ACQUIRED AND INFUSED VIRTUE ACCORDING TO

THOMAS AQUINAS.

Onyenuru Okechukwu. P. (OP).

Student of Domincan Institute, Samanda, Ibadan, Nigeria.

An unpublished work written March, 2013. pauloke24@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION
The overall description of a person is nothing other than with respect to their actions. A

person is has positive personality if she/he act in a manner that is acceptable by the group

in which they belong, and a negative one if their actions attract reproach, criticism or

scorn. However it is not considered without consistency in action. A person is called

virtuous or vicious when there is a consistency of good or bad actions respectively.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of morality includes a description of human acts

considering various factors broadly divided into nature, nurture and the transcendental

disposition to situation. In this his work I will focus on causes of virtue as treated by

Aquinas in his “Disputed Questions on Virtues in General,” with a intention of retrieving

his views on the two classes of virtue. Beginning with general definitions of virtue, we

shall proceed to expose his position on whether virtues are natural to man, or extrinsic to

him, and then briefly explore his opinion on the relationship between these virtues with

regards to their beginnings.

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF VIRTUE

It is said that the end of a thing is that by which the thing is considered, and that end is

achieved by means of a power. But also the finality of power is act, and a power is
perfect if its act is perfect.1 Consistency in using a power to perform an act which leads to

a good end is known as a virtue. Virtue is that which thus, perfects a power with respect

to a perfect end.2

Characteristically, virtue is a good quality of the mind because it perfects whatever it

encounters. It is an operative habit because human acts which it perfects find their

operative root in the soul. Virtue is not a power, but a habit, a good habit at that. With

respect to perfection of an act, two requirements must be met. First, that the act be right,

and that the habit not be that principle of the contrary of the act.3 Therefore, virtue is

never the principle of anything bad because it perfects, contrary to the imperfections that

reside in evil or the bad acts.

With respect to perfection of virtue on the subject, Aquinas considers three things:4

I. The subject: Good or evil can be predicated of rational things, and never of non-

rational things. Virtue as habit is predicated of them because there lies in them the

power to choose as potency proceeds to actuality. Aquinas distinguishes three

kinds of powers in this regard. He says “for some powers only act, others are only

acted upon or moved, yet others are both acted upon and act in others.”5Divine

powers, natural powers and agent powers belong to the first group and their acts

cannot be called habit because the actuality of their actions resides in its potency.

In the second category the power to act is not in the subject but still resides in the

agent causing the change such that the subject is like an automaton. Such things

1
Cf. Thomas Aquinas,Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q.55 a.1.
2
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 2
3
Thomas Aquinas,Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 2
4
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 2
5
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 1

1
 include non-rational things and their actions cannot be referred to as a virtue.

Only in the third group do we talk of virtue as habit and here rational things fit in.

Thus virtue as habit is found in, and perfects human beings.

II. The Intellect: The intellect is the seat of knowledge and a key support to the

will, the seat of choosing. In choosing that which is right, virtue perfects the

intellect.

III. The Quality: Virtue resides as a habit in a person not as a passion. Unlike passion

which is inclined to good or evil, virtue is directed only to the good. Thus, virtue

can be acquired only as a habit.

For Aquinas, virtue as a habit is of great importance to rational creatures since it enables

them to act uniformly and consistently towards a particular event. Due to the fact that

virtues condition the operative powers to act in a certain manner, it will be difficult to

alter it unless some other habitual inclination replaces it. This very attribute of virtue

makes good acts easy to come by in a person. Also being that good acts are pleasant and

delightful, virtue is delightful and ensures a fulfilled life.6

It is pertinent to that virtues are not formed by a single act, but by continuous

performance of the act, because “..the active power of reason cannot in one sweep

overcome the appetitive powers.” 7

CLASSES OF VIRTUE

The role of virtue in bringing about the good in man is not commonly disputed, but its

very source is one of great debate. Some philosophers hold that virtue is inborn or natural

6
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 1
7
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q.51 a.3.

2
to man. Some posit that man lacks what it takes as a being to generate any good, so

virtue, which is aimed at the good, is extrinsic to his very nature. The rest of them hold a

middle ground, by which virtues are partly from man and partly extrinsic to him.

Aquinas holds onto the third view which seems best as it is a middle way between the

two extremes. He explains it in a quite fascinating manner. Aquinas says that virtue is not

“partly from nature because some part of it is from nature and another not, but because it

is from nature according to an imperfect way of being, namely, according to potency and

aptitude.”8 This is the most preferred position because it does not take away the power of

natural agents. In fact it preserves man’s natural will and inclination to acquire virtue and

science by exercise and study.9

Following this criterion, Aquinas categorizes virtue into two- Acquired Virtues and

Infused Virtues.

Acquired Virtue.

Acquired virtues are those virtues that are inborn, congenital and natural to man. Our

aptitude for these virtues is partly due to the fact that all men have them in relation to

their nature of species, and partly due to the individual’s inclination to being virtuous.

Aptitude according to the former is universal and in both active and passive potency

which drives man to his temporal end. On the other hand, aptitude according to the latter

8
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8
9
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8

3
is particular and drives the person to his/her personal goal. For this reason, some persons

more inclined to certain good acts than others.10

Nevertheless, it behooves on reason to set the benchmark or mean for these virtues that

reside in the intellect, will and lower appetitive parts (Irascible and Concupiscible), so

that by habitual exercise of the acts in conformity with the dictates of reason, one may

not err, but acquire virtue.

Aquinas makes it clear that the beginnings of these virtues reside in man, but as stated

earlier, the virtues are caused by constant exercise of the beginnings. That is why they are

regarded as acquired since we acquire them by constant practice. 11 The virtues in the

higher part (intellect and will) are not formed in the same ways as those of the lower

appetitive part. Those of the higher part are not determinate because there is always an

assimilation of the action to what is already known. Some subtle checks and balances are

performed before an action is taken. But in the lower part there is a determinate response

to particular situations according to the virtue in question.12

The nexus between these two groups of acquired virtues is such

“that the beginning of virtue in the higher part is ordered to the virtue of
the lower part, just as a man is made apt for the virtue that is in the will by
the beginning of virtue that is in the will, and by that which is in intellect.
But the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible [is brought to
consummation] by the beginnings of virtue in them, and by that which is in
the higher, but not vice versa.”13
Aquinas goes on to differentiate the acquired virtues into two broad groups.

10
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8
11
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8
12
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 9
13
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8

4
1. Intellectual Virtues:

These virtues, he says, perfect the cognitive part of the soul in knowing and enquiring the

good. They pertain to the ultimate good in accordance with man as a temporal being.

Intellectual virtues reside in the different powers of the intellect. They are:14

I. Understanding by which knowledge of self-evident truth and first principles are

gained.

II. Science by which knowledge of necessary things are gained by inference.

III. Prudence by which knowledge of contingent things pertaining to our operation is

gained in order to safe guard one’s interest. Passion is able to vitiate this

knowledge, so prudence is needed to guard against misuse of inclinations and

desires.

IV. Wisdom by which we are able to apply our reason concretely to order our life.

Moral Virtues:

Moral virtues have their beginnings in the appetitive powers, and like other virtues,

perfect the appetitive part. They perfect the good in accordance with the specific end of

the individual man. Moral virtues are:15

I. Temperance by which man holds back or refrains from his passions when

they tend to go contrary “to reason by modes of inciting to action of

pursuit.”16

14
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 12
15
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8
16
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi Art. 8

5
 II. Justice by which man in his dealings with external things make sure that these

things receive fitting proportion, in so far as they pertain to the sharing of

human life in accordance with good reason.

III. Courage by which man in dealing with the passions of fear impeding the

reason’s instruction to sustain position, remains steadfast.

Infused Virtues

Aquinas continues that “a man’s good in so far as he is a citizen, is ordered in all things

in accordance to that city.”17 So that the virtues that are natural to man are to order him

towards actualizing his end in the earthly city not beyond. But

“.. man is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but is also a participant in
the heavenly city of Jerusalem whose ruler is the Lord and whose citizens
are the angels and all the saints, whether they reign in glory and are at
rest in the heaven or are still pilgrims on earth…”18

Thus the good which man seeks beyond the earthly city exceeds his nature, although it is

there as passive. But we know that “what is passive must acquire perfection from the

agent differently according to the diversity of the agent’s power.”19 In view of this, it is

necessary for man to be fortified with virtues extrinsic to him. These virtues are called

infused for this reason, and also referred to as supernatural virtues because they are given

by the Supreme Being-God.Aquinas lists them as Faith, Hope and Charity and about

them he says:

17
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi,Art. 9
18
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 9
19
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 10

6
 “Therefore, in order that a man might perform actions ordered to the end
of eternal life, there is divinely infused in him first grace, by which the
soul has a kind of spiritual existence, and then faith, hope, and charity, so
that by faith the intellect is illumined by certain things known
supernaturally, which are in this order as the principles naturally known
in the order of connatural activities, and by hope and charity the will
acquires a certain inclination to that supernatural good to which the
human will is insufficiently ordered by its natural inclination.”20

RELATIONSHIP AMONGST THE VIRTUES

We can rightly infer from the above points that Aquinas identifies two ends for man: a

temporal end and a supernatural end. These ends are intertwined just as the soul and body

are. Thus man’s quest for a good temporal end is not removed from his quest for a

supernatural end, even if he is unaware of the latter. The acquired virtues that perfect his

activity towards a temporal end help in actualizing the good as made possible by infused

virtues. Consequently, all virtues in man namely intellectual, moral, and supernatural

work seamlessly to perfect man towards his ultimate end - Citizenship of the Heavenly

Jerusalem.

However, while acquired virtues can be strengthened or intensified by act, infused virtues

cannot be increased by act rather,

“Our actions dispose to the increase of charity and the infused virtues, in
the way that charity is obtained from the outset. A man who does what it is
in his power prepares himself so that he might receive charity from God.
Furthermore, our acts can merit an increase of charity, insofar as they
presuppose charity which is the principle of meriting.”21
Thus God alone has the power to increase infused virtues in us.

20
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 10
21
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi, Art. 11

7
Finally, in the afterlife, all acquired virtues remain in the soul as regards their formal

elements (as residing in the reason).22 On the other hand, not all infused virtues survive

decay of the flesh. Hope and faith contain in them some imperfections and so are

dispelled because what is hoped for and believed is now beheld.23 But charity remains

for:

“Charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since
it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or
not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but
remains identically the same.”24

CONCLUSION

This piece has tried to expose the view of Aquinas on the source of virtue in man.

Aquinas posits that virtue is a perfection of an act, a quality of the soul formed by habit

which perfects all things that come its way from potency to actuality. Some virtues are in

us with regards to our nature of species with which we arrive at our temporal end, and are

so-called acquired virtues. Other virtues, extrinsic to human nature, are to order us

towards our ultimate end and they are so-called Infused virtues.

Infused virtues, given and increased by God, work in harmony with the acquired virtues

which are products of nature and both must be nurtured to ensure that the individual

reaches the desired and destined supernatural goal of the beatific vision.

22
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q.67 a.1.
23
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q.67 a.3.
24
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q.67 a.4.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, Thomas. “Questiones Disputatae De Virtuitibus in Communi” in Disputed

Questions on Virtue. Transl. by Ralph McInerny. Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae QQ. 55-67. Benziger Bros

edition. London: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1947.

Aristotle, Nichomechian Ethics. Transl. by Hippocrates G. A. Apostle and Lloyd P.

Gerson. Iowa: Peripatetic Press, 1982.