Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Digests Persons and Family Relations
Case Digests Persons and Family Relations
VERIDIANO
FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation
April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: Quash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge an
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the
transfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three offense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of
certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town‗s police station motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was check, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense.
based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22
carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review the
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of
before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982. in May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act
of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against the Pesigans on fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2 special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in
thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date
Administrative Code. The word ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars & 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,
requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation & days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to
they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to
summary confiscation wasn‗t in order. The recipients of the carabaos make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of
the carabaos.
RULING: Yes. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive
application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows
some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The
intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time
they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize
the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons
with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated,
honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such
would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31
July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the
validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the
conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.
8. ACOSTA VS. 9. MRCA VS. CA
PLAN FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,
ISSUE: the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-
RULING: observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,
that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein
(plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case
where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the
complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for
the negligence of such driver.
RULING: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent
in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have
not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted
by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could
not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an
injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero
negligent because of such circumstances.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after,
Barretto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm and
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada, invoking Sec
9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the
Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents
died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barretto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales
be ordered to pay Barretto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all
the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of
the children also filed as intervenors in the case.
RULING: Art 9 and Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the
Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce
in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve
of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in
16. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO 17. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO
FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis. While in Misamis, Escano asked were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US without 1983, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as
again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July the administrator of the said property.
30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation and
damages against wife and parents in law. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal. petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: No, the divorce and the second marriage are not recognized as RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.
valid. As stated in Art. 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
The Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
the code, instead of divorce; legal separation is used, wherein marriage Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
is still recognized. To recognize a decree of divorce of foreign courts recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
would be violation on public policy and Article 17 of Civil Code. national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by served.
determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would
also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced
elsewhere. It would not make any difference if Tenchavez was also in the
court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗t
confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds
to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other
than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of
adultery. As result, the petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation,
and may recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.
18. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA 19. PEOPLE VS. RITTER
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private FACTS: Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by appellant who inserted a
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the foreign object into her vagina causing her death. A criminal case and a
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal civil case was filed against the defendant
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in HELD: Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victim‗s heirs
private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free
1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. doctrine in Urbano v IAC, wherein a person while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable, is applicable.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
29. BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ 30. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS
FACTS: The defendant Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one other
parish priest, took possession of the church on July 5, 1901. He persons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with two
administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until November others as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severally
14, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a Standard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of the
demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and debt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) that
prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused her husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 by Manila‘s Court of
to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction First Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, with
w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the authority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given by
Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the her husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanently
Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Manila. insane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane and
unable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason asked
In January 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant., the court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence for
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was Villanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond.
the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacity
money, and other properties, belonging thereto, and asking that it be to act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908.
restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of
the properties which he had received and which was retained by him, ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva, appellant, was incapable of entering
and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.
plaintiff.
RULING: No, he wasn‘t. ―Capacity to act‖ must be supposed to attach to
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made capacity is presumed to continue so long contrary is not proved, that is,
with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years at the time of his acting he was incapable, crazy or out of his mind;
any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case.‖
eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still There was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of
worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting
consideration. because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they
observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,
but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,
1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally
deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that
he was insane.
31. MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU 32. YOUNG VS. TECSON
FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of FACTS:
the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale,
these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the HELD: Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not estop
time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the him from denying that he was of age or from asserting that he was under
notary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their age, at the time he entered into the contract, for the breach of w/c an
two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother action is brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the liab. resulting from
the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and misrepresentation has its juridical source in the capacity of the person
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum making the misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making the
of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the misrepresentation cannot bind himself by contract, he cannot also be
annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the bound by any misrepresentation he may have made in connection
thing benefited by the defendant. therewith. A person entering into a contract must see to it that the other
party has sufficient capacity to bind himself.
According to the Defendant, the plaintiff‘s mother had sold a portion of
the original land to the defendant for a sum. The plaintiff‘s father The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the
subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for a minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affect
sum to cover his children‘s welfare after his wife‘s death. The plaintiffs the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his
had alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing
perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400. Cross-complaint the contract.
filed for damages due to the malicious and unfounded complaint by the
plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.
RULING: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid
since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty
and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.
RULING: With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that
the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it
not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity
were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily
or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said
marriage did not legitimate him.
57. BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ 58. NINAL VS. BADAYOG
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel 26, 1974 and they had five children who are the petitioners in this case.
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, Twelve years later (1985), Pepito shot Teodulfa which resulted in her
1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao death. A year and 8 months after the said death (Dec. 1986), Pepito
before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both married the respondent Norma Badayog without a marriage license
contracting parties were ―separated‖ thus, respondent Judge ought to claiming that they were exempt from the requirement because they had
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he already cohabited with each other for five years as husband and wife.
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had Pepito died in a car accident on February 1997 galvanizing petitioners,
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested the children from his first marriage, to file a declaration of nullity of the
in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never subsequent marriage claiming that it was void for lack of a marriage
cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. license.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two ISSUE: Whether or not the five year cohabitation as husband and wife in
contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract this case can be considered to have sufficiently met the requirement to
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of be exempt from acquiring a marriage license.
Family Code.
RULING: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
RULING: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they from the time of Pepito‘s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
are both ―separated‖ is an impediment that would make their marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
59. REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO 60. PERIDO VS. PERIDO
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had Gonzalo. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for "where they partitioned among themselves lots inherited by them from
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Lucio Perido. The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido
Code. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance against the children of the
second marriage, to annul the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Judicial Partition". Petitioners alleged that the children belonging to the
Family Code. second marriage were illegitimate. The trial court held that the 5 children
of Perido were all legitimate and it annulled the "Declaration of Heirship
RULING: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative and Extra- Judicial Partition". The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26, Par. 2 should be Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred (1) in declaring that the 5
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the children were and (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of owner of Lots because the said lots were the conjugal partnership
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong.7.The court of
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Now, the instant
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the petition.
marriage.
HELD: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
Hence, the court‘s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, Par. 2 be of marriage. Marriage is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a of which the public is deeply interested. Every intendment of the law
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry leans toward legalizing matrimony. Because if they are not married, they
under Philippine law. would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage." The petitioner‘s witness‘s failed to
prove the illegitimacy of second marriage.
61. FIEL VS. BANAWA 62. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
FACTS: FACTS: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5,
1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got
HELD: A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for many married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb.
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and
community where they live may be considered legally "married" in convicted of bigamy for the second marriage.
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza is liable for bigamy.
RULING: No. Acquitted. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613 provides: ―Any
marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been
annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive
years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is
only necessary for third case.‖ Thus, his marriage with Lema is null and
void without need for judicial declaration. Third marriage was contracted
after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.
63. PEOPLE VS. ARAGON 64. TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his FACTS: Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia G. Tolentino on July
marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with 31, 1943. While marriage was still subsisting, he contracted another
Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a marriage with Ma. Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on Nov. 1, 1948. He
traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued
Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as living with Clemente until he died on July 25, 1974. Ma. Clemente was
teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Tolentino claims
physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo that she is the rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the
treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for lack of publication.
with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paras is the rightful surviving spouse of
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void. Tolentino.
RULING: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second RULING: Yes. Petition granted. She needs to obtain judicial declaration
wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the from court first before she can request for the correction of the entry.
first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last Publication not necessary because all the parties involved are part of the
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting case. Court should order the publication. Conviction of Tolentino for
marriage cannot prosper. bigamy is best proof that his second marriage is null and void thus,
Paras is still his rightful spouse. No need for judicial declaration of nullity
for void marriages. Certificate entries though presumed to be correct
must yield to positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
65. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY 66. DONATO VS. LUNA
FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was
married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter‘s former marriage. petitioner‘s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of
that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
married to another woman before their marriage. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donato‘s second since she had no previous
ISSUE: Whether Karl‘s marriage with Lilia is void. knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage
RULING: No, it is voidable. Petition dismissed. Presence of force only was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
makes a marriage voidable, not void. (CC ART. 85) It is valid until force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. Even private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to
if marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
for purposes of remarriage. together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with
with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with
is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that
that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first Donato already previously married.
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is
no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia‘s marriage are regarded void under marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
the law. ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the
testimony of the husband.
RULING: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did
not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot
be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this
country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating.
She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be
a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should
not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
89. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA 90. JONES VS. HORTIGUELA
FACTS: Petitioner requests that she be declared the sole heir of the
intestate estate of Marciana Escano, her mother. Prior to the motion, at
the time when petitioner was still a minor, respondent was awarded a
fixed rate of P10,000for the administration of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner alleged that when her mother remarried in May 1927, the
judicial declaration of the absence of her father was not yet effective. As
such, the marriage of the deceased and the respondent was null and
void.
The Supreme Court declared such as an error. On July 31, 1889, the
Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the Philippines
and took effect on Dec 8, 1889. On Dec 31, an order was published
which states that Titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the
archipelago, though no decree can be found published in the Gaceta.
The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a
consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the Constitution of
1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis
was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in
1889, no part of the law was in force here, except Articles 44 to 78 which
were promulgated in 1883. It is claimed that if these are suspended, the
only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts
competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical. There can be no
doubt that the order of suspension refers to Titles 4 and 12 of Book 1
and it has always been understood, it follows that Arts 42-107 of the CC
were not in force here. The canon law had not as such any binding force
outside the church, however, any part of the canon law which by proper
action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same
footing as any other law in Spain. As ordered by the Council of Trent,
these decrees have, in Spain, the force of a civil law. It may be doubted if
these decrees, even if considered as extended to the Philippines and in
force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question. Canonists
suggest declaring adultery to be a ground for divorce, however, the
causes for divorce is nowhere distinctly stated therein. The laws of the
church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil
laws. The decretal law provides abolishing in the peninsula the special
jurisdictions was extended to the Philippines. It states that ecclesiastical of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce. That provision
courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of
eleemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with sovereignty. The complete separation of the church and the state under
provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and the American government while it changed the tribunal in which this right
annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trent, but incidents should be enforced, could not affect the right itself. The fact that
with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important. The
other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts. The Partidas jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of
contain provisions relating to the subject of divorce, it states that when ACT no. 136.
spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man
separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between As the result, the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for
them. Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the divorce. For that the only ground therefore is adultery and that the action
other the sin of fornication. Religion if on desires to take holy orders and on that ground can be maintained by husband, and that the decree does
the other should grant permission, with authority of the church; while not dissolve the marriage bond. The CFI of Iloilo therefore, committed no
Divorce due to Adultery or Fornication, brought before the judge of the error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case. The adultery of the
holy church, includes spiritual fornication. In here the spouses are defendant was fully proved. The adultery of the plaintiff is however,
separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, which is the
contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation letter showing confession of guilt.
granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may
remarry after the death of the other. No other person but the spouses On the main issue of Adultery, the lack of evidence destroys the theory
themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the
made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the
themselves of their attorneys. This divorce did not annul the marriage. company of other women. It is not adequate to explain the sudden
That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her termination of their marital relations. The testimony of the defendant
suit so is the fact that she has pardoned her—if after a divorce has been correctly explained the theory—he stated that on his return from an
granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the inspection of one his estates his wife‗s maid gave him a letter in the
judgment handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish Corporal of
the civil guard, named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter,
ISSUE: Whether these provisions of the Partidas were in force in the fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon her, that same day he
islands prior to 1889? took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her
there. That the plaintiff is guilty and the defendant has condoned the
RULING: The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in offense, though no factual evidence on this claim. Law 6 , Title 9 Partida
the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain 4 provides that the wife can defeat the husband‗s suit for divorce by
laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way. proving that he has pardoned her, but no laws in the Partidas says that
Recopilacion de laas Leyes de Indias provides ―and as to all matters not the effect of the pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a
provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations divorce against him in a case like this present one. Therefore, neither of
and the Partidas of these kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the the party is entitled to a divorce, both committed adultery. Judgment is
decisions of causes in accordance with the following law. By the therefore reversed.
operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the
Partidas herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery
and settlement of the Philippines became at once effective therein, they
have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished
from laws of the church. Being in force on August 13, 1898, they
continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature. The Partidas
recognized adultery as a ground for divorce, therefore according to the
civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898, the commission
95. ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN 96. IN RE: ATTY RUFILO BUCANA
FACTS: Albano a municipal judge prepared and notarized a document FACTS: On November 10, 1975, Bucana notarized an Agreement
providing for personal separation of Valentina Andres and Guillermo executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It they agreed that in case anyone of them will remarry, both parties offer
provides that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them. It
the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action would allow them to have a concubine, and extra-marital affairs. As his
against the other. They did this since they were separated for a long time defense, it is said to have been prepared by his clerk and he only signed
and to forestall violent incidents between husband and wife. it out of negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Albano can notarize a personal ISSUE: Whether or not he committed grave act of misconduct in
separation. notarizing agreement
RULING: No. The law considers as void "any contract for personal RULING: Yes, he is guilty of malpractice. It is for the notary to inform
separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been
partnership. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led
extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Family Code 26, Par 2 to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public
provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad even to the extent of disbarment.
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
97. TENCHAVES VS. ESCAÑO 98. VAN DORN VS. ROMILO
FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes-Van Dorn a Filipino and Richard Upton a
Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, US citizen married in Hongkong. They established their residence in thhe
they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while Philippines. On 1982, they obtained a divorce in Nevada, US. Petitioner
Escano stayed in Cebu, then Misamis. In Misamis, Escano asked for remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton is contesting for his
petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her share in Galleon Shop which he contends is conjugal property.
non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the United States
without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
extreme cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
and damages against wife and parents in law. through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
RULING: No, the divorce and 2nd marriage are not recognized as valid. Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
As stated in Art 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
the code, instead of divorce, legal separation is used, wherein marriage
is still recognized. To recognize decree of divorce of foreign courts would ISSUE: Whether or not Filipino Laws would still prevail.
be violation on public policy and article 17 of Civil Code. Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which have for their RULING: No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
object public order, policy, and good customs shall not be rendered Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would also discriminate in our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced elsewhere. It would not divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
make difference if Tenchavez was also in court of Nevada when divorce they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
was filed since mere appearance can‗t confer jurisdiction on court which Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
had none. Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce respondent since she standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling him to
ask for legal separation under basis of adultery. Therefore, petitioner has
grounds to file for legal separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral
damages and fees.
99. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA 100. GARCIA-RECIO VS. GARCIA
FACTS: On Sept. 7, 1979, Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino, married Erich FACTS: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Geiling, a German in Federal Republic Germany. They later resided in citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the
Malate, Manila. On Jan. 1983, they asked for divorce which was marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio
obtained on Jan. 15 1986. By June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two complaints became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina (Garcia) in
of adultery with William Chia and Jesus Chua. Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio
was single and a Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On
ISSUE: Whether or not he can still file for adultery after German divorce May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to
RULING: No. Article 344 of RPC provides that only offended spouse nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a
may bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became
complaint was filed. Since he filed it after he divorce was decree he is aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise
now not considered a spouse. It would be absurd to bring action and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce
determined by his status before or subsequent to commencement of decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of
adultery. Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couple‗s wedding
sue as spouse anymore. and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent
wasable to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC
declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had
ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 149 is absolute and therefore can‗t grant
wife any support since she was the one who left home
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, whether or not
abatement also applies if the action involves property rights?
RULING: Yes, the action for legal separation is purely personal, it may
be made by the innocent spouse and can still stop proceedings if they
reconcile. The death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself.
Yes, it is solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they
cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Art
106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of
the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death. The
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. The enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do
not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage 107. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES
Even in actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. The
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10,
the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in 1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. They
nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over
each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each
other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also
agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse
and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo
cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and
recorded as Zoilo‗s. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.
Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal
separation and change of surname against husband due to
abandonment and concubinage. The trial court declared that Zoilo‗s acts
constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:
CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year
after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known
cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and
CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e.
that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo
and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of
their agreement)
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is
not an innocent spouse
RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only
made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time
one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she
condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds
for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are
expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides
for (NCC 100).
108. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt,
her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong. In this case, he
FACTS: On August 27, 1949, Bugayong married Ginez. Bugayong was a slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he
serviceman in the US Navy. Bugayong began receiving letters from his came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus, falling
sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be
October 1951, Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
propriety of a legal separation. On August 1952, Bugayong went to condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to
the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and lived together for
2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired Bugayong‗s
house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery. Instead of
answering, Geniz packed up and left, which Bugayong took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. On November 18,
1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz.
Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint and file a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of sleeping with wife for two days was
already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she allegedly committed
HELD: As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its
ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent
consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to
compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to
court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a
husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy,
if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its
commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior
consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party
from prosecuting the offense.
117. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ 118. BROWN VS. YAMBAO
FACTS: Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married FACTS: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from
on 1949 to Ginez while on furlough leave. Before he reported back to 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from
duty, they made arrangements as to where the wife would stay. In July which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on
1951, the husband received letters informing him of his wife‘s infidelities. they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this
In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her, they lived together effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the
as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night after, they erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying
continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of
about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not
her infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city
The court ordered the dismissal of the action based on wife‘s motion to fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the
dismiss. He appealed but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has
questions of law, to the SC. begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of
prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and
ISSUE: Whether or not the copulation which transpired after the husband involvement of consent and connivance.
knew about his wife‘s alleged infidelities can be considered an act of
condonation. ISSUE: Whether or not proceedings for legal separation can still be
instituted when both spouses are offenders.
HELD: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of
one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed. HELD: No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive
According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual period is over since he learned of his wife‘s relations in 1945 and only
intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another
with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation. woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set
Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred. up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven
there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal
separation.
119. BROWN VS. YAMBAO 120. OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO
FACTS: FACTS: Jose Ocampo was married to Florenciano and had several
children together who are living with the husband. In March 1951, the
ISSUE: Whether or not findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown husband discovered on several occasions that his wife was having illicit
lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop relations with one Jose Arcalas. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff again
him from legal separation proceedings. surprised the wife and found her engaging in other illicit relations with
Nestor Orzame. On July 5, 1955, husband filed a petition for legal
HELD: Yes. Collusion as defined is the act of married persons in separation with the wife conforming to the charge provided that she isn‘t
procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted criminally charged. Because the wife did not answer the charge, the RTC
commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance declared her in default. The CA, however, held that the husband‘s right
of agreement to defend divorce proceedings. It is legitimate for the Fiscal to legal separation on the ground of the wife‘s relations with Arcalas had
to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference already prescribed and it also interpreted the facts to mean that a
that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more confession of judgment on the part of the wife agreeing with the husband
than mere contract). The NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal signified collusion between the parties and thus bars the right to
separation since he is also guilty of concubinage. NCC Article 102 also procuring a separation.
bars him since he filed out of time. Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's ISSUE: Whether or not the CA interpreted Art. 101, which prohibits a
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. It cannot decree of legal separation upon a confession of judgment, properly.
be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date HELD: No. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant
when such cause occurred. appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a
pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This did not occur.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make
it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was
not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even
in the absence of grounds therefore.
121. MATUTE VS. MACADAEG 122. LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery and a decree of FACTS: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now
legal separation was granted to Armando Medel, awarding custody of the legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name.
children to the latter. Medel went to the US leaving children with his Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates
sister in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The
offspring. Armando returned late 1954. With his permission, Rosario lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and
brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father on the granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also
condition that the children would be returned after two weeks. She never reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion
returned and instead filed a motion to regain custody on the ground that in the woman‘s finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
the children did not want to go back to their father and that the father was assets.
living with another woman. Armando opposed this motion and countered
with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court (in ISSUE Whether or not a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of
view of her failure to return the children). Judge Macadaeg absolved the legal separation has been granted.
Rosario from contempt but denied her motion for custody and ordered
her to return the children. Rosario then filed an action of certiorari and HELD: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife‘s change of
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Armando and the name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and
Judge. Preliminary injunction was granted after filing. surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is
unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name
ISSUE: Whether or not mother can regain custody of her children after in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
the issuance of a degree of legal separation.
It was held that the judgment appealed from in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has
absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she
is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-
complaint.
127. ABELLA VS. COMELEC 128. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES
FACTS: Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) FACTS: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they
running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13
alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest
who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation
COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage
the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her
when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an
votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November
Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made
erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that before Cervantes‗ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, ISSUE: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations
the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle between live-in partners.
of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this
regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence RULING: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations
Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as
course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City.‖ it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
Leyte. rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
RULING: For the purpose of running for public office, the residence adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory
requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it
where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. The as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment provision would not be attained.
of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their
habitual residence. Art. 68 provides that the husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. While Art. 69 provides that the husband
and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other
if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if
the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Husband and
wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is
their usual place of abode.
129. DELIZO VS. DELIZO 130. BALLADOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: From the time of April 1891 until Dec 1909, Nicolas Delizo was
married to Rosa Villasfer, who then later died. During Oct 1911 up to
May 1957, he had a second marriage, to Dorotea de Ocampo until he
himself died. The petitioners and respondents are fighting over the land
owned by Nicolas Delizo whether it belongs to the conjugal property of
the first or second marriage. The trial Court first partitioned the land to
the first marriage‗s heirs since there was no liquidation of conjugal
property of first marriage thus the co-conjugal partnership was converted
into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the
first marriage. The judgment was appealed by petitioners from the
second marriage. Court of Appeals ruled that Caanawan lands were
acquired during the first marriage and the fact that lands were registered
under ―Nicolas married to Dorotea‖ is merely descriptive of his civil
status. Though it did not agree with the partition of Trial Court when it
held that ½ of conjugal property from first marriage is husband‗s own
separate property when he remarried again. It also held that since it was
at the time of the second marriage that the land was cultivated, it is
entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of the 47 hectares.
Thus ½ that is given to the first marriage‗s heirs must be deducted by
the improvements made by second marriage. It declared partition as
follows: One-half of the Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villasfer or
1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other
properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. ½ to Nicolas Delizo
descending to his heirs both in the first and second marriage.
RULING: No. Lands acquired in first marriage were from the Homestead
Act and at the time of the 1st marriage, the lands weren‗t owned by
Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the requirements of the public
land law for the acquisition of such lands. Act 926 provides the right of
the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he
has complied with all the requirements of the law, thus Caanawan lands
weren‗t conjugal property of first marriage due to non-compliance. Thus
held that land properties should be divided between the two conjugal
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership since to
leave the heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance discord
and not promote family solidarity.
131. JOCSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS 132. ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF
FACTS: Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina Jocson- FACTS: Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili
and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn
intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and
of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate damages from the obligations of Agcaoili to Philippine Trust Company.
of his wife. Moises says that it should be partitioned between him and Agcaoili defaulted hence Fidelity and Surety Company brought an action
Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void. against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy
Defendant Moises says that the first document was signed through fraud on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that
and deceit. Same with the second and third document. Moreover, he they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldo‗s
said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the personal obligations. Ansaldo filed action in the CFI to declare it null and
same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold. void. It was granted by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is conjugal. ISSUE: Whether or not the joint savings account is liable for the payment
of the personal obligations of the husband.
RULING: No. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that
Moises said that Agustina didn‗t have enough funds, but then Agustina RULING: No. It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property
is in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no
than the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of
prove that a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the Ansaldo.
properties were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and
Acquisition of title are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, because it was registered in
his name alone.
133. CASTRO VS. MIAT 134. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. QUINTOS
FACTS: Moises and Miat bought two parcels of land, one in Paranaque FACTS: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the
and one in Paco. Moises then wanted the Paranaque property to himself amount of P31, 284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI,
but would leave the two properties to his sons. Moises and Concordia Compañia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company. In the
bought the property on installment basis on 1977, and it was only on document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife,
1984 it was finished. Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to Romeo. except in their civil statues. It also does not show that they bound
However, Romeo found out that the property was sold to Castro by themselves solidarily to the debt incurred. A complaint was then filed
Moises. Moises bought the property through mortgage from Castro. requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt. Defendants claim that their debt is
Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo received none. The Court of not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of
Appeals rendered a decision nullifying deed of sale between Moises and their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal
Castro and ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo for P36,000. partnership. Petitioner raises Art 1408 of NCC that provides all debts
incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to
ISSUE: Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of the conjugal partnership thus Margarita Ansaido, the wife, is part of the
Moises. obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal
partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court held that conjugal
RULING: No, it is a conjugal share. Since it was acquired through joint partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private
funds, Moises and Concordia bought the property during the marriage. property of each of them since they are both obligated. Upon Motion for
There was even a letter from Moises to Romeo conveying the land. Reconsideration, the court reasserts that conjugal property is liable for
Moreover, Castro is not a buyer in good faith. Since they knew that there the debt they incurred as husband and wife.
was an adverse claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred
through conjugal partnership
RULING: Yes, the Civil Code expressly states that partners are not
solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. Also Article
1137 provides solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. A
partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership,
because, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon one.
Properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the
debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
payment thereof.
135. LAPERAL VS. KATIGBAK 136. BERCILES VS. GSIS
FACTS: The Laperals sought for recovery of money evidenced by FACTS: GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural
promissory notes made by Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that child and other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, Mercy
Katigbak was supposed to sell. On Nov 1, 1950 the Trial Court ordered Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge
Katigbak to pay back the Laperals and return the jewelry. On Dec 1950 Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed for judicial separation of property and retirement benefits. This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and
separate administration which was granted. By Feb 1, 1955 the Laperals their children.
filed complaint that the separation of property should be annulled and
should be deemed as conjugal property. On Dec. 27, 1958 the Supreme ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a
Court rendered judgment that while the conjugal property should be used natural child and illegitimate children
to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal property of Kalaw
shouldn‗t. As the case was remanded the Trial Court rendered judgment RULING: No. Art. 287 of the New Civil Code say that illegitimate children
that Kalaw‗s property was indeed paraphernal. other than natural are entitled to support and such successional rights
are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be
ISSUE: Whether or not property being contested is part of conjugal admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child. There was no
property. evidence of admission. There was no evidence that he intervened when
his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual Berciles, thus his part
RULING: No. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provide properties acquired in the birth certificate is null and void. The baptismal certificate has no
during marriage are deemed conjugal property unless it is proven that it weight as well and living together does not prove filiation, also, pictures
belongs exclusively to husband and wife. It was shown through that (1) are not proof of filiation. Their mother was not recognized to be married
title is in name of wife alone (2) husband gave his marital consent to their to the deceased. Retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five
being mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is financially able to buy property. In recognized heirs from his marriage to Iluminada Ponce who is also an
this case, proved that mother of Evelina bought the contested property heir. This is in corollary with Art. 966 of the New Civil Code that provides
for her, it was under Evelina‗s name, Ramon Katigbak issued a if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving
manifestation where he stated he had no interest in the property, spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
husband could not have afforded to buy it. The land is therefore children. And, by Art. 980 of New Civil Code, children of deceased shall
paraphernal and thus can‗t be subject to the debts of Katigbak. always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
137. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ 138. PLATA VS. YATCO
FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the FACTS: Amailia Plata purchased land which he then sold the property to
possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per Celso Saldana but he resold it to her seven months after when she was
month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services already married to Gaudencio Begosa. On Sept 1958, Amalia mortgaged
rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000.
alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question Gaudencio also signed the deal. Amalia and Gaudencio failed to pay
before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio.
the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was
mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the granted. However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party
death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not
time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and conjugal property
gave as security the jewelry.
ISSUE: Whether or not Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against
ISSUE: Whether or not jewelry is conjugal property. Gaudencio Begosa.
RULING: It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to RULING: No, Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own
Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the jewelry was kept exclusive paraphernal property since she owned it before marriage and
remained with the deceased. Defendant now denies that she knew that even if Saldana did give it back to her when she was already married it
her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the did not transform it to conjugal property since there was no proof that
same by paying the amount due. Record shows that the jewels were the they money paid to Saldana came from common or conjugal funds. And
sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her mother. It is part since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was
of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the paraphernal as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment
same. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until against the husband alone doesn‗t affect the paraphernal property of
and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against
with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.(Article 1384, her husband. The Supreme Court can‗t decide at the moment whether
Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio it was then
the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. remanded to Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
139. LIM VS. GARCIA 140. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an estate valued at FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the
P50,000. It was alleged in the inventory by the administrator, Luis Lim, possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per
that everything but a house and lot, P10k (paraphernalia) and P700 month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services
(acquired as payment for the land that he sold) were the conjugal rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry
property of Hilario and his wife, Isabel Garcia. The administrator alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question
contends that the said properties were the separate properties of Hilario before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to
because he allegedly brought them into the marriage alone. The three the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her
parcels of land were only conveyed to Isabel as a gift or for valuable mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the
consideration by Hilario during the coverture; hence, it is a void donation. death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short
The P700 was the price he had received for the sale of a certain lot. time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and
gave as security the jewelry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land were conjugal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jewelry needs to be returned to the
RULING: No, the evidence show that the properties were not acquired by defendant.
Isabel by conveyance from Hilario but by third parties by way of
exchange for a certain property she had inherited from her father‗s RULING: The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate
estate. Hence, they are her separate properties according to Civil Code property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of
Art. 1396 (3) since they were acquired by exchange of her separate further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
properties. While the RTC held that they were part of her dowry, the paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised
record did not prove that it was so and evidence strongly supported the dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the
presumption that it was and continued to be part of her separate estate. exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had
Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received for the lot) and the delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the
buildings constructed thereon, Supreme Court held that they were part of husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is
the conjugal properties since the buildings were constructed out of the no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her
conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was the separate husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could
property of Hilario, Civil Code 1404 holds that the buildings, erected not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her
during coverture on a land belonging to one of the spouse, will be consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code
considered as conjugal partnership property, that is ―after allowing the above cited.
owner of the land the value thereof.‖
141. MANOTOK REALTY VS. COURT OF APPEALS (against third parties). Lucero and Sojio were also found to have acted in
bad faith since the latter waited a long time before going to PTC, ignored
FACTS: Authorized as the special co-administrator of the testate estate the Court summons, and instead executed a deed of assignment, while
of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, Vicente Legarda sold 280 sq.m. of the the latter constructed a house when he was a mere lessee.
Legarda Tambunting Subdivision to Dr. Abelardo Lucero for P30/sq.m.,
payable on an installment basis. Lucero paid the initial amount of P200
and Legarda issued a receipt and delivered the property to him. Although
he was ordered by the CFI to sell the Subdivision, Legarda failed to
execute the necessary document/s and to submit the same to the Court
for approval as he was ordered. He did not execute and register a deed
of sale in a public instrument. Meanwhile, Lucera subsequently leased
the property on 1953 to six tenants, who paid monthly rentals and
constructed their houses thereon. On July 31, 1956, CFI authorized
Philippine Trust Company as administrator of the estate to sell the
subdivision at the earliest possible time. Hence, it sold the same portion
of the property to Manotok Realty, Inc. Although the property was
advertised for sale, Lucera failed to appear in the estate proceedings.
Instead, he waited for Legarda, who was no longer a special co-
administrator, to send him the formal contract in order for him to make
further payments. In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain Lucero when
he finally went to them for payment of the property because the estate
was then involved in litigation. Consequent to the litigation, a deed of
sale was then issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13, 1959; the
same was approved by the Court. On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc.
demanded the surrender of the actual and material possession of the
property and on March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for ejectment.
Although summonses were served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero
instead executed a deed of assignment of the lot in favor of his lessees.
When RTC favored Manotok Realty, Inc., Lucero alleged on appeal to
CA that the sale made by Legarda was valid because Legarda was
authorized to do so and hence, there was no need for the approval of the
probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Legarda and Lucero was valid.
RULING: No, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano was made upon
credit of the property of his wife, the money became conjugal property by
virtue of Civil Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to the
construction of the house also made the house conjugal property and
liable to the payment of his debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.
144. TORELA VS. TORELA 145. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued in favor FACTS: The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim
of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770). By March 5, 1958, Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They
Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the
Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an
order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein
(movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon
Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago". He then executed a definite ISSUE: Whether or not the properties belong to the one spouse alone.
deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot
No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and RULING: When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
Maria Luna Mahilum. The children claim that the land was conjugal and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot
Gallego clean the lot in question. Felimon Torela declared that he and prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land in question was innocent third parties are involved.
decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego.
RULING: No, whole property. Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC.
166, husband can‗t alienate real property of conjugal partnership unless
wife has been declared a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction or in a
leprosarium. 167, wife may annul said contract within ten years from
transaction questioned. And both laws were complied with. Alienation
must be annulled in its entirety and not only in so far as the share of wife
in the conjugal property is concerned. The limitation of, contract shall
prejudice wife‖ was not spelled out in statute. Conjugal partnership is
liable for many things when it is existing thus husband has to be stopped
from disposing it without consent of wife.
163. SANTERO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 164. GARCIA VS. MANZANO
FACTS: Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for Allowance FACTS: Spouses live separately from each other. Wife assumed
from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual (legitimate father of private complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership.
respondents) which was granted by the CFI. Petitioners (also legitimate
children of Pascual with another woman) oppose the motion on the HELD: The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with
grounds that most of the private respondents are already of age. Neither the consent of the husband. In the event of such maladministration by
of the women are legally married to Pablo Pascual. the wife, the remedy of the husband doesn‘t lie in a judicial separation of
properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the
ISSUE: Whether or not court acted with grave abuse of discretion by administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of
granting the motion for allowance. the conjugal property.
RULING: No, petition lacks merit. Art. 290 (support for children can apply
even beyond the age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It
doesn‗t matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and married. The
New Civil Code entitles the children to allowance as advances of their
shares in the inheritance from their father, Pablo. A substantive right
cannot be impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court).
165. LACSON VS. SAN JOSE-LACSON 166. MAXEY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
167. JUANIZA VS. JOSE 168. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
169. VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS 170. YAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
171. CARINO VS. CARINO 172. ALAVADO VS. CITY OF TACLOBAN
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
173. ARROYO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 174. GAYON VS. GAYON
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
175. WAINWRIGHT VS. VERSOZA 176. MODEQUILIO VS. BREVA
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
177. SIARI VALLEY VS. LUCASAN 178. PERIDO VS. PERIDO
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
179. DE LA PURRTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 180. TAN VS. TROCIO
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
181. MOORE VS. REPUBLIC 182. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
183. MANGUIABNAR VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 184. OSMENA DE VALENCIA VS. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
185. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG 186. MACADANGDANG VS. COUT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
187. TAN VS. TROCIO 188. JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
189. AMURAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 190. CHUA KENG GIAP VS. PAC
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
191. LIM VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 192. LIYAO, JR VS. TANHOTI-LIYAP
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
193. REYES VS COURT OF APPEALS 194. CASTRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
195. MENDOZA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 196. RAMOS VS. RAMOS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
197. LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS 198. RANAS VS. RANAS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
199. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 200. VDA. DE ALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
201. BALUYOT VS. BALUYOT 202. PATERNO VS. PATERNO
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
203. GAPUSAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS 204. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN
FACTS: FACTS:
ISSUE: ISSUE:
RULING: RULING:
205. PEOPLE VS. RIZO 206. DEMPSEY VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FACTS: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old FACTS: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel Dempsey without the
mongoloid sister was bigger than usual. She discovered that she was benefit of marriage and Christine Marie was born. The child receives
pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the husband of her yaya had monthly support from him in the sum of $150. Janalita seeks for the
intercourse with her in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had sexual accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his
intercourse with Felicidad. On October 22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a American citizenship. Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously
baby. Rizo did not confirm nor deny that he had sexual intercourse with entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was
her but filed a motion to dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC abandonment and failure to provide adequate support for the child
found Felicidad to be a competent witness and rendered judgment though he had the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found him to be
against the accused. RTC also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring guilty. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed into a
as his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a married man. fine and not to be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rizo can be compelled to recognize the offspring ISSUE:
of the crime.
RULING:
RULING: No. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be
compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any,
as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the
judgment ordering him to recognize the child as his legitimate son should
therefore be eliminated.
207. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 208. PEOPLE VS. BARRANCO
FACTS: FACTS: Rosalia Barranco (19) was raped by Bartolome Barranco, the
second cousin of her father who lives 100 meters away from her house.
ISSUE: On Feb 10,1980. Rosalia was raped by while being threatened with
death, he was holding a butcher‗s knife to her neck. On March 19, 1980,
RULING: Bartolome attempted rape but foiled because Rosalia was able to fend
him off by hitting him with a piece of wood. On the eve of the same day,
Rosalia confessed to her mother the rape. They went to the police and
had a physical exam. Turned out she was pregnant. On April 3, 1981,
trial court convicted Bart of Rape and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua
RULING: The trial court erred when it ordered that the child be
acknowledged as Bart‗s because the child of a sin cannot be
acknowledged by a married man. However he is entitled to support the
child.
209. LAZATIN VS. CAMPOS 210. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
FACTS: On Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate, FACTS: This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was
respondents Nora and Irma. One month after, Margarita de Asis born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
commenced an intestate proceeding. On April 11, 1974, Margarita de Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered
Asis died, leaving a holographic will. By Nov 22, 1974, petitioner the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr. petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when
Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child. Aug. 20, 1975, she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina.
an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the
Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was child. RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne
an ―illegitimate son‖ of Dr. Lazatin and was lated adopted by him. This Fajardo was changed to Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
affidavit was later modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. Respondent court heart P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
petitioner‗s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the
Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that
hi his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
respondents‗ objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused
as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly
he was known as ―Renato Lazatin‖ but was compelled to change his ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted.
surname to ―Sta. Clara‖ when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife. On March 4, 1976, RULING: Yes. Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
respondent Court barred the introduction of petitioner‗s evidence and on woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will
March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to declare as established the not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally
fact of adoption. The Court denied motion adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in not allowing authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where
petitioner to introduce new evidence. the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted
RULING: No. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Petitioner‗s flow of evidence in the
case below doesn‗t lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. No proof of
specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption
proceeding initiated by the late spouses No judicial records of adoption
or copies. Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the
estate as an adopted son because of lack of proof
211. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARANTO 212. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES
FACTS: Court of Appeals granted Caranto spouses‘ petition for adoption FACTS: Feb 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles (private respondent) filed petition
of Midael with prayer for the correction of the minor‘s first name from to adopt Jason Condat, court grants it given that all requirements for
Midael to Michael. adoption are satisfied. Petitioner appeals to CA who affirms the trial court
decision, hence this petition
HELD: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While
there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision w/c granted
The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not the petition in favor of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles.
notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.
RULING: No. Though Dioscoro was not named as a petitioner, he did
provide written consent that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child, which is sufficient to make him a petitioner. The future
of the child must not be compromised by insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules. Adoption statutes are liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of the adoption institutions and to protect the
child. Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. The rights
concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the
best interest of the child. The CA found the following in the petition and
correctly approved the adoption: Natural parents gave consent / DSWD
recommended approval / Trial court approved / Written consent of
adopting parents
213. SANTOS VS. ARANSANZO 214. DAOANG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
FACTS: Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed petition for adoption of FACTS: Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed petition
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949. With their parents for adoption of the minor Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. Petitioners
whereabouts unknown, their current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang assisted by their father, file an
his written consent, Paulina being 14 years old likewise gave consent. opposition claiming that the Agonoys have a legitimate daughter named
Hence, Court granted petition. On Oct 21, 1957, Juliana dies, Simplicio Estrella Agonoy (mother of Roderick and Rommel), who died March 1,
files for settlement of intestate estate including Paulina and Aurora as 1971, thus Agonoys are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art 335. The
surviving heirs. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the first cousin of Trial Court still granted the petition for adoption
Juliana files an opposition to the petition, stating that Simplicio‗s
marriage to Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that the adoption of ISSUE: Whether or not respondent spouses are disqualified to adopt
Paulina and Aurora were void for there is no written consent from natural under NCC Art. 335 par. 1.
parents. Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the first cousin of
Juliana and adding that she is the mother of Paulina Santos, likewise RULING: No. Art 335, those with legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
files as opposition. The CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be natural children, or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. The law is
attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES and declares that the clear, children mentioned therein do not include grandchildren. The
adoption is void for lack of written consent. Petitioners file for preliminary legislators of the NCC obviously intended that only those persons who
injunction against the CA orders and the Court grants it hence this have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt. Adoption is
petition by the respondents. used to benefit the adopter. This has since changed as now; the present
notion on adoption promotes the welfare of the child and the
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents can assail in settlement enhancement of his opportunities for a happy life. Under the law now in
proceedings the adoption decree of Paulina and Aurora Santos. force, having legitimate, legitimated, etc children is no longer a ground
for disqualification to adopt
RULING: No. If natural parents have abandoned the children, the
guardian‘s consent suffices. Furthermore, the adoption court made
sufficient findings that the natural parents of them minors couldn‗t be
located, hence its order cannot be attacked collaterally. Hence the CA
erred in reviewing, under collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. Even if Simplicio were married to another person (not
decided in this case), the estate of Juliana being the subject matter, the
adopted children status of Paulina and Aurora is not affected, hence they
succeed Juliana. Respondents cannot intervene in the settlement
proceedings and attack the adoption. As the adoption is held valid, and
in intestate succession, adopted children exclude first cousins, the CA
decision is reversed.
215. NIETO VS. MAGAT 216. DUNCAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: pouses Ernesto and Matilde Magat reared as their own child FACTS: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty.
Roy Sumintac, who is their nephew, from his birth until the spouses went Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses
to Guam to work when the boy was already four years old. They to adopt the child.
petitioned the court to allow them to adopt Roy, but the trial court denied
this, on the ground that they are non-residents of the Philippines and that HELD: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to the
the trial custody as required under P.D. No. 603 cannot be effected. adoption. The father‘s consent is not required because the child is
They went to the Supreme Court to have the decision reviewed. illegitimate. The mother‘s consent is not necessary either, because she
is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty.
ISSUE: Whether or not residency in another country disqualifies the Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a
couple from adopting, and whether or not the trial custody is a mandatory proper party. Provision says legal guardian)
requirement.
On the second issue, the law specifically authorizes the court, either
upon its own or on petitioner’s motion, to dispense with the trial
custody if it finds that it is to the best interest of the child. In this case, the
Minister of Social Services and Development suggests that trial custody
is unnecessary because the child was already comfortable with the
couple and the couple was capable of disciplining the child.
217. CANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS 218. BOBANOVIC VS. MONTES
FACTS: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally FACTS:
separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to adopt the
3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition ISSUE:
for adoption along with Clavano.
RULING:
HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang‘s consent as the father is
necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was
proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It
was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.
219. PARDO DE TAVERA VS. CACDAC foreigners whose livelihood was earned abroad. And that the Decision
had become final and executory.
FACTS: On June 19, 1986, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor,
Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On The Trial Court relied on the Resolution of this Court in Administrative
the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition, OSG failed Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a
to send any representative for the State. Evidence established that the Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court and the ruling in
Gordons (British spouse) are allowed by their home country to adopt Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes ―"In refusing to grant the travel clearance
foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines. The certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects of a
husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building valid and final judgment of the Court regarding which no appeal had
Superintendent therefore financially secured. Anthony's mother, even been taken from (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370, July 7,
Adoracion Custodio, had given her consent to the adoption realizing that 1986)." The 10,000.00 given by Gordon spouses was only a financial
her child would face a brighter future. The Case Study Report submitted assistance to the natural mother of the child. The spouses also would
by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation want to adopt a baby girl but upon learning that she‗s mongoloid, they
as the natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr 2mos child. Trial turned her over to International Alliance for Children, where she
Court declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the unfortunately died. And finally, Muslim Laws shall not apply to them, they
Gordons. The Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony being Britons.
on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if subpoenaed, saying that the
Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the
International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report
of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency. And that there is
a required six-month trial custody, which had not been met nor were the
reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603). Contended also that the Gordons had
given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the
undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were
shopping for commodities. Under the Muslim Law (Dubai), Anthony
cannot inherit from the adopting parents. The Gordons had filed another
petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month
later they tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same
name and represented that she was the very same girl they were
adopting. There being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai
and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not
be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.
RULING: NO. As the Trial Court has held, it ordered the MSSD to issue
the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to issue the corresponding passport saying that the Court Social
Worker Report could take the place of a report from a duly licensed
placement agency or of the MSSD. Court had also impliedly dispensed
with the six-month trial custody considering that the Gordons were
220. IN RE: ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate
FACTS: The spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such
8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re
declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. It is established that the Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of
Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal
home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged
natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y
Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola
Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business
interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His
co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly
earning of about P300.00. It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza
was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth.
Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the
petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and
as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a
deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor
testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of
their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and
conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal
consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
HELD: Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may
not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are
not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code
names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose
adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by
the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father
or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last
article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not
prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of
parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should
not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude
adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of
the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
221. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO 222. IN RE: HABEAS CORPUS OF ANGELIE CERVANTES
FACTS: A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over FACTS: A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over
the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb.
14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for
adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petitioners. adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child. appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.
Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the
child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that
she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina
refused. refused.
ISSUE: Whether the adoption would be given effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted.
RULING: The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full RULING: Yes, respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.
child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
223. PELAYO VS. LAURON 224. SANCHEZ VS. ZULUETA
FACTS: On the evening of October 13, 1906, Dr. Arturo Pelayo was FACTS: Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego and had a child Mario
called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He was asked Sanchez. On 1932 Feliciano refused to support Josefa and Mario and
to give birth to their daughter-in-law. He assisted in the delivery of the then abandoned them. Josefa and Mario have no means of subsistence.
child and was kept occupied until the next day. He valued his fee at P500 Feliciano receives a monthly pension of P174.20 from US Army. Josefa
but Marcelo and Juana refused to pay without reason. On November 23, Diego and Mario Sanchez sought monthly allowance for support and
1906, a Complaint by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella for collection of support pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez. Feliciano contends that
money was filed. Lauron and Abella contends that that their son and his Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez which resulted to Mario
wife lived independently from them and in a separate house and that if Sanchez. Also that on October 27, 1930, Josefa abandoned the conjugal
she did stay in their house that night, it was due to fortuitous home. And as the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario, Mario is not
circumstances. They also allege that their daughter-in-law had died due entitled to his support. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in
to the childbirth. On April 5, 1907, the Regional Trial Court held Lauron support of this defense which Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
and Abella absolved from the complaint due to lack of sufficient evidence denied
to establish a right of action against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macario and Josefa are entitled to support
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband is bound to pay the bill
RULING: No, Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against
RULING: Yes. Article 142 and 143, Civil Code provides: Mutual an action for support of the wife or an action for support of the child who
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support is the fruit of such adulterous relations. The defense should be
which includes medical services in case of illness. Also that when either established and not merely alleged, and that proof must therefore be
of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the permitted. Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he asked for an
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary opportunity to present evidence to prove his allegations, it was error to
services of a physician in order that health may be restored. Also that the deny him the opportunity.
father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that
devolves upon the husband to provide support. Hence, her husband, and
not her father and mother- in-law, is liable. It is of no matter who called
the doctor and requested his services for there was imminent danger to
her life and medical assistance was urgently needed.
225. REYES VS. INES-LUCIANO 226. LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On January 18, 1958, Manuel J. C. Reyes married Celia Ilustre- FACTS: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were married on 1951.
Reyes and had children. On March 10, 1976, Manuel attacked Celia by On 1969, petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent.
fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down 1969, respondent then filed for legal separation on the grounds of
the 13-flight stairs and hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half concubinage and attempt against her life. Moreover, she wanted support
unconscious. By May 11, 1976, she left their office. On May 26, 1976, pending trial for their youngest son. On 1969, respondent Judge granted
she returned to get her overnight bag and Manuel demanded that she respondents application for support pendente lite. Petitioner filed for a
get out but she ignored him, hence, he doused her with grape juice, preliminary injunction which was dismissed. Meanwhile, in 1972, the
kicked her and attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by Court of First Instance of Rizal found Respondent and Teodor Ramirez
her driver. On June 3, 1976, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed against Manuel J. (his paramour) guilty of adultery.
C. Reyes an action for support pendente lite, and for Legal Separation
when he had attempted to kill her. Manuel contends that Celia committed ISSUE: Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the
adultery with her physician and that she is thus not entitled to support respondents claim for support pendente lite.
and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was
excessive RULING: Yes. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from
the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a
ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately.
There must be a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to
RULING: Yes. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support live separately for him/her to gain support. In other words, the right to
but only if proven. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly support was lost by the respondent when she was found guilty of
proved and sustained will defeat the action but it must be established by adultery.
competent evidence and not merely alleged. During hearing of the
application for support pendente lite, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation. During hearing of the application for
action for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove
his allegation. Yet Celia asked for support pending litigation from their
conjugal partnership and not necessarily from Manuel‗s private funds.
The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon
parents the ―duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,‖ while,
on the other hand, gives them the ―right to correct and punish them in
moderation.‖ The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. The defendants
failed to do.
231. PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES 232. AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Spouses filed a case with the RTC for damages on the death of FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate, Pablito Daffon, while
their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila Technical Institute grounds in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. He was in school to
(laboratory room) against defendants Antonio C. Brillantes (member of finish a physics experiment as a pre-requisite to graduating that year. He
the Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (the President), Santiago M. died at 17. The respondent school and its faculty members submit that
Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio L. Daffon (co-student and they cannot be held liable for what happened because, technically, the
assailant of Palisoc). The death of the victim was believed to have been semester had already ended.
caused by the heavy fist blows to the body which he had incurred from a
fight with Daffon which damaged his internal organs. The lone witness to ISSUE: Whether or not they should be held liable now that the
the event, Desiderio Cruz, attested that he and Daffon were fixing a semester had ended when the incident happened.
machine while the victim was looking on. After a snide comment by
Daffon regarding his inaction, the victim slapped him which started the RULING: No and the petition is hereby denied. Art. 2180 of the Civil
fight. Daffon then retaliated with fist blows to the body. After which Code states that: ―Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
Palisoc fell down and fainted after which he was brought to the hospital and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
where he later died from his injuries. The TC found Daffon guilty for the students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.‖ There
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the other have been cases in the past where who was liable would depend on w/n
defendants from liability under Article 2180 of the NCC. The court cited the school was academic or non-academic. If it were academic, the
that the damages to incurred in the case would not be on the defendant teacher-in-charge of the student would be liable, while if it were non-
from MTI since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code contemplated a academic, the head would be. (The ratio of this being that heads of
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the schools of arts and trade would be closer and more involved with their
control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. students, who can be considered their apprentices.) The Court believes
that this provision should apply to ALL schools, academic and non-
ISSUE: Whether or not under the factual findings, the trial court erred in academic. Even if the student was within the school grounds and
absolving the defendants-school officials from civil liability under Art. basically doing nothing, he is still within the school custody and subject
2180 of the NCC. to the discipline of school authorities. However, in the case at bar, none
of the respondents can be clearly said to have been responsible for what
RULING: Yes, the SC held the lower court erred in its application of Art. happened to Amadora. The school itself cannot be held directly liable
2180 in as much as they misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the because according to the provision, it is only either the teacher-in-charge
student) remain in their (the school‗s) custody‗, to mean that the school or the head of the school. The rector, dean of boys or the high school
incurs liability for a student‗s actions only if the student actually boards principal also may not be held liable because it is clear that they are not
or resides w/ them (a case where their influence over the student teachers-in-charge. Alfredo‗s physics teacher cannot be held liable
supersedes that of the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of because he was not necessarily the teacher-in-charge of Daffon.
Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the mentioned phrase actually
implied that liability arises not from the boarding of the student w/ the
school but from the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. As
such being that the offense occurred in school premises during class
time within the supervision of the school. They should be held liable
under 2180 unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage." which they did not do.
233. SALVOSA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 234. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
FACTS: The Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic FACTS: From Feb 13-20 1995, St. Mary‗s conducted an enrollment
institution and is also an institution of arts and trade. Within the premises drive, part of which were school visits from where prospective enrollees
of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed were studying. As a student of St. Mary‗s, Sherwin Carpitanos (son of
Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy. B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer, respondent spouses) was part of the campaign group. Sherwin, along
he was appointed by the AFP and he also receives his salary from the with other students were riding the jeep, owned by co-respondent
AFP. He also receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a commerce Vivencio Villanueva, driven by James Daniel, 15 years old, also a
student of the BCF. On Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student, allegedly, he was driving in reckless manner resulting the jeep
student of the University of Baguio in the parking lot of BCF with an to turtle, and Sherwin died as a result of injuries sustained. After trial,
unlicensed firearm which he took from the armory of the ROTC Unit. RTC ordered St. Mary‗s to pay the spouses Carpitanos for damages. St.
Heirs of Napoleon (Respondents) sued for damages from Abon, his Mary‗s appealed the ruling to the CA, but was denied, hence this appeal
officer, officers of the BCF and BCF, Inc. The RTC rendered their
decision, sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and severally for ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner
damages. The IAC affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC. liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be held solidarily liable with RULING: Yes, Under FC Art. 218, Schools have special parental
Jimmy Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. authority (APA) over a minor child while under their custody - such
authority applies to field trips and other affairs outside school whenever
authorized by the schools. Under the Family Code, Art. 219, if a person
RULING: No. Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident was around under custody is a minor, those exercising SPA are liable for damages
8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed to be in the ROTC office at that time, caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under
as ordered by his Commandant, Ungos. Abon could not have been in the their custody. For St. Mary to be liable, there must be an act or omission
custody of the school at the time, as he was under direct orders to have considered negligent and which has proximate cause to the injury, and
been somewhere else. IAC decision is reversed. the negligence must have causal connection to the accident.
Respondents fail to show that the negligence was the proximate cause,
hence reliance on Art 219 is unfounded. Respondents Spouses Daniel
(parents of driver) and Villanueva (owner of the jeep) admit that the
cause of the accident was not negligence of St. Mary‗s nor the reckless
driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep - which the Carpitons do not dispute. There is likewise no evidence
that St. Mary‗s allowed the minor James to drive, it was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of the jeep owner who allowed James to drive.
Hence liability for the accident whether caused by negligence of the
driver or detachment of steering wheel guide must be pinned on the
minor‗s parents. The negligence of St. Mary‗s was only a remote cause.
With the evidence presented by St. Mary‗s and with the fact that the
Daniel spouses mention the circumstance of detachment of steering
wheel, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who
shall be responsible
235. MEDINA VS. MAKABALI 236. LUNA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: On Feb. 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to Joseph FACTS: Private Respondent Maria Santos is an illegitimate child of the
Casero in Makabali Clinic, Pampanga, owned by respondent petitioner Horacio Luna, who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Luna.
Dra.Venancia Makabali. Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabali from Maria is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they are the parents of
his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. Zenaida never Shirley, who is the subject of this child custody case. Around 2-4 months
visited the child nor paid for his expenses until Aug of 1966 where she after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a
claimed for custody of the minor. Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with childless couple with considerable means who loved Shirley and raised
Feliciano Casero with two other children, with the tolerance of Casero‗s her as their very own. Petitioners asked for the respondents‗ consent to
lawful wife who lives elsewhere. During trial, the minor addressed the Shirley‗s application for a US Visa because they wanted to bring her to
respondent as Mammy, and even chose to stay with the respondent. Disneyland but to no avail. Hence, petitioner left Shirley with the
With Dra. Makabili making a promise to allow the minor the free choice of respondents, upon the latter‗s request, but with instructions that their
whom to live with upon reaching the age of 14 – the Court held that it driver take and fetch Shirley to Maryknoll College every school day.
was for the child‗s best interest to be left with the foster mother. When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the
respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The
ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in ordering the minor to stay with private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did
the respondent. the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof,
the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, and the trial court ruled
RULING: No, petition dismissed. While the law recognizes the right of in favor of them. Respondents appealed to CA, who reversed the order.
parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic Petitioners opposed the execution of the judgment and filed a motion for
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and reconsideration on grounds of the subsequent emotional, psychological,
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (NCC Art. and physiological condition of the child Shirley which would make the
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be judgment prejudicial to the child‗s best interests. Shirley made a
ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or run away from
and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the
parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, petitioners herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. Regardless,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. respondent court still ruled in favor of the respondents
356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved
remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners is entitled to the rightful custody
love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his of Shirley.
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
RULING: Petition granted, Shirley goes to the petitioners. Shirley‗s
manifestations that she would kill herself or run away if she were taken
away from the petitioners would make the judgment unfair, unjust, if not
illegal. NCC Art. 363 provides that questions relating to the care,
custody, and education, etc. of children, the latter‗s welfare is
paramount, hence best interests of the minor can override procedural
rules - even the rights of the biological parents. Furthermore, in her
letters to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological
parents as selfish and cruel who beat her often. To return her to the
private respondents would be traumatic, as requested by the child
herself, let us not destroy her future.
237. LINDAIN VS. COURT OF APPEALS 238. CHUA VS. CABANGBANG
FACTS: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land FACTS: Pacita Chua worked as a hostess and lived with Chua Ben in
whose title was under their names. 1950. They had a child but died in infancy. She then cohabited with Sy
Sia Lay, with Robert and Betty Chua Sy as fruits. After Betty‗s birth, they
HELD: Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. separated. She then became Victor Tan Villareal‗s mistress in 1960, a
Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and duties as legal girl was born to her but then they separated and she gave the child away
administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power to a comadre in Cebu. On May1958, Bartolome Cabangbang and his
to mortgage, encumber or dispose. wife, who were then childless, acquired custody of Betty, who was then
four months old. They had her baptized as Grace Cabangbang. On how
Cabangbangs acquired Betty: according to Pacita, it was Villareal during
their cohabitation, who gave Betty to Cabangbangs (for favors Villareal
received). She only knew of such when Betty was three years old and
was brought to her by Villareal, who then returned Betty to the
Cabangbangs due to threats. The Cabangbangs say they found her
wrapped in bundles at their gates and then treated her as their own, and
that only when Betty/Grace was 5 ½ years old that the controversy
arose.
Trial Court said that Betty was given to Cabangbangs by Villareal but
with knowledge and consent from Pacita. Pacita demanded the custody
of the child. Respondents were the Cabangbangs and Villareal. A writ
was issued by court but the body of child was not produced. The Trial
court eventually ruled that for the welfare of the child, she should remain
in the custody of the Cabangbangs
RULING: No. Article 363 of the New Civil Code say that minor under
seven years of age shall not be separated from mother, but issue is now
moot as Grace is already 11. The courts may, in cases specified by law,
deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid
reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of
parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
Petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not been taken any step to see
the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of
the Cabangbangs.
239. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC 240. JOHNSTON VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, FACTS: On June 24, 1960: a Petition for Adoption of Ana Isabel
1970. They had two children: Junior and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana was filed by Isabel Valdes
abandoned the conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his Johnston. The 2-yr.-10-mo. old baby was then under the custody of the
previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50,000 from Rep. orphanage Hospicio de San Jose whose Mother Superior consented to
Maglana and 10,000 from a certain Galagar. Classmates of Junior and the adoption. As alleged in the petition, Isabel was then married to
Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate Raymond Arthur Johnston who also consented to the adoption. The
any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the adoption was granted but the surname of the child was changed to
kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed at the Court of First ―Valdes‖ because it was held as the surname of the petitioner. On
Instance of Bohol on April 10, 1978 a petition to change surname of her October 24, 1960, a Motion was filed to change the surname to ―Valdes
two children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). Trial Johnston‖.
Court dismissed petition saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling,
abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio, but their marriage has not ISSUE: Whether the adopted child can use the surname of adopter‗s
yet been annulled nor declared bigamous) were not sufficient grounds to husband.
invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would
give false impression of family relations. RULING: No, because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her surname can
be used by the child.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two children‗s prayer to drop their father‗s
surname is justified. NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use the adopter‗s
surname.
RULING: No. Following the New Civil Code Art. 364, since Junior and
Bombi are legitimate children, therefore they should use their father‗s The husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption, his consent to the
surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopting father.
mother‗s desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of Hence, his surname cannot be used because it would give the wrong
name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec impression that he adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to the
5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the status of his legitimate child under NCC 341 (1).
children later on, may cause confusion as to the minor‗s parentage and
might also create the impression that said minors are illegitimate But why ―Valdes‖ despite her marriage to Johnston? Because ―Valdes‖
children, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. remains to be as her own surname. Use of the surname of the husband
Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have is only an addition to the surname of the wife and it does not change the
been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature latter. NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to her surname her
age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then husband's surname but she has a surname of her own to which her
they can already file said action for themselves. husband's surname may only be added if she so chooses.
241. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA 242. TOLENTINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she FACTS: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years Appeals. On February 8, 1931 – Respondent Consuelo David married
later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was dissolved
Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin‘s and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a
mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer‘s decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and
using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records. abandonment by the wife for a t least 3 continuous years Arturo
She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is Tolentino married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage.
required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3
Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after
father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino
among persons and entities she dealt with and would entail endless and (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should
vexatious explanations of the circumstances. discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she
change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition, was divorced.
the mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come
forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of RULING: Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may
Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate publication of the proceeding continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no
has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of provisions for divorce under Philippine law. There was a commentary by
Serafin Ferrer. Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an
exclusive right to use the husband‘s surname. She cannot be prevented
from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 is
not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present
case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid
marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where
the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. Of the
husband even if he has remarried.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emperatriz can change her civil status from
married to single in Victoria‗s birth certificate.
RULING: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry
does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and
surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth
certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her
status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth,
thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents
would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.