Straightaway Arrest

P L D 2021 Supreme Court 708
Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Amin-ud-Din Khan,
JJ
Shahzada QAISER ARFAT alias QAISER---Petitioner
Versus
The STATE and another---Respondents
Criminal Petition No. 801-L of 2020, decided on 3rd February, 2021.
(Against the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 03.03.2020, passed in
Crl. Misc. No.7155-B of 2020).
(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Grounds---Mala fides of complainant---Scope---
Mala fide being a state of mind could not always be proved through direct evidence,
and it was often to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.
Khalil Ahmed v. State PLD 2017 SC 730 ref.
(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 54---Police Order [22 of 2002], Art. 4(1)(j)---Police Rules, 1934, R. 26.1---Power of
police to arrest an accused---Scope---Ordinarily no person was to be arrested
straightaway only because he had been nominated as an accused person in an FIR or
in any other version of the incident brought to the notice of the investigating officer
by any person until the investigating officer felt satisfied that sufficient justification
existed for his arrest---Investigating officers should not mechanically make the arrest
of a person accused of having committed a cognizable offence, rather they must
exercise their discretion in making the arrest of such person judiciously by applying
their mind to the particular facts and circumstances of the case and consciously
considering the question: what purpose would be served and what object would be
achieved by arrest of the accused person.
Sughran Bibi v. State PLD 2018 SC 595 ref.
(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 498---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 10-A & 14(1)---Pre-arrest bail---
Constitutional grounds for pre-arrest bail stated.
The power of the High Courts and the Courts of Sessions to grant pre-arrest bail,
first and foremost, must be examined in the constitutional context of liberty, dignity,
due process and fair trial. Pre-arrest bail was in the nature of a check on the police
power to arrest a person. The non-availability of incriminating material against the
accused or non-existence of a sufficient ground including a valid purpose for making
arrest of the accused person in a case by the investigating officer would as a corollary
be a ground for admitting the accused to pre-arrest bail, and vice versa. Reluctance of
the courts in admitting the accused persons to pre-arrest bail by treating such a relief
as an extraordinary one without examining whether there was sufficient incriminating
material available on record to connect the accused with the commission of the alleged
offence and for what purpose his arrest and detention was required during
investigation or trial of the case, and their insistence only on showing mala fide on
part of the complainant or the police for granting pre-arrest bail did not appear to be
correct, especially after recognition of the right to fair trial as a fundamental right
under Article 10A of Constitution. Protection against arbitrary arrest and detention
was part of the right to liberty and fair trial.
2014 SCMR 1349 and A Basic Guide to Legal Standards and Practice, published by
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights USA (2000) ref.
(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Grounds---Mala fides of complainant---Scope
and proof---In many cases, accused persons were granted pre-arrest bail after the
court found that there were no reasonable grounds for believing their involvement in
the commission of the alleged offences and the court did not require independent
proof of mala fide on part of the police or the complainant before granting such relief-
--Despite non-availability of the incriminating material against the accused, his
implication by the complainant and the insistence of the police to arrest him were the
circumstances which by themselves indicated the mala fide on the part of the
complainant and the police, and the accused need not lead any other evidence to prove
mala fide on their part.
Muhammad Fayyaz v. State 1976 SCMR 183; Zakaullah v. State 1987 SCMR 1720;
Zakia Begum v. State 1991 SCMR 297; Bashir Ahmad v. State 1993 SCMR 919;
Muhammad Gul v. State 1998 SCMR 576; Dildar Ali v. State 1999 SCMR 1316; Rizwan
Iqbal v. State 2007 SCMR 1392; Meeran Bux v. State PLD 1989 SC 347; Muhammad
Firdaus v. State 2005 SCMR 784; Darbar Ali v. State 2015 SCMR 879 and Aqsa Safdar
v. State 2019 SCMR 1923 ref.
(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 109 & 120-B---Abetment and conspiracy---Proof---Court must base its
conclusion as to involvement of an absentee accused as abettor or conspirator on some
solid material collected during the course of investigation, and not on surmises or
conjectures, either tentatively at bail stage or finally at judgment stage---Conspiracy
to commit a crime by its very nature was usually secret, and could not be proved by
direct evidence in most cases, however, it did not mean that the prosecution was
absolved from its duty to prove the allegation of conspiracy, or that mere allegation
of conspiracy was sufficient for holding the accused liable---In case of non-availability
of direct evidence, the police must collect during investigation, and the prosecution
must lead during trial, such circumstantial evidence from which a court could draw a
legitimate inference of the existence of conspiracy and involvement of the accused in
that conspiracy.
(f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, abetment,
rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---
Material available as to the alleged involvement of the accused in hatching alleged
conspiracy of committing murder of the deceased persons, so far as the FIR was
concerned, was confined to mere allegation of conspiracy/abetment without
disclosing any details of such conspiracy/abetment, such as place and time of the
alleged conspiracy/abetment and names of the persons who heard such
conspiracy/abetment---However, later on the police recorded statements of certain
persons, under S.161, Cr.P.C. wherein they had stated that while passing through the
Bazar outside the house of the accused persons, they overheard the accused persons
say that they would take revenge of the murder of their brother---Prosecution had not
claimed that the accused was present at the spot or that he had caused any injury to
any deceased or anybody else---In such circumstances there was no chance of any
recovery at the instance of the accused if he was arrested---All the incriminating
material against the accused was already with the prosecution---Present case was a fit
case for exercise of discretion to admit the accused to pre-arrest bail to save him from
unjustified arrest, consequent humiliation and the curtailment of his right to liberty--
-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was
granted pre-arrest bail.
M. Sohail Dar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioner in
person.
Respondent No.2 in person.
Khurram Khan, Addl. P.G. for the State along with Humayun Rashid, SI.
Date of hearing: 3rd February, 2021.
JUDGMENT
SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J.---
Crl. M.A. No. 310/2020: This is an application for condonation of delay. For the
reasons given therein, the same is allowed, and the delay in filing the main petition is
condoned.
Crl. Petition No.801-L of 2020
2. On December 7, 2019 at about 12 a.m., three persons were shot dead on G.T. Road
in Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura. Five brothers and three unknown persons were
nominated in the first information report ("FIR")1 to be the assailants; while their sixth
brother, Qaisar ("petitioner") and their father were nominated as abettors, alleged to
have instigated and conspired the murders. As Shabbir Hussain (one of the deceased)
was involved in the murder of their seventh brother, Asim, the motive alleged was
that they wanted to avenge the murder of their seventh brother. Accused Qaisar, the
alleged abettor, is the petitioner before us. The Court of Sessions and High Court have
dismissed his petitions for pre-arrest bail. The order dated 03.03.2020 of the High
Court has been impugned before us through the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Hon'ble High Court has
failed to appreciate the mala fide of the complainant in nominating all the male family
members of the accused persons, and the material prime facie showing non-
involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence, i.e., the entries in the passport of
the petitioner according to which he was not in Pakistan on the day of occurrence. On
the other hand, learned counsel for the State has opposed this petition.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the
case. The High Court has declined the relief of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner making
the observation that pre-arrest bail is an extra-ordinary relief and can only be extended
to an innocent person who is implicated in the case on the basis of mala fide, but the
petitioner has failed to point out to any mala fide. The learned High Court did not
appreciate that the "mala fide" being a state of mind cannot always be proved through
direct evidence, and it is often to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the
case.2
5. No doubt, a police officer has, under section 54 of the Cr.P.C., the power to arrest
a person who has been involved in any cognizable offence or against whom a
complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable
suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. Having the power to arrest is one
thing but the justification for the exercise of that power is quite another. A police
officer that makes arrest of a person must be able to justify the exercise of that power
in making the arrest apart from his having the power to do so. He cannot make arrest
of a person, only because he has the power to do so. He must also show sufficient
grounds for making the arrest. Article 4(1)(j) of the Police Order, 2002 states this legal
position when it prescribes that it is the duty of every police officer to "apprehend all
persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend and for whose apprehension
sufficient grounds exist". And Rule 26.1 of the Police Rules, 1934 explains this by
providing that the authority given under Section 54 of the Cr.P.C. to the police to
arrest without a warrant is permissive and not obligatory. As per the said Rule
whenever escape from justice or inconvenient delay in completion of the investigation
or commencement of the trial is likely to result from the police failing to arrest, they
are bound to do so, but in no other cases. "Ordinarily no person is to be arrested
straightaway only because he has been nominated as an accused person in an FIR or
in any other version of the incident brought to the notice of the investigating officer
by any person until the investigating officer feels satisfied that sufficient justification
exists for his arrest."3 The investigating officers should not mechanically make the
arrest of a person accused of having committed a cognizable offence, rather they must
exercise their discretion in making the arrest of such person judiciously by applying
their mind to the particular facts and circumstances of the case and consciously
considering the question: what purpose will be served and what object will be
achieved by arrest of the accused person?
6. The power of the High Courts and the Courts of Sessions to grant pre-arrest bail,
first and foremost, must be examined in the constitutional context of liberty, dignity,
due process and fair trial. Pre-arrest bail is in the nature of a check on the police power
to arrest a person. The non-availability of incriminating material against the accused
or non-existence of a sufficient ground including a valid purpose4 for making arrest
of the accused person in a case by the investigating officer would as a corollary be a
ground for admitting the accused to pre-arrest bail, and vice versa.5 Reluctance of the
courts in admitting the accused persons to pre-arrest bail by treating such a relief as
an extraordinary one without examining whether there is sufficient incriminating
material available on record to connect the accused with the commission of the alleged
offence and for what purpose his arrest and detention is required during investigation
or trial of the case, and their insistence only on showing mala fide on part of the
complainant or the Police for granting pre-arrest bail does not appear to be correct,
especially after recognition of the right to fair trial as a fundamental right under
Article 10A of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.6 Protection against arbitrary arrest and
detention is part of the right to liberty and fair trial.7 This Court has, in many
cases,8 granted pre-arrest bail to accused persons after finding that there are no
reasonable grounds for believing their involvement in the commission of the alleged
offences and has not required independent proof of mala fide on part of the Police or
the complainant before granting such relief.9 Despite non-availability of the
incriminating material against the accused, his implication by the complainant and
the insistence of the Police to arrest him are the circumstances which by themselves
indicate the mala fide on the part of the complainant and the Police, and the accused
need not lead any other evidence to prove mala fide on their part.
7. It is the case of the petitioner that he along with his father were in Saudi Arabia
for performing Umra when the occurrence took place. No doubt, managing one's
presence in a foreign country at the time of actual commission of an offence may be a
tactic to escape criminal liability for being involved in the commission of that offence
as abettor or conspirator; but the court must base its conclusion as to involvement of
an absentee accused as abettor or conspirator on some solid material collected during
the course of investigation, and not on surmises or conjectures, either tentatively at
bail stage or finally at judgment stage. It is true that a conspiracy to commit a crime
by its very nature is usually secret, and cannot be proved by direct evidence in most
cases. It, however, does not mean that the prosecution is absolved from its duty to
prove the allegation of conspiracy, or that mere allegation of conspiracy is sufficient
for holding the accused liable. In case of non-availability of direct evidence, the police
must collect during investigation, and the prosecution must lead during trial, such
circumstantial evidence from which a court could draw a legitimate inference of the
existence of conspiracy and involvement of the accused in that conspiracy.
8. The material available as to the alleged involvement of the present petitioner in
hatching alleged conspiracy of committing murder of the deceased persons, so far as
the FIR is concerned, is confined to mere allegation of conspiracy /abetment without
disclosing any details of such conspiracy/abetment, such as place and time of the
alleged conspiracy/abetment and names of the persons who heard such
conspiracy/abetment. However, later on the Police recorded statements of certain
persons, under section 161, Cr.P.C. wherein they have stated that while passing
through the Bazar outside the house of the accused persons in the night of 18 and 25
November, 2019, they overheard the accused persons say that they would take
revenge of the murder of their brother from Shabbir Hussain. It is not the case of the
prosecution that the petitioner was present at the spot or he caused any injury to any
deceased or anybody else and in such circumstances there is no chance of any recovery
at the instance of the petitioner if he is arrested. All the incriminating material against
the petitioner is already with the prosecution.
9. In the circumstances, we find it a fit case for exercise of discretion to admit the
petitioner to pre-arrest bail to save him from unjustified arrest, consequent
humiliation and the curtailment of his right to liberty. We, therefore, convert this
petition into appeal and allow the same.
10. These are the reasons of our short order of even date, which is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:
"For reasons to be recorded later, the instant criminal petition is converted into an
appeal and the same is hereby allowed. Petitioner Shahzada Qaiser Arafat alias
Qaiser is allowed pre-arrest bail subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum
of Rs.100,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand) with one surety in the like
amount, to the satisfaction of the trail Court/Illaqa Magistrate, within fifteen
days."
MWA/S-18/SC Bail granted.
P L D 2018 Supreme Court 595
Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, ACJ, Mushir Alam, Maqbool Baqar, Manzoor Ahmad
Malik, Sardar Tariq Masood, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ
Mst. SUGHRAN BIBI---Petitioner
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
Human Rights Case No.10842-P of 2018, decided on 23rd May, 2018.
(Regarding registration of second FIR in respect of a police encounter wherein the

petitioner's son namely Mohsin Ali was killed at the hands of the local police).

----Ss. 154, 156, 157, 159, 160 & 161---Police Rules, 1934, R. 24.5---First Information Report
(FIR)---Registration of multiple FIRs for the same incident---Question as to whether a
separate FIR could be registered for every new version of the same incident when
commission of the relevant cognizable offence already stood reported to the police and
an FIR already stood registered in such regard---Held, after entering the first information
relating to commission of a cognizable offence in the prescribed book, i.e. after
registration of an FIR the matter became a "case",and thereafter every step taken in the
ensuing investigation was a step taken in that case---Perusal of R. 24.5 of the Police Rules,
1934 showed that commission of a cognizable offence, when reported to the police
through the first information and registered in the FIR register, was treated as a "case"
bearing an annual serial number and such "case" carried the same number for ever
irrespective of any number of different versions received by the police regarding
commission of the said offence or any number of different circumstances or sets of
culprits brought to the notice of the investigating officer during the investigation of the
"case"---During the investigation conducted after registration of an FIR the investigating
officer may record any number of versions of the same incident brought to his notice by
different persons which versions were to be recorded by him under S. 161, Cr.P.C. in the
same case---No separate FIR was to be recorded for any new version of the same incident
brought to the notice of the investigating officer during the investigation of the case---All
subsequent or divergent versions of the same occurrence or the persons involved therein
were to be received, recorded and investigated by the investigating officer in the same
"case" which was based upon the one and only FIR registered in respect of the relevant
"offence" in the prescribed book kept at the local police station---Supreme Court held that
the judgment of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1975 SCMR
149) and Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) were closer to the relevant law
and the judgments Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others
(2001 SCMR 1556), Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West,
Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) and Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi
and others (PLD 2016 SC 484) had drifted away from the relevant scheme of law because
of Court not being assisted properly.

----Ss. 154, 156, 160 & 173---Police Rules, 1934, R. 25.2(3)---First Information Report (FIR)-
--Investigation---Investigating officer, duty of---Scope---Investigation of a case was not to
be restricted to the version of the incident narrated in the FIR or the allegations levelled
therein---Investigation should not be driven by any duty to establish that the story of the
incident contained in the FIR was correct---Investigating officer was not to be guided or
controlled by the contents of the FIR---If the information received by the local police about
commission of a cognizable offence also contained a version as to how the relevant
offence was committed, by whom it was committed and in which background it was
committed then that version of the incident was only the version of the informant and
nothing more and such version was not to be unreservedly accepted by the investigating
officer as the truth or the whole truth---On the contrary, after registration of the FIR the
investigating officer was to embark upon an exercise to discover the actuality of the
matter irrespective of the version of the incident narrated by the first informant through
the FIR and in the process he was expected to collect information from any number of
persons who appeared to him to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case and he
may entertain any fresh information becoming available from any other source regarding
how the offence was committed and by whom it was committed and he may arrive at his
own conclusions in such regard---Final report to be submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C. was
to be based upon his final opinion and such opinion was not to be guided by what the
first informant had stated or alleged in the FIR.

----Ss. 54 & 55---Police Rules, 1934, Rr. 25.2(2), 25.2(3), 26.1, 26.2 & 26.9---Arrest of accused-
--Principles---Ordinarily no person was to be arrested straightaway only because he had
been nominated as an accused person in an FIR or in any other version of the incident
brought to the notice of the investigating officer by any person until the investigating
officer felt satisfied that sufficient justification existed for his arrest---For such justification
guidance was found in the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
and the Police Rules, 1934---Suspect was not to be arrested straightaway or as a matter of
course and, unless the situation on the ground so warranted, the arrest was to be deferred
till such time that sufficient material or evidence became available on the record of
investigation prima facie satisfying the investigating officer regarding correctness of the
allegations levelled against such suspect or regarding his involvement in the crime in
issue.
In attendance:
Petitioner in person.
Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Attorney-General for Pakistan assisted by Barrister Asad Rahim,
Muhammad Usman Rauf, Mirza Moiz Baig and Nousherwan Niazi, Advocates.
Qasim Ali Chauhan, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab;

Nemo. On behalf of the Advocate-General, Sindh.
Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan.
Tariq Mehmood Jehangiri, Advocate-General, Islamabad.
Saeedullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Babar Nadeem, Advocate, Abu Bakar
Khuda Bakhsh, Additional Inspector-General of Police Punjab.
Barrister Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court (Amicus Curiae).
Date of hearing: 9th May, 2018.

JUDGMENT
ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA, ACJ.---If the first information to the police reporting
commission of a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 is called an FIR (First Information Report) then through the same logic the second
information to the police in respect of commission of the same offence ought to be called
an SIR and the third information regarding commission of the same offence may be called
a TIR but there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for an SIR or a TIR. For
reasons never exhaustively attended to before, parties to a criminal case other than the
party which has already lodged an FIR about commission of a cognizable offence often
insist upon registration of their own version regarding commission of the same offence
through another FIR and it is argued that the different version of the same incident
advanced by such a party is being reported to the police for the first time and, therefore,
such new version regarding commission of the same cognizable offence is to be treated
as the first information to the police about that version. In view of some conflicting
judgments of different Courts, including this Court, on the issue the present Larger Bench
has been constituted so as to put the controversy at rest through an authoritative
pronouncement on the subject. The background in which this issue has cropped up before
this Court through the present petition is briefly narrated in the following paragraph.
2. On 21.03.2008, more than a decade ago, one Mohsin Ali had lost his life through the
hands of the police and FIR No. 177 was lodged by Zulfiqar, SI in respect of the said
incident on the same day at Police Station Shahdara Town, District Lahore for offences
under sections 324, 353 and 186, P.P.C. read with section 34, P.P.C. and section 13 of the
Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. It was alleged in that FIR that Mohsin Ali and others had
launched a murderous assault upon a police party and in exercise of its right of private
defence the police party had fired back resulting in death of Mohsin Ali. After completion
of the investigation a Challan was submitted in that case before the Court of Session,
Lahore for trial of the accused persons implicated therein. On 12.01.2010 the present
petitioner namely Mst. Sughran Bibi (mother of Mohsin Ali deceased) instituted a private
complaint in respect of the self same incident alleging that as a matter of fact Mohsin Ali
had cold bloodedly been murdered by the local police by managing and staging a fake
encounter. On 19.05.2010 a learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore seized of the case
summoned 16 accused persons to face a trial in connection with the said private
complaint. As per the legal norms the private complaint filed by the petitioner was taken
up first for trial and on 18.06.2015 a Charge was framed against the summoned accused
persons and, we have been informed, no progress has so far been made in that trial of the
complaint case. Now through the present petition filed as a Human Rights Case under
Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 Mst. Sughran
Bibi petitioner has sought issuance of a direction to the local police to register a separate
FIR containing the different version of the same incident being advanced by her.
3. The issue before us, to put it very simply, is as to whether a separate FIR can be
registered for every new version of the same incident when commission of the relevant
cognizable offence already stands reported to the police and an FIR already stands
registered in that regard or not. An ancillary issue is that if no separate FIR can be
registered for any new version of the same ncident then how can such new version be
recorded and investigated by the police. We have heard elaborate arguments on these
issues and have carefully gone through all the precedent cases cited before us on the
subject.
4. The emotionally charged and visibly grieved petitioner appearing in person has
passionately submitted that her son namely Mohsin Ali was cold-bloodedly murdered
by the local police through a managed and staged encounter whereafter an FIR
containing a false story was registered at the local Police Station in respect of the incident
at the instance of a police official depicting the deceased as the aggressor. She has
maintained that in some ensuing administrative and judicial inquiries the local police
were found to be guilty of a calculated murder but no separate FIR was registered in that
regard at the petitioner's instance which had led the petitioner to institute a private
complaint in respect of her allegations and the accused persons in her private complaint
have already been summoned by the trial court to face a trial in the complaint case. She
has lamented and bemoaned that no progress has been made in that complaint case so
far despite a Charge having been framed by the trial court against the accused persons
about three years ago. In the end she has urged that justice would be served if a separate
FIR is registered in terms of her version of the relevant incident and the persons being
accused by her of the murder most foul are ordered to be arrested.
5. The learned Attorney-General for Pakistan has taken us through different provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (usually referred to as Cr.P.C.) and the Police
Rules, 1934 and has maintained that the statutory scheme of the criminal law in vogue in
the country envisages registration of only one FIR regarding an incident involving
commission of a cognizable offence and every fresh version of the same incident brought
to the notice of the investigating officer during the investigation of the case is to be
recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C.. He has submitted that the investigating officer is
legally obliged to investigate the case from every possible angle and to probe into every
version of the incident brought to his notice and then he is to submit his final report in
the matter in terms of the facts found by him and not in terms of any particular version
of the incident advanced by any person. The learned Attorney-General has referred to
the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad
Akram Khan and another (1975 SCMR 149), Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR
436), Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR
1556), Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West, Karachi and
12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) and Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others (PLD
2016 SC 484) which are the only reported pronouncements of this Court on the issue
under consideration and he has highlighted that not only contradictory views were
expressed in such judgments but all such judgments were also completely shorn of any
meaningful discussion about the issue with reference to the relevant statutory provisions.
He has, thus, urged that a comprehensive treatment of the issue by this Court is called
for so as to remove the prevailing confusion. The learned Additional Advocates-General,
Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan and the learned Advocate-General,
Islamabad Capital Territory have adopted the arguments addressed before the Court by
the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan. Barrister Salman Safdar, ASC has assisted the
Court as an amicus curiae and while approaching the issue from diverse angles he has
maintained that ordinarily there is to be only one FIR in respect of an incident but there
is no statutory bar against registration of multiple FIRs in respect of the same occurrence
if different versions of the incident are advanced with different sets of accused persons
and such versions disclose commission of different cognizable offences. He has also
impressed upon the Court as to why people insist upon registration of separate FIRs qua
their own versions of the incident and as to why the remedy of filing a private complaint
is generally not considered to be an adequate alternate remedy in that regard. The learned
amicus curiae has also extensively referred to the above mentioned five reported
judgments of this Court available in the field and has respectfully highlighted the
deficiencies in those judgments.
6. After hearing the petitioner, the learned Law Officers and the learned amicus curiae,
attending to all the statutory provisions relevant to the legal issue involved and perusing
the precedent cases available on the subject we find that for a proper resolution of the
controversy at hand it is imperative to correctly understand the scheme of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police Rules, 1934 regarding registration of a criminal
case through an FIR and its investigation by the police and also to minutely examine all
the precedent cases available on the subject. In the following paragraphs we undertake
such an exercise to develop and elucidate such understanding of the scheme.
7. As regards the precedent cases available on the subject there appears to be an utter
confusion prevailing in the field and different Courts have in the past been taking
different positions on the issue of registration of multiple FIRs in respect of commission
of the same offence through different versions advanced in respect of the same
occurrence. In the first category of the precedent cases it has been declared quite
categorically that there is to be only one FIR in respect of an occurrence wherein a
cognizable offence has been committed and any other version of the same incident
advanced by any person during the investigation of the case is to be recorded under
section 161, Cr.P.C. The following cases decided by different High Courts fall in this
category of cases:
Mansur Ali and 2 others v. The State
(1970 PCr.LJ 287)
"Another thing to be pointed out here is that there cannot be two first information
reports in a case. It appears that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has used
both the reports as first information reports in this case and marked them as Exhs.
1 and 3. Section 154, Cr.P.C. contemplates only one first information report and
only one such report can go into evidence in a case. Law never permits two first
information reports to be admitted in evidence "
Kaura v. The State

(1979 PCr.LJ 521)
"It is quite obvious from the above that the primary purpose of the F.I.R. is to
inform about the commission of a cognizable offence which a police officer is
empowered to investigate under Section 156 Cr.P.C. All other informations with
regard to that occurrence coming out later in point of time have to be taken down
as statements of those persons before the police under section 161 Cr.P.C. .. The
order to register a second F.I.R. in that situation, was not justified in law, even if
there was a concession made on the part of the State."
Qazi Rehmat Ullah, General Secretary, Jamat-e-Islami, Rawalpindi v. Dr. Ghulam

Hussain, Former Federal Minister for Railways and 13 others
(1979 PCr.LJ Note 36)
Law does not require recording of as many reports as versions of same occurrence
by different persons - Police Officer not to prefer one over another or to prefer one
giving more complete picture -Priority to be considered in point of time and not
in elaborateness of report or its being correct.
Ghulam Siddique v. Station House Officer, Saddar, Dera Ghazi Khan and 8 others
(PLD 1979 Lahore 263)
` "It is quite obvious that the primary purpose of the F.I.R. is to inform about the
commission of a cognizable offence, which a Police Office is empowered to
investigate under section 156, Cr.P.C. The Police Officer receiving that information
may question the informant to find out his source of information about the names
of the offenders and the witnesses and whether the informant himself was an eye-
witness as laid down in rule 21.1(4). All other informations with regard to that
occurrence coming out later in point of time have to be taken down as statements
of those persons before the police under section 161, Cr.P.C. The version given by
Ghulam Siddiq, therefore, should have been considered as a statement under
section 161, Cr.P.C. only. The order to register a second F.I.R. in that situation, was
not justified in law, even if there was a concession made on the part of the State."
Muhammad Aslam v. Station House Officer, Police Station Mamun Kanjan,
Faisalabad
"It will be seen that distinction is to be drawn between a version being given for
purpose of defence only and a version being given by way of a grievance. In the
former category, the accused and the offences are ordinarily the same and
information in amplification of that recorded earlier is being conveyed. In the latter
category of cases separate offences are disclosed and even the persons complained
against may be different. The distinction is material for whilst in the former case
the registration of an F.I.R. is required by law, in the latter it need not be recorded
as an F.I.R. but as observed in Ghulam Siddique's case may be recorded as a
statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C."
Mushtaq Ahmad v. The S.H.O., Police Station, Munawan

(1984 PCr.LJ 1454)
"When a case has been registered in respect of an occurrence, no second case can
be registered giving a counter-version thereof by the accused persons.
It is by now clearly established law that no direction can be issued for registration
of a case when a F.I.R. has already been registered in respect of the occurrence for
giving counter-version of the other side."
Wali Muhammad and 4 others v. The State and another

(1985 PCr.LJ 1342)
"It is true that in respect of one and the same occurrence, only one F.I.R. should be
recorded and that where the accused persons set up a counter version, the same
should be investigated by the police on the case file of the same F.I.R. and not by
recording any subsequent F.I.R. It is also true that where a counter version is set
up by the accused, the police should find out the truth and submit the challan only
in respect of the version found true by them and not submit both the versions to
the Court for trial."
Hafiz Haji Muhammad v. The Superintendent of Police Dera Ghazi Khan and
others
(1986 P.Cr.L.J. 2167)
"Since a criminal case stands already registered against the petitioner, he seems to
overawe the police and others by getting a case registered against them so that
proper investigation may not be carried out. He has an alternate remedy of filing
a private complaint. He may pursue the same."
Ghulam Mustafa v. S.H.O. and others

(1987 PCr.LJ 272)
"In these circumstances I am not inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the
petitioner when according to his own showing a case stands already registered in
respect of the afore-said vehicle at Police Station Sharqpur. If the petitioner has
any claim to the vehicle in question he may approach the Investigating Officer who
can take into consideration his version as well."
Muhammad Younas v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad and others

(1987 PCr.LJ 1464)
"It is contended that the complainant-party was guilty of aggression and had
caused fire-arm and other injuries to Muhammad Younas and Khushnood and
despite the fact that their medico-legal reports were produced before the
Investigating Officer with the request of registering a counter-case he has refused
to do so. It is further stated that the Investigating Officer has even refused to
receive the medico-legal certificates or to record their statements.
In the above circumstances, S.S.P. Faisalabad is directed to issue necessary orders

to the S.H.O. Police Station Dijkot for carrying out the investigation faithfully and
to record the statements of the aforementioned persons and the petitioner without
any addition or omission and also to receive their medico-legal certificates. He is
also directed to proceed strictly in accordance with law and place the correct
version before the Court."
Rahmat Ullah v. Station House Officer and others

(1987 PCr.LJ 2197(2))
"I do not feel inclined to direct S.H.O. to register the case for the reasons that the
challan in case of murder against Munawar Ali and others, having been sent up
the case is at trial stage and the prosecution evidence has partly been recorded;
that the S.H.O. has stated that Rehmat Ullah was examined by the police and on
his own showing he had not seen the occurrence; that Munawar Ali, the victim of
murderous assault has neither approached the police for the registration of the
counter-case nor has he moved any petition before this Court for direction to the
S.H.O. to register the case and that adequate alternative remedy of complaint
was/is available to the petitioner."
Sharifan Bibi v. M. Ilyas etc.

(KLR 1987 Cr,C. 739)
"In view of the circumstances aforementioned and particularly the fact that the
challan in the case under section 302/34 P.P.C has already been submitted in Court
and that an alternative remedy of filing a private complaint is available to the
petitioner I am not inclined to issue the direction prayed for by her."
Muhammad Azim v. The S.H.O. Police Station Abbas Nagar and 4 others
(1988 PCr.LJ 41)
"Conversely, in Kaura v. The State and others 1983 SCMR 436 it has been held that
when a case has been registered in respect of previous occurrence, then the
registration of a fresh case is not called for notwithstanding divergent version
contained therein and the Police is not only competent but also duty bound to
unearth true facts and trace real culprit. This principle enunciated in the said
ruling was followed in Mushtaq Ahmad v. The S.H.O., Police Station, Munawan
1984 PCr.LJ 1454 and Wali Muhammad and 4 others v. The State and others 1985
PCr.LJ 1342. The facts of this case are peculiar. The petitioner and others have been
challaned in the case registered by Muhammad Sadiq and prosecution evidence
has been summoned on 27-9-1987. The counter-version stated by Muhammad
Azeem has already been investigated by the Police and in the circumstances a
second F.I.R. shall not serve any useful purpose. The private complaint is
efficacious remedy for Muhammad Azeem, if he so likes. I, therefore, decline to
issue a direction for the registration of second F.I.R. regarding the counter version
put forth by Muhammad Azeem and dismiss this writ petition."
Malik Muhammad Anwar Khan v. The State and 4 others

(1988 PCr.LJ 986)
"In the circumstances discussed above, I do not feel persuaded to interfere in the
matter at this stage but would direct the police to carry out the investigation
faithfully, record statements of the petitioner and the injured persons and to
receive their medico-legal certificates. They are further directed to proceed strictly
in accordance with law and place correct version before the Court by bringing to
book all those who are found to have participated in the occurrence. If the
petitioner feels dissatisfied with the role of the police he may resort to an
appropriate remedy in the Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law
by filing a complaint which by no means is less efficacious remedy than the
registration of case with the police."
Ch. Zafaryab v. Mian Bashir Ahmad, S.H.O./Inspector Police Station Shalimar

Lahore, etc.
(1990 PCr.LJ 896)
"The learned counsel, however, submits that the version of the first informant is
false and the counter version of the petitioner represents the true and correct
factual position. This counter version has however, not been placed before the
police as according to the SHO the petitioner did not join the investigation. Let the
petitioner appear and place his version before the Superintendent of Police who
shall give it due consideration in accordance with law."
Yousif v. The State

(PLD 1988 Kar. 521)
"In these provisions, once the investigating machinery is set in motion after
registration of FIR, there is no room for filing of second FIR but the investigation
can continue without hindrance even if in the result of the investigation culprits
are found to be different persons who are not mentioned in FIR."
"In the instant case therefore we hold that there was no need or justification for the
Investigating Officer to file himself as a complainant of second FIR because even
without doing so he was quite competent under the law to continue the
investigation and arrest persons against whom there was material to connect them
with the offence regardless of the fact whether they were named in FIR as accused
persons or not."
Sadiq Masih v. S.H.O. and others

(1994 PCr.LJ 295)
"It is now well-settled that when an F.I.R. stands already registered regarding an
incident, no direction for registering second F.I.R. based on cross-version put forth
by other side can be issued because it is not so provided in law, as has been held
by a Division Bench of this Court in Mushtaq Ahmad's case 1984 PCr.LJ 1454."
Arif Khan v. Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirwala District Khanewal and 2 others
(2006 PCr.LJ 1937)
"The only point in this case which requires determination is whether in presence
of first F.I.R., second F.I.R. can be registered or not."
"Rule 24.1 of the Police Rules, 1934, deals with the recording of the first
information relating to an offence, whether cognizable or non-cognizable. It is
provided therein that every such information shall be recorded in writing, by the
officer incharge of the police station. The Police Officer thus, is obliged to record
in writing every information relating the commission of any offence. The only
distinction made here is that the information disclosing commission of a
cognizable offence is to be recorded in the First Information Report Register as
well as station diary under Rule 24.1(2) while the information with regard to non-
cognizable offence is to be recorded in the station diary only under Rule 24.3. The
information given by respondent No.3 in the shape of cross-version disclosed a
commission of non-cognizable offence, as such it should have been considered as
a statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. the order to register a second F.I.R. in that
situation was not justified in law."
" plea was to be investigated and recording of cross-version, if any, was the proper
answer rather than registering a separate F.I.R."
"In view of the above circumstances, I am of the view that the learned Additional
Sessions Judge was not justified in giving direction to respondent No. 2 to record
F.I.R. as it was a case of cross-version which was ordered to be recorded."
Syed Wahid Bux Shah alias Chacho Shah and another v. The State
(2011 MLD 64)
"Admittedly first F.I.R. No. 21 of 2008 was registered by brother of deceased
Ghulam Qadir and that F.I.R. was fully investigated and challan was submitted in
the Court of law, which is pending adjudication. In existence of first F.I.R. which
was lodged by the brother of deceased Ghulam Qadir second F.I.R. by his cousin
cannot be considered as true. In the above circumstances, the impugned order,
dated 20-11-2009, passed by learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, Thull, is
set aside. The proceedings arisen out of Crime No. 184 of 2009, of Police Station
Thull are also hereby quashed."
8. The second category of the precedent cases comprises of those cases decided by
different High Courts wherein it has been held that after registration of an FIR a new
version of the same incident depicting a different story and a different set of accused
persons can be recorded through a separate FIR and the following cases fall in this
category:
Sawant v. S.H.O., Police Station Saddar, Kasur and another
"The basic question of law involved in this case is whether the police can refuse to
register a case on the basis of the counter version given on behalf of the accused
party on the ground that they consider that version to be false."
"In my view, the correct legal procedure for the police should have been to record
the F.I.R. containing the counter version and to have investigated it. If they found
that the evidence adduced by the petitioner did not sustain the charge they could
have submitted a report to the Magistrate for cancellation of the case."
Akram Ali Shah v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Kasur and 2
others
"It cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that if one F.I.R. pertaining to a
particular occurrence has been registered then another F.I.R. containing the
counter-version of the same occurrence cannot or ought not to be registered."
"On the other hand, however, if the accused of a particular case have a counter
version by way of a grievance, then unless a formal F.I.R. containing that grievance
exists, the accused of the counter case could get away without any punishment
therefore in a situation of the latter type the existence of a counter F.I.R. would
appear to be equitable, as a private complaint is erroneously not given the due
importance. This view is consistent with the practice established over centuries of
submitting challan in cross-cases in a Court of law."
Mirza v. The S.H.O.

(1982 PCr.LJ 171)
"The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to petitioner's
version the members of the opposite party have committed cognizable offences,
therefore, the respondent was under a statutory obligation to register the case. On
the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent S.H.O. vehemently argues
that as the same occurrence has been reported through F.I.R. No. 185 dated 10th
August, 1981 there is no question of recording another F.I.R. and the investigating
agency can be directed to take down the petitioner's version during the
investigation. In the circumstances, I accept this petition and direct the respondent
S.H.O. to receive a written complaint from the petitioner and act in accordance
with section 154 Cr.P.C."
Abdul Ghani v. S.H.O., P.S. Saddar, Sheikhupura and others

(1983 PCr.LJ 2172)
"It may well be that the occurrence reported about is the same but then there are
two cross-versions of the occurrence and not two different versions of the same
occurrence. The version on the basis of which the F.I.R. has already been registered
is distinct .... whereas the version given by the petitioner is totally on a different
premises ."
"In the context of the above position it appears that the respondent is under
statutory obligation to register the case and proceed with the investigation in
accordance with law."
Muhammad Ibrahim v. S.H.O. Police Station Mansehra and another

(PLD 1983 Pesh. 229)
"In the circumstances we are of the view that the SHO (respondent No.1) has failed
in his duty by not registering and investigating the counter version of the case
given in the report of the petitioner."
`Halim Sarwar v. S.H.O., Police Station Headmarala and 2 others

(1984 PCr.LJ 2993)
"Even if an FIR has been registered on the basis of one sided version, registration
of a second FIR showing a different grievance could not be refused by the Police
Officer in proper performance of his legal duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C."
Fateh Sher v. S.H.O etc.

(1985 PCr.LJ 151)
"No doubt, it was held in the aforementioned cases reported as PLD 1979 Lahore
320, PLD 1980 Lahore 116 and 1982 PCr.LJ 171 that if the accused of a particular
case have counter-version by way of a grievance and the counter-version discloses
commission of cognizable offence, it is the duty of the Station House Officer to
register a counter FIR and in case of his failure to do so, he can be commanded by
this Court to perform his statutory obligation. However, there is no dearth of case-
law on the point that so far as this Court is concerned, it is not necessary that in
each and every case, where there is an omission to perform a statutory duty, a
direction must issue. Facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into
account and it has also to be seen if filing of a private complaint, in the
circumstances of the case, is not as adequate or efficacious a remedy as the
registration of a case."
Karim Bibi v. Station House Officer, Police Station Rajana (Faisalabad) and others
(1985 PCr.LJ 213)
[The investigating officer] "did not take down the counter-version nor made any
investigation on that line despite the same having been brought to his notice in the
form of various applications."
" it is enough that the version of Mst. Karim Bibi was not taken down and in that
respect the A.S.I. did not perform his statutory duty under section 154 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. His failure to do so was illegal. Consequently the petition
is accepted and it is directed that let an F.I.R. be registered on the statement of Mst.
Karim Bibi."
Ghulam Hussain v. Siraj-ul-Haq and others

(1987 PCr.LJ 1214)
"As regards the last contention, the petitioner has made allegation in the report
against police and army personnels. The incident is admitted and F.I.R. has also
been registered. There is no bar of recording a second F.I.R. of the same incident
giving counter-version of the incident."
Mst. Rehmi etc. v. S.H.O. Basirpur etc.

(1987 MLD 1682)
"From the above observations, it would be quite clear that informations can be laid
one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.Rs. if these disclose separate cognizable
offences, the second or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the
disclosure of other criminal activities. Recording of a second F.I.R. or a direction
to that effect therefore depends upon the circumstances of each case. Counter cases
are often recorded and tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid down
as to when a second FIR can or should be recorded. The matter has to be seen in
the context of the totality of the circumstances and the allegations. But if a new
case is made out or allegations of a cognizable case are levelled showing a genuine
grievance, then the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case registered and
investigation made."
"Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge fell in error in directing
the registration of a case on the motion of the side who had lost a life simply
because the other side who had suffered an injury on a finger had succeeded to
get a FIR recorded earlier."
Manzoor Hussain (Chaeywala) v. Station House Officer, etc.

(1988 MLD 2681)
" learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently urged that the mere
fact that an FIR has already been registered does not debar the petitioner to lodge
the second FIR in respect of the same offence and that it is the statutory duty of the
officials respondents to record the same. There cannot be any cavil with
proposition of law laid down in the above cited cases "
Abdul Rehman v. S.H.O. Police Station Karianwala, Tehsil and District Gujrat and
another
(1989 MLD 2698)
"The law enjoins upon the police to register the counter version and to proceed
with the investigation in accordance with law. The respondent S.H.O. is directed
to register a case on the basis of the counter version and to proceed with the
investigation according to law."
Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of Sindh and another

(PLD 1997 Karachi 119)
"Reference to the case-law, therefore, indicates that there is no hard and fast rule
that a second F.I.R. cannot be registered in respect of a different version given by
an aggrieved party of the same occurrence. If information is subsequently given to
a police officer, which discloses a different offence, also cognizable by the police,
then unless it is a mere amplification of the first version, it must be recorded by
the police. Therefore, direction to the police to record a second F.I.R. would
depend upon the circumstances of each case. If true facts in respect of an
occurrence are not reflected by the first F.I.R., then refusal to record a genuine
version of the same occurrence would not be justified. The question has, therefore,
to be examined in the light of the circumstances of a particular case."
Muhammad Ishaque v. S.P. Jaffarabad and another

(PLJ 1998 Quetta 1)
"The conclusion of the above discussion would be that the police was under
bounden duty to have registered the counter-version of the petitioner through a
separate F.I.R. Then, it was duty of the SSP to conduct impartial and honest
investigation through an independent police officer of the second version as
directed by Mr. Justice Javed Iqbal. I, therefore, agree with his conclusions."
Mst. Razia Sultana alias Gogi Butt v. Deputy Inspector-General of Police and
others
(1999 PCr.LJ 694)
"I would express that the case-law is not bereft of the judicial decisions to the effect
that in the presence of the registration of a criminal case the order for the
registration of the 2nd F.I.R. about the same occurrence can be passed by the High
Court However, in the circumstances of this matter when case F.I.R. No.442, dated
8-9-1998 registered at Police Station Nawan Kot under section 436, Pakistan Penal
Code is under investigation wherein the version of the petitioner can be recorded
thereof, there is no legal and factual necessity to pass the order in the matter. I
declare that there is no legal justification to pass the order for the registration of
the 2nd First Information Report as required and desired by Mst. Razia Sultana
alias Gogi Butt petitioner."
Ahmad Yar v. Station House Officer, Shah Kot, District Sahiwal and 8 others
(2007 PCr.LJ 1352)
"As held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case Mst. Anwar
Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West Karachi and 12 others
PLD 2005 SC 297 and Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of Sindh
and another PLD 1997 Kar. 119, also relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the
impugned order, there is no embargo with regard to registration of second F.I.R.
in respect of different version given by the aggrieved party of the same occurrence
and the only impediment is that second F.I.R. should not contain the facts for the
mere amplification of the first version."
Muhammad Azam v. Inspector-General of Police, Islamabad and 2 others

"Similarly, it has been repeatedly held by superior Courts of the country that
where a different, opposite or a cross version is put forth by the complainant which
discloses commission of cognizable offence, second F.I.R. is not barred. In this
regard, reference may be made to PLD 1978 Lahore 187 and Miss Ghanwa Bhutto
and others v. Government of Sindh and others, PLD 1997 Karachi 119."
Mst. Allah Rakhi v. D.P.O. Gujranwala and 5 others

(2009 MLD 99)
"Insofar as the registration of the second F.I.R. is concerned, by now, it has been
settled that there is no bar against the registration of second F.I.R. regarding the
same occurrence, rather, in the case of Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto (PLD 1997 Kar.119),
the order of registration of third F.I.R. was passed by Hon'ble Karachi High Court,
which was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Wajid Ali Durani
and another (supra)."
9. The third category of the precedent cases is where different High Courts have clarified
that a separate FIR is to be registered if the new version being advanced pertains to a
different occurrence or discloses commission of a different cognizable offence. The
following cases fall in this category of cases:
Muhammad Rafique v. Ahmad Yar and another
(PLD 1982 Lah. 825)
"In the present case, however, the earlier F.I.R. relates altogether to a different
incident and transaction . The F.I.R. sought to be lodged was not a counter version
and it therefore, cannot be said that Ahmad Yar as an accused in the earlier case
was trying to give his own version in respect of the same incident or transaction."
In the present case, the learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion [by
ordering registration of second F.I.R.] which he undoubtedly possessed and
nothing has been shown to warrant interference in the Intra Court Appeal."
Allah Ditta and 3 others v. The S.H.O., P.S. Basirpur, District Okara and 3 others
"From the above observations, it would be quite clear that informations can be laid
one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.Rs. if these disclose separate cognisable
offences, the second or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the
disclosure of other criminal activities. Recording of a second F.I.R. or a direction
to that effect, therefore, depends upon the circumstances of each case. Counter
cases are often recorded and tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid
down as to when a second FIR can or should be recorded. The matter has to be
seen in the context of the totality of the circumstances and the allegations. But if a
new case is made out or allegations of a cognizable case are levelled showing a
genuine grievance, then the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case registered
and investigation made."
Pervez Akhtar v. The State

(1989 PCr.LJ 2199)
"In this view of the matter, being bound by the principle laid down by this Court
in Akram Shah's case PLD 1979 Lah. 320, Muhammad Aslam's case PLD 1979 Lah.
907, Malik Muhammad Aslam's case PLD 1981 Lah.138, Mirza's case 1982 PCr.LJ
171 and Abdul Ghani's case 1983 PCr.LJ 2172, I do not see any illegality in the
registration of the second F.I.R. at the instance of Fazal Din. Since the two versions
contained in the two F.I.Rs. are different versions of two different occurrences and
not two versions of the same occurrence and recoveries have to be made from the
five accused, I would not like to interfere in this matter."
Firdous Barkat Ali v. The State

(1990 PCr.LJ 967)
"The second First Information Report which was filed on the basis of the written
complaint included certain fresh instances concerning the involvement of the
present applicant. The second First Information Report in the circumstances could
competently be lodged. In any event the argument that the second First
Information Report is merely a statement of a witness under section 161, Criminal
Procedure Code can always be raised before the trial Court and it is up to the trial
Court to thrash out the facts and determine whether the second First Information
Report would amount to a statement under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code
or a new complaint giving information of newly detected instances of
misappropriation."
Muhammad Latif v. S.H.O., Police Station Saddar, Dunyapur and 14 others

(1993 PCr.LJ 1992)
"It is now a settled proposition of law that informations can be laid one after the
other, to be recorded as F.I.Rs. if these disclose separate cognizable offences, the
second or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the disclosure of
other criminal activities. Although recording of a second F.I.R. or a direction to
that effect depends upon the circumstances of each case but counter-cases are often
recorded and tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid as to when a
second F.I.R. can or should be recorded. The matter has to be seen in the context
of the totality of the circumstances and the allegations. After the registration of the
first F.I.R. if a new case is made out or allegations of a cognizable case are levelled
showing a genuine grievance, then the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case
registered and investigated."
Hamayun Khan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others

(1999 PCr.LJ 1706)
"It was, therefore, obligatory upon the police to register a separate report there
being no bar of the first F.I.R. as a new case was made out by the respondent
disclosing allegations of separate cognizable offences, as recording of a second
F.I.R. shall depend upon the facts of each case and the matter is to be seen in the
context of totality of the circumstances and the allegations made in second F.I.R.
Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Latif v. S.H.O. and others 1993 PCr.LJ
1992."
Muhammad Anwar, Sub-Inspector, Railway Police Lahore v. Station House

Officer, Railway Police, Kasur and 2 others
"There is no cavil with the proposition that when two or more versions with regard
to one incident or offence are given after recording of the F.I.R., second F.I.R.
cannot be recorded on the basis of every subsequent version but if in a case it is
found that a counter version is given by a party which discloses a distinct and
separate offence, another F.I.R. will have to be registered and shall be investigated
upon."
Rana Ghulam Mustafa v. Station House Officer, Police Station Civil Line, Lahore
and 2 others
"From reading the language of section 154, Cr.P.C. it is clear that information can
be laid before the S.H.O. about an occurrence at any time even if already an F.I.R.
stands registered about the same occurrence. In such circumstance, there is no bar
laying information one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.R. if such an
information discloses commission of a separate cognizable offence. The second or
later information should not be merely an amplification for the first F.I.R. but is
should be a disclosure of a different criminal activity. Recording of a second F.I.R.
or a direction to that effect, therefore, depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. No. hard and fast rules or principles can be laid down as to when a
second F.I.R. can or should be recorded. The matter has to be seen in the context
of the totality of the circumstances and the allegations."
Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Attorney and another v.

Prosecutor General, Quetta and 7 others
(PLD 2015 Balochistan 54)
"The moot question for consideration arises as to whether investigation and
further proceedings on the basis of all the FIRs is permissible? Though a
straitjacket formula cannot be laid down, yet the only test whether 75 FIRs can be
permitted to exist. In such case, the Court has to examine the facts and
circumstances giving rise to all the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied
to find out whether all the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents, which are two or more parts of the
same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second or the remaining
FIRs are liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the
version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different
incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible."
Pervaiz Rasheed and others v. Ex-officio Justice of Peace and others

(2016 YLR 1441)
"It is well settled proposition of law that second FIR can be registered if a distinct
and separate cognizable offence is disclosed or if any aggrieved person got
reservation about the first FIR grousing that contents of the FIR already registered
does not disclose the true picture of the occurrence. However, second FIR cannot
be registered if it is just an amplification or elaboration of earlier."
Imtiaz Ali v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 8 others

(2017 MLD 132)
"It is well settled that lodgment of second FIR against the same offence is neither
prohibited nor restricted by the law, nevertheless the controverting set of
allegations narrated in second FIR must emanate a quite separate and distinct
offence, and same should be examined prudently in the purview of facts stated
regarding the incident in earlier FIR as well as documentary evidence collected
and statements of PWs recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. by earlier Investigating
Officer, to curb and defeat the fabrication of events with mala fide intention and
false involvement of any innocent person."
10. The Privy Council and this Court have also dealt with the issue at hand in the
following cases:
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad
(AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 18)
"The argument as their Lordships understood was that the only information report
under Ss. 154 to 156, Criminal P.C., was that recorded on 31st August 1941, that
the allegations recorded at a later stage of 5th September were not an information
report, but a statement taken in the course of an investigation under Ss.161 and
162 of the Code, that there was therefore no reported cognisable offence into which
the police were entitled to enquire, but only a non-cognisable offence which
required a Magistrate's order if an investigation was to be authorized. Their
Lordships cannot accede to this argument. They would point out that the
respondent in his case treats each document as a separate information report and
indeed, on the argument presented on his behalf, rightly so, since each discloses a
separate offence, the second not being a mere amplification of the first, but the
disclosure of further criminal activities."
Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another

(1975 SCMR 149)
"Jamshed Ahmad petitioner has felt aggrieved by the order of a learned Single
Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 8-7-1974, whereby his petition under
Clause 22 of the Letters Patent read with section 154 of the Cr.P.C. praying for the
issuance of a direction to respondent No. 1 who is S.H.O., Police Station, City
Khanpur, Rahimyar Khan, for the registration of a case under sections
467/468/420/471/109/114/116, P.P.C. read with section 81/82 of the Registration Act
and conduct of preliminary investigation by some higher police officer was
dismissed in limine on the ground that in respect of the same transaction a case
had already been registered with the petitioner as one of the accused therein.
2. In support of the petition for leave, learned counsel contended that respondent
No. 1 was under an obligation to register the case at the instance of the petitioner
reflecting his own version of the incident notwithstanding the fact that in respect
of the same transaction a case had already been registered. In support of this,
learned counsel has relied on the plain language of the statutory provision
contained in section 154, Cr.P.C.
3. We are not impressed by the argument. A perusal of the record shows that on
receipt of the petition, the learned Judge had called for a report from respondent
No. 1 who gave three reasons for the non-registration of the case at the instance of
the petitioner: Firstly, that no case could be registered against the Tehsildar/Sub-
Registrar, whom the petitioner wanted to rope in as one of the accused-persons,
without the previous approval of the Provincial Anti-Corruption,
Council/Divisional Anti-Corruption Committee. Secondly, that according to his
information the report sought to be recorded was false, and Thirdly, that a case of
forgery and cheating etc. was already under investigation in respect of the same
transaction, the petitioner having been named as one of the accused therein.
4. The petition could be thrown out on the short ground that the High Court was
under no obligation to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. It was a matter
resting entirely in its discretion and there is nothing to indicate that it was
improperly exercised. Even otherwise, by no means does the impugned order shut
the door on the petitioner who is at liberty to initiate criminal proceedings by
lodging a complaint. The position is too well known to be reiterated that the
Supreme Court does not sit as a Court of appeal and interferes only in cases of
grave injustice, the present case being certainly not one of those. The petition is,
therefore, dismissed."
Kaura v. The State and others

(1983 SCMR 436)
"It appears to us that once the case was registered vide FIR 23 the registration of a
fresh report notwithstanding the divergent version contained therein was not
called for inasmuch as the ball had already been set rolling and the police was not
only competent but also duty bound to unearth the true facts and trace the real
culprits."
Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others
(2001 SCMR 1556)
"These two petitions for leave to appeal are directed against the judgment dated
7-11-1996 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi whereby the learned
Judges gave direction to the S.H.O., Clifton Police, Karachi, to register another
F.I.R. sought to be lodged by Mst. Ghanwa Bhutto and Mst. Badrunnisa in respect
of the incident in which their husbands, namely, Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Ashiq
Jatoi lost their lives."
"3. As however, widows of the deceased were not satisfied and felt that the two
previously registered F.I.Rs did not reflect the true facts, they filed Constitutional
Petition in the High Court of Sindh, seeking direction to the Clifton Police Station
to record another F.I.R. disclosing the true facts of the incident. During the hearing
of the Constitutional Petition, the petitioners wanted to be impleaded as
respondents to the petition, but the High Court declined such request. The
Constitutional Petition was resisted on behalf of the State on the grounds that the
two earlier F.I.Rs. in respect of the same incident having been already registered
at the same police station, the lodging of third F.I.R. by the widows of the deceased
was not warranted in law and that if the petitioners were not satisfied, they had
an alternate remedy of filing a direct complaint in the Court."
"In the result, the learned High Court allowed the Constitutional Petition and gave
direction to the Clifton Police Station to register a third F.I.R. at the behest of the
widows of the deceased. Hence, these petitions."
"6. We see no force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel. Perusal of the
impugned judgment passed by the learned High Court would show that the first
contention of the learned counsel was precisely raised before the learned High
Court, who dealt with it elaborately and repelled it for the reasons shown in the
judgment, to which no exception can be legitimately taken and the learned High
Court in the circumstances of the case, was within its jurisdiction in giving the
direction to the police for registering another F.I.R. at the instance of the aggrieved
widows of the deceased. Moreover, admittedly, since lodging of the third F.I.R.,
regular challan has been submitted in the Court in which the petitioners have been
named as accused persons and the trial is yet to take place."
"Similarly, the contention that the learned High Court has not followed the view
expressed by this Court in 1983 SCMR 436 is misconceived, as perusal of the
impugned judgment would also show that in the circumstances pointed out in the
judgment the learned High Court had correctly appreciated the views expressed
in several cases by the superior Courts including the case referred to by the counsel
in giving the direction for registering another F.I.R."
Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West, Karachi
and 12 others
(PLD 2005 SC 297)
"7. Admittedly, petitioner from the day of incident has been agitating that the
murder of her husband was managed by his real brothers, namely, Abdul Khaliq,
Abdul Malik and Latif in league with respondents Siddiq, Saifur Rehman,
Muhammad Raza-ul-Haq, Akbar Ali and S.I. Malik Nazir. In such circumstances,
the veracity and truthfulness of F.I.R. lodged by respondent Muhammad Yousuf,
the Manager of the Company, became highly doubtful and the petitioner was right
in asking for registration of another F.I.R. at her own version. It is on record that
she had been moving applications and making representations to the high-ups in
the police but because of influence of private respondents, all in vain, therefore,
she rightly invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court and
urged for registration of the case at her own version which apparently was not
disposed of in legal manner. No doubt, exercise of the jurisdiction under Article
199 of the Constitution is discretionary with the High Court but according to the
principles laid down by the Superior Courts, the discretionary powers must be
exercised in good faith, fairly, justly and reasonably having regard to all relevant
circumstances. Examining the case of petitioner in the light of above principles, we
are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not only exercised its
jurisdiction improperly but also disposed of petition without adverting to the
grievance of the petitioner only on technical grounds. This Court in the case of
Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others 2001 SCMR
1556 maintained the order of High Court whereby registration of third F.I.R. was
allowed on the ground that the two F.I.Rs earlier registered by police do not reflect
the true facts of the case. It has also been held in this case that if information given
to a police officer, which discloses a different offence was also cognizable by the
police, then unless it is a mere amplification of the first version, must be recorded
by the police.
In the case of Muhammad Ishaque referred (supra), the petitioner therein

approached the learned High Court for registration of second F.I.R. as the police
has refused to register his version with regard to a cognizable offence under
section 154, Cr.P.C. By majority view, it was held that it was the duty of the police
to register counter version of the petitioner through a separate F.I.R. and also
directed for impartial and honest investigation by the police."
"10. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that in the instant
case petitioner has been able to make out a case for registration of second F.I.R."
Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others

(PLD 2016 SC 484)
"3. Regarding this incident, an FIR was earlier lodged with misleading and
incorrect statement of facts, therefore, she filed an application under Section 22-A
Cr.P.C. before the Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge Pishin with the following
assertions: ---"
"5. We have heard arguments of the learned ASC for the appellants. He contended
that indeed there is no specific prohibition under the provisions of Cr.P.C. which
precludes registration of another FIR with respect to the same incident;
nevertheless, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, such
practice has been deprecated particularly when the proceedings in a criminal case
arising out of earlier FIR have reached at an advanced stage; however, this
important legal aspect has not been duly taken into consideration by the High
Court in its impugned judgment. He, however, could not refer to any case law in
support of his argument that registration of another FIR is unwarranted by any
specific provision of law.
6. The learned Additional Advocate General Balochistan in his submissions did

not oppose findings of the High Court of Balochistan in the impugned judgment.
He referred to before us the judgments in the cases of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and
others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR 1556) and Mst. Anwar
Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West, Karachi and 12 others
(PLD 2005 SC 297), which lay down a general principle in this regard as under:
"no definite rule could be laid down barring the registration of another F.I.R. when
a different version of the same occurrence is given by an aggrieved party.
Moreover, any direction to the police to record another F.I.R. would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case, however, refusal to record/register a
genuine version of the same occurrence is unwarranted in law."
7. In another earlier case Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) while
dismissing the CPLA, the Court had suggested the aggrieved party to move the
High Court for review of its order regarding registration of another FIR with the
observation that the police was not only competent but also duty bound to unearth
the true facts and trace the real culprits while conducting investigation of the
crime. This judgment was taken into notice in the case of Mst. Anwar Begum
(supra) but not commented upon, while in the other case of Wajid Ali Khan Durani
(supra) similar contention of the learned counsel was repelled as being
misconceived. It was further held that in the circumstances discussed, the learned
High Court correctly appreciated the view expressed in several other cases of the
superior Courts for giving direction to register another FIR.
8. We have considered submissions of the learned ASC for the appellants on short
controversy involved in the matter relating to registration of another FIR. In the
instant case, perusal of contents of the earlier FIR lodged at the instance of Ali
Muhammad Defedar Levies on 09.06.2010 and the contents of other FIR lodged by
Respondent No.1 on 27.08.2015, in terms of the impugned judgment, reveals two
entirely different and conflicting stories about the actual occurrence. It is, thus,
obvious that in case prosecution leads its evidence on the basis of contents of
earlier FIR and the investigation made on that basis, then from no stretch of
imagination the grievance of Respondent No.1, attributing criminal liability of
whole occurrence to the complainant and his party ("the appellants" herein), could
be considered or adjudicated upon by the Court. In such circumstances,
considering the allegations of Respondent No.1 about mala fide of the complainant
in the earlier FIR so as to exonerate himself from the liability of Qatl-i-amd of her
son, followed by distorted and collusive investigation, the impugned judgment of
the High Court directing registration of another FIR seems fully justified and in
accordance with law, wherein no specific bar or prohibition is provided in this
regard. The two cases referred to by the learned Additional Advocate General
Balochistan in support of the impugned judgment also fully support this view.
9. The whole gambit of controversy in hand revolves around the import and
application of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. hence for ready reference it will be useful to
reproduce the same as under:
"154. Information in cognizable cases.- Every information relating to the

commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-incharge of a police
station, shall be reduced in writing by him or under his direction and be read over
to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced
to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf."
10. As could be seen from the plain reading of above reproduced provision of law,
the requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C. is to enter every information of commission
of a cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge
of the police station, which shall then be reduced into writing and signed by the
person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by
such officer in the form prescribed by the Provincial Government in this behalf.
Meaning thereby, that it is not a legal requirement for provider of such information
to canvass the whole scene of occurrence of a cognizable offence giving description
and details of accused, details of weapons used by them, their specific role, motive
behind the occurrence, and the names of eye-witnesses etc. But it is a matter of
common experience that usually the entries made in Section 154 Cr.P.C. book, as
per practice, contain invariably all such details so much so that in the ordinary
parlance/sense it is considered as the gist of the prosecution case against the
accused. In such state of affairs, if a collusive, mala fide or concocted FIR,
registered at the instance of some individual with some ulterior motive, is taken
as sacrosanct, it is likely to divert the whole course of investigation in a wrong
direction and spoil the entire prosecution case on that premise. The Court while
considering the crucial point of registration of another FIR cannot remain
oblivious of these ground realities so as to non-suit the aggrieved party from
agitating his grievance in an honest manner, or ensure regulating proper
investigation of a crime in the right direction, or apprehend the real culprits and
brought them before the Court of law for justice.
11. Though our criminal legal system proceeds on the presumption of honest, God
fearing and fair police officers, impartial and honest investigation system, but this
is far from reality in the society we live in. In such circumstances when the Courts
feel that due to mala fide, dishonest, colourful and motivated acts or omissions,
entire investigation of the crime has been misled or it is going to be misled and on
that account the case of the prosecution is likely to fail, then they are not denuded
of their powers to order recording of another FIR disclosing a different version to
check such nefarious design meant to save the real culprits vis-a-vis misleading
the investigation/prosecution, at any appropriate stage of the proceedings.
However, where need be, such powers are to be exercised with extreme care and
caution and not in a routine manner so as to merely fulfill the wish of an individual
who, as per his whims, is not satisfied either with the contents of earlier FIR or the
direction of investigation based thereon or wants registration of another FIR with
some ulterior motive. It is more so important in the circumstances when the
procedure of direct complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. is also provided to meet
such eventualities. However, it may be clarified here that there may be
circumstances where registration of another FIR will be the only proper course as
adopting the alternate course provided in Section 200, Cr.P.C. may not be equally
efficacious and effective for the aggrieved person. The case law on the subject,
which has been referred to above, lend support to the view that provisions of
Section 154, Cr.P.C. are to be read in a pragmatic, holistic and realistic manner in
order to ensure that its true spirit and object is achieved and it is not abused at the
hands of individuals or police, who may be adamant to make mockery of this
system. It is for these reasons that no definite principle can be laid down barring
the registration of another FIR.
12. It is unfortunate to note that in the instant case due to one-sided version
disclosed in earlier FIR No.17/2010, the investigating agency never bothered to
look into the crime from another angle as narrated in the other FIR dated
27.08.2015, which means that as per assertions of Respondent No.1, the alleged
culprits could have otherwise escaped from their criminal liability successfully at
the very initial stage without even being charged for the offence on the basis of
misleading contents of earlier FIR. The short and long of the above discussion is
that the impugned judgment of the Balochistan High Court warrants no
interference."
11. The confusion gripping the issue, we observe so with great respect and deference, is
because of the fact that in none of the precedent cases detailed above the actual scheme
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police Rules, 1934 regarding registration
of a criminal case through an FIR and its investigation by the police had been examined
in any detail and we venture to undertake such examination in the following paragraphs.
12. Section 154, Cr.P.C. is the legal provision under which an FIR is registered in respect
of commission of a cognizable offence and the relevant part of that provision reads as
follows:
"154. Information in cognizable cases. Every information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer incharge of a police
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over
to the informant, and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced
to writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf. ---"
It is straightaway to be noticed that the heading of this section speaks of "cognizable
cases" meaning thereby that after entering the first information relating to commission of
a cognizable offence in the prescribed book, i.e. after registration of an FIR the matter
becomes a "case". We have found the learned Attorney-General to be entirely justified in
maintaining that an FIR is essentially an "incident report" which informs the police for
the first time about an occurrence in which some cognizable offence has been committed
and after registration of the FIR the occurrence is treated as a "case" and thereafter every
step taken in the ensuing investigation under sections 156, 157 and 159, Cr.P.C. is a step
taken in that case. The steps to be taken during the investigation of the case include
gathering of information about the circumstances of the case and such information may
or may not be in accord with the facts narrated in the FIR. Section 160, Cr.P.C. quite clearly
indicates that and the same reads as under:
"160. Police officer's power to require attendance of witnesses.-- Any police

officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order in writing,
require the attendance before himself of any person being within the limits of his
own or any adjoining station who, from the information given or otherwise,
appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; and such person shall
attend as so required."
This section clearly dispels the impression that the investigating officer is to be guided or
controlled by the contents of the FIR or that the investigation to be conducted by him is
driven by any duty to establish that the story of the incident contained in the FIR is
correct. In fact, to the contrary, after registration of the FIR the investigating officer is to
embark upon an exercise to discover the actuality of the matter irrespective of the version
of the incident narrated by the first informant through the FIR and in the process he is
expected to collect information from any number of persons who appear to him "to be
acquainted with the circumstances of the case". Every new information received by him
during the investigation of the case or every new circumstance in which the relevant
offence was committed coming to his notice during the investigation of the case is not to
require registration of a separate FIR because such further information or knowledge is a
part of investigation of the same case which had taken birth at the time of registration of
the FIR. Section 161, Cr.P.C. also deals with examination of any person supposed to be
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The said section reads as follows:
"161. Examination of witnesses by police. (1) Any police officer making an

investigation under this Chapter or any police officer not below such rank as the
Provincial Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf,
acting on the requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person supposed
to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
(2) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to
him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a
tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.
(3) The police officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the
course of an examination, under this section, and if he does so he shall make a
separate record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records."
The "case" already stands registered through an FIR and thereafter any person can supply
any information about the facts and circumstances of the case to the investigating officer.
There is no bar in the matter against an information which may disclose circumstances
and culprits different from those mentioned in the FIR. According to section 173(1)(b),
Cr.P.C. the action taken under section 173(1), Cr.P.C. by the officer-in-charge of the police
station is to be communicated through the public prosecutor "to the person, if any, by
whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given". This by
itself is a recognition of a possibility that any other information about commission of the
relevant offence (including information about different circumstances and different
culprits) may also be provided to the investigating officer by any other person as well
during the course of investigation of the case commenced upon registration of the first
information received, i.e. the FIR and no fresh FIR needs to be registered on the basis of
a new information provided by a different person.
13. The same distinction between a "case" and an "information" about commission of an
offence also appears to be writ large in the relevant Police Rules, 1934 as well. Rule 24.1
of the said Rules in Chapter XXIV dealing with 'Information to the Police' speaks of
"information relating to an offence" received under section 154, Cr.P.C. and Rule 24.5
makes that distinction absolutely clear. Rule 24.5 of the said Rules provides as follows:
"24.5. First Information Report Register.-- (1) The First Information Report
Register shall be a printed book in Form 24.5 (1) consisting of 200 pages and shall
be completely filled before a new one is commenced. Cases shall bear an annual
serial number in each police station for each calendar year. ----"
It is clear from Rule 24.5 reproduced above that commission of a cognizable offence, when
reported to the police through the first information and registered in the FIR register, is
treated as a "case" bearing an annual serial number and such "case" carries the same
number for ever irrespective of any number of different versions received by the police
regarding commission of the said offence or any number of different circumstances or
sets of culprits brought to the notice of the investigating officer during the investigation
of the "case". At this stage an analogy may be apt vis- -vis registration of motor vehicles.
After rolling out of a motor vehicle from the assembly line and before it is brought on the
road such motor vehicle is required by the law to be registered with the relevant authority
and upon such registration the relevant motor vehicle is allocated a registration number.
After its registration and allocation of a registration number such motor vehicle is to carry
the same registration number throughout its life and utility even when its ownership
changes hands, its user is transferred to different persons, its colour is changed or its
shape is modified at any subsequent stage. Similarly, the FIR number allocated to a
criminal case is the number of that case in the police record and till culmination of the
case the said criminal case is to carry the same number and is to be identified by that
number alone. This by itself is a sure indication of the scheme of the law that in respect
of an incident involving commission of a cognizable offence there is to be only one FIR
and every step taken during the investigation of the case is to be with reference to that
FIR. Rules 24.12 to 24.18 deal with Special Reports submitted and received by different
officers during the investigation of a case and Rule 24.17 reads as follows:
"24.17. Continuation and final reports.-- (1) Each successive special report in the
same case shall bear the same number as the first report and shall be distinguished
by the addition of a capital Roman letter in the order of the alphabet.
Illustration-- The first special report of the murder of X is No.20. The next special
report shall be numbered 20-A, the next 20-B and so on. -------"
This Rule again makes it evident that the case and its number in the police record remains
the same whatever development may take place during the investigation of the case and
that is also true of any new version advanced or any new set of culprits introduced during
the progress of the investigation.
14. Chapter XXV of the Police Rules, 1934 deals with 'Investigation' and Rule 25.1 falling
in that Chapter provides as follows:
"25.1. Powers to investigate.-- (1) An officer-in-charge of a police station is
empowered by Section 156, Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any
cognizable offence which occurs within the limits of his jurisdiction.
(2) He is also empowered under Section 157(1), Criminal Procedure Code, to
depute a subordinate to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and
circumstances of the case and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and
arrest of the offenders. -------"
This Rule shows that the power to investigate is relatable to the offence and is not
confined to the circumstances reported to the police through the first information
reduced to writing as an FIR. The first information only sets the ball rolling and according
to this Rule the investigation to follow is about "the facts and circumstances of the case",
not just those reported by the first informant but including any other information
received through any other informant or source. This aspect of the matter comes out very
clearly through Rule 25.2(3) which reads as under:
"(3) It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter under
investigation. His object shall be to discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest
the real offender or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely to any
view of the facts for or against any person."
This Rule should suffice to dispel any impression that investigation of a case is to be
restricted to the version of the incident narrated in the FIR or the allegations levelled
therein. It is quite evident from this Rule that once an FIR is registered then the
investigating officer embarking upon investigation may not restrict himself to the story
narrated or the allegations levelled in the FIR and he may entertain any fresh information
becoming available from any other source regarding how the offence was committed and
by whom it was committed and he may arrive at his own conclusions in that regard. The
final report to be submitted under section 173, Cr.P.C. is to be based upon his final
opinion and such opinion is not to be guided by what the first informant had stated or
alleged in the FIR. It is not unheard of that sometimes in the final report submitted under
section 173, Cr.P.C. the first informant is put up before the court as the actual culprit.
15. The confusion prevailing in the matter of registration of multiple FIRs in respect of
the same offence stems from a misunderstanding that an FIR is the version of the incident
reported to the police whereas the legal position is that an FIR to be registered under
section 154, Cr.P.C. is only an information about commission of a cognizable offence and
not an information about the circumstances in which such offence was committed or by
whom it was committed. If the information supplied to the police not only reports
commission of a cognizable offence but also contains a story as to how and by whom the
offence was committed then such further information is just a version of the informant
and during the investigation the investigating officer is free to entertain any number of
versions advanced by any number of persons and it is his duty "to discover the actual
facts of the case and to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not commit himself
prematurely to any view of the facts for or against any person" as mandated by Rule
25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934 reproduced above. All subsequent or divergent versions
of the same occurrence or the persons involved therein are to be received, recorded and
investigated by the investigating officer in the same "case" which is based upon the one
and only FIR registered in respect of the relevant "offence" in the prescribed book kept at
the local police station.
16. Now we turn to the judgments rendered by this Court so far on the issue of
registration of multiple FIRs in respect of commission of the same cognizable offence
depicting different versions of the same incident. In the case of Jamshed Ahmad v.
Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1975 SCMR 149) this Court had found the High
Court to be justified in refusing to order registration of a second FIR because an FIR
already stood registered in respect of "the same transaction" and the case was already
under investigation.
17. In the case of Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) this Court had
categorically held that a case had already been registered through an FIR and, therefore,
registration of another FIR "was not called for" merely because the subsequent
information supplied to the police contained a divergent version of the same incident. It
was observed by this Court that "the ball had already been set rolling and the police was
not only competent but also duty bound to unearth the true facts and trace the real
culprits."
18. The subsequent case of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh
and others (2001 SCMR 1556), however, struck a different note and, therefore, the same
requires a close scrutiny. It was alleged in that case that the two FIRs already registered
with the local police in respect of the same incident "did not reflect the true facts" and,
therefore, another FIR ought to be registered "disclosing the true facts of the incident" and
in that backdrop the High Court had ordered the local police to register a third FIR in
respect of the selfsame incident. When the said order of the High Court was assailed
before this Court it was upheld and maintained simply by observing that "the learned
High Court in the circumstances of the case, was within its jurisdiction in giving the
direction to the police for registering another F.I.R. at the instance of the aggrieved
widows of the deceased. Moreover, admittedly, since lodging of the third F.I.R., regular
challan has been submitted in the Court in which the petitioners have been named as
accused persons and the trial is yet to take place." This Court had gone on to observe that
"Similarly, the contention that the learned High Court has not followed the view
expressed by this Court in 1983 SCMR 436 is misconceived, as perusal of the impugned
judgment would also show that in the circumstances pointed out in the judgment the
learned High Court had correctly appreciated the views expressed in several cases by the
superior Courts including the case referred to by the counsel in giving the direction for
registering another F.I.R." A careful examination of the said judgment handed down by
this Court shows three things: firstly, it was presumed without referring to any legal
provision or basis that the High Court had the jurisdiction to order registration of a third
FIR in respect of the same incident; secondly, the third FIR had already been registered
on the basis of the impugned order passed by the High Court and upon completion of
the investigation on the basis of the third FIR a Challan had already been submitted
before the trial court for holding a regular trial of the accused persons implicated through
the third FIR; and, thirdly, the judgment passed by this Court earlier on in the case of
Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) had not been correctly appreciated. We
understand, and it is submitted with great respect, that in that case this Court did not feel
persuaded to interfere in the matter primarily because the case had already reached the
trial court after completion of the investigation stage and it was presumably on account
of that development that this Court had paid little attention to the legal issues involved
in registration of multiple FIRs in respect of the same incident. It, thus, appears to us that
the said judgment had proceeded on the basis of its own peculiar facts and, therefore, the
same could not readily be treated as the law declared.
19. The case of Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West,
Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) was a case in which the High Court had refused
to order registration of a second FIR regarding an incident in respect of which an FIR
already stood registered with the local police but this Court issued such an order. In this
case a second FIR containing a different version was ordered by this Court to be
registered because it was found that "the veracity and truthfulness of F.I.R. lodged by
respondent Muhammad Yousuf, the Manager of the Company, became highly doubtful
and the petitioner was right in asking for registration of another F.I.R. at her own
version". The investigation of the case was still in progress when this Court had observed
in that case that the veracity and truthfulness of the FIR originally registered was "highly
doubtful" which observation, it is submitted with deep reverence, was not only
presumptuous but also premature. Apart from that while issuing an order regarding
registration of a second FIR this Court had referred to the judgment of this Court passed
in the case of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001
SCMR 1556), it had made no mention of the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases
of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1975 SCMR 149) and Kaura
v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) and it had placed reliance upon the case of
Muhammad Ishaque v. S.P. Jaffarabad and another (PLJ 1998 Quetta 1) decided by a High
Court. Unfortunately no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or of the
Police Rules, 1934 was discussed in that judgment and as a matter of fact no discussion
of the relevant law had taken place in the said judgment of this Court at all.
20. The last of the precedent cases from this Court is the case of Ali Muhammad and
others v. Syed Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 484) wherein the High Court had ordered
registration of a second FIR containing a different version of the same incident and this
Court had upheld that order of the High Court. In that judgment this Court had observed
in the very beginning that "Regarding this incident, an FIR was earlier lodged with
misleading and incorrect statement of facts, therefore, she filed an application under
Section 22-A Cr.P.C. before the Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge Pishin with the following
assertions: ---". With utmost respect, this Court could have been more circumspect before
making an observation about misleading or incorrect nature of the facts asserted in the
original FIR especially when the stage of the case was premature and the investigation of
the case was still in progress. This Court had then gone on to notice the case of Kaura v.
The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) but unfortunately the ratio decidendi of that case
was not even adverted to. It appears that the main consideration persuading this Court
in favour of registration of a second FIR about the same incident was what was observed
in the following paragraph of the judgment:
"8. We have considered submissions of the learned ASC for the appellants on short
controversy involved in the matter relating to registration of another FIR. In the
instant case, perusal of contents of the earlier FIR lodged at the instance of Ali
Muhammad Defedar Levies on 09.06.2010 and the contents of other FIR lodged by
Respondent No.1 on 27.08.2015, in terms of the impugned judgment, reveals two
entirely different and conflicting stories about the actual occurrence. It is, thus,
obvious that in case prosecution leads its evidence on the basis of contents of
earlier FIR and the investigation made on that basis, then from no stretch of
imagination the grievance of Respondent No.1, attributing criminal liability of
whole occurrence to the complainant and his party ("the appellants" herein), could
be considered or adjudicated upon by the Court.---"
It appears that the Court was not properly assisted on that occasion and it was
erroneously made to understand that the police are to investigate the case only on the
lines asserted in an FIR and then it is to lead evidence before the trial court only in terms
of the accusations made in the FIR. As already noticed in the preceding paragraphs of the
present judgment, the scheme of the law is totally the opposite of it and according to the
same after commencement of an investigation on the basis of an FIR the investigation
officer is to collect every possible information about the facts and circumstances of the
case, he is to receive or record any information in that regard becoming available from
any source whatsoever, he is not to prematurely commit himself to any particular version
of the incident and after finding out the actual facts the final report under section 173,
Cr.P.C. is to be submitted not in terms of the allegations levelled in the FIR but in
accordance with the actual facts discovered during the investigation.
21. In the same judgment this Court had further observed as follows:
"10. As could be seen from the plain reading of above reproduced provision of law,
the requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C. is to enter every information of commission
of a cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge
of the police station, which shall then be reduced into writing and signed by the
person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by
such officer in the form prescribed by the Provincial Government in this behalf.
Meaning thereby, that it is not a legal requirement for provider of such information
to canvass the whole scene of occurrence of a cognizable offence giving description
and details of accused, details of weapons used by them, their specific role, motive
behind the occurrence, and the names of eye-witnesses etc. But it is a matter of
common experience that usually the entries made in Section 154 Cr.P.C. book, as
per practice, contain invariably all such details so much so that in the ordinary
parlance/sense it is considered as the gist of the prosecution case against the
accused. In such state of affairs, if a collusive, mala fide or concocted FIR,
registered at the instance of some individual with some ulterior motive, is taken
as sacrosanct, it is likely to divert the whole course of investigation in a wrong
direction and spoil the entire prosecution case on that premise. The Court while
considering the crucial point of registration of another FIR cannot remain
oblivious of these ground realities so as to non-suit the aggrieved party from
agitating his grievance in an honest manner, or ensure regulating proper
investigation of a crime in the right direction, or apprehend the real culprits and
brought them before the Court of law for justice."
In this paragraph of the judgment the scheme of the law did not appear to be correctly
presented before the Court and the Court was led to understand that investigation of a
case by the police is to be driven exclusively or predominantly by the FIR originally
registered whereas the legal position, as already discussed by us above, is to the contrary.
As a matter of fact the scheme of the law did not support the Court's observation that the
version of the first informant advanced through his FIR is to "non-suit" any other version
of the same incident advanced by any other person or party to the case. In the same vein,
the reference made by the Court to the so-called "ground realities", a subjective notion,
could have been avoided while interpreting legal provisions and enunciating the law.
22. It was also observed by this Court in the same judgment that:
"11. Though our criminal legal system proceeds on the presumption of honest, God
fearing and fair police officers, impartial and honest investigation system, but this
is far from reality in the society we live in. In such circumstances when the Courts
feel that due to mala fide, dishonest, colourful and motivated acts or omissions,
entire investigation of the crime has been misled or it is going to be misled and on
that account the case of the prosecution is likely to fail, then they are not denuded
of their powers to order recording of another FIR disclosing a different version to
check such nefarious design meant to save the real culprits vis-a-vis misleading
the investigation/prosecution, at any appropriate stage of the proceedings.
However, where need be, such powers are to be exercised with extreme care and
caution and not in a routine manner so as to merely fulfill the wish of an individual
who, as per his whims, is not satisfied either with the contents of earlier FIR or the
direction of investigation based thereon or wants registration of another FIR with
some ulterior motive.---"
The first thing said in this paragraph was that in our society the police officers are no
longer "honest, God fearing and fair" and the system of investigation is no longer
"impartial and honest". We feel, with great regard, that making of such sweeping remarks
or recording of such pervasive observations about the police or any other department of
public service as a whole was unnecessary besides being uncharitable. Interpretation of
law by this Court ought not to be premised on damning generalizations which are
nothing but subjective. The second thing said in this paragraph was that a subsequent
FIR may be ordered to be registered "when the Courts feel that due to mala fide,
dishonest, colourful and motivated acts or omissions, entire investigation of the crime
has been misled or it is going to be misled and on that account the case of the prosecution
is likely to fail". What it meant was that at such a premature stage of the case the Courts
are to pass a value judgment and record a finding that the original FIR lodged by a person
about commission of a cognizable offence is "mala fide, dishonest, colourful and
motivated" and that the "entire investigation of the crime has been misled or it is going
to be misled and on that account the case of the prosecution is likely to fail". Such an
approach sets up the Courts as monitors or supervisors of the investigation, a role which
the law forbids and the precedent loathes. The third thing said in this paragraph was a
word of caution according to which "However, where need be, such powers are to be
exercised with extreme care and caution and not in a routine manner so as to merely
fulfill the wish of an individual who, as per his whims, is not satisfied either with the
contents of earlier FIR or the direction of investigation based thereon or wants
registration of another FIR with some ulterior motive." While making these observations
no guidance had been provided as to how "extreme care and caution" is to be exercised,
as to how the jurisdiction is not to be exercised "in a routine manner" and as to how,
without delving deep into the facts and circumstances of a case at the investigation stage,
the Courts are to detect, decipher or fathom the motivation on the part of the person
seeking registration of another FIR according to his own version of the incident.
23. Towards the end of that judgment this Court had observed as under:
"12. It is unfortunate to note that in the instant case due to one-sided version
disclosed in earlier FIR No. 17/2010, the investigating agency never bothered to
look into the crime from another angle as narrated in the other FIR dated
27.08.2015, which means that as per assertions of Respondent No.1, the alleged
culprits could have otherwise escaped from their criminal liability successfully at
the very initial stage without even being charged for the offence on the basis of
misleading contents of earlier FIR. The short and long of the above discussion is
that the impugned judgment of the Balochistan High Court warrants no
interference."
It appears that this Court was heavily influenced by the assertion of the party seeking
registration of a second FIR that "the alleged culprits could have otherwise escaped from
their criminal liability successfully at the very initial stage without even being charged
for the offence on the basis of misleading contents of earlier FIR." Acceptance of such an
assertion by this Court indicates that the Court laboured under an impression that any
other version of the same incident advanced by any other party can be brought on the
record of the investigation only through an FIR to be registered under section 154, Cr.P.C.
and such divergent version can be investigated by the police only after registration of a
separate FIR in that regard. Such an impression entertained by this Court on that
occasion, it is submitted in all humility, was not correct and the same ran counter to the
scheme of the law referred to in the earlier part of the present judgment.
24. The discussion made above leads us to an inescapable conclusion that the judgments
delivered by this Court in the cases of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and
another (1975 SCMR 149) and Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) came closer
to the scheme of the relevant law whereas the judgments handed down by this Court in
the cases of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001
SCMR 1556), Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West,
Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) and Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi
and others (PLD 2016 SC 484) drifted away from that scheme and in fact contributed
towards disturbing and distorting the same and that had been occasioned mainly due to
the reason that the Court had not been assisted on those occasions properly and the
scheme of the law on the subject with reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
and the Police Rules, 1934 had not been brought to its notice at the time of deciding those
cases.
25. During the course of hearing of this petition we had inquired from the petitioner as
to why she was insisting upon registration of a separate FIR in respect of her version of
the incident especially when she had already instituted a private complaint containing
her version of the incident and the accused persons in her private complaint had already
been summoned by the trial court to face a trial and a Charge had been framed against
them. In response to that query the petitioner had categorically stated that she wanted
the accused persons in her version of the incident to be arrested and recoveries to be
affected from them which was not possible through the medium of a private complaint.
Such understanding of the law on the part of the petitioner, which understanding is also
shared by a large section of the legal community in our country, has been found by us to
be erroneous and fallacious. By virtue of the provisions of section 202(1), Cr.P.C. a court
seized of a private complaint can "direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any
Justice of the Peace or by a police officer or by such other person as it thinks fit". If in a
given case the court seized of a private complaint deems it appropriate to direct an
investigation to be carried out in respect of the allegations made then the powers
available during an investigation, enumerated in Part V, Chapter XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 read with section 4(1)(l) of the same Code, include the powers
to arrest an accused person and to affect recovery from his possession or at his instance.
Such powers of the investigating officer or the investigating person recognize no
distinction between an investigation in a State case and an investigation in a complaint
case.
26. The impression entertained by the petitioner that if a separate FIR is registered in
terms of her version of the incident then the accused persons nominated by her would
automatically be arrested has been found by us to be not only misconceived but also
discomforting. The law does not permit arrest of a person merely on the basis of a bald
allegation levelled against him. The powers of the police to arrest a person accused of
commission of an offence are provided in sections 54 and 55, Cr.P.C. and some provisions
in the Police Rules, 1934 also deal with the same. Writing for a Full Bench of the Lahore
High Court, Lahore in the case of Khizer Hayat v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab),
Lahore and 7 others (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) one of us (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, ACJ) had
observed on the subject as follows:
"20. ------- The powers of arrest in both the said sections are the same but they relate
to different situations. In the case of Abdul Qayyum v. S.H.O., Police Station
Shalimar, Lahore (1993 PCr.LJ 91) this Court had an opportunity to attend to the
requirements of section 54, Cr.P.C. and it was observed by this Court as follows:
"Under the provisions of clause first of section 54, Cr.P.C., the Police Officer can
arrest a person in the following four conditions:-
(a) The accused is involved in a cognizable offence;

(b) Against the accused a reasonable complaint has been made for the said offence;
(c) A credible information is received by the Police Officer that he is involved in a

cognizable offence; and
(d) Reasonable suspicion exists that the said person is involved in the cognizable
offence.
The expression 'credible information' is not a technical legal expression importing

that the information must be given upon oath or affirmation. It includes any
information which in the judgment of the officer to whom it is given appears
entitled to credit in the particular instance and which he believes. The credible
information mentioned therein need not be in writing. -------
The object of section 54, Cr.P.C. is to give the widest powers to the Police Officers
to arrest the persons who are involved in cognizable cases and the only limitation
placed upon their power is the necessary requirement of reasonability and
credibility to prevent the misuse of the powers by the Police Officers.
As the powers mentioned above given to the Police Officers under section 54,
Cr.P.C. encroaches upon the liberty of a person, this wide power has to be
construed, interpreted and defined strictly. A general definition of what
constitutes reasonableness in a complaint or suspicion and credibility of
information cannot be given. Both must depend upon the existence of tangible
legal evidence within the cognizance of the Police Officer and, he must judge
whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the reasonableness and credibility
of the charge, information or suspicion. It has been laid down by this Court in 1992
PCr.LJ 131: 'An arrest which is beyond the provisions of section 54, Cr.P.C. would
be illegal and void per se'."
Prior to that in the case of Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Boota and another
(PLD 1975 Lahore 729) this Court had observed that
"The words "reasonable suspicion" (in section 54, Cr.P.C.) do not mean a mere
vague surmise, but a bona fide belief on the part of the Police Officer that an
offence has been committed or is about to be committed. Such belief has to be
founded on some definite averments tending to show suspicion on the person
arrested. --- The action of a police Officer under section 54, Cr.P.C. must be
guarded inasmuch as he should first satisfy himself about the credibility of the
information which, as stated already, should relate to definite facts. It was not at
all the intention of the law-giver that the Police Officer should at his own sweet
will arrest anybody he likes, although he may be a peace loving citizen of the
country."
The Hon'ble Sindh High Court had also observed in the case of Muhammad Siddiq v.
Province of Sindh through Home Secretary, Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1992 Karachi
358)(DB) that
"It will thus be seen that the first sub-clause of section 54(1), Cr.P.C. a person can
be arrested without a warrant in the following circumstances:-
(a) If he be concerned in any cognizable offence.

(b) Against whom a reasonable complaint has been made.
(c) Against whom credible information has been received that he is concerned with
commission of such offence.
(d) If reasonable suspicion exists about him bei m m mll ng so concerned.
It is true that a Police Officer has been conferred sufficient powers to arrest a
person in the investigation of a cognizable offence if he be concerned with
commission of such offence. But such a power can be exercised only in those cases
where a Police Officer is possessed of some evidence indicating involvement of a
person under the four situations mentioned in section 54(1), Criminal Procedure
Code."
In the case of Mst. Razia Pervez and another v. The Senior Superintendent of Police,
Multan and 5 others (1992 PCr.LJ 131) this Court had observed as follows:
"No doubt, the Police Officer can arrest a person where a reasonable suspicion
exists of his having been concerned in any cognizable offence but power given to
the Police Officer under this section (section 54, Cr.P.C.) being an encroachment
on the liberty of a citizen is not unlimited. It is subject to the condition stated
therein. An arrest purporting to be under this section would be illegal unless the
circumstances specified in the various clauses of the section exist. This section does
not give free licence to a Police Officer to arrest anybody he may like. In order to
act under this section, there must be a reasonable suspicion of the person to be
arrested having been concerned in a cognizable offence. An arrest of a citizen in a
reckless disregard of the conditions imposed in this section would make the arrest
and detention of the subject illegal and the Police Officer arresting or detaining the
subject would be exposed to prosecution under the Pakistan Penal Code and also
for departmental action under the relevant rules."
The above mentioned precedent cases clearly show that an arrest of a person in
connection with a criminal case is not to be a matter of course and the power to arrest is
conditional upon fulfillment of the requisite legal requirements.
21. One of the cardinal principles of criminal law and jurisprudence is that an
accused person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty before a court of
law. However, of late we have noticed a growing tendency on the part of the
complainant party to insist upon arrest of an accused person nominated by it in
the F.I.R. and an increasing willingness, nay eagerness, on the part of the
investigating officer of a criminal case to affect arrest of the accused person even
before initiating or launching a proper investigation of the allegations levelled in
the F.I.R.. Such an approach has been found by us to be absolutely against the spirit
of the relevant law, to be wrought with inherent dangers to cherished liberty of
citizens who may ultimately be found to be innocent and to amount to putting the
cart before the horse! It had been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
Pakistan in the case of Brig. (Retd.) F. B. Ali and another v. The State (PLD 1975
Supreme Court 506) that
"In my view the mere lodging of an information does not make a person an
accused nor does a person against whom an investigation is being conducted by
the police can strictly be called an accused. Such a person may or may not be sent
up for trial. The information may be found to be false. An accused is, therefore, a
person charged in a trial. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an "accused" as a
person "charged with a crime" and an "accusation" as an "indictment". Aiyer in his
Manual of Law Terms also gives the same meaning. I am of view, therefore, that a
pAerson becomes an accused only when charged with an offence. The Criminal
Procedure Code also uses the word "accused" in the same sense, namely; a person
over whom a Court is exercising jurisdiction."
Even the Hon'ble Federal Shariat Court had remarked in the case of Mst. Asho and
3 others v. The State (1987 PCr.LJ 538) that
"Mere leveling accusations against a person in F.I.R. does not make him an accused
person unless and until some evidence implicating such person in the commission
of the offence is available."
We may add in this context that a general impression entertained by some quarters that
an arrest of a suspect or an accused person is necessary or sine qua non for investigation
of a crime is misconceived and the same portrays scant knowledge of the relevant
statutory provisions. We may briefly allude to such statutory provisions here. Section 46,
Cr.P.C. provides as to how an arrest is to be made, section 54, Cr.P.C. deals with arrest
by a police officer without a warrant, section 55, Cr.P.C. pertains to arrest of vagabonds,
etc. by an officer in charge of a Police Station, section 59, Cr.P.C. caters for a situation
where a private person may affect an arrest and section 151, Cr.P.C. authorizes a police
officer to arrest a person in order to prevent commission of a cognizable offence. Section
169, Cr.P.C. visualizes a situation where a suspect may be released if the investigating
officer finds no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground for suspicion against him. The
parameters of such arrests are essentially those already discussed in the above mentioned
precedent cases. According to Article 4(1)(j) of the Police Order, 2002 it is a duty of every
police officer to "apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend and
for whose apprehension sufficient grounds exist". Rules 24.1, 24.4 and 24.7 of the Police
Rules, 1934 (which are still in vogue due to the provisions of Article 185 of the Police
Order, 2002) clearly contemplate situations where an information received by the police
regarding commission of a cognizable offence may be doubted or even found false. Rule
25.2(1) of the Police Rules authorizes an investigating officer to associate "any person"
with the investigation and Rule 25.2(2) categorically provides that "No avoidable trouble
shall be given to any person from whom enquiries are made and no person shall be
unnecessarily detained". Rule 25.2(3) clinches the issue by clarifying that "It is the duty of
an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter under investigation. His object
shall be to discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest the real offender or offenders.
He shall not commit himself prematurely to any view of the facts for or against any
person" (emphasis has been supplied by us). As if this were not enough, Rule 26.1
emphasizes that "Section 54, Code of Criminal Procedure, authorizes any police officer to
arrest without a warrant any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence
or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been
received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned. The authority
given under this section to the police to arrest without a warrant is, however, permissive
and not obligatory. Whenever escape from justice or inconvenient delay is likely to result
from the police failing to arrest, they are bound to do so; but in no other cases. The law
allows a police officer to apply to a magistrate for a warrant or a summons instead of
making the arrest immediately, and this discretion shall be exercised whenever possible
and expedient. The law also allows a police officer in any bailable case to take security
under section 170, Criminal Procedure Code from an accused person to appear before a
magistrate without first arresting him" (emphasis has been supplied by us). Rules 26.2
and 26.9 provide further guidelines to the police officers involved in investigation of
crimes requiring them not to unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of suspects "until the
investigation is sufficiently complete" and "the facts justify arrest". According to Rule 26.1
the facts justifying an immediate arrest may include a possibility of the suspect escaping
from justice or inconvenient delay likely to result from the police failing to arrest.
22. All the statutory provisions and the precedent cases mentioned above
manifestly point towards the intention of the law that a suspect is not to be arrested
straightaway upon registration of an F.I.R. or as a matter of course and that, unless
the situation on the grounds so warrants, the arrest is to be deferred till such time
that sufficient material or evidence becomes available on the record of
investigation prima facie satisfying the investigating officer regarding correctness
of the allegations levelled by the complainant party against such suspect or
regarding his involvement in the crime in issue. If the law itself requires an
investigating officer to be generally slow in depriving a person of his liberty on the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations then insistence by the interested complainant
party regarding his immediate arrest should not persuade the investigating officer
to abdicate his discretion and jurisdiction in the matter before the whims or wishes
of the complainant party. ------- It must always be remembered that delaying the
arrest till after formation of an opinion regarding prima facie correctness of the
allegation against a suspect goes a long way in deterring false, frivolous and
motivated complaints and also that there may not be any adequate recompense or
reparation for an unjustified arrest. It would be preposterous and a mockery of
justice if a person may be deprived of his liberty first and later on the allegations
against him may be found by the arresting agency itself to be bogus, trumped up
or false. That surely would be, as observed above, putting the cart before the
horse."
Enunciation of the law in the above mentioned case ought to suffice for the purpose of
dispelling the impression entertained by the petitioner in the present case that
registration of a second FIR in terms of her version of the incident would automatically
entail arrest of the accused persons nominated by her.
27. As a result of the discussion made above we declare the legal position as follows:
(i) According to section 154, Cr.P.C. an FIR is only the first information to the local
police about commission of a cognizable offence. For instance, an information
received from any source that a murder has been committed in such and such
village is to be a valid and sufficient basis for registration of an FIR in that regard.
(ii) If the information received by the local police about commission of a
cognizable offence also contains a version as to how the relevant offence was
committed, by whom it was committed and in which background it was
committed then that version of the incident is only the version of the informant
and nothing more and such version is not to be unreservedly accepted by the
investigating officer as the truth or the whole truth.
(iii) Upon registration of an FIR a criminal "case" comes into existence and that
case is to be assigned a number and such case carries the same number till the final
decision of the matter.
(iv) During the investigation conducted after registration of an FIR the
investigating officer may record any number of versions of the same incident
brought to his notice by different persons which versions are to be recorded by
him under section 161, Cr.P.C. in the same case. No separate FIR is to be recorded
for any new version of the same incident brought to the notice of the investigating
officer during the investigation of the case.
(v) During the investigation the investigating officer is obliged to investigate the
matter from all possible angles while keeping in view all the versions of the
incident brought to his notice and, as required by Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules,
1934 "It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter
under investigation. His object shall be to discover the actual facts of the case and
to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely
to any view of the facts for or against any person."
(vi) Ordinarily no person is to be arrested straightaway only because he has been
nominated as an accused person in an FIR or in any other version of the incident
brought to the notice of the investigating officer by any person until the
investigating officer feels satisfied that sufficient justification exists for his arrest
and for such justification he is to be guided by the relevant provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police Rules, 1934. According to the relevant
provisions of the said Code and the Rules a suspect is not to be arrested
straightaway or as a matter of course and, unless the situation on the ground so
warrants, the arrest is to be deferred till such time that sufficient material or
evidence becomes available on the record of investigation prima facie satisfying
the investigating officer regarding correctness of the allegations levelled against
such suspect or regarding his involvement in the crime in issue.
(vii) Upon conclusion of the investigation the report to be submitted under section
173, Cr.P.C is to be based upon the actual facts discovered during the investigation
irrespective of the version of the incident advanced by the first informant or any
other version brought to the notice of the investigating officer by any other person.
28. As an FIR had been registered in the present case regarding the same occurrence and
the offences allegedly committed therein and upon completion of the investigation of the
case a Challan had been submitted before the trial court and as the present petitioner had
instituted a private complaint depicting her version of the same incident and after
summoning of the accused persons nominated there in a trial is already in progress in
connection with that private complaint, therefore, ordering registration of another FIR
based upon the petitioner's version of that very incident is not legally warranted. This
petition is, thus, dismissed.
29. Before parting with this judgment we are constrained to observe that the occurrence
in the present case had taken place more than a decade ago and the trial court is seized
of the trial of this case for the last many years but unfortunately no significant progress
has been made by the trial court in the trial of the case so far. The delay caused and the
apathy displayed in the matter has been found by us to be shocking, to say the least. The
trial court is, therefore, directed to conclude the trial of this case within the next four
months without fail and then to submit a report in that regard before the Registrar of this
Court for our perusal in Chambers.
30. The office of this Court shall send copies of this judgment to the Inspectors-General
of Police of all the Provinces and the Islamabad Capital Territory who are directed to
apprise all the Station House Officers of all the Police Stations in the country of the law
declared by this Court through the present judgment and to make sure that the law so
declared is followed in its letter and spirit.
MWA/S-19/S Order accordingly
2015 S C M R 1724
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Present: Jawwad S. Khawaja, Dost Muhammad Khan and Qazi Faez Isa, JJ
HAIDER ALI and another---Petitioners
versus
DPO CHAKWAL and others---Respondents
Civil Petition No. 1282 of 2014, decided on 4th September, 2015.
(Against the order dated 20-6-2014 of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in
Writ Petition No. 1194 of 2014)
----Ss. 154 & 22-A(6)---Police Order [22 of 2002], Art. 155---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.
182 & 211---Criminal justice system in Pakistan, deficiencies in---Pre-investigation stage
(registration of FIR)---Inefficiency, maladministration and abuse of power by the police
with regard to registration of FIR---Directions by Justice of Peace---Implementation---
Police flouting provisions of S. 154, Cr.P.C.---Supreme Court observed that police stations
refused to register FIRs even if the information provided by a complainant related to the
commission of a cognizable offence---Number of persons suffered and were pushed into
litigation because of failure of the police to register the FIR---Directions of Justice of Peace
to take action against defaulting Station House Officers (SHOs) were rarely implemented-
--People who registered false or vexatious complaints/ cases were rarely prosecuted---
Inefficiencies, maladministration and abuse of power by the police with regard to
registration of FIR highlighted.
----Ss. 156 & 157---Criminal justice system in Pakistan, deficiencies in---Investigation

stage---Incompetency and lack of training of police for purposes of investigation of a case
and arrest of an accused---Initiating investigation of a case was not mandatory unless the
officer in charge of a police station, from the information received by him, had reason to
suspect the commission of an offence---Supreme Court observed that what practically
happened, often, was that on registration of a FIR, the relevant police officer without
application of mind directly proceeded to arrest the accused---Police should not move for
the arrest of the accused nominated in the FIR unless sufficient evidence was available
for the arrest---No real guidelines were available to the police which would channel their
discretion and judgment with regard to investigation and arrest of an accused---Lack of
training of police and emphasis on the development of specialized investigation officers
and facilities, was a major reason for defective investigation---Police, it appeared, was
still largely used to secure the interests of the dominant political regime and affluent
members of society, rather than furthering the rule of law---Incompetency of police and
lack of focus on their training for purposes of investigation of a case and arrest of an
accused highlighted.
Muhammad Bashir's case PLD 2007 SC 539 ref.
----Part VI [Ss. 177 to 442]---Criminal justice system in Pakistan---Low conviction rates---

Prosecution and trial, deficiencies in---Lack of cooperation between the police and
prosecution---Lack of training of prosecutors---Lack of protection of witnesses---
Adjournments requested by lawyers---Delay in fixation of cases by courts---Deficiencies
in the prosecution system which resulted in very low conviction rates highlighted.
(d) Police Order [22 of 2002]---
----Chapters VIII, IX & X [Arts. 73 to 108]---Police officials, accountability of---Police funds

and performance reports, transparency of---Supreme Court observed that sufficient
measures were not taken by senior police officials to deter delinquent behaviour and
misconduct by police officials---Accountability forums which were created pursuant to
the Police Order, 2002, in the form of National and Provincial Public Safety Commissions
and Police Complaints Authority were either inactive or not operational---Information
regarding funds allocated to the police, police plans and annual performance reports
were not publicly available---Lack of accountability of delinquent police officials and
transparency of funds allocated to police, highlighted.
(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 154---Police Order [22 of 2002], Chapters VIII, IX & X [Arts.73 to 108]---Penal Code
(XLV of 1860), Ss. 182 & 211---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 10, 10A & 14---Criminal
justice system in Pakistan, deficiencies in---Supreme Court observed that existence of a
high degree of political and administrative apathy had translated into a failing criminal
justice system---Failure to address individual grievances of citizens caused frustration
amongst them which, in turn, may lead to lawlessness---Functioning criminal justice
system was directly linked to the enforcement and realization of various Fundamental
Rights of citizens such as Arts. 9, 10, 10A & 14 of the Constitution---Directions given by
the Supreme Court to address the issues of inefficiency, maladministration and abuse of
power by the police and the deficiencies in the criminal justice system of Pakistan stated.
Following are the directions given by the Supreme Court to address the issues of
inefficiency, maladministration and abuse of power by the police and the deficiencies in
the criminal justice system of Pakistan.
(i) A universal access number (UAN) and website should be provided to the general
public for filing of complaints. The said website should be developed and be operational
within three months from the date of present order. Till such time that the website was
launched, the provisions of section 154 Cr.P.C. should be strictly adhered to and action
should be taken against any police official who failed to abide by the said provision.
(ii) Serious notice should be taken of frivolous, false or vexatious complaints and where
applicable cases should be registered under sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal
Code, 1860.
(iii) Principles laid out in Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt. and
others (PLD 2007 SC 539) should be strictly followed and no person should be arrested
unless there was sufficient evidence available with the police to support such arrest.
Where a person was unjustly deprived of his liberty, compensation would be required to
be paid to him or her by the delinquent police officer. The affected person may approach
the civil courts for appropriate remedy in such regard.
(iv) Adequate provision should be made for the training of police officers and the
development of specialized investigation officers and facilities. In addition adequate
funds should be made available to police stations and for investigation activities. The
respective Provincial and Federal heads of police shall submit a report in court within
three months from the date of present order which detailed the steps taken in such regard
and the relevant police funds and personnel dedicated towards investigation activities,
training of police personnel, and development of forensic facilities.
(v) No police officer was to be transferred in breach of the principles laid out by Supreme
Court in the case of Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi and others v. Federation of Pakistan
and others (PLD 2013 SC 195). The respective Provincial and Federal Heads of police shall
submit a report in court within one month from the date of present order which specified
the names and details of all police officers above BPS-17 who had been transferred or
made Officers on Special Duty (OSD) over the past three years and also provide reasons
for the same.
(vi) Guidelines/SOPs should be developed to foster coordination between the

prosecution and the police. The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General
of each province shall submit the said guidelines/SOPs in court within three months from
the date of present order.
(vii) Adequate funds should be dedicated towards the training and development of
public prosecutors. The Attorney General and the respective Prosecutors General of each
province shall submit in court within three months from the date of present order details
of hiring requirements and compensation packages of public prosecutors; and
accountability mechanisms and review systems of public prosecutors.
(viii) The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General shall submit a report
in court within one month from the date of present order stating the steps being taken to
provide witness protection in their relevant jurisdiction and the funds dedicated for such
purpose.
(ix) The respective Bar Councils may take appropriate action against lawyers who
deliberately sought adjournments with a view to delay trial. Respective district judges
were also directed to impose costs on such lawyers and hear criminal cases involving the
liberty of persons on a day to day basis to the extent possible.
(x) Respective Heads of police of the Federation and the Provinces shall submit a report
within one month of the date of present order which detailed the relevant police
complaints and accountability mechanisms in place and the actions taken under such
mechanism against delinquent police officials. Such information shall also be made
publicly accessible in English as well as Urdu on their respective websites. The Attorney
General and respective Advocates General shall submit a report detailing compliance in
such respect within one month from the date of present order.
(xi) Police budgets (disaggregated by district and local police stations, functions, human
resource allocation and a statement of their utilization), police plans and annual
performance reports shall be made publicly accessible on the respective Federal and
Provincial police websites and submitted in court within one month of the date of present
order. The Attorney General and respective Advocates General shall submit a report
detailing compliance in such respect within one month from the date of present order.
(xii) The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General of the Provinces of
Sindh and Balochistan should submit in Court within one month from the date of present
order reports which examined the Constitutionality of the policing regime established by
the Police Act, 1861, currently in force in Sindh and the Balochistan Police Act, 2011
currently in force in Balochistan. Such report should inter alia state whether these
policing statutes allowed the constitution and organization of a politically independent
police force which was consistent with the protection of the Fundamental Rights of
citizens.
(xiii) The Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen should submit in Court within three
months from the date of present order, good-administration standards for police stations
and should also submit a report which outlined the measures being taken to curb
maladministration in police stations.
(xiv) Provincial Information Commissioners should notify transparency standards

relating to police services and functions and submit these standards in court within three
months from the date of present order.
(xv) The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan shall prepare a consolidated report
based on the various reports received by the court till date and the proposals submitted
by a senior Advocate, Supreme Court during proceedings of the present case, detailing
the relevant amendments which were required in legislation to improve the criminal
justice system. Said report shall be submitted in court within three months from the date
of present order. Copies of the said report shall also be sent to the National and Provincial
Assemblies.
Muhammad Bashir's case PLD 2007 SC 539 and Anita Turab's case PLD 2013 SC 195 ref.
Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record with Haider Ali Petitioner No.1.
Sohail Mehmood, Dy. Attorney General and Syed Nayab Hassan Gardezi, Advocate
Supreme Court/Standing Council for the Federation on Court's Notice.
Tariq Mehmood Butt, Prosecutor-General, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional A.-
G and Syed Parvaiz Akhtar, Dy. Prosecutor-General for Government of Balochistan on
Court's Notice.
Mujahid Ali Khan, Additional A.-G. for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on Court's
Notice.
Razzaq A. Mirza, Additional A.-G. and Ch. Zubair Ahmed Farooq, Additional P.-G. for
Government of Punjab on Court's Notice.
Shehryar Qazi, Additional A.-G. for Government of Sindh on Court's Notice.
Date of hearing: 4th September, 2015.
ORDER
JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, C.J.---The facts of this case are all too typical for our criminal
justice system. A party to a family dispute, which appeared to be of a civil nature, filed a
compliant with the police to allegedly pressurize the other party. The police initially
(presumably in good-faith) rejected the complaint. The party then attempted to have the
case registered through the Justice of Peace. This application was also denied. Thereafter,
a writ petition was filed, on the basis of which the High Court ordered investigation of
the case. What culminated thereafter was a series of appeals and petitions taking the
matter right up to the Supreme Court.
2. When the case came up for hearing before us, the unsatisfactory state of affairs was
apparent. We were perplexed to note that the police failed to register the FIR on the
complaint being filed, even though the provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C. do not provide
them any discretion in deciding whether or not they can register a FIR. Numerous
judgments of this Court have also reaffirmed this principle. If the complaint was indeed
false and vexatious, as the petitioner alleged, then the police should have filed a case
against the complainant under the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code.
However, the relevant officials chose not to do this and instead pushed the parties into
various rounds of litigation involving a simple issue of whether the FIR should be
registered. Similar maladministration was noted in the police investigation. Neither the
challan had been submitted within the stipulated period of fourteen days nor was there
any valid or apparent reason as to why the investigation of the case had not been
concluded. It was clear to us that such unjustified delays created room for wrongdoing.
What made the matter worse is that there were no effective safeguards within the police
to guard against such maladministration. And there was no accountability.
3. It would be an under statement to say that the state of our criminal justice system which
led to this case, and many others like it, is deficient. The majority of human right cases
which come before us concern in one way or another police abuse of powers or
inefficiency. Even as we heard this case, we noted many instances of police excesses.
These numerous complaints cannot be adequately dealt with by the apex Court nor is it
the primary function of the apex Court to probe into the transparency or honesty of police
investigation. This is a function which has to be performed by the Provinces and by the
Federation. Ineffective investigation and weak prosecution is similarly another matter
which has created deep ruptures in our justice system and which we identify on a daily
basis. Therefore, seeing how this matter is recurrent, of great public importance and
directly related to the fundamental rights of the citizens at large, we issued notices to the
Federation and the four Provinces to submit a comprehensive and effective plan which
would be necessary for ensuring that the grievances of citizens are redressed at their
doorsteps in the shortest possible time and that instances of wrongdoing or
maladministration are dealt with promptly.
4. At our request Khawaja Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court agreed to assist
us. He reviewed the reports submitted by the Provinces and also solicited suggestions
and proposals from the Advocates General, Prosecutors General, Secretaries Prosecution
and Inspectors General of Police, as well as from some of the eminent retired civil
servants who had served in the Police or the Prosecution Department.
5. In response thereto, a number of suggestions and proposals were received by Khawaja

Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and the same were placed on the record
through C.M.A. No.1014 of 2015. Thereafter, on the basis of the suggestions and
proposals so received, Khawaja Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court,
formulated 72 questions considered to be relevant for purposes of ensuring effective
redressal of complaints, fair, honest and effective investigation and for ensuring
accountability of the police. These questions were then forwarded to all the
aforementioned officials of the four Provinces and the retired civil servants. Their
responses were placed on the record of this Court through C.M.A. No.1457 of 2015. The
learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court also provided his own proposals with respect
to the subject matter through C.M.A. No. 3710 of 2015. Based on our directions, Mr.
Sarwar Khan, Secretary Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, also submitted his
report on the issue with suggestions through C.M.A. No. 5569 of 2015.
6. A bare overview of the above mentioned reports and the numerous responses we
received from the various state officials during the course of this case, would be enough
to show that there are a number of fundamental issues with our criminal justice system.
Everyone admits as such. Even the learned Prosecutor General Punjab admitted before
this Court that the Government is "aware that steps have to be taken to ensure that the
police and prosecution departments which are meant to ensure the enforcement of the
law fairly and honestly, do not in fact become instruments of oppression of the public at
large". While admission of fault is the first step towards making amends, our concern is
that despite appreciation of the problem no effective steps have been taken to enhance
the efficiency and competence of the concerned government departments. What is more
troubling is that certain key issues faced by our justice system could be addressed
instantly, in some cases through administrative measures and in others through
legislation.
7. It may be useful at this stage, to refer to some of the key issues which were highlighted
before us. For ease of reference, we have categorized the issues based on whether they
relate to: (i) pre-investigation stage (registration of FIR); (ii) investigation stage; (iii)
prosecution and trial; and (iv) accountability and transparency.
A. Pre-investigation stage (registration of FIR)
Any person familiar with the workings of a police station in Pakistan knows that the
provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C. are flouted and misused. Section 154, Cr.P.C. provides,
inter alia, that every information given to an officer in charge of a police station relating
to the commission of a cognizable offence, whether given in writing to him or reduced in
writing by an officer in charge of a police station, shall be signed by the person giving it,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such
form as the Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf. While this provision is
mandatory in nature, often the concerned police station refuses to register the FIR even if
the information provided to it relates to the commission of a cognizable offence. Khawaja
Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, noted in his report that in the year 2011
alone, out of 419,365 FIRs lodged in the Province of the Punjab, 28,787 (approximately
7%) were registered pursuant to orders of the Justices of Peace under section 22-A(6) of
the Cr.P.C. What is astonishing is that despite orders of the Justices of Peace, FIRs were
not registered in 554 (approximately 2%) cases. It is thus clear that a number of persons
suffer and are pushed into litigation because of failure of the police to register the FIR.
Litigation too, it seems, does not guarantee relief. The Justice of Peace cannot issue
coercive process for compliance of his orders. At best, learned Senior Advocate Supreme
Court submits, the Justice of Peace can refer the matter to the higher officials of police for
taking actions against the defaulting SHO under Article 155 of the Police Order, 2002, but
such a direction to proceed against the official for misconduct is rarely implemented.
Another issue at this stage is the registration of false or vexatious complaints to pressurize
and harass people. While, the Pakistan Penal Code provides for measures through
Sections 182 and 211 to discourage and punish false complaints, it is common knowledge
that very few cases involving such offences are filed and prosecuted. This must be
unacceptable, especially given that section 154 of the Cr.P.C. requires mandatory
registration of FIR. If the Police therefore has no discretion in registering an FIR, action
must be taken against those who abuse this provision of law and use the police as an
instrument for their designs.
B. Investigation stage
While the registration of a FIR is mandatory, initiating investigation is not. Reading

section 156 Cr.P.C. with section 157, Cr.P.C. it appears that the officer in charge of a police
station shall proceed to initiate investigation of a case only where, inter alia, from
information received, he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence. This
interpretation is further fortified when we read clause (b) of the proviso to subsection (1)
of section 157, Cr.P.C., which provides that "if it appears to the officer in charge of a police
station that there is not sufficient ground for entering on an investigation he shall not
investigate the case." Yet, what we often find is that on registration of a FIR, the relevant
police officer without application of mind directly proceeds to arrest the accused.
We have held time and again (see for instance Muhammad Bashir's case (PLD 2007 SC
539), that the police should not move for the arrest of the accused nominated in the FIR
unless sufficient evidence is available for the arrest. Yet to our dismay we have to deal
with such matters on a daily basis. Perhaps, as some of the reports referred to above point
out, the issue lies in the fact that there are no real guidelines available to the police which
would channel their discretion and judgment. This coupled with their lack of training,
makes defective investigation almost a near possibility. In this regard, it is instructive to
note the following observations of Khawaja Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme
Court in his report:
"It is indeed a fact that even today an officer investigating a case of murder has no concept
of (1) securing the scene of the crime so that the place where the occurrence has taken
place as well as the surrounding area is not trampled or invaded by the general public
before the investigation officer has had an opportunity to collect evidence from the place
of occurrence, (2) how to secure incriminating articles, likes pieces of cloth, blood, fiber
or hair etc from the place of occurrence and its surrounding area, (3) how to lift and secure
fingerprints from various articles found inter alia at the scene of the crime and to get them
examined and matched for purposes of investigation, (4) how to ensure that all
incriminating articles are properly secured from the spot and delivered promptly and
intact to a forensic laboratory and/or fingerprints expert in safe custody and without
being tampered with, and to expeditiously obtain the results from the forensic laboratory
so as to be credibly admitted in evidence during the trial."
The lack of training and emphasis on the development of specialized investigation

officers and facilities, is perhaps indicative of the wider issue in policing: the police it
appears is still largely used to secure the interests of the dominant political regime and
affluent members of society, rather than furthering the rule of law. As a result, where,
even in this debilitating environment, an honest and competent investigation officer is
found, his work is thwarted at one juncture or another.
C. Prosecution and trial
In our order dated 15-1-2015, we noted how at least in the Punjab more than 65% of
criminal cases do not result in conviction. The learned Prosecutor General Punjab also
stated that in even those cases where a person has been convicted by the trial court, a
substantial number are acquitted by the appellate forums. These figures are indicative of
weak investigation and gathering of evidence which we noted above, but are also a result
of serious deficiencies in our prosecution system. The following issues among others
were highlighted by the various parties in this respect:--
(i) Lack of cooperation between the police and prosecution at the investigation stage:
there appears to be no standardized SOPs which guide the relationship between
prosecutors and police officers and allow them to aid each other in the fair and timely
investigation of the case.
(ii) Lack of training and competent prosecutors: prosecutors are not provided proper
training and facilities. In addition, competent prosecutors because of lack of incentives
resign from their service for better opportunities. There also appears to be no effective
quality review system in place to check under performing prosecutors. As a result, the
best prosecutors are not being retained in service.
(iii) Protection of witnesses: we have been informed that in many cases the prosecution's
case is damaged as key witnesses resile from their stated position because of pressure
from the accused.
(iv) Adjournment requests by lawyers and delay in fixation of cases by judiciary: the
defendant's lawyer deliberately at times delays resolution of cases. Delays and injustice
is also caused as a result of backlog in the judicial system and frequent transfers of
presiding judicial officers.
D. Accountability and transparency
During the course of the proceedings, we directed the Inspector General of Police Punjab
to submit figures relating to actions taken against delinquent police officials. As a result,
various reports were submitted regarding actions taken against delinquent police
officials on the recommendation of the prosecution department. An overview of these
reports would make two things clear. First, we noted that the figures submitted in these
reports kept changing. We assume that such changes were made in good-faith to present
the correct position before this court. But this exercise at the very least lays bare the
attention which senior police officials place towards delinquents within their ranks: they
did not even have for ready reference an accurate collation of complaints against police
officials! Second, even if we accept the most conservative figures of complaints submitted
before us, we note that in only 20 cases was some form of major punishment (reduction
in rank and pay) awarded to delinquent officers (in another report this figure was stated
to be 10). We must therefore ask whether sufficient measures are being taken by senior
police officials to deter delinquent behavior and misconduct by police officials. It was
also noted by us that the systemic accountability forums which were created pursuant to
the Police Order, 2002, in the form of National and Provincial Public Safety Commissions
and Police Complaints Authority are either inactive or not operational.
Transparency in policing activities is another major issue. Public money is used to finance
the police, which in turn is supposed to deliver services to the public. At present however
information regarding funds allocated to the police, police plans and annuals
performance reports are not publicly available. How then are the public and state
functionaries supposed to properly examine (and if required make changes to) the
delivery of this important public service, if the relevant facts and figures are not available
to them?
8. The issues noted above can be addressed, provided there is political and administrative
action to transform the police and prosecution into an effective public service. There are
many examples where we have seen this. The Police Order, 2002, is one such example of
political will aimed at transforming the police. During the course of these proceedings,
our attention was also drawn to various initiatives taken by the Punjab and KPK
Governments towards making the police an effective public service. Regrettably however
such actions are few and far between. Even in the case of the Police Order, 2002, it is
discouraging to note that after the passage of the 18th Amendment, the provinces of
Sindh and Balochistan abandoned the Police Order and shifted to a policing regime
which is reminiscent of colonial times where the police was used to keep the 'natives' on
a tight leash.
9. In some of our earlier orders, we have noted the high degree of political and
administrative apathy which has translated into the failing criminal justice system before
us. It must be emphasized that the failure to address individual grievances of citizens
causes frustration amongst them which, in turn, may lead to lawlessness. It also needs to
be emphasized that a functioning criminal justice system is directly linked to the
enforcement and realization of various fundamental rights of citizens such as Articles 9,
10, 10A and 14. We can no longer stand idle as the nation suffers. It is therefore directed
as under:--
(i) A universal access number (UAN) and website should be provided to the general
public for filing of complaints. The said website should be developed and be operational
within three months from the date of this order. Till such time that the website has been
launched, the provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C. should be strictly adhered to and action
should be taken against any police official who fails to abide by the said provision.
(ii) Serious notice should be taken of frivolous, false or vexatious complaints and where
applicable cases should be registered under sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal
Code.
(iii) The principles laid out in Muhammad Bashir's case (PLD 2007 SC 539) should be
strictly followed and no person should be arrested unless there is sufficient evidence
available with the police to support such arrest. Where a person is unjustly deprived of
his liberty, compensation will be required to be paid to him or her by the delinquent
police officer. The affected person may approach the civil courts for appropriate remedy
in this regard.
(iv) Adequate provision should be made for the training of police officers and the
development of specialized investigation officers and facilities. In addition adequate
funds should be made available to police stations and for investigation activities. The
respective Provincial and Federal heads of police shall submit a report in court within
three months from the date of this order which details the steps taken in this regard and
the relevant police funds and personnel dedicated towards investigation activities,
training of police personal, and development of forensic facilities.
(v) No police officer is to be transferred in breach of the principles laid out by this Court
in the Anita Turab case (PLD 2013 SC 195). The respective Provincial and Federal heads
of police shall submit a report in Court within one month from the date of this order
which specifies the names and details of all police officers above BPS-17 who have been
transferred or made OSD over the past three years and also provide reasons for the same.
(vi) Guidelines/SOPs should be developed to foster coordination between the

prosecution and the police. The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General
of each province shall submit the said guidelines/SOPs in court within three months from
the date of this order.
(vii) Adequate funds should be dedicated towards the training and development of
public prosecutors. The Attorney General and the respective Prosecutors General of each
province shall submit in Court within three months from the date of this order details of
(i) hiring requirements and compensation packages of public prosecutors; and (ii)
accountability mechanisms and review systems of public prosecutors.
(viii) The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General shall submit a report
in court within one month from the date of this order on the steps being taken to provide
witness protection in their relevant jurisdiction and the funds dedicated for this purpose.
(ix) The respective bar councils may take appropriate action against lawyers who
deliberately seek adjournments with a view to delay trial. Respective district judges are
also directed to impose costs on such lawyers and hear criminal cases involving the
liberty of persons on a day to day basis to the extent possible.
(x) Respective heads of police of the Federation and the Provinces shall submit a report
within one month of the date of this order which details the relevant police complaints
and accountability mechanisms in place and the actions taken under such mechanism
against delinquent police officials. This information shall also be made publicly accessible
in English as well as Urdu on their respective websites. The Attorney General and
respective Advocates General shall submit a report detailing compliance in this respect
within one month from the date of this order.
(xi) Police budgets (disaggregated by district and local police stations, functions, human
resource allocation and a statement of their utilization), police plans and annual
performance reports shall be made publicly accessible on the respective Federal and
Provincial police websites and submitted in Court within one month of the date of this
order. The Attorney General and respective Advocates General shall submit a report
detailing compliance in this respect within one month from the date of this order.
(xii) The Attorney General and the respective Advocates General of the Provinces of
Sindh and Balochistan should submit in Court within one month from the date of this
order reports which examine the constitutionality of the policing regime established by
the Police Act, 1861, currently in force in Sindh and the Balochistan Police Act, 2011
currently in force in Balochistan. This report should inter alia state whether these policing
statutes allow the constitution and organization of a politically independent police force
which is consistent with the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens.
(xiii) The Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen should submit in Court within three
months from the date of this order, good-administration standards for police stations and
should also submit a report which outlines the measures being taken to curb
maladministration in police stations.
(xiv) Provincial Information Commissioners should notify transparency standards

relating to police services and functions and submit these standards in Court within three
months from the date of this order.
(xv) The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan shall prepare a consolidated report
based on the various reports received by the Court till date and the proposals submitted
by Khawaja Haris, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, detailing the relevant
amendments which are required in legislation to improve the criminal justice system. The
said report shall be submitted in court within three months from the date of this order.
Copies of the said report shall also be sent to the National and Provincial Assemblies.
10. It is so ordered. Let the matter come up for hearing in the 3rd week of October, 2015.
MWA/H-7/SC Order accordingly.

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P L D 2021 Supreme Court 708

(Regarding registration of second FIR in respect of a police encounter wherein the

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

Qasim Ali Chauhan, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab;

Barrister Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court (Amicus Curiae).

Date of hearing: 9th May, 2018.

Kaura v. The State

Qazi Rehmat Ullah, General Secretary, Jamat-e-Islami, Rawalpindi v. Dr. Ghulam

Mushtaq Ahmad v. The S.H.O., Police Station, Munawan

Wali Muhammad and 4 others v. The State and another

Ghulam Mustafa v. S.H.O. and others

Muhammad Younas v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad and others

In the above circumstances, S.S.P. Faisalabad is directed to issue necessary orders

Rahmat Ullah v. Station House Officer and others

Sharifan Bibi v. M. Ilyas etc.

Malik Muhammad Anwar Khan v. The State and 4 others

Ch. Zafaryab v. Mian Bashir Ahmad, S.H.O./Inspector Police Station Shalimar

Yousif v. The State

Sadiq Masih v. S.H.O. and others

Mirza v. The S.H.O.

Abdul Ghani v. S.H.O., P.S. Saddar, Sheikhupura and others

Muhammad Ibrahim v. S.H.O. Police Station Mansehra and another

`Halim Sarwar v. S.H.O., Police Station Headmarala and 2 others

Fateh Sher v. S.H.O etc.

Ghulam Hussain v. Siraj-ul-Haq and others

Mst. Rehmi etc. v. S.H.O. Basirpur etc.

Manzoor Hussain (Chaeywala) v. Station House Officer, etc.

Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of Sindh and another

Muhammad Ishaque v. S.P. Jaffarabad and another

Muhammad Azam v. Inspector-General of Police, Islamabad and 2 others

Mst. Allah Rakhi v. D.P.O. Gujranwala and 5 others

Pervez Akhtar v. The State

Firdous Barkat Ali v. The State

Muhammad Latif v. S.H.O., Police Station Saddar, Dunyapur and 14 others

Hamayun Khan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others

Muhammad Anwar, Sub-Inspector, Railway Police Lahore v. Station House

Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Attorney and another v.

Pervaiz Rasheed and others v. Ex-officio Justice of Peace and others

Imtiaz Ali v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 8 others

Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another

Kaura v. The State and others

In the case of Muhammad Ishaque referred (supra), the petitioner therein

Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others

6. The learned Additional Advocate General Balochistan in his submissions did

"154. Information in cognizable cases.- Every information relating to the

"160. Police officer's power to require attendance of witnesses.-- Any police

"161. Examination of witnesses by police. (1) Any police officer making an

(a) The accused is involved in a cognizable offence;

(c) A credible information is received by the Police Officer that he is involved in a

The expression 'credible information' is not a technical legal expression importing

(a) If he be concerned in any cognizable offence.

(d) If reasonable suspicion exists about him bei m m mll ng so concerned.

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

HAIDER ALI and another---Petitioners

DPO CHAKWAL and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1282 of 2014, decided on 4th September, 2015.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 156 & 157---Criminal justice system in Pakistan, deficiencies in---Investigation

Muhammad Bashir's case PLD 2007 SC 539 ref.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Part VI [Ss. 177 to 442]---Criminal justice system in Pakistan---Low conviction rates---