Roche, C. 2008. The Fertile Brain and Inventive Power of Man

Africa
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‘The Fertile Brain and Inventive Power of Man’: Anthropogenic Factors in

the Cessation of Springbok Treks and the Disruption of the Karoo
Ecosystem, 1865–1908
Chris Roche
Africa / Volume 78 / Issue 02 / May 2008, pp 157 - 188

DOI: 10.3366/E0001972008000120, Published online: 03 March 2011
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0001972000087374
How to cite this article:

Chris Roche (2008). ‘The Fertile Brain and Inventive Power of Man’: Anthropogenic Factors in the Cessation of Springbok
Treks and the Disruption of the Karoo Ecosystem, 1865–1908. Africa, 78, pp 157-188 doi:10.3366/E0001972008000120
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Africa 78 (2), 2008 DOI: 10.3366/E0001972008000120
‘THE FERTILE BRAIN AND INVENTIVE POWER

OF MAN’: ANTHROPOGENIC FACTORS IN
THE CESSATION OF SPRINGBOK TREKS AND
THE DISRUPTION OF THE KAROO
ECOSYSTEM, 1865–1908
Chris Roche
In the 1700s and 1800s, the imaginations of Dutch and British settlers
at the southern tip of Africa in what was to become the Cape Colony
fell captive to reports of enormous roving herds of a small gazelle-
like antelope, the springbok Antidorcas marsupialis. Descriptions of
herds, estimated at hundreds of thousands or even millions of animals,
periodically sweeping across the then mostly unknown interior of the
sub-continent, laying waste vast swathes of grazing and pasture and
disrupting any attempt at profitable pastoralism, both concerned
and fascinated the colonists and were featured with some fanfare and
excitement in the local press. Known as the trekbokken or trekbokke
(migrating antelope), by the Dutch, these swarms of small antelope and
their apparently random comings and goings were wrapped in myth and
mystery. It was not known precisely where the large herds came from,
what drove their movements, where they disappeared to, and why and
when they would return. The vast flat interior beyond the Cape Fold
Mountain, a harsh and largely unsettled scrub-covered desert known as
the Karoo, was the area most associated with their incursions, however,
and all manner of theory and conjecture accompanied the veritable war
waged against them by the colonists.
Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, while outright hunting
and shooting was generally seen as the only means of staunching the
periodic onslaughts, media and municipality urged multiple methods of
protecting stock and grazing against the springbok treks if any progress
was to be made in taming and settling the interior. Indeed, after a
protracted and dramatic inundation of springbok in a concentrated area
of the north-eastern Karoo in 1896 and 1897, the treks suddenly ceased
and the principal mammal migration of the Karoo became extinct, so
removing an important impediment to settlement and agriculture.
The cessation of springbok treks coincided with the arrival in the
colony of the rinderpest epizootic: a ‘cattle plague’ that over the
preceding five years had raced the length of Africa and decimated cattle
CHRIS ROCHE, a graduate of the University of Cape Town, has spent the last ten years
in the Southern African ecotourism industry. He is currently based in Johannesburg as
communications manager and environmentalist for Wilderness Safaris. His research interests
have focused on environmental history and historical ecology in the former Cape Colony, and
the integration of this into modern conservation planning.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 30 Aug 2013 IP address: 137.158.158.60

158 THE END OF SPRINGBOK TREKS
populations from Uganda to the Transvaal and finally the Cape Colony
(Henning 1956: 828–33). Given its apparent coincidence in both space
and time with the last great springbok trek in 1896 and 1897, rinderpest
has long been claimed as the root cause of the extinction of springbok
treks (Skinner 1993: 302; Skinner and Louw 1996: 7). There is no
hard evidence to support this conclusion, however, and there are more
plausible explanations.
After first examining the basic ecology of the species and the
important role of trekbokke in the Karoo ecosystem, this article
investigates any potential relationship between rinderpest and the
cessation of springbok treks. Having discovered no more than a
circumstantial link, a combination of anthropogenic influences is
introduced as the primary causative complex in the extinction of this
phenomenon. The loss of the treks robbed the Karoo of a cornerstone
of its ecosystem and severely disrupted the natural processes of the area.
KAROO CORNERSTONE: THE ROLE OF SPRINGBOK IN AN ARID ECOSYSTEM
The broader Karoo is in fact comprised of two distinct biomes, the

Succulent Karoo in the west (winter rainfall) and the (summer rainfall)
Nama Karoo in the central and eastern reaches (see Figure 1). Over
the past 50 years the state of this semi-desert environment has provided
much fuel for an extended and ongoing debate about environmental
degradation in the region and the extent of man’s influence on this
apparent decline (Acocks 1953: 1–92; Hoffman and Cowling 1990:
286–94; Dean and Roche 2007: 57–63). Much of this debate has
centred on the composition of available vegetation (both grasses and
shrubs and the ratio between them) and what this make-up indicates
as to past agricultural and pastoral practices. Certainly it is clear
from agricultural censuses conducted by the colonial administration
that sheep densities in particular have at times been damagingly high
and that as a result the productivity of the system and its ability to
sustain high stock populations have declined over time (Dean and
MacDonald 1994: 281–98; Beinart 2003: 1–27). These trends were
already recognizable in some areas of the Karoo, and its earlier settled
fringe, by the late nineteenth century. It is here that the foundations of
the debate lie (Shaw 1875: 202–8; Graaff-Reinet Advertiser 13 February
1899, 2 February 1900).
While this discussion continues unabated today it is nonetheless
indisputable that the natural processes of the Karoo are now largely
or, in some cases, entirely disrupted. The first fifty years of the
twentieth century exerted considerable impact, of course, but this
massive disruption began to occur primarily in the late nineteenth
century during a period when anthropogenic impacts on then extant
natural processes were spectacular.
By 1878 the quagga Equus quagga quagga was extinct (Skinner and
Smithers 1990: 720). Eland Tragelaphus oryx had been extirpated
from the Karoo even earlier (Bryden 1889: 291), and formerly

THE END OF SPRINGBOK TREKS 159
characteristic species such as black wildebeest Connochaetes gnou, red

hartebeest Alcephalus buselaphus, blesbok Damaliscus dorcas phillipsi
and gemsbok Oryx gazella occurred only at negligible densities
(C. Roche, unpublished data). Of the larger herbivores, only springbok
still occurred in significant numbers. Most importantly, however,
springbok, and specifically the enormous herds of so-called trekbokke,
continued to exhibit irruption and nomadism in sync with the cyclical
fluctuations and functioning of the Karoo ecosystem (Roche 2004:
110–54). Irruption, an arid ecosystem survival strategy that sees
population explosions during times of plenty and subsequent crashes
or out-migration in the harder times that follow, is today well known in
certain bird species occurring in the Karoo (Dean and Siegfried 1997:
11–21; Milton, Davies and Kerley 1999: 183–207; Dean and Milton
2001: 101–21) and other arid areas (Davies 1984: 183–4) but was
not recognized during the colonial period. Nonetheless we know from
ethnographic and archaeological records of the hunter-gatherer/Xam
and Swyèi (Bushman clans that inhabited this forbidding desert before
the arrival of Europeans) that the movements of trekbokke and their
cyclical abundance were a cornerstone of survival in the Karoo, and
an aspect of the natural process around which much else revolved
(Roche 2004: 45–64; Roche 2005: 1–22). The other large herbivores
such as the quagga and eland had in all likelihood also exhibited similar
movements, albeit on a significantly smaller scale and as a result of
slightly different stimuli, but by the latter half of the nineteenth century
occurred at such low densities that the exact nature of these movements
is not known.
Endowed with exceptional fecundity, springbok in the central parts
of the Nama Karoo displayed a cyclical build-up of numbers and
ensuing emigration to neighbouring areas in both the Succulent
Karoo to the west (with its winter rainfall) and the higher-rainfall
areas of the eastern Nama Karoo to the east. This cyclical build-
up was naturally allied to rainfall and the response of both grass
and shrubs; it did not take place every year, but rather in tandem
with what has been termed a ‘quasi-periodic rainfall oscillation’. This
oscillation sees an average 18-year cycle of two consecutive nine-year
periods of above- and below-average rainfall (Tyson and Preston-
Whyte 2000: 322; Roche 2004: 83–90). During extended periods of
high rainfall, springbok numbers grew exponentially, particularly in
normally marginal areas with low productivity in normal or dry years
but high fertility during wet years. During the inevitable droughts that
followed, these swollen herds migrated at random to whatever grazing
remained, usually in adjacent higher-rainfall areas of the Karoo that
may not necessarily have seen a dramatic local increase in springbok
numbers. As the cycle progressed, with droughts increasing in duration
and forage availability decreasing, springbok numbers declined and
even crashed. This biome-wide process, although also exploited by
them, was generally compatible with the initial transhumance of settlers
of the region, who were themselves partly nomadic with their herds
and flocks of cattle, sheep and goats. Later, however, the springbok

Graaff-Reinet
Philipstown
FIGURE 1 Extent of the Succulent Karoo and Nama Karoo in the admin-
istrative districts of the Cape Colony
trek phenomenon was inevitably disruptive of attempts at organized

stock farming and increasingly came into conflict with this evolving
land use.
While early settlers in the region were initially forced by dependence
on the vagaries of weather patterns to mimic natural nomadic
processes – such as those of the springbok – increasing numbers of
people, allied with advances in technology and infrastructure, meant
that transhumance evolved into farming practices characterized by
greater permanency. Windmills and boreholes allowed the invasion of
the previously inhospitable Karoo by permanent stock farmers, their
flocks and their rifles, and the ensuing enclosure with wire fencing
increasingly prevented free movement of wild ungulates such as the
trekbokke, at least into the most productive areas integral to both stock
and game. These changes in the Karoo landscape were censused on
a regular basis by the colonial administration and can be mapped
at the relatively coarse resolution of districts, the colonial units of
administration (see Figure 1).
While rinderpest, the so-called ‘cattle plague’, was previously
believed to have been the primary cause of the demise of the springbok
treks, this article establishes that a combination of anthropogenic
factors – and most importantly enclosure and hunting – were in fact
responsible, and that rinderpest played little or no role in the demise of
the phenomenon. The dramatic extinction of this phenomenon allowed

the replacement of the Karoo’s fundamental, and essential, boom and

bust cycle – and its most apparent exponent, the trekbokke – with an
artificial system regulated more by market demand than environmental
cycles. The eclipse of the trekbokke symbolized the triumph of human
economies over undesirable ecological processes and the beginning of a
long process of environmental degradation.
‘THE DAYS OF THE GREAT “TREKS” ARE OVER’ – REASONS FOR THE END
As a number of authors have noted, 1896–7 witnessed the last ‘mega-

trek’ of springbok in the Karoo. This trek, the result of several years
of good rainfall followed by a devastating drought, was concentrated in
the Britstown district. The trekbokke remained clustered here for several
months before favourable rains further west caused their dispersal.
Due to the unusually concentrated nature of the trek, springbok
suffered enormous and previously unsustained mortalities at the hands
of settlers, many of whom had travelled to the area specifically
to hunt the trekbokke. Vosburg became known as a ‘springbuck town’
(De Britstowner 21 October 1896) and various lurid descriptions of veld
strewn with offal and abandoned carcasses and the massive trade in
ammunition and springbok skins and biltong appeared in both the local
and British press (Roche 2004: 110–54).
Thereafter, dramatically reduced springbok numbers, scattered
across the remaining unfenced areas of the Karoo, continued to exhibit
some limited localized movement in response to rain, but not on a scale
that could be considered treks. Rather these movements might be better
understood as seasonal concentrations and the trekbok population in
fact never recovered. Explanations for the disappearance of the mass
migrations remain wholly unsatisfactory, often being based on nothing
more than conjecture and coincidence. Skinner, and subsequently
Skinner and Louw, attempted to provide a more reasoned explanation.
Skinner was initially dismissive of fencing as a cause, claiming, on the
basis of a single oral source, that enclosure began only twenty years
after treks had ended. While conceding that hunting may have played a
role in reducing numbers, he contended that the rinderpest epidemic,
which spread rapidly in the Cape from 1896, was ‘almost certainly’
the overriding cause (Skinner 1993: 302). Skinner and Louw (1996:
7) were more circumspect, concluding that the treks had probably
been terminated by a combination of factors such as increases and
advances in stock farming, fencing and hunting techniques, but still
singled out rinderpest as the single most important cause. While this
latter combination has the ring of common sense to it, it has not been
substantiated to any significant extent and even the passage of the
rinderpest epidemic through the Cape Colony, although tracked with
regard to social impact and veterinary science (van Onselen 1972: 473–
88; Phoofolo 1993: 112–43; Gilfoyle 2002: 161–200; Gilfoyle 2003:
133–54; Phoofolo 2004: 94–177), has yet to be plotted chronologically
or quantitatively in any great detail. Skinner and Louw’s claims

therefore remain based on intuitive logic, not empirical evidence, and

can at best be regarded as a provisional hypothesis.
‘THE FEARFUL PEST’: THE SPREAD AND IMPACT OF RINDERPEST IN

THE CAPE COLONY, 1896–8
Rinderpest, endemic in Europe and Asia, reached northern Africa in

the area of Eritrea in 1889 and spread southwards via the transport
oxen of the Italian army in 1890 (Henning 1956: 829). As an airborne
viral disease attacking both domesticated and wild ruminants in the
form of cattle and various ungulate species, and causing fatalities in less
than 14 days in over 90 per cent of infected animals, it spread rapidly
southwards (Jacobs 2002: 29). Rinderpest reached the Cape Colony in
1896, leaving a swathe of dead livestock in its wake (Henning 1956:
829–31; Jacobs 2002: 29; Bengis et al. 2003: 260).
Skinner’s conclusion that rinderpest was the primary cause of the
termination of springbok treks appears to be based on two pieces of
circumstantial evidence. First, the epidemic coincided roughly with the
end of springbok treks; second, springbok treks typically originated in
the Kalahari and moved south across the Orange River into the Cape
Colony and the Karoo – a path that would have exposed the trekbokke to
rinderpest as the plague swept down through Botswana from Zimbabwe
and into the area north of the Orange River. Skinner’s contention that
springbok treks originated north of the Orange River and not to the
south (Skinner 1993: 298) appears, however, to be a misinterpretation
of Andries Stockenstrom’s analysis of the phenomenon. Stockenstrom
was in fact adamant that the treks originated between the colonial
border and the River itself; in other words, south of the Orange River
and thus outside of the Kalahari (Hutton 1887: 37–9).
Although springbok apparently did trek south across the Orange
River from the Kalahari into the Karoo in 1896 (Roche 2004: 129–
45), these animals did not comprise a significant portion of the last
mega-trek and, contrary to Skinner’s supposition, would appear to
have constituted only a very minor fraction of it (Roche 2004: 144).
Indeed, this is the only period during which a springbok trek crossed
the Orange River from the Kalahari into the Karoo in the nineteenth
century that could be discerned in a thorough reading of the Karoo
colonial press and numerous other sources (Roche 2004: 13–152).
Such movements cannot therefore be considered to have been the
norm. The overwhelming majority of the springbok involved in the trek
of 1896 would therefore not have been exposed to rinderpest. This does
not exclude the possibility that a small minority introduced rinderpest
at a later stage, subsequently decimating the tightly massed population
south of the Orange River, but it does cast some doubt on one premise
of Skinner’s explanation.
As far as the other coincidence is concerned, the rinderpest epidemic
was closely tracked by the colonial administration. The path and timing
of its entry into both the area immediately north of the Orange River

FIGURE 2 The spread of rinderpest in central southern Africa by January

1897 (Anon 1897: 729–31)
and the Cape, as well as its impact on livestock in border districts

from Hope Town through to Namaqualand, were documented in
considerable detail (see Figure 2). This fact makes a comparison of
the spread of rinderpest with the movements of the trekbokke possible.
From its first recorded occurrence in southern Africa on 5 March
1896 in Bulawayo, rinderpest spread rapidly. As early as that same
month a cordon of Cape Mounted Police had been established along
the northern and eastern border of the Colony to prevent the epizootic
crossing from Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Courier
26 March 1896). By May this cordon had been breached and hastily
redeployed further south (Graaff Reinet Advertiser 15 June 1896).
By June the Kalahari was described as ‘swept clean by rinderpest’
rendering it ‘hoofless’ (Graaff Reinet Advertiser 15 June 1896). Nothing
but dead cattle were apparently to be seen along the Molopo River, with
massive losses of both revenue and animals recorded: the Protectorate
estimated a loss of £4,000,000 while the Bechuana under Khama were
said to have lost 600,000 head of stock (Courier 25 June 1896). In the
Transvaal any hope of stamping out the disease outside the cordon (see
Figure 2) was surrendered by July when the veld was said to be ‘simply
rotten with disease stricken game, koedoe, gemsbok, duiker &c. being
in such a condition that policemen simply ride up and shoot them down
with revolvers’ (Graaff Reinet Advertiser 6 July 1896). Further south
similar fatalism prevailed. Contrary to Skinner’s claim that rinderpest
had broken out in Vryburg in May (Skinner 1993: 302), it is only
two months later in July that this is in fact the case (Courier 16 July

1896). By September it had reached Herbert on the northern bank of

the Orange River, leading to the feeling that ‘the fearful pest . . . [was]
most likely to find its way eventually to the coast’ (Courier 10 September
1896).
Attitudes towards rinderpest within the Colony itself varied,
however. There was the inevitable panic-tinged response that regarded
any unusual cattle death as evidence of the epidemic and imagined
the disease to be advancing far more quickly than it was. This was
counter-balanced by sceptics who believed the threat to be exaggerated.
For example, an outbreak of rinderpest was prematurely reported for
Kenhardt in September, having to be corrected the following week as a
mistake (Courier 28 September 1896; 1 October 1896), and the same
process occurred in Prieska the following July (De Britstowner 14 July
1897; 28 July 1897). Conversely some farmers of the Prieska district
felt that, in the light of the rinderpest fence that prevented access to the
Orange River, it was ‘better to have rinderpest than fence, as the latter
will mean death to all river farm cattle and stock generally, as no other
water is available owing to the drought’ (Courier 8 October 1896).
Rinderpest duly spread from Vryburg and Herbert to Kimberley by
October 1896 (Skinner 1993: 302) and thereafter broke out in the Free
State, being well established along its southern and eastern borders
by January 1897 (see Figure 2). From here it crossed to the Colony
in March that year (Courier 30 March 1897; see also Phoofolo 1993:
114). Although rinderpest penetrated the eastern districts, its route
from the Kalahari into the northern districts of the Karoo continued
to be obstructed: the double barbed wire fence along the Orange
River from Hopetown to Prieska was guarded by 50 special police
and their supervisors. From Prieska to the Kenhardt boundary another
160 ‘specials’ were present and from here to Zeekoestreek a further
230. Protection along the remaining 300 miles to the west coast was
considered ‘exceedingly unsatisfactory’ and this section was thought
to represent the greatest danger of infection to the northern districts
(De Britstowner 5 May 1897). As an added precaution, and to create
a buffer zone, Gordonia was declared an infected district prior to any
documented rinderpest outbreak (De Britstowner 19 May 1897) and by
May, despite appearing on the borders, the disease had yet to enter the
district (Anon 1897: 729–31).
Partly in anticipation of a rinderpest outbreak expected to decimate
domestic stock and render the carcasses unfit for human consumption,
meat prices in Kenhardt had been on the increase since February (De
Britstowner 10 February 1897) and in October rinderpest did finally
reach the district (Victoria West Messenger 8 October 1897). The disease
had advanced from Hopetown via Britstown in September, and then on
to Victoria West (Victoria West Messenger 1 October 1897) and Prieska.
As a result of limited inoculation the cattle population in Britstown was
‘devastated’ (De Britstowner 1 September 1897; 15 September 1897).
The interior and extreme north-western districts were not affected,
however, and by August 1898 the Civil Commissioner believed that
rinderpest had ‘entirely disappeared’ from Kenhardt (Anon 1898a:

237–43). There was a risk of reintroduction from Gordonia where it

still existed, but, despite fears that it would remain for ‘some time’
(Anon 1898a: 237–43), by October it had been eradicated from this
district as well (Anon 1898c: 493–502).
Rinderpest, although relatively short-lived in the Colony, had a
massive impact and, writing towards the end of 1897, a correspondent
to the Victoria West Messenger summed up the devastating dual effects
of drought and rinderpest as a pivotal moment in South African history:
Ja als er ooit iets belangryks was om opgestekend te worden in de geschiednis van

Zuid Afrika, dan is het de gebeurtenissen van 1896 en 1897, de zware droogten,
sterven van duizenden van groot en klein vee, door droogte en rinderpest. (Yes,
if ever there was something important to emphasize in the history of South
Africa, it is the events of 1896 and 1897, the severe drought, the deaths of
thousands of large and small stock as a result of drought and rinderpest.)
(Victoria West Messenger 22 October 1897)
As will be seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the impact of rinderpest on

settler cattle and sheep holdings is easily quantifiable. For the purposes
of this argument, and because the colonial administrative districts
regularly changed boundaries and size, the core of the Succulent
and Nama Karoo can be divided into four regions (see Figure 3),
allowing a spatial analysis of the impact of rinderpest and other factors.
The four regions are roughly aligned to certain characteristics such
as geographic location and dominant habitat and rainfall patterns.
The north-western districts (Namaqualand, Van Rhynsdorp and
Clanwilliam), for example, are comprised mainly of Succulent Karoo in
a winter rainfall area, while the midland districts (Murraysburg, Graaff-
Reinet, Middelburg, Cradock) are comprised of mountainous Nama
Karoo and grassland in the highest rainfall region under discussion,
with precipitation occurring mainly in summer. The northern and
central districts (Kenhardt, Calvinia, Fraserburg, Carnarvon, Prieska,
Victoria West) and the north-eastern districts (Hopetown, Britstown,
Richmond, Hanover, De Aar, Philipstown, Colesberg) comprise the
bulk of the Nama Karoo and can be separated on the basis of rainfall
and vegetation. The north-eastern districts experience significantly
higher and more reliable rainfall, and as a consequence feature more
extensive grass cover.
The north-eastern districts were worst hit in terms of cattle numbers,
suffering a decrease of almost 68 per cent between 1891 and 1898, with
only minor recovery demonstrated by 1911. Similarly, the northern and
central region lost over 64 per cent of cattle between 1891 and 1898
and numbers rose only slightly by 1911. An analysis of the effect of
rinderpest on cattle density, rather than absolute numbers, is even more
revealing: the number of cattle per hectare in the very large geographic
area of the northern and central districts fell by only a third between
1891 and 1904, while in the comparatively much smaller north-eastern
districts this figure was over 70 per cent, indicating just how hard hit
this part of the Colony was by the disease. That these losses were

FIGURE 3 The districts of the core of the Nama and Succulent Karoo divided
into four regions: north-western districts, northern and central districts, north-
eastern districts, and midland districts
driven by rinderpest and not drought is supported by the fact that

the north-western districts, which suffered an even worse period of
drought in the mid-1890s, show a loss of 53 per cent between 1891
and 1898 and a decline in density between 1891 and 1904 of only 12.5
per cent. Furthermore, this region reflected a significant increase by
1911. An analysis of sheep numbers shows a similar trend over 1891
to 1898, with the northern and central districts and those of the north-
east suffering losses of 57.3 per cent and 43.1 per cent respectively,
while over the same period the sheep population of the north-western
districts declined by only 22.9 per cent. A comparison of densities once
again offers more insight: it shows a decrease in the number of sheep
per hectare in the northern/central districts and the north-eastern
districts of almost 65 per cent and 59 per cent respectively between
1891 and 1904. Sheep proved more resilient to rinderpest than cattle
and, particularly in these two regions, numbers grew significantly fol-
lowing recovery from both this disease and drought.
The impact of rinderpest on wild ungulates is not so easily quantified.
The estimates of game numbers in the Colony provided by the
Agricultural Department and published by the Western Districts Game
Protection Association (WDGPA) (see Table 1) suggest a slight
decrease in numbers of key species occurring in the northern districts

TABLE 1 Population estimates of large wild game species occurring in the

Achterveld (back country), 1897–19081
of the Colony after July 1897. It is difficult, however, to draw any

firm conclusions from the impressionistic estimates provided by Civil
Commissioners, which do not, for the most part, differentiate between
districts. Indeed, although it was reported that some game, such as
common duiker Sylvicapra grimmia and grey rhebok Pelea capreolus
near East London (De Britstowner 13 October 1897) and eland,
kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros, red hartebeest, klipspringer Oreotragus
oreotragus, steenbok Raphicerus campestris and an ‘antelope’ at Rhodes’s
Groote Schuur Estate in Cape Town (De Britstowner 1 December
1897), had succumbed to rinderpest, it was admitted that ‘the amount
of loss from this cause cannot be accurately ascertained’ (Graaff Reinet
Advertiser 24 August 1898). Nonetheless the WDGPA warned that:
‘The effect of rinderpest on large game has been disastrous in several
tracts of country . . . . From the best information available it would
appear that kudu, eland and buffalo suffered most; but hartebeest, the
other antelope, were affected only to a slight extent’ (Pringle 1982:
69). This latter suggestion would seem to be supported by the fact
the Kalahari was reported to be ‘teeming with vast herds of gruisbok
[gemsbok], hartebeest, wildebeest and wild ostriches’ in 1899 (Anon
1899: 477–80) and that red hartebeest occurred in sufficient numbers
to trek out of the Kalahari to Upington towards the end of 1903.
Even a single blue wildebeest appeared at the same time (Victoria West
Messenger 16 October 1903; 4 December 1903).
Modern knowledge of the disease would indeed suggest that while
bovids, such as buffalo Syncerus caffer, tragelaphids, such as kudu, and
suids, such as warthog Phacochoerus africanus, were heavily impacted
1
Estimates for the respective years were published in the following sources: Graaff Reinet
Advertiser 5 August 1897, 24 August 1898, 7 September 1900; Courier 22 October 1908. The
increase in the number of ostriches in the Prince Albert district in the 1908 figures may have
been due to escape or release of once-domesticated birds (Courier 16 April 1903).

by rinderpest (Henning 1956: 840–1; Bengis et al. 2003: 360), other

species may not have suffered declines on the same dramatic scale.
The omission of springbok from any description in the colonial press
of the devastation of rinderpest on wild game suggests they were not
obviously devastated by the disease. In addition the persistence of
gemsbok in Kenhardt and the fact that the ostrich Struthio camelus
population, a species not known to be susceptible to rinderpest, showed
similar trends to those of gemsbok and red hartebeest would seem to
indicate that the rinderpest did not completely obliterate wild game
populations in the northern districts and that some other factor, such
as the protracted drought or illegal hunting during this period, is likely
to have been the primary driver of these fluctuations.
In addition, farmers’ inherent fear of the transmission of disease from
wild animals to livestock should also be borne in mind. This fear is
clearly evident in the northern districts of the Colony in the case of
another disease, scab, which was endemic in sheep and goats as well as
springbok. Springbok suffering from scab were blamed for the spread
of the disease (Victoria West Messenger, 26 October 1894) and the
restrictions placed on the movement of stock (but not on springbok)
under the Scab Act attacked (De Britstowner, 29 November 1895). A
springbok skin infected with scab was eventually sent to Hutcheon, the
Colonial Veterinary Surgeon for confirmation. He found that a different
species of sarcoptes mite was involved, however, and that, although
it might possibly affect non-fleeced animals such as the boer goat, its
transmission to sheep was very unlikely (De Graaff Reinetter, 16 August
1894; Anon 1895: 113–18).
The obsession with disease transmission between wild and
domesticated ungulates suggests that any hint of rinderpest in the
springbok herds would have sparked vigorous calls for their complete
extermination; at the very least, if the plague had affected springbok
numbers, this would have been noted. No mention whatsoever of
rinderpest affecting springbok appears in the contemporary press,
however.
Rinderpest, then, did penetrate the districts of the northern and
north-eastern Karoo and inevitably had a dramatic impact on stock
numbers. However, as can be seen in Figure 4 and in the discussion
that follows, the progression of the plague followed in the wake of the
springbok dispersal, and rinderpest and springbok treks did not at any
point coincide.
Over the course of 1896 the overwhelming bulk of the trekbokke had
concentrated in the Britstown district. The springbok had moved into
this area from the Kenhardt, Prieska and Victoria West districts in
January of that year and, aside from some movements back and forth
between Britstown and the neighbouring areas of Prieska and Victoria
West, stayed concentrated there until November and December, when
they dispersed westwards. January 1897 saw good concentrations in
Kenhardt, but March saw the beginnings of a movement east in Prieska
and then east and south east from there in April into both Britstown and
the vicinity of Van Wyk’s Vley in the northern parts of the Carnarvon

FIGURE 4 Comparison of timing of rinderpest and trekbokke in the northern

parts of the Cape Colony
district (Roche 2004: 136–48). By March rinderpest had been recorded

in the nearby district of Hopetown, but the disease was contained
there for some months and did not spread further west. The trekbokke,
meanwhile, did not penetrate as far as Hopetown during 1897. Indeed,
by May 1897 the springbok had moved west into the Kenhardt district
and from there seem to have dispersed both north and south, with no
further records of concentrations anywhere in the Karoo that year.
By contrast, it was only in September that year that rinderpest moved
into the districts of Britstown, Prieska and Victoria West (Courier 30
March 1897; Phoofolo 1993: 114), four months after the springbok
had dispersed from the former two districts and a full ten months after
they had left Victoria West. The movement of the disease westwards
was also several months behind that of the springbok, arriving as it
did in Kenhardt in October (Victoria West Messenger 1 October 1897;
8 October 1897), at least four months after the apparent dispersal of
springbok. In addition, the disease did not penetrate as far west as
Namaqualand or as far south as Fraserburg and Sutherland (Anon
1898b: 301–10).
It can safely be said, then, that rinderpest was not the primary cause
of the cessation of springbok treks, and that, although the possibility of a
limited role cannot be completely discounted, there is no contemporary

evidence to suggest this. Other potential causes of the demise of the

springbok treks therefore need to be examined.
‘THEY DROVE THE SPRINGBOKS AWAY’ – THE INCREASE IN LIVESTOCK AND

HUMAN POPULATIONS, 1865–1911
In 1867, in reply to a question as to whether illegal hunting had been

the cause of the demise of the great game herds of the Colony, the
Auditor General replied that this was not altogether the case and that:
‘When I first came out to the Colony in 1830, there were very few flocks
of sheep in the district I lived in; as the sheep increased they drove
the springboks away. The quantity of game has diminished quite as
much by the increase of sheep as by other causes’ (Cape of Good Hope
1867: 11).
This increase in livestock numbers in the Colony as a whole and
in the Karoo has been noted by a number of scholars (Christopher
1976: 55–86; Dean and MacDonald 1994: 281–98; Beinart 2003:
1–27), mostly with regard to its contribution to the Cape economy
and impact on grazing conditions and carrying capacities. The latter
theme in particular was already well developed by the end of the
nineteenth century. The Zwarte Ruggens Farmers’ Association, for
example, decried the replacement of the natural rotation system of
herds of wild game with overstocking, overgrazing, erosion, increased
stock mortality and lowered output. Their fear was that if this system
continued the Karoo would become ‘a region of emptiness, howling
and drear – Which man has abandoned from famine and fear’ (Graaff
Reinet Advertiser 2 February 1900). MacKenzie is another who has
noted the increase in livestock numbers and concomitant decrease in
game numbers in the Cape Colony (MacKenzie 1988: 92).
Contrary to contemporary opinion, however, springbok and sheep do
not under normal circumstances compete for the same food resources
in the Karoo (Davies and Skinner 1986a: 115–32; Davies and Skinner
1986b: 133–47; Davies, Botha and Skinner 1986: 165–76). It was not
direct competition between the two species, therefore, that pushed the
indigenous springbok back. Rather, disturbance and an increasingly
impoverished ecosystem, resulting from overstocking and overgrazing,
had this effect. Perhaps even more important was the settler farmer
perception of direct competition, and reaction to it through hunting and
driving springbok away, along with the steady settlement of previously
unoccupied land. The human advance moved in tandem with an
increase in sheep and other livestock numbers and it is useful, despite
some doubt in official statistics (Nell 1998), to track the increase in
numbers and densities of all these species over the period 1865 to 1911.
Figure 5 clearly shows an increase in livestock (cattle, sheep and
goats) numbers and densities in those parts of the Karoo historically
associated with springbok treks over the course of the final few decades
of the nineteenth century. Prior to the 1898 census a steady increase
in livestock is apparent across the rural districts of the Cape Colony.

FIGURE 5 Increase in livestock numbers and densities in districts historically

associated with springbok treks, 1865–19112
The census in 1898, however, revealed a dramatic and obvious decline

that can be attributed primarily to rinderpest. This general increase,
followed by the rinderpest effect, is even more marked when broken
down into the regions previously considered in discussing the impact
of rinderpest. The north-western districts, the northern and central
districts, and the north-eastern districts all showed an increase in cattle
numbers up until 1891, with this growth persisting only in the north-
western districts thereafter. Sheep numbers also showed consistent
growth across the board between 1865 and 1891, and post-rinderpest
growth continued to a limited degree in both the north-western and
northern and central districts. It is possible that the better-watered
north-eastern districts, having been the target of the earlier thrust of
commercial pastoral expansion, had already reached and even exceeded
their carrying capacity by 1891.
It is clear that, aside from the mortalities caused by rinderpest,
there was a general increase in both cattle and sheep numbers in
all the regions prior to the springbok trek of 1895–6. The general
2
Districts accounted for in Figure 5 include: Namaqualand; Van Rhynsdorp; Clanwilliam;
Calvinia; Sutherland; Fraserburg; Carnarvon; Kenhardt; Prieska; Beaufort West; Prince
Albert; Murraysburg; Graaff-Reinet; Cradock; Richmond; Britstown; Hanover; De Aar;
Philipstown; Middelburg; Hopetown; Colesberg; Victoria West. Cattle, sheep and goat
numbers comprise all species occurring (Cape of Good Hope (1866; 1876; 1892; 1898; 1905;
Union of South Africa 1912).

FIGURE 6 Cattle numbers and densities in the north-western districts,

northern and central districts, and north-eastern districts, 1865–19113
FIGURE 7 Sheep numbers and densities in the north-western districts,

northern and central districts, and north-eastern districts, 1865–19114
3
Cattle numbers given in Figure 6 comprise all breeds of cattle (Cape of Good Hope 1866;
Cape of Good Hope 1876, 1892, 1898, 1905; Union of South Africa 1912).
4
Sheep numbers given in Figure 7 comprise numbers of both woolled sheep and all other
species (Cape of Good Hope 1866, 1876, 1892, 1898, 1905; Union of South Africa 1912).

FIGURE 8 Densities of sheep per 1,000 hectares, 1891

upward trend in sheep numbers is most marked, with sustained

growth occurring in the north-western and northern and central
districts, notwithstanding the impact of the rinderpest, drought and
indiscriminate stock theft during the Anglo-Boer War (Constantine
1996: 20–44; 133–49; 165–75). These regions were essential to the
phenomenon of springbok treks, providing, as they did, the space for
population growth during favourable climatic conditions. The increase
in livestock numbers here cannot have boded well for the antelope and
its natural population fluctuations. Equally importantly, stock densities
remained highest in the north-eastern districts and continued to prevent
the overflow of trekbokke from the northern and central districts into this
area. Although, as can be seen from figures 8–10, sheep densities fell
slightly across the board between 1891 and 1904, the trend for greater
densities to persist in the eastern districts, and effectively exclude
trekbokke, continued.
The colonization of the Achterveld by both humans and livestock
was of course facilitated by the provision of water; an analysis of
the increase in boreholes and wells thus provides an insight into this
process. Figure 11 reflects the significant increase in artificial sources
of permanent water over the period 1891 to 1911. This development
was instrumental in enabling extensive and permanent pastoralism in
the previously seasonally utilized northern Cape Colony. Perhaps more
important than the increase in livestock numbers however, was the

FIGURE 11 Numbers and densities of wells (artesian and other) in the north-
western districts, northern and central districts, and north-eastern districts,
1891–1911 (Cape of Good Hope 1892; 1905; Union of South Africa 1912)
associated growth in the human population, and more specifically that

of white settlers (see Figure 12).
Settlers brought with them their own need for protein. Wild game,
such as springbok, provided an important part of this, with domestic
stock such as woolled sheep being preserved for the value of their
wool on the market rather than consumed for sustenance. Even more
importantly springbok, especially the trekbokke, did massive damage
with their myriad hooves to the pasture and gardens maintained by
farmers. Even when the veld was not trampled to dust by the passage
of large herds of springbok, it was said that sheep would not graze
where the antelope had cropped the grass (Courier 12 August 1880).
This damage, both real and imagined, encouraged the indiscriminate
slaughter of springbok. Stockenstrom, in 1824, had identified the
arid areas of the northern and central districts, and the absence
of a permanent settler presence, as the key to the springbok treks
(Hutton 1887: 37–9). With this refuge increasingly penetrated and
ultimately lost to settlement and livestock, the Karoo springbok treks
were seriously imperilled.
‘SECURING HIS ACRES’: THE EFFECTS OF FENCING
Another innovation brought by settlers to the springbok range was

fencing. This development was integral to both control and ownership
of the landscape (van Sittert 2002) and in one case the process of
fencing or enclosure was described as a farmer ‘securing his acres’

FIGURE 12 Numbers and densities of white settlers compared with total

population in the north-western districts, northern and central districts, and
north-eastern districts, 1865–1911 (Cape of Good Hope 1866, 1876, 1892,
1898, 1905; Union of South Africa 1912)
(Victoria West Messenger 4 October 1880). As early as 1880 the Victoria

West Messenger argued for wide-scale fencing of farms to protect both
stock and grazing against the invasion of springbok herds (Victoria
West Messenger 4 October 1880) and it is clear that as wire fencing
spread it proved effective against invasion by trekbokke. Springbok
did occasionally damage and tear down small stretches of fence (De
Britstowner 10 April 1896; Cronwright-Schreiner 1899: 45; Green
1955: 39) but the confidence with which the Colesberg Advertiser could
refute claims of a trek in the area in 1893 by citing the fact that the
whole country was ‘traversed by a network of wire fences’ (Colesberg
Advertiser 21 July 1893) suggests that this generally proved an efficient
method of exclusion. The fact that in 1893 only about 17 per cent of
the Colesberg district was enclosed indicates the extent to which even
limited enclosure effectively curtailed springbok movements.
Similarly, in Graaff-Reinet the initial decline in springbok numbers in
the 1850s was blamed on fencing and the end of the age of the trekbokke
locally was widely ascribed to enclosure. Ironically, however, this
fencing process was driven by the economic boom in ostrich feathers,
which also allowed the recovery of the local springbok population
because landowners ‘jealously protected’ their encamped populations
of trekbokke in order to allow hunts with family, friends and neighbours
(Roche 2003: 86–108). This transformation in the nature of springbok
populations from nomadic to sedentary was an irrevocable one that was
to follow in the wake of fencing’s advance across the Colony.

FIGURE 13 The increase in fencing (hectares) and the extent (%) of the
country enclosed in the north-western districts, the northern and central
districts, the north-eastern districts, and the midland districts, 1891–1911
(Cape of Good Hope 1866, 1876, 1892, 1898, 1905; Union of South Africa
1912)
Fencing was initially most concentrated in the midland divisions

of the Cape Colony (van Sittert 2002), where long-established and
settled districts such as Graaff-Reinet (78 per cent), Cradock (79 per
cent) and Colesberg (90 per cent) were almost completely enclosed
by 1911. Districts such as Middelburg (75 per cent), Philipstown (72
per cent) and Hope Town (82 per cent) were not far behind, and in
some cases even overtook their predecessors. The more remote and less
densely populated districts such as Namaqualand and Kenhardt were
much slower to follow: both were still less than 1 per cent enclosed by
1911. The proclamation of the Fencing Act (No. 30 1883) spread the
practice steadily across the Karoo and, as can be seen in figures 13–
16, fencing flourished first in the older, more densely settled eastern
districts, only spreading very gradually into the lower-rainfall districts
of the interior where population densities were lower, farms larger and
farming methods more extensive.
While the eastern districts were increasingly covered with a ‘network
of wire fences’ that, despite not enclosing all available land, effectively
prevented the invasion of trekbokke into these better-watered areas, the
Achterveld remained relatively unenclosed. Between 1904 and 1911,
however, key districts such as Calvinia, Fraserburg and Carnarvon
increased the area fenced by 54 per cent, 61 per cent and 68 per cent
respectively. Ultimately, between 1891 and 1911, ‘the fertile brain and
inventive power of man’ invoked by the Victoria West Messenger in
1880 (Victoria West Messenger 4 October 1880) had triumphed and the

FIGURE 14 Extent of enclosure, 1891

‘gigantic scheme’ of fencing the perimeter of every farm began to gain

momentum.
Skinner’s original contention (1993) that fencing began only twenty
years after treks had already ceased is patently incorrect. Instead the
opportunistic movement of springbok in response to rain, integral to
both population fluctuations and treks, was significantly curtailed. The
trek overflow areas of the better-watered eastern Karoo districts were
the first to be enclosed by a moving wire fencing front advancing
gradually westward. The increasing fencing out of springbok from the
districts of Hopetown, Philipstown, De Aar, Hanover and Colesberg
by the mid-1890s resulted in the build-up and concentration of trekbok
numbers in the unenclosed triangle between the towns of Britstown,
Vosburg and Victoria West in 1896. Exacerbating this cul-de-sac was
the effect of drought in the districts to the north, south and west,
suggesting that the natural mortality of the 1896 trek was considerably
higher than in earlier, more dispersed, mass movements.
‘DE KLACHT VAN DEN DAG IS DER VERSCHRIKKELYKE DROOGTE’ – THE TWIN
EFFECTS OF DROUGHT AND HUNTING, 1895–1908
Perhaps the most important impact on the 1896/7 trek was hunting.
The unnatural concentration of springbok in the Britstown-Vosburg-
Victoria West triangle allowed for a more focused and sustained

FIGURE 17 Percentage variation of annual rainfall in the Achterveld, 1889–

19085
exploitation, and ultimately decimation, of the trekbokke. Whereas

earlier ‘mega-treks’ such as those of 1861–2, 1872–3, 1877–8 and
1880 had followed the same pattern and build-up as that of 1896–7,
their movements were far less restricted. The result of this was that
concentrations were not as marked or as prolonged, and the human-
induced impact on mortality therefore significantly less, permitting the
natural ‘boom and bust’ springbok population cycle to continue in
subsequent years (Roche 2004: 72–109).
The effects of both prolonged hunting and drought on the 1896/7
trek (Roche 2004: 110–54) produced an unprecedented mortality of
trekbokke. The continuing drought of 1897 and 1898 only exacerbated
the initial impact and ensured that there was no immediate recovery in
the population. Rather, instead of an expected wet cycle, the wet years
of 1899–1901 gave way to a decade that, with the exception of 1907,
was significantly drier than even the mid-1890s (see Figure 17). With
the exception of a few districts in 1904 and 1907, for example, rainfall
received across the Karoo during this period was dramatically below
average and in harsh contrast to the above average years 1889 to 1895
and 1899 to 1901.
In Upington during 1903 ‘de klacht van den dag [was] der
verschrikkelyke droogte’ (Victoria West Messenger 16 October 1903) (‘the
complaint of the day was the terrible drought’) and the same was true of
most of the districts south of the Orange River. Complaints of drought
in districts such as Kenhardt and Prieska filled the local press (see,
for example: Victoria West Messenger 24 February 1905; Cape Archives
Depot 1902–3) and in Beaufort West the proverbial ‘oldest farmers
in the district’ held that it was ‘by far the severest drought that has
been known here’ (Courier 26 March 1903). By July 1903 Kenhardt

was described as devoid of people or stock, the inhabitants having

trekked north of the Orange River in search of pasture (Courier 23 July
1903). By year’s end it was accepted that the districts worst affected
were Fraserburg, Carnarvon, Victoria West and Beaufort West (Courier
19 November 1903). Public prayers for rain were held in Beaufort
West in early 1904 (Courier 7 January 1904) and although the drought
conditions in the interior lifted somewhat during 1904 and 1905 (see
Figure 17), as a result of exhausted local grazing the trekboere (migrating
farmers) of the Fraserburg district were said to ‘rond maal soo’s spring-
bokke, en weet ni waarheen ni’ (Victoria West Messenger 24 February
1905) (‘mill around like springbok and not know what direction to go
in’). Even in the regions of much higher rainfall such as Graaff-Reinet,
the drought took its toll, and as a result even the local springbok, which
were known as a species to be more drought-resistant that domestic
stock, were ‘so ma’er [thin] that they die easily from fright’ (Victoria
West Messenger 20 May 1905) and hundreds reportedly perished during
the drought (Graaff Reinet Advertiser 28 June 1905). By 1908 the
persistent drought led to widespread speculation that ‘South Africa
[was] becoming parched up’ due to the ‘decreasing African rainfall’
(Victoria West Messenger 6 February 1908; 13 August 1908).
This extended drought precluded a recovery in springbok numbers, a
fact borne out by the complete lack of reported treks during this period.
Hunting continued, of course. This was not on the scale of 1896, but
in the Achterveld surviving springbok were still regarded as vermin and
a threat to what was essentially a marginal agrarian economy under
massive pressure from drought (Victoria West Messenger 5 July 1906).
In addition to hunting organized either for sport or for vermin
extermination, springbok were also important as a source of protein
during both the 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer War (see Figure 18). Aside
from farmers embattled by the drought and forced to rely on
wild sources of protein such as springbok, Boer guerrillas operated
throughout the districts discussed here and themselves relied to a
large extent on what the veld could provide in the way of sustenance
(Constantine 1996: 20–44; 133–49; 165–75).
In Victoria West during 1903, to the great relief of the population,
the Game Law Amendment Act (No. 36 of 1886) was suspended, ‘not
so much to serve sportsmen, but to enable the poorer class to eke
out their meagre food supply with game’ (Victoria West Messenger 18
December 1903). The similar importance of springbok to households in
the Kenhardt district was noted the following year by a correspondent
of the Victoria West Messenger (18 November 1904), and even ostrich,
during the open season, were hunted for biltong and to protect the
pasture (Victoria West Messenger 27 September 1906). Kimberley,
although beyond the range of the trekbokke and a substantially larger
5
Annual rainfall figures are taken from Meteorological Commission data published in the
Statistical Register of the Cape of Good Hope. Average rainfall figures are obtained from
Union of South Africa 1927.

FIGURE 18 ‘Group of Boers beside a trestle table loaded with Springbok

carcasses.’ (Cape Archives Depot: AG 2221)
town than those within the Achterveld, serves as a vivid example of the
importance of ‘game’ to sustenance during this time. Accounts of life
on the diamond fields record how an industry developed to meet the
demand of the diggings for meat, ‘many men [spending] their morning
in the veld, shooting whatever they came across, and trekking towards
the diggings in the afternoon to sell what they shot on the early morning
market’ (McNish 1968: 261–2) and there is no doubt that this parallel
‘extractive industry’ was both burgeoning and profitable. In the 1904
hunting season, for example, 12,975 ‘head of game’, realizing £2,752,
were sold on the Kimberley market. In 1905 this figure was 29,119
at £4,667, and in 1906, 40,933 at £4,829. Springbok were not the
only target of market hunting, however, and in 1906 the composition
of the trade was: Springbok 4,025; Duiker 174; Steenbok 1,415;
Hares 5,131; Korhaan 3,565; Redwing Francolin 2,957; Guineafowl
818; Bustards 59; Wild Duck 130; Geese 33; small birds 22,626
(Horsbrugh 1912: 26).
In short, the twin effects of drought and hunting first ensured
abnormal mortality during the 1895–6 trek and then, together with
a range steadily shrunken by fencing and expanding permanent
settlement and agriculture, effectively prevented any recovery in the
population over the ensuing decade, thus accounting for the mass
mortality that precipitated the disappearance of springbok treks and
which previously has been ascribed to rinderpest.

CONCLUSIONS
That springbok treks in the Karoo ended with the 1896–7 trek is
obvious and indisputable. A modern ecological understanding of the
cyclical and nomadic pattern of these treks helps to make it equally clear
that the replacement of this phenomenon with sedentary small stock
farming has had a dramatic impact on the ecological state of the Karoo.
Previously the abrupt end of the springbok treks has been attributed
directly to the rinderpest epidemic that swept through southern Africa
at roughly the same time. It is apparent, however, that the closeness
in time of the two events is purely coincidental and that rinderpest
had little or no influence on the Karoo springbok population and the
trekbok phenomenon. This is clear for a number of reasons. First, the
two events did not coincide exactly, with at least four months between
the dispersal of the trekbokke and the arrival of rinderpest in any of
the Karoo districts affected in 1897. Second, the spatial overlap of
the trekbok movements in 1897 and the path of infection taken by
rinderpest is not convincing. Third, given that colonial farmers were
obsessive about disease in their stock and the role wild game played
as a reservoir and transmitter of such disease, the fact that there is no
contemporary report of rinderpest in springbok (in most cases the only
large wild mammal surviving in any appreciable number) is persuasive
evidence that springbok did not in fact suffer dramatic impact from the
disease, if indeed it affected the population at all.
It is important, however, to discern the causes of the obvious
demise of the trekbok phenomenon in such an abrupt and absolute
fashion. First, it is clear that the advent of widespread settlement of
the Karoo during the last quarter of the nineteenth century exerted
considerable pressure on natural resources, including local extinctions
of large mammal species and subspecies. Increasing enclosure through
wire fencing, the establishment of villages, towns and permanent farm
settlements, and the growing human and livestock population densities
began the process of circumscribing springbok treks. Increased
competition for space, the introduction of a new super predator in
the form of colonial man and his firearms, the need for protein in a
growing human population and the perception amongst farmers that
springbok and livestock competed for forage drove a decline in the
overall springbok population.
Crowding out of the springbok was gradual at first, but increasingly
access of the trekbokke from the Achterveld to the higher-rainfall
districts of the eastern Karoo was restricted. Initially this resulted
in ever more concentrated treks as springbok were forced to gather
in bottlenecks of good unenclosed grazing surrounded by established
farmland and towns. The process had been noted by Scully in
explaining the destructive impact of the 1892 trek in Namaqualand:
‘as the area over which the bucks range becomes more and more
circumscribed, the trek, although the numbers of bucks is rapidly
diminishing, becomes more and more destructive owing to its greater
concentration’ (Scully 1898: 104–5). The highly concentrated nature

of the springbok treks combined with dramatically increased resident

human populations and the infrastructure in the form of rail links
meant that springbok mortality was enormous, with large numbers
being commercially harvested and others shot for sport. This increasing
mortality culminated in 1896 when the trekbokke spent the bulk of
the year focused on the area around Vosburg – a cul-de-sac caused
by colonial expansion (a significant aspect of which was fencing) and
drought, and which resulted in an unusually concentrated, sustained
and severe impact on pasture. Abnormal mortalities followed, and,
combined with the devastating impacts of equally unprecedented
hunting, effectively reduced the trekbokke to numbers below a
population threshold from which early recovery was possible.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the unprecedented number of
springbok killed during this time, enabled by the factors described
above, dealt a mortal blow to the overall springbok population of the
Karoo and thus the ability of this population to recover.
While hunting might have been the proximate cause of the demise of
the springbok treks, recovery of the overall springbok population and
the re-establishment of the trek phenomenon in the decade after 1897
was prevented by ever-increasing enclosure, a severe and prolonged
drought and continued hunting of the surviving springbok. Hence, not
only was the overall springbok population decimated but the conditions
essential for the maintenance of treks were destroyed, thus ensuring the
extinction of a unique phenomenon.
Skinner and Louw’s conclusion that rinderpest was the main cause
of the demise of the springbok treks is thus clearly wrong, the disease
playing little or no role in the 1896–7 trek or in springbok mortality
in the years thereafter. In much the same way as an amalgam of
environmental and anthropogenic factors are considered to have caused
the destruction of the bison (Isenberg 2000: 123–63), the end of
springbok treks in the Karoo can instead be attributed to a complex
combination of factors including the increase in livestock and human
populations, the spread of fencing and increasing enclosure, drought
and hunting. The combined effect of all these factors ensured that the
conditions necessary to sustain cyclical springbok treks in the Karoo
were completely eroded and the advent of the Game Law Amendment
Act No. 11 in August 1908, for all its good intentions to include the
trekbokke as ‘game’, was a clear case of closing the stable door after the
horse had bolted.
The impact of the disappearance of springbok treks and replacement
thereof with livestock and human settlement must be seen from two
perspectives. In the first case the trekbokke ceased to exist because the
ecosystem and conditions needed to sustain such enormous population
growth and movement ceased to exist. In the second case the removal
from the ecosystem of such an important component must have had
far-reaching consequences which at this stage are unfathomable. Both
perspectives hint at the massive anthropogenic impact on the Karoo.
The replacement of a system of irruption and nomadism adapted to
Karoo fluctuations with a static and artificially manipulated one that

sought to overcome Karoo ecological cycles, rather than to respond to

them, has resulted in the continuing degradation of Karoo pasture.
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ABSTRACT
The demise of springbok treks, the irruptive migration patterns of the species
in South Africa’s Karoo region, has long been attributed to the rinderpest
epizootic understood to have coincided in both time and space with the last of
the great springbok treks. This is incorrect. Instead the cessation of springbok
treks can be attributed to a variety of anthropogenic factors. This article first
examines and then rejects the case for rinderpest, before introducing alternative
causal factors such as the increase in livestock and human populations, the
effects of fencing and the double impact of hunting and concomitant drought.
These factors, it is argued, acted in concert to effectively remove the conditions
necessary for springbok treks and thereby end the phenomenon. It is suggested
that the local extinction of this phenomenon – a keystone species and process –
is an important and heretofore unconsidered element in the decline of the
Karoo ecosystem.
RÉSUMÉ
On attribue depuis longtemps la disparition de la migration irruptive du

springbok dans la région sud-africaine du Karoo à l’épizootie de peste bovine

qui semble avoir coïncidé, temporellement et géographiquement, avec les

dernières grandes migrations du springbok. C’est faux. En effet, on peut
attribuer la fin de la migration du springbok à divers facteurs anthropogéniques.
Cet article commence par examiner puis par rejeter l’argument de la
peste bovine, avant de s’intéresser à d’autres facteurs causaux comme
l’accroissement de la population humaine et du bétail, les conséquences des
clôtures et le double impact de la chasse et de la sécheresse concomitante.
Il soutient que ces facteurs ont agi de concert pour supprimer efficacement
les conditions nécessaires à la migration du springbok et donc mettre fin à ce
phénomène. L’article suggère que la disparition locale de ce phénomène (une
espèce et un processus clés) est un élément important et jusqu’à présent négligé
du déclin de l’écosystème du Karoo.

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Roche, C. 2008. The Fertile Brain and Inventive Power of Man

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‘The Fertile Brain and Inventive Power of Man’: Anthropogenic Factors in

Africa / Volume 78 / Issue 02 / May 2008, pp 157 - 188

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‘THE FERTILE BRAIN AND INVENTIVE POWER

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KAROO CORNERSTONE: THE ROLE OF SPRINGBOK IN AN ARID ECOSYSTEM

The broader Karoo is in fact comprised of two distinct biomes, the

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characteristic species such as black wildebeest Connochaetes gnou, red

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trek phenomenon was inevitably disruptive of attempts at organized

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the replacement of the Karoo’s fundamental, and essential, boom and

As a number of authors have noted, 1896–7 witnessed the last ‘mega-

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therefore remain based on intuitive logic, not empirical evidence, and

‘THE FEARFUL PEST’: THE SPREAD AND IMPACT OF RINDERPEST IN

Rinderpest, endemic in Europe and Asia, reached northern Africa in

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FIGURE 2 The spread of rinderpest in central southern Africa by January

and the Cape, as well as its impact on livestock in border districts

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1896). By September it had reached Herbert on the northern bank of

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237–43). There was a risk of reintroduction from Gordonia where it

Ja als er ooit iets belangryks was om opgestekend te worden in de geschiednis van

As will be seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the impact of rinderpest on

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driven by rinderpest and not drought is supported by the fact that

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TABLE 1 Population estimates of large wild game species occurring in the

of the Colony after July 1897. It is difficult, however, to draw any

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by rinderpest (Henning 1956: 840–1; Bengis et al. 2003: 360), other

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FIGURE 4 Comparison of timing of rinderpest and trekbokke in the northern

district (Roche 2004: 136–48). By March rinderpest had been recorded

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evidence to suggest this. Other potential causes of the demise of the

‘THEY DROVE THE SPRINGBOKS AWAY’ – THE INCREASE IN LIVESTOCK AND

In 1867, in reply to a question as to whether illegal hunting had been

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FIGURE 5 Increase in livestock numbers and densities in districts historically

The census in 1898, however, revealed a dramatic and obvious decline

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FIGURE 6 Cattle numbers and densities in the north-western districts,

FIGURE 7 Sheep numbers and densities in the north-western districts,

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FIGURE 8 Densities of sheep per 1,000 hectares, 1891

FIGURE 9 Densities of sheep per 1,000 hectares, 1904

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FIGURE 10 Densities of sheep per 1,000 hectares, 1911

upward trend in sheep numbers is most marked, with sustained

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associated growth in the human population, and more specifically that

‘SECURING HIS ACRES’: THE EFFECTS OF FENCING

Another innovation brought by settlers to the springbok range was