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37. Tobias vs.

Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)


Facts: Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46
thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one
bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects,
namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the
division of the congressional district of San Juan Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.

Answer: No.
Law: The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one
representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.

Application: The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a


subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.
Conclusion: Therfore, RA 7675 is constitutional.
38. Guingona vs. Caraque, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)
FACTS: In the 1990 National Budget, P86 Billion is appropriated (through automatic
appropriation) for debt service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the
Department of Education.
Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution provides: “(5) The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.”
Senators Guingona and Pimentel went to the SC to declare such appropriation
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation of P86 billion for debt service vis-a-vis only
27 billion for education violates Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution.

ANSWER: No

LAW: Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution provides: “(5) The State shall assign the
highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.”

APPLICATION: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education” in order to “insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share
of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. As aptly
observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according
highest priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is
certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of
which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of
honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake

CONCLUSION: Therefore, the appropriation made is constitutional.


39. Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS: The President signed the GAA of 1994 with certain conditions manifest in his
Presidential Veto Message. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, now seek judicial
intervention to rule on the constitutionality of the presidential vetoes. The Solicitor
General argues that the other petitions seek a remedy political, in effect saying the
petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing to sue.

ISSUE: Do the petitioners senators have legal standing to sue?

ANSWER: Yes

LAW: Under the constitution a member of Congress has the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential veto or condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess
of authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of impermissible
intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises. An act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress.

APPLICATION: In this case the petitioners as stated by the constitution has the legal
standing to sue.

Conclusion: Therefore, the actions of the petitioners are deemed constitutional.


40. Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: Petitioner Tolentino, filed a certiorari for the court to reconsider the decision
dismissing the petitions totalling of ten suits filed for the declaration of R.A. No.
7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law's unconstitutionality.
As per him, R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by the Constitution as it was a version proposed by the
Senate; The petitioner argued that the Bill must retain the essence of H. No. 11197
to comply with the constitution. Furthermore, Although H. No. 11197 was indeed
filed in the House of Representatives and has passed three readings therein. It was
sent to the Senate and was approved on May 24, 1994 as S. No. 1630 after passing
only for the first reading in a day, not complying to the constitution by having to pass
"three readings on separate days" due
ISSUE: W/N R.A. No. 7716 violated Article VI, Section 24 and 26 (2) of the Philippine
Constitution.
ANSWER: No
LAW: SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

APPLICATION: The Petitioners' error is that they have assume that the S. No. 1630 is
an independent bill. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as the Senate could not have made and enacted S. No. 1630 without
H. No. 11197. On March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630. The
President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment on June 1,
1993. Together with other bills, it was later substituted by H. No. 11197 hence S. No.
1630 was also certified for immediate enactment. For this, the members of the
Senate believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630 in
order to respond to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third
readings on the same day
Conclusion: Therefore, the enactment of R.A 7716 was constitutional.

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