Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) which swept away the Song saw the
displacement of a polite culture by a warrior ethos. The Mongols did not
initially value the learning of the Chinese men of letters, but they were
certainly very interested in the revenue which could be generated from
trade. Consequently, while they dismantled the examination system, they
reinstated the old Silk Road and were careful to retain the maritime
institutions of the Tang and the regulatory systems of the Song. They
reinstated old trading towns and established new ones along the Silk
Road. They kept the three Song Maritime Trade Bureaus in Guangzhou,
Quanzhou and Qinyuan (Ningbo) and added four others along the east
coast: Shanghai, Xupu, Hangzhou and Wenzhou. 'The number of
Maritime Trade Bureaus rose to seven by 1293, as Khubilai's financial
advisers at the court sought to fill the government treasury through
percentage levies on cargoes and trade taxes.'
Like preceding regimes, the Yuan court commissioned voyages and
even stationed diplomats in powerful Southeast Asian countries. They
campaigned to conquer Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Java, which has
recently attracted serious attention.* In February 1296, Zhou Daguan
(1266-1346) set sail from Wenzhou and arrived in Angkor Wat in August.
He returned to China in 1297 and produced a most valuable study,
Zhenla Fengtu Ji or The Customs of Cambodia, about the country and
court of Angkor Wat.106 In 1301, Yang Shu (1283-1331) left the port of
Guangzhou at the head of a government delegation which travelled as
far as Hormuz and the Persian Gulf on his second voyage in 1304. In
1330, a twenty-year-old young man named Wang Dayuan (b. 1311) set
sail from Quanzhou on the first of several voyages which took him to
Southeast, South and West Asia and even East Africa. Wang's work,
Dao Yi Zhilue or A Brief History of Island Foreigners, records almost 250
products that he discovered in these foreign countries and has become a
most valuable source in the study of these regions. The Song-Yuan era
was China's Age of Exploration. Witnessing the birth of long-distance
seafaring and voyages undertaken by individuals, it foreshadowed the
maritime activity of the later Ming era.
[* Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: the Treasure Fleet of
the Dragon Throne 1405-1433 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.
54.]
'Let everyone come and trade with us and with whoever they like in
China.' That the Mongols adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards foreign
trade might be a reflection of their nomadic origin. It was more likely
borne out of necessity, as trade provided steady income to fund their
endless campaigns. The extent to which maritime trade contributed to
Mongol expansion is debatable, but there can be no doubt that the
Mongols took foreign trade seriously and grew increasingly protectionist
as family-based private trade networks emerged to challenge the court
monopoly. Indeed, the Mongols became so defensive that the regime
issued four sea bans, which 'forbade merchants to go out to the seas'.
Taken together these bans were in place for barely ten years, and we
wonder how effective they were. Nevertheless, they established a
precedent which the Ming and Qing would follow. It would become
commonplace for a regime to claim that the private trade which
threatened their own sources of profit must be curtailed in the interest of
national security and social order. Private trade conglomerates
continued, however, to challenge the Yuan, and the contest between the
political regime and private merchants would intensify in the Ming, when
it became impossible for the court to control the private trade which grew
to be the norm.
The Mongols published China's first maritime law, called Maritime Trade
Law, in 1292. This legal code consisted of 22 regulations, some of which
are listed below:
'Regulation Four:
On the subject of diplomats, big or small ranking officials and military
personnel who are sent abroad for work, have their fares and expenses
paid by the government, but many of them still use the opportunity to do
business on their own. If they have done so, upon their return, their
goods must be handed to the Maritime Trade Bureau for taxation or
confiscation.'
'Regulation Five:
On the subject of Buddhist monks and priests, Daoists, Christians and
Muslims who often take lay people with them in order to undertake
business when they travel abroad and who often escape taxation. From
now on, when they travel abroad, they can't escape taxation without the
Emperor's permission. Otherwise, all their goods will be taxed
accordingly.'
'Regulation Ten:
Concerning the arms, ammunitions and gongs used by seafaring
merchants for self-defence during their voyages, these must be counted
and stored with the port authority, which will hand these items back to
them should they put to sea again.'
'Regulation Thirteen:
Gold, silver, copper money, iron products, people, male or female
cannot be privately traded to foreigners / foreign places.'
The Law established rules of taxation, restrictions on goods traded, and
guidelines of conduct for diplomatic and religious travel. Regulations
Four and Five are revealing: everyone, even men of religion, was
engaged in making money; this is demonstrative of the scale and
profitability of maritime trade under Mongol rule.
During the Song-Yuan dynastic era, Quanzhou overtook Guangzhou to
become the largest port of foreign trade, and as Angela Schottenhammer
has remarked, the city became the 'Emporium of the World'. Quanzhou
thrived at the expense of Guangzhou for at least two reasons. First, the
economy and reputation of Guangzhou had been severely damaged by
the peasant rebel forces led by Huang Chao in 878. Expressing their
hostility towards the Tang regime, the peasant army launched an assault
on those things which the regime prized most as they marched into
Guangzhou, they burnt the valuable silk cocoons and massacred the
foreign traders, mostly Muslims, who brought so much revenue to the
Tang regime. Secondly, Guangzhou declined because the prosperity of
the port fostered widespread corruption, which eventually made it
unfeasible for foreign traders to continue to operate there; they inevitably
looked for a new and more suitable place. Corruption and massacres
drove foreign traders away from Guangzhou to neighbouring Quanzhou,
which was home to a mixed population that controlled the foreign trade
and was second only to their Mongol masters in the social hierarchy.
One of the most visible was the Pu conglomerate. Maritime merchants
of Arab-Muslim descent, the Pu family rose to eminence through the
fragrance trade, and Pu Shougeng (1205-1290) became a key official in
charge of maritime trade in the Fujian bureaucracy. He surrendered to
the Mongols and served in the Yuan hierarchy, which further enhanced
his position and wealth, making the Pu family one of the most powerful
during the Yuan dynasty. Shi Zongle (1318-1391) vividly describes the
mixed landscape and culture of Quanzhou:
Rare is the place of Quanzhou in the south
Fragrance wafts around the city and temples
Arabs, Persians and Mestizo merchants
Tall ships usually bring sea treasures.
Muslim traders continued to come and stay in China, despite violence
and corruption, because silk and porcelain remained the most numerous
and most profitable items for export, followed by domestic necessities
such as iron woks, textiles and stationery. It was during the Yuan period
that the Islamic Encyclopaedia of Medicine was translated into Chinese;
it would have a profound impact on the practice of traditional Chinese
medicine (TCM). While historians continue to question whether or not the
Venetian merchant Marco Polo really went to and lived in Song-Yuan
China, the legend alone lent force to the allure of the land itself. While
Persian and Arab traders had led the way, they would soon be replaced
by Europeans, whose race for Asian, and especially Chinese, luxuries
began soon after the Mongol tide subsided in the fourteenth century.
The Tang turned to the sea for contact and exchange when the Silk
Road fragmented. The Song institutionalised foreign trade management
with a regulatory system, and the Mongols built still further on this
infrastructure. How effective were the Song Regulation and Yuan Law?
This would involve much more research, as regional authorities often
responded to central directives with their own strategies; this continued
during the following Ming-Qing dynastic era - and in fact continues to the
present day. The Tang-Song-Yuan regimes solicited foreigners to come
and facilitated private trade because this enriched and empowered them.
Kent Deng was right to call the Song a 'money-hungry state' that created
and drove a vigorous market. The Song survived and even thrived,
despite being isolated from northern China, because of the profits it
garnered from its open attitude towards the seas and maritime trade. The
Song-Yuan era, as Li Donghua and Chen Xinxiong have remarked, saw
the pinnacle of China's maritime trade and shipbuilding, which enabled
their engagement with the seas. The maritime world thus became
indispensable, with obvious, far-reaching, consequences."
"The Ming Paradox: 1368 to 1643
If, as Valerie Hansen asserts, China faced the West from 200 to 1000
and the North from 1000 to 1600, she also faced the seas and almost
only the seas from then onward. The founding of the Ming dynasty in
1368 marked a return to Chinese rule; it also marked a changing attitude
towards the seas. The founding monarch, the Hongwu emperor (1368-
1398) [Zhu Yuanzhang], was suspicious of the sea and hostile towards
seafaring. This attitude was immediately evident in Hongwu's first wave
of edicts:
'Order to the Deputy Prime Minister Prince Wu and Marquis Jing Hai
(Pacify Seas): Because the followers of Fang Guozhen in Wenzhou,
Taizhou and Qingyuan three districts and the people in the Lanxiu
Mountain have been made boat people and there are 111,730 of them,
put them under your army. Still do not allow coastal people go to the
seas on their own.'
Hongwu enforced the ban with zeal and reissued a decree every
decade. Sometimes the ban was so strict that people were not even
allowed to fish inshore waters. His lines would be evoked by other
monarchs later in history, and even historians. That the emperor included
this demand in Ancestral Instructions made it extremely difficult for his
sons and grandsons to adopt a different approach to the sea, as this
would have been considered unfilial, a most serious transgression for
any Chinese. Hongwu did re-open the famous Maritime Trade Bureau for
business, but only for tribute trade, which as usual was dictated by and
served the Ming court. This was characteristically different from the
Tang-Song-Yuan regimes, which fashioned policies to encourage and
manage private trade. Timothy Brook recently summed up the
importance of tribute trade: 'The Hongwu emperor cared deeply about
receiving tribute embassies. Every visit confirmed his right to rule, to
potentates beyond his borders as well as to his subjects watching the
foreign embassies enter the capital.'
There are a number of reasons why the new emperor, a peasant boy
who once nearly died of starvation, was so antagonistic towards the sea
and seafaring. Hongwu's political and economic ideology was a
decidedly conservative one, which gave precedence to agriculture over
commerce and underpinned his hostility towards the maritime world.
Hongwu's armies, wherever they marched and were stationed, undertook
garrison and commercial farming which helped to feed the soldiers and
the increasing population, reducing the need for revenue garnered from
maritime trade. As the Ming gained control over northern China and
expanded into the southwest, the land available for cultivation expanded
considerably. The Ming's self-sufficiency was complimented by the
introduction of new foodstuffs from the New World, namely maize and
the foreign yam, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
Secondly, the forces which competed with Hongwu for the imperial
throne, led by Zhang Shichen and Fang Guozhen as mentioned in his
first decree, maintained a presence on the open sea. Zhuang Jinghui has
carefully studied the dangers posed by these enemies on the sea during
Hongwu's reign and has identified 23 severe raids in this period. This
marks a turning point in Chinese history, as the threats to preceding
dynasties had almost always come over land. The Ming did notice it, and
Hongwu did his best to manage the situation, but they did not develop a
long-term strategy and could find no solution. For Hongwu, seafaring
activities undertaken by individuals were dangerous and provided an
opportunity for ordinary Chinese to associate freely with rebel forces and
invite potential enemies ashore. Understandably, fear of returning
enemies who might challenge him for the throne was a most pressing
issue for Hongwu. However, all this would soon change.
The Yongle emperor (1402-1424) [Zhu Di], Hongwu's son, adopted a
dramatically different attitude toward the maritime world, beginning the
father-son tug of war that lasted into the Qing. To many he seemed
curious, and the voyages he commissioned audacious. But he was not
much different from the First Emperor, the King of Wu, or the Sui, Song
and Yuan monarchs who had commissioned similar voyages that were
considered epic in their own times. Admiral Zheng He called on many
ports of Southeast, South and West Asia, as well as East Africa, in seven
epic voyages. He visited Mecca and reached Malindi near present-day
Mombasa (Kenya) in 1418, eighty years before Vasco de Gama rounded
the Cape of Good Hope. These voyages punished, silenced or
intimidated anti-Ming remnants wherever they were hiding or plotting,
from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean. They more importantly
projected China as a benevolent power and facilitated tribute trade.
Although the voyages did not establish colonies as the expeditions of
Europeans would a hundred years later, they did have significant
consequences. In the short term, the voyages were costly and depleted
the treasury; they were unrealistic in their ambitions and they contributed
to ferocious political infighting between eunuchs and scholar-officials.
From a longer-term perspective, however, these voyages were
instrumental in shaping Asia's early modern economy, inaugurating
'Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450 to 1680' and 'China's
silver century, 1550-1650'.* They encouraged private trade and
facilitated Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Upon Yongle's death in
1424 his son, the short-lived Hongxi emperor (1424-1425) [Zhu Gaochi],
resumed a strict ban on private seafaring that would remain in place for
the next eighty years. During this time tribute trade flourished and
peaked as foreign tribute missions arrived frequently, but the father-son
tug of war would continue, and with it the ban-and-lift cycle of Ming
maritime policy.**
[* Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce; Richard Von Glahn,
Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, Fourteenth to
Seventeenth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996),
p. 113.]
[** Angela Schottenhammer, ed. The East Asian Maritime World 1400-
1800: its Fabrics of Power and Dynamics of Exchanges (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2007).]
It was under the Zhengde emperor (1505-1521) [Zhu Houzhao] that the
ban began to be relaxed. Zhengde knew that private trade had been
flourishing because of the ban, and that the court could profit from it by
taxation, so he did not need - nor did he dare - to lift the ban imposed by
the Hongxi emperor. For the first time during the Ming, non-tribute ships
were permitted to anchor in Guangzhou, signalling the legalisation of the
private trade that had flourished in spite of the eighty-year ban as
Zhangzhou on the Fujian coast became a heaven for private trade.
Historians generally agree that Zhengde's reign saw the displacement of
tribute by private trade. The tribute missions came not, as official
histories claim, because they admired Chinese civilisation, but because
this was the only means by which to legally procure what China had to
offer. For the Ming court, too, this was the best way to procure what they
needed. Some missions came often and became a financial and logistic
burden on the Ming administration. Meanwhile, the ban did not stop
individuals from seafaring; private trade actually thrived because of the
ban, as can be seen from the outflow of coastal Chinese to Southeast
Asia and the growth of their settlements there.*
[* Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, eds. Emporia, Commodities,
and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C. 1400-1750 (Stuttgart:
Steiner Verlag, 1991); Roderich Ptak, China and the Asian Sea: Trade,
Travel and Visions of the Other (Aldershot & Brookfield [VT]: Ashgate,
1998); and Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern
Times (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), pp. 7-
52 & 55-104.]
Zhengde's reign is also significant because it saw the arrival of the
Portuguese. The early decades of the sixteenth century marked the
Portuguese endeavour to find a footing in China; Zhang Zengxin has
traced their footsteps and activities along the Chinese coast in this
period. After several attempts by Jorge Álvares, Rafael Perestrello, Tomé
Pires and Fernão Pires de Andrade, the mission of King Manuel I of
Portugal to the court of the Zhengde emperor finally succeeded in
securing for the Portuguese the right to send tribute missions to Beijing.
This understanding was, however, damaged irreparably by the actions of
Simão Pires de Andrade, brother of Fernão Pires, who allegedly
assaulted a Guangzhou official in 1519.* What was worse, he sailed
north and landed in Xiamen and then Ningbo without official permission.
In 1545, his men ransacked the town and took women and children
captive, in response to feeling himself cheated in a deal. Chinese local
authorities retaliated, destroying the Portuguese settlement and attacking
their ships.
[* John E. Wills, Jr., 'Relations with Maritime Europe, 1514-1662', in The
Cambridge History of China Volume 8.]
The Portuguese episode damaged the reputation of European traders
and provoked a return to the policy of banning seafaring under
Zhengde's successor, the Jiajing emperor (1521-1567) [Zhu Houcong].
This encounter strengthened the Ming's resolve to keep all foreigners
away from its shores, including not only the Europeans but also the short
pirates, referring to the Japanese.* Profit had given rise to fierce
competition and intrigue as pirates devastated the Ming coast; as Zhang
Bincun has pointed out, however, most were actually Chinese, with
relatively few Japanese amongst them. The battle against piracy saw the
rise of Qi Jiguang (1528-1588), a native of the legendary Penglai area
and the Ming's most effective naval commander, who succeeded in
restoring calm to the seas from Bohai to the Taiwan Strait, if only
temporarily.
[* Ivy Lim, Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China: the
Impact of Japanese Piracy in the 16th Century (Amherst [NY]: Cambria
Press, 2010); and Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's
Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).]
Where foreign trade and merchants had helped the Tang-Song-Yuan
regimes to make money, they proved problematic and threatening for the
Ming. Timothy Brook's new book, Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan
and Ming Dynasties, lends force to this argument. Trouble was brewing
at sea and devastating the Ming coast. There was also trouble in the
weather; as Brook points out, the Yuan-Ming era coincided with what
environmental historians called the 'Little Ice Age'. The Longqing
emperor (1567-1572) [Zhu Zaihou] succeeded Jiajing in 1567. As
expected, he relaxed the maritime ban immediately. This was the Ming's
last maritime policy change, as the dynasty saw its twilight during the
reign of Longqing's successor, the Wanli emperor (1573-1620) [Zhu
Yijun].
The history of the Ming is, as scholars have often remarked, perplexing
and complicated. Kent Deng aptly characterized the Ming paradox when
he described the dynasty as a 'power-hungry state which bullied the
private sector'. On one hand, the Ming regime is synonymous with the
epic voyages of Zheng He; on the other, it is renowned for its
conservative anti-trade stance. The conservative policy of the Ming
actually contributed to the rise of private trade, as family-led multinational
networks emerged and thrived. One of the most powerful was the Zheng
Chenggong conglomerate, which reached from Nagasaki to the Straits of
Malacca by the end of the Ming. The more private trade was banned, the
bigger and stronger it grew. The Zheng army and fleet put up a brave
resistance that helped the dying Ming dynasty last four more decades. It
is ironic that the court which so despised maritime trade came to rely on
the maritime world in the end: who knows what would have happened if
the Ming had adopted a more Song-like attitude towards the seas?
Historians revisited the Zheng He voyages as the People's Republic of
China celebrated its 600-year anniversary. As the debate regarding their
purpose continues, Chen Kuo-tung has advanced a new view that Zheng
He's voyages had three distinct aims: sappan wood, pepper, and
giraffes. Foreign to China, the giraffe resembles the Chinese mythical
holy animal Qilin, and was valued highly. Pepper was a necessity in
cuisine and the Chinese were dependent on a steady supply of the
seasoning. As for sappan wood, Chen argued that this product was
destined for the Ming court, where it was used to pay the salaries of
high-ranking officials, who would sell it to make a profit. Why then did the
Chinese need so much sappan wood during the Ming, and apparently
neither before nor after? Sappan wood exposes what I call the 'Red
Revolution'.* When boiled, sappan wood yielded a reddish tint which was
popular as a dye. This is significant because the Ming passion for red
passed down to the Communists. Red is the official colour of the
Communist Party, the flag it flies, and the army it created. The Chinese
appetite for red deserves independent study, which will undoubtedly
reveal some of the dynamics of psychological and socio-cultural change
wrought by foreign trade.
[* I hope to elaborate this in a new book titled 'A History of the Colour
Red in China'.]
The Ming era is significant because it marked the beginning of large-
scale overseas migration, which had begun - on a smaller scale - much
earlier and can be traced back to the Tang-Song or even, as some
historians point out, to the time of Xu Fu. Official histories since the Song
have listed the places frequented by coastal Chinese, which include
Lusong (Philippines), Brunei, Palembang, Malacca and Cambodia. Song
Shi or History of the Song mentions merchants who stayed in overseas
countries for long periods, as long as twenty years, and returned to
China with foreign wives and children. It seems that Palembang had
become a safe-haven for the Chinese by the early Ming. Ma Huan,
translator to Zheng He, detailed the kind of Chinese who found
themselves in Palembang in his memoir:
'Many people in this country are from Guangdong, Zhangzhou and
Quanzhou who fled here; they are rich. So is the land. ... During the time
of Hongwu, Cantonese Chen Zuyi and his entire family fled here. He
became the head of the locality, he is loaded and big-headed; he
harasses and plunders boats that come and go.'
The Chinese presence in Southeast Asia has continued to fascinate
travellers and scholars interested in the region.* It is surprising that mass
migration took place under the Ming and not under earlier dynasties,
when it would have been much easier for Chinese to travel. Several
historians have demonstrated that migration under the Ming was
motivated both by necessity and opportunity; Yang Guozhen pointed to
the rise of what he called the 'maritime economy and society'. An
increasing number of coastal Chinese left to seek their fortune: China
needed what Southeast Asia could provide as population increased and
cultivable land shrank, while the global trade that stretched from China to
England via Southeast Asia, and to the Americas via the Philippines,
seemed to offer abundant opportunities to become rich. The commercial
instinct and talent of the Chinese finally found a match in the environs of
Southeast Asia. The increasing pressure from within and the arrival of
Europeans made the space that Southeast Asian countries provided,
together with the absence of government restriction on commercial
activities in these lands, particularly attractive to the Chinese. The
consequent Chinese exodus drew China into greater economic, if not
political, entanglement with Southeast Asian countries.
[* Thomas S. Raffles, The History of Java (London: Black, Parbury and
Allen, 1817); Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London:
Oxford University Press, 1951).]
The Ming also saw the arrival of the Jesuits and the initial spread of
Catholicism on Chinese soil. As we shall see in Chapters Four and Five,
the Jesuits used goods manufactured in Europe, such as clocks, to gain
access to China and the Ming political establishment. While obviously
shrewd, their machinations did not produce the kind of success they
imagined, and their missions ended in the disastrous 'Rites Controversy'.
But the Jesuits, the Portuguese, and their rivals the Spaniards and the
Dutch were not the only Europeans on Asian waters.
On 14th April 1636 a fleet of four ships, the Dragon, Sunne, Catherine,
and Planter, and two pinnaces, the Anne and the Discovery, left the
Downs near London and sailed for Asia.* Eager to catch up, the English
East India Company wished to establish direct trade links with China.
Captain Weddell carried with him two royal commissions and three
letters from H. M. King Charles I; they were addressed to the agents of
the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie or
VOC), to the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa and to the Governor at Macao.
That the letters were addressed to such diverse authorities reveals that
control of Asian trade was complex and that the British venture would be
far from straightforward.** Dutch and English competition, in the words of
H. B. Morse, was 'one of constant fighting like two dogs over one bone'.
Just as Captain Weddell was setting forth, the Manchus christened their
northern kingdom 'Qing' and were planning their next plot to invade Ming
China, which they managed successfully in May 1644. The English
would test the shores of Qing China and challenge her much as the
Portuguese had done during the Ming. The dynamics of their encounter
would shape the history of the Qing.
[* H. B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to
China 1635-1834 (4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), vol. 1, p. 16.]
[** The mission ended in disaster. See John Keay, The Honourable
Company: A History of the English East India Company (London:
HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 123-24.]"
"Conclusion
The consistencies and disparities of the last two millennia of Chinese
encounters with the sea have been laid bare in this chapter. Although the
Qin-Han regimes emphasised control, the smaller dynasties that came
after had to be flexible in order to survive. The Tang-Song-Yuan regimes
recognised the potential of maritime trade to generate much-needed
profit, and they installed institutions and fashioned laws that allowed
ordinary Chinese to pursue trade and travel. The biggest beneficiaries of
this maritime activity were, of course, the regimes themselves. The
relationship of the Ming to the sea was far more ambivalent and
paradoxical. The Ming had neither the mentality nor the need for a liberal
seafaring policy, and the period was characterized by the reigns of hard-
line anti-maritime monarchs like Hongwu, and maritime visionaries like
Yongle. The Ming saw the zenith of tribute trade; it also saw the rise of
private trade. Foreigners, too, had noticed China ever since the Qin, if
not earlier. Han China appeared in The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea;
Tang-Song China and porcelains in Arab memoirs like Anciennes
Relations des Indes et de la Chine by Sulayman Al Tajir; Yuan China in
European travel logs; and Ming China in Jesuit memoirs.*
[* Ancient Accounts of India and China by Two Mohammedan Travellers
(London: Sam Harding, 1733). See also Catherine C. Brawer and Geri
Wu, Trade Winds: the Lure of the China Trade, 16th-19th Centuries
(Katonah [NY]: Katonah Gallery, 1985).]
China's engagement with the seas has a long history and demands
much more examination. Ever since the founding of the Middle Kingdom,
monarchs from the First Emperor to the Yongle Emperor commissioned
epic voyages. While some sought the secrets of longevity and revenue in
the seas, others sought recognition, power and exotic goods. In
succession, Buddhist monks, Song-Yuan diplomats, and finally ordinary
Chinese journeyed to South and Southeast Asia. While the rise and fall
of the Qin-Han dynasties coincided with that of the Western Roman
Empire, the ascendancy of the Tang-Song epoch paralleled the
expansion of Islam. While the Ming flourished at the same time as the
Portuguese, the Qing would come to face the English. Trade was
instrumental in introducing new religions such as Buddhism, Islam and
Christianity into China, as well as bringing a diversity of new goods such
as fragrances, tobacco and maize. How would the consistency of Tang-
Song-Yuan policy towards the seas, and the rupture in this policy that
was represented by Ming ambivalence, shape the Qing's attitude
towards the maritime world? What, in other words, would the Manchus
learn from their Chinese and Mongol predecessors?"
"2 'THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE SEAS'
Matteo Ripa was one of many Jesuits who worked for the Kangxi
emperor (r. 1662-1722) [Xuanye] in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. He served as an interpreter when Kangxi received
the Russian embassy led by Count Ismailof in the winter of 1720, and he
remembered the audience:
'His Majesty then began to speak, and after a bombastic preamble, said
that the people and welfare of the two nations depended on the Czar's
health; and that having heard how he delighted in marine excursions, he
was desirous to warn him against the inconsistency of the seas, lest he
should thus expose himself to destruction. At the conclusion of this
solemn illustration of the old saying 'Parturient montes, nascentur
riduculus mus,' Count Ismailof had great difficulty in refraining from
laughter, as he himself afterwards told me.'*
[* Memoirs of Father Ripa during Thirteen Years' Resident at the Court of
Peking in the Service of the Emperor of China (London: John Murray,
1844), pp. 111-12.]
Kangxi thought the seas were inconsistent and destructive, even though
the Manchu sphere of control had extended to the Liaodong Peninsula-
Bohai area before they entered China in 1644. Perhaps Kangxi knew of
the lessons the early Manchu court learnt from the late Ming general
Mao Wenlong (1584-1630), who demonstrated to them the difficulty of
managing the seas. A major figure in the late Ming fight against the
advancing Manchus, General Mao operated from Pi Dao, an island at the
mouth of the Yalu River, where he held the Manchus at bay for nearly a
decade. Pi Dao is a most strategic place, situated at the heart of the
Northeast Asia maritime triangle, which consists of the Shandong-
Liaodong peninsulas, Korea and Japan (Jiuzhou or Kyushu). Not much
has been written on this important episode of history; the two volumes of
the Cambridge History of China on the Ming do not discuss Mao
Wenlong at all, which again demonstrates the lack of interest in the
maritime regions.
Perhaps Kangxi had not forgotten about Ming loyalist Zheng
Chenggong, whose four-decade-long resistance will be discussed in the
following pages. His comment may also have merely been words of
caution, which he habitually offered to many - whether they wanted or
not - but 'inconsistency' certainly captures the essence of his maritime
policies. This chapter focuses on the Qing's foremost encounters with the
maritime world after they entered China. In doing so, it lays bare the
Qing's political philosophy and control mechanism toward the seas, and
illuminates the circumstances behind their several vacillations: the ban of
1656, which was reinforced in 1661 but relaxed in 1684; the ban of 1717,
revoked in 1727 before a change in 1757 implemented the so-called
'Guangzhou one port system'. This dictated Sino-foreign trade in theory,
but not in practice, as the seafaring provinces continued - as they always
had - to circumvent court policies in whatever ways they could in order to
protect their own interests, until the Treaty of Nanking in 1842."
"Change but Continuity
On the 14th day of the 6th moon (July) in the Kangxi emperor's 22nd
year (1683), 238 ships carrying more than 21,000 soldiers set sail from
the island of Dongshan on the southeast coast of Fujian province. Led by
Shi Lang, the Fujian Naval Commander and Junior Guardian to the Heir
Apparent, the fleet rode on the south wind and sailed straight towards
Penghu (Pescadores in Portuguese or Fishermen), an archipelago off
the southwest coast of Taiwan consisting of 90 small islands covering an
area of 141 square kilometres.* Their target was the anti-Qing forces
which, led by Zheng Chenggong, had established themselves in Taiwan
in 1662 after they were driven from their mainland stronghold in Xiamen.
In the face of this successful assault the Zheng regime surrendered a
month later, in August 1683.
[* John E. Wills, 'Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang', in From
Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-
century China, eds. Jonathan Spence and John E. Wills Jr. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 203-238.]
This victory was not an easy one, despite the fact that Dongshan is not
at all far from Taiwan; it is as far as Miami is from Cuba. It came forty
years after the Manchus installed themselves in Beijing as the Qing
dynasty, and after several failed attacks led by the same general. What
made this attempt successful? This conquest is important not because it
brought Taiwan into the Qing orbit, but because history threatens to
repeat itself as the Communist regime on the mainland continues to
pursue the dream of unification. This was the first and last time that the
Qing court utilised the talents and resources maritime China had to offer
and assembled a large naval force that sailed to victory. This supremacy
on the seas was lost soon after the Taiwan conquest, a loss which
ultimately led to the Qing defeat in the Opium Wars in the nineteenth
century. This section traces the Qing encounter with the maritime world
when they swept down the central plains to coastal China. It analyses
Qing responses to the challenges of the seas and assesses what
lessons were learnt from the Ming, if not from history.
The Manchu regime and its armies of the Eight Banners entered Ming
China in 1644 without firing a single shot, thanks to treacherous Ming
general Wu Sangui, who opened the Mountain Sea Pass. The Manchus
quickly installed themselves in the old Ming palace, and their luck may
indeed have been a manifestation of a 'Mandate from Heaven'. Ho Ping-
ti believes that the Qing was 'the most successful of conquest dynasties',
and Charles Hucker describes the conquest as 'the least disruptive
transition'. As soon as the Manchu court had accustomed itself to the
Forbidden City, they began the real conquest. Like the Mongols before
them, they swept through the north and central plains easily, until they
arrived at Fujian in 1648. The Manchus soon realised that southern
China was not as easy to conquer, as it was not only exotic but also
challenging. The Zheng Chenggong conglomerate would offer strong
resistance in the city of Xiamen and the Taiwan Strait vicinity until 1683.
The Qing court and officials began to reinforce the old Ming naval force
to help them defeat the Zheng opposition. To prevent the coastal
population from communicating with and providing support to the Zheng
forces, the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644-1661) [Fulin], the first Manchu
monarch to rule from China, issued the first Sea Ban edict in August
1656:
'Sea rebel Zheng Chenggong and his troops hide themselves in the sea.
They have not been wiped out; traitors will pass on information to them.
They hope to profit from the trade and provide the rebels with provision
and ammunitions. If we don't set the rule, how can we turn our seas into
calm waters? From now on, all the civil and military officials of the coastal
provinces/regions cannot allow merchants and ordinary people to go out
to the seas on their own.'
The edict also stipulated that those who helped provide provisions,
especially rice, and other kinds of help to the rebels would be punished
severely. However, this ban on coastal people going to sea did not
prevent rebels from sneaking in, and the vigilance of local military
officials, who could be tempted to let them pass with a little money, was
not always to be depended on. Punishment was therefore also laid out
not just for those who were immediately responsible for such
transgressions, but for the entire chain of command. Sea bans had been
frequent during the Ming and remained so during the early Qing, as the
father-son tug of war continued; neither the Ming nor the Qing was able
to produce a sensible policy. The 1656 ban was motivated by security
concerns and imposed along the coast from Shandong to Guangdong;
but it did allow people in less affected areas to use one-mast vessels for
fishing in coastal waters.
The Qing differed from the Ming in their enforcement of sea bans due to
their determination to wipe out the Zheng resistance. To tighten the net
on the Zheng forces, the Shunzhi emperor issued Order to Move the
Boundary in 1661:
'Move the coastal people of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangnan and Zhejiang
provinces thirty miles inland from the sea... No one can help supply the
Zheng rebels and they will disappear before we attack them. Order the
governors-general of the four provinces to give those who moved 'land
and housing' so that they can settle in the interior. Their houses and
boats should be burnt and destroyed. Not a single plank of wood is
allowed into the sea. Build walls, put up stone boundaries, erect bunkers
and barracks. The punishment for those who go beyond the boundary is
death.'
Unprecedented in maritime history, the 1661 Order forced tens of
thousands of coastal people to leave their homes and move inland, some
more than one hundred miles. By cutting off their moral support and
material supply, the Manchus thought they could starve the Zheng rebel
forces to death. The Manchus were determined, thorough and effective,
and the Zheng-led resistance was forced off the mainland in 1662 due to
a shortage of food, rice in particular.
Far from easing the problems, however, the expulsion of Zheng's forces
from the mainland made matters worse. The rebels managed to oust the
Dutch from Taiwan in 1662 and obtained a rich island base that could
provide everything from manpower to supplies. The Qing court could
have left the rebels in Taiwan but they didn't. The Manchus realised that
the threat was even greater than before, since they could now no longer
foresee when and where enemy forces might emerge from the sea. The
worst scenario was that the Zheng resistance coordinate with their
supporters on the mainland and mount covert attacks. In the meantime,
the Order to Move the Boundary proved to be catastrophic for the
ordinary people who lived along the coast, as evidenced in the works of
Zhu Delan, who has carefully studied life during this period. Some
inhabitants would return decades later, but many would never again see
their home villages or the seas as they settled permanently in the
interior. This naturally affected the maritime trade that now stretched
from China to Europe via Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean on the
one hand, and to the Americas via the Philippines on the other.
But the Kangxi court had much more urgent matters to deal with at this
time, as pockets of resistance persisted in various areas of southern
China, challenging the nomadic banner warriors who were more used to
the cold weather of the north. Heat and tropical diseases proved to be
more menacing than the Chinese, but the Manchus held on. Kangxi
managed to crush the so-called 'three feudatories' scattered in Yunnan,
Guangdong and Fujian provinces. He then turned his attention to the
Zheng forces in Taiwan. The 1683 assault was very successful and the
1680s marked the Qing's final campaigns in southern China; these
territories would remain under Manchu control until the Taiping Rebellion
in the 1850s.
Decades of war and the maritime ban not only ruined families and
businesses but also emptied local and court treasuries. Many of Kangxi's
officials had complained about the lack of funds ever since the Manchus
began the southern campaigns; they blamed the maritime ban and
suggested lifting it, even during the Taiwan campaigns, in order to garner
badly-needed financial resources. Kangxi read their memorials carefully
and acknowledged the issue, as we can see from the jottings he made
on those documents, which usually read 'Noted'. National security,
however, took precedence over all else, even profit-making. When all
southern resistance was crushed and Taiwan brought into the realm, the
debate over whether to lift the ban re-opened immediately within
officialdom. Kangxi clearly took the issue seriously this time, and
convened with his advisers to discuss lifting the ban in Jiangnan,
Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. He sent a team of officials to
investigate and assess the situation in these coastal regions. Jin Shijian
returned in the spring (lunar April) of 1684 and reported on the situation
in Zhejiang:
'Your Majesty's virtue and power have spread to all the corners and the
seas are calm. Along the coast of Zhejiang, we should be able to use the
same policy for Shandong. We could allow the people to use boats under
500 dan capacities to go fishing and trade on the sea.'*
[* See also Lillian M. Li, Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market,
and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2007), appendix on weights and measures, pp. 391-92.]
Reports from Fujian and Guangdong read more or less the same, as life
returned to normal after years of unrest. These were not just
recommendations from a handful of officials in the field; they reflected
the consensus that was building among the majority of those who served
in the maritime regions. Kangxi read their memorials and made up his
mind:
'I intend to lift the ban of sea trade because it would benefit the small
people along the Fujian and Guangdong coast. If these two provinces
have enough, the circulation of money and goods will be smooth, and
every other province would benefit from it. Those who could go do
overseas trade are not poor people but big merchants. We can tax them
heavily; this would not burden the small people. We could use the money
for military purposes and help other provinces in need. This way, the
provinces can help each other out in terms of grains and funds; and the
small people can enjoy peace and plenty. I therefore lift the ban on
maritime trade.'
Qing maritime policy was determined by considerations of national
security, as it had been during the Ming. Like the founders of the Ming,
the Manchus rose with a few thousand men and without the support of
the maritime world. Seafaring was not of great concern to them, even
though Kangxi, followed by his son and grandson, were interested in
what the maritime world could bring. The court benefited from the
revenues it generated, and they themselves became addicted to the
exotic foreign goods brought in by maritime trade, which will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five.
After lifting the ban, the Qing set up four Sea Passes/Checkpoints, to
manage maritime affairs: Guangdong Customs in Guangzhou, Fujian
Customs in Zhangzhou, Zhejiang Customs in Ningbo, and Jiangnan
Customs in Songjiang (Shanghai). A government agency was also
established in Guangzhou; this was the Gong Hang or Co-hong which
managed acquisition and taxation for the court, just like the old Maritime
Trade Bureau during the Tang-Song-Yuan era. The Qing did not invent
these institutions, but simply re-opened them for business. The Manchus
proved to be sensible in allowing private trade, which generated badly-
needed revenue after decades of devastation. Below is a rare image
found in the Chinese Collection held at the John Rylands Library at the
University of Manchester, depicting what is called 'Caton Customs
Inspection'.
The lifting of the ban would usher in one of the most dynamic periods in
maritime trade. Southeast Asian historian Leonard Blusse has referred to
the 1684 relaxation as 'liberalisation' and 'institutionalisation', which is the
correct terminology in the language of economics but does not
adequately reflect the perspective of the Qing. They could - and did -
resume the ban should the situation change, but seafaring and trade
went on, despite or even because of the restrictions, as it had during the
Ming. We know this from the countless efforts of the East India
Company; they 'had striven for a third of a century to obtain entrance to
the China trade, and had had no success'. They tried again in the year
1676:
'A ship was dispatched from England to Amoy, with a view of
establishing a factory there, in which they succeeded; but the trade was
obstructed by the civil wars which then raged in China. In 1680 the
Tartars drove the Chinese from Amoy, and destroyed the Company's
factory, their servants escaping to Tonquin and Bantam. In 1684 the
Tartar General permitted the factory to be re-established. In the following
year the Company's Residents there observed that 'having had five
months' experience, of the nature and quality of these people, they can
characterise them into no otherwise than as devils in men's shape;' and
they stated, 'that to remain exposed to the rapaciousness of the
avaricious Governors was considered as more detrimental than the trade
would be beneficial.' The factory was, however, continued, till the
Emperor's edict for confining the trade to Canton, compelled them to
withdraw.'*
[* William Milburn, Oriental Commerce: Containing a Geographical
Description of the Principal Places in the East Indies, China, and Japan
(2 vols. London: Black & Parry, 1813), vol. 2, p. 546.]
This Company account testifies to the opening of the Customs in 1684
(despite its apparent mistake about the year 1680). Trade went on during
the ban years and became more sophisticated, as people learned to
avoid patrol boats and as Chinese communities in the various Southeast
Asian destinations began to take shape, making it easier for people to
settle. Official sanction in 1684 only made things easier for the 'small
people', as Kangxi called them; it legitimised maritime activities in the
official dictionary. The English came at a time of dynastic change, which
complicated their own business just as it had complicated Portuguese
affairs during the Ming. The consolidation and rise of the Qing in China
coincided with the ascent of Britain on the seas.
Historians of Northeast and Southeast Asia have noticed the increasing
number of Chinese vessels that called upon ports in those areas in the
post-1684 years. Zhu Delan has carefully studied Sino-Japanese trade
and finds that a total of 7 Chinese ships (excluding those from Taiwan)
called on Japan in 1684; this figure jumped to 57 in 1685 and reached
153 in 1688. Between 1644 and 1684, fewer than 7 Chinese ships
annually called on Manila, where Sino-Philippine commerce had
flourished after the Spanish established themselves there in 1571 and
fostered the Galleon trade. An average of 20 ships, however, sailed into
Manila each year from 1685 to 1716, the dawn of another maritime ban
which is examined in the next section. Thai scholar Sarasin Viraphol
believes that 'after 1685 the number of Chinese ships calling at Siam
increased steadily' to about 15 in 1689.*
[* Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1977), p. 55.]
Another indicator of the obvious consequences of the 1684 relaxation
was the increase in Chinese settlement in small Southeast Asian
countries. Viraphol believes that the Chinese population in Siam grew to
more than three thousand in the post-1684 years, and a similar increase
was also noted in Java. Leonard Blusse has argued that the 1680s saw
the decline of Dutch trade in Asia; indeed, it was not just the English,
Javanese and other peoples of Southeast Asia who were competing with
the Dutch, but the Chinese.* Luc Nagtegaal argues that increased opium
smoking in Java in the 1680s was linked to the increased circulation of
Chinese merchants and labourers on the island.** The Chinese who
sojourned in Java learned to smoke opium there; they returned to the
coastal provinces with opium and the habit of smoking the substance.***
Maritime traffic continued to increase over the following decades, as
greater numbers of Chinese went out to trade and labour in Southeast
Asia.
[* 'No Boats to China: the Dutch East India Company and the Changing
Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690', Modern Asian Studies 30, 1
(1996): 51-76.]
[** Riding the Dutch Tiger: the Dutch East India Company and the
Northeast Coast of Java, 1680-1743 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), pp.
143-47.]
[*** Zheng Yangwen, The Social Life of Opium in China (Cambridge:
Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2005), pp. 41-55.]
The 1680s proved to be a successful decade for the Kangxi emperor, as
he secured a territory larger than the old Ming and established the border
with Russia in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689.* He would then march
west into Central Asia to pacify the Zunghars (Mongolian and Tibetan-
Buddhist), the Tibetans and the Uyghurs (Turkic and Islamic).** These
campaigns, which continued into the mid-eighteenth century, are
significant because they redrew the map of China and established the
boundaries which still stand today and continue to generate
controversy.*** Kangxi accomplished a feat of which his forefathers could
only dream. He undertook his first Southern Tour in 1684, a practice
begun eighteen hundred years prior by the First Emperor and continued
by Kangxi's Ming predecessors; his grandson Qianlong would perfect the
practice, and even Deng Xiaoping would emulate it in the 1980s. Kangxi
also took time out to renew his Manchu skills, such as hunting and
archery, and stumbled upon an old Ming garden in ruin, which he
claimed for himself and began to rebuild and enlarge. He called it
Garden of Eternal Spring.
[* The impact of this Treaty went beyond China and Russia. See
Boleslaw B. Szczesniak, 'Diplomatic Relations between Emperor K'ang
hsi and King John III of Poland', Journal of the American Oriental Society
89, 1 (1969): 157-61.]
[** Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central
Eurasia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).]
[*** 31 The latest was the so-called Wulumuqi Incident in Xinjiang that
began on 5th July 2009.]"
"The Kangxi Emperor versus Pope Clement XI
Just as Kangxi was beginning to enjoy the fruits of his hard work in the
early years of the eighteenth century, Pope Clement XI issued a decree
to Chinese Catholics in 1704 which addressed the way in which they
should worship:
'I. We use Deus to call the creator of Heaven, Earth and everything in
the universe in Europe; but these two words do not exist in the Chinese
language. Europeans in China and the Chinese converts to Catholicism
have been using Tian Zhu (Heavenly God) for a long time. From now on,
they can't use the word Tian (Heavenly), they also cannot use the phrase
Shang Di (Heavenly God); they can only use Deus. As for the horizontal
board Jing Tian (Reverence for Heaven) that hangs in churches, don't
hang it if you haven't and take it down if you have.
II. During the Confucius and ancestor worship in the spring and autumn,
Chinese Catholics are not allowed to participate or help with the
ceremonies; they should not even stand by because that constitutes
participation.'
These were only the first two of a long list of restrictions the Pope placed
on Chinese converts; they effectively dictated that converts relinquish
Chinese cultural practices once they became Christians. Many Chinese
converts and officials found this unacceptable, and the Kangxi emperor
reacted strongly:
'Reading this proclamation, I can only say that the Europeans are really
small-minded. They don't read or understand Chinese; how can they
have such opinions and lecture us about China? They are absolutely
ridiculous. They are not different from monks, priests and other extreme
sects. I have never seen anything full of such nonsense. To avoid further
trouble, we should not allow them to preach in China from now on.'
[* D. E. Mungello, ed. The Chinese Rites Controversy: its History and
Meaning (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1994); Ben Elman, On Their Own
Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2005), pp. 160-68; Ricci Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural
History, 100 Roman Documents Concerning the Chinese Rites
Controversy (1645-1941) (San Francisco: Ricci Institute for Chinese-
Western Cul-tural History, 1992); and Paul A. Rule, 'The Chinese Rites
Controversy: a Long Lasting Sino-Western Cultural History', Pacific Rim
Report 32, (February 2004).]
This was the so-called Chinese 'Rites Controversy', in which an
increasing number of historians have become interested; none, however,
has linked it with the 1717 maritime ban, the focus of this section.* It is
vital to explore this link, as the Pope's quarrel with the Qing court over
the issue of dual worship would provide the context for another maritime
ban, imposed by the ageing Kangxi emperor. In other words, the
controversy led to yet another change in the Qing's attitude and policy
towards the seas. It also highlights the challenge that would continue to
face the Qing regime. The Jesuits had been operating in Macao since
the 1550s and in China since the 1580s; they managed to gain some
converts, both high status - such as the late Ming scholar-official Xu
Guangqu - and low status, or 'rice Christians'.36 Chinese Catholics made
good Christians, but the problem from the Church's perspective was that
they also worshiped Confucius, their ancestors, and possibly many other
gods at the same time. Not only that, they used the word Tian, which
means 'Heaven', and Di, which means 'God'. Although these are native
Chinese words, the Pope found their wide usage unacceptable and
claimed a Catholic monopoly over them. This struggle was not new; it
had surfaced during the very first Catholic-Chinese encounters in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.*
[* Alvarez Semedo, The History of that Great and Renowned Monarchy
of China (London: E. Taylre, 1644), p. 205.]
Matteo Ricci, the first Jesuit to arrive and settle in Ming Beijing, seemed
to have resolved the issue. Ricci believed that the Jesuits must respect
Chinese tradition if they were to be successful in China, and turned
himself into a defining example of tolerance. He learned to speak
Chinese and wore Chinese clothes, and also followed Chinese customs.
Ricci believed that the commemoration of Confucius and one's ancestors
was not a religious act in the same way as the worship of God in the
Catholic faith was; he therefore did not consider these rituals to be in
conflict with the worship of God. Catholicism could, and did, live in
harmony with Chinese cultural practices, and many Jesuits tolerated or
put up with this 'Ricci doctrine', even though they might not have been
reconciled to it in their hearts. This was what Ben Elman calls the 'Sino-
Jesuit accommodation'.
To a large extent, the Chinese rites controversy resulted from the arrival
of the Dominicans and Franciscans, what Liam Brockey calls the 'arrival
of rivals'.* Juan Bautista de Morales, one of the first Dominicans to arrive
in China in 1633, not only reopened the debate but also reported to the
Pope, accusing the Jesuits of allowing dual worship and compromising
Catholic etiquette. A fundamentalist, Morales was also jealous of the
Jesuits' success and dominance. The first edict from Pope Innocent X
was issued in 1645; it stated that Chinese Catholics should not
participate in activities that commemorated Confucius and that they
should not establish altars and tablets for their ancestors. This edict
arrived in China at a time when the Ming court had escaped to southern
China and the Manchus had barely established themselves on Chinese
soil.
[* Liam Brockey, Journey to the East: the Jesuit Mission to China, 1579-
1724 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), pp.
151-63; and Jonathan Spence, The China Helpers: Western Advisers in
China 1620-1960 (London: Bodley Head, 1969), p. 20.]
How the Manchu court perceived the various missionaries after they
entered Beijing in 1644 is certainly a question worth exploring if we
assume that they had never seen Europeans, except the Russians,
before. Anxious to 'consolidate their claims as the holders of the
Mandate of Heaven, the true heirs to the Ming', the Shunzhi emperor
treated those with astronomical skills well, as the calendar of the
Mandate of Heaven rested in their hands. It seems that he was on very
friendly terms with Jean Adam Schall von Bell (1591-1666), whom he
called Mafa, a Manchu term for a respected senior.* This prompted some
Jesuits, Alvarez Semedo for example, to believe that Shunzhi was
converted.
[* Louis Pfister, Notices Biographiques et Bibliographiques sur les
Jesuites de l'Ancienne Mission de Chine 1552-1773 (2 tomes. Chang-
hai: Imprimerie de la mission Catholique, 1932), tome 1, pp. 168-69. It
was translated as 'Venerable Père' in French.]
Kangxi inherited his father's ministers and missionaries when he
became emperor in 1662. A reading of the various Jesuit memoirs
reveals that Kangxi was not initially hostile to the Catholic faith. He was
friendly with the missionaries, as they themselves remembered and as
historians have acknowledged. He treated those with technical abilities
extremely well; he was well-disposed to the educated missionaries in
part because of his intense interest in astronomy and geography and his
desire to master mathematics and music, about which I shall elaborate in
Chapter Four. Good relations with the missionaries made Kangxi flexible
when friction surfaced, a trait evidenced in the ways in which he received
and handled the special envoy of Pope Clement XI. Nevertheless, it is
important not to overestimate the emperor's leniency, and he did not
hesitate to punish and banish those who did not follow his rules as the
rites controversy escalated into a bitter clash between the Qing court and
the Vatican. Kangxi was well aware of what the missionaries came for
and he knew how to handle them. The struggle over dual worship would
decide the fate of Christianity in China, the consequences of which is still
felt today.
The situation between the Qing court and the Vatican had already
begun to deteriorate in 1693, when the French missionary Charles
Maigrot publicly forbade Chinese Catholics in Fujian to carry on dual
worship. This angered many converts, as well as officials who reported to
Kangxi. To make things worse, Pope Clement XI issued the above
decree and sent a special envoy, Cardinal Carlo Tommaso Maillard de
Tournon (1669-1710), who arrived in Beijing on 4 December 1705.
Tournon was sent to reiterate and reinforce the ban on dual worship
among Chinese Catholics. Kangxi was deeply serious about this and, as
court documents and missionary memoirs testify, received the envoy on
31 December. When Tournon mentioned a figure somewhat like a
Cardinal for China, Kangxi replied that this must be someone who had
stayed long enough in the country - at least ten years - to know the
culture well. Kangxi clearly had a representative of the Jesuit community
in mind, which aroused the jealousy of the Dominicans and Franciscans.
Kangxi received Tournon again on 29 and 30 June 1706, when Tournon
mentioned that Charles Maigrot was to arrive in Beijing.
Kangxi received Charles Maigrot at the Palace of Heavenly Purity in
early August. Kangxi tested his Chinese by asking him to translate the
four characters on a horizontal sign behind the dragon throne, which
read Jing Tian Fa Zu or Reverent to Heaven and Follow the Ancestors.
Maigrot could only decipher the second, and most common, of the four
characters, Tian or Heaven. Kangxi's reaction was understandable: 'You
don't even read Chinese, how dare you lecture the Chinese about the
ways in which they should behave.' Already furious that someone who
neither read their language nor understood their culture should dictate
the religious life of the Chinese people, Kangxi was further angered by
the fact that Tournon communicated the Vatican's edict to the missionary
community in Beijing against his wishes. Tournon left for Nanjing in
August and spoke publicly about his mission. He denounced the Kangxi
emperor and demanded unconditional compliance from Chinese
Catholics. This was not acceptable to Kangxi, who expressed his
displeasure by expelling him to Macao, where he died in 1710. Liam
Brockey has called this episode 'a cruel tragedy'.
Kangxi then introduced a bond system for the missionaries. Those who
agreed to follow the 'Ricci doctrine' and signed the bond could continue
to practice in China; those who refused would be forced to leave.
According to the research of Wu Liwei, 75 signed the bond, 43 were
expelled, and 5 restricted to work only in the Guangdong area. Kangxi
was not hostile to Catholicism and the missionaries; what made him
angry was that they interfered with the practice of Chinese tradition, and
more importantly defied his authority. Hard-line missionaries did not
understand why Catholicism could not replace Chinese culture and found
it difficult to accept that their God had to live side-by-side with Confucius
and the ancestors of the converts. Cultural accommodation held the key
to success for the missionary enterprise, but it seems that fundamentalist
Catholicism had foreshadowed the future of Christian faith in China.
The battle with the Catholic Church over dual worship did not end here,
but intensified in the following decade and culminated in 1716, when
Kangxi discovered that the Pope had bypassed the Qing court and
secretly sent agents to China to enforce the ban on dual worship. This
enraged not only Kangxi, but also the political establishment, especially
those in the localities affected. A tidal-wave of memorials poured in,
attacking foreigners in general and missionaries in particular. Many, if not
all, called for an immediate and permanent ban on foreign missionary
activity. The letter from Governor-General Yang Lin of Guangdong-
Guangxi provinces detailed the whereabouts of the various foreigners:"
"Just as the court in Beijing recognised the difference between Jesuits,
Franciscans and Dominicans, so local officials in Guangdong knew how
to distinguish the different kinds of foreigners, even though their
knowledge was imperfect. They had 'Red Hair' and came from the 'West
Ocean', which at that time meant Europe, and had established
themselves in places like Siam, Java and Luzon. Some came to trade
and others to establish churches; most came with arms, while many
stayed. Governor-General Yang did not have negative opinions of the
merchants, but he did harbour the suspicion that all foreigners were
potential troublemakers. It seemed to him that keeping all of them at bay,
regardless of whether they were merchants or missionaries, were by far
the safest option. Macao was a particular cause for concern, as it was
the destination of the expelled missionaries."
"'The recommendation was followed, and the Kieu-king resolved that
Canton should be closed against foreigners, our holy religion prohibited,
all the Christians imprisoned, and their churches demolished.'
The news filled Ripa and others with horror and despair, even though
they had signed the bond pledging their allegiance to the 'Ricci doctrine'
that respected Chinese tradition. In the meantime, Kangxi realized that
banishing the missionaries to Macao was similar to driving the Zheng
resistance to Taiwan; it only made his empire less secure, as it would be
easier for them to organize and return. He needed to keep them at bay, if
not destroy them as he did with the Zheng rebels, and he also needed to
restrict Chinese access to Macao, where the missionaries were
banished, and to places where they congregated."
"Even as he aged, however, Kangxi did not lose his mind or control, and
the 1717 maritime ban testifies to this fact. The emperor knew where
potential dangers lay and he dealt with them in the best way he knew.
Neither expelling missionaries nor banning trade to the South Ocean
brought peace to the ageing Kangxi; instead, these actions caused more
problems. Guangdong and Fujian were by this time unable to feed their
population and relied on inland provinces and neighbouring countries for
rice, especially in times of famine, such as the year 1721: lack of rice
could lead to unrest and rebellions. Kangxi was advised that the country
of Siam was rich with rice and that it could be easily obtained to relieve
the situation, which was growing urgent. Kangxi had to act immediately,
and authorised the import of rice from Siam in June 1722. This seems to
be the first time the court authorised a rice import, but henceforth this
would become a necessary policy. Although it was the Qing court who
invited the Siamese to come, the news encouraged many Chinese to go
and procure rice in Siam in violation of the 1717 ban. Siam lies close to
Java, and ships could stop at the island on their way to and from their
destination. Kangxi became seriously ill and died in December 1722,
leaving a cloud of confusion regarding his successor. The Qing Empire
might have looked strong and stable, but the question of succession
sparked an unprecedented family feud.
The Yongzheng emperor [Yinzhen], Kangxi's fourth son, managed to
succeed him, but would be plagued for the rest of his life by the
suspicion that he had usurped the throne from his fourteenth younger
brother, despite the fact that his own son, the Qianlong emperor, seemed
to have redeemed his ascension. Yongzheng proved to be an ambitious
and astute ruler, seemingly better than many of his brothers. He knew
very well that corruption was rampant, and upon ascending the throne he
quickly eliminated his rivals and took effective measures to curb
corruption. Yongzheng confiscated the property of corrupt officials and
made Manchu princes and Banner men work for a living, but such
measures, as the emperor himself was aware, only served to make him
more enemies. Observing that 'the treasury was several hundred millions
short', and that this deficiency extended to local government and military
coffers, Yongzheng established a central agency to oversee the
collection and distribution of money and provisions. He also created a
most important central agency: the Grand Council, which consolidated
and controlled decision making.
Yongzheng was ruthless toward his own brothers; he would be even
more so to foreigners. Like his father, he retained those with technical
and artistic skills but had little tolerance for the rest. Matteo Ripa,
Kangxi's favourite painter, noticed the difference between father and son:
'A few months after, all the Europeans were summoned to appear
before the Too-yoo-soo, or Board of the Imperial Household, when the
manda-rins informed us in the name of the Governor, who was the
seventeenth brother of the Emperor, that for the future, when they
wanted anything, they must no longer go to the palace, but communicate
with the Board. In consequence of this measure, which has certainly
emanated from the Sovereign, the Europeans were excluded from the
imperial residence, to which they had hitherto been admitted; and from
that day forward no one of them was allowed to enter it unless by his
Majesty's especial permission, as in Scipel's case and my own.'
Missionaries were treated better in Kangxi's time. Many were taken to
see Kangxi upon their arrival, as he was keen to learn about their tech-
nical skills. While some lived in the imperial compound, others were
allowed to walk freely in the various royal palaces, an honour that only
the emperor could bestow. Some even spent hours with Kangxi, who
seemed to enjoy their company, as Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) vividly
remembered:
'The whole Court have been eyewitness (to their great Surprize) of the
private Audiences and Conferences we had duly every day, no body
being admitted to be present, but three or four Eunuchs of the
Empereur's Bed-chamber; where the Chief Subject of our Discourse was
concerning all manner of Sciences, the Manners and Customs, and what
else was worth our Observation in the European, and some other States
of the World. As there was not any Subject, wherewith we used to
entertain this Prince with more particular Satisfaction, than the Glorious
Actions of Lewis the Great, so I can testify it my self, That there was not
any thing of this Nature, in which he took more delight to be inform'd in.
At last, he gave us such ample Marks of his great Esteem, that he would
absolutely command us to sit down near his side; an Honour never
granted before to any Body living, unless to his own Children.'
Yongzheng thought his father was too kind to the foreigners and was not
about to continue in the same vein."
"Yongzheng established rules for those in Beijing, as detailed by Ripa,
and he kept a close eye on the rest through his army of local officials,
who reported to him often and in secret. Yongzheng was suspicious by
nature; he worried about retaliation from missionaries scattered in the
provinces and those in Macao in particular. Many officials, especially
those in the maritime region, shared his concern, as they would have to
deal with the foreigners should they make trouble. Kong Sunxun, the
new Governor-General of Guangdong-Guangxi provinces, wrote to
Yongzheng in his second year (December 1724) about the situation in
Macao:
'Foreigners have been living in Macao for a long time. After I took up
office, I checked the situation with regard to the mixed population and
foreign vessels. There are now three thousand five hundred sixty-seven
foreign men and women there; twenty-five big or small foreign ships,
eighteen of which are old and seven new. There are two thousand five
hundred and twenty four Chinese mouths there.'
He proposed to Yongzheng: 'Those foreigners who came without a
reason should not be allowed to stay; even if they came to trade and
make money, they can't reproduce here and mix with our people'. One of
Sunxun's colleagues, Liang Wenke, was even more worried. 'Over the
years', he wrote, 'their population has grown; we can't rule out evil wills.
We must be careful so we can prevent potential concerns to come true.'
Just as the Dutch authority noticed and worried about the increase of
Chinese merchants and migrants on the island of Java at the same time,
so Chinese officials saw and concerned themselves with the increase of
Europeans in Macao.* Apprehension of the 'other' is common. Many, not
just European merchants and missionaries, but also Chinese outlaws,
frequented or had taken refuge in Macao, and the enclave had grown
significantly. Like the retreat to Taiwan by the Zheng resistance, the
increase in foreigners and foreign vessels in Macao provoked the
anxieties of local and court authorities, but neither the Ming nor the Qing
had a durable policy; when worries arose, regimes reacted with a ban,
and when circumstances or regimes changed, they responded with
relaxation. While some scholar-officials exaggerated the danger from the
foreigners, others knew that the cycle of ban and lift had not deterred
coastal Chinese from departure or homecoming, and bans were in fact
an opportunity for many. Just as Yongzheng was contemplating a
decision regarding the foreigners, a domestic crisis once again emerged
from the coastal provinces, one which demanded a quick solution.
[* A. R. T. Kemasang, 'The 1740 Massacre of Chinese in Java: Curtain
Raiser for the Dutch Plantation Economy', Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars 14, (1982): 61-72.]"
"Rice or Riot
Kangxi's 1717 maritime ban on South Ocean, like those introduced by
emperors before him, outlawed seafaring activities in theory but not in
practice. Many of those who dared to continue their seafaring adventures
would thrive, as the ban meant less competition; the more restrictions the
court imposed, the more innovative local circumvention became. Of
those unable to skirt the new rules, some switched to other livelihoods,
while others lost partial or entire incomes. In times of natural disaster and
bad harvest, this relative decline in wealth would have grave
consequences. Kangxi made an exception and authorised the import of
Siamese rice in 1722, but in order to have real impact Siamese rice ships
would have to come every month and keep coming. Many local officials
were aware of this; some were outspoken about necessary change.
Kong Sunxun made bold suggestions to the Yongzheng emperor in the
first year of his reign, 1723, proposing a lift of the 1717 ban in order to
facilitate the import of rice, but it would take more than just memorials for
Yongzheng to revise his father's policy. Trouble was brewing in these
provinces as his Grand Council sat on the pile of requests from officials.
Posing a challenge to his young mandate, bad news poured in
throughout the first two years of Yongzheng's reign. While the supply of
rice had been stretched to its limit in 1723 and 1724, the spring and
summer of 1725 brought further disaster to the Guangdong region.
Governor-General Kong's deputy Yang Wengan wrote to Yongzheng to
report on the situation in the region: 'Local thugs gathered people and
plundered the government rice depot; they beat up officials and guards.
They also stormed local government offices where the Banner troops are
stationed.' The reason for the shortage of rice and the outbreak of riots,
as Yang elaborated, was bad harvests in previous years and flooding in
eleven counties of the Pearl River delta region in the spring and summer.
If the news from Guangdong was bad, that from Fujian was worse. The
autumn harvest of 1725 was appalling, and that of spring 1726 even
worse. Soon crowds gathered and stormed rice shops and government
depots reserved for emergency and military purposes."