Republic of the Philippines

Fourth Judicial Region

Regional Trial Court
Branch 90
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

-versus- Crim. Case Nos. DC-1002-04

and DC-1003-04
For: Murder

LUIS PAREDES y GARCIA @

PEEWEE, KAYMURA SULTAN @
JALIL @ MAROHOM MAMA,
TIMBANG SULTAN AND
MALIK BATAO,
Accused.
x-------------------------------------------x

Motion for Bail

The accused, ALI MAMA AMITO by undersigned Law firm,

respectfully moves the Honorable Court to allow bail on the ground
of weak evidence.

The accused was arrested on November 21, 2017 under a

different name of Kaymura Sultan @ Jalil @ Marohom Mama and is
currently detained at Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP), City of Dasmariñas, Cavite for the charge of Murder.

Since the time of his arrest up to August 6, 2019, the accused

has not been arraigned. He was only arraigned on August 6, 2019 or
exactly one (1) year and nine (9) months of imprisonment.
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 Under Sec. 2 of Circular No. 38-98, August 11, 1998, it provides:

SEC. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-

Trial.- The arraignment and the pre-trial if
the accused pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. The period of
the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a
bill of particulars, or other causes justifying
suspension of arraignment shall be excluded.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, bail is the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law. To be clear about this,
the exact provision is hereby quoted as follows:

Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the

security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All

persons in custody shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognizance as prescribed by
law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial court
of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
In this instant case, the evidence of guilt is not strong
considering the fact that the recitals of the private complaining
witness are not sufficient since the allegations stated therein are

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considered hearsay thus, inadmissible as evidence, and considering
that his co-accused in this case had expressly manifested the
innocence of Ali Mama Amito.

First, one of the prosecution witnesses, SPO2 Joffre Jacob,

cannot be admitted as witness because he has no personal knowledge
to the facts being established by the prosecution in charging Ali
Mama Amito of a crime of murder.

To prove this, the question and answer of preliminary

investigation conducted by Judge Lorinda T. Mupas dated 17
November 2003, is read as:

T: Sino ang idinidemanda ninyo?

S: Luis Paredes alias Pee-wee, Marahim Mama, Malik Batao at
si Sultan Timbang, Ma’am.

Second, a reading of the same shows nothing of his personal

knowledge about the incident of the alleged killing neither of his
personal knowledge to prove any participation of the accused Ali
Mama Amito on the crime as charged nor to prove that indeed the
latter killed PO2 Cresente Maximo Javier and Dominador Mercado,
but a mere hearsay and reliance to the documentation and statements
other policemen whom had also no personal knowledge of the same,
to wit:

T: Sino ba ang talagang pumatay sa inyong kasamahan na pulis

at asset?
S: Noon pong dumating kami sa loob ng bahay ni Kaimura
Sultan ay wala nang tao sa loob, nakaalis na silang lahat at
ang natira na lamang doon ay ang 2 patay na kasamahan
naming, ma’am.
T: Bakit ninyo idinemanda sina Luis Paredes, Kaymura Sultan,
Timbang Sultan at Malik Batao?
S: Dahil sila po ang inaakala naming pumatay sa aming
kasamahan dahil sila lang po ang galling sa bahay na iyon,
Maam.
T: Kanina ang declaration mo ay noong pumasok kayo sa
bahay ni Kaimura Sultan ay wala ng katao-tao doon?
S: Opo, Ma’am.

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 T: Paano mo nasabi na ang mga taong nakademanda dito ay
ang pumatay sa iyong mga kasamahan.
S: Ang makakasagot po dito ay yung mga taong nauna sa lugar
na sina SPO1 Jesus Lautriso y Pulgo at PO2 Lodripas,
Ma’am.
T: Bale wala kang kinalaman sa tunay na mga taong pumatay
sa mga kasamahan mo?
S: Wala po Ma’am dahil po noong dumating ako patay na ang
mga kasamahan naming, Ma’am.

A reading to the preliminary investigation conducted by Judge

Mupas to SPO1 Jesus Lautriso y Pulgo dated 17 November 2003
shows nothing of his personal knowledge from every narration of
facts the involvement of Ali Mama Amito in the crime of murder, to
wit:

T: Sinu-sino uli ang suspect sa patayan na ito?

S: Ang huli pong nakita ko ay si Malik Batao, Timbang Sultan,
Kaymura Sultan at si Luis Paredes, Ma’am.

Moreover, a reading to the preliminary investigation conducted

by Judge Lorinda Mupas to PO2 Eve Lodripas shows that he has no
personal knowledge to the facts being established by the prosecution
indicting Ali Mama Amito of a crime of murder.

T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari.

S: Noon pong October 3, 2003 ng umaga mayroong pumunta sa
aming opisina sa Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna na civilian
asset at ini-report na mayroon daw siya ka-deal tungkol sa
drugs kina KAIMURA SULTAN @ DALIM TIMBANG
SULTAN, MALIK BATAO at si LUIS PAREDES @ Pee-Wee,
Ma’am.

In the case of Patula versus People of the Philippines, G.R.

164457, April 11, 2012, the Supreme Court held that:

“To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay

evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference
is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of

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 Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of
her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the
truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not
from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.”

It was also given emphasis that in case a witness is permitted to

testify based on what he has heard another person say about the facts
in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to
be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of
the other person giving the information to the witness without oath.

The Supreme Court also held citing Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracy’s
Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221 that the theory of the hearsay rule is
that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination.
However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to
prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the
accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was

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made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

In People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946), the

Supreme Court explained that Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing
party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.

In the case of Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243, that Court

ruled that if hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because
the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to
cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of
testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential
to the administration of justice.

In the case of Gulam v. Santos, G.R. No. 151458, August 31,

2006, 500 SCRA 463, 473, the Supreme Court held that:

“We thus stress that the rule excluding

hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation
and due to its not being subjected to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel to test
the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of
the out-of-court statement depends.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, the testimonies of the

private complaining witnesses as well as the reference thereof, their
mere conclusion of facts, and statements, should be denied and be
rejected as the prosecution’s evidence against the accused Ali Mama
Amito.

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 Lastly and worst, the only connection of the accused to the
crime is the testimony/certification of the Barangay Chairman
Dominador C. Narido, Jr. which was already recanted on August 6,
2019. Attached is the Certification as Annex “A”.

To prove this, a copy of Affidavit of Barangay Chairman

Narido is hereto attached as Annex “B”.

Summing up, all the pieces of evidence presented by the

prosecution are too weak to warrant a grant for the accused to post
bail in surety or cash. The right to bail is not only statutory rights of
the accused but also constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, it is prayed of the Honorable Court to grant the

motion to allow the accused to post bail in surety or cash bond.
Other relief just and equitable is also prayed for. August 14, 2019.
City of Dasmariñas.

RENTA PE CAUSING & SABARRE LAW FIRM

Unit 12, 2nd Floor, Heritage Building, Mangubat
Avenue, Zone IV, City of Dasmariñas, Cavite
Tel. No. (046) 435-2987
Email Address: repecasalawfirm@yahoo.com

By:

RONALDO E. RENTA
Counsel for the Accused
IBP No. 056761 /12.12.18 / Manila
PTR No. 7980629 /12.7.18 / Manila
Roll No. 46952
MCLE V-0013220/01.19.2016
MCLE VI in Progress

ATTY. LEONARDO B. USITA

Roll No. 71373
IBP No. 080512/04.30.19/Baler, Aurora

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 PTR No. 8172206/05.03.19/Quezon City
MCLE Compliance in Progress

Cc:
Office of the City Prosecutor
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

NOTICE OF HEARING

The Clerk of Court

Regional Trial Court
Branch 90
City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

Office of the City Prosecutor

City of Dasmariñas, Cavite

Greetings!

Please be notified that the undersigned submits the foregoing

Motion for the consideration of the Honorable Court on
____________ at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

EXPLANATION

Lack of manpower and distance compelled the service of this

Motion by registered mail.

ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA

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