Kt2

ARGUMENT FOR THE THESIS

The Meanings of the Names of Being and Essence

Something is considered a being in two senses: one, which refers to things sorted into ten
categories, and also to signify the truth of a proposition. In the second sense, everything can be
considered a being for which a true affirmative proposition can be formed, even if it doesn't posit
anything in reality. Blindness and the like are not beings in the first sense. The name "essence" is
derived from "being" in the first sense, which signifies the substance of the thing. The essence of
a thing is what makes it what it is, and it is also known as "form" or "nature." The name "nature"
refers to that which can be apprehended by the intellect, while "quiddity" is derived from the
definition of a thing. The essence of a thing is through which and in which it has its being.

The Essence of Material Substances

A substance is a being primarily and without qualification, while an accident is a being only
secondarily. Substance differs from accident in the sense that, a substance has an essence in the
strict and sense while an accident has an essence only somehow with qualification. Substances
are considered to be either simple or composite, with both having their essence. Simple
substances are considered to have a more excellent way of being, since they are the cause of the
simple ones.

In composite substances, form and matter are known components, as are soul and body in man.
However, the essence of a thing cannot be the form alone or the matter alone, as it is the form
that causes this act of being in its own way. The act of being in a composite substance is neither
of the form alone nor of matter alone, but of the composite itself.

The essence, on account of which the thing is denominated a "being," cannot be the form alone
or the matter alone, but has to be both. This is evident in cases of other things composed of
several principles, such as flavors, where the thing is not denominated on account of only one of
those principles that constitute it, but all that constitutes it.

The principle of individuation is matter, and from this follows that the essence, which comprises
both matter and form, is only particular and not universal. Therefore, only designated matter
(matter considered under determinate dimensions), is not included in the definition of man as
such, but in the definition of Socrates, if at all he has a definition. The definition of man includes
non-designated matter, such bones and flesh absolutely, but not this bone and this flesh, which
are the non-designated matter of man.