People v.

Rodriguez

G.R. No. L-13981, April 25, 1960

Facts:

On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba, Laguna. The accused filed a motion to quash on the
ground that the crime with which he is charged is already alleged as a component element or ingredient
of the crime of rebellion with which he was charged in Criminal Case No. 16990 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not the charge to Rodriguez of illegal possession constitutes double jeopardy as it was also
charge in the rebellion case?

Ruling:

Yes,

as held by this Court, any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
and can not be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves . . . and can not be considered as
giving rise to a separate crime that, under Art. 48 of the code, would constitute a complex one with that
of rebellion" . The conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place
him in double jeopardy.
 People v. Tiozon

G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991

Facts:
In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch
131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital Judicial Region, accused-appellant
was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any lawful motive or purpose,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one
.38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without
authority of law, which firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one
Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused death.

Issue:
Whether or not charging Tiozon of violations against PD 1866 constitutes double jeopardy in the Murder
case?

Ruling:

No, The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double
jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense.

Since the informations were for separate offense –– the first against a person and the second against
public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy.
 People v. de Gracia

G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

Facts:

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989
by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and
military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine
Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also,
some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping
Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1

Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.

On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession
of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Moreover, it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely

executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P.
C., the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail
term of five (5) years of good behavior.

"any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."

Issue:

Whether or not the recommendation of executive clemency in pursuant to Art.135 of RPC is proper?

Ruling:

No,

provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in
determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made
clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion
punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate statutes
penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime
apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might
conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as
part of a rebellion.

Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De
Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a
matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated
against any tenuous importunity.
 People v. Lovedioro

G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

Facts:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was shot and killed. The incident was witnessed from a distance of
about nine meters by Nestor Armenta claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew
(appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter
was a resident of Bagumbayan.

As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an
Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding
him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.

Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his
claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.

Issue:
whether or not Lovedioro should be guilty of rebellion?

Ruling:

No,

if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime
and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so general
and non-specific34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made
towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never
alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
 Samar vs. People

G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020

Facts:

The incident transpired on the early morning of January 12, 2007. According to the prosecution, at
around 6:45 a.m., the Olongapo Police Station 3 received a report of an altercation on the ground floor
of GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon Avenue. At this, PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza, who were both in
uniform, went to the scene. There, they found two (2) groups of women fighting and pulling each
other's hair out, among them a visibly drunk Mallari. The officers rushed to stop the fight.10

Once the squabble was over, the officers asked the women to go to the police station to file proper
complaints. However, the intoxicated Mallari shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka
sasama sa inyo."11 She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and kicked his legs
several times. To restrain her, PO2 Navarro held her by the shoulders and brought her to the back of the
patrol car. SPO3 Merza was about to pacify the other women, but they eventually agreed to go to the
police station. The incident was entered in the blotter and Mallari was detained for direct assault

Mallari later filed a Complaint against PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza for unlawful arrest, illegal
detention, maltreatment of prisoners, and physical injuries. This was eventually dismissed by the Office
of the Prosecutor.20

In its September 5, 2013 Decision,21 the Municipal Trial Court found Mallari guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. It noted that Mallari admitted to kicking
PO2 Navarro and grabbing his shirt while he was performing his official duties. It likewise gave premium
to the prosecution's positive testimony against Mallari's defense of denial.

Issue: Whether or not Mallari is guilty of direct assault?

Ruling:

No, petitioner should not be held guilty of direct assault, but rather, of the crime of resistance or
disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

ARTICLE 148. Direct assaults may be committed in 2 ways.

[F]irst, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

In this case, petitioner is charged with the second mode of assault. Its elements are the following:
 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d)
makes a serious resistance.

However, the first element of the offense is not present.

To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of a
person in authority must be serious.

ARTICLE 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not serious in
nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article 148
of the RPC. Slap was not serious, so Mallari is guilty of Art. 151

People vs. Breis and Yumol

G.R. No. 205823, 17 August 2015

People vs. Chan Fook, 42 Phil 230 (1921)