1

Aquinas on the Union of Body and Soul

Gyula Klima

Hylomorphism “Between” Dualism and Materialism

Recently, there are more and more authors in the current literature on the
philosophy of mind who hail Aristotelian hylomorphism as promising a viable
passage between the flesh-mangling Scylla of dualism, tearing body and soul
apart, and the soulless abyss of the Charybdis of materialism, sinking us into
the depths of senseless, cold matter. I, for one, am guilty as charged, on at
least two counts, on account of two papers (Klima 2007, 2009). But one could
also cite any number of “Analytical Thomists” or even other contemporary
philosophers of mind who are flirting with hylomorphism precisely for this
reason, namely, its promise to overcome the apparent impasse between
materialism (in its various modern guises of physicalism, emergentism,
attribute dualism, etc.) and dualism (substance-dualism), plain and simple.
So, hylomorphism is coming back and not necessarily as just “a sinister
Catholic plot” (to use Howard Robinson’s happy phrase), but as a genuine
theoretical alternative in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, as is
the case with every major conceptual framework, hylomorphism, too, comes
in many shades and colors. In this talk I will attempt to give a more detailed
than usual account of Aquinas’ version of the hylomorphic union of body and
soul. 1
But before talking about what is specific in Aquinas’ account, we should
settle the main points of agreement among those who worked and nowadays
work within a hylomorphist framework, despite all their finer differences.
So, to start with the apparently obvious, all hylomorphists agree that all
material substances are composed of matter and form. I say that this simple
claim is merely apparently obvious, for although it is just a mere explication
of the meaning of the term, providing the meanings of the two Greek terms
involved in it by means of more familiar English terms, when it comes to
taking a serious look at the meanings of the English terms themselves, we may
find the explanation actually more baffling than what it is supposed to explain.
For what is this composition? And what are the things composed? What is
matter? What is form? And what are the material substances they compose?

1
Since this is not my first go at the issue, some passages in this paper are “lifted” from some
of my earlier papers. But it does contain substantial new research, too.

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Well, finally, it seems we have a question that is easy to answer: material
substances are just the things we stumble upon in our ordinary experience,
like rocks, rivers, trees, cats, dogs, horses or humans. But what sense can we
make of the claim that these things are composed, i.e., put together, from form
and matter? Aren’t living things put together from their limbs or organs, and
those from tissues, and those from cells, and those from molecules, and those
from atoms, which is the sort of composition they share even with non-living
things, just as they share with them the lower levels of composition from sub-
atomic particles, at which level we may soon reach the limits of our
knowledge (well, my knowledge for sure), but perhaps not the ultimate limit
of lower levels of organization, until we reach the absolutely elementary
constituents of absolutely everything there is in this universe?
Actually, one way of making sense of hylomorphism is by pointing out that
the composition of matter and form is a radically different kind of composition
from the types of composition listed above, although hylomorphism is
absolutely compatible with these types of composition, provided they are
understood in a certain way. For there is a certain type of understanding of
the composition of the complex structures of material substances from basic
particles through various levels of organization up to the complexity of living
things that is definitely incompatible with hylomorphism, namely,
interpreting this multi-level organization of material substances in terms of
metaphysical atomism.
For on the atomistic interpretation, this multi-level organization is just the
putting together of whatever our actual physics deems to be the most basic
particles, and what our atomistic metaphysics will accordingly regard as the
primary entities, the basic building blocks of reality, and will regard
everything else as just a combination, an organized, structured collection of
these primary entities and primary units of reality. 2 By contrast,
hylomorphists assert that the primary units of reality are just primary
substances, such as the material substances listed above, while not denying
that these primary units do have some intrinsic complexity, in fact, various
types of complexity, depending on how we distinguish their constitutive parts.
Hylomorphism vs. Atomism
So, one way of making sense of the explication of the common ground of all
sorts of hylomorphism is by pointing out hylomorphism’s contrast with

2
Of course, the guiding principle here is the Aristotelian idea of the convertibility of being
and unity, to be discussed here in more detail later. But see also Klima (2013). In general, as
I am using these phrases here, a primary unit is something that is counted as one in a process
of counting and relative to which everything else that is not a primary unit is counted as a
secondary unit, which is either a part or a (possibly structured) collection of primary units.

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metaphysical atomism: for atomism, the primary units of reality are some
primitive particles that make up material substances, whereas for
hylomorphism, the primary units are these substances themselves, although
they do have some sub-units, namely, their various sorts of parts. In other
words, for atomism, the primary units of reality are absolutely simple, in
principle indivisible entities and everything else is their combination, owing
their relative unity to the ways in which the primary units are combined. By
contrast, for hylomorphists, the primary units are actually undivided, but
possibly divisible primary substances, containing several sorts of relative sub-
units as their constitutive parts.
As is well-known, Aristotle rejected metaphysical atomism on the grounds
that if atoms are extended, then they are not strictly atoms, i.e., in principle
indivisible units, for then they can at least conceptually3 be divided into really
distinct quantitative parts; whereas if they are point-like, unextended entities,
then they can never make up extended bodies. Thus, he opted for
hylomorphism, which does not identify the primary units of physical reality
with indivisible units, but allows them to be complex, structured units, which
have both several sorts of parts or relative sub-units resulting from the
(conceptual, not physical) division of the primary units, like the fractions of
the natural number one (halves, thirds, etc.), and several sorts of relative
super-units, like natural numbers, the multitudes measured by the natural
number one, resulting from the combination, organization or any sort of
collection of the primary units, just as armies are the ordered, organized
collections of soldiers, etc. It is against the background of these general,
preliminary considerations about the metaphysical notions of being and unity
that the further details and refinements of the medieval hylomorphist tradition
arise.
Given that within this tradition the primary units are not indivisible, but have
some intrinsic complexity on account of the relative sub-units making them
up, which is the clearest especially in the case of the organic units we call
living things, medieval hylomorphists devised various ways of accounting for
the different levels of organization found within living organisms, based not
so much on structure, as on function. For of course when we are

3
By saying that the parts of a material substance are conceptually divided, it is not implied
that the parts so divided are merely conceptually distinct (i.e., that they are one and the same
in reality, but merely conceived in different ways), for of course my left and right sides are
merely conceptually divided as long as they are not (God forbid!) physically separated, but
they are still really distinct, insofar as they are not the same (the one is not the other and vice
versa) regardless of whether anyone considers this fact or not. As will be clear later, however,
that they are not the same in reality does not mean either that they are two distinct entities or
two real beings.

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distinguishing sub-units within a unit by conceptually dividing it, we may do
so in a number of different ways, depending on the basis of our division. Thus,
we may divide a horse in any old way, say, into its left ear and the rest, or its
left and right side, but also, “more naturally”, into its various limbs or organs,
or even into such structurally less easily identifiable sub-systems as its
immune system, or its nutritive, reproductive or cognitive systems.
Sometimes, indeed, most of the time, we may be totally ignorant as to what
it is that enables something to perform some function. But that would
certainly not prevent us from giving it a name, usually deriving the name from
the name of that function. So, for instance, when we talk about an organism’s
nutritive system, we are naming it not on the basis of what it is, but on the basis
of what it does, namely, nutrition. However, we do not want to talk about what
it does, but what it is, so we are just naming it from what it does, but intend
to give the name to or impose the name on the thing that does the nutrition.
Of course, this is just the good old scholastic distinction between a quo and ad
quod nomen imponitur, i.e., from which and on which a name is imposed, the
classic example of which was provided by Isidore of Seville’s somewhat
dubious etymology of ‘lapis’ (a stone, i.e., what a stone is), as ‘laedens
pedem’ (something hurting the foot, i.e., what a stone does, [Aquinas, ST I,
q. 13 a. 2 ad 2].). But it is crucial in this context to keep this in mind, because
when we are talking about the soul as the principle of life, or when we are
talking about forms in general, we are naming and identifying items in our
discourse in this way most of the time. Thus, we may not know what any form
mentioned in some medieval metaphysical argument is, i.e., we may not have
the essential definition of the item we are talking about, nevertheless, we can
still name it and identify it on the basis of knowing what it does or can do. In
fact, this is the way we usually identify and classify primary substances
themselves: Aquinas famously complained that “no philosopher could have
ever completely investigated the nature of a single fly” (In Symbolum
Apostolorum, pr), 4 yet this fact did not prevent him from naming and
identifying the kind of creature he was complaining about. And even today,
when we are certainly better off at least with regard to the geneticists’ favorite
pet, the common fruit fly, this is precisely how we use its “scientific name”,
Drosophila Melanogaster, which comes from its dew-loving habit and dark
belly (whereas we obviously do not want to name by this name just any dark-
bellied dew-lover).
Now, with this semantic observation in mind about the imposition and
application of our terms, we may say that originally, before “the Ockhamist

4
“… nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare naturam unius muscae”.

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linguistic turn”, when a medieval hylomorphist was talking about a form as a
component of a material substance, all he meant was whatever there was in
the thing that made a predicate true of that thing, whereas the matter of the
thing was taken to be the subject that the form enformed5 in such a way as to
make the predicate true of the thing thus configured. So, for instance, whether
or not we know what it is in this gas that enables it to produce water when it
is burnt in air, we can call it ‘hydrogen’ (“water generator”), denominating
it from what it does, but intending to name what it is, signifying in it the form,
whatever it is, that enables it to perform this characteristic operation. And the
same goes for all other predicates.
Accordingly, when it comes to living things, that is, animate beings, they are
called ‘animate’ (or ‘animatum’ in Latin), precisely because they have the
form signified by this predicate, called ‘anima’, that is, the soul, which is the
animating, life-giving principle of the living thing, whatever it is. And since
for a living thing to live is for it to be, absolutely speaking, that is,
substantially, and not just to be somehow, that is, accidentally, a soul must be
a form of a living thing on account of which it substantially exists, that is, its
substantial form. Accordingly, if existence is the actuality of every form (cf.
esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, ST I. 3.4 co.), then form, in turn,
can be described metaphysically (to complement the previously given
semantic description as the significate of a common term in an individual) as
the determination of the way of being (modus essendi) of each kind of thing,
determining what this kind of thing can or cannot do.
Hylomorphic “Pluralism” and the Organization of Matter
However, given that such a substantial form comes to be known through the
observable vital functions a living organism essentially has, such as nutrition,
reproduction, sensation or even intellectual cognition (depending on the kind
of organism it is), the names imposed upon each form accounting for the
organism’s ability to perform these functions may signify the same, unique
substantial form in each individual organism, or they may signify distinct
substantial forms accounting for these functions at the different
organizational levels of matter alluded to earlier. This is one way of putting
the famous medieval problem of the plurality or unicity of substantial forms. 6

5
I am reviving here this obsolete verb to distinguish a form enforming matter, actualizing it
in real being, from an intention informing a cognitive subject, actualizing the object of its
cognition in intentional being. Cf. https://www.academia.edu/38437877/Two_Recent_
Lectures_on_Form_Intention_Information_and_Art.pdf
6
For an excellent historical summary, see Callus (1967–1979).

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In fact, putting the issue this way actually has direct bearing on the
contemporary “analytical hylomorphist project”: for the different levels of
the organization of matter we all learned about in high school, especially in
living things, may now seem to be directly identifiable with the scholastic
“pluralists’” different substantial forms in the same individual, given
contemporary hylomorphists’ tendency to explain the scholastic notion of
substantial form as the organization, configuration or structure of matter.
For it’s not like some analytic philosophers suddenly discovered that humans
were composed of matter and form, rather than from subatomic particles,
atoms, molecules organized into organelles, cells, tissues and complete
biological human bodies, as they were told in high school. Instead, having
realized that Aristotle’s and/or Aquinas’ hylomorphic conception of the
ontological status of the human mind may offer a way out of the apparently
“bad alternatives” one encounters in contemporary philosophy of mind, these
philosophers figured that this conception may even be made compatible with
“the high school story” of the organization of matter. So, arguing for their
version of hylomorphism, they usually start with the implied task of making
the Aristotelian idea more palatable to those who would otherwise think it is
just one of those old wives’ tales belonging together with astrology and
phlogiston in some dusty corner of the museum of failed scientific ideas.
Accordingly, such authors first of all assure their readers that they know all
the high school/pop science stuff we all agree on, but also that the language
of hylomorphism may just be superimposed on that talk without further ado,
for while we talk about all these different levels of the organization of matter
in the first place, the hylomorphist talk about “matter” is just talk about this
“stuff” that everything is made of, whereas when the hylomorphist talks about
“form” it is just another way of talking about these “configurations” (Stump
2003) or “structures” (Koslicki 2008; Jaworski 2011) of this “stuff” we are
all familiar with from high school/pop science.
There are, however, several problems with this approach. After all, merely
replacing the Norman word “matter” with the synonymous Saxon word
“stuff” is just an instance of explaining the same by the same, which is helpful
only to the linguistically challenged.
Furthermore, explaining form as the configuration or structure of this stuff
may give one the impression that it is basically just the arrangement of the
particles that make up the matter of the thing; so, it is just an “inner shape”
of how the particles of matter are arranged in constituting the macroscopic
thing we are talking about. So, and this would be the relevant analogy, just
like the visible and tangible form of the thing is its outer shape, determining
its external limits, the substantial form of the thing is its “inner shape”
determining the interrelations of its particles. However, this understanding of

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the description might be taken to imply that the determination is just the
reverse of what it is supposed to be: it is not the form that determines how the
particles are arranged, but rather it is the arrangement of the particles that
determines what form the thing has, since the form of the thing is just this
arrangement itself.
Indeed, on this understanding it becomes a vital issue to understand how the
particles, their arrangement, and the form are related to each other. Is the form
anything over and above the arrangement of the particles? If not, then what
do we gain, besides the vain attempt at reviving an obsolete lingo, by talking
about this arrangement or organization of matter as a form? But if it is
something other than this arrangement, then what the heck is it, and how can
it act on the arrangement of the particles?
Finally, if the notion of a substantial form of a thing is defined as nothing but
the arrangement of the particles of matter, or something else that mysteriously
determines this arrangement “from inside”, as it were, then this understanding
of the notion of a substantial form ab ovo excludes the possibility of what the
scholastics referred to as subsistent forms, that is, forms that do not enform
any chunk of matter.
Indeed, on top of all these general difficulties, we run into another, more
specific difficulty contrary to Aquinas’ position, even with regard to the
forms of material substances themselves: for if form is the structure of matter,
then this structure is precisely what determines what this “stuff” is organized
into; so, a substantial form would seem to be the same as the essence of a
material substance, which Aquinas explicitly denies.
So, when Aquinas says, siding with Avicenna contra Averroes, that the
essence of a material substance is not only its form but somehow comprises
both matter and form, then he is making an important distinction between two
different types of mereological divisions of the same material substance into
its principles. For even if Aquinas is willing to call the essence or nature of
material substances their form, when it really matters (as in the context of the
theology of resurrection, for example), he draws a strict distinction between
the “form of the whole” (forma totius), which he identifies with the essence
of the thing (such as Socrates’ humanity), and the “form of the part” (forma
partis), which is the single substantial form of the thing (such as Socrates’
soul) immediately enforming its prime matter. Without going into further
detail, it should be clear, however, that both a substantial form and an essence
are for Aquinas just differently distinguished parts of the same primary unit,
namely, a composite primary substance. (For more detail, see Klima 2002d.)
So, these forms, whether we are talking about the form of the whole or about
the form of the part, are material for Aquinas not because they are the

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“structure” or “configuration” of matter, for structure or configuration (in any
sense whatsoever), as we shall see, for him actually presupposes the
actualization of matter by a substantial form, determining its modus essendi,
but because their act of being is one and the same act that is had by the
composite as well as by its matter (whether its designated matter, the
counterpart of the form of the whole, or its prime matter, the counterpart of
its form of the part). Thus, on Aquinas’ understanding, even a material
substantial form cannot be identified with the “structure” of this matter,
because matter can have any structure at all, only if it is already actualized by
a substantial form determining its way of being, which in turn demands a
certain structure. In fact, we can see Aquinas’ idea best contrasted with the
approach of trying to identify substantial forms with the structures of matter
at its different levels of organization (which would correspond to the
scholastic “pluralists’” multiple substantial forms in the same individual), if
we take a closer look at his main argument for the thesis of the unicity of
substantial forms.
Aquinas on the Unicity of Substantial Forms
The argument may be reconstructed as follows. A substantial form f of a
substance s is such that for s to be is for f to be, i.e., such that the existence
(esse, or actus essendi, act of being) of the form is the same as the existence
of the substance, for otherwise the form is accidental (since for an accidental
form to be is not for the substance it enforms to be, but it is for the substance
to be somehow, whence an accidental form may come and go, leaving the
existence of the substance unaffected). Now suppose s has or acquires another
substantial form, say, f’, which is an entity distinct from f. Then the existence
of f cannot be the same as the existence of f’ [that is to say, e(f) ≠ e(f’),
denoting by ‘e(x)’ the esse of x, whatever entity x is], because, if they are
distinct entities, then each must have its own existence, on account of which
each is denominated ‘an entity’ (ens), distinct from that of the other. However,
the existence (esse) of f is the same as that of s [that is to say, e(f) = e(s)],
since f is a substantial form of s, whereas the existence of f’ is distinct from
that of f; therefore, the existence of f’ cannot be the same as the existence of
s [that is, e(s) ≠ e(f’)].

(1) e(f) ≠ e(f’)

(2) e(f) = e(s)
(3) e(s) ≠ e(f’) [by SI from (1) and (2)

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Consequently, f’ can be only an accidental form of s, contrary to our original
assumption, namely, that f’ was another substantial form of s, whence the
assumption must be false. Therefore, no substance can have two or more
substantial forms. But if a substance exists, then it has at least one substantial
form (since its existence is the same as the existence of its substantial form);
so, it must have exactly one substantial form. 7
To be sure, Aquinas’ argument was not taken to be a knock-down argument
by others, mostly Augustinians, who would not buy into Aquinas’s
assumptions about the relationships among forms, their acts of existence and
the acts of existence of the substance they enform. 8 However, if we properly
explicate and understand these assumptions, they may be seen to become not
only acceptable, but even plausible enough to support Aquinas’ argument
and its conclusion.
The first, obvious, and universally endorsed assumption is the principle of the
convertibility of being and unity, namely, the Aristotelian thesis that every
being is one, i.e., a unit, and every unit is a being. However, we must note
Aquinas’ specific understanding of the Aristotelian thesis, namely, that the
convertibility of the two predicates (namely, ‘being’ and ‘one’ or ‘unit’)
means that they signify the same in reality and they differ in their concepts,
insofar as the concept of ‘one’ adds to the concept of being the connotation
of indivision (unum est ens indivisum). 9

7
See, e.g., SN2 d. 18, q. 1, a. 2 co. “… cum omnis forma det aliquod esse, et impossibile sit
unam rem habere duplex esse substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substantialis adveniens
materiae det sibi esse substantiale, quod secunda superveniens det esse accidentale...”
8
For more on this, see Klima (2011a).
9
Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 24 q. 1 a. 3 co. [...]-14 Unde ens et unum convertuntur, sicut quae sunt
idem re, et differunt per rationem tantum, secundum quod unum addit negationem super ens.
Unde si consideretur ratio unius quantum ad id quod addit supra ens, non dicit nisi
negationem tantum: et eadem ratione multitudo non addit supra res multas nisi rationem
quamdam, scilicet divisionis. Sicut enim unum dicitur ex eo quod non dividitur, ita multa
dicuntur ex eo quod dividuntur; prima autem ratio divisionis, secundum quam aliquid ab
aliquo distinguitur, est in affirmatione et negatione; et ideo multitudo dicit in ratione sua
negationem, secundum scilicet quod multa sunt quorum unum non est alterum: et hujusmodi
divisionis hoc modo acceptae in ratione multitudinis, negatio importatur in ratione unius. Cf.
Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 10 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 1. unitas rei consequitur esse ipsius: partes autem
alicujus homogenei continui ante divisionem non habent esse actu, sed potentia tantum; et
ideo nulla illarum habet unitatem propriam in actu; unde actu non est accipere ipsarum
numerum, sed potentia tantum. Et propter hoc forma quae est tota in toto tali, et tota in
partibus ejus, non dicitur ante divisionem continui esse ibi pluries actu, sed solum potentia:
sed post divisionem multiplicatur secundum actum, sicut patet de anima in animalibus
anulosis. Et similiter corpus Christi ante divisionem hostiae, quamvis sit totum sub qualibet
parte hostiae, non est tamen pluries actu sub partibus illis, sed tantum potentia.

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Accordingly, one being, an ens, which is something habens esse, is
denominated a being, as well as one thing, a unit, from its esse, its act of being
(actus essendi). Therefore, not one being can have two acts of being, because
two acts of being would make two beings (entia).10
But does the reverse also hold? Couldn’t one and the same act of being be
had by two or more entities denominated beings from the same act of being?
As we could see, Aquinas’ answer is affirmative: Aquinas allows that a
substance and a substantial form have the same esse, nevertheless, he
carefully distinguishes between the ways in which each possesses the same
esse: the substance has it as that which is [ut id quod est], whereas an inherent
form has it as that by which something (namely, the substance) is [ut id quo
aliquid est].11

10
Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 6 q. 2 a. 2 co. “Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo
esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens: unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae
aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum.”
11
IIIª q. 17 a. 2 co. “Respondeo dicendum quod, quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una
hypostasis, necesse est quod ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem
pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum. Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et
ad naturam, ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id
quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo
quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo. Est
autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse
personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed
secundum quid, sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non inquantum est Socrates, sed
inquantum est albus. Et huiusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel
persona, aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus. Sed illud
esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se impossibile est in una
hypostasi vel persona multiplicari, quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse. Si
igitur humana natura adveniret filio Dei, non hypostatice vel personaliter, sed accidentaliter,
sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse, unum quidem secundum quod
est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo. Sicut in Socrate ponitur aliud esse secundum
quod est albus, aliud secundum quod est homo, quia esse album non pertinet ad ipsum esse
personale Socratis. Esse autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum
pertinet ad unam personam Socratis, et ideo ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate.
Et si contingeret quod, post constitutionem personae Socratis, advenirent Socrati manus vel
pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret Socrati aliud esse, sed
solum relatio quaedam ad huiusmodi, quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum secundum ea
quae prius habebat, sed etiam secundum ea quae postmodum sibi adveniunt. Sic igitur, cum
humana natura coniungatur filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non
accidentaliter, consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum
esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam,
ut scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed
etiam humanam.”

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In any case, in possession of this distinction Aquinas can coherently hold that
no two inherent forms can share the same act of being, for then two entities
would have to possess the same act of being in the same way, which is
precisely the absurdity to which pluralists would have to commit themselves.
So, Aquinas maintains that even if a substance and its substantial form can
share the same esse, this is only because they do not have it in the same way,
whence they are not entities in the same sense, countable together in the same
order of entities. 12 Accordingly, the pluralists are implicitly committed not
only to the absurdity that one substance, one entity, consists of several entities
that share its esse (given that they are all supposed to be the substantial forms
of the same substance), but also that these several entities each is one entity
in the same sense, denominated ‘being’ from the same one esse. However,
Aquinas’ conception solves this problem by positing just one substantial
form, which therefore shares the esse of the substance it enforms, and yet it
does not make with the substance two entities, because they are entities in
different senses, having the same esse differently. 13
Not so fast, one may object, though. Aquinas famously argued that the human
intellective soul, on account of the immateriality of its intellect is not only a
form inherent in matter, existing as that by which the substance is, but also
the subsisting substance underlying the immaterial operations of the intellect,
existing as that which is. So, the human soul according to Aquinas is a being
not only in the sense in which a form is, but also in the same sense in which

12
Quaestiones Quodlibetales 9, 2, 2, in corp.: “… esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est
ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic esse non attribuitur nisi
rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem
genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo ut sicut ei quod proprie
et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere
est, dicitur substantia in i Physic. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum
alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut
ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse alio modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur
esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et
vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Unum
scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi
substantiale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod est
esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale; ut esse album attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur:
Socrates est albus.”
13
De potentia, q. 3 a. 8 co. “Forma enim naturalis non dicitur univoce esse cum re generata.
Res enim naturalis generata dicitur esse per se et proprie, quasi habens esse, et in suo esse
subsistens; forma autem non sic esse dicitur, cum non subsistat, nec per se esse habeat; sed
dicitur esse vel ens, quia ea aliquid est; sicut et accidentia dicuntur entia, quia substantia eis
est vel qualis vel quanta, non quod eis sit simpliciter sicut per formam substantialem: unde
accidentia magis proprie dicuntur entis, quam entia, ut patet in Metaphys. Unumquodque
autem factum, hoc modo dicitur fieri quo dicitur esse.”

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the composite of form and matter is. But whenever x and y are both F in the
same sense and x is not identical with y, then they constitute two F’s, not one.
Therefore, if the human soul and the human being whose soul it is are beings
in the same sense, then they are two beings in the same sense, not one, which
seems to be a classic case of substance dualism, which Aquinas rejects.
However, this objection is fallacious, because it relies on a principle that
easily leads to paradox. For clearly, the principle as quoted is valid only if the
variables it uses are of the same type, ranging over items of the same type.
But just because the items in question are F in the same sense, that may not
guarantee that they are of the same type. 14 After all, just because the halves,
thirds or quarters of a cake are all parts of the same cake in the same sense,
you cannot add them up and say that the two halves and three thirds and four
quarters of the cake add up to nine parts altogether, because if based on the
divisions just listed you would promise to hand out nine slices, then you
would run out of cake after handing out the first two halves, leaving the
remaining seven promised slices undelivered. Indeed, you cannot say either
that because the cake mentally carved up in two halves is a whole cake and
the totally intact cake you don’t even think about cutting up is another whole
cake (because it is undivided even mentally, and what is divided cannot be
the same as what is undivided, as someone might wistfully think); therefore,
you have two cakes. 15
Furthermore, by the same token, you could “prove” that a finite line section
is equal in length to an infinite line. For the section has two halves, and three
thirds, etc., which are line sections in the same sense as the original. But the
original is infinitely divisible, so it contains infinitely many finite line
sections. But infinitely many finite line sections add up to an infinite line;
ergo, etc. Of course, you can always map a finite line onto an infinite one on
account of the equal (continuum) cardinality of their points. But that just goes
to show that this equal cardinality is not the same as the equality of lengths,
which could be “magically” generated by adding up the infinity of finite lines
contained in a finite line.
In general, whenever we are counting units together, we have to keep in mind
that the process of counting, i.e., adding up units to yield a number of units,
presupposes a principle of division and identification of the units to be added
together. After all, unum est ens indivisum, what is one, a unit, is an undivided

14
See Russell’s paradox in set theory or the analogous impredicable paradox in logic, which
both result from lumping together items under the same common term, such as ‘set’ or
‘property’, and both demand some type theory for their solution.
15
For more on this, see Klima (2018b)

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being, and any divisible unit can be divided in any old ways to yield some
sub-units, which, however, are not on a par with the unit of which they are
the sub-units. 16 So, if the units are of different orders or types, carved out
based on different principles of division and identification, we cannot just add
them up to yield a number of items without further ado. 17 As Aquinas himself
succinctly put it: pars non ponit in numerum contra totum – the part does not
constitute a number with the whole.18 Therefore, even if the human soul is a
being in the same sense as the whole human being, of which it is an essential
part, sharing with it the same undivided act of being, the soul and the human
being still do not constitute two beings in the same sense, but one being, one
substance, of which the soul is a substantial part.
So, form, matter and the substance they constitute, as well as any of the
substance’s integral parts share the same substantial act of being [esse]
determined by the form. Yet each of these items has this same act differently:
the substance has it as that which is (quod est), the form as that by which (quo
est) the substance is, and, we might add, the matter as the subject in which (in
quo) this form is.
The Hylomorphism of Aquinas
In any case, one consequence of Aquinas’ interpretation of his unicity-thesis
is that all the different organizational structures of matter of a material
substance they constitute presuppose, and so, cannot be identical with the
single substantial form actualizing this chunk of matter, determining the way
it is, and thereby further determining its material powers realized by the
structures required by its characteristic functions, i.e., the things it can do or
undergo. Thus, just as a horse-soul organizes matter in such a way as to
produce legs in this matter and a fish-soul in such a way as to produce fins,
so, at a “lower” level, it determines the chemical and organic structure of their
respective reproductive systems, which is why one cannot generate the other.
Well, so far so good, it might seem, but what is this mystical determination
or organization of matter that the soul is supposed to do? Why couldn’t the
soul, at least an animal or plant soul, be just the same as this organization of
matter, and so, why couldn’t the direction of the determination be just the

16
For more on this, see Klima (2000).
17
Otherwise we could end up with the story of the facetious job applicant boasting about the
hundreds of books he authored, on the basis that his thesis was printed in two hundred copies,
or with the story of Geach’s cheeky schoolboy listing at the request of his teacher five
animals they saw in the zoo thusly: zebra, giraffe, and three monkeys, etc., etc., the examples
could be multiplied ad nauseam.
18
Contra impugnantes, pars 2 cap. 2 ad 3.

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opposite, not the principle of organization determining the components, but
rather the nature and properties of the components determining the principle
of organization? Why should this determination be “top-down” (a horse-soul
requiring these organic structures), so to speak, rather than “bottom-up”
(these organic structures constituting a horse-soul)?
Again, in the answer to this question a great deal depends on the
understanding of what happens with the components in a genuine union,
forming a genuine unit as opposed to the mere congeries of several distinct
(no matter how closely intertwined) units. For if the components of a
composite whole are the same as they were before they were composed, i.e.,
if they existed before entering the composition and preserve their existence
and identity in the composite, then the composite is a mere aggregate of
replaceable units, like a computer (no matter how complex and tightly built it
may seem) is a mere aggregate of replaceable modules (such as IC cards). On
the other hand, if the components of a newly generated composite, that is, the
functionally and/or structurally distinguishable components it is made of
(what the scholastics called materia in qua), do not exist in the composite in
the same way they existed independently before their composition, and the
components the composite is made from (what the scholastics called materia
ex qua) do not preserve their own actual existence and identity upon entering
into composition with each other, then the newly generated composite is a
genuine primary unit, with its own single substantial existence, in which the
components have only some relative unity, but their function and structure is
determined by what and how they contribute to the structure and function of
the whole. The substantial form of such a composite whole is whatever it is
on account of which such a genuine unit is capable of preserving its existence,
unity and identity over time.
But what is this form? If it is anything over and above the unified structure
of the components of the whole composite, then where is it in the whole and
how does it exert its “preservative” function? On the other hand, if it is not
anything over and above the unified structure of the components of the whole
composite, then shouldn’t it, again, be just the spatio-temporal configuration
of the components, extended along with their extension, configuring them
part-by-part?
As we could see, for Aquinas, a soul, the unique substantial form of a living
thing (whether plant, brute or human) enforms the whole living body; after
all, it is the principle of life; so wherever there is life in living organisms and
their parts (such as organs, tissues, cells and their components, whatever
those are), there is the soul. Indeed, it is one and the same soul and the same
whole soul, the substantial form of the living body, directly enforming prime

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matter that actualizes this structure. So, it is the same whole soul that is in
every part of the living body.
However, when Aquinas says that it is the whole soul that is in every part of
the body, he does not mean the totality of any extended parts, but rather the
totality of the essence of the soul, i.e., whatever it is that is capable of
maintaining this structure and enables its essential functions: “when we say
that the whole soul is in any part of the body, we mean by ‘whole’ the totality
of perfection of its nature, and not some totality of parts” (1SN d. 8, q. 5, a. 3,
ad 1).19 But that whole essence of the soul surely permeates the whole body in
its every quantitative part, giving it its existence, that is, its life, unity and
identity.
In fact, this goes for all material substantial forms, 20 except that the substantial
forms that are souls enable essential functions that are self-and-species-
sustaining vital functions, such as metabolism, reproduction, sensation and
even intellection. However, it is only in this last case, in the case of the
intellective, human soul that Aquinas would hesitate to call the substantial
form enabling this function, namely, the intellective soul, a material form. But
not because he would think it is unextended, for in his view all forms are per
se unextended, except dimensive (extensive) quantity itself (Super De
Trinitate, pars 2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3); 21 rather, for him, the immateriality of the
intellective soul would consist in the way it possesses its existence, which is
also the existence of the body it enforms and the existence of the composite
whole, namely, human life.
For Aquinas argues that thinking, the characteristic function of the human
intellect, the power that enables us to think, is an activity that cannot take

19
“Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicimus totam animam esse in qualibet parte
corporis, intelligimus per totum perfectionem naturae suae, et non aliquam totalitatem
partium; totum enim et perfectum est idem, ut dicit Philosophus.” Cf. Aristotle, PHYS III, 6,
207a13, 4. See also De spirit. creat. a. 4, co; ST Iª q. 76 a. 8.
20
See 4SN d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3 co. “tota forma substantialis ligni est in qualibet parte ejus,
quia totalitas formae substantialis non recipit quantitatis totalitatem, sicut est de totalitate
formarum accidentalium quae fundantur in quantitate, et praesupponunt ipsam”
21
“Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis
ultima divisione divisum. Nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis
nisi quantitas. Unde dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem individuationis
secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis.” Together with the
quote in the previous note, this passage clearly entails the claim made here. For further
discussion, see Klima (2006).

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place in a material medium, i.e., it cannot be the activity of any material
organ, such as the brain. 22
Whether or not we accept Aquinas’ arguments for this conclusion, we may
still appreciate the consistency of the resulting non-materialistic and non-
dualistic solution he provides on the basis of this conclusion. The intellect,
being a nonmaterial power, cannot inhere in matter, but being a power, and
not a substance (pace Averroes), it must inhere in a subject. So, it inheres in
the intellective soul itself as its subject. However, the soul itself is a form
enforming matter, for which to be is for it to enform matter. But being the
subject of an immaterial power, it is also a substance, for which to be it does
not have to enform anything. So, the existence of the human soul is not
necessarily identical with the existence of the body, even if it actually is.
Thus, it is actually the truly, genuinely substantial form of the body, but it is
not dependent for its ongoing existence and activity upon enforming the
body; therefore, it is naturally capable of surviving the body.
But no matter how it is in the special case of the intellective soul, if it is the
whole soul that is in every part of the whole body, doesn’t this mean that
Aquinas is committed the conclusion that the leg of a horse is a horse? Indeed,
just how is one and the same entity, the soul of a horse, is supposed to be in
two distinct places, both in its leg and in its ear? But if it is there in both
places, since the union of a horse-soul with matter anywhere produces a
horse, does this mean that the ear of a horse is a horse and the leg of a horse
is a horse as well?
Actually, at one point, Aquinas explicitly raises the problem:
… an animal is composed of a soul and a body. If, therefore, the whole soul
was in any part of the body, then any part of the body would be an animal,
just as any part of fire is fire. (1SN d. 8 q. 5 a. 3 obj. 2) 23
In his reply, however, he points out that a soul, being the substantial form of
an organic, living body, requires (or rather causes) an organic structure in the
body it enforms, which cannot be realized except in an organic whole:
… something perfectible has to be proportionate to its perfection. Although
the soul is a simple form, nevertheless, it is virtually multiple, insofar as its
essence causes several powers, and so a proportionate body has to have
differently structured parts to receive its diverse powers, which is why the

22
For a detailed discussion of what I take to be the most effective of Aquinas’ arguments for
this claim, along with a discussion of Buridan’s critique of this argument, see Klima (2015)
and (2018a).
23
“Praeterea, animal est quod est compositum ex anima et corpore. Si igitur anima esset in
qualibet parte corporis tota, quaelibet pars corporis esset animal, sicut quaelibet pars ignis
est ignis. Ergo etc.” Cf. De spirit. creat. a. 4 obj. 2.

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soul is said to be the act of an organic body. Thus, since not just any part
of an animal has this sort of structural diversity, it cannot be said to be an
animal. However, less perfect souls, which have a lesser diversity of
powers, also perfect a body that is sort of uniform both in the whole and in
the parts; hence, the actual division of the parts results in actually distinct
souls in those parts, as it happens in the case of plants and annular worms.
But even in the case of these animals, the parts cannot be said to be
animals before their division, except potentially; just as any part of
something continuous is only potentially something; whence not even a
part of fire is actually something, but only after its division. (1SN d. 8 q. 5
a. 3 ad 2) 24
Accordingly, Aquinas says that although the whole soul is in the whole body
and in any of its parts with regard to its essence, nevertheless, it is not the
whole soul in any part of the body with regard to its powers:
Therefore, if the soul is considered as a form and an essence, then it is in
any part of the body as a whole; however, if it is considered as a mover by
its various powers, then it is whole in the whole, but it is in diverse parts
with respect to its diverse powers. (1SN d. 8, q. 5, a. 3, co.) 25
Indeed, as he puts it in a parallel passage talking specifically about the human
soul:
Thus, taking the totality of the soul with regard to its powers, it is not only
not wholly in any part of the body, but it is not even wholly in the whole
body, because the power of the soul exceeds the capacity of the body. (De
spirit. creat. a. 4 co.) 26
So far, so good, one might say, but just how can the whole soul with regard to
its essence be in the whole body and in any of its parts at the same time? Even

24
“Ad secundum dicendum, quod perfectibile debet esse proportionatum suae perfectioni.
Anima autem quamvis sit forma simplex, est tamen multiplex in virtute, secundum quod ex
ejus essentia oriuntur diversae potentiae; et ideo oportet corpus proportionatum sibi habere
partes distinctas ad recipiendum diversas potentias; unde etiam anima dicitur esse actus
corporis organici. Et quia non quaelibet pars animalis habet talem distinctionem, non potest
dici animal. Sed animae minus nobiles quae habent parvam diversitatem in potentiis,
perficiunt etiam corpus quod est quasi uniforme in toto et partibus; et ideo ad divisionem
partium efficiuntur diversae animae actu in partibus, sicut etiam in animalibus annulosis et
plantis. Non tamen ante divisionem in hujusmodi animalibus quaelibet pars dicitur animal,
nisi in potentia; sicut nullius continui pars est nisi in potentia: unde nec pars ignis est aliquid
actu, nisi post divisionem.”
25
“Unde si consideretur anima prout est forma et essentia, est in qualibet parte corporis tota;
si autem prout est motor secundum potentias suas, sic est tota in toto, et in diversis partibus
secundum diversas potentias.”
26
“Unde sic accepta totalitate animae secundum virtutem, non solum non est tota in qualibet
parte, sed nec tota in toto: quia virtus animae capacitatem corporis excedit, ut supra dictum
est.”

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if we can grant that its visual power is in the eyes, optical nerves and optical
cortex, and its auditory power is in the ear, etc., how can one and the same
item, the essence of the soul be both in the head and the foot, up and down at
the same time?
Aquinas provides an answer in terms of an elaborate set of distinctions with
regard to how something can be said to be somewhere at all, depending on
what kind of a thing we are talking about. In the first place (no pun intended),
he establishes that being somewhere is being determined to some place, which
happens by a thing’s being applied to some place somehow.
This happens either (1) by position, or (2) by contact, or (3) by form, or (4)
by some operation. In the first way a point in a line, for example, is in its place
by its position. In the second way a body is in a place by its surface being in
contact with another body or other bodies containing it, which we can simply
call “the container”, where the inner surface of the container circumscribes
the surface of the contained body, whence the place of the contained body is
nothing but the inner surface of the container. It is in this way that something
is strictly in a place part by part. In the third way any form is in its subject,
giving it an act of being, esse. Finally, in the fourth way, a thing is applied to
a place by its activity producing its effect in that place, which Aquinas also
relates to the second way by saying that in the second way the contact in
question can be either contact properly speaking, namely, the surface of one
body touching another’s or others’, or metaphorically, when we say that
something saddening touches us, or that the sunrays touch the stone they
warm up. It is in this metaphorical way that a spiritual agent can be said to
apply its power somewhere, and thereby to be there. But this, again, can
happen in several ways, depending on the ways a spiritual agent gives being
(esse) to its effect somewhere. In the first way, the agent can give some
accidental being, but not substantial being, as when an angel moves a planet.
In the second way, the agent gives substantial being to its effect, but not its
own, which is the way God is everywhere in his creation. Finally, in the third
way, the agent gives substantial being to its effect, namely, an act of
substantial being which at the same time is its own, and this is how the soul is
everywhere in the body. 27
Conclusion
Obviously, this quick sketch of Aquinas’ position cannot deal with all
possible objections to its consistency, but at least it may show the possibility

27
This paragraph is just a brief paraphrase of 1SN d. 37, q. 3, a. 1.

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 19
of its consistency. To see this more clearly, here is a brief, point-by-point
summary of what can be our final takeaway from the foregoing.
In the first place, for Aquinas, the quidditative predicates of a substance all
signify its single substantial form and denominate it by this form. Thus,
‘man’, ‘rational’, animal’, etc. all signify the same substantial form of man
although under different concepts obtained by different processes of
abstraction, and they all denominate a human being. But this substantial form
determines for itself a certain quantity of matter with the requisite organic
structure for its powers within a definite range of quantities. So, although any
part of a human being is human, being enformed by the human soul, it is only
the whole human being that is a man, but not any quantitative part of it.
In the second place, since Aquinas does not identify the soul with its own
powers, Aquinas can have an immaterial power inherent in a matter-free form
(which is matter-free in the sense that matter is not its integral part), which,
however, enforms matter as its substantial form.
In the third place, for Aquinas, the immateriality of the intellective soul does
not have to mean that it is unextended and the materiality of animal souls
does not mean that they are extended; after all, for him, all material
substantial forms, whether they are souls or not, are unextended, as the
substantial forms that enform matter are presupposed by the quantity that
extends a body, however large or small.
Furthermore, for Aquinas, it is a metaphysically provable conclusion that the
existence of any creature is distinct from the essence of that creature. So,
several distinct items can share the same existence (as do matter, form and
composite), but in different ways (as that in which something is, as that by
which something is, and as that which is, respectively), and even the same
item can have the same existence in several different ways (as the human soul
exists both as that by which the human being is, and as that which is, as an
agent having its own activity, which, as such, is at the same time the activity
of the whole individual whose substantial form it is).28
Finally this substantial form, just like any other substantial form of a material
substance is everywhere as a whole by its essence in the whole body and in
all of its parts as long as it enforms it, still, given that it has its own proper
operations, which it can therefore perform even without united to the body, it
can also exist without the body; hence, its separation from the body is just the
end of the existence of the human being, but for the human soul it is just the

28
For more detail, see Klima (2018a)

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continuation of its subsistent existence, which at the moment of the death of
the human person simply ceases to be its inherent existence in the body.

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