DON BOSCO COLLEGE OF PHILOSOPHY WITH EDUCATION

(An Affiliate College of the Catholic University of Eastern Africa)

A SUMMARY OF THE BOOK, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON BEING AND

ESSENCE.

By Fredrick Oketch
Metaphysics;
Lecturer Rev Dr. Alex Mulongo, sdb.
September 2023, Moshi-Tanzania.
Thomas Aquinas. On Being and Essence. Translated by Armand Maurer. 2nd Edition. (Toronto:
The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1968)
INTRODUCTION

The main topic in Thomas Aquinas' philosophy of being and essence is his exploration of the
nature of existence and what it means for something to be. In his introduction to this work, St.
Thomas does two things. In (1) he states the purpose for writing this treatise. Being and essence
are the starting points of knowledge by the intellect. Therefore, one must guard against making
errors about being and essence; for obviously a single and simple error at the beginning point
easily turns all that follows after into a multiple and complex one.

In (2) he highlights the three main roles of his treatise, each role an attempt to lay the
foundations for guarding against possible errors apropos being and essence. The first role is to
clarify the meaning of the terms “being” and “essence”. The second is to investigate the being
and essence of various types of real things. The third is to determine how the being and the
essence of real things are related to the logical intentions, difference, species and genus. The
third and second roles are treated in alternating order. Instead of completing the second role
before endeavoring on the third, St. Thomas does part of the second role, then part of the third,
then returns to do the other part of the second, etc.

Chapter two of this treatise highlights how essence is found in material things; chapter four how
the essences of material things are related to the logical intentions. Chapter five highlights how
essence is found in separated substances, that is, in the human soul, in the intelligence and the
First Cause. After a review of the way in which essence is found in diverse substances, in
chapter six, St. Thomas considers the relation of the separated substances to the logical
intentions. Chapter seven highlights how essence is found in accidents, and how accidents are
related to the logical intentions.

Therefore, in this work, I intend to highlight the outstanding arguments in St. Thomas Aquinas’
Being and Essence.
ARGUMENT FOR THE THESIS

The Meanings of the Names of Being and Essence

Something is considered a being in two senses: one, which refers to things sorted into ten
categories, and also to signify the truth of a proposition. In the second sense, everything can be
considered a being for which a true affirmative proposition can be formed, even if it doesn't posit
anything in reality. Blindness and the like are not beings in the first sense. The name "essence" is
derived from "being" in the first sense, which signifies the substance of the thing. The essence of
a thing is what makes it what it is, and it is also known as "form" or "nature." The name "nature"
refers to that which can be apprehended by the intellect, while "quiddity" is derived from the
definition of a thing. The essence of a thing is through which and in which it has its being.

The Essence of Material Substances

A substance is a being primarily and without qualification, while an accident is a being only
secondarily. Substance differs from accident in the sense that, a substance has an essence in the
strict and sense while an accident has an essence only somehow with qualification. Substances
are considered to be either simple or composite, with both having their essence. Simple
substances are considered to have a more excellent way of being, since they are the cause of the
simple ones.

In composite substances, form and matter are known components, as are soul and body in man.
However, the essence of a thing cannot be the form alone or the matter alone, as it is the form
that causes this act of being in its own way. The act of being in a composite substance is neither
of the form alone nor of matter alone, but of the composite itself.

The essence, on account of which the thing is denominated a "being," cannot be the form alone
or the matter alone, but has to be both. This is evident in cases of other things composed of
several principles, such as flavors, where the thing is not denominated on account of only one of
those principles that constitute it, but all that constitutes it.

The principle of individuation is matter, and from this follows that the essence, which comprises
both matter and form, is only particular and not universal. Therefore, only designated matter
(matter considered under determinate dimensions), is not included in the definition of man as
such, but in the definition of Socrates, if at all he has a definition. The definition of man includes
non-designated matter, such bones and flesh absolutely, but not this bone and this flesh, which
are the non-designated matter of man.

The Composition of Material Substances

The essence of man and Socrates differ as designated and non-designated, with Socrates being
animality and rationality. The essence of the genus and species differ as designated and non-
designated, with the latter being determined by matter determined by dimensions. The
determination of the species regarding the genus occurs through a constitutive difference, which
is taken from the form of the thing.

The body, in the sense of being a part of an animal, differs from the body in being a genus. The
name "body" can be taken in several senses, such as being in the genus of substance or having a
form on account of which three dimensions can be designated. The genus indeterminately
signifies the whole that is in the species, as it does not signify only matter. The difference
signifies the whole and not only form, as does the species.

The essence of man and Socrates differ only as designated and non-designated, as well as the
essence of the genus and species. The designation of an individual with respect to the species
takes place through matter determined by dimensions, while the designation of the species
regarding the genus occurs through a constitutive difference. The determination or designation of
the species with respect to the genus is not through anything in the essence of the species that
would in no way be in the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the
genus indeterminately.

The name "body" can be taken in several senses, such as being in the genus of substance or
having a nature on account of which three dimensions can be designated in it. However, the
genus indeterminately signifies the whole that is in the species, as it does not signify only matter.
The difference signifies the whole and not only form, as well as the definition and the species.

In summary, the essence of man and Socrates differ only as designated and non-designated, and
the essence of the genus and species are analogous to matter, form, and composite in nature.
The Essence of Material Substance and the Logical Intentions

The concept of essence in material substances is related to notions of genus, species, and
difference. The notion of a universal cannot apply to essence as it is signified as a part, such as
humanity or animality. Avicenna argues that rationality is not a difference, and humanity is not a
species. The notion of genus or species applies to essence as a whole, as it implicitly contains all
that is in the individual. A nature or essence can be considered in two ways: according to its
proper notion and its absolute consideration, or according to its existence in this or that thing.
The nature of man is absolutely considered abstracts from all existence, without excluding any of
them. The notion of universals does not apply to natures taken in this way, as it does not have the
unity and community required for universals.

The concept of human nature is universal, but it is a particular species within the intellect. The
Commentator's argument that there is a single intellect for all humans is mistaken. Human nature
is predicated on Socrates, not Socrates himself. The concept of species is related to the intellect's
action, but it is not an absolute consideration or an accident. The notion of species is an accident
that follows upon the intellect's existence, similar to the concept of genus or difference.

On the Essence of Immaterial Substances

Essence is found in separate substances, such as the soul, intelligences, and the first cause, God.
However, some philosophers argue that these substances are separate from matter and cannot be
composed of form and existence. Forms are intelligible only if they are separated from matter
and its individuating conditions. Intelligent substances must be immune from matter in every
way, and intelligibility is not impeded by corporeal matter.

The essence of a composite substance is not only its form but also both form and matter. The
essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or part, while the essence of a
simple substance is its form only. The essence of a composite substance is not predicated in
every way of the composite thing itself, and the essences of composite things are multiplied by
the division of designated matter.
Essence is distinct from essence, unless there is a unique thing whose quiddity is its own
existence. Intelligences have to have existence besides their form, and an intelligence is form and
existence.

A thing's existence is either due to its own principles or external sources. Intelligence is both
form and existence, with its existence from God. Intelligences have potentiality and actuality,
making them equivocally composed of what is and exists. The possible intellect is related to
intelligible forms, similar to prime matter. The human soul is at the lowest grade among
intellectual substances, with the greatest potentiality. The possible intellect is related to
intelligible forms, attracting material things to share its existence. Other forms have more
potentiality and are closer to matter, but they do not have any operation except for active and
passive qualities and those that dispose matter to receive form.

Essences of Substances in Relation to Logical Intentions

Essence can be found in three ways: in God, created intellectual substances, and in sensible
substances. God is existence only, but he is distinct from every other existence by its purity
itself. He has all perfections of all kinds and is perfect absolutely speaking. In created intellectual
substances, existence is other than essence, and their existence is finite and delimited to the
capacity of the receiving nature.

Intelligences are infinite from below and finite from above, but their nature or quiddity is
subsistent. They can be sorted into genera, species, and differences, but their proper differences
are hidden from us. Genus and difference cannot be taken in the same way in sensible substances
and sensible substances. In immaterial substances, the difference is taken from the whole
quiddity, but their genus is taken from their immateriality. However, these differences do not
have to be accidental, as they correspond to greater or lesser perfection, which does not diversify
species. The diverse grades of perfection among the forms or natures themselves do diversify the
species, as nature proceeds stepwise from plants to animals.

Intellectual substances, composed of matter and form, do not need to be classified based on two
real differences. They are finite, exist from above and below, and have logical intentions.

The Essences of Accidents

Essence is found in accidents, which have an incomplete definition as they cannot be defined
without their subject. Accidents have an accidental act of existence when they come to the
subject, which is not a complete essence. The supervening accident does not cause the act of
existence in which the thing subsists, but it causes a secondary act of existence. Accidents stem
from matter and form, with some primarily stemming from form and others from matter. Some
accidents stem from specific forms, like the masculine and feminine gender in animals, while
others stem from generic forms, like the skin color of a black man. Accidents stem from the
essential principles of the genus or species, and can be found in all individuals that share the
nature of genus or species. Accidents can also be caused by external principles, such as motion,
which are separable from the essence of the thing.

Accidents differ from substances in terms of genus, species, and difference. In substances,
concrete names signify the composite, while abstract names signify the species and genera.
Accidents' genus is derived from their mode of existence, which is predicated in different senses.
Differences are based on the diversity of principles causing them. In abstract forms, the subject is
included as the genus, while in concrete forms, the subject is included. The essence and existence
are found in all substances, except for the First Principle, which is infinitely simple, and the
notion of genus or species does not apply.

THE ANTITHESIS

The ideas of St. Thomas on being and essence have also been subject to critique. Here's an
antithesis that challenges some aspects of Aquinas's views:

Primacy of Essence over Existence

Aquinas asserted that essence (what a thing is) precedes existence (that a thing exists). This
means that a thing's essence defines what it is before it comes into existence. However, this
perspective can be criticized for not adequately accounting for the contingent nature of existence.
In this view, there might be potential entities with well-defined essences that never come into
being, rendering the concept of essence as incomplete without existence.

Limitations of Essentialism
 Aquinas's essentialism, which posits that things have a fixed and unchanging essence, can be
criticized for not accounting for evolution, change, and development over time. It may struggle
to explain how entities evolve or transform while still maintaining a consistent essence.

Inadequate Treatment of Non-Substantial Beings

Aquinas's discussions on being and essence primarily focused on substantial beings (entities
that exist in their own right). This approach might not adequately address non-substantial entities
or abstract concepts, which pose different ontological challenges.

CONCLUSION

In his book on being and essence, Thomas Aquinas outlined the differences between being and
essence and how they relate to one another. Although existence and essence are interdependent
in created entities, Aquinas contends that they are two distinct concepts. Essence is what it
means to be a specific kind of object, and that is what defines essence, whereas being is the act
of existence itself. For instance, humanity is at the core of every human being. Although not all
humans are present at the same moment, they all share the same essence.

The contrast Aquinas makes between being and essence is crucial because it enables him to
explain a variety of aspects of the world, including the likelihood of change and the existence of
God.

Regarding Aquinas' distinction between being and essence, we can understand the possibility of
change since beings can change their qualities without changing their essence. For instance, a
substance is modified when it takes on a new shape while retaining its previous form. This is
feasible because in created substances, being and essence are separate.

The distinction made by Aquinas between being and essence is crucial for comprehending the
character of God. Only God has an existence that is equal to His essence. This suggests that God
simply is; He does not need to be made to exist. God is absolute reality, which explains why. He
is incapable of developing or changing. God does not thus need to be made to exist for, He
simply is.