REPUBLIC ACT No. 10951
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815,
Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code"
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000), and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000); but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
"2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed
Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million
two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed
Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following means:
"1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
"(a) altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the offender shall
deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral
or illegal consideration.
"(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
"(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing
any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any third
person.
"2.
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
"(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.
"(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) clays from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prime facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
"Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:
"1st The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount of fraud is over
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight
hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.
"2nd. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000).
"3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four
hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
"4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
"5th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000).
"3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
"(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
"(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
"(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers."
1

G.R. Nos. 59568-76 January 11, 1990
PETER NIERRAS, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in
their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City
Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents.
Victor C. Veloso for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the resolution dated
September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385,
4386 and 4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to
quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were
already included in Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, pending before the lower court. In both sets of criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases,
petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to
quash, which was denied by respondent Judge ruling as follows:
The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied. Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor
of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter delivered to him
simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not committed by mere issuance of a check.
Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885, the following are the
elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee
thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the mere issuance of a check
without sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation and the check was dishonored upon
presentation for that estafa is committed under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer will also
be liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds (pp. 1-2,
Resolution On Motion To Quash dated September 17, 1981; Annex "MM", Petition). (p. 100, Rollo)
The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa
against petitioner under the Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the
same offenses. In other words, can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks?
It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon
presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his
account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner
either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to
do either.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-
d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely
(1) "the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 approved on April 3, 1979 which provides that:
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law,
mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the
drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA
523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a
drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the
same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance
negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa
is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against
public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
2
These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the Honorable Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as follows:
MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act committed does not only violate this proposed
Act but also the Revised Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised Penal Code . That is
why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform penalty for all violations in this Act. However the
court is given the discretion whether to impose imprisonment or fine or both or also in whatever severity the
court may consider appropriate under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a particular
person for issuance of a bouncing check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under this proposed bill. On
the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it does not necessarily follow that he can be
prosecuted for estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of circumstances, the offense under this Act is the
only offense committed while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense described in this Act is
committed but also estafa. So that, for example, if a check with sufficient funds is issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation and the position of the Government should turn out to be correct that there is no estafa, then
the drawer of the check would only be liable under this Act but not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he
issues a check in payment, or contemporaneously with incurring, of an obligation, then he will be liable not only
for estafa but also for violation for this Act. There is a difference between the two cases. In that situation where
the check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage
to the payee and so it is but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa but only for violating this Act. But
if he issued a check to induce another , to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces, then he
does inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating this law . In that case, it should be but fair
that he be subject to prosecution not only for estafa but also for violating this law.
MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but my worry is with respect to situations
where there is prosecution first to estafa.
MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .
MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will be mandatory on
the part of the prosecuting official to also file a case for violation of this offense under the proposed bill.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the offender did not only cause injury on
account of the issuance of the check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this Act, then he will be
liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps in such situation, the penalty may be
somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other jurisdictions, the issuance of bouncing checks is penalized with
substantially lower penalty. However, because of the situation in the Philippines, the situation being now
relatively grave that practically everybody is complaining about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at least
initially, at this point in time for us to impose a rather severe penalty and even allow liability not only under this
Act but also for estafa. Then perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been inculcated in our people and that
the incidence of the offense has been reduced, we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty.
But at this time, shall we say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic and expeditious effort to
prosecute persons who issue bouncing checks may be necessary to curb quickly this evil. (explanations given by
Solicitor General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan Pambansa during his sponsorship speech of BP 22
which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record of the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978). (Emphasis
supplied). (pp. 115-117, Rollo or pp. 9-11, Memorandum for respondents).
Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that:
Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by
petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise
to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in
one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the
two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).
In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA
309) that "when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in
People v. Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because
there is still a necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their
contentions and not because the remedy of appeal is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. 132323 July 20, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNST GEORG HOLZER and MERCIDITA D.
ALBISO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, convicting accused-
appellants of estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer 24 years
of reclusion perpetua and to pay ₱100,000.00 as actual damages.
The information2 against accused-appellants reads:
That on June 1, 1995 in the City of Dipolog, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping one another, defraud one
BERNHARD FORSTER by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or
3
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, in the following manner: that accused made the private-
complainant Ramos [should be Forster] to believe that their FEB&T check No. C054220 dated August 1, 1995 in
the amount of ₱100,000.00 was duly covered by corresponding funds in the drawee bank, Far East Bank &
Trust Company, Dipolog Branch; that they assured the private-complainant that the said check would not
bounce; that the latter should accept it as payment of their obligation because the check has corresponding
deposits; which deceit and pretenses, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously able to
obtain and receive from him the sum of ₱100,000.00; however, when the said check was presented for
payment with the said drawee bank, the same was dishonored and refused payment by the said bank for the
reason that it was drawn against accuseds’ insufficient funds thereat, and despite repeated demands made
upon them to make good or pay their obligation, the accused failed and/or refused to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of herein private-complainant in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, Bernhard Forster, the complainant, and Jay Adraincem, general
bookkeeper of the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch in Dipolog City. The facts, as established by their
testimonies, are as follows:
Accused-appellants are the owners of MGF ELECTRONICS SATELLITE SUPPLY, a business engaged in selling
and installing satellite antenna system, with principal office at General Luna Street, Dipolog City. 3 In May 1995,
accused-appellants installed in the house of complainant Bernhard Forster, in Maria Uray, Dapitan City, a single
satellite antenna, for which complainant paid the total amount of ₱82,200.00. 4
Complainant was not, however, satisfied with the satellite antenna installed and the equipment which came with
it, i.e., television, remote control receiver, and manual receiver, which he thought were second-hand. Moreover,
he wanted a bigger antenna. He was assured by accused-appellant Holzer that should new equipment arrive
from abroad, the used equipment would be replaced and another antenna would be given. 5
On June 1, 1995, accused-appellant Holzer informed complainant that new equipment had arrived in Manila. His
money, however, was not enough to secure the release of the equipment from the Bureau of Customs. For this
reason, he asked complainant to lend him ₱100,000.00.
Complainant agreed and issued a check for ₱100,000.00 to accused-appellant Holzer. In exchange, the latter
issued Check No. C054220 worth ₱100,000.00 and postdated August 1, 1995, which he and the accused-
appellant Mercidita D. Albiso signed.
Before the due date, accused-appellant Holzer asked the complainant not to deposit the check on August 1,
1995. Four days later, accused-appellant again asked the latter not to deposit the check because the money
from Switzerland to cover the check had not yet arrived.
Despite the request, however, complainant deposited the check on August 9, 1995. As to be expected, the
check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. 6
On the same day, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against accused-appellants. 7 On September 20, 1995,
accused-appellants were ordered arrested by Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez. Bail was fixed at ₱30,000.00 for each
of the accused-appellants. Accused-appellant Holzer was committed to the City Jail of Dicayas, Dipolog City;
accused-appellant Albiso, who had gone to Manila, was arrested subsequently. 8
During the trial, bank records were presented showing that accused-appellants opened their Savings Account
with Far East Bank and Trust Company in Dipolog City on March 10, 1995 (Account No. 0196-024-10-2) while
their Current Account was opened on April 11, 1995 (Account No. 0096-00348-0). The current account of
accused-appellants contained the words ATSA, for Automatic Transfer from Savings Account, which meant that
should the current account be insufficient to cover a check issued by the drawers, and there are enough funds
available in the savings account, there would be an automatic transfer from the savings account to the current
account.
FEBT Co.’s Jay Adraincem testified that, as early as April 1995, some checks issued by accused-appellants were
already covered by the money transferred from the savings account by virtue of ATSA. 9 He further testified that
based on the records, four checks issued by accused-appellants were dishonored by the bank on August 1, 1995
due to insufficient funds. On August 9, 1995, two checks, one of which was Check No. C054220, were also
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Per bank policy, the current and savings account of accused-appellants
were closed.10
The defense presented as its lone witness accused-appellant Ernst Georg Holzer, a Swiss national.
Accused-appellant Holzer testified that in May 1995, he installed a single satellite antenna in the house of
complainant. After this transaction was completed, complainant came to him and asked if it was possible to
watch German stations on his TV set. Accused-appellant, after consulting his foreign suppliers, answered in the
affirmative and promised another antenna for the complainant. 11
On June 1, 1995, he told complainant that the new equipment had arrived. However, he told complainant that
he did not have enough money to secure the release of the equipment from the Bureau of Customs. He,
therefore, asked for an advance payment of ₱100,000.00 for the antenna. According to accused-appellant, he
issued Check No. C054220, postdated August 1, 1995, in the amount of ₱100,000.00 as security for his
obligation of installing the second antenna in complainant’s house. If he failed to install the antenna, he bound
himself to return the amount advanced to him by means of the check in question. 12
Accused-appellant Holzer claimed that he was able to install the antenna in complainant’s house. However,
since he did not know yet how much the antenna cost, he did not demand immediate payment from
complainant.13
In November 1995, accused-appellant Holzer sent a letter from jail demanding from complainant payment of
₱102,345.75 for the antenna.14 Complainant answered the letter stating that the prices quoted by accused-
appellant were excessive and that he was willing to pay only ₱20,000.00. 15
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the accused guilty of estafa as defined and penalized under
Par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the amount of the fraud, accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer 24 years of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties and to indemnify the
complaining witness by way of actual damages in the sum of ₱100,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants contend that their liability is only civil, not criminal. They argue (1) that
Check No. C054220 was issued to secure the loan they obtained from complainant; (2) that there was no deceit
on their part because they duly informed the complainant that the check was not yet funded; and (3) that
complainant parted with his ₱100,000.00 not because of the check issued by them but because of the interest
they agreed upon.
Art. 315(2)(d), as amended by R.A. No. 4885, states:
4
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow... :
xxx
2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxx
d. By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The elements of estafa, as defined, are as follows:
(1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the
postdating or issuance.
(2) At the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
(3) The payee has been defrauded.17
In view of the amendment of Art. 315(2)(d) by R.A. No. 4885, the following are no longer elements of estafa:
1. knowledge of the drawer that he has no funds in the bank or that the funds deposited by him are not
sufficient
2. failure to inform the payee of such circumstance 18
The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to deposit the
amount necessary to cover the check. Otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit will arise which must then
be overcome by the accused.
First. Accused-appellant issued a postdated check in payment of an obligation. The first element was thus duly
proven. It is admitted that accused-appellants issued Check No. C054220 on June 1, 1995, postdated August 1,
1995, to complainant Forster. The check was issued in exchange for the ₱100,000.00 loan received by accused-
appellant Holzer on that day.
There is no merit in accused-appellants’ contention that the check was given by them merely as a security for
the faithful performance of their obligation to install a satellite antenna in complainant’s house or even, as
contended by them in their brief, as security for the payment of the loan of ₱100,000.00 contracted by them.
The check could not have been issued to secure the faithful performance by accused-appellants of their
obligation to install an antenna in complainant’s house for if it was, the delivery of the antenna would have
rendered the check without effect. The fact is that even after they had delivered the antenna to complainant,
accused-appellant Holzer still had to pay the ₱100,000.00.
Nor could the check have been intended as security for the loan of ₱100,000.00 from the complainant. Accused-
appellant contracted the loan and, therefore, his obligation was to pay it. In this case, Holzer promised to pay
on August 1, 1995 when the subject check matured. There was no other means agreed upon to pay the debt. If
the check was issued to secure the loan, then complainant and accused-appellant could have agreed on a
method of payment, upon the failure of accused-appellants to comply with which, complainant would have
recourse to Check No. C054220.
The check was thus not issued as an evidence of the accused-appellant’s debt to the complainant but rather, as
payment of the former to the latter.
Second. Accused-appellants had no sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check at the time of its issuance.
This is the second element of the crime, which we also find to have been duly proven. On June 1, 1995, when
they issued the checks, accused-appellants had insufficient funds in the bank. This fact was admitted by
accused-appellant Holzer himself:
Q When did you issue this check to Mr. Forster?
A 1st week of June as I have testified here.
Q So 1st day of June, 1995, you have money in the bank?
A Yes.
Q May I see the record?
A Yes.
Q (The Prosecution examining the record.)
First week of June the record says between May 31 and June 5 only P30,000.00?
A It is P60,000.00.
Q The post dated check August 1, 1995, at that time, you have no sufficient funds in your drawee Bank?
A No.19
On the other hand, as early as April 1995, the current account of accused-appellants no longer had sufficient
funds. When asked about a particular check issued to one Anabelle Ramos which was honored in April 1995, Jay
Adraincem, of the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch in Dipolog City, answered:
A Actually, these checks were issued by them [accused-appellants]. We can see the validation of the bank.
Check No. 054207 was encashed to us on April 17, 1995. We can also see this transaction in their statement.
This ₱4,800.00 was encashed April 17, when this check No. 054207 was honored. We can see the ATSA.
Meaning, this ₱4,800.00 comes from the Savings Account. This ₱9,000.00 and ₱15,000.00 can also be seen in
this statement, meaning for encashment.20
Thus, it appears that accused-appellants were running out of funds as early as April 1995, shortly after they
opened their savings and current account with Far East Bank and Trust Company in Dipolog City.
5
Third. There is, however, no evidence that deceit accompanied the issuance of the check. This is the third Q Do you know that Mr. Holzer was called before the Office of the City Prosecutor?
element, which we find was not proven. The prosecution presented no evidence to show that a notice of
dishonor had been to sent accused-appellants. Though complainant testified that he demanded payment from A I did not know.
accused-appellant Holzer and waited for several days after the check had been dishonored, his affidavit, dated
August 9, 1995, showed that he filed his complaint on the same day the check was dishonored. Complainant Q But you are sure, you did not meet this Holzer in that Office before the case was filed?
failed to explain the discrepancy when confronted about this:
A No, I cannot remember.
Q What did you do when the check was returned by the drawee Bank for the same reason that it is drawn
against insufficient funds? Q But you can remember, that you often meet with Mrs. Ramos before the case of Holzer was filed?

A I asked him to pay and he promised. A Yes, because she knows he was trying to run away before we came to confirm to that he went there he has a
pass port.
Q Did you demand payment?
Q But, you have not gone to the Office of Mr. Holzer?
A Yes, I demanded payment.
A No, before I went there to see him for this purpose after that I did not go. 21
....
As the prosecution failed to present evidence of any written or oral demand on accused-appellants to pay the
Q Now, when you informed them that the check was dishonored, what did they tell you? amount of their check, there is no prima facie presumption of deceit. Nor is there evidence showing that, as a
matter of fact, accused-appellant Holzer committed deceit.
A He promised to pay anytime because he is waiting money from Switzerland any day it will come so I waited
for few days time but the money was not still there. Complainant testified that he would not have given ₱100,000.00 to accused-appellant Holzer if he had known
that the latter’s check was not good. 22 However, he also admitted that he knew at the time of the issuance of
Q So, there was no money coming from Switzerland? the check that it was not funded and that the money to cover it was still to come from Switzerland. Thus,

A Yes, sir. Q By the way, when the accused issued this check, what did they assure you?

.... A He promised that Switzerland is sending money.

ATTY. GAINSAN: Q At the time, the check was issued to you on August 1, 1995, what did he say?

Q Your affidavit is also dated August 9, 1995, do you mean to say that after the Bank dishonored his check for
drawn against insufficient funds, you right away went to the Office of the Public Prosecutor to file your case?
A I was not alone. That he had bouncing checks I did not know that then this OTHER person went to see me
and I found out that he had borrowed more than half a million.
Q Can you tell us who is that person you are referring to?
A Annabel Ramos.
A That there is money coming.23
Complainant also admitted that accused-appellant informed him twice ¾ before the check’s due date and days
thereafter ¾ that the money from Switzerland had not yet arrived. Thus,
PROS. MAH:
Q Now, when you received the check as payment of the obligations of the accused to you this post dated check
dated August 1, 1995, what did you do with the check?

.... A When the due [date] arrived he went to me and requested not to deposit the check on August 1, 1995 but
few days later and about four days he again told me that the money from Switzerland has not arrived. I wanted
Q So you filed a case against Holzer? to find out.

A Yes. Q So, you deposited the check with the drawee Bank?

Q And because of this case, Holzer was arrested? A He kept on coming to me and telling me that his money from Switzerland has not arrived yet. 24

A Yes. There is, therefore, no proof that complainant was defrauded. 25

6
The prosecution failed to show what the parties’ transaction really was. Complainant said that the ₱100,000.00
which he gave accused-appellant Holzer was a loan, but he also said it was an advance payment. Thus he
testified:
Q With respect to the first antenna system that he installed when was that?
Indeed, the evidence adduced by the parties shows that the ₱100,000.00 given by the complainant to accused-
appellant Holzer was a loan. It was not an advance, as claimed by Holzer, because if it was, Holzer would not
need to issue a check in exchange. It appears that after delivering the antenna, accused-appellant Holzer looked
to complainant for payment, something he would not do had the amount of ₱100,000.00 he had received been
given to him as payment for the antenna.

A I cannot remember maybe May or something like that. On the other hand, the check which he issued was intended as payment for the loan of ₱100,000.00. It could
not have been given as a security or as a mere evidence of the debt because accused-appellant himself
Q In May of what year? intended to encash it on its due date. That is why accused-appellant asked complainant not to deposit the check
until his money from Switzerland arrived. 28 Had the check been given as security for the faithful performance of
A Last year. accused-appellant’s obligation to install the antenna, there would have been no need for complainant to encash
the check.
Q Were you able to pay the installation fee?
It appears that complainant instituted this case through the prodding of one Anabelle Ramos, a complainant in
A Yes, in full and advance the first one and also the second. 26 five other estafa cases against accused-appellants. The trial of the six cases against accused-appellants ¾ one
of which is this criminal case ¾ was conducted jointly. We cannot, however, base accused-appellants’
.... conviction on the number of estafa cases filed against them and the evidence presented in the other cases.
Each case must be proven independently of each other. In this case, we find the evidence to be wanting.
Q You let him borrow money?
There is no doubt that complainant suffered damage as a result of the dishonored check.1âwphi1 However,
where deceit is not proven, the accused cannot be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
A Yes, the first one was for the antenna and the second was a loan which he needed to bring to Manila
Penal Code. At most, he can only be held civilly liable.
according to him.
This is such a case. Accused-appellants’ liability is civil. In accordance with the ruling in Padilla v. Court of
Q You forgot that you were installing another antenna?
Appeals,29 accused-appellants must be held liable for ₱100,000.00 in actual damages to complainant.1âwphi1
A The first one that he installed I paid in advance and the second which I also paid partly, the second antenna
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is set aside and another one is entered acquitting accused-
not yet paid.
appellants of the charge against them on the ground of reasonable doubt but ordering them to pay the
complainant the amount of ₱100,000.00 as actual damages.
Q So, you paid partly for the second?
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellants unless the latter
A Yes.
are being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
Q How much?
SO ORDERED.
A (Witness presenting to his counsel a receipt with No. 054 dated 5/31/95 in the amount of P55,400.00; the
second receipt No. 007 dated May 31, 1995 in the amount of ₱1,300.00 this ₱1,300 represents the installation
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
fee.)

....
Footnotes
Q Did it mention that this ₱55,400.00 is for the payment for the second?
1
Per Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez.
A I think it was combined an additional second antenna. It was mixed up payment.
2
Records, pp. 1-2.
Q But the statement, balance payment for a single satellite TV?
3
TSN, pp. 10-11, Jan. 9, 1997.
A What does has that when I have answered some related matters to this case.
4
Records, pp. 67-68; Exhs. 1, 2, & 3.
Q What does it mean when it is stated balance payment for a single satellite TV?
5
TSN, pp. 8-9, Nov. 7, 1996.
A You better ask Mr. Holzer. That can be answered by him. 27
7
6
Id. at 4-5. G.R. No. 134120 January 17, 2005

7
Records, p. 3; Exh. 4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEA SAGAN JULIANO, appellant.

8
See Records, p. 9. DECISION

9
TSN, pp- 5-6, 29, Sept. 17, 1996. AZCUNA, J.:

10
Id. at 8, 16. This case was certified to us for review by the Court of Appeals after finding appellant Lea Sagan Juliano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal
11
TSN, pp. 5-6, Jan. 9, 1997. Case No. 2053, and that the proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.

12
TSN, pp. 6-7, Jan. 9, 1997; TSN, pp. 18-19, March 11, 1997. Appellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case
13
TSN, pp. 7-8, Jan. 9, 1997. No. 2053. The pertinent Information for Estafa reads as follows:

14
Records, pp. 71-73; Exh. 5, 6, & 7. Criminal Case No. 2053

15
Id. at 74-76; Exh. 8. That on or about July 27, 1991, at Kalawag II, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to defraud and by means of
16
Rollo, p. 28. false pretense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [purchase] one hundred ninety (190)
Bags of Rice from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment thereof, the said accused [did] make or
17
A. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review 832 (1997). draw and issue in favor of the said Corporation Check No. 142254 post-dated July 30, 1991 for a value of
EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (₱89,800.00), Philippine Currency, drawn against the
18
Id. Philippine Commercial International Bank, Isulan Branch, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, knowing at the time of issue
that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check and when presented for
19 encashment, the same was dishonored by the said bank for reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds", and on
TSN, p.20, March 11, 1997.
August 20, 1991, the said accused again issued PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454 in the amounts of
₱50,000.00 and ₱39,800.00, respectively, in replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254 which was earlier
20
See TSN, p. 29, Sept. 17, 1996. (Emphasis supplied)
dishonored, and when the said replacement checks were presented for encashment, the same were again
dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development
21
TSN, pp. 5-6, 13-14, Nov. 7, 1996. Corporation in the said amount of ₱89,800.00.
22
Id. at 6. CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. 1
23
Id., at 5-6. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial of the three criminal cases
ensued.2
24
Id., at 4-5.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, 3 are as follows:
25
See People v. Lilius, 59 Phil. 339 (1933)
At about 10:00 a.m. of July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks of milled rice worth
26
TSN, p. 8, Nov. 7, 1996. (Emphasis supplied) ₱89,800 from the sales office of complainant JCT Agro-Development Corporation ("JCT") in Kalawag II, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat. She issued postdated Check No. 142254 drawn against the Philippine Commercial International
27
Id. at 9-10. Bank (PCIB), Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, dated July 30, 1991 for ₱89,800 in payment of the goods. The sale was
evidenced by Ordered Goods Slip No. 54524 dated July 27, 1991, with the check number written thereon.
28
Id. at 4-5.
On July 30, 1991, Remedios Torres, JCT’s cashier and acting manager, encashed the check, but the drawee
29
129 SCRA 558 (1984). bank refused payment because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Thereafter, Torres requested one Mrs.
Graza to tell appellant to visit JCT’S office because the check she issued bounced.

8
Appellant went to JCT’s office and Torres showed her the check that bounced. Appellant pleaded that Torres
accept two checks to replace the first check that was dishonored, and Torres agreed. The replacement checks
payable to JCT were (1) PCIB Isulan Branch Check No. 145452 5 dated August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000; and (2)
PCIB Isulan Branch Check No. 145454 6 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800. The Ordered Goods Slip was then
revised upon Torres’ instruction. Torres surrendered the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant when
she accepted the two replacement checks.
On their due dates, Torres encashed the two replacement checks, but they were dishonored by the drawee
bank. The bank issued two Check Return Slips 7 indicating that payment was refused because the checks were
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." JCT, through Torres, sent a demand letter 8 dated August 31, 1991 to
appellant informing her of the dishonor of the replacement checks. Appellant received the demand letter on
September 6, 1991.
Thereafter, appellant went to the office of JCT. Torres brought appellant to one Major Salvador of the PNP,
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. Before him, appellant executed a promissory note 9 dated September 10, 1991 wherein
she promised to pay JCT as follows: (1) ₱20,000 on September 16, 1991; (2) ₱19,800 on September 23, 1991;
(3) ₱20,000 on September 30, 1991; (4) ₱20,000 on October 7, 1991; and (5) ₱10,000 on October 14, 1991,
which all amount to ₱89,800.
Through her driver, appellant sent JCT ₱10,000 for the installment due on September 16, 1991. JCT rejected
the payment because it was short by ₱10,000. Appellant no longer made any payment. JCT then sent her a
demand letter10 dated October 21, 1991, through registered mail, reiterating the dishonor of the checks she
issued and giving her five days from receipt of said letter to pay the amount of ₱89,800; otherwise, legal action
would be taken against her.
The trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal
Code for issuing PCIB Check No. 142254, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check
Nos. 145452 and 145454. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks law, and of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).
Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2051
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs
of suit;
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2052
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of FORTY THOUSAND (₱40,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the
costs of suit.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2053
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to pay to the JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of
EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED (₱89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the value of
ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190) BAGS of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of the
Information in this case, until fully paid; and to pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Appellant appealed her conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2053 to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court found appellant guilty of the offense. It pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on
October 22, 1975, increased the penalty12 provided in Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It
held that pursuant to the said amendatory law and considering that the amount of the unpaid check is ₱89,800,
appellant should be penalized by reclusion perpetua. Hence, the Court of Appeals referred the case to us in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant raised the following issues:
1. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any
fraudulent act.
2. Appellant’s failure to deposit the amount of PCI Bank check numbered 142254 for ₱89,800.00 in this case
does not give rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
3. The appellant could not be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code due to the
dishonor of the replacement checks because these were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 13
The trial court held appellant liable for Estafa for the following reasons: (1) The fact that appellant had
insufficient funds in the bank to cover the check at the time she postdated or issued Check No. 142254 is
sufficient to make her liable for Estafa; and (2) appellant’s failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover her
check within three days from receipt of notice from the payee or holder that said check had been dishonored for
insufficiency of funds is prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In the first and second assigned errors, appellant contends that she could not be found guilty of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that
she employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.
Appellant alleges that when she issued postdated PCIB Check No. 142254 on July 27, 1991, she represented
that the check would be fully funded on July 30, 1991. She stated that when complainant JCT accepted the
postdated check, it was aware that the funds for the said payment would become available only on the maturity
date of the check. JCT was also aware that the postdated check would be fully funded from the proceeds of
another check which had not yet been cleared for payment.
Appellant asserts that when JCT agreed to accept the postdated check, it was aware of and in effect accepted
the risk that the postdated check would not be funded in case the check that was supposed to fully fund the
same would not be cleared. She alleges that the officers of JCT must have known that notwithstanding her
representation, there was always a chance that the said check would not be funded on its maturity date for a
variety of reasons, among them force majeure. Some of those who purchased rice on credit from her
(appellant) may not pay their obligations. The fact that she (appellant) was mistaken in her belief that she
would be able to fund the check on its maturity date does not prove deceit.
Appellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to defraud. After she was notified of the
dishonor of the first check, she did not hide or abscond, but she offered to replace the first check with two
checks. Appellant also contends that when JCT accepted the replacement checks in place of PCIB Check No.
9
142254, she was relieved of her obligation of funding said check. Hence, she alleges that she is not covered by
the prima facie presumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. She claims
that since deceit is absent in this case, she is not liable for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the
Revised Penal Code.
We agree.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow…:
...
2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
...
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said
check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check; (3) the payee has been defrauded. 14 Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and
must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act
must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check. 15 The drawer of the
dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check,
otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit arises. 16
As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding appellant liable for Estafa, we find that appellant did not
deceive complainant JCT by stating that she had sufficient funds in the bank on the date of issuance of the
check. JCT knew that the postdated check was not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and that it would be
funded on July 30, 1991. Prosecution witness Remedios Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
...
Q:- The check which you said … was used by Lea Sagan Juliano which is PCIB Check No. 142254 dated July 30,
1991, why is it dated July 30 when the transaction occurred on July 29?
A: - She placed it post dated with her assurance that she deposited at PCIB and it is not yet cleared and it will
be cleared on July 30, 1991.
Q:- You said her deposit was not yet cleared, why, did she tell you that she deposited a check at the PCIB of
Isulan?
A: - Yes, sir."17
As regards the second reason of the trial court for holding appellant liable for Estafa, we note that appellant no
longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal
notice of dishonor of said check because complainant JCT had accepted the replacement checks and
surrendered the first check to appellant, which indicated that JCT no longer held appellant liable for the
payment of her obligation under the first check.
It has been established that after the dishonor of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, Remedios Torres,
JCT’s acting manager, verbally informed appellant at JCT’s office that she was unable to encash said check due
to insufficiency of funds, but she did not demand that appellant make good PCIB Check No. 142254 within three
days from receipt of said notice. Instead, on the same occasion, Torres accepted PCIB Check No. 145452 dated
August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000 and PCIB Check No. 145454 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800 as the
replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254, which first check she surrendered to appellant. JCT was then holding
appellant liable for payment under the replacement checks, PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454, and no
longer under PCIB Check No. 142254. Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
Q: - And since you said PCIB Check No. 142254 in the total amount of ₱89,800.00 [bounced] because of
insufficiency of funds, what did you do next?
A: - I went to the residence of Mrs. Graza to [ask] Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano is she still purchasing from her the
same rice and I found out she had been there very often so I asked Mrs. Graza to help or tell us if ever Mrs. Lea
Sagan Juliano to come over and visit our office because the check she issued in payment of the 190 sacks of
rice in the total amount of [P]89,800 [bounced].
...
Q: - When Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano appeared in your Office at Kalawag II, what did you tell her?
A: - When she arrived at our office I showed her the check that [bounced].
Q: - And what transpired next?
A: - Then afterwards she told me she asked for consideration to give or allow certain period to pay that said
check by issuing us again another check to be staggard so that she can be able to pay the amount because of
her pleadings I let her issue by surrendering the previous check and she issued me the two checks dated
August 20 and 22.
Q: - When you said surrendered the check in the amount of ₱89,800.00, are you referring to PCIB check no.
142254?
A: - That was the check I returned to her.18
10
In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant instead of demanding 3
TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 7-29; September 19, 1994, pp. 6-20.
payment under the first check (PCIB Check No. 142254) on the same day that JCT’s Acting Manager informed
appellant of the dishonor of the first check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the 4
Exh. "A," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 155.
necessary amount to cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of dishonor. On July 31,
1991, appellant’s balance in her account with PCIB Isulan Branch was ₱78,400. It is possible that appellant 5
Exh. "B," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.
could have deposited ₱11,400 to make good the first check worth ₱89,800 if JCT made it clear that it was
demanding payment under the first check. 6
Exh. "C," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.

It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after appellant’s receipt of the 7
Exhs. "E" and "F," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 159.
verbal notice of dishonor of the first check, because by then the prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant
for failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice 8
Exh. "G," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 7.
of dishonor, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been
established.l^vvphi1.net 9
Exh. "1," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 204.

Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover 10
Exh. "2," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 203.
the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
deceit against appellant. For it was due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and 11
Supra, note 2, at 13-14.
surrendering the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount necessary
to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer 12
P.D. No. 818, Section 1:
holding her liable for payment under the said check. The surrender of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254,
to appellant would explain why the prosecution failed to submit said check in evidence, and merely relied on
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
testimonial evidence to prove the issuance of the check.
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be
punished by:
In failing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of ₱89,800, which is the value of the sacks
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which
of rice she purchased.
may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties, which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua
The third assigned error need not be discussed since the trial court did not convict appellant of Estafa for the
. . . ."
issuance of PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454.1a\^/phi1.net
13
Rollo, pp. 66, 74, 75.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case
No. 2053, is set aside and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, 14
People v. Holzer, 319 Phil. 196, 203.
paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant is ordered to pay JCT Agro-Development Corporation,
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (₱89,800.00), representing the
value of 190 bags of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of the Information in this case,
15
People v. Chua , 315 SCRA 326, 336 (1999).
until fully paid. 16
People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58 , June 3, 2004.
No costs. 17
TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 12-13.
SO ORDERED. 18
Id. at 15-16.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
G.R. No. 184053 August 31, 2011
1
Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 39.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER, Accused-Appellant.
2
Trial Court Decision, CA Rollo, p. 8.
DECISION

11
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision 1 dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01162, entitled People of the Philippines v. Virginia Baby P. Montaner, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated April
8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, in Criminal Case No. 0748-SPL. The
RTC found appellant Virginia Baby P. Montaner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an Information3 dated April 21, 1998, appellant was charged as follows:
That on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and
fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis the
following Prudential Bank Checks Nos.:
1. 0002284 ₱5,000.00
2. 0002285 ₱5,000.00
3. 0002286 ₱5,000.00
4. 0002287 ₱5,000.00
5. 0002288 ₱5,000.00
6. 0002289 ₱5,000.00
7. 0002290 ₱5,000.00
8. 0002291 ₱5,000.00
9. 0002292 ₱5,000.00
10. 0002293 ₱5,000.00
all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) and all aforesaid checks are postdated June
17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said
checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of "ACCOUNT
CLOSED" and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice
of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount of ₱50,000.00.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge leveled against her during her arraignment on June 10, 1998.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The parties’ evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17, 1996, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner, in
exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house at Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes,
San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10) Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos. 0002284, 0002285, 0002286,
0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated June 17, 1996, each in
the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of P50,000.00. Accused represented to complainant Solis that
the checks were fully funded. When private complainant deposited the checks for encashment however, they
were dishonored for the reason "account closed". Private complainant verbally and thereafter, thru demand
letter (Exhibit "A") formally demanded that accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand letter,
accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private complainant Reynaldo Solis filed
the instant complaint for estafa. In connection with this complaint, private complainant Solis executed a sworn
statement (Exhibit "D").
Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that they placed the mark "account closed"
on the ten (10) checks issued in the account of accused Montaner considering that at the time the same were
presented to them, the account of accused Montaner was already closed. Witness Pajarito further testified that
as per their records, the account of accused Montaner, account no. 00099-000050-4 was closed on July 11,
1996. The checks were returned on October 4, 1996 for the reason account closed.
Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is intending to file a demurrer to evidence. However, her
right to file the same was considered waived in view of her failure to file the demurrer despite due notice.
To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she
issued ten (10) checks in private complainant’s favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her
by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same
albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was filed
against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her
if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her by private
complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in
July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997. 5
In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the crime of estafa as defined and
penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion
perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of ₱50,000.00. 6
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was merely affirmed by the appellate
court in its Decision dated February 12, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the challenged Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
Hence, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court and adopted her Appellant’s Brief with the Court of
Appeals, wherein she put forth a single assignment of error:
4
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. 8
Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope
(Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond
reasonable doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her money.
12
She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have Q: And what is the date of the checks that were issued to you?
been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.
A: June 17, 1996, ma’am.
We are not persuaded.
Q: What is the total value of these ten checks?
Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
A: Fifty Thousand Pesos.
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x: Q: At the time these checks were issued to you, what if any, was her representation about them?

xxxx A: To deposit those checks on their due date, ma’am.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with Q: And aside from telling you to deposit those checks on their due date, what else did she represent to you
the commission of the fraud: regarding these checks?

xxxx A: None, ma’am.

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the Q: Did you deposit these checks?
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of A: Yes, ma’am.
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. Q: Where?

The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or A: At the Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of
sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. 9 Q: What happened to these checks after depositing the same?

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa A: The checks bounced, ma’am.
under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of ₱5,000.00 Q: All these checks?
or a total of ₱50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent. We quote the pertinent portions of
the transcript:
A: Yes, ma’am, all checks bounced for reason account closed.
[On Direct Examination]
Q: After these checks were dishonored what did you do?
Q: Mr. Witness, why did you file this complaint against the accused?
A: I informed her about that.
A: She issued me checks in exchange for cash, ten postdated checks, ma’am.
Q: Thru what, verbal or written?
Q: When did Mrs. Montaner issue to you these checks?
A: Initially it was verbal, then I informed her thru a demand letter, ma’am.
A: In May 1996, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: What was the purpose of issuing to you these checks?
Fiscal (continuing):
A: Because she needed cash, ma’am.
Q: You said that the accused issued to you ten checks in exchange for cash, where are those checks?
Q: And how many checks did she issue to you?
A. The original checks are with me here, ma’am.
A: Ten checks, ma’am.

13
Q. Handed to this representation are checks, Prudential Bank checks Nos. 002284, 002285, 002286, 002287, As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks imprudently, without
002288, 002289, 002290, 002291, 002292, 002293 all dated June 17, 1996 and all in the amount of ₱50,000 knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court views such statements with the same
[should be ₱5,000.00] each. Mr. Witness, there appears from these checks a signature at the bottom portion incredulity as the lower courts.
whose signature is this?
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
A. The signature of Mrs. Montaner, ma’am. itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
Q. Why do you say it is her signature? observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.12 1avvphi1
A. She signed those in my presence, ma’am.
Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but signed checks not
Q. I am showing these checks to the opposing counsel for comparison… knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on
them. Verily, appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience.
Atty. Peñala
Moreover, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
The checks are admitted, your Honor. serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.13 We agree with the lower courts that appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded credence
xxxx for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial court, appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a
witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause. 14 In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
[On Cross-Examination] upholding the conviction of appellant for estafa.

Atty. Peñala (continuing): WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01162 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Q: When Mrs. Montaner issued those checks, ten checks were they issued in your house or in her house?
SO ORDERED.
A: In my house, sir.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Q: Mrs. Montaner brought the checks in your house?
Associate Justice
A: Yes, sir.
WE CONCUR:
Q: Can you tell us the time of the day when she brought the checks to you?
RENATO C. CORONA
A: May 17, 1996 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, sir.
Chief Justice
Q: Was she alone or including her husband?
Chairperson
A: She was alone, sir. 10

From the circumstances narrated above, it was evident that Solis would not have given ₱50,000.00 cash to LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash Associate Justice Associate Justice
them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 11 which was received by appellant’s husband to
inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to
cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, Associate Justice
which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second
sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. CERTIFICATION

14
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) in Criminal Case No. SCC-3026, finding Batac
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act ( R.A.) No. 4885, committed against private complainant Roger L. Frias
RENATO C. CORONA (Frias).

Chief Justice Batac was charged as follows:

Footnotes
That sometime on November 8, 1998, in the public market, municipaljty of Malasiqui, [P]rovince of Pangasinan,
1
Rollo, pp. 4-10; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well
and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring. that she had no funds in the bank to cover the amount of the checks, by means of false pretenses and deceit
and with intent to defraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, issue and deliver to
2 [Frias] several post-dated checks, to wit:
CA rollo, pp. 19-22.

3
Records, pp. 1-2. Check No. Drawee Bank Amount Date

4
Id. at 37.

5
CA rollo, pp. 20-21. 0050275 Prime Bank, Calasiao P8,000.00 Nov. 18, 1998
6
Id. at 22.
0050278 -do- 8,500.00 -do-
7
Rollo, p. 10.
0050263 -do- 8,000.00 -do-
8
CA rollo, p. 87.
0050265 -do- 7,500.00 -do-
9
Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
0050277 -do- 8,000.00 -do-
10
TSN, November 25, 1998, pp. 4-8.

11
0050262 -do- 8,000.00 -do-
Records, p. 15.

12 0050260 -do- 8,500.00 Nov. 16, 1998

People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659 (2002).

13
Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing People v. Magbanua, 0050266 -do- 8,500.00 -do-
G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.

14
0050267 -do- 8,500.00 -do-
Records, p. 212.
0050256 -do- 7,000.00 Nov. 12, 1998
G.R. No. 191622 June 06, 2018

ILUMINADA BATAC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. 0050257 -do- 5,000.00 -do-

0050255 -do- 8,000.00 -do-

RESOLUTION
MARTIRES, J.: 0050258 -do- 5,000.00 Nov. 10, 1998

Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Iluminada Batac 0050259 -do- 5,000.00 -do-
(Batac) assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 6 November 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29462.

15
 P103,500
in the amount of P103,500.00 and [Frias] accepted the said checks in a rediscounting manner after being
convinced that [Batac] had sufficient funds in the bank and when said checks were presented for encashment
with the drawee bank on their respective due dates, all checks were returned unpaid for reasons of "ACCOUNT
CLOSED", and despite repeated demands made upon her, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to make good her checks, to the damage and prejudice of [Frias] in the total amount P103,500.00.
Contrary to Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. [2]
When arraigned, Batac pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.
THE FACTS
Frias recounted that on 8 November 1998, Batac and one Erlinda Cabardo ( Erlinda) went to his store, located
inside the public market of the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, to have her checks rediscounted. When
Batac assured Frias that the checks were hers and were duly funded, he was persuaded to buy a total of
fourteen (14) checks at a rediscounted rate of five percent ( 5%) of the total aggregate amount. Batac
thereafter affixed her signature on the face of the checks in the presence of Frias.
Upon the due dates stated on the checks, Frias attempted to deposit the checks to his bank accounts. However,
the drawee bank – Prime Bank, Calasiao Branch, Poblacion West, Calasiao, Pangasinan – refused payment for
the reason "Account Closed" and thus returned the checks to Frias. Frias then proceeded to Batac's house to
demand from her payment of the equivalent amount of the said checks, giving her five (5) days within which to
complete payment. Batac failed to do so, prompting Frias to file the present case for estafa.
On the other hand, Batac maintains that it was Erlinda who issued and delivered the checks to Frias for
rediscounting; and that she had never met nor transacted business with Frias. According to Batac, further
raising doubt on Frias' assertions is the fact that the proceeds being claimed still amounts to P103,500.00, the
aggregate amount of the checks involved, when there should have been a rediscounting fee of 5%; thus casting
doubt on whether there was a rediscounting transaction at all. Consequently, Batac asserts, there is reasonable
doubt that she committed estafa. Furthermore, Batac claims that if she has any criminal liability at all, it would
only be for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ( B.P. Blg. 22), or the Bouncing Checks Law, instead of estafa.
After trial, the RTC found Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Iluminada Batac is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for estafa, defined under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years, 10 months and 21 days of arresto mayor as minimum and
12 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Iluminada Batac is ordered to reimburse private complainant Roger Frias the amount of PhP103,500.00 with
interest computed from the date of this decision. [3]
On appeal, the CA affirmed Batac's conviction. According to the CA, the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. The CA ruled that it was Batac's
representations that the checks were funded which induced Frias to buy them at a rediscounted rate, to his
damage and prejudice; and that Batac's knowledge of the insufficiency of funds was clearly established by her
express admission. The CA, however, modified the penalty imposed.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the First Judicial Region, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. SCC-3026 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Iluminada Batac is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
By way of restitution, Iluminada Batac is ORDERED to PAY the offended party, Roger L. Frias, the amount of
one hundred three thousand five hundred [pesos] (Php103,500.00) plus six (6%) percent interest per annum,
counting from the filing of this case, i.e., 25 March 1999 up to the time [o]ur Decision becomes final and
executory. Thereafter, the amount due shall further earn interest at twelve (12%) percent per annum, until the
obligation is satisfied. No pronouncement as to Costs. [4]
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
At the outset, in contending that she should not be criminally liable for estafa because it was Erlinda, and not
Batac, who issued and delivered the subject checks as well as defrauded Frias, Batac raised a factual issue.
It must be noted that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. [5] If the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, such as the one posed by Batac, the question posed is one of fact. [6] While
the Court has admitted exceptions to this rule, [7] it does not appear that any of those exceptions was alleged,
substantiated, and proven by Batac. Thus, the factual findings of the courts a quo is binding upon this Court.[8]
Both the RTC and the CA correctly gave credence to Frias' testimony that Batac, together with Erlinda,
personally met with him at his store and represented to him that the checks were funded. This was
corroborated by his sister Ivy Luna Frias ( Ivy), who testified that she was present during the transaction in
question and that the exchange between Batac and Frias, as narrated by the latter, was consistent with Ivy's
recollection.[9]
To controvert Frias' positive identification, Batac merely offered the defense of denial, as in fact in her petition
she merely insists that it was Erlinda, not she, who committed the crime, without laying any basis for such
conclusion. The Court has held that "positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical." [10] There is no reason to doubt the credibility of
the identification made by Frias, as corroborated by Ivy.
Moreover, the finding by the RTC of such fact, especially since it has been affirmed by the CA, is binding upon
this Court.
16
The identity of Batac as a party to the subject transaction having been established, the issue now is whether
Batac's guilt for the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as provided as follows:
2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxxx
d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that such estafa consists of the following elements: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. [11]
It has been settled in jurisprudence that in the above-defined form of estafa, it is not the nonpayment of a debt
which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. [12] Deceit has been defined
as "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations
or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another
so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." [13]
In People v. Reyes,[14] the Court ruled that for estafa under the above provision to prosper, the issuance of the
check must have been the inducement for the other party to part with his money or property, viz:
To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act
of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of
the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not. It must be shown that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check
by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the
surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation.[15] (emphasis and underlining supplied)
The prosecution sufficiently demonstrated Batac's deceit when it established that the latter induced Frias into
buying the checks at a rediscounted rate by representing to him that she had enough funds in her account to
cover them. In an effort to support her misrepresentation and further persuade Frias to believe her, Batac
conveyed to him that she was a school teacher, [16] presumably as a guarantee of her good reputation. Batac
also signed the postdated checks in Frias' presence, [17] presumably as a measure of good faith and an assurance
that the signature therein was genuine. All these induced Frias to part with his money.
Further highlighting Batac's deceit was her knowledge, at the time she issued the subject checks, that she had
no sufficient funds in her account to cover the amount involved. During trial, she expressly admitted that at the
time she issued them, she only had a little over one thousand pesos in her account. [18] Moreover, when informed
by Frias of the dishonor of the checks, Batac failed to pay the amounts thereon within the 5-day grace period
given to her by Frias, prompting him to file the instant case. [19]
There is thus no merit to Batac's contention that, at most, she can only be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. While sourced from the same act, i.e., the issuance of a check subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from each other because they pertain to different causes of action. [20]
The Court has held that, among other differences, damage and deceit are essential elements for estafa under
Article 315 2(d) of the RPC, but are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the mere issuance of
a bouncing check, to wit:
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2-d) [of the] Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the
latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the
Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a
dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the
same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of
the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire
banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Reyised Penal Code are mala in se, while those
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.[21] (emphasis and underlining supplied)
Batac attempts to punch holes in Frias' testimony by pointing out that the proceeds being claimed by the latter
amounts to P103,500.00, the aggregate amount of the checks involved, when there should have been a
rediscounting fee of 5%, casting doubt that there was a rediscounting transaction at all. No cloud of suspicion
could be gathered from this fact alone. Frias has been defrauded of the aggregate amount of the checks she
had issued, as this was the amount Frias expected to secure from the transaction: precisely, he was induced to
buy the subject checks by the guarantee that he would obtain the amounts stated therein on the dates so
stated, but at a price lower than the aggregate amounts on the date of the subject transaction with Batac. The
aggregate amount therein is the subject of Batac's deceit and the amount of which Frias was defrauded.
As previously discussed, Batac's deceit and the damage to Frias in the subject transaction have been duly
proven by the former's own admissions and the clear, credible, and positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, to which Batac offered no sufficient refutation but a mere denial. Accordingly, her conviction for
estafa must be upheld.
The penalty imposed by the CA, however, must be modified in view of the amendments embodied in R.A. No.
10951, to wit:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four
17
million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty SO ORDERED.
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two
million pesos (P2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over
One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand
pesos (P2,400,000). July 6, 2018

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million
two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000). (emphasis and underlining supplied)
Sirs/Mesdames:

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (P40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following Please take notice that on June 6, 2018 a Resolution, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme
means: Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 6, 2018 at 2:47 p.m.

xxxx Very truly yours,

Considering that the amount involved in the subject transaction is P103,500.00, the proper imposable penalty is (SGD.) WILFREDO V.
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. This has a range of 4 LAPITAN
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, with a minimum period of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a medium
period of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months, and a maximum period of 1 year, 8 months and 1 day to 2 Division Clerk of Court
years and 4 months.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 56-72; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law ( ISL), the minimum term, which is left to the sound discretion of the
Mario L. Guarina III and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo.
court,[22] should be within the range of the penalty next lower than the aforementioned penalty, which is left to [2]
Id. at 21-22.
the sound discretion of the court.[23] The penalty next lower is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, with a range of 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. The Court now fixes the minimum at 4 months. On the
[3]
other hand, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed Id. at 26.
under the RPC rules.[24] Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium
period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. Since none of these circumstances are [4]
Id. at 71-72.
attendant in the case at bar, the maximum term is the medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum, at 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months.
[5]
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, 711 Phil. 576, 585-586 (2013).
In line with current policy, the Court also modifies the rate of interest imposed by the CA. Such interest shall
[25]
[6]
be imposed at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary award, from the date of finality of Id. at 586.
this Decision until fully paid.
Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182-183 (2016), where the Court, citing Medina v. Mayor Asistio Jr., 269
[7]

WHEREFORE, the 6 November 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29462 is MODIFIED Phil. 225, 232 (1990) reiterated the exceptions, viz:
with respect to the penalty imposed on petitioner Iluminada Batac. The indeterminate sentence imposed on
petitioner Iluminada Batac is hereby reduced to 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 1 year and 8 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
months of prision correccional, as maximum. The monetary award shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this resolution until fully paid.
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

18
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; [21]
Id.

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; [22]

Vasquez v. People, 566 Phil. 507, 513 (2008).

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; [23]

Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1.

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
[24]
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; Id.

(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; [25]
People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 854 (2016) citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013).
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
G.R. No. 203583 October 13, 2014
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF
contradicted by the evidence on record. THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
[8]
Id. at 182. DECISION

[9]
TSN, 19 January 2001, pp. 3-8. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 25, 2012 and the
[10]
People v. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484, 508 (2011). Resolution3 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96528, which affirmed
the Decision4 dated October 28, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15 (RTC) in Criminal Case
[11]
Lopez v. People, 578 Phil. 486, 491-492. No. 04-227211 acquitting petitioner Leonora B. Rimando (Rimando) of the crime of estafa, but nonetheless,
held her civilly liable to respondents-spouses Winston and Elenita Aldaba (Sps. Aldaba) in the amount of
[12] ₱500,000.00. The Facts
Id. at 492.
An Information dated January 21, 2004 was filed before the RTC charging Rimando of the crime of estafa
[13]
Id. through the use of false manifestations and fraudulent representations (estafa case). 5 According to the
prosecution, Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable and
[14] that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. 6 Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into
298 Phil. 661 (1993).
consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
investment in her business. In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdatedchecks, one for ₱500,000.00
[15]
Id. at 669. and the other two (2) for ₱40,000.00 each, and made them sign an investment contract with Multitel
International Holding Corporation (Multitel). Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the
[16]
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 13-20; TSN, 19 January 2001, pp. 3-8. same but were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. 7 This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand
Rimando to make good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence, they were constrained tofile a criminal complaint
for estafa against her.8
[17]
Id.
In her defense, Rimando denied her friendship with Sps. Aldaba and that she enticed them to invest in her own
[18]
TSN, 1 December 2001, pp. 34-35. business, as she had none. According to her, she only referred them to Multitel Investment Manager Jaimelyn 9
Cayaban who handled their investment. 10 She also maintained that she only issued the three (3) post dated
[19]
checks to accommodate them while waiting for the check from Multitel, but when the latter issued the check,
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 19-20. Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be held liable in case their investment fails. 11

[20]
Rimando v. Aldaba, 745 Phil. 358, 364 (2014). Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
2212 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch VI, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 407191-193 (BP 22

19
cases).13 On July 7, 2010, Rimando was acquitted 14 in the BP 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with
a declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated October 28, 2010, the RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly
liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of ₱500,000.00. It found the absence of the element of deceit as Sps.
Aldaba were fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and not in Rimando’s purported
business. Nevertheless, the RTC ruled that as an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps.
Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be heldliable to Sps. Aldaba for the corresponding amount of
₱500,000.00.16 Aggrieved, Rimando appealed to the CA. In her Appellant’s Brief 17 dated October 29, 2011, she
contended that her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps.
Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case. 18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 25, 2012, the CAaffirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for violation of BP
22 is distinct, separate, and independent from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve the same
parties and transaction. As such, Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22
cases does not automatically absolve her from civil liability in the estafa case. 20
Rimando moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution 21 dated September 25, 2012,
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability
in the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from
any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the accused does
not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there isa
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." 22
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the
RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in
Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks
she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety
to the latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. 23 Verily, Rimando’s
civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of ₱500,000.00 does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the estafa case.
In this relation, the CA is also correct in holding that Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP
22 cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances.
In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy,24 the Court laid down the fundamental differences between BP 22 and estafa, to
wit:
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.1âwphi1 Under the
latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the
Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check
may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation,
while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific
and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against
property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does
injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while
those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita. 25
Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes 26 even instructs that the simultaneous filing of BP
22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy:
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the
petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise
to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is
one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the
two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy. 27
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their
criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. 28 Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the
criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 25, 2012 and the Resolution dated
September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96528 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
20
 Chairperson 13
See rollo, p. 112.

14
See MeTC Decision; id. at 112-129.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 15
Id. at 26-43.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 16
Id. at 42-43.

17
Id. at 44-53.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
18
Id. at 50-52.
Associate Justice
19
Id. at 77-92.
CERTIFICATION
20
Id. at 89.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 21
Id. at 93.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 22

Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil 127, 141 (2009).

Chief Justice 23
"The relation between an accommodation party and the party accommodated is, in effect, one of principal
and surety – the accommodation party being the surety. It is a settled rule that a surety is bound equally and
Footnotes absolutely with the principal and is deemed an original promisor and debtor from the beginning. The liability is
immediate and direct. It is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable
1
Rollo, pp. 7-23. consideration whenhe executed the instrument; nor is it correct to say that the holder for value is not a holder
in due course merely because at the time he acquired the instrument, he knew that the indorser was only an
2
Id. at 77-92. Penned by Associate Justice Arny C. Lazaro-Javier with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan accommodation party." (Aglibot v. Santia, G.R. No. 185945, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA283, 297-298;
Castillo and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring. citations omitted.)

24
3
Id. at 93. 260 Phil 6 (1990).

25
4
Id. at 26-43. Penned by Pairing Judge Carmelita S. Manahan. Id. at 10-11; citations omitted.

26
5
Id. at 78-79. G.R. Nos. 101127-31, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 13.

27
6
Id. at 79-80. See also id. at 28-32. Id. at 17-18; citation omitted.

28
7
Id. See Lim v. Kou Co Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 114, 131.

8
Id. at 11. G.R. Nos. 104238-58 June 3, 2004

9
Jaymilyn in some parts of the record. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CORA ABELLA OJEDA, appellant.

10
Rollo, pp. 33-34. DECISION

11
Id. at 33-34. See also id. at 35-36. CORONA, J:

12
Entitled "AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT For review is the decision1 dated June 21, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, the dispositive
SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." portion of which read:

21
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Cora Abella Ojeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
041714 Nov. 10, 1983
as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep.
6. 26, 890.00
Act 4885, in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 and hereby sentences her to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any, in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and to pay complainant Ruby Chua the
amount of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Three Hundred Six (₱228,306.00) Pesos with interests thereon 042942 Nov. 10, 1983
from the time of demand until fully paid. 7. 1,941.59

Likewise, the Court also finds the said accused guilty for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 88- 66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-66242, 88-66243, 88- 66245 to 88-66248 (14) counts 041783 Nov. 12, 1983
and hereby sentences her to suffer a penalty of one year of imprisonment for each count. On the other hand, 8. 5,392.34
the other charges docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 88- 66229, 88-66231, 88-66233, 88-66234, 88-66241 and
88-66244 are hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
041800 Nov. 14, 1983
Costs against accused in all instances.2 9. 11,953.39

Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was charged in 21 separate Informations for estafa in Criminal Case No. 88-66228
and for violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 88-66229 to 88-66248. 041788 Nov. 15, 1983
10. 3,081.90
The Information charging Ojeda with estafa read:

That on or about the first week of November, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then 033529 Nov. 15, 1983
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud RUBY CHUA in the following manner, to wit: the said 11. 19,437.34
accused, well knowing that she did not have sufficient funds in the bank and without informing the said Ruby
Chua of such fact drew, made out and issued to the latter the following post-dated Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation checks, to wit: 041784 Nov. 18, 1983
12. 5,392.34
Date Amount
Check No. 042901 Nov. 18, 1983
13. 11,953.38
1. 033550 Nov. 5, 1983
P17,100.00 042902 Nov. 23, 1983
14. 11,953.38
041782 Nov. 5, 1983
2. 5,392.34 041785 Nov. 25, 1983
15. 5,392.34
042935 Nov. 6, 1983
3. 1,840.19 042903 Nov. 29, 1983
16. 11,953.38
041799 Nov. 9, 1983
4. 11,953.38 033532 Nov. 29, 1983
17. 13,603.22
033530 Nov. 10, 1983
5. 19,437.34 041786 Nov. 30, 1983
18. 5,392.34

22
 Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics ( telas) from complainant Ruby Chua. For the three years
approximately she transacted business with Chua, appellant used postdated checks to pay for the fabrics she
bought. On November 5, 1983, appellant purchased from Chua various fabrics and textile materials worth
₱228,306 for which she issued 22 postdated checks bearing different dates and amounts.

042905 Dec. 8, 1983 Chua later presented to the bank for payment check no. 033550 dated November 5, 1983 in the amount of
19. 11,953.39 ₱17,1003 but it was dishonored due to "Account Closed." 4 On April 10, 1984, Chua deposited the rest of the
checks but all were dishonored for the same reason. 5 Demands were allegedly made on the appellant to make
good the dishonored checks, to no avail.
043004 Dec. 10, 1983
20. 2,386.25 Estafa and BP 22 charges were thereafter filed against appellant. The criminal cases were consolidated and
appellant, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty to each of the charges.

042907 Dec. 15, 1983 On the whole, appellant’s defense was grounded on good faith or absence of deceit, lack of notice of dishonor
21. 11,953.38 and full payment of the total amount of the checks.

With the exception of six checks 6 which did not bear her signature, appellant admitted that she issued the
042906 Dec. 18, 1983 postdated checks which were the subject of the criminal cases against her. She, however, alleged that she told
22. 11,953.39 Chua not to deposit the postdated checks on maturity as they were not yet sufficiently funded. Appellant also
claimed that she made partial payments to Chua in the form of finished garments worth ₱50,000. This was not
rebutted by the prosecution.

₱228,306.60
in payment of various fabrics and textile materials all in the total amount of ₱228,306.60 which the said accused
ordered or purchased from the said RUBY CHUA on the same day; that upon presentation of the said checks to
the bank for payment, the same were dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason ‘Account Closed’,
and said accused, notwithstanding due notice to her by the said Ruby Chua of such dishonor of the said checks,
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to deposit the necessary amount to cover the amount of the checks
to the damage and prejudice of the said RUBY CHUA in the aforesaid amount of ₱228,306.60, Philippine
currency.
Contrary to law.
The Informations charging Ojeda for violation of BP 22 were similarly worded except for the amounts of the
checks, the check numbers and the dates of the checks:
The trial court convicted appellant of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua. The trial court also
convicted appellant of violation of BP 22 for issuing bouncing checks. However, the court a quo held her guilty
of only 14 counts out of the 22
bouncing checks issued. The court reasoned:
xxx This is due to the fact that of the 22 checks, two of them are not covered by the indictment. This refers to
Check No. 042935 dated November 6, 1983 in the amount of ₱1,840.19 (Exhibit D) and Check No. 042942
dated November 10, 1983 in the amount of ₱1,941.59 (Exhibit F). And of the total number of checks, six of
them were not signed by the accused but by the latter’s husband (Exhibits C,H,J,M,R and O). The accused
should not be liable for the issuance of the 6 checks in the absence of any showing of conspiracy. 7
Appellant appealed to this Court, seeking acquittal. Her counsel, however, failed to file the appellant’s brief
within the prescribed period. Her appeal was thus dismissed in a resolution of this Court dated October 14,
1992.8

That on or about the first week of November 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then In her motion for reconsideration, appellant asked this Court to reverse its order of dismissal in the interest of
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to RUBY CHUA to apply on account or for substantial justice and equity.9 We initially found no compelling reason to grant her motion and resolved to deny
value Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. Check No. 041784 dated November 18, 1983 payable to Ruby Chua in the with finality appellant’s MR in a resolution dated February 3, 1993. 10 Appellant thereafter filed a "Second and
amount of ₱5,392.34, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they did not have sufficient Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," attaching thereto an "Affidavit of Desistance" of complainant Ruby Chua
funds in or credit with the drawee bank or payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, which stated in part:
when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
xxx xxx x x x.
said complainant the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
2. that the defendant Mrs. Cora Ojeda has already fully paid her monetary obligation to me in the amount of
₱228,306.00 which is the subject of the aforementioned cases;
Contrary to law.
xxx xxx x x x.
The pertinent facts of the case follow.
23
5. That as the private complainant, I am now appealing to the sense of compassion and humanity of the good
justices of the Supreme Court to reconsider the appeal of Mrs. Cora Ojeda and I solemnly pray that the criminal
liability be extinguished with her civil liability.11
In a resolution dated March 17, 1993, 12 this Court denied the second MR for having been filed without leave of
court. In the same resolution, this Court ordered the entry of judgment in due course.
Appellant thereafter filed another motion dated April 21, 1993, praying that she be recommended to then
President Fidel V. Ramos for executive clemency. In support of such motion, she once more attached the
affidavit of desistance13 of complainant Ruby Chua which categorically declared that "the defendant, Ms. Cora
Ojeda, (had) already fully paid her monetary obligations to (Chua) in the amount of ₱228,306 which (was) the
subject of the aforementioned cases."14
In view of such special circumstances, this Court issued a resolution dated June 9, 1993 15 recalling its
resolutions dated October 14, 1992, February 3, 1993 and March 17, 1993 for humanitarian reasons and in the
interest of justice, and in order that this Court may resolve appellant’s appeal on the merits. 16
Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignments of error:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DECEIT WAS EMPLOYED BY ACCUSED APPELLANT WHEN SHE
ISSUED THE CHECKS TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ISSUANCE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CHECKS TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS MERELY A MODE OF PAYMENT WHICH ARRANGEMENT HAD
BEEN THEIR PRACTICE FOR THREE (3) YEARS.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT GOOD FAITH IS A VALID DEFENSE AGAINST ESTAFA BY
POSTDATING A CHECK
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF FOURTEEN (14) COUNTS OF B.P. 22 WHEN
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO THE ACCUSED.
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SINCE 13 OF THE 14 CHECKS WERE DEPOSITED ONLY
AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 90 DAY PERIOD, HENCE, THE PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE DOES
NOT APPLY.17
Appellant firmly denies any criminal liability for estafa. She argues there was no deceit employed when she
issued the checks because she never assured Chua that the checks were funded. Chua allegedly knew all along
that the checks were merely intended to guarantee future payment by appellant.
Appellant further claims good faith in all her transactions with Chua for three years. She explained that her
failure to fund the checks was brought about by the collapse of the country’s economy in the wake of the
Aquino assassination in 1983. The capital flight and financial chaos at that time caused her own business to shut
down when her customers also failed to pay her. Despite the closure of her business, appellant maintains that
she did her best to continue paying Chua what she owed and, when she could no longer pay in cash, she
instead paid in kind in the form of finished goods. But these were not enough to cover her debts. Nevertheless,
she spared no effort in complying with her financial obligations to Chua until she was gradually able to pay all
her debts, a fact fully admitted as true by complainant in her affidavit.
From the foregoing, appellant contends that the element of deceit thru abuse of confidence or false pretenses
was not present. Thus, her guilt was not established with satisfactory proof. Appellant asserts that good faith on
her part was a valid defense to rebut the prima facie presumption of deceit when she issued the checks that
subsequently bounced.
Furthermore, out of the 14 checks cited in the decision of the trial court, only one check was deposited within
90 days from due date. This was check no. 033550 dated November 5, 1983. The rest of the checks were
deposited only on April 10, 1984 or more than 90 days from the date of the last check. 18
Appellant also denies she received any notice of dishonor of the checks, contrary to the findings of the trial
court. She was not even aware that cases had already been filed against her for violation of BP 22. Since there
was allegedly no proof of notice 19 of the dishonor of the checks, appellant claims that she cannot be convicted
of violation of BP 22.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was criminally liable for issuing worthless
checks. Complainant Chua accepted the postdated checks as payment because of appellant’s good credit
standing. She was confident that appellant’s checks were good checks. Thus, no assurances from appellant that
the checks were sufficiently funded were needed for Chua to part with her goods. And when the checks later
bounced, appellant betrayed the confidence reposed in her by Chua.
The Solicitor General also argues that there was a simultaneous exchange of textile materials and checks
between complainant and appellant. Complainant Chua would not have parted with her telas had she known
that appellant’s checks would not clear. Appellant obtained something in exchange for her worthless checks.
When she issued them, she knew she had no funds to back up those checks because her account had already
been closed. Yet, she did not inform Chua that the checks could not be cashed upon maturity. She thus
deceived Chua into parting with her goods and the deceit employed constituted estafa.
We grant the appeal.
DECEIT AND DAMAGE AS ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, 20 the elements of estafa are: (1) a
check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 21 Thus, the drawer
of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the
check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit was successfully
rebutted by appellant’s evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. 22 Good faith may be
demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the
debtor not only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-
appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
24
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent A Yes, that is the signature of my lawyer.
denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a
concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the "criminal mind" behind the ATTY. ANGELES:
"criminal act." Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a
criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person May we request that this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988 consisting of two (2) pages, Your Honor, be
performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:23 marked as Exhibit ‘W’ and that the signature on the second page of this letter of Virginia Guevarra Nabor be
encircled and be marked as Exhibit ‘W-1’ and that the attached Registry Receipt, Your Honor, be marked as
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification of public documents and Exhibit ‘W-2’.
estafa:
COURT:
"Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting." Mark them.

American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in embezzlement ATTY. ANGELES:
is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be
no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. Q Now, Mrs. Witness, why do you know that this is the signature of Virginia Guevarra Nabor?

The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert the money or A After preparing that I saw her sign the letter.
goods for his personal benefit.24 We are convinced that appellant was able to prove the absence of criminal
intent in her transactions with Chua. Had her intention been tainted with malice and deceit, appellant would not Q Now, after sending this Demand Letter, do you know
have exerted extraordinary effort to pay the complainant, given her own business and financial reverses.
If the accused herein made payments or replaced
LACK OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR
the checks that were issued to you?
We also note that the prosecution presented virtually no evidence to show that the indispensable notice of
dishonor was sent to and received by appellant. Excerpts from the following testimony of complainant are COURT:
significant:
Q Of course, you assumed that the accused received that letter, that is his basis on the premise that the
ATTY. ANGELES: accused received that letter?

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, when these checks from Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘V’ have bounced, what steps, did you do? ATTY. ANGELES:

A I consulted my lawyer and she wrote a Demand Letter. A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: COURT:

Q What is the name of that lawyer? Q What proof is there to show that accused received the letter because your question is premises ( sic) on the
assumption that the accused received the letter?
A Atty. Virginia Nabora.
ATTY. ANGELES:
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, do you know Mrs. Witness if the accused received the letter?
Q Now, you mentioned a Demand Letter sent by Atty. Virginia Nabor, I am showing to you this Demand Letter
dated March 16, 1988, will you kindly examine the same if this is the same Demand Letter you mentioned a A There is a registry receipt.
while ago?
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, later on after sending that letter, did you have communication with the accused?
Q Now, on this second page of this Demand Letter there is a signature above the printed name Virginia
Guevarra Nabor, do you know the signature, Mrs. Witness?
A I kept on calling her but I was not able to get in touch

25
with her. fairness require -- that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
Q But do you know if that letter of your lawyer was received by the accused?
Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence, personal knowledge of the notice
A I was not informed by my lawyer but I presumed that of dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there may have been constructive notice to appellant regarding
the insufficiency of her funds in the bank, it was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due
the same was already received by the accused. process.

ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, aside from sending this Demand Letter, do you know what your lawyer did?
A We filed a case with the Fiscal’s.25
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was made by the prosecution. The
prosecution claimed that the demand letter was sent by registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of
the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt bearing a signature which was, however, not even
authenticated or identified. A registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. 26 "Receipts for registered
letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as
proof of receipt of the letters."27
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter
prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the
checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after
complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscal’s office 28
without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received
by appellant.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and
Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to
cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the
maker or drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both
laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice
of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or violation
of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella
Ojeda is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 for estafa and in Criminal Case Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232,
88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-66242, 88-66243, 88-66245 to 88-66248 for violation of BP 22.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. Penned by Judge Arturo U. Barias, Jr.
The lack of such notice violated appellant’s right to procedural due process. "It is a general rule that when
service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service." 29 2
Rollo, p. 40.
The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for
conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 3
Exhibit "A".

When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it became incumbent upon the 4
Exhibit "Y".
prosecution to prove that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was
received by appellant. But it did not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 5
Exhibits "X", "Y", "AA", "BB" and "CC".

This Court therefore cannot, with moral certainty, convict appellant of violation of BP 22. The evident failure of 6
Exhibits "C", "H", "J", "M", "O" and "R".
the prosecution to establish that she was given the requisite notice of dishonor justifies her acquittal. 30
7
Record, p. 139.
As held in Lao vs. Court of Appeals:31
8
Rollo, p. 47.
"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing
him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action 9
Rollo, p. 49.
is abated.’ This was also compared ‘to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of
time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.’ In 10
Rollo, p. 52.
this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an 11
Ibid., p. 61.
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice
of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of 12
Rollo, p. 62.
26
13
Rollo, p. 70.

14
Ibid. G.R. No. 144785 September 11, 2003.

15
Rollo, p. 76. YOLANDA GARCIA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

16
Rollo, p. 76. DECISION

17
Rollo, pp. 87-88. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

18
Section 2 of BP 22 states: This is an appeal from the decision 1 dated August 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22771
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila which found petitioner Yolanda
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds . – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, to
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such indemnify the complainant in the amount of P87,000.00, and to pay the costs.
insufficiently of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Petitioner Yolanda Garcia was charged with estafa in an information which reads:
19
Ibid.
That on or about and during the period comprised between June 20, 1995, and August 15, 1995, inclusive, in
20
Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code states: the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
one DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the and fraudulent representations which she made to said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to the effect that accused has
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the three (3) checks which according to her have sufficient funds and if encashed, the same will not be dishonored;
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said DOLORES S.
of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or APOLONIO to accept the following checks:
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
Name of Bank Check No. Amount Date Payable to
21
People vs. Chua, 315 SCRA 326 [1999].
Phil Nat’l Bank 046884 P28,000.00 6-20-’95 Cash
22
People vs. Gulion, 349 SCRA 610 [2001]; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals , 150 SCRA 336 [1987]; People
vs.Villapando, 56 Phil. 31 [1931]. -do- 047416 34,000.00 8-15-’95 -do

23
268 SCRA 332 [1997]. Pilipinas Bank 60042087 25,000.00 7-25-’95 Garcia

24
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 396 [1999]. Vegetable Dealer

25
TSN, December 7, 1989, pp. 37-43. as payments of assorted vegetables which accused purchased and received from said DOLORES S. APOLONIO
in the total amount of P87,000.00, said accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and
26
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551 [2000], citing Central Trust Co. vs. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580. representations were all false and untrue as said checks when presented to the bank for payment were all
dishonored for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds", and were made solely for the purpose of
27
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, ibid. obtaining, as in fact she did obtain assorted vegetables in the amount of P87,000.00; which once in her
possession and with intent to defraud, she willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
28
TSN, December 7, 1989, pp. 42-23. converted the said assorted vegetables or the value thereof to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P87,000.00, Philippine Currency.
29
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing 58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
30
Caras vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 371 [2001].
Petitioner pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. Trial on the merits then ensued.
31
Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572 [1997].
27
For more than a year, petitioner had been buying assorted vegetables from Dolores Apolonio in Divisoria,
Manila. Petitioner always paid in cash. However, in May 1995, petitioner thrice bought vegetables from Apolonio
using three checks: one postdated June 20, 1995 for P28,000.00, drawn by her husband, Manuel Garcia; the
second postdated July 25, 1995 for P34,000.00, drawn by her daughter Gigi Garcia; and the third postdated
August 15, 1995 for P25,000.00, drawn by her nephew Jose Nadongga Jr. When the three checks were
presented for payment, they were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Hence, Apolonio instituted the aforesaid criminal case against petitioner.
In her defense, petitioner claimed that the amounts of the checks were already paid and that the same did not
belong to her as they were only paid to her by her customers. She also maintained she did not have any
transaction with the complainant in May 1995.
On December 29, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, Sec. 2(2) (sic) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances and taking into account the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused Yolanda Garcia to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum.
She should also indemnify the complainant in the amount of P87,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals, which, on August 30, 2000, rendered the assailed
decision affirming the judgement of conviction rendered by the trial court.
In this petition for review, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In affirming the trial court’s decision finding her guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, Section 2[d]
of the Revised Penal Code as amended for issuing postdated checks, when she was charged in the information
for the crime of estafa through false pretenses punishable under Art. 315, Section 2[a] of the Revised Penal
Code.
2. In convicting her of estafa under Article 315, Section 2[d] of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes those
who issue postdated checks when petitioner did not issue or draw the postdated checks.
3. In convicting her of estafa under Article 315, Section 2[d] of the Revised Penal Code when there is no
evidence that she had knowledge that the postdated checks she allegedly delivered to complainant were
without sufficient funds.
4. In not considering that she delivered said checks to complainant in payment of a pre-existing obligation so
that her liability if at all is civil in nature.
5. In not reversing and setting aside the trial court’s decision and in not acquitting her instead. 4
Petitioner basically claims that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her was violated because, although she was charged with estafa under Article 315, Section 2[a], as
amended, which penalizes false manifestations or fraudulent representations in defraudation of another, she
was instead convicted of estafa under Article 315, Section 2[d] which penalizes the issuance of postdated
checks that were not funded or were insufficiently funded.
Petitioner further claims she was not the issuer or the drawer of said checks, and had no knowledge that they
were unfunded or underfunded. In any case, assuming that she indeed issued or drew the checks, they were in
payment of a pre-existing obligation. Consequently, she could not be held liable for estafa and her liability is
only civil in nature.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information. Section 8 thereof provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained
in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must
be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information
must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes. 5
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code provides that swindling or estafa by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud is committed by "using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits." The elements of estafa under this penal
provision are: (1) the accused defrauded another by means of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party. 6
A careful reading of the Information clearly shows that petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that petitioner "by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations . . . to the effect that accused has three checks which according
to her have sufficient funds and if encashed the same will not be dishonored; . . . induced . . . Dolores S.
Apolonio to accept the following checks . . . as payment of assorted vegetables . . . in the total amount of
P87,000.00." 7
There is, however, no basis for petitioner to conclude that she was convicted for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes any person who shall defraud another by postdating
or issuing a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the bank or
his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The elements of this form of estafa
are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. 8
While the typographical error in the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision did not help in clearing this
matter by saying that,." . . the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315, Sec. 2(2) of the Revised Penal Code, . . .," 9 the body of the trial court’s decision clearly
discusses the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), thus:
The elements of estafa are (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (2) that the damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party.
In the instant case when accused convinced the complainant assuring her that the postdated checks she was
giving as payment of the vegetables of the same amount that she got, are funded as they belong to her
relatives, when actually they are bad checks, she employed deceit. In so doing, the complainant is damaged to
the tune of P87,000.00 which is the value of the vegetables.
28
Another element to be proven in estafa is knowledge that at the time she negotiated the checks, the drawer has
no sufficient funds in the bank. The fact that the checks were postdated at some future date is evidence enough
to show that at the time of negotiation the drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the checks. 10
Even supposing that the trial court apparently discussed estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), it was only
pointing out the absurdity of petitioner’s argument, thus:
When accused testified that she does not use the checks of other persons, what did she mean during the pre-
trial that the checks subject of this case belong to her customers and given to her in payment? Is she not in
effect saying that she gave to the complainant the three checks of her customers to pay her own purchases?
This again is an admission that she really used the checks of other persons to pay her obligation.
Maybe she has in mind that since she is not the maker of the checks she cannot be guilty of estafa. But she is
wrong. In the case of People v. Isleta, et. al., 61 Phil. 332 and reiterated in the case of Zalgado v. CA, 178 SCRA
146, it was held that the appellant who only negotiated directly and personally the check drawn by another is
guilty of estafa because he had "guilty knowledge that at the time he negotiated the check, the drawer has no
sufficient funds." 11
In other words, whether petitioner was charged under either paragraph 2(a) or 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, she would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements
of the offense, have been established with satisfactory proof. The fraudulent act was committed prior to or
simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check. The guarantee and the simultaneous delivery of the checks by
petitioner were the enticement and the efficient cause of the defraudation committed against Apolonio who
suffered damage amounting to P87,000.00 as a result of the fraud committed by petitioner in paying him
underfunded checks drawn by three different persons.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a specie of fraud.
12
In fact, the Court of Appeals saw through petitioner’s deceit when it observed, thus:
Appellant’s scheme is obvious. She wanted to get vegetables from Apolonio for free. In order to escape from
any criminal liability, she asked her husband, daughter and nephew to issue the bouncing checks. And certainly,
the scheme was deceitful. The appellant could not have been unaware of the insufficient funds of her relatives
to support the checks they issued but she tendered the checks to Apolonio with the assurance that they were
funded. Appellant could have exerted efforts to settle her account upon notice of the dishonored checks if she
were in good faith. 13
In view of the foregoing, we see no need to discuss the other assigned errors.
Petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2[a] of the Revised Penal Code. The proper
imposable penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. 14
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such as estafa,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. 15
In this case, petitioner defrauded Apolonio in the amount of P87,000.00. The fact that the amount exceeds
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the
matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of
the full indeterminate sentence. This accords with the rule that penal laws are construed in favor of the
accused. 16
Hence, the maximum penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be taken from the maximum period of the
basic penalty, i.e., prision mayor in its minimum period, which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day to eight (8) years.
The minimum penalty, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree than the basic penalty which is prision correccional in its minimum and medium period, in any of its
periods, the range of which is from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years and one (1) day. The proper penalty should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial
court finding Yolanda Garcia guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2[a] of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P87,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
1. Penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo Sr.
(now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Martin S. Villarama Jr.
2. CA Records, p. 13.
3. Penned by Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43.
4. Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 14–15.
29
5. Naya v. Spouses Abing, G.R. No. 146770, 27 February 2003. by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which he made to said Go Song Hiap to the
effect that he (accused) has 23,000 bags of cement for sale of 94 pounds each in his bodega at 1332 Tayabas,
6. People v. Balasa, 356 Phil. 362, 382 (1998). Manila, all valued at P33,500.00; that said bags of cement are ready for delivery anytime to the buyer upon
demand and that he (accused) is willing to issue Checj No. BA--HO 345479A which has sufficient funds in the
7. Information, Records, p. 13. bank of Asia as a cover check to guaranty the quality of cement which Go Song Hiap may encash on May 25,
1970 if the cement is not of the standard quality, and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and
succeeded in including the said Go Song Hiap to deliver the sum of P33,500.00 as payment for the said 23,000
8. People v. Tan, G.R. No. 120672, 17 August 2000, 338 SCRA 330, 336–337.
bags of cement, which said accused received well knowing that he has no cement and that he has no sufficient
money in the bank up his cover check sums of money, once in his possession, in spite of repeated demands
9. Decision, Records, pp. 53, 56; Emphasis ours. made ipon him to return the said amount of P35,500.00 or deliver the 23,000 bags of cement, he refused and
failed, and still fails and refuses to do so, and instead misappropriated, misaplied and coverted the said amount
10. Id., pp. 53, 55. to his personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Go Song Hiap in the aforesaid sum of
P33,500.00, Philippine currency.
11. Id.
After trial, the lower Court convicted petitioner of Estafa undr Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code (by
12. People v. Hernando, 375 Phil. 1078, 1091 (1999). issuance of bouncing checks).

13. Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, pp. 29, 33. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed conviction but penalized the accused instead Article 315, 2(a)
(thru false pretenses or similar deceits). Two Motions for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
14. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. interposed the instant appeal by Certiori.

15. People v. Hernando, 375 Phil. 1078, 1094 (1999). G. R. No. L-53663

16. People v. Hernando, supra. Petitioner Lolita Bañares was accused of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 1772 of the Court of First Instance,
Negros Occidental, Branch III, under an Information reading:

G.R. No. L-57170 November 19, 1982
KO BU LIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53663 November 19, 1982
LOLITA BAÑARES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Separate Decisions of the Court of Appeals are sought to be reversed through these two appeals by certiorari
files by petitioners Ko Bu Lin (in G. R. No. L-57170), and Lolita Bañares (in G. R. No. L-53663), involving Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code on Estafa, and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
The Petitions were initially denied by the former First Division of the Court, but, on Motions for Reconsideration
filed by both petitioners, and after of both cases to the Court en bank due to failure to get the concurrence of five
members within the Division, the Court en banc resolved to give due course.
That on or about, the 2nd and 3rd week of June, 1974, in the municipality of San Enrique, province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-assorted jewelries worth
P92,100.00 on consignment basis, with the condition to return the same within one (1) month from receipt
thereof if unsold or the money value of the same if sold, far from complying with her said obligation, with abuse
of confidence and with intent to defraud, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to her own personal use and benefit the proceeds thereof after said jewelries were sold
and disposed of, and in order to cover up her aforesaid unlawful and felonious act, well knowing that she no
longer had any deposit with the banks herein below mentioned having already closed her account with said
banks issued and delivered to said Dolores Centeno the following postdated checks drawn against the banks
hereinbelow mentioned:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
which checks, when presented for payment, wre dishonored and not paid for the reason stated in the foregoing,
to the damage and prejudice of said Dolores Centeno in the total amount of NINIETY-TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED PESOS (P92,100.00), Philippine currency.

G. R. No. L-57170
Petitioner Ko Bu Lin was charged in Criminal Case No. 6959 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XL,
with Estafa under the following Information:
That on or about the 5th day of May, 1970, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Go Song Hiap in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
The Trial Court convicted here of Estafa under Article 315 2(d) after Revised Penal Code (by issuance of bad
checks) as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
of estafa as so defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 4885 and as further amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 and senteces her to suffer an

30
indeterminate imprisonment o Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty-two (22)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, to indemnify the offended party in the amout of
Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Pesos (P92,100.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
On appeal, respondent Court modified the lower Court judgment and convicted her instead of Estafa under
Article 315, 1(b) (by misappropriation or conversion). The decretal portion of that Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the appellant Lolita a Bañares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
ESTAFA as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of, from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prison correccional as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P92,100.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in case
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
After denial of her Motions for Reconsideration, the accused filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner Ko Bu Lin argues that when he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, he was exposed to the jeopardy
of conviction of Estafa by means of false pretenses [Art. 315, parag. 2(a)], or by issuing a check with no funds
[ibid, parag. 2 (d)], or both; that the Trial Court's findings appearing in the body of the judgment that "he cannot
be said to have falsely pretended or fraudulently acted in selling the 23,000 bags of cement to Go Song Hiap"
and that "Article 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to this case" exonerated him from the
charge of Estafa thru false pretenses [Art. 315, 2(a)] and was as good as an acquittal although omitted from the
dispositive portion of the Decision; that said acquittal is final and the Appellate Court cannot therefore be justified
in reopening his acquittal; that because he never disputed said findings of the Trial Court and concentrated his
appeal on his conviction under Art. 315, 2(d), nor did the prosecution appeal from said findings, the Court of
Appeals went beyond the limits of the assigned error and the facts upon which conviction was based, thus
depriving him of his day in Court and denying him his right to due process in his appeal.
Petitioner Lolita Bañares contends that the Information charged her with two separate and distinct offenses of
Estafa: that defind and penalized under Art. 315 1(b), Revised Penal Code, or Estafa through misappropriation,
and that defined and penalized under Art. 315, 2(d), Revised Penal Code, or Estafa issuance of bouncing
checks, thereby, she was already placed in jeopardy of being convicted of both offenses; that when the trial
Court chose to convicrt her of only the Estafa defined and penalized under Art. 315, 2(d), it necessariily
"impliedly acquitted" her of Estafa under Art. 315, 1(b), Revised Penal Code; that her siad "implied acquittal" of
Estafa through misappropriation was immediately final; that she appealed only from the judgment convicting her
of Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks, so, what was opened up for review was only the concerning
Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks; that the Court of Appeals went beyond the limits of its power
contrary to the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
The decisive issue is whether ir not respondent Appellate Court erred in convincing petitioner Ko Bu Lin of
Estafa by means of false pretenses [Art. 315, parag. 2 (a)], and petitioner Lolita Bañares of Estafa by
misappropriation or conversion [Art. 315, parag. 1 (b)], when the Trial Courrts had allegedly "impliedly acquitted"
them of the said offenses when they were respectively found guilty of Estafa through the issuance of bouncing
checks [Art. 315, parag. 2 (d)].
It must be condeded that the elements of Estafa committed by means of the issuance of bouncing checks [Art.
315, 2 (d)], of which petioners were convicted by the Court, are different from the elements constituting Estafa
by means of false pretenses [Art. 315, 2 (a)], of which Ko Bu Lin was convicted by the Court of Appeals, and
from the elements constituting Estafa by means of misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, 1(b), of
which Lilita Bañares was convicted by the same Appellant Court.
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioners were convicted of crimes charged in the
informations as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the informations yields an
affirmative answer. The Information filed against Ko Bu Lin sufficiently charges Estafa through false pretences.
So does the Information filed against Lolita Bañares sufficiently charge Estafa through misappropriation or
conversion. There was no ambiguity in the Informations, and the accused could adequately prepare for their
defense. Petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them,
petitioners could be convicted of the said offenses, the same having been proved. Petioners have not deprived
of any constitutional right.
It is inaccurate for petitioners to contend that the Informations filed against them exposed them to conviction for
two offenses. The Informations are not duplicitous ones. The fact is that the different means of commission have
been specifically spelled out. AS held in the case of Jurado vs. Suy Yan 1, per Makasiar, J., with almost Identical
facts as in the Ko Bu Lin case:
The allegations in the information are clear and do not charge the accused with two offenses. As contended by
the City Fiscal of Iligan City, the information accuse the defendant of onlu one estafa committed by false
pretenses under paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penall Code, but specifficaly describes the false
pretenses or deceitful acts employed by the accused in perpetrating the offense, namely, his falsely pretending
to possess property, credit or business under sub-paragraph (a) of the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 315 and
by post-dating a check or issuing such check in payment of an obligation knowing that he had no sufficient funds
in the bank to cover the amount of the check, without informing the payee of such circumstances, inder sub-
paragraph (d) of the same paragraph 2 of Article 315. It is emphasized herein that sub-paragraphs (a) and (d) of
Article 315 of Revised Penal Code are two of the five false pretenses or fraudulent acts that can be employed
and were actually employed in this case by the accused to commit the one crime of estafa charged against him
in the information.
By parity of reasoning, the same can be said in Lolita Bañares' case although separate sections, Article 315,
2(d) and Article 315, 1(b) are involved.
We reiterated the earlier jurisprudence that where an offence may be committed in any of the different modes
and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or modes specified, the indictment is sufficient,
notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate
sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby defective on the ground of
multifariousness. (ibid.)
One of the earlier jurisprudence referred to is U.S. vs. Tolentino 2, which held:
It is well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several
modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes
specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them, provided that it be such as to
constitute the substantive offense.
Besides, the appellants having gone to trial, without objection. on Informations they allege as charging
duplicatous offenses, they be deemed as having waived the right secured to them under Section 12, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court. 3
Invocation of the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is misplaced. When the petitioners appealed from
the sentence of the Trial Court, they waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the
whole case open of the Appellate Court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, 4 and whether they are made the subject of assignments or
error or not. 5 Petitioners' appeal confered upon the Appellate Court full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to
examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of
the penal law. 6 Also explicit in this regards is Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
31
Power of appellate Court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the Court of First Instance, the
appellate court may reverse. affirm, or modify the judgement and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the
trial court, remand the case to the Court of First Instancefor new trial or re-trial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
A case in point is that of Lontoc vs. People, 7 aptly cited by the Solicitor General. In that suit, the accused was
charrged with having committed the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of a Public Document. The Court
of First Instance found him guilty only of Falsification thru Reckless Imprudence and sentenced him to suffer 4
months and 1 day of aresto mayor. The acused appealed to the Court of Appealswhich, after reviewing the
evidence, found him guilty of the original charge of Estafa thru Falsification of a Public Document and sentenced
him to an interminate penalty of from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, and
to pay a fine P200.00 and costs. When the case was elevated to this Tribunal on Petition for Review on
Certiorari, the main question of law involved was: "could the Court of Appeals legally find the appellant guilty of
Estafa thru Falsification of a Public Document as originally charged against him after the lower Court had found
him guilty only of against him after the lower Court had found him guilty only of Falsification through Reckless
Imprudence, thereby acquiting him of Stafa?" This Court affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals and held:
We find that the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner of the higher offense with which he
was charged in the Court of First Instance is in accordance with the ruling laid down by this Court in a long line
of decisios, from U.S. vs. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, to People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1, which has been embodied in
statutory from in section 11 of Rule 120 above quoted. The reason statutory form in section 11 of Rule 120
above quoted. The reason behind this ruke when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the apppellant. This rule is too well known for any lawyer to ignore. But if the
numerous cases wherein this Court has convicted the appellants of a higher offense or has increased the
penalty imposed on them by the trial court, have not benn seen by some lawyers for accused-appellants as a
red indicative of danger or risk, let the bitter experience of the herein petitioner serve as a perpetual reminder to
others to heed the moral lesson of the proverbs with which this opinion is prefaced. 8
but modified the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals for being erroneous.
The proposition submitted by petitioner, Lolita Bañares, that the appeal to the Court of Appeals is "limited only
to the judgment or sentence of conviction and does not affect the implied acquittal, which was immediately
final", is unavailing. The power of the Appellate Court on appeal cannot be thus constricted. Petitioner's appeal
was unqualified.
... the rule is well — settled that when an accused unqualifiedly appeals from a sentence of the trial coiurt — as
did the accused in this case — he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon the render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable to the appellant or not. 9
There was no implied acquittal to speak of, only one offense of Estafa having been sufficiently charged in each
Information. The Information in the Ko Bu Lin case merely speaks of a "willingness" to issue "a cover to guaranty
the quality of the cement." While the Information in the Bañares case alleges that the checks were issued "to
cover up a felonious and unlawful act." Absent is an essential elements in Estafa through the issuance of
bouncing checks that the checks be issued in payment of an obligation. But even if there were implied acquittal,
following the Lantoc case, the pertinent excerpt from which has been quoted hereinabove, there is no
impediment to conviction by the Court of Appeals even for a higher offense with which an accused has been
charged.
For the same reason neither can petitioner, Ko Bu Lin, successfully claim that he was "denied due process of
law in hisappeal because the Court of Appeals wentr beyond the limit of his assigned errors and the upon which
his conviction under sub-section (d), paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amendedm, is
predicated." As earlier stressed, whether raised in the assignments of error or not, the entire case is open for full
review. 10
In sum, respondent Court of Appeals did not err in modifying the respective judgments of the Trial Courts by
finding Ko Bu Lin guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a), and Lolita Bañares under Article 315 (1) (b), both of
the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, denying petitioners' Motions for Reconsideration, both Petitions are hereby dismissed, and the
sentences of conviction respectively affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C. J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The petition are based on frivolous grounds and should have been summarily dismissed. They raise questions
similar to how many angels can stand on the point of a needle.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
I beg to dissent.
To my mind, the information * is a duplicitious one because it charges two different offenses, namely: (1) estafa
by abuse of confidence, mparticularly estaffa through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code; (2) estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
specifically estafa through issuance of bouncing checks Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the said Code.
There seems to be question that the trial court convicted the accused (petitioner herein) only of the second
charge. As such, having been charged and tried of estafa on two counts and convicted only under the second
charge, the accused is thereby necessarily, albeit impliedly, acquitted of the first. When the accused appealed
from the judgment, it could only be from the judgment of conviction, not from that of acquittal. No one in his right
mind would appeal from a decision of acquittal. Moreover, legally speaking, a decision of acquittal is immediately
final, inappealable and executory. There is nothing more to be done therewith. If no appeal was taken with
respect thereto, then the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to convict and impose the penalty for the said
charge.
I am of the opinion that it is not correct to say that the appeal throws the whole case for review, to the extent of
giving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to convict and impose the proper penalty for the first charge of estafa.
This would be a clear violation of the right against double jeopardy. There is no waiver either of this right since
the appeal is limited only to the charge of which petitioner was convicted, as explained above.
What justifies the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the whole case for review is that the appeal
constites a waiver of the right of double jeopardy. However, an appeal from a judgment of conviction as to one
offense would not reopen the judgment of acquittal for another offense charged in the same information. If in the
case cited, 1 for the complex crime of estafa through falsification, the judgment convicted the accused only of
falsification, but on appeal, the accused was found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification, this
was legally feasible because only one offense was charged, so the judgment was on that one complex crime,
which may legally be modified, because the judgment, as modified, will still be the same judgment on the single
32
charge of a complex crime. It will at once be noted in the case just cited, that the accused therein was convicted
of a lesser offense included within the higher offense of which the accused was originally charged. In other
words, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appels to review the case when the right to appeal is exercised
by the accused is limited only to the offense of which he was convicted and from which judgment hehas
appealed, excluding the other offense of which the accused has been acquitted though charged in the same
information, the latter not having been appealed, nor is it included in the former; it is entirely separable
therefrom.
Moreover, the falsification in the case cited in the main opinion, may be only considered as the means of
committing the estafa, and is not separable as a simple felony in itself but is always an integral part of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification. It could be equated to a mere aggravating circumstance, which
even if not found to be existent by the triall court, may be found existent by the appellate court if the evidence
warrants such finding. Thus when it comes to mere aggravating circumstances, even if the trial court failed to
consider any, appellate court may do so, even if as a result the penalty would be raised by the appellate court.
This is not violative of the principle double jeopardy, and the appellate court may increase the penalty, there
being a waiver of the right by the appeal taken by the accused, and the case is thrown open for a complete
review violating the double jeopardy rule.
But if by way of illustration, A is charged with double murder for the killing of X and Y, and the judgment of the
trial court is to convict A only for the death of X, nothing having been said of the killing of Y, and the indemnities
awared are only for the heirs of X, the judgment is if not express at least implied, one of acquittal insofar as the
killing of Y is concerned. If the judgment is appealed, then the appellate court may not convict A for the killing of
Y, although it may convict or acquit A for the killing of X.
As between the two sets of cases illustrated above, it is the last one to which the instant case is similar in all
material aspects. The same rule as intimated to be applicable thereto should therefore, apply to the case at bar.
This means that the Court of Appeals could not legally and validly convict petitioner for the first charge of estafa
(abuse of confidence) after she had been already acquitted thereof by the trial court.
What should also be given proper significance is the fact that petitioner's conviction for the charge for the charge
of estafa for having issued bouncing checks in payment of the obligation to complainant,as to the price of the
jewelries, is so erroneous on its face, in the light of the established jurisprudence on the matter that petitioner is
compelled to appeal the judgment of conviction. In a manner of speaking, the accused is forced toappeal not as
a voluntary act, as to constitutre waiver of the right against double jeopardy. Accordingly, as already intimated, it
would not be accurate to any that the appeal threw the whole case open for review, including the fact that
petitioner had been acquitted of the first charge of estafa (abuse of confidence). It was only with the second
charge of estafa (issuing bouncing checks) that the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction and may affirm,
modify or reverse the judgment with respecty onlu to said offense, which in the light of existing jurisprudence, 2
should be to reverse the conviction, and the Court of Appeals did. The result would be for the petitioner to stand
acquitted of both charges by the trial court of estafa through misappropriation or conversion, and the Court of
Appeals, of estafa through issuance of bouncing checks in payment of a pre-existing objection.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it
convicts the petitioner of the first charge of estafa committed by the abuse of confidence.
Makasiar and Guerrero, JJ., join the dissent of Justice Castro.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The petition are based on frivolous grounds and should have been summarily dismissed. They raise questions
similar to how many angels can stand on the point of a needle.
DE CASTRO, J.,dissenting:
I beg to dissent.
To my mind, the information * is a duplicitious one because it charges two different offenses, namely: (1) estafa
by abuse of confidence, mparticularly estaffa through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code; (2) estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
specifically estafa through issuance of bouncing checks Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the said Code.
There seems to be question that the trial court convicted the accused (petitioner herein) only of the second
charge. As such, having been charged and tried of estafa on two counts and convicted only under the second
charge, the accused is thereby necessarily, albeit impliedly, acquitted of the first. When the accused appealed
from the judgment, it could only be from the judgment of conviction, not from that of acquittal. No one in his right
mind would appeal from a decision of acquittal. Moreover, legally speaking, a decision of acquittal is immediately
final, inappealable and executory. There is nothing more to be done therewith. If no appeal was taken with
respect thereto, then the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to convict and impose the penalty for the said
charge.
I am of the opinion that it is not correct to say that the appeal throws the whole case for review, to the extent of
giving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to convict and impose the proper penalty for the first charge of estafa.
This would be a clear violation of the right against double jeopardy. There is no waiver either of this right since
the appeal is limited only to the charge of which petitioner was convicted, as explained above.
What justifies the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the whole case for review is that the appeal
constites a waiver of the right of double jeopardy. However, an appeal from a judgment of conviction as to one
offense would not reopen the judgment of acquittal for another offense charged in the same information. If in the
case cited, 1 for the complex crime of estafa through falsification, the judgment convicted the accused only of
falsification, but on appeal, the accused was found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification, this
was legally feasible because only one offense was charged, so the judgment was on that one complex crime,
which may legally be modified, because the judgment, as modified, will still be the same judgment on the single
charge of a complex crime. It will at once be noted in the case just cited, that the accused therein was convicted
of a lesser offense included within the higher offense of which the accused was originally charged. In other
words, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appels to review the case when the right to appeal is exercised
by the accused is limited only to the offense of which he was convicted and from which judgment hehas
appealed, excluding the other offense of which the accused has been acquitted though charged in the same
information, the latter not having been appealed, nor is it included in the former; it is entirely separable
therefrom.
Moreover, the falsification in the case cited in the main opinion, may be only considered as the means of
committing the estafa, and is not separable as a simple felony in itself but is always an integral part of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification. It could be equated to a mere aggravating circumstance, which
even if not found to be existent by the triall court, may be found existent by the appellate court if the evidence
warrants such finding. Thus when it comes to mere aggravating circumstances, even if the trial court failed to
consider any, appellate court may do so, even if as a result the penalty would be raised by the appellate court.
This is not violative of the principle double jeopardy, and the appellate court may increase the penalty, there
being a waiver of the right by the appeal taken by the accused, and the case is thrown open for a complete
review violating the double jeopardy rule.
But if by way of illustration, A is charged with double murder for the killing of X and Y, and the judgment of the
trial court is to convict A only for the death of X, nothing having been said of the killing of Y, and the indemnities
awared are only for the heirs of X, the judgment is if not express at least implied, one of acquittal insofar as the
killing of Y is concerned. If the judgment is appealed, then the appellate court may not convict A for the killing of
Y, although it may convict or acquit A for the killing of X.
33
As between the two sets of cases illustrated above, it is the last one to which the instant case is similar in all
material aspects. The same rule as intimated to be applicable thereto should therefore, apply to the case at bar.
This means that the Court of Appeals could not legally and validly convict petitioner for the first charge of estafa
(abuse of confidence) after she had been already acquitted thereof by the trial court.
What should also be given proper significance is the fact that petitioner's conviction for the charge for the charge
of estafa for having issued bouncing checks in payment of the obligation to complainant,as to the price of the
jewelries, is so erroneous on its face, in the light of the established jurisprudence on the matter that petitioner is
compelled to appeal the judgment of conviction. In a manner of speaking, the accused is forced toappeal not as
a voluntary act, as to constitutre waiver of the right against double jeopardy. Accordingly, as already intimated, it
would not be accurate to any that the appeal threw the whole case open for review, including the fact that
petitioner had been acquitted of the first charge of estafa (abuse of confidence). It was only with the second
charge of estafa (issuing bouncing checks) that the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction and may affirm,
modify or reverse the judgment with respecty onlu to said offense, which in the light of existing jurisprudence, 2
should be to reverse the conviction, and the Court of Appeals did. The result would be for the petitioner to stand
acquitted of both charges by the trial court of estafa through misappropriation or conversion, and the Court of
Appeals, of estafa through issuance of bouncing checks in payment of a pre-existing objection.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it
convicts the petitioner of the first charge of estafa committed by the abuse of confidence.
Makasiar and Guerrero, JJ., join the dissent of Justice Castro.
Footnotes
1 38 SCRA 663 (1971).
2 5 Phil. 682 (1906).
3 Sec. 12. Duplicity of offense. — A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offense.
4 People vs. Carreon, 115 Phil. 245 (1962).
5 U.S. vs. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83 (1902); People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1 (1924); Suy Sui vs. People, 92 Phil. 685
(1953).
6 U. S. vs. Abijan, supra.
7 74 Phil. 513 (1943).
8 74 Phil. 519-520.
9 People vs. Carreon, 115 Phil. 242, 245 (1962).
10 Suy Sui vs. People, supra.
De Castro, J.:
* For simplicity and convenience, this dissent focused on the case of petitioner Lolita Banares although, by
reason of similarity on the essential facts of the two (2) cases, whatever is said with respect to the case of
petitioner Bañares may likewise be applicable to the case of petitioner Ko Bu Lin.
1 Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513.
2 People v. Sabio, Jr., 86 SCRA 568 and cases cited therein.
G.R. No. 50173 September 21, 1993
HANIEL R. CASTRO and PIO C. CASTRO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Enrique Y. Tandem for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Father and son, Pio Castro and Haniel Castro, filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari which prays for the
reversal of the decision1 of the court a quo finding them guilty of estafa penalized under the provisions of Article
315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885 and Presidential Decree No.
818, for issuing a "bad check". The information 2 reads:
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1975, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other , with deliberate intent of gain and by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit:
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Insular Bank of Asia and America,
Tagbilarang Branch, and without informing complainant Victor Elipe of that circumstance, with intent to defraud
said Victor Elipe, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue or make out a check dated April
21, 1975, bearing No. TAG 1600-702, in the amount of P18,200.00, in payment of construction materials, and
when said check was presented for encashment with the said bank, the same was dishonored for the reason
that they had no funds deposited thereat, and despite notice and repeated demands made upon them by Victor
Elipe to make good said check, have failed and refused and still fail and refuse to make good said check, to the
damage and prejudice of Mr. Victor Elipe in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts of the case that led to the filing of the criminal information arose prior to the enactment on 03 April
1979 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.3
A chance meeting between Pio Castro and Victor Elipe in October, 1974, on board a boat bound for Surigao
from Cebu City got them to converse. Castro learned that Elipe had just opened in Cebu City a hardware store.
Castro, on the other hand, needed to procure materials for the construction of his apartment house at
Tagbilaran City. He proposed to buy, and Elipe agreed to sell, the items that the latter could supply on cash
basis.
As orders were placed on different dates by Pio Castro, so also were deliveries made by Elipe between 09
October 1974 and 25 November 1974. Each time, no payment was made; deliveries, however, continued until
the total unpaid account reached P18,081.15. Elipe kept on making demands for payment but Castro, on every
such occasion, would ask for an extension of time within which to pay.
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Finally, on 21 April 1975, Haniel Castro, a son of Pio Castro, went to see Elipe in Cebu City. The young Castro
issued on even date an Insular Bank of Asia and America check No. TAG 1600702 for the entire amount due
from his father. When presented for encashment, the check was dishonored because the bank account had by
then already been closed.
Demands for payment of the due obligation were again made by Elipe. In return, he got either excuses or
promises from the two Castros. Exasperated, Elipe filed his complaint that led to the filing of the estafa case
against both Pio and Haniel Castro.
On 6 February 1979, the court a quo, after due hearing, rendered judgment, 4 finding the two accused guilty of
estafa as charged, and the two were accordingly sentenced; thus —
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds both accused, Pio Castro and Haniel Castro,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, having confederated and connived in the commission
thereof, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty of ONE (1)
YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS as minimum to FIVE (5) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
and TWENTY (20) DAYS as maximum; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the
complainant Victor Elipe the amount of P18,018.80 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and,
to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition, the conviction by the court a quo is questioned basically on the ground that the factual settings
gave rise to a civil, not criminal, liability.
We agree. The Solicitor General himself recommends for acquittal.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, for which the
petitioners have been charged and convicted, penalizes estafa when committed, among other things, —
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. . . .
The essential requirements of the above offense are that (1) a check is drawn or postdated in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) there are no funds sufficient to cover the check; and
(3) the payee sustains damage thereby.
In People vs. Sabio, et al., G.R. No. L-45490; Tan Tao Liap vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45711; and Lagua
vs. Cusi, G.R. L-42971,5 jointly decided by this Court en banc, reiterated in People v. Tugbang, 6 we held:
. . . (W)hat is significant to note is that the time or occasion for the commission of the false pretense or
fraudulent act has not at all been changed by the amendment (R.A. 4885). The false pretense or fraudulent act
must be executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. Thus, under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, the following are the
elements of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (2) lack or sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.
Now, it is asked: Is there deceit and damage when a bad check is issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation? It is clear that under the law, the false pretense or fraudulent act must be executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. To defraud is to deprive some right, interest, or property by
deceitful device. In the issuance of a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer derives no material
benefit in return as its consideration had long been delivered to him before the check was issued. In short, the
issuance of the check was not a means to obtain a valuable consideration from the payee. Deceit, to constitute
estafa should be the efficient cause of the defraudation. Since an obligation has already been contracted, it
cannot be said that the payee parted with his property or that the drawer has obtained something of value as a
result of the postdating or issuance of the bad check in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
Finally, considering the absence of an express provision in the law, the postdating or issuance of a bad check in
payment of a pre-existing obligation cannot be penalized as estafa by means of deceit, otherwise, the
legislature could have easily worded the amendatory act to that effect. Since the language of the law is plain
and unambiguous, We find no justification in entering into further inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining the
legislature intent. Moreover, laws that impose criminal liability are strictly construed. The rule, therefore, that
the issuance of a bouncing check in payment of a pre-existing obligation does not constitute estafa has not all
been altered by the amendatory act.
Evidently, the law penalizes the issuance of a check only if it were itself the immediate consideration for the
reciprocal receipt of benefits. In other words, the check must be issued concurrently with, and in exchange for,
a material gain to make it a punishable offense under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. In
the issuance of a check to pay a pre-existing obligation, as in the instant case, the drawer derives no such
contemporary gain in return since the obligation sought to be settled is already incurred and outstanding before
the check is issued.
Elipe by continuing to still effect sales and deliveries to the petitioners even without promptly getting paid, for
all intents and purposes, had sold on credit, the amounts due thus turning into simple money obligations. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which now penalizes the mere issuance of a check by a drawer knowing that it will not be
honored cannot obviously apply retroactively to the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Rafael. T. Mendoza of then Court of First Instance, Cebu, Branch VI.
2 Rollo, p. 9-10.
3 AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS
FOR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law.
4 Rollo, 9-24.
5 86 SCRA 568 [1978].
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6 G.R. No. 76212, 196 SCRA 341 [1991].

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