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Moral and Legal Defetcs in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence

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Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice, an XV, nr. 1-2/2019, p. 193-204

MORAL AND LEGAL DEFECTS IN THE CONCEPT

OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Punsara Amarasinghe
Institute of Law and Politics,
Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa, Italy
e-mail: punsaraprint10@gmail.com

Abstract.
This paper seeks to show the fragility of views that have defended
nuclear deterrence as a feasible way to maintain peace and order by proving
why nuclear deterrence becomes detrimental on moral and legal grounds. The
overall structure of this paper is based on main arguments proving the legal
and moral defects of considering nuclear deterrence as method of balancing
power or avoiding a conflict. The paper is based on dual theoretical structures
stemming from international law and moral philosophy. In order to reach the
research outcome, the paper has relied on international case law and moralist
argument critiquing the concept of nuclear deterrence.

Rezumat.
Acest studiu încearcă să arate fragilitatea opiniilor care au apărat
descurajarea nucleară ca o modalitate fezabilă de menţinere a păcii şi a ordinii,
dovedind de ce descurajarea nucleară devine dăunătoare din motive morale şi
legale. Structura generală a acestei lucrări se bazează pe argumente principale
care dovedesc defectele legale şi morale ale considerării descurajării nucleare
ca metodă de echilibrare a puterii sau de evitare a unui conflict. Lucrarea se
bazează pe structuri teoretice duale provenind din dreptul internaţional şi
filozofia morală. Pentru a ajunge la rezultatele cercetării, lucrarea s-a bazat pe
jurisprudenţa internaţională şi argumentul moralist care critică conceptul de
descurajare nucleară.

Keywords.
Morality, Deterrence, International Law.
 Punsara Amarasinghe

Introduction
“I am become death, the destroyer of the worlds” these were the words
uttered by nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer after witnessing the first
nuclear detonation on 16th of July in 1945 and this was a phase Oppenheimer
quoted from Hindu Scripture Bhagavad Gita. It may be a strange factor to observe
why a nuclear physicist wanted quote a Hindu Scripture after seeing the first
atomic detonation of human history, but by looking at conceptual value of Gita
and the moral dilemma Oppenheimer was grappling with his involvement in a
mass destructive project, this context gives a clue to understand how Gita became
a consoling weapon for Oppenheimer. The central thesis of Bhagavad Gita has
generated some interesting questions on what we have been coping to understand
for centuries. The two main characters in this Hindu scripture called Arjuna and
Krishna engage in a dialog before waging a war in the battlefield where Arjuna who
was the warrior of Pandavas behaved anxiously about the losses of lives the in
battle field and saddened by the fact that his victims had not done any injury to
him personally. Arjuna believes one’s decisions rise serious consequences and the
doer is liable for the outcomes emerging from his actions. This moral quandary
was solved by deity Krishna and he justified why one should adhere to the duty
as duty stands foremost obligation regardless any emotional prejudices. No
wonder, how Oppenheimer sought his salvation from this defense of Krishna in
Gita who emphasized the utmost importance to fulfilling the duty. In 1945 being
the chief nuclear scientist of Manhattan project, Oppenheimer’s duty was to
protect the interests of the US and American authorities had aptly illustrated the
necessity of atomic bomb as the only possible way to surrender Japan which
remained staunch even after the fall of Third Reich in 1945 April. The goal
dreamed by American president Truman came true with the unconditional
surrender of Emperor Hirohito after the fall of two atomic bombs in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki and the duty held by Oppenheimer was accomplished too. From a
realist perspective, the scientific research on manufacturing an atomic bomb can
be justified as the creation of such a terrible weapon stood as important to
terminate the war. Moreover, as US military authorities calculated the conducting
a mass military operation to invade Japan would have given a catastrophic result
for both sides and with all these hardships the atomic bomb made American task
possible.
In examining the moral and legal arguments stemmed from Hiroshima,
Nagasaki calamity in order to defend the use of nuclear weapons that it is
interesting to observe that majority of the pro nuclear weapon arguments have
based on using nuclear weapons as a method to create deterrence. However ,in
this article we expect to trace what defects are significantly imbued with the cause
of deterrence from both moral and legal perspectives. This article will unveil the
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 Moral and Legal Defects in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence
fragility of common understanding of deterrence and why taking it as a defense
for nuclear weapon justification becomes a fallacy.

Concept of Deterrence
The obvious monopoly of the US as world only nuclear power did not
last for a longer period after Hiroshima, Nagasaki bombing as USSR entered the
nuclear contest in 1949 by detonating its first atomic bomb and in the same year
the North Atlantic Treaty was signed which saw the emergence of its
implementing organization NATO. The rise of deterrence theory arose since the
moment both USA and USSR began to possess nuclear weapons. Gen. Rupert
Smith has provided an apt analysis about the nature of deterrence in his work
“The utility of Force” in following manner

“The essence of deterrence, whether nuclear or not, is that the force which would be used in
response to an attack in thought to be so destructive, and this consequence so certain, that the
price is to be paid a deemed to high for the gain sought by initial attack.”1

As a matter of fact, the concept of nuclear deterrence emerged in the

backdrop of this nuclear weapon contest between Soviet Union and West and
each believed that other had to be deterred from attacking and their enthusiasm
to seek allies was a salient feature throughout this power struggle. Soviet allies
were mainly consisted in their Warsaw pact which included its satellite states in
Eastern Europe and furthermore Soviets were aligned with China and Cuba . The
defensive preparation made by the US and its Western allies were mainly
represented by the creation of NATO. However, the rigor of doubt existed
between two parties assured that each party was under the threat of attack from
other, which assured the strategy of mutually assured destruction or commonly
known as MAD. However taking deterrence as a solid argument in favor of
justifying nuclear weapon seemed to be problematic from its very beginning,
because there was a legitimate question how capability of deterrence in
preventing an attack entirely as if the attacked side becomes completely destroyed
the attacker would not get envisage any retaliation regarding his actions. In tracing
the Cold War politics, it was a certain feature that Soviet led Warsaw pact and
NATO maintained different approaches on deterrence which were quite peculiar
for their own sets of military strategies. For an example as how they successfully
massacred Germans in Second World War front, Soviets were highly confident
in the mass force and the strength in war machinery, in fact it was always assumed
that Soviets would launch a surprising attack through the iron curtain to Western

1 Ruppert Smith, The Utility of Force, Allen Lane Publisher, 2005, P.79.
195
 Punsara Amarasinghe
Europe whereas US and its Western allies relied upon its supreme air power.
Having expanding its gruesome fear on each other’s strength, MAD continued
to work effectively throughout the Cold War era. Gen. Ruppert states,

“It is worthwhile briefly considering the sheer magnitude of the structures-since once again it is
the industrial aspect, in its size and output as well as technological capacity that underpinned
MAD.”2

The whole logic of MADD was solely based on generating uneasiness

between two nuclear holding states as it assured the whole destruction of both
states in a nuclear attack. However as I mentioned above the vulnerability of
MAD always gutted the international peace and order as this mechanism had not
proven any pertinent solution in a situation of where one state attacks the other
nuclear weapon holding state in a devastating manner. In truth the US was
planning such a stunning attack on Soviets through Strategic Air Command
program which focused on destroying the entire air power of Soviet Union
without giving any space for retaliation. The SAC’s plan was never implemented
because the Soviet Union’s counter attack would have caused utter destruction
in the United States. According to the National Security Council’s Net Evaluation
Subcommittee, a preemptive attack was not possible for the United States
without a huge and destructive retaliatory attack from the Soviets. However,the
MAD doctrine prevailed throughout Cold War, even in the brink of a warlike
situation of Cuban missile crisis in 1962. However ,the doctrine introduced by
Kissinger in Nixon administration named “Madman” was another deterrence
strategy Washington adopted in taming Soviets especially which they thought as
a best option to impede USSR from involving in North Vietnam operations. The
exact reason why it was called “Madman” was that Kissinger believed this would
give a signal to Moscow that the US would use nuclear weapon at any cost, but
contrary to his much anticipation, Soviet cooperation with North Vietnam
communists were not thwarted by this policy.

Moral Claim
Now we like to trace the moral failure of taking nuclear deterrence in
balancing the power as a fragile tactic which serves no purpose. In discussing the
gravity of nuclear deterrence that one has to admit that deterrence does not arise
an individual action as it cannot be compared with how an individual act against
another individual in defending himself. In other words, the scope of nuclear
deterrence can be regarded as a collective act rising from state, which is a social
institution. How can the method of moral evaluation of an individual action be

2 Ibid., p. 81.
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 Moral and Legal Defects in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence
applied as a model in judging the moral status of a social institution? Any
institution is liable to involve some isolated violations of no consequentialist
rules, and when it does, the method of moral evaluation of an individual action
can be applied in a straightforward manner: if the institution achieves sufficient
social benefit to override the violations, then it may be morally justified despite
them. The yardstick which ensures the moral framework of the actions
committed by a social institution necessarily stands for the actions covering the
moral aspect. As an example the slave based society cannot be judged as a just
society albeit its slave population has been used for larger economic interests.
This idea is called the principle of the morality of the social institutions. Generally
this principle has been defined as Social institutions are morally justified only if
they achieve their social benefit in a way that does not systematically violate no
consequentialist rules, such as those of justice and respect for rights. The morality
of punishment depicts how this principle functions and H.L Hart’s analysis
would be the most convenient way to understand this principle of deterrence in
law as he clearly expressed the point that deterrent effects to justify punishment
only if the burdens of the system are distributed in a retributively just manner, in
accordance with desert. But if that manner of punishment includes a systemic
method of contravening the basic principles of humanity, such a method would
result in miscarrying justice.3 In applying this logic upon upholding the policy of
nuclear deterrence from moralistic point of view, it is important to understand
that principle on nuclear deterrence should be in conformity with the principle
of morality of social institutions and an important question arises in examining
the logic behind deterrence principle as its intention of generating fear seems to
be problematic. As an example state A may establish a justification for nuclear
deterrence by claiming that its purpose of nuclear weapon would only target the
military target of sate B and state A may justifies the applicability of nuclear threat
as a mean of taming state B militarily without causing injury to innocents. Which
may sound like that state A has aptly complied with the principle of morality of
social institutions, but the reality that one cannot deny is the consequences
emerging from nuclear attack cannot be merely confined to destroying military
targets. On the other hand the objective of threat is more unjust, especially when
it is envisaged by innocent individuals that have no link to the decision making
mechanism of the political military leadership of threatened state. Moral theorist
Steven Lee states
“The nuclear deterrence imposes on the innocent persons whose lives and well-being it threatens
a substantial risk of harm. The risk is real, for the policy is not guaranteed success. It might fail

3H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-
27.
197
 Punsara Amarasinghe
through de- liberation or through accident, and the probability of its failure, even if small, is not
negligible. Given the nonnegligible probability of failure and the extent of harm failure would
bring to innocent persons, the policy imposes a substantial risk of harm on those persons. This
is the same way in which cancer is said to impose a substantial risk to each person: the chances
of a given person's getting cancer may be small, but the extent of harm caused if cancer does
strike is great. Even if deterrence policy never fails, this would not falsify the claim that it imposes
a substantial risk of harm”.4

Moreover, the nuclear deterrence imposed upon the civilians is a threat

imposed by them without their consent and in an extreme situation that is likely
to be a nuclear war that trepidation among the innocents is not fundamentally
limited to the parties of two nuclear states as it spreads to the neighboring states
and innocent citizens. As an example in a situation of nuclear unrest between
India and Pakistan in South Asia, the stabilities of their neighboring countries like
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal which are not nuclear states would be
detrimentally affected for being bordered to nuclear states.

Self-Defence
Right to self-defense stands as a bulwarking argument for nuclear
deterrence by pro-nuclear theorists, nevertheless the evasive nature of using
nuclear weapons as a deterrence factor is rather ambiguous in trying to
understand its legitimacy. For an example it may be a well-grounded argument
that a state has a legitimate right to use nuclear threat as a mode of self-defense
against a powerful enemy holding a nuclear power. The risk of an armed conflict
could lead to reduce by a mere threat as both states are aware of deadliest
repercussions of a nuclear strike and it would be a perfect example of using
nuclear deterrence for sake of self-defense. But such an argument would be
nullified, if the nuclear deterrence has used against a completely innocent state.
Michael Walzer's brief argument on behalf of deterrence in his Just and Unjust
Wars concludes that the harm threatened by an enemy intending to use nuclear
weapons is sufficiently severe that the threat justifies a counter nuclear threat in
order to prevent such harm.5 In a simplistic view using a nuclear threat as a mode
of self-defense is akin to a situation where a person is using a gun against an
armed burglar who entered his home. Unarmed robbery is to be distinguished
from armed robbery, and the justification for using a gun to deter an armed
burglar is greater than the justification for using a gun to deter an unarmed
burglar. Having examined the facts on the ground it may be justifiable to assume

4 Steeven Lee, The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding and Consequences, Ethics,
Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence(Apr., 1985), pp. 549-
566.
5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, Third Edition, 2000, p.67.

198
 Moral and Legal Defects in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence
that using nuclear deterrence against nuclear enemies is an act of pure self-
defense. From international law perspective the logic of self-defense has become
a moot point in the advisory opinion delivered by International Court of Justice
on the legality of nuclear weapons. In the advisory opinion the doctrine adopted
by the Court was traced under the light of two separate branches of international
law named law of the use of force and law of armed conflict ( jus ad bellum and
jus in bello ) and in the view of ICJ in an exceptional situation of using nuclear
weapons for self-defense, the act would not become an act of self-defense unless
one has to satisfy the rules on the use of force (as found in the UN Charter), as
well as the rules of armed conflict. While bringing the overarching principles of
International Humanitarian Law, Court went on to state

“A use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defense, must, in order to be lawful,
also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”6

With regard to the argument on self-defense, Court paid a crucial concern

on the concept of proportionality. Nevertheless,it should not be misunderstood
on what court regarded as proportionality was not referring that the response in
self-defense is proportionate to the damage in attack. On the other hand, the
overall concept of self-defense in international law was in a twilight position in
its development. As an example the notion self-defense in international law owes
its real roots to naturalist legal approach which defines the necessity of self-
defense of states are inherently imbued rights vested with states and such an
inherent right could not be limited by positive law as it its origin directly and
chiefly in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection. According to
international law scholar Dienstein this theory was an anachronistic residue from
an era in which international law was dominated by ecclesiastical doctrines.7 With
the positivistic influence upon international law, the later development on the
concept of self-defense took a different direction as it was regarded as extra-legal
concept and this view affirmed that self-defense is impossible to be governed as
a harsh legal concept as war always stands as an inevitable factor in human
existence such as flood, draught and other natural phenomenon which have been
befallen upon us since the inception of human civilization. A clear expression of
this position can be found in the remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Dean

6 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.
226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4b2913d62.html [accessed 7 April 2019].
7 Anthony Dienstein, Origin of Self Defense in International Law, American Journal of

International law, Vol 12, No1 , 1967, p.278.

199
 Punsara Amarasinghe
Acheson before the 1963 Conference of the American Society of International
Law who pointed out that: "law does simply not deal with such questions of
ultimate power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty and the survival of
states is not a matter of law.8 However the court’s analogy of self-defense in
international law was a described under customary international law and UN
charter, also Court emphasized on “dual condition” in exercising self-defense
under two important elements named necessity and proportionality . As a self-
explanatory concept court adhered to necessity to convince that actions arising
for self-defense should be necessary to prevent further destruction rather than
taking any retaliatory manner. Court’s understanding on proportionality was not
entirely referring to the fact that response in self-defense is proportionate to the
damage done in attack. It would be rather interesting to observe the dissenting
opinion given by Judge Higgins in the advisory opinion as she aptly describes the
use of proportionality in international law. Judge Higgins states “In the Military
and Paramilitary Activities case the terms used by the Court already made clear
that the concept of proportionality in self-defense limits a response to what is
needed to reply to limits a response to what is needed to reply to an attack”. The
astute consideration taken by court on the issue of self-defense was culminated
in their concluding analysis in the advisory opinion, where court went on to say

" Beyond the conditions of necessity and proportionality, Article51specifically requires that
measures taken by States in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council; this article further provides that these measures shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. These
requirements of Article 51 apply whatever the means of force used in self defence.”9

More importantly Court’s notion on the legality of nuclear weapons was

centered on the UN charter as court found it that words drawn by Charter has
not been weapon-specific. In its opinion Court states “"[the Charter neither
expressly prohibits nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear
weapons”. In fact, the task which was expecting from ICJ by asking its advisory
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons was transformed into a riddle when
court adopted too much cautious position in its approach to international law.
The ambivalent position held by the court on the scope of nuclear weapons made
rather a complex situation as they over examined the scope of self-defense in UN

8 Thomas Donaldson, Nuclear Deterrence and Self-Defense, Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue:
Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence(Apr., 1985), p. 539.
9 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.

226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4b2913d62.html [accessed 7 April 2019].
200
 Moral and Legal Defects in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence
charter, which finally led them to reach a conclusion that affirmed there is no
legal prohibition in the use of nuclear weapons , but in examining the principles
of international humanitarian law along with the issue of nuclear weapons court
found that using nuclear weapons would contravene the principles affirmed by
international humanitarian law. However, the dilemma court could not solve is
that it left no specific remarks on link between self-defense and use of nuclear
weapons, especially court’s position would not provide a light in an extreme
circumstance of choosing the principles of international humanitarian law and
self-defense. This situation seems to have created a loophole for justifying the
legality of nuclear weapons under self-defense for the sake of preserving states,
but I think the in its implicit approach court too has pointed out that using
nuclear weapons are contrary to the law of armed conflict and international
humanitarian law. However, court deserves no admiration as it entangled the
entire concept. Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght state

“The Court should have distinguished the ends from the means. The aim of the United Nations
is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, . . . and to reaffirm the faith in
fundamental human dignity and worth of the human person. The rules that are most adequate to
achieve this goal are undoubtedly the rules of humanitarian law, rather than the concept of
extreme self-defense. States are only means of governing communities of peoples and facilitating
the interaction between those communities and are never an end in themselves. The Court should
have given priority to the objective of the international community instead of favoring the survival
of states”.10

Nevertheless ,the dissenting opinion raised by Sri Lankan judge in ICJ

C.G Weeramantry has left some real profound thoughts on the legality of nuclear
weapons under international law as his dissenting was more than a mere legal
document. As a jurist hailed from an oriental civilization , he showed a keen
attitude in sharping his views on justifying why nuclear weapons should become
illegal and be banned by every means of international law and his argument was
fundamentally enriched from a philosophical perspective. For instance, he aptly
elaborated how ancients respected the laws of war by avoiding mass destruction
in order to accomplish victory in battle field. Having taken the story illustrated in
ancient Sanskrit epic Ramayana, Judge Weeramanthry has traced the reluctance
shown by epic hero Rama to use any mass destructive weapon to destroy his
enemy king Ravana and his country Lanka as it would be act of complete
annihilation of a nation, which was contrary to the laws of war. Rama states

Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, “THE ADVISORY OPINION ON THE LEGALITY
10

OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Georgia Journal of International and

Comparative Law, Vol 27, No2, p. 190.
201
 Punsara Amarasinghe

"because such destruction en masse was forbidden by the ancient laws of war, even though
Ravana was fighting an unjust war with an unrighteous objective”11

The gravity of Weeramanthry’s dissent lies in its utmost emphasis over

the moral need to ban nuclear weapons, which would prevent the humankind
from calamity.
It is true that scholars appearing for the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence
have attempted to reduce the anomaly between nuclear deterrence and
international law from various perspectives. The mediocre opinion given by ICJ
had risen their jubilant expectations as court eventually went on to rehabilitate
the overall understanding of nuclear weapons instead of delegitimizing it. On the
other hand the lack of direct prohibition of nuclear weapon using in international
humanitarian law may have generated further problems in creating a discourse
against the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. When it comes to the fatalistic
nature of nuclear weapons, Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, argues
for the applicability of the Geneva Gas Protocol and Article 23(a) of the
Regulations. His reasoning is based on showing that radiation is poisonous and
that it involves contact of materials (in casu material particles) with the human
body as required by the Geneva Gas Protocol. But rest of the judges in Court did
not agree with his reasoning for two main reasons. One, that these conventional
instruments do not provide a definition of poisoned weapons and so could
potentially also encompass nuclear weapons, and the other, that practice shows
that states do not consider these treaties to cover nuclear weapons. The lacuna
of black letter treaties which explicitly banns nuclear weapons, the doctrine of
“jus cogens” still stands in international law as a good defense against nuclear
deterrence principle albeit it filled with idealism. In international law the basic
proposition of jus cogens is existence of certain fundamental legal norms that
individual states may not vary by agreement. Bringing jus cogens doctrine against
nuclear deterrence is rather a tricky notion, but it is important to understand as a
doctrine is mainly based upon four core principles such as importance to
international peace and order, general acceptance in the international community
and moral foundation of mankind.12 In complying nuclear deterrence with the
principles based on jus cogens, it becomes obvious that nuclear weapons
nonproliferation and deterrence are a moral issue within the parameters of the
first jus cogens criteria. It is worthy to mention UN General Assembly Resolution

11 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.
226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4b2913d62.html [accessed 7 April 2019].
12Walter T. Gangl, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, Cornell International

Law Journal, Volume 13, Issue 1, Winter 1980, p.66.

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 Moral and Legal Defects in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence
1653 (XVI) in 1961resolved that the use of nuclear weapons was a violation of
the letter and the spirit of the U.N. Charter and a crime against mankind.
However, the legalistic rationale to apply jus cogens for a state possesses nuclear
weapons to deter its rival states can mainly be justified from the moralistic point
of view. As it was mentioned above the rigor of morality plays a pivotal role in
the growth of jus cogens and also the importance of maintaining international peace
is crucially imbued with the concept of jus cogens.

Conclusion
The given analysis has shown the risk factor behind justifying nuclear
deterrence as both moral and legal failures in our time. As we described above,
the fear created by deterrence upon the civilians in brutally unimaginable and the
psychological impacts arising from such disorder cannot be justified from self-
defense perspective. Especially the need to annihilate a whole society or make
their psychological conditions feeble for the military decisions made by few in
state hierarchy in that society goes beyond the exact limit of proportionality,
because we cannot exactly measure under which circumstances the innocent
civilians of the targeted state would be liable for the acts taken by their superiors.
On the other hand the argument in favor of nuclear deterrence as a practical
strategy to continue world stability has been disproven in various grounds. After
India conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 1974 which was known as the
““Smiling Buddha “ project, it’s neighboring state Pakistan vowed to have nuclear
power as a protective method. In fact Pakistan’s prime minister Mr. Ali Butho
was known to state that “ We need nuclear weapons even our citizens have to eat
grass!”, because at that time Pakistan was stuck in a peripheral level of poverty as
a nation, yet it determined to acquire nuclear power against India. Since then both
India and Pakistan have entered a nuclear contest of proving superiority over
each other. India-Pakistan example shows the extreme fallacy of creating
deterrence as India’s move on possessing nuclear weapons was finally thwarted
by Pakistani counter nuclear strategy that eventually led both nations to involve
in a gruesome nuclear contest. The criticism on nuclear deterrence is further
strengthening by the twilight anomaly between counterforce attack and counter
value attack. In the first the attacking sates expects to destroy the second strike
capability of victim’s state and counterforce theory avoids the civilian targets of
the victim state, but the executing such a theory is always been deterred by the
fear of second strike. Steven Lee states

“In balancing the possibility of the greater risk of a limited Soviet nuclear attack under countercity
policy against the increased risk of Soviet nuclear attack under a coun- terforce policy due to
Soviet first strike fears and other destabilizing elements of the policy, it seems clear that the risk

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Punsara Amarasinghe
of Soviet nuclear attack is greater for the United States under counterforce policy than under
countercity policy. Counterforce policy is, then, the worse deterrent of a nuclear attack, which is
the only sort of behavior that it is morally acceptable to use nuclear weapons to deter. The
conclusion is that more than achieving at least substantially as much social benefit as counterforce
policy, countercity policy achieves greater social benefit. But to complete the investigation of
whether counterforce policy in comparison with countercity policy satisfies clause 3 of PMSI*,
we must return to consid- eration b: whether countercity policy is less acceptable from a noncon-
sequentialist perspective than is counterforce policy”.13

The state which uses nuclear weapons to deter another nuclear state
should always be aware of the repercussion arising from creating a deterrence as
deterrence necessarily boomerang from a counter deterrence and moreover as I
mentioned in my argument the greatest moral crime would be agonizing a state
that have been sandwiched between nuclear powers. In critiquing the aspect of
Self- Defense while focusing on jus in bello and jus ad bellum , it is just to oppose
the nuclear doctrine by all means and such an opposition is not only arising from
the enormity of horror in a nuclear attack , but also the kind of horror it creates.
From self-defense perspective nuclear theorists can elucidate the validity of
maintaining nuclear deterrence from state-centric point of view, but would it be
sufficient to justify from the perspective of whole society? The rationale of self-
defense of society before nuclear deterrence is left with no justification. In this
article I have constructed both moral and legal arguments which are standing
against nuclear deterrence strongly. All in all the main contention against nuclear
deterrence cannot entirely build from the either international legalistic point of
view or moralistic perspective as none of them become obligatory for present
state systems. But as we attempted to portray in this article, nuclear deterrence is
not a strong mechanism to uphold peace as it was painted by pro-nuclear
theorists.

13Steeven Lee, The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding and Consequences, Ethics,
Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence(Apr., 1985), pp. 549-
566.
204