Issue 489 • 4 August 2023

www.africa-energy.com

Niger on the brink as neighbours threaten to

respond to coup with force
Strategically important Niger is at a crossroads after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum,
with events quickly deteriorating to the extent that Ecowas has threatened force to reinstate democratic
rule, while France and the US are anxious to ensure their key regional military base doesn’t follow other
Sahel states by falling into the Russian camp, writes Marc Howard

T
he unravelling of President Mohamed Bazoum’s
strategically important, elected government in the
Sahel’s latest military putsch poses thorny questions
for Niger’s neighbours and the international powers that
made Niamey their regional hub – especially after pro-
Russian military regimes that are antagonistic to the West
took over in several other states across a region where
jihadist insurgency and extreme poverty remain a blight.
As ramifications sank in of the crisis launched by the coup
d’état that placed pro-western Bazoum under house arrest
on 26 July, regional bloc the Economic Community of West
African States (Ecowas) invoked the threat of force to
reinstate democratic rule, while France and the United
States have been working to ensure their key regional
military base doesn’t fall into the Russian camp.
These events have left development partners, financiers and
many other stakeholders in a quandary that will prove acutely
difficult to resolve, barring a very unlikely speedy resolution.
That quandry was expressed by the World Bank Group
(WBG), which on 2 August said it was “alarmed” by the coup
and had thus “paused disbursements for all operations until
further notice, other than private sector partnerships which
will continue with caution”.
Reflecting its strategic importance and huge development
needs, the WBG has some $4.5bn committed to priority
CONTINUED ON PAGE 3

Just transitions Biomass revival Tanzania’s resource nationalist legacy

The agreement announced in
Paris in June for Senegal to
become only the second
African economy to secure a
Just Energy Transition
Partnership (JETP) with the
G7 major economies has the
potential to salvage the
climate financing framework’s
credibility among African
hydrocarbons producers and
importers. It could open the
way for others to benefit from
big new financial flows,
including those who have so
far missed out on JETPs such
as Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco.
—SEE PAGE 38
Financial close for a 45MW
project in Ayébo, Côte d’Ivoire
could prove a milestone for
Africa, as the continent’s first
utility-scale, on-grid biomass
plant structured as an
independent power producer.
Biomass is often poorly
understood as a fuel source
and there have been plenty of
false dawns in the past, but
the potential of generating
dispatchable baseload whiled
also creating a large number
of jobs for locals could entice
others to explore the
opportunities further.
—SEE PAGE 8
Tanzania has been ordered to pay $109.5m to a group of
developers who claimed their nickel sulphide mining venture
was unlawfully seized by late president John Magufuli’s
government. The International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (Icsid)’s 14 July decision is the latest
– but probably not the last – judgement to stem from Magufuli’s
poorly-conceived economic policies, which often alienated
investors and stalled projects (AE 415/20, 368/21, 338/5).
The claimants included UK-incorporated Ntaka Nickel
Holdings, Nachingwea UK and Tanzania-headquartered
Nachingwea Nickel. The award is one of several
international arbitration claims made by investors as a
result of Magufuli-era policies. Two other cases were
brought at Icsid by Canadian miners, while Symbion Power
launched proceedings in September 2019, which were
discontinued in May 2021 (AE 440/8).
—For more see ESG: Tanzania’s $110m bill

ISSN 1463-1849
Contents

FOCUS
NIGER: Threats of force highlight coup’s challenge 1
NIGER: Chronology of the CNSP coup 3
MAP: Niger’s energy infrastructure and key data 4
Issue 489 • 4 August 2023 REGION: What is Moscow’s role? Why is France so hated? 6
Incisive analysis since 1998 NIGER/MARKET: Questions about nuclear status 6
www.africa-energy.com
BIOMASS: CdI project points to generation potential 8
MAP: Biomass projects across Africa 9
Editorial director BIOETHANOL: Clean cooking, gasoline blends 11
Jon Marks
jon@africa-energy.com POWER
SOUTH AFRICA: Transmission licence ‘milestone’ 14
Commissioning editor
Dominic Dudley CORPORATE: TotalEnergies' full takeover of TotalEren 14
dominic@africa-energy.com BOTSWANA/NAMIBIA: Coal PPA, NamPower tenders 15
Deputy editor ZAMBIA/REGION: Zesco links to Tanzania, Kenya, DRC 15
Marc Howard ZAMBIA/REGION: CSP deal, IPP renegotiation 16
m.howard@africa-energy.com ZAMBIA: Colliary seeks finance for coal plant expansion 17
Hydrocarbons editor ZIMBABWE: First utility-scale wind farm 17
James Gavin TANZANIA: Tanesco transmission project, Record profits 18
james@africa-energy.com CONGO B: Hydropower PPP concessions 18
African Energy staff EGYPT: Scatec, Acwa secure land for giga-scale wind 19
John Hamilton, Tonderayi Mukeredzi (Harare), SENEGAL: Gas-for-power boost 20
Camilla Nytun, Ajay Ubhi (Head of Data)
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POWER
Cartographer SOUTH AFRICA: Sibanye procures renewable energy 21
David Burles
CORPORATE: Starsight/SolarAfrica complete merger 22
Production KENYA: Wind plant for cement factory 22
Aaron Griffiths
EGYPT: Centamin’s Sukari solar expansion progresses 23
Contributing editors
UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS
Martin Burdett, Waly Dione Faye (Casablanca), François
Misser (Brussels), Chiwoyu Sinyangwe (Lusaka) LNG: Progress of projects lifts sector 24
FLNG: Prospects across Africa 25
Editor emeritus
Thalia Griffiths UGANDA/EGYPT: Tilenga drilling, ExxonMobil blocks 26
LIBYA: SLB wins ground-breaking drilling contract 27
Sales and Service
MAJOR COMPANIES: Q2 23 results and plans 27
Direct: +44 (0) 1424 721 667
Email: subscriptions@cbi-publishing.com CLIMATE CHANGE AND FUTURE FUELS
SOUTH AFRICA: More support urged for GH2 projects 28
TRANSITION MINERALS
RWANDA: Rio Tinto takes stake in Aterian lithium project 29
2023 Cross-border Information (London) Ltd. All rights reserved. ESG, FINANCE AND POLICY
Data and information published in African Energy is provided to TANZANIA: Arbitration rulings line up 30
Cross-border Information (CbI) by its staff and network of correspon-
dents through extensive surveys of sources and published with the in- RUSSIA: Putin eyes bigger role in energy projects 32
tention of being accurate. CbI cannot insure against or be held
responsible for inaccuracies and assumes no liability for any loss DRC/REGION: UAE deepens mining and other links 34
whatsoever arising from use of such data.
NIGERIA: Government awaited, cost of living tensions rise 35
No portion of this publication may be photocopied, reproduced, re-
transmitted, put into a computer system or otherwise redistributed AGENDA
without prior authorisation from CbI.
EVENTS: What’s on around the region 37
Registered office: 4 Bank Buildings, Station Road, Hastings, East Sus-
sex, TN34 1NG, UK
AFRICAN ENERGY VIEW
Directors: NJ Carn, E Gillespie, JD Hamilton, JJ Marks
SENEGAL/CLIMATE: G7 backs down on JETP and gas 38

2 AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023


Fallout from the Nigerien coup
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1
sectors, and has given the government $600m in direct
budget support for 2022-23.
Niger itself is most likely extremely divided over preferred
outcomes, as are regional governments.
The putschists have some support from populations who
blame former colonial power France for many of their
problems. Their anger has been fuelled by conspiracy
theories over Paris’ control of the CFA franc and much more
– which can also be heard in more ‘stable’ capitals such as
Dakar – and those who have been persuaded by (often
Russian-inspired) social media that a radical change of
ruling elite is the panacea to the world’s poorest region’s
deep-rooted problems.
Mobilisation of the Sahel street in support of military
takeovers, usually involving protests around the French
embassy, was apparent once more when on 3 August
crowds numbering in the low thousands gathered in Niamey
and Agadez to demonstrate support for the Conseil National
pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) junta.
Their enthusiasm is not shared by democratic members of
Abuja-headquartered Ecowas, which has swiftly
implemented sanctions – and threatened military action –
while the coup was also condemned by the African Union.
But some neighbours have rallied behind Presidential Guard
commander Brigadier General Abdourahamane Tiani, who
led the coup, unsurprisingly including military rulers in
Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali. The Nigerien putsch follows
at least 11 attempts to seize power by force in Sahel and
nearby countries since 2020 (AE 470/30, 455/6, 439/7).
A region mired in crises
Some coups have failed, but whatever the outcome the
consequences for the Sahel, already mired in economic,
climate change and security crises, have been dire.
Desperately poor Niger has a GDP per capita of $533 and is
the world’s seventh-poorest country, according to the WBG.
It ranks third-last on the United Nations’ 2021-22 Human
Development Index (HDI).
Niger’s socio-economic difficulties are compounded by
chronic insecurity in the north, where the government’s writ
barely extends and jihadist groups including the local
Islamic State (IS, Isis or Daesh) franchise and Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb remain active.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Focus
Chronology of the Nigerien coup
On 26 July, nine military officers made a televised address
to say they had ousted the democratically-elected
President Mohamed Bazoum. The announcement was
made on state television by Colonel-Major Amadou
Abdramane – who has since been named as the
putschist’ Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la
Patrie (CNSP)’s spokesman – but no coup leader was
immediately specified (AE 489/online).
Throughout 26 July reports circulated that the
Presidential Guard had placed Bazoum under house arrest
in his official residence in Niamey. While forces loyal to
the president had reportedly attempted to come to his aid,
the putschists nonetheless achieved the crucial step of
gaining access to state broadcaster Office de
Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Niger.
On 28 July, Brigadier General Abdourahamane Tiani
confirmed he was leader of the CNSP and declared
himself president. It had been rumoured that Bazoum was
seeking to replace the Presidential Guard commander.
(There was a similar situation in Guinea in September
2021 when Colonel Mamady Doumbouya overthrew
president Alpha Condé.)
Bazoum subsequently issued a defiant social media
statement and had phone conversations with African
Union commissioner Moussa Faki Mahamat, United
States secretary of state Anthony Blinken and French
President Emmanuel Macron. There is little sign he will be
released imminently.
On 30 July, the Economic Community of West African
States (Ecowas) issued a one-week deadline for Bazoum
to be reinstated, threatening force if that did not happen. It
is not expected the CNSP will give up come the 6 August
deadline.
The Ecowas Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS)
met in Abuja on 2-4 August to discuss possible military
intervention – which upped the ante but would prove very
difficult, even though Nigeria’s new administration is
sounding bullish about taking assertive action.
On 1 August, France said it would start evacuating French
and other European Union citizens.
On 2 August, the US State Department ordered non-
emergency embassy personnel to leave.
African Energy issue 490
The next issue of African Energy
will be published in pdf format on 8 September 2023
Meanwhile a flow of news stories and analysis will
continue to be published at www.africa-energy.com
3
Map: Niger’s energy infrastructure and key data

n
g tio
tin ruc ed ALGERIA SŽguŽdine
pera onst lann
O C P
L L L Liquid fuels 500MW +
C C C Coal 100 Ð 499MW
Assamakka (solar-diesel)
X N I G E R
IfŽrouane
AGADEZ Dirkou
X X X Hybrid incl. battery 10 Ð 99MW Arlit L
(solar-diesel) X
GOVIEX MADAOUELA MINE (solar-diesel) X Bilma
COMINAK AKOUTA MINE L X (solar-diesel)
H H H Hydroelectricity 0.1 Ð 9MW Akokan
X (solar-diesel)
S S S Solar photovoltaic Timia (solar-diesel) X Fachi
1 MANGAIZƒ (solar-diesel)
X DASA URANIUM MINE
W W W Wind 2 DINARA (solar-diesel) SOMINA AZELIK MINE (solar-diesel) NIGER WAPP SOLAR PV
3 BANI BANGOU
C West African Power Pool Secretariat seeking
330kV power line 4 TARBIYAT (solar-diesel) C SONICHAR ANOU ARAREN MINE
studies for World Bank-backed project to
5 ABALA TchirozŽrine L AGADEZ I
132kV power line 6 DINGAZI BANDA (solar-diesel) develop an estimated total 150MW scalable,
7 TELEMCES (solar-diesel) Agadez L AGADEZ II
multi-site, multi-phase regional solar park
9 X 11 X X (solar-diesel)
66kV power line 8 TILLIA (solar-diesel) in Niger.
9 TASSARA (solar-diesel) 10 X X NIGER-AGADEZ (solar-diesel)
10 BAZAGOR (solar-diesel)
11 INGAL (solar-diesel) X 8 W EOLI NIGER DIFFA
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NIAMEY L
DOSSO Goudoumaria LX Lake
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4 ZOMO
T. BENIN TO SéMé-KRAKƒ 0 Miles 200 CAM. 0 Miles 40 5 BUSHIYA

Population (2023 est.) 25.4m ¥ Growth rate: 3.66% ¥ REAL GDP 12 REAL GDP 8
Birth rate: 46.86 births/1,000 population ¥ GROWTH, 10 PER CAPITA
Death rate: 9.66 deaths/1,000 population 6
2016Ð24 8
GROWTH,
Age structure (2023 est.) 0Ð14 years: 49.7% ¥ 15Ð64 years: 47.6% ¥ % change on 4
65+ years: 2.7%
2016Ð24
previous year 6 % change on
Life expectancy at birth Total population: 60.48 years ¥ Male: 58.91 previous year 2
(2023 est.) years ¥ Female: 62.1 years 4
Total fertility rate (2023 est.) 6.73 children born /woman 2 0
est. projections est. projections
Ethnic groups (2021 est.) Hausa 53%, Zarma/Songhai 21%, Tuareg 0 Ð2
11%, Fulani (Peuhl) 7%, Kanuri 6%, 2016 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2016 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Gurma 1%
CPI 6 BUDGET 0
Languages French (official), Hausa, Djerma
Budget balance
Net migration rate (2023 est.) Ð0.62 migrants/1,000 population INFLATION, BALANCE
2016Ð24 4 AND Ð4
Urban population (2023) 17.1% of total population
% change on CURRENT
Urbanisation rate (2020-25 est.) 4.72% annual rate of change previous year 2 Ð8
ACCOUNT,
Armed forces personnel (2022) Forces ArmŽes NigŽriennes (FAN): approx. Current account
12,000 active troops ¥ Niger National 2016Ð24 est. projections
Source for table: CIA, 0 % of GDP Ð12
Guard (NNG): approx. 3,000
The World Factbook; est. projections
Source for charts: AfDB, African Economic Outlooks, 2018-23 Ð2 Ð16
© African Energy 2023 (www.africa-energy.com) 2016 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2016 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

4 AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023


Niger has been a key western ally in the Sahel, hosting US
and French troops, aircraft and drones; its importance has
risen as French forces have left Mali and Burkina Faso over
the past two years. With the prospect of another ally falling,
western diplomats have been trying to assert their influence
and retain their relationship with Niger, while also calling for
the democratically-elected government to be reinstated.
US secretary of state Anthony Blinken has said
Washington’s “partnership depends on the continuation of
democratic governance”. Blinken has previously visited
Niamey and hosted Bazoum in Washington to show support
and pledge military assistance (AE 471/7).
While the security situation in Niamey was calm as the
putschists entered their second week at the helm – little
violence has been reported since 26 July – France has been
evacuating its citizens and the US has partially evacuated
its embassy (see Regional powers below).
‘All measures necessary… including force’
The Ecowas Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS)
met in Abuja on 2-4 August to discuss the possibility of
military intervention, as mandated by an earlier Ecowas
summit that also enacted sanctions.
A 30 July Ecowas communiqué threatened “all measures
necessary… including the use of force” if Bazoum was not
reinstated by 6 August.
Any Ecowas intervention would almost certainly need
support from the two military actors that really matter in
Niger: the US and France, Benjamin Augé of the French
Institute of International Relations (Ifri) told Paris daily Le
Monde on 2 August. This could be forthcoming, Augé said,
pointing to the good relationship between France and
Nigeria – the dominant power in Ecowas.
The Ecowas summit was chaired by President Bola Tinubu,
who made his political career by challenging military rule in
Nigeria. As he beds into the presidency on Aso Rock, Tinubu
has shown clear signs of adopting a more activist regional
stance than his predecessor Muhammadu Buhari, whose
first spell in power was an military leader (see ESG: Nigeria).
Tinubu has made clear his opposition to the CNSP coup
with measures including ordering Transmission Company
of Nigeria (TCN) to cut off electricity exports to Niger. TCN
supplies around 80% of Société Nigérienne d’Electricité
(Nigelec)’s grid capacity (AE 446/12).
The 30 July Ecowas communiqué was signed by the bloc’s
ten members that are in good standing, but four others
remain suspended on account of their rule by juntas: Niger,
Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Focus
The three putschist regimes have all pledged to back Niger
if Ecowas intervenes against it, suggesting a regional bloc
of military governments may be emerging.
Tiani’s regime has moved quickly to establish good
relationships with neighbouring like-minded strongmen.
General Salifou Modi – who was Nigerien army chief of staff
prior to his appointment on 2 June as ambassador to the
United Arab Emirates – has visited Bamako and
Ouagadougou in recent days.
A peaceful resolution to the situation is not yet out of the
question. The CNSP reportedly issued a statement on 3
August saying it was “open to dialogue” and wanted to
“create the conditions for a peaceful transition” including
elections.
However, such statements are part of the playbook often
followed by coup leaders while they cement their power;
history shows reasons are quickly found for delaying
elections when the time comes.
There is, however, a Nigerien precedent for such a transition,
albeit during a less tumultuous time for the Sahel. When
president Mamadou Tandja (also a former army lieutenant
colonel) attempted to extend his rule beyond the two-term
limit in 2009 he was overthrown by a coup launched by the
Conseil Suprême pour la Restauration de la Démocratie
(CSRD) (AE 212/17) .
Tandja was held under house arrest until the CSRD held
elections in 2011. Those polls were deemed credible,
allowing Bazoum’s predecessor and mentor Mahamadou
Issoufou to take power.
History suggests more instability possible
It remains unclear what approach Niger’s new authorities
might take to governing, or their attitude to the position of
international powers in the country, not least because it is
hard to reach any conclusions about how cohesive the new
regime is.
Indeed, the potential for intra-CNSP fighting over power
cannot be discounted. Such outcomes have been seen in
other recent examples of coups, such as in Mali where
Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a second coup in May 2021,
during which he had his rivals arrested (AE 439/7).
The dangers of splits in military/security elites are
underlined by the conflict that continues to rage in Sudan
between forces aligned to two strongmen vying for power:
Sudanese Armed Forces commander General Abdel-Fattah
Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces’
Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) (AE
488/23, 483/5).
5
Focus
REGIONAL POWERS
What is Moscow’s role? Why
is France so hated?
Russia has strongly backed the anti-western, populist
regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso through its mercenary
Wagner Group, which has also established itself as a force
in Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan (AE 487/35).
Wagner is widely considered to be part of Moscow’s hybrid
war against the West. Its blend of propaganda, armed militia
and the sale of arms has proven effective in winning
significant influence among military regimes whose writ is
weak but which have access to natural resources, whose
extraction provides a flow of funds to Russia.
Its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin announced in July that Wagner
would embark on “a new journey to Africa” (AE 488/34).
However, there is no sign of direct Russian involvement in
the Nigerien coup as yet, London think tank Chatham House
consulting fellow Paul Melly told African Energy.
Coup leads to questions about Niger’s nuclear status
Some media reports have pointed to Niger’s substantial
uranium deposits as a potential motivation for the coup –
although personal ambitions are a more likely motivation.
Niger was the source of just 4% of global output in 2022,
according to the World Uranium Association. This was all
from one mine: Société des Mines de l’Aïr (Somair) in the
Agadez region. Somair is 63.4% owned by France’s Orano
with the remainder held by Société du Patrimoine des Mines
du Niger (Sopamin).
Low uranium prices since Japan’s 2011 Fukushima disaster
have had a deleterious impact on all major producers,
including Niger. The Chinese-owned Société des Mines
d'Azelik (Somina) project in the Agadez region was placed
on care and maintenance (C&M) in 2015, although it has
been reported that studies are under way to resume
operations. Imouraren, another project majority-owned by
Orano, has also been on C&M since 2015.
A major new, high-grade mine at Dasa is being developed by
Canada’s Global Atomic Corporation. Expected to produce
20,000 tonnes of uranium compound triuranium octoxide,
Dasa is expected to be commissioned in 2025 (AE 485/27,
466/24).
Global Atomic chief executive Stephen Roman said on 31
July that work continued and “while the situation in Niger
6 AFRICAN ENERGY
But Russian information operations – either regionally or
targeted towards Niger – may have influenced the CNSP
and its backers. Crowds in Niamey and Agadez on 3 August
prominently displayed Russian flags, which were also
conspicuous at other pro-CNSP demonstrations.
Moscow’s approach to francophone Africa is well tested. It
has used social media messaging to whip up hostile
sentiment towards former colonial power France among the
huge numbers of unemployed youth.
This draws on deep-seated resentment towards post-
colonial meddling and the Cold War-era Francafrique
system of clandestine economic, military and political
influence. The CFA franc, used in 14 West and Central
African countries since independence from France, also
often serves as a lightning rod for supposed chicanery on
the part of Paris (AE 407/1).
Such ‘neo-colonial’ narratives are somewhat outdated.
French military strength in Africa is at its lowest post-
colonial level, while Francafrique networks have withered
(but are not extinct).
remains volatile and there has been protesting in some
parts of the capital, the rest of the country remains calm.”
However, Niger is a significant supplier of uranium to
Europe. Figure from the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) for 2021 show it as the source of
24% of imports.
Any interruption in supplies would have no immediate
impact on nuclear power generation in Europe though.
Euratom told Reuters on 2 August that there were three
years of reserves, while other sources could be developed in
the longer term.
One such alternative producer could be Namibia, which
exports almost three times more uranium than Niger and
where there are two operational Chinese-owned projects
and two others under C&M – one owned by Orano and
another by Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed
Paladin Energy (AE 487/26).
Although world-wide uranium demand is gradually
outstripping supply after the long post-Fukushima supply
lull, prices – although rising – remain low by historical
benchmarks. There is also likely to be sufficient latent
capacity under C&M in other producing countries to make
up for any shortfall from political turbulence in Niger.
l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
 Focus

The CFA franc – pegged to the euro since 1999 – is hardly
a tool of significant economic influence: its 14 users
account for only 12.5% of French trade in Africa, according
to academic Loup Viallet.
Even so, Russia’s social media onslaught has proved
effective in diverting local attention from Wagner’s
documented involvement in atrocities and its role in illicitly
exporting minerals. The United Kingdom government said
in July that Wagner and Malian forces had carried out a
massacre of at least 500 people in Moura, central Mali in
March 2022.
On 27 June, the US Treasury said Wagner “funds its brutal
operations in part by exploiting natural resources in
countries like the Central African Republic and Mali”.
This is a business model that could be replicated in Niger,
where coup leaders may be tempted to secure a bigger
share of the action.

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independent analysis
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ENERGY REVENUE SHORTFALL, 2021Ð25 No action scenario CHANGE IN POVERTY, 2012Ð16 UNAVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC
% change SERVICES AND POVERTY

Full African Energy subscriptions include:

2,000 Annual gas sector shortfall 1,878
12,000
1,781 UPPER EAST INCIDENCE COMBINED
$m Annual power sector shortfall $m +10.4% Electricity, safe water & adequate sanitation
UPPER
(left-hand scale) 1,578 614 WEST
1,600 1,518 424 9,600 +0.2%
UPPER EAST
434 UPPER
1,265 407
WEST
1,200 7,200
269 NORTHERN
Accumulated arrears Ð GoG liability +10.7%
(right-hand scale)
800 4,800 NORTHERN

400
996 1,111 1,144 1,264 1,357

2,400


 


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0 0 VOLTA
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 +3.5% BRONG-AHAFO
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POPULATION, 1980Ð2025 EASTERN
AZER.

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Ð9.1% SPAIN AlgeriaÐItaly ITALY
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35 MoroccoÐPortugal MoroccoÐ El HadjarÐ Elmed TunisiaÐItaly
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30 Ð5.0% Spain EuroAfrica EgyptÐCyprusÐGreece
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25 (Guelmim Oued Noun region wind, CENTRAL Tunisia
ACCRA TUNISIA LibyaÐItaly SYRIA
solar & battery projectsÐDevon) Az-ZawiyaÐ CYPRUS
Madeira
TuNur Chiaramonte Gulfi LibyaÐEgypt
LEB. IRAN
20 > 5% increase (Port.) MoroccoÐ TunisiaÐItaly (TobrukÐWadi El Natrun) IRAQ
Algeria (TuNur solar projectÐ ISRAEL
15 < 5% increase MOROCCO
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availability of public services Libya EgyptÐJordan
No change/small change Azores (TabaÐAqaba) KUWAIT
10 (Sp.) ALGERIA
< 5% decrease

issues a year.
Eltam
Lower poverty levels and higher L I B YA EgyptÐSaudi Arabia
5 > 5% decrease availability of public services EGYPT (BadrÐMedina) BAHRAIN
estimates
0 Western SAUDI QATAR
1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25 Sahara 2021
PUBLIC DEBT STOCK, 2013ÐNov
EgyptÐSudan ARABIA U.A.E.
80 Domestic debt 78.4 (ToshkaÐWadi Halfa)
76.0
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1980Ð2025
% of External debt
90 15 GDP West African Monetary Zone target OMAN
$ billion MAURITANIA Sikasso61.2 MLÐ
FerkessŽdougou CIÐ
(current prices, left-hand scale) 60 CABO OMVS SenegalÐMaliÐ
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54.6 54.2
56.1Bobo-Dioulasso BF
39.1 40.8 N I G E R
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estimates
M A L I NigerÐNigeriaÐBenin SUDAN
42.6 LinsanÐBamakoÐKiffa) 29.6
CHAD ERITREA YEMEN
22.0 24.3 28.2 (OuagadougouÐNiameyÐ
40 22.1
SENEGAL 25.4 GuineaÐMali Bernin KebbiÐMalanville)
30 5 (NzŽrŽkorŽÐ CameroonÐChad EthiopiaÐSudan
THE GAMBIA Bamako) (NgaoundŽrŽÐNÕDjamena) (Gerd HEPÐKhartoum)
21.9 BURKINA
GUINEA-BISSAU FASO DJIBOUTI
0 0 OMVG The GambiaÐ GUINEA Ouagadougou BFÐ EthiopiaÐSouth Sudan
20 Bolgatanga
37.0 GH37.6 (Phase 1: GambelaÐMalakal,
% change on previous year 32.6
Guinea-BissauÐ 31.3 31.6
28.1 28.8 27.9 BENIN N I G E R I A Phase 2: DidessaÐJuba)
SIERRA ETHIOPIA

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(constant prices, right-hand scale) 20.7 GuineaÐSenegal CïTE TOGO
Ð5 (BrikamaÐBissauÐ LEONE GHANA SOUTH
DÕIVOIRE CENTRAL
A

LinsanÐKaolack) SUDAN
Coastal Backbone AFRICAN REPUBLIC
LI

0 CLSG LIBERIA
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (Abidjan
2020CIÐ Nov 2021 CAMEROON
A

(ManÐNzŽrŽkorŽÐ C™te
M

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BuchananÐLinsan)
O

1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25 dÕIvoireÐ DaviŽ TGÐ EQUAT.

S

EXTERNAL DEBT STOCK BY CREDITOR, 2013Ð20 Ghana SakŽtŽ BJÐ GUINEA Nelsap EEHP KenyaÐEthiopia
(AbidjanÐ Ikeja NG) S. TOMƒ & (Kenya/Uganda/ UGANDA (SuswaÐWolayta-Sodo)
VIL NGO

TOTAL INVESTMENT, 1983Ð2025 25 Other concessional Dunkwa) PRêNCIPE Rwanda/Burundi/DRC) KENYA

LE)
AZ CO

50 $bn MAJOR TRANSMISSION

Commercial GABON
ZA

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% of GDP 20 INTERCONNECTIONS GabonÐEquatorial GuineaÐ REPUBLIC
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(MoandaÐDjambala)O F
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(KabweÐSingidaÐIsinya)
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TANZANIA
30 DRCÐAngola
Proposed/planned (Inga HEPÐSoyo) DRCÐ
10 Zambia
Construction LubumbashiÐ TanzaniaÐMalawi
20 Chingola (SongweÐNkhoma) COMOROS
KolweziÐ
Operating Solwezi

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5 ANGOLA MALAWI Mayotte
(Fr.)
10 Expansion ZAMBI A
Cahora Bassa HEP MZÐChipata ZM Moma MozambiqueÐMalawi
ANNA AngolaÐNamibia Cahora Bassa (MatamboÐPhombeya)
estimates 0 CLSG: C™te dÕIvoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea
0 (LubangoÐKunene) Cahora Bassa HEP MZÐBindura ZW
2013 2014 2015 Electricity
EEHP: Eastern 2016 Highway2017
Project 2018 2019 2020
1983 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25 Eltam: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali MOZAMBIQUE
Gerd:
IMPORTS AND Grand Ethiopian
EXPORTS OFRenaissance
GOODSDam AND SERVICES, 1980Ð2025 ZiZaBoNa ZimbabweÐZambiaÐ ZIMBABWE MADAGASCAR
Sources: World Bank; IMF; Ghana Ministry of Finance

BotswanaÐNamibia MAURITIUS
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, 1980Ð2025 Nelsap: Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Plan MoZiSa MozambiqueÐZimbabweÐSouth Africa
60 (HwangeÐVictoria FallsÐ
OMVG: Gambia River Basin Development Organisation (InchopeÐTriangleÐNzhelele)
0 PandamatengaÐKatima Mulilo)
%OMVS:
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the Development of the Senegal River RŽunion
NAMIBIA BOTSWANA (Fr.)
$bn estimates Cahora Bassa HEPÐApollo
40 ZimbabweÐBotswanaÐSouth Africa
Ð1 Volume of exports (BulawayoÐSelebi-PhikweÐMatimba) MozambiqueÐSouth Africa

control news notifications.

20 ESWATINI
Ð2
MaputoÐArnot,
South AfricaÐNamibia MaputoÐCamden
0 (AriesÐKeetmanshoop)
Ð3 SOUTH LESOTHO
AFRICA
Ð4 Ð20
Volume of imports
Ð5 Ð40 REGIONAL POWER POOLS
estimates
Ð6 Ð60
1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25 1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25

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Focus
Utility-scale biomass generation gets a boost
in Côte d’Ivoire
Financial close for Biovea’s 45MW Ayébo plant in Côte d’Ivoire could prove a milestone as potential
investors investigate whether utility-scale biomass is bankable in countries with large agro-industries.
Biomass has appeal – providing dispatchable baseload electricity while potentially sustaining a large
number of jobs – but there have been false dawns before and hurdles remain for developers, not least
sourcing sufficient feedstock, writes Marc Howard
T
he 45MW Biovea Ayébo plant in south-east Côte
d’Ivoire has been generating positive news flow for
what is arguably Africa’s first utility-scale, on-grid
biomass independent power producer (IPP). The Ayébo
plant is expected to be commissioned in 2025, Electricité
de France (EDF) announced on 21 July, while on 24 July the
Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) said it had
reached financial close.
Early work began in 2022 on the 337 GWh/yr plant, which
has a 25-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with state
Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Électricité (CIE) (AE 456/15).
Developed by the Biovea Energie joint venture – comprising
EDF, Paris-based Meridiam and Ivorian agro-industrial firm
Sifca Group’s Biokala subsidiary – the two-unit plant’s
boilers will be fuelled by some 520,000 t/yr of biomass.
Palm leaf will be the main feedstock at Ayébo, 110km east
of Abidjan in the Toumanguié region, a centre for palm
cultivation and palm oil processing (of which Côte d'Ivoire
is Africa’s second-largest producer). However, palm trunk
and rubber tree residue can also be used if required.
Waste ash from power operations will be reused as
fertiliser. Electricity will be dispatched to the 90kV network
in eastern Abidjan via a new substation, which will be built
5km away in Aboisso.
Following a 2019 concession agreement, French
development finance institution Proparco and EAIF closed
a €178m ($212m) funding package in mid-2021 (AE 441/24,
424/9).
The developers said Ayébo could support substantial local
employment – in contrast to the majority of renewable
energy (RE) developments, which provide only limited jobs
after construction is completed. This is seen as an
environmental, social and governance (ESG) benefit for
investors, as well as having political attractions to
governments who need to stimulate jobs in rural zones.
Some 25% of the Ayébo feedstock will be supplied by
another Sifca subsidiary, Palmci, with the remainder
8 AFRICAN ENERGY
sourced from 12,000 smallholder farmers within a 60km
radius. According to Biovea, this will create the equivalent
of up to 1,000 full-time jobs in palm cultivation and residue
collection.
Analysis of the African Energy Live Data platform suggests
the Ayébo plant is the continent’s first biomass IPP
developed for grid supply. It gives substance to proponents
who argue that biomass can play a greater role in the energy
mix, providing baseload RE in economies that have
significant agro-industry that can produce the agricultural
residues to support it.
Residue not food crop
Most African biomass schemes use agricultural waste –
known in the industry as ‘agricultural residue’ – as
feedstock. This organic material would otherwise be
discarded and thus – biomass proponents emphasise –
doesn’t displace arable land that could otherwise be used
for food production (see Types of biomass feedstock,
below).
Energy density constraints mean biomass will never
dominate national energy mixes, but it can provide a
significant amount of dispatchable power based on
renewable feedstock.
Total operational generation capacity from biomass is now
over 2GW continent-wide, of which units with total 1.8GW
installed capacity sell excess power to their national grids,
according to African Energy Live Data. This largely
comprises commercial and industrial (C&I) plants run as
vertically-integrated operations by agro-industrial firms.
Sugarcane cultivation is most common, but some palm oil
and rubber producers also generate small amounts of power.
Other crops could provide feedstock but this is under-
developed: just 42MW of grid-connected biomass capacity
is sited in West Africa, according to Live Data – despite
many of the region’s economies having well-established
agricultural sectors that could support projects.
l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
 Map: Biomass projects across Africa

BIOMASS POWER PLANTS IN OPERATION ed

id id dd
-gr f-gr be
On Of Em
Biomass only
TUNISIA
Biomass /coal
Biogas /waste-to-energy (WTE)
MOROCCO
Source:
100MW + African Energy
ALGERIA Live Data
L I B YA 30 Ð 99MW © African Energy 2023
(www.africa-energy.com)
EGYPT 10 Ð 29MW
Western
Sahara The bagasse-fuelled Makeni plant
supplies electricity for an ethanol 3 Ð 9MW
The CSS sugar factory has refinery and is able to supply up
generated power from bagasse to 200GWh/yr of excess power to
since the 1970s. A new 25MW the National Grid. The project Developed by the Ethiopian Sugar Corp.,
Bagasse-fuelled plant supplies
boiler and turbo generator were became the first in Sierra Leone Tana-Beles I was commissioned in 2021.
power to White Nile SugarÕs
installed in 2011, increasing the to be registered for the Clean It will use 16MW for its own operations
efficiency ofMthe
A Uplant
R I T thus
ANIA factory, local residents and the
Development Mechanism. national grid and sell the remaining 29MW to the grid.
reducing fossil fuel consumption.
Compagnie Sucrire SUDAN Bagasse-fuelled plant; Finchaa originally
NIGER
W

SŽnŽgalaise (CSS) MALI ERITREA had 10MW capacity then was expanded
3M

St Louis 47MW CHAD New Halfa Sugar 6MW in 2012. Ethiopian grid receives 10MW.
I1
I 1 MW

SENEGAL
,I

Guneid Sugar 6MW

White Nile Sugar 104MW
W

Bagasse-fired steam
3M
9

GAMBIA Sennar Sugar 7MW

er ou

BURKINA Assalaya Sugar 13MW turbine. Tendaho

en oir f F rot
kŽ

FASO Kenana Sugar 40MW Tendaho Sugar 60MW Phase II will increase
o

GUINEA-BISSAU
cr Su e B

DJIBOUTI capacity to 120MW.

M

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W
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Kakira has been

BENIN NIGERIA
oi

Tana-Beles I 45MW
12

4M
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iv

ou e

feeding non-
la
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ae

TOGO Sunti Golden Finchaa Sugar 31MW Reppie 25MW After processing
Su

captive electricity
w

Makeni 32MW GHANA

K

Sugar 6MW
SOUTH SUDAN Wonji Sugar 32MW sugarcane, the remaining
Su

into the Ugandan

C

SIERRA LEONE
PD

CïTE bagasse is used as fuel

grid since 2003; C.A.R. Omo-Kuraz Sugar Omo Kuraz II 60MW

A
O

DÕIVOIRE for the boiler. The mill

G

LIBERIA

LI
peak supply Development Project Omo Kuraz III 60MW produces enough energy
r
5M b e

ETHIOPIA

A
W

32MW.
W
ub

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to fully cover Wonji

4M
ga W o

M
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CAMEROON
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factoryÕs demand and

O
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3M

UGANDA
ly

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r
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ga
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re

S
Kakira Sugar 52MW Sail KENYA process steam.
r

GUINEA
av

Su
a
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VIL NGO
A

SÌO TOMƒ & 12MW

U
io

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Kinyara Sugar 15MW Nzoia Sugar 3MW

B

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B

LE )
es

The Mumias plant

en

Mumias Sugar 38MW

Pr

Considered to be AfricaÕs Lugazi 10MW, Mayuge Sugar 9MW

AZ CO
om

GABON Chemelil Sugar 3MW, Muhoroni Sugar 3MW

stopped supplying
first utility-scale on-grid
K

ZA

Kagera Sugar 5MW power to the grid in

(BR OF

biomass independent RWANDA South Nyanza Sugar 7MW

D E M O C R AT I C 2020 as Kenya
P.

power producer (IPP), BURUNDI Tanganyika Planting Company 17MW Power had excess
RE

AyŽbo is expected to be Saris Nyaki 6MW REPUBLIC Moso Sugar

Kwale Sugar 18MW generation capacity.
commissioned in 2025. 4MW
OF CONGO Mtwiba Sugar 13MW SEYCHELLES
TANZANIA
OPERATING CAPACITY (on-grid, off-grid and embedded, Kilombero Sugar 6MW
July 2023 North Africa 2MW (0.1%)
Sao Hill 15MW
(Total: 2,024MW) West Africa 176MW (8.7%) Tanganyika Wattle 3MW
(biomas /diesel)
Central Africa 7MW (0.3%) Ilovo Dwangwa COMOROS
ANGOLA Sugar 7MW Mayotte
MALAWI (Fr.)
Southern Africa Triangle and Hippo Valley
809MW (40.0%) are bagasse-fuelled plants ZAMBI A
which sell excess power Nampundwe Nchalo Sugar
to the Zimbabwe grid. 6MW 12MW
East Africa MOZAMBI QUE
1,030MW (50.9%)
Otjikoto 40MW ZIMBABWE MADAGASCAR
RŽunion MAURITIUS
Mafambisse Mill
12MW (Fr.)
The Otjikoto project Triangle Mill 33MW Chisumbanje Albioma St-Pierre 41MW
plans to harvest and 19MW
burn an invasive shrub Hippo Valley Estates 39MW Albioma says St-Pierre is the
SOUTH AFRICA: for power generation. BOTSWANA worldÕs first bioethanol power
Location still to be NAMIBIA Xinavane plant. The feedstock is surplus
Mondi 146MW decided. Mill 26MW molasses turned into ethanol.

Combined heat and power (CHP) ESWATINI Three of RŽunionÕs biomass /coal
for Mondi pulp mill in Richards Bay, plants have been shut down for
producing surplus electricity of conversion into biomass-only
between 25MW to 30MW. ESWATINI: LESOTHO generation: Albioma Bois Rouge
108MW, Albioma Le Gol 122MW
Ubombo Sugar 40MW SOUTH and EDFÕs Port-Est 211MW.
Ngodwana Mill 117MW Since a 2011 upgrade a proportion AFRICA
Fired by the organic polymer lignin of UbomboÕs power generation is MAURITIUS:
(around 45%) and coal (55%), fed into the SEC grid, exporting
55GW in 2015. MethCap 4MW La Baraque (Savannah) 90MW
Ngodwana Mill has frequently
generated a surplus which is sold La Baraque runs almost entirely on bagasse during sugar
to the Eskom grid. Ngodwana Mill 117MW harvests (July to December), supplying excess power to
Malelane Mill 32MW MauritiusÕ Central Electricity Board as well as low-pressure
Sappi Ngodwana 25MW steam for the sugar refinery. It uses coal when bagasse is
Saiccor Mill 98MW Komati Mill 20MW
Bronkhorstspruit 5MW not available.
SaccorÕs four turbines supply a Johannesburg MOZ.
dissolving wood pulp mill, fuelled Landfill 19MW Terragen Mapou 71MW
32% by six coal fired boilers and ESWATINI
68% by two chemical recovery Ubombo Sugar Terragen has a generation model similar to La Baraque.
boilers in a combined heat and 40MW Formerly known as Centrale thermique de Belle Vue (CTBV).
power process.
Alteo Energy Flacq 37MW
Malelane Mill 32MW Pongola Mill 20MW
SOUTH AFRICA FlacqÕs effective capacity in 2017 was 16MW, an expansion
A maximum of 16MW is generated to 66-74MW has been proposed.
during harvesting season (April to
December). Between January and Saint-Aubin 33MW
April the Malelane plant is out of Umfolozi Mill 16MW
operation for maintenance. Shareholders in the Saint-Aubin plant include French firm
Mondi 146MW Albioma, local sugar cane manufacturer Omnicane and a
Felixton Mill 32MW Amatikulu Mill 12MW Mauritian investment cooperative.
Tugela Mill 11MW Felixton Mill 32MW
FelixtonÕs bagasse-fuelled plant Darnall Mill 13MW MŽdine Sugar 22MW Mon Loisir 14MW
was upgraded in the mid-2000s, LESOTHO Maidstone Mill 23MW
allowing the facility to produce a In 2016, Albioma commissioned carbon capture technology
consistent baseload for supply to Durban eThekwini 8MW at the three plants it operates in Mauritius (La Baraque,
the grid while also meeting heavy Terragen and Saint-Aubin) that, in 2019, recovered 40% of
load from the sugar mill. Saiccor Mill 98MW coal by-product tonnage to be used as cement admixtures.

AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023 9

Power
In West Africa, Live Data records 15 operational plants with
over 1MW installed capacity using agricultural feedstock.
Eleven of these are off-grid, including Nigeria’s Bua Sugar
Refinery’s 20MW bagasse plant in Lagos state and Compagnie
Sucrière Sénégalaise’s 47MW bagasse plant in Senegal.
The only operational utility-scale biomass project that
dispatches power to the grid in West Africa is Sunbird
Bioenergy’s Makeni 32MW bagasse plant in Bombali, Sierra
Leone. Commissioned in 2017, this is an embedded C&I
plant rather than an IPP, but can dispatch surplus electricity
to the grid, supplying up 200 GWh/yr of excess power via a
10km HV line. A local micro-grid is also supplied by 200km
of distribution lines.
Sunbird’s feedstock is sourced from its 23,500ha sugarcane
farm, which also grows cassava in the offseason as a
secondary, ethanol-producing crop. Makeni’s on-site
biorefinery also produces up to 85m l/yr of bioethanol.
Biomass’ potential is underlined by comparators such as
Brazil, which has 17GW of installed biomass capacity, of
which 7GW was added in the past decade. Surplus electricity
from embedded C&I biomass plants accounted for 6% of on-
grid supply in May. In 2020, power produced solely from
bagasse (the fibrous residue left over from sugarcane
processing) provided 22,600 GWh/yr to the Brazilian grid.
These figures reflect the size of Brazil’s sugarcane industry
– the world’s largest sugar exporter, it accounts for some
40% of global exports – and its well-established domestic
bioethanol industry, whose product is blended into
petroleum or exported. Efforts are under way (again) to
develop a bioethanol industry in Africa (see Clean cooking
boosts bioethanol prospects).
C&I leads the way
Plants owned by private C&I players account for around
1.5GW of Africa’s 2GW total biomass capacity; of this, IPPs
account for a mere 250MW of aggregate output.
Just 471MW of this African biomass capacity is state-
owned – a figure set to further reduce if Ethiopia succeeds
in selling eight state-owned sugar companies with
aggregate operational and under construction bagasse-fired
generation capacity of some 225MW (AE 482/5).
WtE capacity is also being developed; a handful of IPPs
have plans to use biofuels derived from waste wood.
Bagasse is the predominant biomass feedstock and the top
five countries for operational biomass capacity are also
those with large sugarcane industries: Ethiopia (313MW),
Sudan (176MW), Uganda (96MW), Zimbabwe (91MW) and
Kenya (82MW).
10
Two other countries are large biomass/coal operators:
South Africa has 535MW of coal/bagasse hybrid generation
(535MW) and 79MW of biomass-only capacity.
Large sugarcane cultivator Mauritius has integrated
bagasse-fired power into its grid, with 259MW of
coal/bagasse and 36MW of bagasse-only capacity
combining to account for almost one-third of its Central
Electricity Board grid’s total 907MW supply (AE 485/14).
Although dispatchable, bagasse-fired power is not available
year-round and is also dependent on sugarcane harvest
yields. While bagasse can be dried and stored, its availability
in sufficient quantities for power generation coincides with
the harvesting season.
In Mauritius, bagasse is typically only available in sufficient
quantities for utility-scale generation for around five months
a year. Some bagasse-fired power plants use a secondary
crop, such as cassava, to provide feedstock during the off-
season.
Lack of feedstock is a constraint
An IPP developer told African Energy that difficulties around
securing feedstock were a key reason more on-grid biomass
had not yet been rolled out in Africa.
In wealthy countries, long-term feedstock agreements can
be secured involving agricultural residues or wood biofuel
from large farmers or forestry players with good credit
ratings. Many countries also have markets for widely-used
biofuels such as wood pellets or sunflower husk pellets,
which can be traded on futures markets and are well
understood by financiers.
The trend is for utilities to outsource biofuel cultivation in
Europe’s mature market, Lugano-based biomass fuels
broker John Robert McFarlane of AlbionDesign told African
Energy. German utility RWE divested wood pellet production
in 2020, while the European Union has mandated that any
state subsidy for biomass power generation must use
combined heat and power (CHP) technology.
Africa has far fewer large agro-industrial players that can
sign long-term offtake deals for feedstock, the IPP
developer said. He commented that one developer had
resorted to planting its own forest to assure lenders it would
have sufficient feedstock to underpin a long-term product.
Limits to the continent’s agricultural commodity markets are
acting as a brake on large-scale farming.
The role of commodities traders is also often poorly
understood and frequently criticised in the media, argued
former trader Jonathan Kingsman, author of Out of the
Shadows: The New Merchants of Grain. Open markets
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

Different types of biomass can be mobilised for projects
Biomass is often used as a catch-all term, but there are
several types of feedstock and important differences
between them. Take-up of biomass for power generation
remains limited, although new projects are emerging.
Agricultural residues
Organic by-products of agriculture typically include waste
from crop production, with bagasse and oil palm residue
(palm kernel shells, leaves and empty fruit bunches) the main
sources in Africa.
Bagasse is typically used as fuel in combined heat and power
(CHP) plants that use high-pressure boilers and condensing
turbines. Some operate at significant scale: state-owned,
embedded bagasse-fired plants with over 50MW capacity
dispatch excess power to the grid in Ethiopia and Sudan.
Mauritius has a long history of developing bagasse-fired
plants.
Africa’s largest biomass-only independent power producer
(IPP) is the 52MW Kakira Sugar Works bagasse embedded
plant in Jinja, Uganda. The six-unit plant powers a 150,000
t/yr sugar factory, selling up to 32MW of surplus capacity to
the grid;
Biofuel products
Largely taking the form of pellets, chips or briquettes, biofuels
are typically sourced from agricultural crops or waste wood
(timber is too expensive to be used as fuel). World-wide, most
biofuels are grown in purpose-built plantations, with
standardised wood pellets the main product.
Africa’s small number of plants include South African pulp
served to reduce the margins taken by middlemen – which
remain very high in Africa – by facilitating price discovery.
In the long term this improves the prices paid to farmers and
buyers, Kingsman told African Energy.
Some African commodities market players are growing
quickly. The Abuja-based Afex commodities exchange,
founded in 2014, aims to facilitate $500m of agricultural
trade over the next five years in Nigeria. Afex sets daily
prices for commodities including sorghum, cocoa and
cashew nuts.
More efficient commodities markets could enable farmers
to scale up their businesses, leading to greater economies
of scale in agro-industry. This, in turn, could create greater
volumes of agricultural residue for future biomass IPPs.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Power
and paper company Sappi’s 97.5MW Saiccor wood pulp mill
cogeneration plant in KwaZulu-Natal, which uses lignin, a
substance usually extracted from wood pulp by the paper
industry, for 65% of its power needs (the rest comes from
coal). Namibia Power Corporation (NamPower) is developing
the 40MW Otjikoto plant, which will use wood chips sourced
from encroacher bush (an invasive shrub) as biofuel.
A precedent for the use of imported wood pellets could be
set in the French overseas territory of Réunion, where Paris-
headquartered IPP Albioma is converting its 108MW Bois
Rouge and 122MW Le Gol biomass/coal plants to biomass-
only by year-end (AE 485/15). Albioma told African Energy
the feedstock would be local bagasse and waste wood,
augmented by imported wood pellets.
Also in Réunion, EDF is converting 211MW of heavy fuel oil
(HFO) and diesel-fired capacity at Port Est to run solely on
biomass, scheduled by end-2023;
Biogenic and manure
Biogenic plants use materials such as waste food and natural
fibres, which are combusted in waste-to-energy (WtE) plants,
typically sited at landfills. Examples include five waste-to-
energy plants in Johannesburg with an aggregate capacity of
18.6MW and the 25MW Reppie WtE plant in Addis Ababa.
Feedstock for these plants can come from animal manure or
human sewage, which is converted into biogas (around 65%
methane) by anaerobic decomposition. The 0.275MW
FasoBiogaz plant in Burkina Faso treats 40 t/d of waste from
Brasseries du Burkina and Société de Gestion de l’Abattoir de
Ouagadougou, and burns the biogas for power.
BIOETHANOL
Clean cooking, gasoline
blends boost outlook
Africa has a largely early stage bioethanol industry – after
an earlier phase of biofuels developments fell far short of
expectations, due to problems over financing and concerns
that commercial interests were pushing out vital food crops
(AE 184/1). ‘First generation’ feedstocks sourced from
edible biomass were the subject of a longstanding ‘food
versus fuel’ debate over land use.
There are signs of niche operations gaining momentum
using agricultural residues as a ‘second generation’ biofuel
feedstock (sourced from agricultural waste or non-food-
competitive biomass).
11
Focus
E10 petrol (gasoline with 10% ethanol content) is widely
used in Ethiopia, Malawi and Zimbabwe to fuel vehicles, but
it has little application in other markets, Citac Africa
executive director Elitsa Georgieva told African Energy –
whereas E10 is widely used in the European Union and
United States, while Brazil uses a blend ranging from E20 to
E25 (varying with sugarcane harvest yields).
A source in the refined products trading sector said
bioethanol blending had been held back in Africa as many
vehicles couldn’t use E10 fuel. However, fleets are becoming
more modern, creating new potential markets.
Zambia is actively pursuing a bioethanol industry with the
mothballed Indeni refinery’s conversion with the goal of it
selling E10 fuel by year-end (AE 478/27).
Also in Zambia, Sunbird Bioenergy is developing a cassava-
to-bioethanol refinery at Kawamwba, in the northern Luapula
province, that the privately-held firm says will have a 120m
l/yr bioethanol capacity, alongside a 32MW power plant.
Bioethanol also holds significant potential as a clean
cooking fuel, displacing traditional biomass (such as wood
charcoal) or paraffin, which are major sources of dangerous
air pollutants, including fine particulate matter and carbon
monoxide. A 2020 study by academics from The
Netherlands’ Utrecht University estimated that 900m people
in Africa rely on traditional biomass for cooking.
Entrepreneurs have previously sought to distribute clean
cooking fuels in Africa but their efforts have foundered on
high distribution costs and competition from cheap and
widely-available charcoal and other fuels.
Koko’s stoves
A novel solution was launched by Nairobi-headquartered
Koko Networks in 2019, selling stoves and reusable
bioethanol bottles, which are refilled by customers via a
network of vending machines (AE 457/17). Bioethanol from
Kenya and other African sources is distributed to vendors
AIX
South Africa – the difficult emergence of a new power industry
20 September 2023, 12.00-13.00 BST (GMT+1), Online via Zoom
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in a joint venture with Vivo Energy, which runs 3,900 service
stations (AE 478/26).
Increased demand from Koko’s operations “is already
causing an increase in investment in the sugar industry
within the region,” chief strategy officer Hanaan Marwah told
African Energy. “The potential for petrol-blending with
bioethanol will accelerate the development of this emerging
industry further still.”
Koko’s offering is 40% cheaper than charcoal, in part due to
the use of carbon credits. Operating in five Kenyan cities,
Koko to date has signed up more than 700,000 customers; it
expects to reach 1m households in the near future and is
expanding into Rwanda later this year (AE 457/19).
Bioethanol is also being used for generation in Réunion
where, in 2019, Paris-headquartered IPP Albioma
commissioned the 41MW Saint Pierre development, which
it called the world’s first bioethanol power plant.
Operating as a peaker, spinning up its GE turbine quickly to
meet grid demand, its bioethanol feedstock comes from
surplus molasses produced by the local sugar industry.
Is biomass carbon neutral?
Biomass is often assumed to be carbon neutral: according
to this logic, any emissions from the burning of, say,
woodchip pellets (which are not yet used in Africa) would
be balanced out by the carbon stored in the trees while they
were growing.
However, the United States Energy Information
Administration (EIA) has pointed out that other energy
inputs are needed to grow, fertilise and harvest the
feedstock and to produce the biomass, which is then turned
into fuel.
In addition, forested areas cleared for biofuel may not be
replaced with crops that capture an equivalent amount of
carbon – particularly if the land is then used for general
agriculture rather than replanted with trees for biofuels.
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Power
South African transmission licence marks a ‘milestone’ in
Eskom’s unbundling
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) made a
significant step forward in the process of breaking up Eskom
when, on 27 July, its granted a long-awaited transmission
licence to the new National Transmission Company of South
Africa (NTCSA).
NTCSA has been created as part of the electricity supply
industry (ESI)’s wider restructuring by unbundling the failing
state utility into separate entities responsible for generation,
distribution and transmission (AE 463/1).
Nersa chair Thembani Bukula said the licence was “a
milestone decision”, which would “immensely contribute in
Eskom’s unbundling trajectory”.
NTCSA should become an independent system operator and
planner, network service provider and grid code secretariat.
A key part of its role is ensuring grid stability, while ensuring
open access to the transmission system.
Nersa said NTCSA would be allowed to buy and sell electricity
in order to recover its costs, and it could make a reasonable
return on its assets – but not to such an extent as to make a
profit.
The transmission licence is the first of three permits NTCSA
requires to function; its trading and import/export licences
should follow.
Ramakgopa talks up transmission plans
The government hopes NTCSA’s establishment will unlock
substantial private sector investment into South Africa’s grid.
According to Nersa, Eskom owned and operated 374
transmission lines with a total length of 33,199km, as of
TotalEnergies makes full takeover of TotalEren
Underlining the Paris-based supermajor’s model of mixing big
hydrocarbons plays with renewable energy (RE) initiatives,
TotalEnergies announced on 25 July that it was buying out the
other shareholders in its associated RE developer Total Eren.
Total had acquired a 30% stake in 2017, which gave it the right
to fully acquire the firm formerly known as Eren after five
years. TotalEnergies said the acquisition investment would
be around €1.5bn ($1.66bn).
Total Eren has 3.5GW of operational RE capacity world-wide.
According to African Energy Live Data, it has equity stakes in
185MW of operational capacity in Africa, including two
14
March 2021. It operated 500 three-phase transformers with
a total capacity of 159,384 MVA at 169 substations.
Addressing the media on 30 July, electricity minister
Kgosientsho Ramokgopa described shortages of generation
and transmission capacity as the ESI’s two biggest
challenges. The government aimed to attract ZAR100bn
($5.4bn) in finance to expand generation and transmission
capacity by 2025, he said.
Improved grid and transmission capacity is vital to
accommodate new electricity generation capacity that is
being developed (AE 485/7).
At its meeting on 27 July, Nersa also approved government
plans to procure 7.8GW of new capacity. The largest element
of this is Eskom’s planned 3GW combined-cycle gas turbine
plant in Richards Bay.
Other elements in the procurement programme include
securing 1GW each from Eskom’s standard offer programme
and from Southern African Development Community (SADC)
members under the cross-border procurement programme,
2GW from independent power producers under the load
shedding reduction programme and 800MW from the
government’s emergency procurement programme.
REIPPP6 award
Nersa also granted a 140MW generation licence to
Ngonyama Solar, the sixth preferred bidder under the
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy’s renewable
energy independent power producer procurement (REIPPP)
programme bid window six (AE 475/15).
—TONDERAYI MUKEREDZI
50MWp solar PV plants in Egypt’s Aswan governorate.
Total Eren brings with it a significant project pipeline,
including a venture with London AIM-listed Chariot to develop
230MWp of solar PV and 200MW of wind power in Zambia
for miner First Quantum Minerals (AE 457/21).
Chairman and chief executive Patrick Pouyanné said Eren’s
founders Pâris Mouratoglou and David Corchia, and their
teams would be integrated into TotalEnergies. However, Total
Eren’s green hydrogen projects in North Africa, Latin America
and Australia would be pursued by a new entity named TEH2,
to be 80%-owned by TotalEnergies and 20% by Eren Group.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

BOTSWANA
PPA signed for 300MW of
coal at Mmamabula
State utility Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) and Indian-
owned Jindal Energy Botswana on 25 July signed a 30-year
power purchase agreement (PPA) to develop a 300MW
base-load thermal power station at Mmamabula (AE
488/18).
The plant is scheduled for grid connection by end-Q1 2028,
at which stage the Morupule B power station is anticipated
to be fully repaired and generating about 520MW. The two
plants would then provide a combined 820MW, significantly
boosting BPC’s supply, which is now dependent on the
unreliable Morupule B’s performance.
In the past, Botswana has relied on electricity imports from
neighbouring countries and via the Southern African Power
Pool (Sapp). The reliance on imports was reduced in 2012
when Morupule B was commissioned, increasing supply
from the existing 132MW Morupule A power station.
However, Morupule B – which was built by a consortium of
lesser-known Chinese companies – hasn’t operated optimally
since commissioning due to ‘technical challenges’ (AE 253/1).
Jindal Energy will develop a coal mine to supply fuel to the
power plant (AE 239/10). Jindal Energy is a subsidiary of
Jindal Botswana, a member of the Jindal Group, which has
had a long-standing interest in projects in the country.
ZAMBIA/REGION
Zesco moves forward on links
to Tanzania, Kenya and DRC
Construction of the long-awaited Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya
(ZTK) interconnector is expected to start by year-end,
according to comments by Zambian utility Zesco’s
managing director Victor Mapani to African Energy.
This follows years of inertia on the project, whose initial
memorandum of understanding was signed in 2014 (AE
468/15, 286/9).
The ZTK project covers a total distance of 2,800km and will
provide a link between the Southern African Power Pool
(Sapp) and East African Power Pool (Eapp). Some 905km
of the line will be in Zambia, running from Kabwe, north of
Lusaka, to Tunduma on the border with Tanzania.
At the same time, Zesco is finalising plans via the Sapp to
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Power
NAMIBIA TENDER
NamPower seeks contractor for
70MW solar plant and other schemes
Namibia Power Corporation (NamPower) has issued three
open tenders for generation and transmission contracts,
including a call for engineering, procurement and
construction (EPC) bids to build the 70MWp Rosh Pinah
solar PV project.
Construction work at Rosh Pinah is expected to begin in
mid-2024, with a scheduled start of commercial
operations in November 2025.
The plant is a replacement for a previously-announced
40MW wind project on the same site; that project was
shelved in late 2022 due to lower than expected wind
resources (AE 487/13). A 4.9MWp solar PV plant,
commissioned in July 2017, already operates at Rosh Pinah
NamPower is also seeking a construction contractor for
the 400kV Obib-Oranjemund transmission line.
Its third tender is for an EPC contractor to build a 132kV
static synchronous compensator (statcom) and capacitor
banks at Masivi substation.
Key information
● Rosh Pinah solar – closing date 1 September. Enquiries
to Mathew Nelenge Tel: +264 612052324.
Email: rppv.procurement@nampower.com.na.
● Obib-Oranjemund transmission line – closing date 11
August.
● Masivi substation EPC work – bid deadline 1 September.
Enquiries for the Obib-Oranjemund and Masivi projects
should be referred to Mwale Sampati:Tel: +264 61
2052206 / 2321 / 2258.
Email: bidclarifications@nampower.com.na.
develop a 330kV link between Solwezi in mineral-rich north-
west Zambia and Kolwezi in Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). A private developer is expected to be announced by
year-end for this project, which is being supported by the
World Bank Group and African Development Bank (AfDB).
The new privately-owned Solwezi-Kolwezi line is intended
to reduce reliance on an existing 330kV line, which is jointly
owned by Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) and DRC
state utility Société Nationale d’Electricité (Snel).
As with the ZTK line, the Solwezi-Kolwezi project has a long
history, with the AfDB noting that the line was first mooted
by the two governments in the 1990s.
15
Power
Zambia signs 510MW deal with Nigerian developer in a
rare show of support for concentrated solar power
State utility Zesco signed a power purchase agreement (PPA)
with Nigeria’s Africa Consolidated Services Group (ACSG) on
18 July, covering up to 510MW of solar thermal capacity. An
initial phase will involve a 10MW plant to be developed in the
Shangombo area using concentrated solar power (CSP) – a
technology which is rarely used due to its high costs but
which is starting to attract renewed interest.
The PPA has still to be approved by the Energy Regulation
Board (ERB).
The agreement is a sign of Zambia’s efforts to reduce its
reliance on variable hydroelectric power (HEP) capacity. It
also circumvents a growing problem around energy storage.
Zesco managing director Victor Mapani told African Energy
the national grid could only absorb up to 1GW of solar,
excluding storage. As a result, he said no more solar PV
projects without a storage component would be allowed until
there were “more baseload injections into the system”.
CSP projects are not affected by this as they typically include
thermal storage (often molten salts) to offer dispatchable
renewable energy.
Mapani pointed to the 2.4GW China Integrated Clean Energy
Power Company (CiEG) development as an example of a
solar PV project that includes sufficient storage (AE 483/23).
In July, the ERB approved Zesco’s $3.4bn PPA with the state-
owned Chinese firm.
Earlier this year, Zesco had signed a deal with Abu Dhabi
Future Energy Company (Masdar) to develop up to 2GW of
wind, solar and HEP projects (AE 479/13).
Zesco secures revised terms
with IPPs
State utility Zesco’s plan to reduce its chronic indebtedness
is making progress, with a crucial renegotiation of existing
power purchase agreements (PPAs) with independent
power producers (IPPs) appearing to bear fruit.
Energy minister Peter Kapala recently said that some of the
PPAs had been renegotiated “as a practical measure to
achieve sustainable debt levels”.
The minister did not provide further details, but PPAs with
leading IPPs including Maamba Collieries and Copperbelt
Energy Corporation (CEC) have recently been validated by
the Energy Regulation Board (ERB).
CEC managing director Owen Silavwe told African Energy
16
Mapani said these agreements would allow the electricity
supply industry to be “de-monopolised” as it would remove
Zesco’s “exclusive responsibility” to meet generation
demands.
The return of CSP?
CSP was hailed as a game-changer a decade ago, but just
1.4GW of African capacity has been deployed to date,
according to African Energy Live Data, largely in South Africa
and Morocco.
A key issue has been the high cost of development – which
provoked substantial public criticisms of Moroccan Agency
for Sustainable Energy (Masen)’s first mover investments in
CSP at Aïn Beni Mathar solar/thermal and Ouarzazate Noor I.
However, the Zesco deal is a sign of renewed interest in the
technology. CSP is also being assessed by Namibia, which
launched a feasibility study for a 50-150MW project in April
2022 (AE 459/16).
In March 2021 France’s Engie took a 50% stake in the
100MW/1,650MWh Xina Solar One CSP in South Africa (AE
434/11).
Morocco is also looking again at the technology. A list of
prequalified bidders for the first, PV phase of Masen’s 800MW
Noor Midelt II PV and CSP plant was released in early July
(see Power: Morocco Noor Midelt).
—CHIWOYU SINYANGWE in Lusaka
this “supports the much-needed stability of industry and the
stability of electricity pricing, which obviously means the
stabilisation of the economy.”
Silavwe added the revised agreements “were a product of
negotiations, unlike in the past” when the regulator had
made unilateral decisions. He said the process had
prompted renewed optimism in the sector, including hopes
for a more bankable electricity supply industry.
Zesco owes IPPs more than $1bn in unsettled invoices; this
is considered domestic debt and as a result was not
included in the recent restructuring of Zambia’s $6.3bn of
bilateral international debt (AE 487/41).
While large, the $1bn figure is a sharp improvement from
the $1.7bn owed in late-2021. The debt is expected to be
cleared altogether in 2025.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

Lusaka is expected to soon receive a first $188m
disbursement from its recently-agreed International
Monetary Fund arrangement, to ease its macroeconomic
situation.
Some in the industry have called for lessons to be learned
from the policies that lead to the high debts. Former Rural
Electrification Authority and Indeni Petroleum Refinery chair
turned consultant Johnstone Chikwanda told African Energy
the ERB should ensure new PPA agreements did not include
take-or-pay clauses.
Colliary seeks finance for
300MW coal plant expansion
India’s Nava Bharat Ventures (NBV) is seeking support from
the Zambian government to raise finance to double output
at its 300MW Maamba Collieries Ltd (MCL) coal-fired power
plant, after Chinese lenders that backed the initial phase
proved unwilling to fund the planned expansion.
The facility, which was built by China’s Sepco Electric Power
Corporation and completed in 2016, is Zambia’s biggest
non-hydroelectric power (HEP) generation plant, accounting
for 10% of installed capacity. MCL has played a crucial role
in limiting power shortages resulting from adverse weather
in a country where up to 84% of its power come from HEP.
President Hakainde Hichilema said in March that the
government wanted MCL to press ahead with a previously-
shelved plan to double power output, which would expand
national baseload even as it developed alternative sources
of power such as solar and wind.
MCL is 65% owned by NBV, with the government’s ZCCM
Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH) holding the remaining 35%.
At a meeting at State House on 27 July chaired by
Hichilema, NBV chairman Ashok Devineni said the planned
expansion was expected to take 26 months and cost
$300m. He said NBV had selected Sepco to undertake the
work and was in a position to place “firm orders for an
engineering, procurement and commissioning contract”.
However, Devineni said the Chinese banks involved in the
project’s initial phase “are not any more willing to finance
this project, as per mandate from their own government. So
financing has become the biggest challenge.”
A group of lenders including Commercial Bank of China,
Bank of China, Standard Chartered Bank and Absa Bank had
led financing for the initial project.
Energy minister Peter Kapala said NBV was now seeking
government help in sourcing the $300m needed for the
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Power
expansion project. However, it is unclear what assistance
the government can offer, given its existing heavy debt
burden – the subject of a recent restructuring deal with
international creditors (AE 487/40).
Kapala also said MCL wants Zesco to be the off-taker for
the additional 300MW; the state-owned utility is the sole
buyer of the plant’s existing 300MW.
“Maamba Collieries is awaiting confirmation of funding by
the government,” Kapala told the late July meeting. “The key
project documents like power purchase agreement and
implementation agreement are being pursued with Zesco.”
ZIMBABWE
Tatanga, Enerfin develop
first utility-scale wind farm
Local developer Tatanga Energy and Spanish Elecnor Group
subsidiary Enerfin Socieda de Energia are co-developing a
100MW grid-connected wind power plant and associated
transmission infrastructure in Mashonaland Central
province.
If commissioned, the Guruve-Mazowe project would be
Zimbabwe’s first utility-scale wind farm.
Development on the site started in January 2020; a wind
mast was installed in September 2021 on Great Dyke’s
northern tip, to measure and record wind speeds and
direction for 12-18 months.
Turbines proposed for the project range between 2MW and
5MW in capacity. The developers said the plant could be
hybridised with solar and battery storage, depending on the
outcome of feasibility studies.
To date, wind hasn’t contributed to Zimbabwe’s energy mix.
Some years ago, a few small projects – among them the
Temaruru project in Rusape – were developed by non-
governmental organisations; none of these are now working.
Electricity generated from Guruve-Mazowe would be sold to
state utility Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and
Distribution Company (ZETDC) under a 25-year power
purchase agreement (PPA).
The project’s development is being co-financed by early
stage, developing country low carbon funder Seed Capital
Assistance (Scaf) under its Support Line 2.
Scaf is jointly implemented by the United Nations
Environment Programme, Frankfurt School FS-UNEP
Collaborating Centre and FS Impact Finance. Scaf is also
backed by the United Kingdom and German governments.
17
Power
Neither Tatanga nor Scaf had answered requests for further
information on the project as this report went to press.
According to Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (Zera),
preliminary studies have shown the potential for wind
generation, although the extent of its potential, and
locations for developments, have still to be established.
The government in April received a grant commitment from
the African Development Fund to carry out wind resource
assessments for eight proposed sites under the African
Development Bank Group-supported Zimbabwe–Energy
Sector Reform Support Project.
Harare-based Tatanga Energy is developing two solar PV
projects in Zimbabwe, of which a solar PV plant sited near
Sable Chemical Industries in Kwekwe is most advanced (AE
385/7). The Sable project comprises a grid-connected
50MW PV plant, which is the first phase of a planned
400MW solar park.
In May, Tatanga and the Anglican Diocese of Central
Zimbabwe commissioned a 0.157MW solar PV and
0.300MWh battery storage system mini-grid at St Patrick’s
High School (also known as the Teges project) in Gweru, as
the first phase of a planned 5MW project (AE 467/11).
TANZANIA
Tanesco develops transmission
project with Gridworks
United Kingdom government-owned Gridworks said on 27
July it had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU)
with Tanzania Electric Supply Company (Tanesco) to
develop the North East Grid – Tanzania’s first independent
transmission project (ITP).
Indian engineering, procurement and construction (EPC)
specialist Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is also a signatory to the
MoU. Part of the 2025 Power System Master Plan, the ITP
will connect Tanzania’s central, coastal and north-eastern
regions.
It will include a 400kV line from Dodoma to Chalinze in the
eastern Pwani region, a 400kV line from Chalinze to Segera
village in the north-eastern Tanga region, and a 200kV line
from Segera to the north-eastern port city of Tanga.
Two substations will be built in Segera and Tanga, while the
existing Dodoma substation will be upgraded.
Uganda project
Gridworks is also developing the Amari ITP in neighbouring
18
Uganda, providing up to $90m of equity to upgrade four
crucial substations.
It has said it has a pipeline of ITP projects with a number of
African governments (AE 477/14, 464/17).
Gridworks chief executive Simon Hodson has called on
more private and public capital to be made available to plug
the large funding gap for transmission projects. Experts
estimate that $3.2bn-5.4bn/yr of transmission investment
will be required in Africa by 2040 (AE 450/15).
Tanesco sets profit and
customer connection records
Tanzania Electric Supply Company (Tanesco) has recorded
a TZS109bn ($44m) net profit for 2021-22 – its highest
annual surplus since the state utility was founded in 1964.
This was achieved despite a 12% increase in electricity
imports to 1,735GWh, to offset a 9% fall in hydroelectric
power (HEP) generation to 2,764GWh.
Tanesco said it had connected 504,000 new households
during the 12 months to 30 June 2022, a 21% increase from
FY 2020/21 and another record for the company, which now
has 3.8m customers.
Writing in the utility’s annual report, issued on 29 July,
managing director Maharage Chande said the average
connection time for new customers was now less than 14
days.
The report added that the 2.1GW Julius Nyerere HEP’s
470MW phase one was expected online in June 2024,
marking a significant addition to Tanesco’s existing 1.5GW
generation capacity (AE 483/8).
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Chinese, Swiss-based firms
sign up for HEP concessions
Brazzaville has accelerated its long-mooted policy of
offering public/private partnership (PPP) concessions to
run infrastructure, with deals agreed for international
companies to run the Moukoukoulou, Imboulou, Liouosso
and Djoué hydroelectric power (HEP) dams and other
facilities, including major highway Route Nationale 1.
China’s Wuxi China-Europe International Technology
Transfer Center Company (WiTTC) has signed a PPP
concession agreement for its Société d’Electricité de
Moukoukoulou-Congo (Semac) subsidiary to overhaul,
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

Scatec and Acwa latest to secure land for giga-scale
Egyptian wind projects
The allocation of large parcels of land to Saudi Arabia’s Acwa
Power and Norway’s Scatec for the construction of giga-scale
wind projects on the west bank of the River Nile is another
step forward for Egypt’s ambitious decarbonisation plans.
The projects could ultimately result in large amounts of
natural gas being freed up for export as much more
generation from renewable energy (RE) is installed.
The New and Renewable Energy Authority (NREA) on 17 July
signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Acwa
Power for the allocation of 3,000km2 of land outside Sohag,
an emerging city 400km south of Cairo where the Saudi
developer plans to build a 10GW wind plant. Acwa expects to
generate 50,000 GWh/yr and save $6.5bn/yr in natural gas
costs from the Sohag project.
Ten days earlier, Scatec had signed a similar MoU for land in
the Sohag region for a 5GW plant. These deals follow a land
agreement with Cairo-based Infinity Power, Abu Dhabi Future
Energy Company (Masdar) and Cairo-based Hassan Allam
Utilities in early June for another 10GW West Nile wind
scheme (AE 486/14).
Deals for all three projects were first initialled during the
COP27 climate conference in Sharm El Sheikh last
November, alongside MoUs for the construction of massive
green hydrogen (GH2) production facilities (AE 472/34).
The rationale for Infinity’s 10GW project is the Ministry of
Electricity’s new “five-to-ten” programme, under which it
plans to decommission 5GW of inefficient gas-fired
generation, replacing it with 10GW of RE (AE 487/4).
modernise and operate the 74MW Moukoukoulou HEP plant
on the Bouenza River.
State utility Energie Electrique du Congo (E2C – previously
Société Nationale d’Electricité du Congo) previously owned
Moukoukoulou, but in the new venture the Congolese state
will hold 15% of Semac’s equity via a new Société de gestion
du patrimoine holding company.
Semac has been established under Congolese law to
manage and operate the HEP under a 30-year concession
– a model used for the other dams.
The Moukoukoulou concession signing was attended by
energy and water minister Emile Ouosso and by
international co-operation and PPP minister Denis Christel
Sassou Nguesso. Semac was represented by managing
director Xu Xunzhi.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Power
Neither Acwa nor Scatec have linked their projects to
particular programmes, and it remains unclear if their
schemes are part of Cairo’s decarbonisation initiative or
aimed at another specific purpose.
This could include supplying power to produce GH2, another
Scatec focus (AE 457/8); the direct export of green power,
for instance to Saudi Arabia (AE 447/1); or supplying
electricity for desalination projects, which is now a major part
of Acwa’s business.
At the signing ceremony, Acwa chief executive Marco Arcelli
held talks with Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly on green
desalination, which is expected to be a major focus for
financers and developers over the coming decade.
According to African Energy Live Data, over 55GW of Egypt’s
60GW-plus installed capacity is fuelled by gas or other fossil
fuels. Peak load is somewhat over 30KW. This means the
Egyptian market has no need for additional generation
capacity except in the context of energy transition.
—JOHN HAMILTON
Read more on this topic online
Can Sisi create an energy hub in the eastern Mediterranean?
Getting into Egypt’s new energy era
Watch our recent webinar where John Hamilton discussed
the potential and pitfalls of investing in Egypt's energy sector.
A signing ceremony was held in Brazzaville on 19 July for
the Imboulou HEP concession, whose management was
ceded to private company Nea Imboulou, led by Swiss-
based, privately-owned Hydro Operation International.
As with Moukoukoulou, E2C will have a 15% stake in
Imboulou, which has been operating below its 120MW
installed capacity.
Ouosso, presidential son Sassou Nguesso and budget and
public portfolio minister Ludovic Ngatsé attended the
signing, where Hydro Operation was represented by
corporate affairs and commercial director Amir
Kheradmand.
Lausanne-based Hydro Operation also has a concession to
operate the Djoué HEP, via a subsidiary with E2C, Hydro
Operation Djoué SA.
19
Power
Ouosso on 24 May signed a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) to amend an earlier, July 2022, Djoué dam
agreement, which senior Ministry of Energy and Water
official Frédéric Manienze said was needed “to correct the
shortcomings noted in the application of the concession”.
At the Imboulou event, Ouosso also signed an MoU for the
Djoué dam water supply concession – which had previously
been the monopoly of utility La Congolaise des Eaux – to
Malian industrialist Ibrahim Diawarra’s Builders company.
Builders has also worked on the Pointe-Noire power supply
network, in a project co-financed by the government and
Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic Development in
Africa (Badea).
At the Imboulou event, Ouosso said E2C was expected to
receive around FCFA600m ($1m)/yr as its share of each
concession.
Denis Christel said the concession projects would be
developed “in line with the head of state’s [policy]
orientations… [and] the government would respect all of its
obligations, so the contract can be implemented according
to [international] standards.”
In May 2022, he signed a PPP agreement with China
Grezhouba Group Corporation and the local Energaz to build
the 230MW Moral and 101MW Nyanga HEP units and to
rehabilitate Liouesso.
Manienze said the agreements should not have negative
impacts on employees, as Article 45 of the labour law stated
that all existing employment contracts must continue – a
theme Ouosso was also keen to emphasise, pointing to
local concerns over concessioning such major assets,
which the minister said was “not the same as privatisation”.
Ouosso also said the concessions would “guarantee a
social tariff for the poorest families”.
A WiTTC official in Brazzaville said the Chinese business
consultancy’s main concern at Moukoukoulou was “to
deepen our research, to develop the dam and introduce
technological innovation, to improve the power station’s
security, stability and efficiency” – including by training
“local talent”.
Having entered commercial operations in the 1970s,
Chinese-built Moukoukoulou was last rehabilitated in 2007
(following damage in the 1997 civil war) by China’s Zhenwei
and Weihai International Economic Technical Co-operative.
Equipped with four turbines, Moukoukoulou was for many
years the principal source of electricity supply to Brazzaville
and Pointe-Noire, but it has long functioned far below
capacity. The authorities are looking for a swift increase in
output at all four HEPs.
20
SENEGAL
Just Energy Transition deal
accepts gas-fired projects
The agreement for Senegal to become only the second
African economy to secure a Just Energy Transition
Partnership (JETP) hinges on Dakar being allowed to push
ahead with natural gas and other thermal energy projects
(see African Energy view). This will allow the government to
continue with its ambitious gas-to-power (GTP) plans.
The launch of Senegal’s JETP by the G7’s International
Partners Group – comprising France, Germany, the
European Union, the United Kingdom and Canada – was a
highlight of French President Emmanuel Macron’s 22-23
June Summit for a New Global Financing Pact.
The deal included a commitment to mobilise €2.5bn
($2.74bn) of new financing for Dakar over three to five years
from public, private or philanthropic sources.
The JETP communiqué endorsed Dakar’s intention “to use
its natural gas resources as a transitional energy”. This will
be done in a way that reduces emissions compared to the
baseline set in Senegal’s 2020 Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC) for the reduction of greenhouse gases.
In a transition where there will be “a gradual phase-out of
heavy fuel oils”, the share of renewable energy (RE) in the
energy mix should double from approximately 20% to 40%
by 2030, in line with the Integrated Low Cost Plan (Plan
intégré à moindre coût or PIMC), which was included in the
2021 Electricity Code.
This is a substantial climb-down by the IPG, whose earlier
negotiations with Dakar had stalled due to Senegal’s
commitment to gas (AE 470/34, 467/35).
The IPG expects its money to go towards “training and
research, technology transfer, expansion and modernisation
of the electricity grid, as well as the development of storage
capacity”.
Gas conversion opportunities
A government presentation at the 21-24 June Africa Energy
Forum (AEF), held in Nairobi, showed Senegal surging ahead
with a 945MW gas-fired procurement programme.
Local developer West African Energy, supported by the
Lagos-based Africa Finance Corporation, is building a
300MW plant at Cap des Biches, which will be fuelled by
naptha until gas conversion is possible.
Saudi developer Acwa Power is building a combined cycle
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

gas turbine (CCGT) plant at the same location, while little-
known local developer Ndar Energies plans a 225MW CCGT
plant at Saint Louis (AE 482/17).
Among the largest operating plants with heavy fuel oil (HFO)
in their fuel mix are state utility Société Nationale
d’Electricité du Sénégal (Senelec)’s 197MW Bel Air (C6)
plant; Africa50 investment the 130MW Malicounda plant,
which President Macky Sall inaugurated in March; Azura
Power and Africa50’s 115MW Tobène power station; and
ContourGlobal’s 86MW Cap des Biches plant.
Senelec has other plants at its Bel Air and Cap des Biches
sites. All can be converted to natural gas should supplies
become available. Dozens of smaller diesel plants also
operate throughout the country.
African Energy concludes that, with its JETP, Senegal may
no longer have to compromise on its gas conversion and
development plans to get access to climate finance.
The deal may also have added a twist to the ambitions of
SOUTH AFRICA
Sibanye-Stillwater procures
over 500MW of renewables
State utility Eskom’s failure to supply adequate electricity
from its poorly performing and aging coal plants has forced
mining and industrial companies to seek alternative sources
of energy to avoid production losses.
Sibanye-Stillwater, one of the world’s biggest producers of
platinum, palladium, rhodium and gold, has begun procuring
at least 553MW of renewable energy (RE) to power its
operations across South Africa, thereby helping to mitigate
Eskom’s faltering electricity supply and achieve
decarbonisation targets.
Construction is due to start in Q4 2023 on the 50MW SA
Gold solar PV project in Westonaria, Guateng province.
Although intended to supply Sibanye’s Kloof mining
operation, power from the plant could be wheeled to any
location in South Africa (AE 411/4).
Investor relations manager Sarel Barnard told African Energy
that initial development of the Westonaria site was carried
out by Sibanye itself before a developer was appointed to
finance, build, own and operate the facility under a 20-year
power purchase agreement (PPA).
However, Sibanye has declined to name the project’s key
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Commercial and industrial power
another little-regarded local developer. Dakar-based Africa
Energy SA had hoped to build a 300MW coal-fired plant at
Mboro. Initially conceived in 2013, the Mboro project’s financing,
and even its ultimate ownership, was never clear. Local
media reported it had secured a power purchase agreement
with Senelec for FCFA66/kWh (then about $0.13/kWh).
While a coal plant is now entirely out of the question, the
government’s AEF presentation suggested Dakar now
expects the project at Mboro to go ahead as a gas-fired
plant.
Senegal has committed to prepare an investment plan
within 12 months to identify opportunities and required
investments under the JETP scheme. Its next step is to
publish its vision for a long-term low greenhouse gas
emission development strategy at COP28 in Dubai.
This vision must be finalised in 2024. It must also publish a
new NDC by COP30, reflecting its revised decarbonisation
goals.
participants. “We cannot disclose the developer, lender or
engineering, procurement and construction contractor at
this stage,” Barnard said.
A land claim over the permitted site, which has now been
legally resolved, has delayed the project by at least 12 months.
Sibanye’s gold operations consist of underground mining
and surface treatment facilities at Beatrix, Driefontein and
Kloof, all in the Witwatersrand Basin. The group has two
advanced gold schemes: the developmental stage
Burnstone project and exploration phase Southern Free
State (Sofs) project.
In addition, Sibanye has signed 15-year PPAs with three
local developers to supply a total 328MW of wind energy,
which will be connected to the Eskom grid and wheeled to
its operations.
One of these projects is the 89MW Castle wind farm in
Northern Cape, developed by African Infrastructure
Investment Managers (AIIM). Castle reached financial close
in May, with a construction start in June (AE 486/7).
Developers for all three wind projects were appointed in
2022, and they are all expected to reach commercial
operations in H1 2025. However, Barnard declined to reveal
the identity of two of three projects’ developers or locations.
All three wind projects will be third-party funded through
their PPAs.
21
Commercial and industrial power
Starsight and SolarAfrica complete
their merger
Nigeria’s Starsight Energy and South Africa’s SolarAfrica
said on 1 August they had completed their merger deal,
first announced in September 2022 (AE 469/14). The deal
creates one of Africa’s largest renewable energy-focused
commercial and industrial players.
The merged group has operational and contracted
capacity of 520MWp of solar PV and 60MWh of storage,
with a 2GW project pipeline.
Starsight head Paul van Zijl will be chief executive (CEO)
of the enlarged firm, in which Charl Alheit was named
group chief investment officer (his role in Johannesburg
since 2015), Max Rieg group commercial director and
Bianca Swanepoel group marketing manager.
Private equity players Helios Investment Partners and Old
Mutual Group’s African Infrastructure Investment
Managers (AIIM) – who were shareholders in Starsight –
remain investors in the new group.
Among the merged group’s regional subsidiaries, David
McDonald is SolarAfrica CEO covering southern Africa,
Ladi Sanni is managing director (MD) of Starsight Energy
in Nigeria and Emmanuel Ayifa Baah MD of Starsight in
Ghana, while Rupesh Hindocha is chairman and CEO of
Starsight Premier Energy Group in East Africa.
Three solar PV projects
Sibanye is developing the 80MW SRPM, 65MW Karee and
30MW Marikana solar projects to directly supply power to
its platinum group metals (PGM) mines and processing
plants in North-West province.
To be financed through third parties – under a 20-year PPA
– the construction of these plants is scheduled to start in
H1 24, with commercial operations set for H1 25.
Sibanye said a project developer would be appointed
through a competitive tendering process in H1 2024.
Sibanye’s Southern Africa PGM operations consist of
underground mining operations, surface sources and
concentrators at Kroondal, Rustenburg and Marikana, and the
Zimbabwe-based Mimosa 50/50 joint venture with Implats.
Three new PGM projects are at varying stages of
development: Blue Ridge, Akanani and Limpopo, all located
on the Bushveld Complex.
By 2025, Sibanye’s operating solar and wind projects are
expected to reduce its Scope 2 emissions by 25%, with the
22
group’s commitment for 20% renewable energy generation
surpassed by 2030.
In addition to South Africa, Sibanye has operations in
France, Finland, Australia and the Americas. The group also
produces and refines iridium, ruthenium, nickel, chrome,
copper and cobalt.
KENYA
Devki Group to develop wind
plant for cement factory
Industrial conglomerate Devki Group has announced plans
to develop a 60MW wind farm to supply electricity to its
subsidiary National Cement Company’s Sebit cement plant
in West Pokot county. The plans also include a heat waste
recovery element.
The cement plant, on the border with Uganda in western
Kenya, is due to start operations in August or September,
taking the group’s clinker production capacity to 7.5m
tonnes, making it the largest producer in East Africa.
A public notice issued on 31 July said National Cement had
applied to the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority
(EPRA) for an energy generation licence for a 60MW plant.
Any objections must be filed within 30 days.
The Devki Group, owned by prominent businessman
Narendra Raval, is among Kenya’s biggest consumers of
electricity. The new power plant is one of several announced
by the group in recent years, as it seeks to reduce its
reliance on expensive grid supplies. Previous projects have
included a 60MW wind facility at Devki Steel Mills in Kwale
county and a 15MW coal-fired unit for another steel plant in
Kajiado county, south-east of Nairobi.
It is not clear whether Devki has signed up a contractor to
build the latest facility, but in the past it has used China’s
Sinoma International Engineering Company for similar
projects, including a waste-heat power project at its Athi
River cement plant near Nairobi and for a steel-making plant
in Mombasa.
The Sebit will take Devki’s total generating capacity to
almost 200MW from a combination of wind, heat recovery
and coal-fired facilities.
Local media reported in late 2022 that Kenyan companies
had sought licences from EPRA to enable them to generate
a total 457MW, with the regulator having issued permits for
a total of 260MW. Companies have often cited expensive
grid power from Kenya Power as a major obstacle to doing
business.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

Among those making more use of C&I infrastructure is
Kenya Tea Development Agency, which recently applied for
a change in its KTDA Power Company subsidiary’s licence
to reduce the amount of power its sells to the grid, to supply
more to its tea processing factories (AE 487/15).
EGYPT
Progress for Centamin’s
Sukari solar expansion
Centamin on 26 July announced the completion of
preliminary work to expand to 50MWp its 30MWp solar PV
plant at the Sukari gold mine, near Marsa Alam on the Red
Sea coast. Project design work was under way, the London
Africa Investment Exchange
Power & Renewables
1-2 November, RSA House, London
Sponsored by
africa-investment-exchange.com
Commercial and industrial power
Stock Exchange-listed firm said.
The plant was first commissioned in 2022 with 7.5MW of
battery storage (AE 482/21, 473/17).
Centamin also said that qualifying tenders for Sukari’s
connection to the grid had been received and were being
reviewed, with a 2024 target for grid connection.
Sukari, which started production in 2009, is one of Africa’s
largest gold mines, producing 441,000oz in 2022. On 20
July, Centamin announced a new mining exploitation
agreement with the authorities for some 3,000km2 it had
acquired in eastern Egypt.
The company is also advancing the Doropo gold project in
Côte d’Ivoire
Upstream oil and gas
Progress at Nigerian and Mozambique
projects lifts mood of LNG sector
Following a fall in African liquefied natural gas exports in 2022, there are signs of fresh momentum in a
number of large onshore and floating LNG projects in key markets including Nigeria and Mozambique,
write James Gavin and African Energy staff
S
igns that several big liquefied natural gas
developments are moving ahead after long periods
in stop-start mode, and the emergence of floating
LNG (FLNG) projects around the continent, have given a
glimpse of Africa’s export potential – after years when even
some of the more attractive assets looked likely to be
stranded in the energy transition, and with major
investments stymied by financial, governance and security
constraints.
African LNG exports fell by 7% in 2022, to 53.9bcm,
notwithstanding the stimulus to sales provided by shifts in
the global market following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Nigeria was the worst performer among the world’s major
LNG exporters in 2022, with a 16% drop in export volumes
to 19.6bcm, according to the Statistical Review of World
Energy, released in late June by the Energy Institute (EI)*. It
also shows sizeable falls in the LNG exports of Algeria
(down 8% on 2021) and Angola (down 13%).
In contrast, exports climbed last year in other major LNG-
producing regions, with an 11% rise from the Americas,
Europe and Central Asia 10% up and 5% increases from the
Middle East and Asia Pacific.
The weaker trend in the continent’s LNG market continued
into Q1 2023, when Nigeria posted a 12% quarter-on-quarter
fall in export earnings, according to data from the National
Bureau of Statistics in Abuja.
The NGN622.4bn ($81.7bn) earned from LNG exports in Q1
23 marked a 5% drop on Q1 22. Observers blamed security
challenges and lower associated gas production for the fall.
However, despite this spotty performance, recent news flow
suggests progress can be expected on several major
African LNG schemes – including in Nigeria – and more
FLNG projects (see box: More sightings of rare FLNG).
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) on 20 July
announced that it had signed a heads of terms agreement
with the local UTM Offshore covering the construction of a
1.5m t/yr FLNG vessel linked to oil mining licence (OML)
104. NNPC has reportedly taken a 20% stake in the project.
24
UTM had previously signed an agreement with engineering
groups JGC, Technip Energies and Kellogg Brown and Root
to carry out front-end engineering and design studies for the
vessel. Financing has been secured from Cairo-based
multilateral lender African Export-Import Bank
(Afreximbank) – which has emerged as a major remaining
source of funds for upstream hydrocarbons projects.
Gas for UTM’s facility will be sourced from the Yoho field on
OML 104. Owned by operator ExxonMobil (40%) and NNPC
(60%), Yoho is due to start up in 2026, with a final
investment decision (FID) on the FLNG scheme anticipated
in Q4 2023/Q1 24 (AE 438/20).
Nigeria’s recently-installed President Bola Tinubu has
backed the Yoho project given its potential to “break
bottlenecks”.
According to Edinburgh-based consultant Wood Mackenzie
(WoodMac) senior research manager Mansur Mohammed,
the decision to take a stake in UTM’s proposed FLNG project
was a first for NNPC.
“Traditionally, [NNPC’s] investments would have gone
towards Nigeria LNG as the gas monetisation option for
exports. But because of the location of the resources,
because of the scale of the resources, FLNG is a natural
solution in this instance. And that won’t be the last of such
deals; we expect to see more FLNG projects proposed out
of Nigeria”.
On a much bigger scale, work continues to develop the 8m
t/yr Train 7 project for the Nigeria LNG a joint venture of
NNPC, TotalEnergies, Shell and Eni. Modules for the unit
were recently delivered to the Federal Ocean Terminal at
Port Harcourt, for onward delivery to Bonny Island.
Cutting costs in Mozambique
Among the continent’s other global-scale LNG schemes,
contractors have been in talks with operator TotalEnergies,
whose chief executive Patrick Pouyanné had turned
attention to cost concerns over the 13.1m t/yr Mozambique
LNG (MLNG) project.
This reflected an effort to shift the narrative from the force
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

Africa offers above-average sightings of still rare floating
LNG schemes
Floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) is an emerging option
for African operations – and, indeed, is being pioneered by
projects on the continent – as with Nigerian National
Petroleum Company’s deal with Port Harcourt-based UTM
Offshore to build a 1.5m t/yr FLNG vessel to develop the Yoho
field (see Main article).
FLNG projects are still relatively rare: just five operational
schemes world-wide have a total effective capacity of 8m t/yr.
Two of the schemes already in operation are in Africa: Golar’s
GoFLNG project in Cameroon and Eni’s Tango FLNG unit in
Republic of Congo (RoC).
According to WoodMac analyst Gail Anderson, Africa’s share
of the FLNG market will rise to 50% when the new projects
come on stream, leaving the continent “punching above its
weight” in applications of the technology. WoodMac
estimates that capital expenditure on African FLNG projects
will average $1bn-1.5bn/yr in the period to 2026.
Africa could account for an even larger share of the FLNG
capacity that is due to come on stream in 2023-27, when
consultancy Westwood Energy believes the continent will
account for 56% (10.2m t/yr) of additional capacity. Four units
destined for the region are now under construction or
reactivation.
Globally, Westwood anticipates 18.3m t/yr of additional FLNG
capacity will come onstream by 2027, with another 36.5m t/yr
majeure placed on MLNG following an Islamist attack in
March 2021 and after French diplomat Jean-Christophe
Rufin’s report in May, which concluded that the local security
and humanitarian situation had improved (AE 485/28,
484/25).
Italian energy services group Saipem said in late July that
negotiations were continuing to agree on the additional
costs involved in resuming work. Chief executive
Alessandro Puliti said in an H1 2023 results call that
“intense negotiations” had been held with subcontractors.
Puliti was unwilling to confirm a 2024 restart at MLNG, but
the Saipem chief said work was under way to reach an
acceptable cost for restarting the scheme.
Puliti added that he had recently visited the Afungi project
site, where work to relocate a village to make way for the
LNG plant was almost complete.
In late June, the United Kingdom Supreme Court rejected an
application from environmental campaign group Friends of
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Upstream oil and gas
expected after that from units that will be sanctioned
between now and 2027.
Among planned schemes is Eni’s second FLNG unit in RoC.
In December, the Italian major signed a contract with Wison
Heavy Industry to build and install a second FLNG unit on its
Marine XII block, with a capacity of 2.4m t/yr. The block’s two
units will have capacity to produce 3m t/yr by 2025.
“Republic of Congo FLNG was a response to the energy crisis
in Europe, but it was also able to negotiate improved fiscal
terms with lower royalties and a higher share of profit gas and
that helped that project go ahead,” Anderson told a WoodMac
briefing in June. “Now LNG is being brought to the market
faster, because these projects tend to be smaller, less costly
modular projects with a potential for expansion in countries
where there’s very small gas demand, and which are lower
risk and can capitalise on strong global gas prices.”
Other proposed investments include a second unit at Eni’s
offshore Area 4 development in Mozambique and an FLNG
option to monetise BP’s Yakaar-Teranga and BirAllah offshore
gas discoveries in Senegal and Mauritania respectively (AE
470/23).
In February, Paris-based independent Perenco confirmed
plans to deploy a 700,000 t/yr FLNG unit at the Cap Lopez Oil
Terminal in Gabon (AE 479/31).
the Earth to appeal against export credit agency UK Export
Finance’s decision to help fund the MLNG project.
Big questions remain to be asked in Mozambique, where FID
is not expected from operator ExxonMobil until 2025 at the
earliest for the 18m t/yr Rovuma LNG project, (AE 488/26).
And despite moves to restart work, Edinburgh-based
consultant Wood Mackenzie (WoodMac) says that still
unanswered questions about MLNG’s overall costs and
design concept mean first gas from the TotalEnergies-
operated scheme may not reach market before 2029.
Meanwhile to the north, moves to take the Lindi LNG
(Tanzania LNG) project closer to FID are awaited, after the
main elements of a host government agreement (HGA) and
production-sharing agreement (PSA) for offshore blocks 1,
2 and 4 were publicly agreed in May by partners Norway’s
Equinor, London-headquartered Shell and US supermajor
ExxonMobil, and the Tanzanian government (AE 485/22).
25
Upstream oil and gas
Mixed news for GTA
In mixed news for some other LNG schemes, British major
BP’s Q2 2023 results, issued on 1 August, noted that Phase
1 of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) project in Mauritania
and Senegal was now expected to start up in Q1 2024, up
to six months later than previously expected (AE 482/22).
GTA’s first phase is expected to produce 2.3m t/yr of LNG,
in a project eventually targeted to reach output of 10m t/yr.
BP’s Q2 23 announcement also said the British operator
was taking GTA’s Phase 2 plans to the “next stage of
evaluation”.
* UK-based chartered professional membership body the
Energy Institute has replaced BP, which created the Statistical
Review of World Energy in 1952, as publisher of the annual
data compendium.
UGANDA
TotalEnergies starts drilling
at Tilenga
TotalEnergies said in late July it had started drilling at the
Tilenga oilfield, with oil production due to follow in 2025.
Output from the field is expected to peak at 190,000 b/d,
with more than 400 wells planned at the development.
New York-listed Expro Group Holdings won a $30m, five-
year well intervention and integrity contract for the Tilenga
project in June (AE 486/24).
Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) development and
production director Alex Nyombi said three rigs had been
designated for drilling at Tilenga. Sinopec 1501 is now
operational at the Jobi-5 well pad; a second rig is doing final
tests at the Ngiri 3 well-pad. A third rig is being assembled
and is expected to start operations in October.
Tilenga is part of the wider Lake Albert project, which also
includes the Kingfisher field operated by China National
Offshore Oil Company (Cnooc) and the 1,400km East
African Crude Oil Pipeline (Eacop) that will transport oil to
the port of Tanga in Tanzania for export (AE 454/19).
Cnooc started commercial drilling at the Kingfisher field in
January and has completed its first development well, to a
depth of 3km. The combined output of Tilenga and
Kingfisher is expected to reach 230,000 b/d.
The start of drilling at Tilenga comes amid fresh criticism
of the Lake Albert project. US-based Human Rights Watch
(HRW) issued a report on 10 July, called Our Trust is Broken:
26
Loss of Land and Livelihoods for Oil Development in Uganda,
which said the Eacop land acquisition process had been
marred by delays, poor communication and inadequate
compensation.
Families had been pressured to agree to cash settlements
that were insufficient to buy replacement land, HRW said.
“The situation on the ground for many families who are
losing land is grim,” the report said.
TotalEnergies has defended its conduct, telling HRW in a 15
June letter that close attention was being paid to the rights
of the communities affected and compensation payments
had been at the “full replacement value”.
The pipeline, 296km of which will be in Uganda, comprises
a buried 24-inch pipeline, six pumping stations (two in
Uganda and four in Tanzania), two pressure reduction
stations and a marine storage facility (AE 484/9).
Shareholders in the Eacop pipeline are TotalEnergies (62%),
Uganda National Oil Company (Unoc) and Tanzania
Petroleum Development Corporation (15% each) and Cnooc
(8%). Unoc also has equity in the upstream project.
EGYPT
ExxonMobil commits to deep
offshore blocks
Egypt’s cabinet approved ExxonMobil’s exploration
agreements with Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company
(Egas) for the Cairo Offshore and Masry Offshore blocks at
an end-July meeting. They are the most northerly areas to
be licensed in Egypt to date.
The government also approved an agreement between local
operator Pico Petroleum, its partner Kuwait Foreign
Petroleum Exploration Company (Kufpec) and Egyptian
General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) for oil exploration
and development in the Geisum and Tawila blocks at the
southern entrance of the Gulf of Suez.
In total the companies have committed to drill 13 wells with
investments of about $320m. The greatest part of this
investment will be in the frontier deep water blocks that
ExxonMobil will operate with a 100% interest.
The US major obtained rights to the blocks in an
arrangement announced in January (AE 476/20).
EGPC awarded Pico and Kufpec the Geisum and Tawila
licence in 2007, when it was Egypt’s first oil-producing
concession to be privatised. The acreage has already gone
through several development phases.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

LIBYA
SLB wins drilling work in
ground-breaking contract
United States oil services giant SLB (formerly Schlumberger)
has signed a turnkey contract with National Oil Corporation
(NOC) subsidiary National Oil Well Drilling and Maintenance
Company to drill three wells in Repsol Exploration Murzuq
(Remsa)’s concessions in the south-west.
The contract – signed at NOC’s Tripoli headquarters on 26
Energy majors’ Q2 23 results point to tougher market
Half-year results issued over recent weeks revealed a
comedown for oil companies after the highs of 2022 when
conflict in Europe helped to drive crude and gas prices much
higher. Lower oil and gas prices and a softer refining market
squeezed margins, resulting in lower profits.
Among the majors, ExxonMobil’s Q2 2023 net profit was
down 59% year-on-year at $7.9bn, some 4% below market
expectations. Chevron Corporation’s $5.8bn net profit was
half the level of one year ago.
European majors Shell and TotalEnergies’ profits declined by
a similar amount. Shell reported a 56% drop to $5.1bn, while
the French firm reported a 49% year-on-year fall in net profit
to $5bn, with weaker liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices
affecting earnings.
Norway’s Equinor reported profits that were down by 57% on
Q2 22, while Italian major Eni’s Q2 23 pre-tax profit of €3.7bn
($4bn) was down 41%. BP reported a profits slump to $1.8bn,
compared to $8.2bn in Q1 23.
African operations shaped some of these performances.
TotalEnergies said its 2m barrels of oil equivalent (boe)/d
output was up 2% year-on-year, thanks to new project start-
ups including Ikike in Nigeria.
Chief executive Patrick Pouyanné told a 27 July earnings call
that TotalEnergies’ priority was now Namibia, where data on
an appraisal well at Venus is due soon. A first test will spud
in early August, and results will be ready in September. “If
productivity is 15,000 b/d, it’s fine; if it’s 5,000 b/d, it’s not fine,”
he said. “Then we'll see what can be the expansion in the
Orange Basin on the other side [in South Africa]” (AE 488/25).
Eni said one reason for its exploration and production unit
reporting a 58% fall in quarterly operating profits was the
absence of its Angolan subsidiaries that since last year had
been placed in the Azule Energy joint venture with BP (AE
480/31). It said a ramp-up in Mozambique had contributed to
a 2% increase in hydrocarbon production to 1.63m boe/d,
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Upstream oil and gas
July – represents the first time the corporation’s domestic
drilling company has outsourced an entire drilling operation
to an international provider.
While Libya’s oil sector is heavily dependent on the global
oil industry, NOC and its subsidiaries have generally tried to
maintain self-sufficient management of their activities.
SLB will drill the wells at Remsa’s Al-Nisr and Al-Waha fields
in areas NC115 and NC186, located in the Murzuq Basin.
These are adjacent to the large Es Sharara field operated by
the NOC-Repsol Akakus Oil Operations joint venture.
while natural gas output was up 1% in year-on-year, thanks in
part to increases seen in Algeria and Mozambique.
In May, Eni offloaded the first LNG cargo from Damietta in
Egypt to a new regasification terminal in Piombino, Italy. This
was followed by the delivery of a first commercial cargo from
Algeria’s Betihoua plant in July.
CdI’s Whale coming on stream
Analysts said the results should be seen in the context of
wider industry trends, which have seen majors downsize their
footprints in Africa – aside from some deep-water positions
– and divest non-core, legacy assets.
Yet the majors are still invested in the sub-Saharan and West
African upstream, said Wood Mackenzie analyst Mansur
Mohamed, with a particular focus on sustainable operations.
“Companies are investing in projects that have low emissions
and are putting in place the right mechanisms to ensure gas
flaring is reduced and fugitive emissions are captured,” he
said. “Investment is coming back into the region and we’re
seeing new investments in emerging countries. Many
projects were sent back to the drawing board for scope and
costs revisions” – notably LNG projects in Mozambique.
In West Africa, first oil is imminent from Eni’s Baleine (Whale)
discovery in Côte d’Ivoire, ahead of full-field development by
2026 (AE 470/21). This project is progressing fast. “Eni has
proved to be nimble, and it has a lot of support from the
Ivorian government,” Mohamed said.
Critics might disagree this is possible, but Baleine is designed
as a zero emissions project which, according to Mohamed “is
being developed with the understanding that there is a market
for the volumes… and it will have low or no emissions. And
the scale of the project means will be relatively low-cost for
Eni to pursue.”
* A longer version of this article, with discussion of the
independents’ role, can be accessed online.
27
Climate change and future fuels
South African government urged to provide
more support for GH2 projects
The administration has taken some initial steps to develop green hydrogen projects, but analysts and
industry players say more support is needed from the government, development financiers, international
technology partners and offtakers if the nascent industry is to fulfil its potential, writes Tonderayi Mukeredzi
B
ankers, analysts and other industry players have called
for greater clarity and support from government for
South Africa’s nascent green hydrogen (GH2) sector,
saying momentum could quickly be lost unless access to
finance, poor infrastructure and other issues were addressed.
Buoyed by bullish early reports from global consultants,
South Africa was quick to set out ambitious plans to
develop its hydrogen sector. President Cyril Ramaphosa
observed in October that South Africa was the world’s
largest producer of platinum, a key input in hydrogen fuel
cell technology (AE 471/25).
In the past, the government has said it wanted to capture
about 4% of the global GH2 market by 2050, guided by its
Hydrogen Society Roadmap published in February 2022. It
has set a national target of $250bn of investment in the
sector by 2050 (AE 487/34).
Abundant wind and solar resources, plus large areas of
adjacent land, are among comparative advantages that
could be used to support the industry. However, observers
say there are numerous bottlenecks preventing the
technology from being fully commercialised and the
required investment being raised.
They have urged the government to create a long-term
policy framework for the sector that creates an attractive
environment for international investors.
“The support of big offtakers in the corporate world and
technology partners and subsidisation by government is
absolutely essential to get this market moving,” Fieldstone
Private Capital Group senior banker Christine Gibson told a
GH2 conference organised by Resources Africa on 19 July.
“It certainly seems government subsidisation is in the
works. Sometimes it can be more of a political game than a
commercial game and that is where the risk lies.”
Among the few major GH2 projects announced to date,
chemicals giant Sasol – which already produces grey
hydrogen – has set out plans for a 5GW GH2 project in
Northern Cape (AE 473/23).
Mining group Anglo American Platinum is working with the
government and France’s Engie on developing a ‘hydrogen
28
valley’ industrial cluster, which will run from Mokopane to
Duban, via Johannesburg. Among the projects earmarked
for this are an assembly plant for trucks and buses fuelled
by GH2 (AE 460/24).
Gibson said Fieldstone was working with several other large
hydrogen projects in South Africa that were in the process
of raising development funding and, ultimately, senior debt.
There have been some other notable developments in
recent months. In June, Netherlands-based Climate Fund
Managers (CFM) and Invest International (II) announced
plans for a $1bn fund to support GH2 projects in South
Africa, in partnership with insurer Sanlam, Development
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa (IDC).
A similar scheme has been set up for Namibia by CFM and
II (AE 487/34).
The South African government announced agreement with
Germany, later in June, for Berlin to help to provide access
to technology partners and offtakers in Europe. No new
financial commitments were announced, but German
deputy ambassador Enrico Brandt has said a ZAR450m
($24m) grant from German development bank KfW for GH2
infrastructure is close to being finalised.
Gauteng Industrial Development Zone Company chief
investment facilitator Maidei Matika told the 19 July
Johannesburg conference there was enough money for GH2
projects, but accessing it was the problem. “The challenges
have never been about the money. They have been about
what we need to do differently to ensure that we make it
accessible,” she said.
Banks wary of GH2 projects
While some have complained about the lack of available
funding, financiers argue there are still not many
opportunities for them to engage with.
“It is easier to say we are not banking a lot of hydrogen
projects at the moment, but there are not many hydrogen
projects around,” said Nedbank Group head of
infrastructure, energy and telecoms Mike Peo. “Certainly,
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

there is a lot interest in playing a part. What banks are doing
is to carve out niches to say we can fund the [black
economic empowerment] BEE component of a hydrogen
project if the project is bankable,” Peo said.
Fieldstone’s Gibson said a global pricing mechanism for
GH2 could create a degree of centrality that could
encourage more banks to provide senior debt facilities for
projects. She suggested the COP28 United Nations Climate
Change Conference, due to take place in Dubai in November,
may be an opportune time to explore this idea.
Participants at the GH2 event also called for greater clarity
on the potential funding of projects, particularly from the
Just Energy Partnership (JTEP) – the $8.5bn pact the
government signed in 2021 to support the transition away
from South Africa’s heavy reliance on coal towards green
energy (see African Energy view).
“We see green hydrogen as a key enabler for the ‘just
transition’, with significant potential for South Africa to
produce and export green hydrogen,” said Anglo American
Platinum executive head for projects and environment
Prakashin Moodliar. “The great potential of green hydrogen
is that it can be employed in sectors that were previously
seen to be hard to decarbonise, including long-haul heavy-
duty transport, chemicals, steel, cement, aviation and
shipping.”
RWANDA
Rio Tinto takes stake in
Aterian lithium project
Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto has signed an
agreement with London Stock Exchange (LSE)-listed Aterian
to become operator of the Kinunga lithium mining project in
Rwanda and take a stake of up to 75% in the licence.
Under the deal announced by Aterian on 1 August, Rio Tinto
will have the option to invest $3m over two years in return
for a 51% stake in the licence. In a second stage over the
following three years Rio Tinto would gain a further 24%
based on investment of up to $4.5m.
The licence is held by Kinunga Mining, which is 70% owned
by Aterian, with the other 30% held by Rwandan company
HCK Mining Company. If Rio Tinto takes up the full 75%,
Aterian will be left with 17.5% and HCK with 7.5%.
The licence covers a 2,750ha area in the south where,
according to Aterian, 19 lithium-caesium-tantalum zones
have been identified.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Future fuels & Transition minerals
Poor infrastructure is seen as another bottleneck standing
in the way of South Africa’s GH2 advantages – which were
underlined by a National Business Initiative report which
estimated that GH2 could be produced in South Africa for
$1.60/kg by 2030 – one of the lowest costs world-wide.
South African operators fear they could lose the benefits of
relatively cheap locally-produced GH2, due to the lack
encouragement for local industry to decarbonise, while
much of the hydrogen produced would be exported to
Europe and other wealthy markets.
Read more on this topic online
New scramble for Africa – Green hydrogen and other
clean energy export schemes
As part of the deal, Rio Tinto has agreed to pay a 2% net
smelter return, capped at $50m. The payments will be split
between Aterian and HCK on a 70/30 basis, in line with their
existing shareholdings in the project.
Rio Tinto will also pay an initial $200,000 to Aterian to
reimburse it for previous expenses. A further $100,000
payment will be due to Aterian when the second stage starts.
Rio Tinto has also been given an exclusivity option to invest
in Aterian’s two other Rwandan projects, pending licence
approval from the authorities. These are the Musasa Mining
joint venture with the Kuaka Co-operative in western
Rwanda and the Dynasty joint venture with the local Dynasty
Construction in southern Rwanda.
It is Rio Tinto’s second Africa-focused transition mineral
mining deal in the space of a few weeks. In July, the mining
giant took a 15% stake in Perth-headquartered Sovereign
Metals, developer of the Kasiya graphite project in Malawi’s
Lilongwe district (AE 488/29).
Such deals are becoming more frequent as multinational
mining companies look to secure a bigger share of critical
and transition minerals reserves (AE 487/30)
29
ESG, finance and policy
Magufuli’s resource nationalism comes back
to haunt Tanzania as arbitral rulings line up
Tanzania faces a $109.5m hit in one of several disputes dating back to late president John Magufuli’s
government, after an Icsid arbitral panel decided in favour of the Ntaka Hill nickel sulphide joint venture
in the latest – but likely not the last – bill to come due from the former administration’s nationalist
economic policies – a legacy President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s reforming government is working to
overcome, writes Marc Howard
A
n International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (Icsid) arbitral panel has awarded $109.5m
to a group of claimants over the unlawful seizure of
the Ntaka Hill nickel sulphide joint venture (JV), in the latest
bill to come due from the poorly conceived and hastily
implemented nationalist economic policies promoted by
late president John Magufuli (2015-21).
World Bank Group (WBG) affiliate Icsid’s 14 July ruling
showed how sins of the Magufuli era continue to haunt
Tanzania, after the late ‘Bulldozer’ alienated investors and
stalled projects (AE 415/20, 368/21, 338/5). This is despite
the considerable efforts of his successor President Samia
Suluhu Hassan and her government to rebuild investor
confidence (AE 483/9, 482/27, 480/30, 479/34, 472/33).
The Icsid claimants – UK-incorporated Ntaka Nickel
Holdings and Nachingwea UK, and Tanzania-headquartered
Nachingwea Nickel – were represented by major
shareholder and Ntaka Hill JV manager Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed Indiana Resources.
The group based its claim on the project being unlawfully
expropriated under the Mining (Mineral Rights) Regulations
2018; these measures were based on primary legislation
passed in 2017 by the Magufuli administration, which gave it
the power to revoke all previously-issued retention licences.
The Tanzanian government in December 2019 invited
tenders for the areas previously held by retention licence
holders and, later that month, said bidders need not
compensate former permit owners.
Icsid written rulings are infrequently publicly released (as is
this case), but Indiana executive chair Bronwyn Barnes told
African Energy the panel had unanimously found Tanzania
had unlawfully expropriated the development.
Under Icsid rules either party may file for an annulment
within 120 days of a panel decision. Tanzania’s Dar-es-
Salaam-based Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has
applied to Icsid for an annulment of the $109.5m award,
which the Washington-headquartered Icsid Secretariat
registered on 28 July.
30
An ad hoc Icsid committee will convene to determine
whether there are grounds for annulment. The five specific
grounds for annulment pertain largely to gross misconduct
or serious procedural lapses by the panel. While Tanzania’s
request for annulment continues, the Icsid Secretariat has
granted a provisional stay of award enforcement.
According to Icsid statistics released in January, just one
award had been annulled since 2021, while 23 annulment
applications were rejected; during the same period, 56
awards were made and five annulment proceedings
discontinued.
Barnes said Indiana “remains extremely confident of its
position and an initial review by our legal representation
suggests Tanzania will not be able to meet the requirements
for the annulment.”
The OSG did not respond to a request for comment.
Costly judgements mount up
The 14 July award is just one of a number of international
arbitration claims brought by international investors
stemming from Magufuli-era policies that have been either
concluded or are still proceeding.
At Icsid alone two cases were brought by Canadian miners
Montero Mining and Exploration and Winshear Gold over
retention licence revocations. Symbion Power Tanzania
initiated proceedings in 2019 over Tanzania Electricity
Supply Company (Tanesco)’s breaking of a power purchase
agreement for the 120MW Ubungo gas-fired plant; that
action was discontinued in May 2021 (AE 440/8).
In May, Icsid concluded proceedings relating to another
Magufuli-era case, where $165m had been awarded to
Swedish biofuel and energy investors in April 2022. The
case generated headlines after the claimants had an Air
Tanzania jet seized and impounded in the Netherlands to
enforce the award.
These costly proceedings – and at least two sizeable
arbitral awards made against Tanzania to date – reflect the
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

legacy of Magufuli’s resource nationalist and other policies,
which were rooted in a version of founding president Julius
Nyerere’s ujamaa experiment in socialist/collectivist
national development, during which at least 5m Tanzanians
were forcibly resettled (AE 350/1).
The Magufuli administration’s seizure of foreign investors’
assets was counter-productive, stalling many energy and
mining developments, and is likely to incur huge sums in
compensation.
Barnes said that following its expropriation the Ntaka site
had been illicitly developed by other parties, as were other
mining assets whose retention licences were revoked at the
time. Illegal mining operations had carried out no
environmental studies; neither had they paid taxes or
royalties.
President Samia has promoted reform but her room for
manoeuvre is constrained. Powerful factions within the
ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party remain loyal to
Magufuli-style authoritarian-socialist policies.
CCM has held power continuously since independence over
60 years ago (prior to 1977 as the Tanganyika African
National Union). In the 2020 elections CCM officially took
84% of the presidential vote and 98% of the parliamentary
vote.
Intra-CCM political battles will very likely determine who
heads the next government too, as jostling for position
ahead of the 2025 election has started – and evocative
issues such as the seizure of Tanzanian assets by foreign
investors could become a political hot potato.
Additional costs ramp up...
Damages and additional losses accounted for $76.7m of
Icsid’s $109.5m award against Tanzania. The remaining
$32.8m was accounted for by compound interest, set at 2%
above the US dollar prime rate from January 2018 (which
will continue to accrue until payment).
In addition, Indiana had $3.9m in legal costs and some
$200,000 for tribunal and Icsid expenses.
That over one-quarter of the award comprises interest
penalties and legal expenses showed how sovereigns risk
being exposed to significant additional costs when arbitral
rulings go against them.
The arbitration claim against Tanzania was funded by a
$4.65m facility extended by London Alternative Investment
Market (AIM)-listed Litigation Capital Management,
repayable on the payment of any Icsid award.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
ESG, finance and policy
Perth, Western Australia-headquartered Indiana said on 18
July that Litigation Capital Management was in line for a
total repayment of approximately $15m that would
“continue to increase until the facility has been repaid and
closed”.
Another litigant who had taken Tanzania to arbitration
commented that Icsid was the most appropriate setting to
gain a positive result, as “it is the sovereign you are taking
to litigation, not a company – governments tend to pay
greater attention to that.”
…leading to calls for a middle way
Given the significant sums involved in Tanzania-related and
other arbitrations, some have sought a less contentious way
forward for the parties involved.
The fact multiple mining companies were pursuing
international arbitrations against African sovereigns, and
the likely associated challenges with the enforcement of
any arbitral awards, could potentially lead to a “lose-lose”
scenario for all parties, argued law firm Bowmans partner
Michael Strain.
Dar es Salaam-based Strain proposed an alternative
solution whereby Dodoma might proactively take the lead
and appoint an intermediary – likely a corporate finance
advisory firm with a strong international network – to
identify new potential investors for each of the mine assets.
This intermediary should “determine the likely current fair
market value for the assets, including taking into account
the impact of any illegal artisanal activity (if any)”.
Thereafter, Strain told African Energy, a bidding or sales
process should be run for each of the mining assets, subject
to the former retention licence holders’ consent and an
appropriate ‘reserve price’ being set. If successful, this
approach could lead to everyone getting paid rather than no
one – at least in the shorter term, Strain concluded.
Arbitral award teeth shown by jet seizure
Icsid panel decisions are binding in all WBG member
countries (which include Tanzania), with the legal status of
domestic court rulings. Enforcement of an award can occur
in any WBG member country.
On 20 July, Indiana’s lawyers wrote a letter of demand to
request full payment by 17 August.
Prior to Tanzania applying for annulment, Barnes told
African Energy that if payment was not forthcoming it would
“seek to enforce the award, and will look to seize Tanzanian
assets”.
31
ESG, finance and policy
Barnes said in April that Indiana could seek the seizure of
Tanzanian state-owned aircraft to enforce the award.
This is a route taken by other firms with arbitral awards: in
June 2022 an Air Tanzania Airbus A220-330 was seized and
impounded in the Netherlands. The order was granted by
Limburg court in Maastricht after lawyers representing
energy and sugarcane investors EcoDevelopment and
EcoEnergy Africa petitioned it to enforce an April 2022 Icsid
award of $165m.
The Swedish firms filed their Icsid claim in September 2017
over the 150,000 t/yr Bagamoyo sugar project, which was
also to sell 12MW of bagasse-fired electricity to the grid and
produce 14,000 m3/yr of bioethanol. They argued that the
government had revoked land titles necessary for the
project, which they said amounted to “unreasonable and
discriminatory measures”.
Putin makes play for greater Russian role in
African energy projects
President Vladimir Putin made a pitch for greater Russian involvement in energy projects and much more
during the 27-28 July second Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg. Although the number of African
leaders who attended was far less than at the inaugural summit in 2019, many among the self-selecting
audience responded favourably and several will align with Putin again when the Brics grouping meets in
late August – even if the Russian president, facing an ICC arrest warrant, won’t be in Johannesburg,
writes Dominic Dudley
P
resident Vladimir Putin made a pitch for greater
Russian involvement in African power projects,
hydrocarbons developments and battery production,
during the Second Russia-Africa Summit Economic, which
included a Humanitarian Forum, in St Petersburg on 27-28
July. As he sought to revive a role familiar from Moscow’s
communist past, Putin told the 28 July plenary session: “The
Soviet Union has built many enterprises, power plants and
steel plants in Africa. We should resume that practice… and
we will do this on a bilateral basis.”
The day before, Putin had said Russian companies were
involved in 30 energy projects across 16 African countries,
with a total generation capacity of some 3.7GW.
The Russia-Africa summit drew in some 17 African heads
of state, ranging from firm friends such as Eritrea’s
President Isaias Afwerki and presidents Cyril Ramaphosa
of South Africa, and Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique.
Some on the guest list are seen as key western allies, such
as President Macky Sall of Senegal.
32
Although Icsid had stayed the award on 15 June 2022
following a request from Tanzania for annulment, this was
just one day prior to the Dutch court’s 16 June order
granting the aircraft’s seizure, meaning it came too late to
prevent the A220-330’s impoundment.
It seems this dispute has been resolved, as Icsid said the
annulment proceeding, for which an ad hoc committee was
constituted in July 2022, was discontinued on 16 May. On 9
July, Dar es Salaam daily The Citizen reported that the Air
Tanzania jet had been released “after a successful
discussion between the two sides”.
Details of this apparent settlement have not been made
available. African Energy was unable to obtain comment
from either of the Swedish firms – neither of which have a
publicly available website, phone number or email address
– or the Tanzanian government’s OSG.
It was a significant drop from the 43 heads of state or
government who attended the inaugural event in 2019.
Analysts speculated that many leaders might have opted
not to attend due to western pressure (the Russian
argument) or a desire not to take sides in the stand-off
between Moscow and western powers.
It also likely signalled some leaders’ suspicion of Moscow,
not least over the mercenary Wagner Group’s manoeuvres
in the Sahel and other parts of the continent (AE 488/36).
A few didn’t come because they had only recently been in
Moscow – the case of Algeria, whose President Abdelmajid
Tebboune agreed defence, energy and other deals during a
state visit in June. The Algerian regime – and especially its
military leadership – remains very close to Russia, an
alignment it places in juxtaposition to regional rival
Morocco’s close relations with the West.
Russian energy minister Nikolay Shulginov told the Tass
news agency at the summit that Gazprom (49%) and
Algerian state partner Sonatrach (51%) expected to bring
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

three blocks into production south-east of Hassi Messaoud
– blocks 236b, 404a1 and 405b1 – in 2026.
In a series of bilateral meetings with the visiting heads of
state, Putin fleshed out some of his ambitions, pointing to
plans by Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation to
launch “a number of large projects” in a meeting with
Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso.
Putin also said mining and energy were among the
promising areas of potential development in key regional
ally Mali, in a meeting with interim President Colonel Assimi
Goïta. In March, a Rosatom subsidiary took a 75% stake in
a lithium mining project in the Sikasso region of Mali.
Some of the visiting presidents appeared more encouraging
than others. Guinea-Bissau President Umaro Sissoco
Embalo told Putin “We would like the Russian government
to encourage your businesses to step up their involvement
in oil production in our country.”
Big opportunities for Mother Russia
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni made a similar call,
saying: “Russian companies can also take part in
exploration for more oil in our area”. Museveni invited them
to get involved in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (Eacop),
which is planned to run from Uganda’s Lake Albert to the
Tanzanian coast (see Upstream: TotalEnergies at Tilenga).
With financiers struggling to finance the pipeline, amid
market resistance and activist opposition, Museveni said:
“Russian companies can also come in and invest in that
East African crude pipeline because it can transport the oil
of not only Uganda but even South Sudan and Congo,
Congo-Kinshasa.”
It is unclear how Russian oil companies – most of which are
under western sanctions as a result of Moscow’s invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022 – could get involved in the
pipeline project, particularly given the central role played in
the scheme by French major TotalEnergies. The French
operator has previously said it expects Uganda’s output to
take up almost all of Eacop’s capacity for much of the first
decade of operations (AE 484/10).
Museveni also set out ambitions to attract Russian
investment in other emerging areas. He pointed to Uganda’s
“very big potential for phosphates, and for potassium, and
also for ammonia. I would like to invite Russian companies,
if they can, to take part in that.”
The veteran leader also highlighted battery manufacturing
potential, saying: “We would like to work with Russia, if
possible, on the issue of electric batteries. We have got
lithium, the raw materials, the rare earth, but if you can work
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
ESG, finance and policy
with us on the electric batteries, so that we do not waste
money.”
Ramaphosa also offered encouragement to Putin, saying:
“Co-operation should now be much broader in the energy
sector. Currently, South Africa is going through an energy
crisis and we could learn a lot and do a lot together with
Russia on the energy side.”
However, there was some veiled criticism too, not least over
Russia’s decision on 17 July to cancel its support for the
Black Sea Grain Initiative, which enabled the export of
Ukrainian grain to Africa and other parts of the world.
In a meeting between Putin and the leaders of seven African
delegations which focused on the Ukraine conflict,
Ramaphosa told the Russian leader “we would like the Black
Sea Initiative to be implemented… We would like the Black
Sea to be open to the world market.”
Putin told delegates on the summit’s opening day that
Moscow would step in to replace Ukrainian grain exports to
some of its allies, saying: “In the coming months, we will be
ready to provide Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia,
Central African Republic and Eritrea with 25,000-50,000
tonnes of grain free of charge.”
Kremlin-watchers reported that the Wagner Group’s
supposedly exiled leader Yevgeny Prigozhin had been at the
summit, with pictures emerging on social media of him
greeting African delegates.
The summit ended with Putin and his African guests signing
an Action Plan 2023-26, which included pledges to continue
working on developing Russian-African energy co-operation.
Next stop the Brics
Ramaphosa will return to South Africa to make preparations
for an important summit of a growing Brics grouping, whose
current five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa – are due to convene in Johannesburg on 22-
24 August.
A potential expansion of the grouping is on the agenda, with
Algeria, Argentina and Saudi Arabia among those expected
to join. South Africa has said more than 40 nations had
expressed interest in joining, with 22 formally asking to
become members of the Brics, which is being reimagined
as a counterweight to perceived US-led ‘western hegemony’.
Expansion is expected to underline the Brics’ emerging
identity as a new-look non-aligned movement.
However, the Johannesburg meeting will not be attended by
one of its star guests, Putin, who the South African
Presidency in mid-July confirmed would stay away “by
33
ESG, finance and policy
UAE deepens mining links with DRC as trans-continental
links consolidate
Meetings in July between United Arab Emirates state
minister for foreign affairs Sheikh Shakhbut Bin Nahyan Al-
Nahyan and leaders from around the continent gave further
public expression to the UAE’s interest in promoting mining
and other economic opportunities in Africa – along with
promoting wider political ties and its hosting of the COP28
climate talks in November (AE 487/1, 487/35).
Shakhbut attended the first Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (Igad) quartet meeting on Sudan, held in the
Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 10 July, which was chaired
by Kenyan President William Ruto. Igad has, in recent
months, been given new dynamism, notably in seeking a
negotiating role in the Sudanese crisis (AE 488/6).
The UAE minister went on to Kinshasa for talks with
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Félix
Tsisekedi, and later in the month met Chad’s Interim
President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno in N’djamena and
Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema in Lusaka.
In DRC, the UAE delegation signed a mining deal estimated
to be worth $1.9bn with state-owned gold miner Société
Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (Sakima). The deal covers
the construction of at least four mines in South Kivu and
Maniema provinces in troubled eastern DRC, but few other
details have been released.
It follows an agreement last December between the UAE’s
Primera Group – which has links to national security adviser
Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan – and Tshisekedi’s
government, covering gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum
extracted by artisanal miners in South Kivu and possibly
elsewhere around DRC.
Some reports suggested Primera Group was also involved in
the latest deal. The Abu Dhabi-based company had not
responded to an enquiry at the time of publication.
“What the Congo gets is at the moment unclear, what taxes,
what royalties,” one investigator with experience of the DRC
minerals sector said.
In policy terms, Kinshasa appeared to be taking a different
approach with the UAE compared to the European Union, the
investigator commented: “DRC has been critical towards EU
attempts to create strategic partnerships for raw materials
because they say the EU isn’t giving them enough
infrastructure and financial aid. And then they sign these
deals with the UAE which seem completely commercial.”
One analyst questioned whether there were sufficient
34
deposits in South Kivu and Maniema of the size required to
justify investment on the scale being reported. Another
source queried DRC’s track record, saying Sakima had
entered other joint ventures with mining companies that had
not led to the promised investments materialising.
Meanwhile, Shakhbut Bin Nahyan’s 24 July meeting with
Déby in N’djamena drew attention to the growing but often
opaque links between the UAE and Chad – which, since mid-
May, have been marked by a substantial airlift from Abu
Dhabi to the remote eastern town of Amdjarass (AE 488/34).
The UAE and its corporates have been developing a range of
business. Several MCAV-20 armoured vehicles, made by Abu
Dhabi-based Calidus’ CLS Automotive Technologies affiliate,
were seen on parade in Kinshasha on 22 July.
Shakhbut is part of a small elite group
Shakhbut Bin Nahyan has been increasingly active on the
African continent, since ending a four-year stint as
ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 2021, when he was appointed
minister of state in the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Before then, the UAE Africa portfolio was handled by a
combination of national security adviser (and billionaire
business magnate) Tahnoun Bin Zayed (TBZ) and other
senior figures who had cultivated in-country networks.
Those with special national-level relations include Ali Al-
Shamsi in Somalia and industry and advanced technology
minister, Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar)
chairman, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) chief
executive and COP28 president-elect Sultan Al-Jaber in Egypt.
One source told African Energy’s sister publication Gulf States
Newsletter that Shakhbut reported to TBZ.
In H1 2023, Shakhbut had also met (either in their own
countries or in Abu Dhabi) the leaders of Angola, Benin,
Cameroon, Comoros, Gambia, Liberia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Republic of Congo (twice), Sudan, Tanzania
and Zimbabwe, as well as ministers from Angola, Liberia,
Mozambique, South Africa, South Sudan and Uganda.
Among his many engagements in recent months, Shakhbut
witnessed an agreement between Masdar and Côte d’Ivoire
to develop solar projects and hosted the Ghana Business
Forum in Abu Dhabi. Shakbut last year launched the Masdar-
based Etihad 7 fund, which is aimed at developing renewable
energy projects around Africa.
—ELEANOR GILLESPIE
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

mutual agreement”, after concerns linked to the warrant
issued in March by the International Criminal Court (ICC)
over accusations that Russia unlawfully deported Ukrainian
children – a war crime.
As an ICC member, South Africa would be obliged to arrest
the Russian president – which opponents of the ruling
Nigeria awaits formation of government as
tensions rise over cost of living
President Bola Tinubu’s first two months in office have been marked by rapid moves to reform the poorly
performing economy. However, his government faces daunting challenges which may not be eased by
many senior posts going to ‘political’ appointees, as the new president returns pre-election favours. As
inflation spikes, continued protests against ‘anti-poor policies’ are adding to pressures on Nigeria’s new
leader, writes Jon Marks
P
resident Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s first two months in
office have been marked by rapid moves to reform a
poorly performing economy, but his government still
faces daunting challenges (AE 488/39).
Tinubu went almost to the two-month constitutional
deadline for naming his ministerial appointments, with an
initial list of 28 nominees being read out by Senate president
Godswill Akpabio – one of several Tinubu allies holding top
jobs in the National Assembly – only on 27 July.
Tinubu sent a further 19 names to the Senate on 2 August,
including former governors Atiku Bagudu (Kebbi state),
Adegboyega Oyetola (Osun), Simon Lalong (Plateau) and
Bello Metawale (Zamfara). Several ex-governors were in the
earlier list too.
The lists now include a candidate from each of Nigeria’s 36
states and the range of nominees appears to repay some
of the many favours Tinubu called in to secure the
presidency. Around three-quarters of the names are classed
as politicians, rather than ‘technocrats’, suggesting the new
administration will be a markedly ‘political’ government.
It remains to be seen what positions they will be given; those
nominated could become full ministers, (junior) ministers
of state, or ministers in the Presidency.
As the Senate began screening candidates on 31 July, the
Lagos daily Premium Times reported the chamber’s 109
members were “expected to grill the nominees on the value
they will add to governance if confirmed”. Reports of
proceedings suggested the ‘grillings’ were not intense.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
ESG, finance and policy
African National Congress’ pro-Kremlin factions have
gleefully pointed out. Putin will be represented in Jo’burg by
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, Ramaphosa’s spokesman
Vincent Magwenya said, while his spokesman Dmitry
Peskov said the Russian president would participate
remotely in “a full-fledged participation.”
Tinubu has made a career of delegating jobs, and the 47
names proposed sets a record for ministerial nominees in
the Fourth Republic, which began in 1999 under President
Olusegun Obasanjo. President Muhammadu Buhari sent 42
names to the Senate in 2019.
Barbarians at the gate
Meanwhile continued opposition from Nigerian Labour
Congress (NLC) unions – and many on the Nigerian street
– to fuel subsidy cuts and other price hikes, which have
been dubbed ‘anti-poor policies’, have led to largely peaceful
demonstrations in Abuja, Lagos and other state capitals.
Consumer price inflation was 22.8% in June.
Tinubu on 1 August announced a much-anticipated
NGN500bn ($660m) package of economic stimulus measures
and moves to tackle food supply shortages. He called for
patience, referring to negotiations of a new minimum wage
and telling workers “your salary review is coming”.
This didn’t stop events taking a more violent turn on 2
August, when local journalists reported that demonstrators
had forced open the gates of the National Assembly in
Abuja, during protests called by the NLC.
Reporting on the 2 August protests in Plateau state, Lagos-
based Tribune Online quoted Civil Liberty Organisation
activist Steve Aluko calling the removal of fuel subsidies an
anti-poor policy that must be rejected by all Nigerians.
“Nigerians should not wait for NLC to defend their rights.
We should break this issue of conspiracy of silence on
issues that directly affect you,” Aluko said – adding that
35
ESG, finance and policy
Nigerians should unite on issues of governance, and not be
divided by “this sentiment of ethnicity and regionalism”.
Rufai mooted for the power portfolio
Those in the initial list delivered in late July included Nasir
El Rufai, a former governor of Kaduna state and Obasanjo-
era minister who has been widely tipped for high office.
Bureau of Privatisation director Rufai’s name has featured
prominently in speculation over the power minister post.
Tinubu transitional energy advisor Olu Verheijen’s published
articles and CV, including a spell as Shell deal lead advising
on gas commercialisation and transactions, point to a depth
of knowledge – and her family is well-known to Tinubu –
but this was insufficient to secure a ministerial post. She is
still expected to gain a top job, potentially at the Rural
Electrification Agency.
Former vice president Yemi Osinbajo, who served as energy
reform and climate finance leader in the previous Buhari
government, has been appointed global advisor to the
renewable energy-focused Global Energy Alliance for People
and Planet (Geapp), whose 20 partners are led by
Rockefeller, Ikea Foundation and Bezos Earth Fund.
Other ministerial candidates with gubernatorial experience
include Dave Umahi (ex-Ebonyi governor, now Senate deputy
majority leader), Mohammed Badaru (ex-Jigawa state) and
Nyesom Wike (ex-Rivers state). Wike shifted from the
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to win Tinubu’s favour; he
had previously been nominated by ex-president Goodluck
Jonathan to serve as minister of state for education.
Another ministerial candidate, Alhaji Abubakar Momoh of
Edo state, also migrated from the PDP. Momoh and Wike
were the first two candidates to face Senate screening and
were given a polite ride from the assembly’s senior All
Progressives Congress (APC) members.
Uju Kennedy Ohaneye initially stood as the ruling APC’s only
female presidential candidate, but stepped down in favour
of Tinubu, who then made her vice chairman of his
campaign and now a minister.
Among others with jobs in the campaign team who now
enter government are El Rufai, Umahi, Badaru, APC acting
chairman Abubakar Kyari, Dele Alake (Tinubu’s spokesman
African Energy issue 490
The next issue of African Energy
will be published in pdf format on 8 September 2023
Meanwhile a flow of news stories and analysis will
continue to be published at www.africa-energy.com
36
New UK risk-sharing facility backs
Nigerian climate infrastructure
£10m ($12.7m) from the United Kingdom International
Development-funded FSD Africa Investments (FSDAi) to a
new Risk Sharing Backstop Facility (RSBF), which is
intended to support sustainable climate infrastructure in
Nigeria, was announced on 2 August, during a visit to
Abuja by UK foreign secretary James Cleverly.
The RSBF – created in partnership with Nigeria-based, UK-
backed local currency guarantor InfraCredit – was
described in a British government statement as “a first-of-
its-kind risk-sharing backstop facility, designed to unlock
local currency funding for sustainable infrastructure
development in Nigeria.”
It is intended to “address the challenge of low credit
enhancement by mobilising local institutional investment
via bonds into viable early-stage or green-field climate-
aligned infrastructure projects”.
The RSBF will raise funding initially from FSDAi, but will
eventually seek other funders, with the aim of reaching a
total capital base of up to $50m.
and head of communications during the campaign, as he
was in Lagos state), Blueprint Newspapers chairman Alhaji
Mohammed Idris (strategic communications director), Betta
Edu Bello (APC national women’s leader), Hannatu Musawa
(presidential adviser on culture), Muhammad Goronyo
(north-west zone ‘youth mobilisation’ director) and Uche
Nnaji (campaign co-ordinator in Enugu state).
Nominees with a financial bent
The new government’s ‘technocrats’ have a heavily financial
bent. Widely tipped to become finance minister or Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor is Wale Edun, who was
Tinubu’s financial adviser and Lagos state finance
commissioner during Tinubu’s spell as governor.
Other ministerial candidates with a financial background
include former CBN deputy governor Adebayo Adelabu,
Nigerian Export-Import Bank (Nexim) executive director for
business development Stella Okotete – who was secretary
of the Tinubu campaign’s planning committee.
Imo state finance commissioner Doris Uzoka Anite is a
former Zenith Bank executive, while Kaduna state
government secretary Ahmed Dangiwa has headed Federal
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria.
As well as a shake-out in the military top brass, notable
appointments to date include Nuhu Ribadu’s elevation to
become Nigeria’s first civilian national security advisor.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

EVENTS
4-8 September: African Climate Week, Nairobi
ACW 2023 is Africa’s pre-COP28 event. Website.
18-19 September: PowerTech Africa, Addis Ababa
To be held in Ethiopia, focused on renewables. Website.
20 September: Climate Ambition Summit, New York
Hosted by the UN secretary-general in New York during the UN
General Assembly’s High-Level Week. Website.
20-21 September: DRC-Africa Battery Metals Forum
Organised by South Africa-based Vuka Group at Kinshasa’s Kin
Plaza Arjaan by Rotanaa hotel, this event offers a platform for
miners, battery makers, traders, investors and NGOs. Website.
28 September: Opportunities and risks in finance
as the Gulf adapts to a multi-polar world, London
Invitation-only event at HSBC Bank HQ in Canary Wharf, E14
5HQ, convened by Gulf States Newsletter (GSN) with guest
speaker UK minister of state Trade Lord Johnson of Lainston,
followed by discussion under the Chatham House Rule. Website.
3-5 October: Simsenegal 2023, Dakar
AME Trade’s seventh Senegal International Mining Conference
and Exhibition. Website.
9-10 October: AFSIC – Investing in Africa, London
London-based conference and expo offering networking,
discussions and executing investment deals. Website.
9-11 October: Libya Oil, Gas and Renewable Energy
Exhibition, Benghazi
The third Libya energy exhibition is supported by the Ministry
of Oil and Gas. Website.
9-12 October: Middle East and North Africa Climate
Week, Riyadh
MENACW 2023, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is another pre-
COP28 regional meeting. Website.
9-13 October: Africa Oil Week 2023, Cape Town
The 29th AOW, held at CTICC2 in Cape Town. Website.
26-27 October: 13th Africa PPP, Morocco
This is the 13th edition of AME Trade’s conference, highlighting
renewable energy, waste-to-energy and other public/private
partnership (PPP) opportunities. To be held at the Hyatt
Regency in Casablanca. Website.
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023
Agenda
1-2 November: Zimec 2023, Zambia
11th Zambia International Mining & Energy Conference, at the
Garden Court Hotel in . Website.
13-15 November: Mali Mining & Petroleum Conference
The tenth edition of the conference and exhibition, JMP Mali
2023 is organised by the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water,
Mali in association with AME Trade. Website.
22-23 November: Angola Mining Conference, Luanda
Organised by the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Petroleum,
the second AMC’s theme is Developing Angola’s mineral
resource potential to supply critical minerals for a global clean
energy transition. Website.
30 November-12 December: COP28, Dubai
The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change’s 28th session (COP 28) will be
held at Dubai Expo City in the United Arab Emirates. Website.
1-2 December: Chatham House Climate Change
Conference
A discussions and solutions focused debate on accelerating
climate impact and action at Chatham House, London. Website.
Africa Investment Exchange
20 September: South Africa – the difficult
emergence of a new power industry
An AIX online round table.
1-2 November: Africa Investment Exchange: Power
and Renewables
The 10th annual AIX event, Enabling Power Project
Development in Africa, will be held at RSA House in London
Late February 2024: AIX Nairobi
AIX returns to Nairobi for our regular conference spanning
developments in East Africa.
22-26 April 2024: AIX Energy in Transition Week
The annual conference spanning new technologies, gas ,
strategic and industry trends is back – at RSA House in
London during the planned UK-Africa Summit.
Register to attend a meeting or become an AIX member.
Contact lauren@cbi-meetings.com
37
African Energy view
G7 backs down on gas to secure ‘just energy’ deal for Senegal
The agreement for Senegal to become only the second African
economy to secure a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP)
has the potential to salvage the climate financing framework’s
credibility, which appeared to be flatlining.
Until now the only deals had been with South Africa, Indonesia
and Vietnam. Coal-dependent South Africa’s early inclusion had
been strongly backed by the United Kingdom and other G7
governments, but the details of its deal have been painfully
slow to emerge.
For climate finance purists the Senegalese deal comes at a
cost: to get the much-hyped accord over the line, the JETP’s
backers had to accept that Dakar could continue its gas-to-
power (GTP) expansion plan, which is already well under way
and could be further extended (for analysis of these GTP
developments see Power: Senegal).
As President Macky Sall observed in Paris on 22 June, when the
Senegalese deal was unveiled at French President Emmanuel
Macron’s Summit for a New Global Financing Pact, the JETP
“will make it possible to support the Senegalese dynamic that
we started several years ago of incorporating renewable
energies into our energy mix and securing our energy system
thanks to all our natural resources.”
Top of the list of those natural resources is the offshore Greater
Tortue Ahmeyim liquefied natural gas project (see Upstream:
LNG), but other GTP developments feature at the centre of
government policy.
The Senegalese JETP reflects a wider shift in attitudes, with
European and North American objections to carbon-heavy
developments being eased. This rarely-stated policy about-turn
accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
brutally changed global energy security calculations.
In this context, other African countries not previously seen as
likely candidates might now be eligible for JETPs. These could
include Morocco, which has a strong record of promoting
renewable energy (RE), but is second only to South Africa
among the continent’s users of coal for power generation (AE
472/8, 472/10).
Nigeria, with its gas-centred development strategy, has also
been on the ‘too difficult’ list, while African Energy understands
Egypt’s attempted application was excluded from JETP
discussions even while it was organising last November’s
COP27 climate talks in Sharm El Sheikh.
Committing to Dakar
The launch of Senegal’s JETP by the G7’s International Partners
Group (IPG) of France, Germany, the European Union, the UK
and Canada was a highlight of Macron’s summit.
A commitment to mobilise €2.5bn ($2.74bn) of new financing
38
for Dakar over three to five years from public, private or
philanthropic sources owed a lot to consistent French
sponsorship of Senegal’s JETP candidacy.
The JETP communiqué’s key paragraph endorsed Dakar’s
intention “to use its natural gas resources as a transitional
energy”. This will be done in a way that cuts emissions
compared to the baseline set in Senegal’s 2020 Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC), with “a gradual phase-out of
heavy fuel oils”, and doubles RE’s share of the energy mix to
about 40% by 2030.
This is a substantial climb-down by the IPG. Having added
Senegal to the list of countries negotiating a JETP in mid-2022,
talks quickly ran into trouble. Shortly before COP27, it became
clear Senegal’s commitment to gas meant a partnership was
not possible (AE 470/34, 467/35).
Those optics have changed, leading to a JETP announcement
that came two weeks before Macky Sall’s announcement that
he wouldn’t seek a third term in office. The mooted third term
would have been unconstitutional, but Sall’s decision
nevertheless won plaudits, accompanied by comments that he
could expect a big international retirement job.
Events since then, including the rearrest on 31 July of
opposition figure Ousmane Sonko (whose previous legal
problems triggered riots in Dakar that shook the regime) and
the government’s dissolution of his Pastef-les Patriotes party
have suggested Sall may not have entirely given up on his
political ambitions.
The JETP will probably advance regardless of such awkward
political developments, while Senegal also pushes ahead with
a 945MW GTP procurement programme.
Dakar has committed to prepare a JETP investment plan within
12 months, to identify opportunities and required investments.
It must publish its vision for a long-term low greenhouse gas
emission development strategy (LTS) at the COP28 summit in
Dubai in November/December. The LTS will be finalised in 2024,
when Senegal must also produce a new NDC, with revised
decarbonisation goals.
Who’s next?
With a more relaxed attitude to gas as a transition fuel, other
African countries could become candidates for JETPs. For this
to happen they would need to find sponsors from among the
IPG members – perhaps not an easy task.
Morocco is an obvious candidate for a transition deal, with an
energy mix that includes 42% RE, as well as 36% coal, 10%
heavy fuel oil (HFO) and 11% natural gas, according to African
Energy Live Data. But once a pioneer in wind and solar, progress
has slowed in part due to lack of capacity in Office National de
l’Électricité et de l’Eau Potable (Onee)’s transmission grid and
AFRICAN ENERGY l ISSUE 489 l 4 AUGUST 2023

related difficulties in opening the medium-voltage network to
independent power producers (AE 480/38). Analysts believe
financially-challenged utility Onee would need substantial
external support before risking further liberalisation.
Even then Morocco would need to install large amounts of gas
generation before being able to cut its reliance on increasingly
expensive Russian and other coal. On 26 June, energy
transition and sustainable development minister Leila Benali
wrote an article for the World Economic Forum describing
Morocco’s policy of “fast-tracking sustainable access to the
international liquefied natural gas (LNG) market to ‘power past
coal’, decarbonising industry and addressing the intermittency
of renewables.”
This was a recognition of the vital role played by the re-
engineering of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) to
import LNG from Spain and Onee’s plans for a new 900MW gas-
fired power plant (AE 483/19).
It is not surprising that discussions of JETPs have sidestepped
Nigeria, which remains heavily dependent on small diesel
generation capacity and presents governance challenges.
Egypt agonistes
Meanwhile Egypt might appear to be beyond the need for a
JETP, given its massive programme of RE development and
investment commitments from major international partners.
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African Energy view
African Energy understands Cairo approached the G7 for a
JETP in advance of COP27, but was rejected.
Cairo’s response was to set up the Nexus for Food Water and
Energy (NWFE) initiative under the Ministry of International Co-
operation in July 2022, with the objective of mobilising climate
finance and private investments to support its “green
transition”.
But hammered by a huge and partly self-inflicted financial
crisis, the government’s green credentials are under severe
stress. On 27 July, Prime Minister Moustafa Madbouly
announced HFO imports costing $250m-300m to help manage
power cuts during the summer. The government has previously
swapped generation plants back to liquid fuels to increase the
amount of gas available for export.
Even in Egypt progress on decarbonisation and access to
finance go hand in hand – making an extra JETP commitment
a tempting prospect.
African Energy issue 490
The next issue of African Energy
will be published in pdf format on 8 September 2023
Meanwhile a flow of news stories and analysis will
continue to be published at www.africa-energy.com
company’s work since African Energy was established in
1998. This is supported by an network of in-country
researchers and associates in over 40 African jurisdictions
who gather business intelligence to support our projects.
People choose the AEC to draw on our unique mix of data
analysis coupled with an inherent understanding of
investment flows and African polities. This is underpinned
by a highly empirical to tackling client’s pressing issues.
Contact
Ajay Ubhi,
Head of data
T: 44 (0)1424 721667
E: ajay@africa-energy.com
W: www.africa-energy.com/consultancy