President, it should incontestably be
more so with his wartime power, as it were, to adopt any measure in dealing with situations
calling for military action as in case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be
effective, the occasion for its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive
and sound judgment of the President, at least while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or
insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be left for
the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed forces.
The need for a unified command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic
military concept in the art of warfare.
4. From the clear language of the Lansang case, 4 "the function of Court is merely to check —
not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. " If, however, the constitutional right to bail is granted to the herein
petitioners by the court, through the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of court,
what inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2045, of persons who come under its coverage.
The specific mention in the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along with invasion and
imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms "rebellion and insurrection" are used therein in
the sense of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept of a statutory offense. What,
therefore, should determine the legality of imposing what is commonly referred to as "preventive
detention" resulting from the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is the necessity of its
adoption as a measure to suppress or quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity
for such measure as a means of defense for national survival quite clearly transcends in
importance and urgency the claim of those detained to the right to bail to obtain their freedom.
To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the constitutional grant of the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasions expressly mentioned in the charter.
For what indeed could the purpose be of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
other than to restrict, at least for the duration of the emergency of invasion or rebellion, the right
to personal liberty, dictated as it is, in the greater interest of public safety and national security.
So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not only rebellion or insurrection as coming within
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also other offenses, including
subversion which is not mentioned in the Constitution, committed by reason or on the occasion
of the rebellion, or in connection therewith, or in the furtherance thereof. There need be no
alarm over what libertarian jurists fear as violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty
when the President decrees the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Only those who
give cause for it will be subject to restriction of their liberty, as the necessity therefor arises in
the interest of national defense and survival. The constitutional guarantee of individual freedom
is intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save only as the Constitution has envisioned the need
for its limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the entire population, as the Constitution itself
permits in case of overwhelming and imperious necessity.
5. Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is the fact that the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been deliberately vested on the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, together with the related power to call out the armed
forces to suppress lawless violence and impose martial law. 5 The choice could not have been
more wise and sound, for no other official may, with equal capability and fitness, be entrusted
with the grave responsibility that goes with the grant of the authority. The legislature was
considered in the alternative upon which to lodge the power, or to share in its exercise, but the
distilled wisdom of the Constitutional Convention finally made its choice for the President alone.
As previously noted, "invasion" which is not a statutorily-defined offense and "imminent danger
thereof" as mentioned in the Constitution indicate that "rebellion and insurrection" are also
mentioned therein not in their concept as statutorily-defined public crimes, but as a state or
condition of extreme emergency resulting from the existence of the aforesaid events. Now, if
captured enemies from the invading force may not be charged with any statutory offense that
would provide the occasion to demand the right to bail, it is obvious that persons engaged in
rebellion or insurrection may not claim the right to be released on bail when similarly captured or
arrested during the continuance of the aforesaid contingency. They may not even claim the right
to be charged immediately in court, as they may rightfully do so, were they being charged with
an ordinary or common offense. This is so because according to legal writers or publicists, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "has the sole effect of allowing the
executive to defer the trials of persons charged with certain offenses during the period of
emergency." 6 This clearly means denial of the right to be released on bail on being charged in
court with bailable offenses.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested or captured,
cease to be as committed to the cause of the movement. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of
the essence of how rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound
together by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the criminal act
or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of the movement of which
he continues to be an ardent adherent and ally. It is simple logic then to hold that there should
be no legal compulsion for a captured rebel to be charged in court, only to be released on bail,
while he is, realistically and legally, still as much as part and parcel of the movement, continuing
as it is, as those still engaged in carrying on actively to attain their goal of overthrowing the
established regime. Hence, it is easy to perceive how impressed with absolute verity is the
opinion expressed by two acknowledged authorities on Constitutional law in our country, 7
which We quote:
... If the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended and detained in
areas where the privileges of the writ have been suspended or for the crimes mentioned in the
executive proclamation, the court will suspend further proceedings in the action.
Impeccable as it is, the opinion could not but find a resonant echo as it did in the recent case
of Buscayno vs. Military Commission; 8 decided after Proclamation No. 2045 was issued, which
in terms clear and categorical, held that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect to certain crimes as
enumerated or described in the abovementioned Proclamation.
It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture government troopers or
kidnap private individuals, they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded by
the herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As a matter of
common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are not only not given the right to be
released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be liquidated
unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is, among others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels,
by authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes on. In
this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over those of the government, as when they
resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least, minimized, thereby enhancing
the latter's chances of beating their enemy. It would, therefore, seem to be ignoring realities in
the name of misplaced magnanimity and compassion, and for the sake of humanity, to grant the
demand for respect of rights supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution by those who
themselves seek to destroy that very same instrument, trampling over it already as they are still
waging war against the government. This stark actuality gives added force and substance to the
rationale of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it.
6. Invoking the Lansang case, 9 however, petitioners would ask this Court to review the
issuance of the PCO against them, intimating that arbitrariness attended its issuance because,
relying on the evidence supposedly available in the hands of the military, they claim they are not
guilty of rebellion. They also contend that the provisions of LOI No. 1211 have not been
complied with.
The Lansang case went no further than to pronounce the suspension of the writ of the privilege
of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, valid and constitutional, on a finding that there was no
arbitrariness attendant to the suspension. It never intended to suggest that for every individual
case of arrest and detention, the writ of habeas corpus is available, even after the suspension of
this privilege, to question the legality of the arrest and detention on ground of arbitrariness.
When a person is charged in court for an ordinary offense, the law does not authorize the filing
of a petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that there is absolutely no evidence to hold
him for trial, which, in effect, constitutes an allegation of arbitrariness in the filing of the case
against him. The law has afforded him adequate safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the
requirement of determining the existence of a probable cause by the judge before the issuance
of the warrant of arrest. The finding of such probable cause may not be immediately brought for
review by this Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, on the claim of arbitrariness. The matter is
to be decided on the basis of the evidence, and this Court is not the proper forum for the review
sought, not being a trier of facts. If such a procedure were allowed, it would be easy to delay
and obstruct the prosecution of an offense by a resort to a petition for habeas corpus based on
arbitrariness, which most accuse, if not all, would be most inclined, specially when they are out
on bail. The petition now before Us is exactly one of this kind. If granted, the effect is to transfer
the jurisdiction of the trial courts in criminal cases to this Court, which is simply inconceivable.
Moreover, arbitrariness, while so easy to allege, is hard to prove, in the face of the formidable
obstacle built up by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Unexhilaratingly, this is the revealing experience of this Court in the Lansang case, where it
doubtlessly realized how hardly possible it is to adduce evidence or proof upon which to show
the President having acted with arbitrariness.
7. The last question relates to the legality of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued
by the President on July 12, 1982, tested by the conformity of its issuance to the procedure laid
down under LOI 1211, petitioners insisting that the LOI limits the authority of the President to
cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in or charged with, the crimes mentioned in
Proclamation No. 2045. They contend that the procedure prescribed in the LOI not having been
observed, the PCO issued thereunder did not validate the initial illegal arrest of the herein
petitioners as wen as their continued detention.
It must be noted that LOI No. 1211, which provides the guidelines in the arrest and detention of
persons engaged in, or charged with, the crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045, charged
with, the crimes mentioned contemplates of three situations when an arrest can be made, to wit:
1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge;
2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of a law enforcement
agency after it is determined that the person or persons to be arrested would probably escape
or commit further acts which would endanger public order and safety. After the arrest, however,
the case shall be immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal or to the municipal, city,
circuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the evidence
warrants, shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, we a warrant of arrest;
3. The military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency may apply to the
President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential Commitment Order under the
following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public
order and safety; or
(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by virtue of a judicial
warrant would endanger said public order and safety.
Petitioners appear to place entire reliance on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI No. 1211, ignoring
paragraph 3 of LOI No. 1211, which provides:
3. The above notwithstanding, the military commander or the head of the law enforcement
agency may apply to the President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential
Commitment Order covering the person or persons believed to be participants in the
commission of the crimes referred to in paragraph 1 under the following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public order
and safety; or
(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by virtue of a judicial
warrant would endanger said public order and safety.
The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the alleged necessity of
judicial warrant before a person may be arrested and detained is not well-founded. Neither is
the contention that paragraph 3 of LOI 1211 applies only when judicial process is not possible.
This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when viewed in its entirety. Even in
instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the judgment of the President,
a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would endanger the public order or safety, a
PCO is justified. So, too, when release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the
same danger.
By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or
implementing officers for the ultimate objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and
detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to
insure protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public order and
safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible overthrow of the
government and duty constituted authorities. " LOI 1211 does not, in any manner, limit the
authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in, or charged
with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that he (President) would subject
himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal judicial processes in the
prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a
preliminary investigation is conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read
such an intention on the part of the President in issuing LOI 1211 seems to do so in their view
that LOI forms part of the law of the land under the 1976 amendment of the Constitution. 10 They
would then contend that a PCO issued not in compliance with the provisions of the LOI would
be an illegality and of no effect.
To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in
the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976
amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action. There can be no pretense, much less a showing, that these
conditions prompted the President to issue LOI 1211. Verily, not all LOI issued by the President
should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land.
In the event then that the judge believes no warrant shall issue, the President, under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 and Letter of Instruction No. 1211, is not bound by such
finding, as explicitly provided in paragraph 2 of LOI 1211. That the President avails of the
facilities of the judicial machinery, as is the clear intent of LOI 1211, to aid him in exercising his
power to restrain personal liberty, as dictated by the necessities and exigencies of the
emergency, does not indicate any intention on his part to renounce or to allow even mere
curtailment of his power such that the judicial process will thereupon take its normal course,
under which the detainees or accused would then be entitled to demand their right of due
process, particularly in relation to their personal liberty. 11 The issuance of the PCO by the
President necessarily constitutes a finding that the conditions he has prescribed in LOI 1211 for
the issuance of that PCO have been met, and intends that the detention would be pursuant to
the executive process incident to the government campaign against the rebels, subversives and
dissidents waging a rebellion or insurrection. The ruling in the Nava vs. Gatmaitan case,* as
above intimated, must have shown him that to prosecute the offense through the judicial
process of forthwith instead of deferring it, would neither be wise nor expedient if he were to
deal effectively with the grave emergency at hand.
What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a view to
reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952), that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-
settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the Court is
merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was thus held as permissible, and the
test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted
arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if We consider that with particular
reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave
emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Art. VII of the
Constitution partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford
to assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these
occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President
is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the
supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their
own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.
In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then Justice Fernando, now our learned Chief
Justice, went along with the proposition that the decision of the Executive in the exercise of his
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is his alone, and in his own
language, is "ordinarily beyond the ken of the Courts." This is so, as the Founding Fathers must
have felt that in the particular situations at hand, the Executive and the Judiciary should
maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence of the doctrine of "political
question, " as determining the justiciability of a case. The wisdom of this concept remains well-
recognized in advanced constitutional systems. To erase it from our own system as seems to be
what was done in the Lansang case, may neither be proper nor prudent. A good example could
be given in the exercise of the presidential power of pardon which is beyond judicial review,
specially under the new Constitution where the condition that it may be granted only after final
conviction has been done away with.
True, the Constitution is the law "equally in war and in peace," 12 as Chief Justice Fernando
cited in his brilliant separate opinion in the same Lansang case. Precisely, it is the Constitution
that gives the President specific "military power" in times of warlike conditions as exist on the
occasion of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Both power and right are constitutionally granted,
with the difference that the guarantee of the right to liberty is for personal benefit, while the grant
of the presidential power is for public safety. Which of the two enjoys primacy over the other is
all too obvious. For the power is intended as a limitation of the right, in much the same way as
individual freedom yields to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of
general welfare. The difference again is that the power comes into being during extreme
emergencies the exercise of which, for complete effectiveness for the purpose it was granted
should not permit intereference, while individual freedom is obviously for full enjoyment in time
of peace, but in time of war or grave peril to the nation, should be limited or restricted. In a true
sense then, our Constitution is for both peacetime and in time of war; it is not that in time of war
the Constitution is silenced. The Founding Fathers, with admirable foresight and vision, inserted
provisions therein that come into play and application in time of war or similar emergencies. So
it is that, as proclaimed by the Constitution, the defense of the State is a prime duty of
government. Compulsory military service may be imposed, certainly a mandate that derogates
on the right to personal liberty. It, therefore, becomes self-evident that the duty of the judiciary to
protect individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the
State perishes, the Constitution, with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal
liberty, perishes with it.
In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of
legislation to the President. 13 Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the
principle that during such crises, the judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more
trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as
a ground for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to contradict
the finding of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion for the
exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing
Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two
jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the
more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political question" in reference to the power of
judicial review. 14
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords further reason for the
reexamination of the Lansang doctrine and reversion to that of Barcelon vs.
Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda.
Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the
Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has
the effect of allowing the Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by
Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration
of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have been vested in
Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the United States for which reason,
when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the
Constitutional., 15 Incidentally, it seems unimaginable that the judiciary could subject the
suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same inquiry as our Supreme Court
did with the act of the President, in the Lansang case, to determine if the Congress acted with
arbitrariness.
We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is
the exclusive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by
the courts, under the doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in
the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision
of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning the doctrine of the Lansang case. The supreme
mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to every man
should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him
of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the
protection of public safety which in itself includes the protection of life, liberty and property. This
Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the
President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not
itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.
Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein
petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released
even after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President, who may
order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in
meritorious cases.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146731 January 13, 2004

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Resolution2 dated 31 May 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58875. The Court of Appeals dismissed for being an
inappropriate remedy the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio against
respondents Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante. The present petition also
assails the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated 7 December 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio ("Enemecio") is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of
Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology ("CSCST-CFT"), Carmen, Cebu.
Private respondent Servando Bernante ("Bernante") is an Assistant Professor IV of CSCST-
CFT.
On 30 March 1998, Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct,
falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante
before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT. 3 Dr. Severino R. Romano, CSCST-CFT
Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
("Ombudsman").
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification
of public document.4 The Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit and the
affidavits of her witnesses. After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the Ombudsman
ordered Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit. The administrative complaint was docketed as
OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201, while the criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-
0286. The Ombudsman jointly tried the two cases.
Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable
words against her on the walls of the CSCST Carmen Campus. Enemecio claimed that
Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her while she was inside the school premises.
Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on
forced leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May 1996 to 31
May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June
1996, because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. NR-
1678-CR. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his incarceration since then CSCST-
CFT Superintendent Andres T. Melencion approved Bernante’s application for leave. Enemecio
contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his
"falsified leave applications."5
For his part, Bernante did not deny that he was in prison from 15 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. He
maintained that he received his salary for that period because of his duly approved leave
applications. Bernante also alleged that Enemecio filed the criminal and administrative
complaints against him in retaliation for the case he filed against Enemecio’s friends, Dean
Severino Romano and Bernadette Mante. Bernante denied he was behind the spray-painting of
obscenities against Enemecio on the walls of the school campus.6
On 13 January 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing
the administrative complaint against Bernante in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201. The Ombudsman
explained:
On the issue of the alleged falsification of respondent’s application for leave by making it appear
that he was on vacation when in truth and in fact he was serving a sentence for a criminal
conviction, we have determined that there is no regulation restricting the purpose or use of an
employee’s earned leave credits. Considering that the application for leave filed by the
respondent was duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not how he
utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on leave be
spelled out in such application.
On the issue of the spray painting of obscenities on the walls of the school, the evidence is
insufficient to prove that respondent was the person responsible for such as there were no eye
witnesses to such activity. The testimony of Bernadette Mante merely identifies the respondent
as allegedly having a drinking session with security guard Estanislao Lavaria at around 11:00 on
the night of March 29, 1998. Furthermore, witness Mante states that there are about ten (10) to
twelve (12) families living inside the dormitory facing the school walls where the grafitti
appeared. Despite this number, not one single person appeared to have witnessed respondent
spray painting the questioned grafitti on the walls of the campus (TSN, April 19, 1999). While it
may be probable that the only person or persons who could have had the opportunity to spray
paint the said grafitti on the night of March 29, 1998 or in the early morning hours of March 30,
1998 were the respondent and security guard Lavaria, this is not sufficient justification to directly
blame them for such event.
Regarding the complainant’s allegation that on March 10 and 25, 1998, the respondent defamed
the former by uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the incident occurring on March 10,
1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness Delfin Buot (TSN, April 7, 1998). Witness
Buot testified that he was about (3) meters from the respondent when the latter shouted the
words ‘buricat’ (whore) ‘putang ina’ and ‘maot’ (snob) to the complainant. However, the
circumstances of the utterance, particularly the time and the relation of the protagonists
involved, leads us to conclude that the same is removed from the official functions of the
respondent as a professor of the school. Stated otherwise, the act of the respondent was not in
relation to his official functions. In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA 397, the
Supreme Court ruled that:
In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v. Crisologo, et
al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension under two categories,
namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned (neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office and (2) those not so
connected with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral
turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is
required as a condition precedent to administrative action.
Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in Catmon, Cebu under Criminal Case No. 30006-CR, the matter of respondent’s
administrative culpability is still premature to be determined herein.7
On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante in
OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-02868 finding no probable cause to indict Bernante for falsification of public
document. The Ombudsman explained thus:
It is well established by documentary evidence that the applications for leave filed by the
respondent for the period from May 15 to 31, 1996 were duly approved by the head of office,
which in this case is Mr. Andres T. Melencion, Vocational School Superintendent. All these
leaves were with pay indicating that the respondent availed of his leave credits which are
undeniably due to him by law. It matters not how the respondent utilizes the days where he is on
leave, be they enjoyed as a vacation or, in this case, incarceration for a crime. There appears to
be no regulation or law against the utilization of leave credits for purposes other than recreation.
As such, there could be no falsification where nothing is being misrepresented in the official
leave forms which the respondent prepared and submitted.9
The Ombudsman denied Enemecio’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of
the criminal complaint in its Order of 28 February 2000. In denying the motion, the
Ombudsman stated:
We find the complainant’s arguments untenable. There is no dispute that the leave forms are
public documents. What is in dispute is whether or not the failure of the respondent to indicate
therein the reasons for his leave amounts to a crime of falsification. It is submitted that it does
not, for the simple reason that the form itself does not require stating the reasons for going on
leave. An employee simply indicates through check marks the nature of the leave he is availing
of, which in the case at bar, respondent chose to avail of his forced and vacation leave credits.
Nevertheless, the omission does not affect the validity of its approval. What is indicated in the
leave forms is only the need to specify the whereabouts of the employee who goes on leave.
However, it is not a requirement that specifics must be provided. In any case the omission to
state the location of a vacationing employee is not a condition sine-qua-non for its approval.
To sum it up, there is no falsification of leave forms where there is no requirement for the
indication of reasons for going on leave. Regardless of such a requirement, the need to indicate
the whereabouts of a vacationing employee is not a necessity for its approval.10
Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the
resolutions which dismissed the criminal complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration in
OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. Applying the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,11 the appellate court
dismissed Enemecio’s petition for having been filed out of time. The appellate court also stated
that the proper remedy available to Enemecio was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that the appellate court should not have
relied on Fabian. Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770") and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 ("AO No. 07")
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to
the Supreme Court. Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and
Section 7 of AO No. 07, including the "final and unappealable character" of orders, resolutions
or decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability, still stand. Enemecio stated
that she filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals because she
considered Bernante’s absolution from the administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201
as already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate remedy of appeal, Enemecio
claimed that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari before the appellate court under Rule
65.12
The Court of Appeals denied Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration in its Order of 7 December
2000.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals stated that in Fabian, the Supreme Court held
that appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals
must be brought by petition for review under Rule 43. The appellate court stated that a petition
for review must be filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed final order or resolution. Since
Enemecio received on 22 March 2000 a copy of the Ombudsman’s Order denying her motion
for reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that Enemecio had only until 6 April 2000 to file a
petition for review. Enemecio filed her petition only on 8 May 2000. The appellate court further
stated that Enemecio’s allegation in the petition that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is false. The proper remedy available to
Enemecio is a petition for review.13
In denying Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals clarified
that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition assailing the dismissal of
the criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared
void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the
appellant should take such appeal in administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the power to review decisions of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA
6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.14
The Issues
Enemecio contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over the
petition.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to appreciate that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 was the appropriate course of action considering the circumstances obtaining.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed
by petitioner by misinterpreting the ruling of the Supreme Court in Fabian vs. Desierto.15
The issues boil down to whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Court of
Appeals is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the
Ombudsman.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to dismiss this petition.
Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 6516 questioning
the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28 February 2000
dismissing the criminal case against Bernante.17 Thus, the Prefatory statement of Enemecio’s
Petition in the Court of Appeals states:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and the Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued by the
Public Respondent in the Ombudsman Case docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0201 and
entitled, "Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando Bernante, Asst. Professor IV, CSCST- College of
Fisheries Technology, Carmen, Cebu", for being a manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed
the criminal complaint for malversation and falsification of public documents filed against
herein Private Respondent while the Order dated 28 February 2000 denied herein Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine copies of the aforesaid Resolution and Order are
hereto appended as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition and denied her motion for reconsideration.
Enemecio now comes to this Court via this petition for review, claiming that "what was involved
in the petition before the appellate court was the administrative, not the criminal
case."18 Enemecio thus stresses that "there is no reason for the Court of Appeals to say that the
petition concerned the criminal case."19
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her counsel,
Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandez’s conduct has fallen far too short of the honesty
required of every member of the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals
a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing
the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this reason, the appellate
court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to
Enemecio’s petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary actions. Atty.
Fernandez’s attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a decision favorable to
his client’s cause does not escape our attention. As an officer of the court, Atty. Fernandez is
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity according to
the oath he has taken as attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
He must always bear in mind that good faith and honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are
primary obligations of an attorney. He must always remember to deal with courts with
truthfulness and not to trifle with court proceedings.20 For this, Atty. Fernandez should be
admonished not to commit similar acts again.
Even if we consider Enemecio’s petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the
dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail. Appeals from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.21 The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the
designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of
appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of
decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.22
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.23 Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition
before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in
the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if we consider the substance of the case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s determination of whether there exists a prima facie case against Bernante.
Enemecio assails the dismissal of the criminal charges against Bernante for two reasons: (1)
that she was able to prove before the Ombudsman the charge for malversation against
Bernante; and (2) that Bernante himself admitted that he signed and filed the subject leave
applications.
Enemecio asserts that she was able to present before the Ombudsman the payroll of the
CSCST-CFT employees covering the period from 16 May 1996 to 31 May 1996 signed by
Bernante. Enemecio asserts that this document proved that Bernante "actually received and
was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his falsified letter-requests and leave
applications." According to Enemecio, these constituted acts of malversation.
Enemecio’s contentions do not deserve serious consideration.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public
documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d)
the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third
person.24
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon
Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence.
"Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
narrated.25 Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by
making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he
would spend his vacation leave and forced leave.
In PCGG v. Desierto,26 the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The
Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or substance.
On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in the
Ombudsman’s view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, he may proceed with the
investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without
going through a preliminary investigation.27
Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has carefully
studied the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined
the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent to an
unnecessary and prolonged anguish.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 121047-57. August 16, 2000.]

PONCIANO LAYUG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Is petitioner guilty of falsification of public documents for filling up his daily time record as a
teacher which reflected his actual teaching time and also those when he was within the school
facilities?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

THE CASE

What is before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the
Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Ponciano Layug y Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
eleven (11) counts of falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code. For each count of falsification, the Sandiganbayan meted on petitioner the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 plus costs of suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On March 13, 1990, the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

Criminal Case No. 14444

"That on or about the month of June 1986, in Digos, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, Accused Ponciano Layug being then a duly appointed Secondary Public
School Teacher of the Davao del Sur National High School, hence, a public school teacher, and
as such assigned to teach Science Class IV with the following schedule, to wit:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"MONDAY WEDNESDAY FRIDAY

Science IV A 11:15 12:15 am

Science IV O 1:30 2:30 pm

TUESDAY THURSDAY

Science IV-A 9:30 10:30 am

Science IV-K 3:30 4:00 pm

Science IV-O 4:00 5:00 pm"

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and by
taking advantage of his official position prepare and submit his daily time record for June, 1986
by making it appear that he attended aforesaid classes during the said period of June 18 to 30,
1986 when in truth and in fact he failed to attend said classes to teach and for which he is
legally bound to disclose the truth, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law." 2

In Criminal Case No. 14445, the information states thus:

"That on or about the month of July 1986, in Digos, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, Accused Ponciano Layug, a duly appointed Secondary School Teacher of
the Davao del Sur National High School, hence, a public school teacher and as such was
assigned to teach Youth Development Training I scheduled on Monday, Wednesday and Friday
between the hours of 7:15 in the morning to 9:15 in the morning and on Tuesday and Thursday
between the hours of 7:30 in the morning to 9:30 in the morning, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of his
official position prepare and submit his daily time record for the month of July 1986 by making it
appear that he attended the aforesaid classes from the 3rd day of July to the 31st day of July,
1986, when in truth and in fact he failed to attend and teach said subject and for which he is
legally bound to disclose the truth, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

"Contrary to law." 3

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14446 to 14450, the informations filed are similarly worded as that in
Criminal Case No. 14445, except for the particulars as to the month and year 4 indicated in
each daily time record.

In Criminal Case No. 14451, the information alleged that petitioner made it appear in his daily
time record for January 1987, that from the 13th to the 29th of that month, he reported to the
Division Office in Digos, Davao del Sur by virtue of a directive of the Assistant Regional Director
and Officer in Charge, although he was in truth absent. The information in Criminal Cases Nos.
14452 to 14454 pertain to the daily time records when petitioner was detailed with the Division
Office during the months of February, March and April, 1987, wherein petitioner allegedly made
it appear that he reported to said Office from the 3rd to the 27th of February, 1987, the 2nd to
the 31st of March, 1987, and the 1st to the 3rd day of April, 1987, respectively.
On March 31, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, 5 rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, after trial on the merits, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ponciano
Layug y Medina GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in all eleven (11) counts of
Falsification of Public Documents charged in the above-numbered cases, as defined and
penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no
modifying circumstance in attendance, after applying the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced as follows:

"(1) in Criminal Case No. 14444 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and
to pay the costs of said action.

"(2) In Crim. Case No. 14445 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(3) in Crim. Case No. 14446 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(4) In Crim. Case No. 14447 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(5) In Crim. Case No. 14448 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(6) In Crim. Case No. 14449 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(7) In Crim. Case No. 14450 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(8) In Crim. Case No. 14451 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(9) In Crim. Case No. 14452 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(10) In Crim. Case No. 14453 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"(11) In Crim. Case No. 14454 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to pay the costs of said action.

"SO ORDERED." 6

THE FACTS

On June 7, 1971, petitioner applied with the Division Office of Davao del Sur for a permanent
teaching position in the Digos Provincial High School. He stated in his application letter 7 that he
obtained the degrees of Associate in Arts and Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from the
University of Sto. Tomas, in 1960, and the academic aspect of the course in Master of Arts in
Psychology from the Lyceum of the Philippines. A civil service eligible for secondary teachers,
petitioner claimed having taught for seven (7) years English, Mathematics, Social Sciences,
Biology, General Science and History in the high school level, and Education, Philosophy,
Psychology, Zoology, Botany, Statistics and Health in the college level.

At the Davao del Sur National High School (DSNHS), petitioner taught English, Literature and
Social Studies. In school year 1986-1987, he was assigned to teach two loads of English IV and
four loads of Science IV (Physics). Ramon Presto, the principal of DSNHS, authorized the head
of the Science Department to assign any science course to petitioner. 8 Thus, on June 17,
1986, Lourdes E. Magbanua of the Science Department, issued a memorandum addressed to
petitioner detailing his schedule for Science IV classes. 9 Jovencio Tablang, the assistant
principal in charge of academic affairs, noted the memorandum. However, because petitioner
refused to receive the memorandum, 10 on June 23, 1986, Magbanua informed Presto through
a letter that petitioner refused to teach three (3) Science IV classes assigned to him for the
reason that he was "inexperienced and incompetent to teach the subject." 11 Magbanua
mentioned in that letter that petitioner’s science load had been unattended to for one week
already and thus she referred the matter to Jovencio Tablang. Nevertheless, Magbanua would
see petitioner in campus, talking with friends or with the security guards in the guardhouses. 12

In the month of June 1986, petitioner filed a daily time record showing that he reported for work
within his daily official working hours of 8:30 to 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 to 4:30 p.m. from June 16 to
June 30, 1986. 13 Petitioner signed the June 1986 daily time record but the principal did not
sign it. Petitioner submitted similarly filled up daily time records from July 1986 to April 1987. 14
Notably, the daily time records for those months showed that, except for reasons of court
appearances in certain mornings and afternoons, petitioner regularly reported for work within his
official time of 8:30 to 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 to 4:30 p.m.

On June 4, 1986, Presto filed with the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) TBP Case No. 86-01001, 15
a complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioner. Presto alleged
that petitioner made it appear that he had completed the required number of hours of work in his
daily time records (hereinafter DTR) for the months of January to April 1986, notwithstanding
that he only worked for a short period of time. 16 After his arraignment, petitioner learned that
he was charged with eleven (11) more counts of falsification of public document pertaining to his
daily time records for June 1986 to April 1987, that were docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02474.

On June 30, 1986, petitioner sent a handwritten letter to Presto reiterating his request for the
subjects that he could handle and apologizing for his inability to handle the Physics subject that
Magbanua was asking him to teach. 17 In his reply dated July 2, 1986 to that letter, Presto
noted that as a result of petitioner’s refusal to attend to the science subjects assigned to him
petitioner was serving for only six (6) hours a week teaching two loads of English. Hence, he
was short of fifteen (15) hours per week from June 16-30, 1986. Presto stated that since there
were no more subject load that could be assigned to petitioner except science and YDT,
petitioner was instructed to report to Ruperto H. Escarcha of the Youth Development Training
(YDT) Department for assignment effective immediately and to see Presto for further
instructions. 18

Petitioner did not report to Ruperto H. Escarcha to teach subjects in YDT and CAT-1. 19 Hence,
on July 16, 1986, Presto issued a memorandum calling petitioner’s attention to his failure to
follow instructions from his superiors. Presto warned him that should he fail to explain his side
within five (5) days, he would be constrained to recommend petitioner’s preventive suspension
or summary dismissal to higher authorities. 20

On August 6, 1986, Escarcha informed Presto that he had scheduled petitioner’s working load
for YDT/CAT-1 but petitioner failed to report to his assigned classes. Escarcha reminded Presto
that with the YDT load, petitioner would have a teacher’s total maximum load of twenty-one (21)
hours per week with his two CAE (Communication Arts English) load. 21

On December 17, 1986, Presto issued a memorandum to petitioner instructing him to report
immediately to the Guidance Office during his CAE IV periods, MWF, pending instruction from
higher authorities, because the Guidance Coordinator would give him assignment in guidance
services in lieu of his English subject load. Petitioner was also informed that Mrs. Farcolina
Badilles would be assigned temporarily to CAE IV of Section Garcia while CAE IV of Section
Luna would be handled by Mrs. Celestina Hipe until a qualified teacher assumes the two subject
load. Petitioner would, however, remain assigned to the YDT/CAT Department. Presto clarified
that the shifting of teachers’ assignment/load was made in the interest and welfare of the
students "as requested by them and their parents, and for the good of the service." 22 On that
same day, Presto issued a memorandum to Mrs. Hipe and Mrs. Badilles informing them of their
temporary subject load assignment in addition to their duties in the Guidance Department. 23

On May 19, 1986, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Region XI
in Davao City complaints for harassment and oppression and for unjustifiable refusal to release
vacation salaries against Presto under Administrative Cases Nos. R-0758-XI-86 and R-0766-XI-
86. The cases were consolidated with the complaint filed by Presto against petitioner for
dishonesty under Administrative Case No. R-0764-XI-86.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner was allowed to teach only two (2) English subjects (one
hour in the morning and one hour in the afternoon) he accomplished the daily time record for
June 1986. After teaching, he would while away time in the library, in the administrative office,
and in the school premises because the school did not have a faculty room and he was not
even provided a table by the principal.

On June 19, 1986, petitioner wrote Presto stating that, for reasons of competency, experience
and readiness, he would like to teach: (1) English and Literature, (2) History, "Business
Distributive Arts (commercial) and Population Education," and (3) Science I and Biology. 24
Petitioner submitted the daily time record to Presto, through the head teacher, at the end of
each month. He would place a particular daily time record in a pigeonhole provided for the
purpose and the head teacher would submit it either to the principal or the assistant principal.
However, from June 1986 to April 1987, he was not paid his salary. Only after his case reached
the Court of Appeals 25 did he receive compensation in the amount of P6,000.00. Meanwhile,
Presto and his companions persisted in harassing petitioner. He was not only assigned to
subjects he was not competent to teach, he was also removed from teaching the English
subjects he was already teaching. Petitioner testified that some of the administrators even
induced students not to attend the classes where he taught and posted signs along the corridor.
26

In its order of January 8, 1987, the DECS regional office detailed petitioner to the Division Office
in Digos, Davao del Sur. On January 12, 1987, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On
January 26, 1987, the regional office denied the motion thereby sustaining the order detailing
him to the Division Office. 27 However, petitioner did not report to the Division Office pursuant to
those orders. Neither did he file a leave of absence starting January 8, 1987. 28

Petitioner, however, presented evidence that on July 13, 1987, DECS Regional Director Teofilo
E. Gomez issued a memorandum to Schools Division Superintendent Benedicto V. Cruz and
principal Presto requesting them to give teaching loads to petitioner at the DSNHS effective
upon receipt thereof. The memorandum modified the one issued by the same office on January
8, 1987, detailing petitioner to the Division Office. The memorandum indicated that the detail of
teaching personnel in the Regional/Division/District Offices was prohibited. 29

On July 27, 1987, as a consequence of the withholding of his salary for the vacation period of
1986, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, Civil
Case No. 2425, an action for mandamus against Presto, the DSNHS cashier and the Schools’
Division Superintendent. Petitioner alleged that on June 19, 1987, the DECS Regional Director
had issued an order to effect the payment of his salary as well as other emoluments but the
principal refused to comply therewith and hence, petitioner claimed damages therefor.

On September 17, 1991, the Regional Trial Court 30 rendered a decision ordering the dismissal
of the case and the counterclaim. The trial court directed payment to petitioner of his salary for
work correspondingly rendered from January 5, 1989. 31 The latter date had been fixed by this
Court in the Decision of February 7, 1990 in G.R. No. 82272 (Layug v. Quisumbing), 32 arising
from petitioner’s preventive suspension by the DECS Regional Director and approved by DECS
Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing.

In that case, the Court held that a teacher may not be compelled to accept and neither may he
demand to be given an assignment not specified in his appointment. However, interruptions in
the administrative investigation caused by petitioner’s own fault or upon his own request would
not be counted in computing the 90-day statutory limit of suspension. Hence, for his refusal to
accept assignments given to him by the regional director, petitioner was not entitled to receive
salary for the period of idleness; he may receive salary only from January 5, 1989 when he
reported for work.
On March 30, 1990, the prosecutor filed with the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) counts of
falsification of public document 33 against petitioner.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. 34 The prosecution thus
presented Ramon Presto, Lourdes Magbanua, Benedicto Cruz, Ruperto Escarcha and
Celestina Hipe as its witnesses.

On March 31, 1995, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision finding petitioner guilty of
eleven (11) counts of falsification of public documents.

Hence, this appeal. 35

Petitioner asserts that the facts narrated in his daily time records were not absolutely false.
Hence, there was no falsification as there was "some colorable truth" in the daily time record.
Moreover, in filling up his daily time record, petitioner acted in good faith. Proof of this is that he
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the school head to release his salary for school year
1986-87. On the other hand, it was the school principal who was impelled by improper motives
in testifying against petitioner. As this Court noted in its decision of June 16, 1995 in G.R. No.
114138 (Layug v. Sandiganbayan), 36 despite his knowledge of the irregular attendance of
petitioner, he (Presto) did not take extra care to segregate and scrutinize petitioner’s DTRs
starting January 1986, so as to give himself (Presto) justification not to sign the same.

THE RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in all criminal prosecutions for offenses under the Revised
Penal Code, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
criminal intent to commit the offense charged. As this Court said in Beradio v. Court of Appeals:

"Of great weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. Actus non facit ream, nisi mens set rea,
the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the
element required is negligence (culpa)." 37

Petitioner was charged with having committed eleven (11) counts of falsification of public
document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code that states:

"The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x.’

To convict an accused of the crime of falsification of public or official document under that
provision of law, the following requisites must be established: (1) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. 38

There is authority to the effect that a fourth requisite, i.e., that the act of falsification was
committed to the damage of a third party or with intent to cause such damage, may be
dispensed with as regards falsification of public or official document. The reason for this is that
in falsification of public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 39 However, the daily time
record that a public official or employee must fill up is a public document which has
characteristics distinct from other public documents. It should contain a "true and correct report
of hours of work performed, record of which was made daily at the time of arrival at and
departure from office." 40 As to its nature and purpose, this Court has said:

". . . The evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep a time record is to show
their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy of no
work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to
the government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The
integrity of the daily time record as an official document, however, remains untarnished if the
damage sought to be prevented has not been produced. . . . (w)hile it is true that a time record
is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as
when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public
document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that
document is falsified where the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that
general interest. . ." 41 (Emphasis supplied.)

As such, in the prosecution of cases involving falsification of daily time records, it is imperative
that there be proof of damage to the government. Such damage may take the form of salary
paid to the accused for services not rendered. 42

There is no proof that petitioner unduly benefited from his daily time record. On the contrary,
what appears on record is the fact that petitioner was deprived of his salary from June 1986 to
April 1987, the period of time material in these cases. In fact, petitioner had to resort to our
courts before he could get the salary that was due him in proportion to the time he actually
rendered services to the government.

The court allowed petitioner to receive the amount of P6,000.00 for services he actually
rendered. It sufficiently proves that his daily time record was not absolutely false. In other words,
there was a color of truth in the entries in petitioner’s daily time record as he did report for work
at the DSNHS. The truth that he taught within his official time of work is even buttressed by the
prosecution evidence that two teachers, Hipe and Badilles, had to take over the English
subjects assigned to him.

Upon his replacement by Hipe and Badilles in the English classes he handled, petitioner was
supposed to report to the Division Office in accordance with the January 8, 1987 directive of the
DECS regional office. Petitioner did not report to the Division Office. By his daily time record, he
continued reporting to DSNHS because he protested his detail to that office sometime in
February 1987. 43 Notably, petitioner received a copy of the report of the DECS Grievance
Committee dated December 15, 1986 44 recommending the detail of both petitioner and
principal Presto to the Division Office, only on July 8, 1987. 45 Then, he also received the
Memorandum of the DECS Regional Director dated July 13, 1987, lifting the detail order. 46

Petitioner cannot therefore be faulted for reporting to the DSNHS. He was not under a
suspension order or any administrative sanction that would legally prevent him from reporting to
work. He sought redress in the proper administrative body and during the time that he had not
received a copy of the memorandum regarding his detail that he had questioned, he reported at
the DSNHS. In the absence of sufficient proof to the contrary, good faith in reporting to work and
in accordingly filling up his daily time record may therefore be attributed to petitioner. As this
Court once said:

". . .’there is no falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with
good faith. Thus, it has been held that "a conviction for falsification of public document by a
private person will not be sustained when the facts found are consistent with good faith on the
part of the accused." In other words, although the accused altered a public document or made a
misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he
acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error." ‘ 47

Moreover, in filling up his daily time records from June 1986 to January 1987, petitioner clearly
acted on the erroneous belief that he had the choice of what subjects to teach. This Court
discussed that matter in Layug v. Quisumbing 48 wherein petitioner’s petition to declare
respondents DECS Secretary Quisumbing, Gomez and Presto in contempt and to direct them to
reinstate him as a teacher of English and Biology and to pay his back salaries was denied. From
June 1986 to April 1987, he filled up his daily time record on the notion that he should report to
the DSNHS pursuant to Civil Service Rules requirements on the number of hours a teacher
should remain in school. 49 He did so even though he was not given a subject to teach and the
administrative matter of his detail to the Division Office had not been resolved. Clearly then,
petitioner’s actions do not necessarily reflect criminal intent. If what is proven is mere
judgmental error on the part of the person committing an act, no malice or criminal intent can be
rightfully imputed to him. 50

There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of falsification of public
document. From the facts of all the cases that had been filed by either petitioner or Presto,
there* could have been a lack of cordiality between them. Petitioner’s recalcitrance might have
aggravated the situation that resulted in his, commission of acts that may be grounds of an
administrative cased. 51 However, under the facts established by the prosecution in these
cases, the acts attributed to petitioner may not be the foundation of a successful criminal
prosecution. The evidence presented did not provide moral certainty that petitioner committed
the eleven (11) counts of falsification of public document charged.

In view of the foregoing, the presumption is that petitioner Ponciano Layug is innocent. Such
presumption continues until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 52 Verily, although the
evidence for the defense may be weak, criminal conviction must come from the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. 53 The proofs presented do
not meet the set criterion to justify petitioner’s conviction for the offense.

Thus, acquittal of petitioner is proper.

* THE FALLO

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases Nos. 14444 to 14454. Petitioner Ponciano Layug is hereby ACQUITTED of eleven (11)
counts of falsification of public document for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the
Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding
Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence punished under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information,4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Malabon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang
[P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his
official position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is
legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data
Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City
Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending
against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No.
6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for
Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). 6 That in answer to
the question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for
assault upon an agent ofa person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon
City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520,
was likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official
document and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7 the Court, in the
Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as
regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer vis-à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred
that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a
member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his
house. Ataround two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before
five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy
of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to
him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of
the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any
pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City
Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall
on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter,
they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw
Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, 8 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not
appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a
public document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would
not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the
signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the
same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of
Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of
falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of
public document under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to
falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was
haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article
36511 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal
case against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable
Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he
had not been a candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran
and served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in
question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor
from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the
preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with
malicious intent to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the
veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of
the PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a
government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a
councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the
PDS and should have treated the said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless
Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x.12
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution13 dated
October 22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the
felony of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the
Information that was filed against him specifically charged him with the commission of an
intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he
could not be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under
Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony
of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge
against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless
imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a
public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as
"falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation
implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it.
Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object
of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to
treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property. 15 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through
reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless
imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now
weighs the merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance
between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by
the prosecution. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be
convictedof the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able
to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the
question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the
affirmative. Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of
estafathrough falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him
charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on
his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is
necessarily includedin the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense,
in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case.
Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties,
the Court of Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of
checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and
adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but
which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is
a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.19 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense.
As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of
public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan 20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In
Sarep, the petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An
Information was then filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the
Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document
upon a finding that the accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful
intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that
he did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People
vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having
passed the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational
attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held
liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People
vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives
rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the
doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and
diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that
are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the
mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or
foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences
(People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966).21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in
falsification of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of
four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one
(21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63408 & 64026 August 7, 1985

GAUDIOSO C. LLAMOSO, HILARIO A. GUIGUE PROTACIO U. JUMAMOY, JR., NICANOR
ANINIPO and ALFREDO CAGAIS petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Enrico B. Aumentado for petitioner in 63408.
Prospers A. Crescini for petitioner in 64026.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about a false entry in the payroll for March 16 to 31, 1981 of 12 laborers who
worked in the improvement of Sta. Rosa Street, municipality of E. Villanueva, Siquijor. The
anomaly involves the sum of P 130 as the wages for two weeks of one laborer at P 13 a day.
The entries for the 11 laborers were not falsified.
Gaudioso C. Llamoso was the assistant highway engineer and officer-in-charge of the district
engineer's office. Hilario A. Guigue, 56, a senior civil engineer, was assigned to Project CRI-80-
0704 which undertook the repair of drainage canals and sidewalks at Sta. Rosa Street E.
Villanueva. Protacio U. Jumamoy, Jr., 33, was also a civil engineer who had been in the service
since 1974.
Llamoso, now 57, was assigned as district engineer on February 10, 1981. Alfredo Cagais, 25,
worked as caretaker of the district engineer's cottage and acted as utility man and messenger.
On March 10, 1981 Cagais complained that he had not been paid his wages at thirteen pesos a
day or P 130 for the quincena of February 16 to 27, 1981, a period of ten working days.
He was on the verge of crying because he was the sole breadwinner of vs. family. His mother
was sickly. Llamoso called Guigue and Jumamoy to explain why Cagais had not been paid his
wages. They said that Cagais was listed in the payroll of the Pisong Bridge project. Apparently,
he could not be included in the payroll for personnel of the district engineer's office. Llamoso
asked Guigue and Jumamoy to find a "legitimate way" by which Cagais could be paid his wages
as caretaker (11 tsn November 17, 1982).
Jumamoy intended to consult the auditor as to how Cagais could be paid vs. wages. He was not
able to see the auditor. Instead, he talked with Gertrudes Quilat an auditing aide who suggested
that a person acting as a "stand-in" or substitute for Cagais, might be included in the payroll but
Jumamoy should consult a lawyer about that arrangement (14).
Jumamoy discussed the matter with Mayor Alfredo Orquillas, Sr. of the municipality of E.
Villanueva who used to be a municipal judge. Orquillas advised that a "stand-in" was
permissible provided it was done in good faith and without the slightest intention of defrauding
the government (15). Jumamoy then asked Cagais who could act as his "stand-in". Cagais
suggested Nicanor Aninipo, 18, who was allegedly jobless (17).
So, on March 12, 1981, Jumamoy instructed his clerk to include the name of Aninipo in the form
or document known as "Authority to Hire Casual Employees and Order to Work" for the project
on Sta. Rosa Street, municipality of E. Villanueva for the quincena of March 16 to 31, 1981
(Exh. A and A-2). Jumamoy initialed the inclusion of Aninipo's name in that form and gave it to
his immediate superior, Guigue, for approval (19). Guigue approved it.
Aninipo was also included in the "Time Book and Payroll" (Exh. A) for that quincena of March 16
to 31, 1981 which listed 12 laborers, 11 of whom worked for 12 days. In the case of Aninipo, the
twelfth in the list, it was indicated that he worked for 10 days only to correspond with the ten-day
period for the quincena of February 12 to 27, 1981 for which, as already noted, Cagais worked
in the district engineer's cottage (21- 22).
Aninipo was able to collect P 130 under that payroll for the project on Sta. Rosa Street, E.
Villanueva. He gave the amount to Cagais because, as previously arranged, Aninipo was only a
"stand-in" for Cagais (22-23).
The pay master the sole prosecution witness, testified that at nine o'clock in the morning of April
13, 1981 he paid Aninipo P 130 for his supposed work in the Sta. Rosa Street project. Two
hours later, Aninipo wanted to collect P 156 for his actual work in the Bogo-Licuan road, another
project (Exh. B). The paymaster refused to pay him again. That was how the false entry was
discovered.
It should be clarified that before March 16, Aninipo was really jobless. His first job was in the
Bogo-Licuan project. But he was not able to apprise Cagais before March 16 that he started
working in that project (62-63).
Jumamoy declared that the government was not defrauded because Aninipo gave the P130 to
Cagais for his work of ten days in the district engineer's cottage but Aninipo was not able to
collect P156 for his actual work in the Bogo-Licuan Road project (31-2).
The Sandiganbayan convicted Llamoso Guigue, Jumamoy, Cagais and Aninipo as conspirators
in the crime of falsification of public documents by allegedly having made it appear in the time
book, payroll and authority to hire employees (Exh. A to A-2) that Aninipo worker in the Sta.
Rosa Street project when in fact he did not work therein.
I t sentenced each of them to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum and
to pay a fine of P2,000. They appealed.
We hold that the accused are not criminally liable because they had no criminal intent. Making
no concealment or evasion, they admitted that there was a false entry. They acted in good faith
(12-13 tsn Nov. 16, 1982). They may be disciplined administratively for the irregularity but their
inclusion of ninipo in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law.
Apparently, the case was an isolated instance. It should not be equated with the systematic and
rampant practice in some engineering districts of fabricating payrolls with fictitious laborers
working on fictitious projects resulting in the defraudation of the government of considerable
sums of money,
There is a ruling that the accused is not guilty of falsification in the absence of proof that he
maliciously perverted the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some third person (U.S. vs.
Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 343).
The instant case is similar to U.S. vs. Arceo, 17 Phil. 592, where the accused was the foreman
of carpenters hired by the City of Manila to reconstruct the houses torn down for reasons of
sanitation and removed to the San Lazaro Estate. The city had bound itself to reconstruct gratis
said houses. The wife of the accused had purchased from Severino Pelagio one of these
houses, including the right to have the house rebuilt at the city's expense.
The accused foreman reported that a carpenter named Castro worked for the city when in truth
he worked on the reconstruction of the house which the accused had purchased. He was
charged with falsification,
It was held that he was not criminally liable. He believed in good faith that the city was duty-
bound to rebuild the house which his wife had purchased from Pelagio and that there was
nothing wrong in charging against the city the time spent by Castro in rebuilding that house, just
as there was nothing wrong in charging against the city and time spent by the other carpenters
in rebuilding the other houses removed under the same circumstances.
In the instant case, as in the Arceo case, it cannot be said that the accused perverted the truth
in including Aninipo in the payroll in order to attain any felonious objective. Their honest motive
was to enable Cagais to receive his compensation which he needed very badly.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. The accused are acquitted with costs de
oficio. A copy of this decision should be furnished the Minister of Public Works and Highways for
the purpose of taking administrative action against the accused should the facts warrant such
action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 to seek
the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2
THE FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with
the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information
for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada.
The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED
during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’
IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another
Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558
and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan
issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try,
hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury)
against respondent Estrada.3
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations
of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The People’s evidence for the
illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G.
Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February
4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed
as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified
that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a
certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited
several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name "Jose
Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the
Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied
these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-
62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the
Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003. 4 The accused
separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand,
filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The Sandiganbayan denied the
motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to
evidence in these cases.8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, 9 the Sandiganbayan
only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias)
and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His
demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the
following grounds11:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde";
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as
can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the
following arguments:12
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP
No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of
alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not
BSP Circular No. 302;
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the
habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard
to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed
in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The
salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant
evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information – i.e., the
testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The
Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04
February 2000" and "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly
committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto;
the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s procedural tool to guard against any
variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation
in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read
as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from those that
took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from
interpreting the Information any other way.
Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the
offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada
committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It
ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias
is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the
principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the
transaction involved – the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust
account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the enactment
of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":
a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after
February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under
the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase,
"Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in several transactions," standing alone,
violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it
is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase –
"and use and employ the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is neither his registered name at
birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s representations before persons other than those mentioned
in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in the Information. Estrada’s representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere
communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is
not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel
law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142,
as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused.
It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to
a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada’s use
of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No.
1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the
witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot
be considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the
absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by
this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua
instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142
as amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name
"Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking
transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust
account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose
his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of
assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together,
Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank
deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank
account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the
absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under
fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping
hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust
account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must
necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the
principle that every statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws.
A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case,
led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically,
the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy
provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage
into law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No.
26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was
not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4
February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No.
26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was
allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No.
26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405
and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of
the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by
respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier
final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to
the instant case.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided,
That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not
been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names
in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or
two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall
be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other
than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or
names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the
words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias)
in addition to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of alias to] fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended."18
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No.
142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion
in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime
punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words,
is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling
proceeds from Estrada’s position in the government; at the time of the commission of the
offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name.
We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on
one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142.
In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify
a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema
or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the
President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name
of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we
make based on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua
dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the
accused may be.
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated
February 6, 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution
effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside
the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on
which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise
known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using
an "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise,
he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to "several
transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua
case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or
indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his
real name.22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua
notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in
the present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely
abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its
earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a
mere interlocutory order – a ruling denying a motion to quash 23 – that cannot be given the
attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that
finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution
is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character, and
would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the
controversy to rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the
control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any
time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil case, instructively teaches
that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle
of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous
order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before
the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain
acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the
possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the
resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not
private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to
possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the
restraining order was lifted.28
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of
the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the
Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of
whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information.
Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the
application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is
not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened
by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in
its petition that Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent
Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name
"Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single
transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause
"confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes
seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the
requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that
Estrada’s use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions, we shall now
examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it
presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter
of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting
the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias
"Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction – one that took
place on February 4, 2000 – but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or
subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several transactions" … "with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To the People, the restrictive finding – that
the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February
2000" – drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by
removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents signed with various
entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity
of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto,"
on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent
thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted
escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the
constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him.
Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same
Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality
allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven
as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited
US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are
liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle,
the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the
allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would
prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was
being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court
implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 29 As to
the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of the
offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise
date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.31
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting
forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that
he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the
complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the primary
reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or information – of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] … willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and
employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his
baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities."
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information, as this was how
the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on
this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in
the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3)
OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada
represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were
all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these
transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or
after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said "on or about
February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase
"sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning
separately from the "on or about" already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the "prior
or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence
of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to
February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different
(and would have been clearly in accord with the People’s present interpretation) had the
Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to
various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000
could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the
reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several
separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to
prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another
issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts,
constituting a violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.1avvphi1
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow
on the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the
repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount
to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA
No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers
sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers –
Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua – when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose
Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estrada’s
prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous,
improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use
of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention
or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estrada’s
prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong
and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936,
and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior
to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use
of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited.
Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did
not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have
done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or
prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since
nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142’s coverage.
Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized
refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws which
the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they each deal
with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers
a different class of persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one another.
Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence
between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust
Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account,
according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the
juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated separately and
are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and
requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance
under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the transaction or
communication was privileged in nature was erroneous – a congruent interpretation of CA No.
142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a name
or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for
violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank
transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People
argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not
Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias
to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and
use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank
officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and
the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and
prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the
commission of crimes. The People contends that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not intended by
the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes and
cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right
and justice would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law
of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of
CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua – particularly, the requirement that there be intention by
the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required
publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the
alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause
it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of
the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other
name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly
known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of
the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired
in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his
oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs.
Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.
The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously
rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking argument on the alleged
dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405,
by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the
bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to
be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to
the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so
that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic
development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or
investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under
Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be
invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended
to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits."
Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not
only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that
the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the
word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. 37 Given the private
nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the
trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the
obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the
privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily
guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it
clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were
permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking
regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be
maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post
facto laws.38
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an
attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No.
142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua.
The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada’s use of the alias was
pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this
point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light,
there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires
harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together
when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent
vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor
in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the
circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua
requisites. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the
highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the
Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the
evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the
People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we
so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the
assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.