XIV. TRIAL - Rule 119, Rule 116, Secs.

9 and 11, Rule 115

A. Constitution, Article III, Sections 12, 14, 16 and 17

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to

have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the

person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which

vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,

incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section

as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar

practices, and their families.

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the

contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,

to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a

speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have

compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of

evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed

notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly

notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

B. Statutes/Rules
1. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Rule 116,
Sections 9 and 11, Rule 115

RULE 119 - TRIAL

Section 1. Time to prepare for trial. – After a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial once commenced

shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not
apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter
period of trial.

Sec. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing

the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:

(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the
accused;

(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against
the accused;

(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not
exceed thirty (30) days;

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of

venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) Delay resulting from a finding of existence of a prejudicial question; and

(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days,
during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent

when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by
due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are
known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability
of the accused to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a
charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from
the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence
to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a
co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the
time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu
proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the
court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that
the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the accused in a speedy trial.

Sec. 4. Factors for granting continuance. – The following factors, among others,
shall be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under
section 3(f) of this Rule.

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely
make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of
justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due
to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established
therein.

In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because
of congestion of the court’s calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to
obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.

Sec. 5. Time limit following an order for new trial. – If the accused is to be tried
again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from notice of the order, provided that if the period becomes impractical
due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors, the court may extend but not
to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the
time limit shall be one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for new
trial.
Sec. 6. Extended time limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule
116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred
eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit
shall be eighty (80) days.

Sec. 7. Public attorney’s duties where accused is imprisoned. – If the public

attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that he latter is
preventively detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no
means to post bail, or, is charged with a non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of
imprisonment in any penal institution, it shall be his duty to do the following:

(a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or
cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring
such person to so advise the prisoner of his right and demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise
the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter
the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause
notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain
the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly
supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purpose of trial, the
prisoner shall be made available accordingly.

Sec. 8. Sanctions. – In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public
attorney, or the prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary
witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without
merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to
be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as
follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an
accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de officio, public attorney, or prosecutor

a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and

(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the
court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment
provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal
action or other sanction authorized under these rules.
Sec. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. – If the
accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule
116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the information may be
dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy
trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution
shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion
of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on
double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of
the right to dismiss under this section.

Sec. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the
Constitution. – No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the
same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy
trial guaranteed by Section 14(2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 11. Order of trial. – The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper
case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any,
arising, from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted
for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Sec. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. – When the
accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice
to the other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The
motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of
his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable
ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or resides more than
one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend
the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him
unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported
by an affidavit of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require.

Sec. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made. – If the court is satisfied that
the examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order shall be made
directing that the witness be examined at a specific date, time and place and that a
copy of the order be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the
scheduled examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in
the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an
inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the
hearing. A written record of the testimony shall be taken.

Sec. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. – When the court is
satisfied, upon proof of oath, that a material witness will not testify when required,
it may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as
may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to
prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.

Sec. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.– When it is satisfactorily

appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, of has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him,
shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Sec. 16. Trial of several accused. – When two or more accused are jointly charged
with an offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion and
upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more
accused.

Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the
trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. – The order indicated in the
preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall
be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge.

Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. – When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall
commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information.

Sec. 20. Appointment of acting prosecutor. – When a prosecutor, his assistant or

deputy is disqualified to act due to any of the grounds stated in section 1 of Rule
137 or for any other reason, the judge or the prosecutor shall communicate with
the Secretary of Justice in order that the latter may appoint an acting prosecutor.

Sec. 21. Exclusion of the public. – The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public
from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to
decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the
public from the trial except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.

Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded
on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be
tried jointly at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused
may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed
without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its
grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the
prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose
the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Sec. 24. Reopening. – At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the
judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the
proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated
within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.

Rule 116, Sections 9 and 11, Rule 115

Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for
a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The
motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and
the details desired. (10a)

● Motion for bill of particulars should be made before arraignment.

● The motion shall specify alleged defects of the complaint / information and
the details desired.
● A bill of particulars is a written document in which a party has to explain the
allegations in his/her complaint, or petition, in more detail.

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effective renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)

● Arraignment shall be suspended when:

○ The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition.
○ There is a prejudicial question
○ A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President

2. A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC dated April 25, 2017 (circularized in OCA

Circular No. 101-2017 dated May 16, 2017)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT BAGUIO CITY

A.M. No.15-06-10-SC
REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES
I. Applicability
The Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (Revised Guidelines)
shall apply to all newly-filed criminal cases, including those governed by Special
Laws and Rules,1 in the First and Second Level Courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals as of effectivity date. The Revised Guidelines shall also apply
to pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of the proceedings.
Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, the Revised Guidelines shall not apply
to criminal cases filed under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Objectives
1. To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a speedy disposition
of their criminal cases;
2. To reinforce and give teeth to the existing rules on criminal procedure and other
special rules prescribing periods for court action and those which promote speedy
disposition of criminal cases; and
3. To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the parties.
III. Procedure
1. HearingDays and Calendar Call
Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday, and courts shall call the cases at
exactly 8:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M., pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 3-99.
Hearing on motions, arraignment and pre- trial, and promulgation of decisions shall
be held in the morning of Fridays, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
All courts shall ensure the posting of their court calendars outside their courtrooms
at least one (1) day before the scheduled hearings, pursuant to OCA Circular No.
250-2015.
2. Motions
(a) Motion for Inhibition.- Motions for inhibition based on grounds provided for
under Rule 137 shall be resolved immediately or within two (2) calendar days from
date of their filing.
(b) Prohibited Motions. - Prohibited motions shall be denied outright before the
scheduled arraignment without need of comment and/or opposition.
The following motions are prohibited:
i. Motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
ii. Motion for preliminary investigation filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary
period in inquest proceedings under Sec. 6, Rule 112, or when preliminary
investigation is required under Sec. 8, Rule 112, or allowed in inquest proceedings
and the accused failed to participate in the preliminary investigation despite due
notice.
iii. Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor recommending the filing of
information once the information has been filed before the court (1) if the motion is
filed without prior leave of court; (2) when preliminary investigation is not required
under Sec. 8, Rule 112; and (3) when the regular preliminary investigation is
required and has been actually conducted, and the grounds relied upon in the
motion are not meritorious, such as issues of credibility, admissibility of evidence,
innocence of the accused, or .lack of due process when the accused was actually
notified, among others.
iv. Motion to quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in Sec.
3, Rule 117.
v. Motion for bill of particulars that does not conform to Sec. 9, Rule 116.
vi. Motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds not stated under Sec. 11,
Rule 116.
vii. Petition to suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question,
when no civil case has been filed, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 111.
(c) Meritorious Motions. - Motions that allege plausible grounds supported by
relevant documents and/or competent evidence, except those that are already
covered by the RevisedGuidelines, are meritorious motions, such as:
i. Motion to withdraw information, or to downgrade the charge in the original
information, or to exclude an accused originally charged therein, filed by the
prosecution as a result of a reinvestigation, reconsideration, and review;
IL Motion to quash warrant of arrest;
111. Motion to suspend arraignment on the ground of an unsound inental condition
under Sec. ll(a), Rule 116;
iv. Motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question where a
civil case was filed prior to the criminal case under Sec. ll(b), Rule 116;
v. Motion to quash information on the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of criminal action or liability, or
double jeopardy under Sec. 3, par. (a), (b), (g), and (i), Rule 117;
vi. Motion to discharge accused as a state witness under Sec. 17, Rule 119;
vii. Motion to quash search warrant under Sec. 14, Rule 126 or motion to suppress
evidence; and
viii. Motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal case is a Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
The comment of the adverse party shall be filed within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) calendar days from notice/receipt of the order of the court to file the same,
and the court shall resolve the motion within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
calendar days from the expiration of the ten (10)-day period, with or without
comment. The court, at its discretion, may set the motion for hearing within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) calendar days from the expiration of the ten
(10)-day period to file comment, in which case the same shall be submitted for
resolution after the termination of the hearing, and shall be resolved within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) calendar days thereafter. Reply and memorandum
need not be submitted.
In case of a motion to discharge accused as state witness under Sec. 17, Rule 119,
where the prosecution is required to present evidence in support thereof, such
motion shall be submitted for resolution from the termination of the hearing, and
shall be resolved within a non-extendible period of ten (10) calendar days
thereafter .
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution of a meritorious motion shall be
filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) calendar days from receipt of such
resolution, and the adverse party shall be given an equal period of five (5) calendar
days from receipt of the motion for reconsideration within which to submit its
comment. Thereafter, the motion for reconsideration shall be resolved by the court
within a non-extendible period of five (5) calendar days fro1n the expiration of the
five (5)-day period to submit the comment.
Motions that do not conform to the requirements stated above shall be considered
unmeritorious and shall be denied outright.
(d) Motion for postponement. - A motion for postponement is prohibited, except if it
is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear
and testify. If the motion is granted based on such exceptions, the moving party
shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be finished on the
dates previously agreed upon.
A motion for postponement, whether written or oral, shall at all times be
accompanied by the original official receipt from the Office of the Clerk of Court
evidencing payment of the postponement fee under Sec. 21 (b), Rule 141, to be
submitted either at the time of the filing of said 1notion or not later than the next
hearing date. The Clerk of Court shall not accept the motion unless accompanied by
the original receipt.
3. FreeLegal Assistance
If a party fails to qualify for the availment of the services of the Public Attorney's
Office, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Local Chaptershall provide free legal
assistance to said party. For this purpose, the IBP Local Chapter shall submit to the
Executive Judges a list of IBP-local lawyers who inay be appointed by the courts to
act as counsel de officio in such cases. The lists shall be disseminated among all the
trial courts in the station.
4. Private Prosecutor
In cases where only the civil liability is being prosecuted by a private prosecutor,
the head of the prosecution office must issue in favor of the private prosecutor a
written authority to h·y the case even in the absence of the public prosecutor. The
written authority must be submitted to the court prior to the presentation of
evidence by the private prosecutor in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 110.
With this authority on record, the court may set the trial in the case and in other
cases tried by private prosecutors with delegated authority on separate days when
the presence of the public prosecutor may be dispensed with.
5. Consolidations
(a) Newly-filed Cases. - When newly-filed criminal cases involving offenses based
on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character, are
accompanied by a motion for consolidation filed by the Office of the Prosecutor, the
Executive Judge shall cause the raffle to only one court which shall then resolve
said motion for consolidation, preferably on the date of the arraignment and in the
presence of the accused and counsel.
(b) Pending Cases with Multiple Accused. - In cases involving multiple accused
where a subsequent information is filed involving an accused who has been
subjected to further investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor over an incident
which has the same subject matter as a prior information/s against different
accused, said subsequent case when filed accompanied by a motion for
consolidation from the Office of the Prosecutor shall no longer be raffled. The
subsequent case shall be assigned directly by the Executive Judge to the court
where the earlier case is pending. If the earlier case is already at the trial stage and
witnesses have been presented, the parties may be allowed to adopt the evidence
so far presented, without prejudice to additional direct examination questions and
cross-examination questions.
6. Archiving of Cases
The archiving of cases shall be done within the period prescribed under the
Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases under SC Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, as
restated in OCA Circular No.
89-2004. A criminal case shall be archived only if, after the issuance of the warrant
of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the delivery of the
warrant to the proper peace officer. Such case shall likewise be archived when
proceedings therein are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because:
(a) the accused appears to be suffering fro1n an unsound inental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against hin1 and to
plead intelligently, or to undergo h·ial, and he has to be committed to a mental
hospital;
(b) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of
the criminal case, unless the civil and criminal cases are consolidated;
(c) an interlocutory order or incidents in the criminal case IS elevated to, and IS
pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has
issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction; and
(d) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and ca1u1ot be arrested
by the bondsman.
7. Revival of Provisionally Dismissed Cases
Revival of provisionally dismissed cases shall conform to the requisites and the
periods provided for under Sec. 8, Rule 117. Provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount or
both shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. Provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, shall become permanent two (2) years
after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
8. Arraignment and Pre-trial
(a) Schedule of Arraignment and Pre-trial. - Once the court has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the arraignment of the accused and the pre- trial
shall be set within ten (10) calendar days from date of the court's receipt of the
case for a detained accused, and within thirty (30) calendar days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction (either by arrest or voluntary surrender) over a
non-detained accused, unless a shorter period is provided by special law or
Supreme Court circular.
The court must set the arraignment of the accused in the commitment order, in the
case of detained accused, or in the order of approval of bail, in any other case. For
this purpose, where the Executive Judge and Pairing Judges act on bail applications
in cases assigned to other courts, they shall coordinate with the courts to which the
cases are actually assigned for scheduling purposes.
(b) Notice of Arraignment and Pre-Trial. - Notice of arraignment and pre-trial shall
be sent to the accused, his/her counsel, private complainant or complaining law
enforcement agent, public prosecutor, and witnesses whose names appear in the
information for purposes of plea-bargaining, arraignment and pre-trial.
(c) Waiver of Reading of the Information. - In multiple cases, the court, upon
personal examination of the accused, may allow a waiver of the reading of the
information upon the full understanding and express consent of the accused and
his/her counsel, which consent shall be expressly stated in both the
minutes/certificate of arraignment and the order of arraignment. The court shall
explain the waiver to the accused in the language or dialect known to him/her, and
ensure the accused's full understanding of the consequences of the waiver before
approving the same. (SeeAnnex1) (d) Arraignment Proper
i. Plea Bargaining Except in Drug Cases . - If the accused desires to enter a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense, plea bargaining shall immediately proceed, provided the
private offended party in private crimes, or the arresting officer in victimless
crimes, is present to give his/her consent with the conformity of the public
prosecutor to the plea bargaining. Thereafter, judgment shall be immediately
rendered in the same proceedings. (SeeAnnexes2 and 3)
ii. Plea of Guilty to the Crime Charged in the Infonnation. - If the accused pleads
guilty to the crime charged in the information, judgmentshall be immediately
rendered, except in those cases involving capital punishment. (See Annex 4)
Sample flowcharts A. Regular Rules
Arraignment and Pre-Trial
B. Special Laws/Rules 1. Drug Cases
Trial
(To be finished not later than 60 days from filing of Information)
Presentation of the Prosecution'sand the Accused's Evidence
(6 months/180 days)
Promulgation of Decision
(90 days from submission of case for decision)
n i . Where No Plea Bargaining or Plea o f Guilty Takes Place. - If the accused does
not enter a plea of guilty, whether to a lesser offense or to the offense charged in
the information, the court shall immediately proceed with the arraignment and the
pre- trial, in accordance with the succeeding provisions on pre-trial.
The schedule of the trial dates, for both the prosecution and the accused, shall be
continuous and within the periods provided in the Regular Rules/Special Rules. The
trial dates may be shortened depending on the number of witnesses to be
presented. In this regard, a flowchart shall be prepared by the court which shall
serve as the final schedule of hearings. (See Annexes 5 and 6)
Decision
(15 days from submission of case for resolution)
2. Environmental Cases
Arraignment and Pre-Trial 30 clays
Trial (3months)
Decision (60 clays from last day to file memoranda)
3. Intellectual Property Rights Cases
Arraignment and Trial
Disposition period shall be within 10 months from date of arraignment
Pre-Trial
(60 days for each party to present evidence or 120 days)
Memo
30 days
Judgment (90 days from submission of case for decision)
4. Arraignment and Pre-trial of Cases Referred to Mediation
Arraignment and Pre-Trial
30 days Mediation
Trial
(6 months/180 days)
Judgment (90 days from submission of case for decision)
Arraignment
Mediatable Cases subject to the Rule on Summary Procedure
The arraignment and preliminary conference shall be simultaneously held, and the
court shall take up all the 1natters required under Sec. 14, Rule on Summary
Procedure during the preliminary conference.
i. If the accused pleads guilty to the crime charged in the information, subheading
III, item no. 8, subparagraph (d) ii (Plea of Guilty to the Crime Charged 1n the
Information) shall be followed.
ii. If the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense, subheading III, item no. 8,
subparagraph (d) 1 (Plea Bargaining except in Drug Cases) shall be followed.
ni. If the accused does not enter a plea of guilty, whether to a lesser offense or to
the offense charged in the information, the court shall immediately proceed with
the arraignment and the preliminary conference, and thereafter refer the case to
mediation. (See Annex7)
Sample flowchart
Rule on Summary Procedure of Criminal Cases referred to Mediation
Arraignment and 30 days Mediation
Trial (60 days)
Judgment (30 days from termination of hearings
Preliminary Conference '
(f) Conduct of Pre-trial
i. Absence of parties. - The court shall proceed with the pre-trial despite the
absence of the accused and/or private complainant, provided they were duly
notified of the same, and the counsel for the accused, as well as the public
prosecutor, are present.
ii. Stipulations. - Proposals for stipulations shall be done with the active
participation of the court itself and shall not be left alone to the counsels.
iii. Marking of evidence. - The documentary evidence of the prosecution and the
accused shall be marked.
iv. Pre-trial Order. - The Pre-trial Order shall i1nmediately be served upon the
parties and counsel on the sa1ne day after the termination of the pre-trial.
v. Compliance with Rules. - Courts must strictly comply with the Guidelines to be
Observed in the Conduct of Pre-Trial under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.
9. Mediation
(a) The fallowing cases shall be referred to mediation on the civil liability unless a
settlement is reached earlier in the pre-trial/ preliminary conference:
i. Crimes where payment may prevent criminal prosecution or may extinguish
criminal liability, such as violations of:
a. B.P. Blg. 22;
b. SSS Law (R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A No. 8282); and c.PAG-IBIGLaw
(R.A.No.9679).
ii. Crimes against property under Title 10 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), where
the obligation may be civil in nature, such as:
a. Theft under Art. 308, RPC, cognizable by the first level courts;
b. Estafa under Art. 315(1), RPC, except estafa under Art. 315 (2) and (3);
c. Other forms of swindling under Art. 316, RPC;
d. Swindling of a minor under Art. 317, RPC;
e. Other deceits under Art. 318, RPC; and
f. Malicious mischief under Art. 327, RPC.
g. Crimes against honor under Title 13, RPC, where the liability may be civil in
nature, such as:

1. Libel by means of writings or similar means under Art. 355, RPC;

2. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a
compensation under Art. 356, RPC;
3. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings
under Art. 357, RPC;
4. Grave Slander (Grave Oral Defamation) of serious and insulting nature under
Art. 358, par. 1, RPC;
5. Simple Slander (Oral Defamation) - not of a serious and insulting nature
under Art. 358, par. 2, RPC;
6. Grave Slander by Deed - of a serious nature under Art. 359, par. 1, RPC;
7. Simple Slander by Deed - not of a serious nature under Art. 359, par. 2, RPC;

h . Incriminating innocent person under Art. 363, RPC;

L Intriguing against honor under Art. 364, RPC;
iv. Libel under R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) where the liability
may be civil in nature;
v. Criminal negligence under Title 14, RPC, where the liability inay be civil in nature;
and
vi. Intellectual property rights cases where the liability may be civil in nature.
(b) The referral of the case for mediation to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
Unit shall be made only after the conduct of the arraignment and the
pre-trial/preliminary conference.The court shall serve the Order of Referral to the
PMC Unit immediately after the arraignment and the pretrial/preliminary
conference.
The mediation shall be terminated within a non-extendible period of thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of referral by the court to the PMC Unit. After the lapse
of the mediation period or if mediation fails, trial shall proceed.
Except those cases mentioned above, criminal cases subject to the Rule on
Summary Procedure shall not be referred to mediation.
10. Bail

(a) Petition for bail

A. Regular Rules
Hearing and Resolution of Petition for Bail (30 days)
Presentation of Evidence- in-chief of the Prosecution (60 days) and Presentation of
Evidence of the Accused (90 days)
Promulgation of Decision
(90 days from submission of case for decision)
Arraignment and Pre-Trial
Petition for bail filed after the filing of the information shall be set for summary
hearing after arraignment and pre-trial. Testimony of a witness in petition for bail
may be in the form allowed by subheading III, item no. 11, par. b (Form of
Testimony) of the Revised Guidelines, provided that the demeanor of the witness is
not essential in determining his/her credibility.
Petition for bail shall be heard and resolved within a non-extendible period of thirty
(30) calendar days from date of the first hearing, except in drug cases which shall
be heard and resolved within twenty (20) calendar days, without need of oral
argument and submission of memoranda, consistent with the su1nmary nature of
the proceedings. (See Annexes 8-A and 8-B)
Motion for reconsideration on the resolution of petition for bail shall be resolved
within a non- extendible period of ten (10) calendar days from date of submission
of the motion.
Presentation of Evidence in the Petition for Bail and Presentation of
Evidence-in-chief of the Prosecution and of Evidence of the of the Accused (180
days)
B. Drug Cases Arraignment and
Pre-Trial (Within 10 days from filing of Information)
(b) Hearing and Resolution of Petition for Bail (20 days) and Presentation of
Evidence-in-chief of the Prosecution (5 days)
Presentation of Evidence of the Accused
(25 days)
Decision
(15 days from submission of case for resolution)
Trial (To be finished not later than 60 days from filing of information)
Evidence in petition for bail
The resolution of petition for bail shall be based solely on the evidence presented
during the bail proceedings by the prosecution. The prosecution shall present only
pieces of evidence that are essential in establishing that the evidence of guilt is
strong. The accused need not present evidence to contradict or rebut the
prosecution's evidence.
(c) Non-suspension of the presentation of evidence
The court shall not suspend the presentation of the evidence in chief while awaiting
resolution of the petition for bail or the motion for reconsideration.
11.Form of Testimony
(a) For First Level Courts
In all criminal cases, including those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
the testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed written statements
given to law enforcement or peace officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted before the investigating prosecutor, and if such are not available,
testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits, subject to additional direct and
cross-examination questions.
The trial prosecutor may dispense with the sworn written statements submitted to
the law enforcement or peace officers and prepare the judicial affidavits of the
affiants or modify or revise the said sworn statements before presenting it as
evidence.
(b) For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals
In criminal cases where the demeanor of the witness is not essential in determining
the credibility of said witness, such as forensic chemists, medico-legal officers,
investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians, expert witnesses and
other similar witnesses, who will testify on the authenticity, due execution and the
contents of public documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are
transactional in character, such as falsification, malversation, estafa, or other crimes
where the culpability or innocence of the accused can be established through
documents, the testimonies of the witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written
statements given to law enforcement or peace officers or the affidavits or
counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor, and if such are not
available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits, subject to additional
direct and cross-examination questions.
In all other cases where the culpability or the innocence of the accused is based on
the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses
shall be in oral form.
12. Stipulations
During pre-trial/preliminary conference, the court shall require the parties to enter
into stipulations on the subject of both direct and cross- examinations of witnesses
who have no personal knowledge of the material facts constituting the crimes, such
as forensic chemists, medico-legal officers, investigators, auditors, accountants,
engineers, custodians, expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify
on the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public documents and
reports; corroborative witnesses; and those who will testify on the civil liability.
This rule is without prejudice to allowing additional direct and cross-examination
questions.
If stipulations cannot be had in full, where the adverse party does not waive the
right to cross- examination, the subject of the direct testimony of these witnesses
should be stipulated upon, without prejudice to additional direct and cross-
examination questions.
13. Trial
(a) The court shall encourage the accused and the prosecution to avail of:
i. For the accused - Secs. 12 and 13, Rule 119 on the application for examination of
witness for accused before trial and how it is made; and
ii. For the prosecution - Sec. 15, Rule 119 on the conditional examination of witness
for the prosecution.
(b) Absence of counsel de parte. - In the absence of the counsel de parte, the
hearing shall proceed upon appointment by the court of a counsel de officio .
(c) Offer of evidence. - The offer of evidence, the comment/objection thereto, and
the court ruling thereto shall be made orally. A party is required to make his/her
oral offer of evidence on the same day after the presentation of his/her last
witness, and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his/her oral
comment/objection thereto. Thereafter, the court shall make a ruling on the offer of
evidence in open court.
In making the offer, the counsel shall cite the specific page numbers of the court
record where the exhibits being offered are found, if attached thereto. The court
shall ensure that all exhibits offered are submitted to it on the same day of the
offer.
If the exhibits are not attached to the record, the party making the offer must
submit the sa1ne during the offer of evidence in open court.
(d) Demurrer to Evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
shall inquire from the accused if he/she desires to move for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence, or to proceed with the presentation of his/her evidence. (See
Annex 9)
If the accused orally moves for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, the
court shall orally resolve the same. If the motion for leave is denied, the court shall
issue an order for the accused to present and terminate his/her evidence on the
dates previously scheduled and agreed upon, and to orally offer and rest his/her
case on the day his/her last witness is presented.
If despite the denial of the motion for leave, the accused insists on filing the
demurrer to evidence, the previously scheduled dates for the accused to present
evidence shall be cancelled.
The demurrer to evidence shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
calendar days from the date leave of court is granted, and the corresponding
comment shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) calendar days
counted from date of receipt of the demurrer to evidence. The de1nurrer shall be
resolved by the court within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) calendar days
from date of the filing of the comment or lapse of the ten (10)-day period to file the
same.
If the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence is granted, and the
subsequent demurrer to evidence is denied, the accused shall likewise present and
terminate his/her evidence (one day apart, morning and afternoon) and shall orally
offer and rest his/her case on the day his/her last witness is presented. The court
shall rule on the oral offer of evidence of the accused and the comment or objection
of the prosecution on the same day of the offer. If the court denies the motion to
present rebuttal evidence because it is no longer necessary, it shall consider the
case submitted for decision.
(e) Presentation of Rebuttal and Sur-rebuttal Evidence. - If the court grants the
motion to present rebuttal evidence, the prosecution shall immediately proceed with
its presentation after the accused had rested his/her case, and orally rest its case in
rebuttal after the presentation of its last rebuttal witness. Thereafter, the accused
shall immediately present sur-rebuttal evidence, if there is any, and orally rest the
case in sur-rebuttal after the presentation of its last sur-rebuttal witness.
Thereafter, the court shall submit the case for decision. (See Annexes 11 to 13).
(f) One-day examination of witness rule. - The court shall strictly adhere to the rule
that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day.
14. Memoranda
The submission of memoranda is discretionary on the part of the court, which in no
case shall exceed twenty-five (25) pages in length, single-spaced, on legal size
paper, using size 14 font. The period to submit memoranda shall be non-extendible
and shall not suspend the running of the period of promulgation of the decision;
thus, with or w ithout memoranda, the promulgation shall push through as
scheduled.
15. Lack of Stenographic Notes
Judges who conducted the trial and heard the testimonies of some or all of the
witnesses shall not defer the submission of the case for decision on the ground of
incomplete or missing transcript of stenographic notes. If the case was heard
completely by another judge, not the judge tasked to write the decision, the latter
shall direct the stenographers concerned to submit the complete transcripts within a
period of thirty (30) calendar days from date of his/her assumption to office.
16. Promulgation
(a) Schedule of promulgation. - The court shall announce in open court and include
in the order submitting the case for decision, the date of the promulgation of its
decision which shall not be more than ninety (90) calendar days fro1n the date the
case is submitted for decision.,4 except when the case is covered by Special Rules
and other laws which provide for a shorter period.
(b) Resolution of Motion for reconsideration of judgment of conviction or Motion for
new trial. - A motion for reconsideration of judgment of conviction or 1notion for
new trial under Rule 121 filed within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
from promulgation shall be resolved within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
calendar days fro1n the submission of the comment of the prosecution. With or
without comment, the court shall resolve the motion within the ten (10)-day period.
2 For those covered by Regular Rules, including Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals.
For those covered by Special Laws and Rules:
a) Drug cases - fifteen (15) days from the date of submission for resolution of the
case;
b) Environmental cases - sixty (60) days from the last day of the 30-day period to
file the memoranda;
c) Intellectual Property Rights cases - 60 days from the time the case is submitted
for decision, with or without the memoranda; and d) Others that may be provided
in other Rules and Laws.
17. Inventory of Criminal Cases
The one (1) week of each semester devoted for the conduct of annual and
semi-annual physical inventory of cases and preparation of the semestral docket
inventory report pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 76-2007 shall not suspend
court hearings.
18. Posting
The Revised Guidelines shall be posted at all floors of the covered halls of justice,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and the offices of their respective
Clerks of Court, including all offices of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
other Bar associations.
IV. Monitoring, Evaluation and Training
The application of and adherence to the Revised Guidelines shall be subject to
periodic monitoring by the Committee and its Technical staff by visitation and
submission of data.
For this purpose, all courts covered by the Revised Guidelines shall accomplish and
submit a periodic report of data in a form to be generated and distributed by the
Committee.
Training of judges and court personnel shall be undertaken by the PHILJA in
coordination with the Committee and its Technical staff.
V.
Effect of Non-Compliance
VI.
Non-compliance with the Revised Guidelines, including failure to observe the
timelines and deadlines herein provided, is a ground for disciplinary action.
Repealing Clause
Existing rules and guidelines inconsistent with the Revised Guidelines are deemed
amended or repealed.
VII. Effectivity
The Revised Guidelines shall take effect on 1 September 2017, after publication for
two (2) consecutive weeks in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

3. Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (1991), Sections 14,

18-2054

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (1991)

Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. — Before conducting the trial, the court
shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of
facts may be entered into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense may be considered, or such other matters may be
taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case.
However, no admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced
to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. A refusal or failure to
stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is
no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been
complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused
was arrested without a warrant.

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings,

motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to
comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of
trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; chanrobles virtual law library
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.

Sec. 20. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule
shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are
admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters
stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits
the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible
affidavit or portion thereof from the record.

4. Republic Act No. 8493 (1998), Sections 6-14

RA 8493 (1998) Speedy Trial Act of 1998

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gbWjMaIp77esgazCZJ2br
JZOyAF1eFgA/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=11693860544504872318
4&rtpof=true&sd=true

5. Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98-SC dated August 11, 1998

CIRCULAR NO. 38-98 August 11, 1998

IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493, ENTITLED

"AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

SECTION 1. PURPOSE OF CIRCULAR. — This Circular is promulgated for the

purpose of implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998," as directed in Section 15 hereof.

Sec. 2. TIME LIMIT FOR ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL. — The

arraignment and the pre-trial, if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a
motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension
of arraignment shall be excluded.

Sec. 3. MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES. — In all criminal

cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

 (b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state whether
he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require
the prosecution to proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while
an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to
prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Sec. 4. PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENT. — All agreements or admissions made or

entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used against the
accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 3 hereof are
subject to the approval of the court; Provided, That the agreement on the plea of
the accused should be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense
charged.

Sec. 5. NON-APPEARANCE AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. — Where counsel

for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pretrial conference and
does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may
impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Sec. 6. PRE-TRIAL ORDER. — After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and the evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed
of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.

Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial which shall commence within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the pre-trial order.

Sec. 7. EXTENDED TIME LIMIT. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the

preceding sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its
effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial
imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second
twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and
for the third twelve-month period the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

Sec. 8. TIME LIMIT FOR TRIAL. — In criminal cases involving persons charged
with a crime, except those subject to the Rule of Summary Procedure, or where
the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a
fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, the court shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the
counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial.
In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 9. EXCLUSIONS. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including
but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental

condition of the accused;

(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges
against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory

orders;

(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; Provided, that the delay
does not exceed thirty (30) days;

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating to

change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial

question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30)
days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under
advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered

absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. An essential witness shall be considered unavailable
whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be
obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter
a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay
from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would
commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is mentally incompetent or

physically unable to stand trial.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu
propio or on motion of either the accused for the same offense, any period of
delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation
would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.

Sec. 10. FACTORS FOR GRANTING CONTINUANCE. — The following factors,

among others, shall be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a
continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 9 hereof:

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would be
like to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a
miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex,
due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that
it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time
established herein.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) Section 9 hereof shall be granted because

of congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to
obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.

Sec. 11. TIME LIMIT FOLLOWING AN ORDER FOR NEW TRIAL. — If the
accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order of a court for a new trial, the
trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from notice of that order, except that
the court retrying the case may extend such period but not to exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for a new trial if unavailability
of witnesses or other factors make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.

Sec. 12. PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S DUTIES WHERE ACCUSED IS IMPRISONED.

— If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows
that the latter is preventively detained, either because he is charged with a
bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged with a non-bailable
crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution:

(a) The public attorney shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of
the prisoner requiring such person to so advise the prisoner of his right to
demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall
promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial, If at
any time thereafter the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial,
the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public
attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain
the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public
attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for
purposes of the trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly.

Sec. 13. SANCTIONS. — In any case in which private counsel for the accused,
the public attorney or the public prosecutor:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a
necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally
frivolous and without merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he know to
be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with
the provisions hereof, the court may punish any such counsel, attorney or
prosecutor, as follows:
 (1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the
defense of an accused, by imposing a fine of not exceeding twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney or

public prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to

practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to
any appropriate criminal action or any other sanction authorized under the Rules
of Court.

Sec. 14. REMEDY WHERE ACCUSED IS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN

THE TIME LIMIT. — If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
required by Sections 2 and 6 hereof, as extended by Section 7, the information
may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to
speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving such motion by the
prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in
connection with the exclusion of time under Section 9 hereof. The dismissal shall
be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver
of the right to dismiss under this section.

Sec. 15. REPUBLIC ACT NO 8493 NOT A BAR TO PROVISION ON SPEEDY

TRIAL IN THE CONSTITUTION. — No provision of Republic Act No. 8493 shall
be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by
Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation and shall take effect on September 15, 1998.

6. Republic Act No. 6981 (1991)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6981

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY AND

BENEFIT PROGRAM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Name of Act. — This Act shall be known as the “Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Act”.

SEC. 2. Implementation of Program. — The Department of Justice, hereinafter

referred to as the Department, through its Secretary, shall formulate and
implement a “Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program,” hereinafter
referred to as the Program, pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this
Act.
The Department may call upon any department, bureau, office or any other
executive agency to assist in the implementation of the Program and the latter
offices shall be under legal duty and obligation to render such assistance.

SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. — Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:

Provided, That:

a) The offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;

b) His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

c) He or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that
he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from
testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony;
and

d) He is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the

other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his
family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.

If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.

SEC. 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. — In case of legislative investigations

in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the
Program upon the recommendation of the legislative committee where his
testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity therefor:
Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.

SEC. 5. Memorandum of Agreement With the Person to be Protected. — Before a

person is provided protection under this Act, he shall first execute a memorandum
of agreement which shall set forth his responsibilities including:

a) To testify before and provide information to all appropriate law enforcement

officials concerning all appropriate proceedings in connection with or arising from
the activities involved in the offense charged;

b) To avoid the commission of the crime;

c) To take all necessary precautions to avoid detection by others of the facts

concerning the protection provided him under this Act;

d) To comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against him;

e) To cooperate with respect to all reasonable requests of officers and employees of

the Government who are providing protection under this Act; and
f) To regularly inform the appropriate program official of his current activities and
address.

SEC. 6. Breach of the Memorandum of Agreement. — Substantial breach of the

memorandum of agreement shall be a ground for the termination of the protection
provided under this Act: Provided, however, That before terminating such
protection, the Secretary of Justice shall send notice to the person involved of the
termination of the protection provided under this Act, stating therein the reason for
such termination.

SEC. 7. Confidentiality of Proceedings. — All proceedings involving application for

admission into the Program and the action taken thereon shall be confidential in
nature. No information or documents given or submitted in support thereof shall be
released except upon written order of the Department or the proper court.

Any person who violates the confidentiality of said proceedings shall upon
conviction be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not
more than six (6) years and deprivation of the right to hold a public office or
employment for a period of five (5) years.

SEC. 8. Rights and Benefits. — The witness shall have the following rights and
benefits:

a) To have a secure housing facility until he has testified or until the threat,
intimidation or harassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or tolerable
level. When the circumstances warrant, the Witness shall be entitled to relocation
and/or change of personal identity at the expense of the Program. This right may
be extended to any member of the family of the Witness within the second civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.

b) The Department shall, whenever practicable, assist the Witness in obtaining a

means of livelihood. The Witness relocated pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to a
financial assistance from the Program for his support and that of his family in such
amount and for such duration as the Department shall determine.

c) In no case shall the Witness be removed from or demoted in work because or on

account of his absences due to his attendance before any judicial or quasi-judicial
body or investigating authority, including legislative investigations in aid of
legislation, in going thereto and in coming therefrom: Provided, That his employer
is notified through a certification issued by the Department, within a period of thirty
(30) days from the date when the Witness last reported for work: Provided, further,
That in the case of prolonged transfer or permanent relocation, the employer shall
have the option to remove the Witness from employment after securing clearance
from the Department upon the recommendation of the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Any Witness who failed to report for work because of witness duty shall be paid his
equivalent salaries or wages corresponding to the number of days of absence
occasioned by the Program. For purposes of this Act, any fraction of a day shall
constitute a full day salary or wage. This provision shall be applicable to both
government and private employees.

d) To be provided with reasonable travelling expenses and subsistence allowance by

the Program in such amount as the Department may determine for his attendance
in the court, body or authority where his testimony is required, as well as
conferences and interviews with prosecutors or investigating officers.

e) To be provided with free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicines for

any injury or illness incurred or suffered by him because of witness duty in any
private or public hospital, clinic, or at any such institution at the expense of the
Program.

f) If a Witness is killed, because of his participation in the Program, his heirs shall
be entitled to a burial benefit of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
from the Program exclusive of any other similar benefits he may be entitled to
under other existing laws.

g) In case of death or permanent incapacity, his minor or dependent children shall

be entitled to free education, from primary to college level in any state, or private
school, college or university as may be determined by the Department, as long as
they shall have qualified thereto.

SEC. 9. Speedy Hearing or Trial. — In any case where a Witness admitted into the
Program shall testify, the judicial or quasi-judicial body, or investigating authority
shall assure a speedy hearing or trial and shall endeavor to finish said proceeding
within three (3) months from the filing of the case.

SEC. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a
crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:

a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;

d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in

order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent
the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

SEC. 11. Sworn Statement. — Before any person is admitted into the Program
pursuant to the next preceding Section he shall execute a sworn statement
describing in detail the manner in which the offense was committed and his
participation therein. If after said examination of said person, his sworn statement
and other relevant facts, the Department is satisfied that the requirements of this
Act and its implementing rules are complied with, it may admit such person into the
Program and issue the corresponding certification.
If his application for admission is denied, said sworn statement and any other
testimony given in support of said application shall not be admissible in evidence,
except for impeachment purposes.

SEC. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The
certification of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full
faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include
the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to
petition the court for his discharge in order that he can utilized as a State Witness.
The Court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the
information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given
or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.

SEC. 13. Failure or Refusal of the Witness to Testify. — Any Witness registered in
the Program who fails or refuses to testify or to continue to testify without just
cause when lawfully obliged to do so, shall be prosecuted for contempt. If he
testifies falsely or evasively, he shall be liable to prosecution for perjury. If a State
Witness fails or refuses to testify, or testifies falsely or evasively, or violates any
condition accompanying such immunity without just cause, as determined in a
hearing by the proper court, his immunity shall be removed and he shall be subject
to contempt or criminal prosecution. Moreover, the enjoyment of all rights and
benefits under this Act shall be deemed terminated.

The Witness may, however, purge himself of the contumacious acts by testifying at
any appropriate stage of the proceedings.

SEC. 14. Compelled Testimony. — Any Witness admitted into the Program pursuant
to Sections 3 and 10 of this Act cannot refuse to testify or give evidence or produce
books, documents, records or writings necessary for the prosecution of the offense
or offenses for which he has been admitted into the Program on the ground of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination but he shall enjoy immunity from
criminal prosecution and cannot be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for any
transaction, matter or thing concerning his compelled testimony or books,
documents, records and writings produced.

In case of refusal of said Witness to testify or give evidence or produce books,

documents, records, or writings, on the ground of the right against
self-incrimination, and the state prosecutor or investigator believes that such
evidence is absolutely necessary for a successful prosecution of the offense or
offenses charged or under investigation, he, with the prior approval of the
Department, shall file a petition with the appropriate court for the issuance of an
order requiring said Witness to testify, give evidence or produce the books,
documents, records, and writings described, and the court shall issue the proper
order.

The court, upon motion of the state prosecutor or investigator, shall order the arrest
and detention of the Witness in any jail contiguous to the place of trial or
investigation until such time that the Witness is willing to give such testimony or
produce such documentary evidence.

SEC. 15. Perjury or Contempt. — No Witness shall be exempt from prosecution for
perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under
compulsion pursuant to this Act. The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed
in case of conviction for perjury. The procedure prescribed under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court shall be followed in contempt proceedings but the penalty to be
imposed shall not be less than one (1) month but not more than one (1) year
imprisonment.

SEC. 16. Credibility of Witness. — In all criminal cases, the fact of the entitlement
of the Witness to the protection and benefits provided for in this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence to diminish or affect his credibility.

SEC. 17. Penalty for Harassment of Witness. — Any person who harasses a Witness
and thereby hinders, delays, prevents or dissuades a Witness from:

a) Attending or testifying before any judicial or quasi-judicial body or investigating

authority;

b) Reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge the commission or possible

commission of an offense, or a violation of conditions or probation, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings;

c) Seeking the arrest of another person in connection with the offense;

d) Causing a criminal prosecution, or a proceeding for the revocation of a parole or

probation; or

e) Performing and enjoying the rights and benefits under this Act or attempts to do
so, shall be fined not more than Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) or suffer
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year, or
both, and he shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office in case of a public officer.

SEC. 18. Rules and Regulations. — The Department shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and purposes of this Act.
Said rules and regulations shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

SEC. 19. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive issuances, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 20. Funding. — The amount of Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby
authorized to be appropriated out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated to carry into effect the purpose of this Act.

Expenses incurred in the implementation of the Program may be recovered as part

of the cost or indemnity imposed upon the accused.

Furthermore, other funding schemes or sources, subject to the limitations of the

law, shall be allowed in furtherance hereof.

SEC. 21. Separability Clause. — The declaration of unconstitutionality or invalidity

of any provision of this Act shall not affect the other provisions hereof.

SEC. 22. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
 7. Presidential Decree No. 749 (1975)

GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES

AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND
OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation
of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; Republic Act
Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended; Section 345 of the
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
other provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part
of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations
punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who
willingly testifies against any public official or employee for such violation
shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with
reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead
or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases
where the information and testimony are given against a person who is not a
public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the
commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that
this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding
that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the public official or his accomplice
for such gift or bribe-giving; and Provided, finally, that the following
conditions concur:

1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the

above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;

2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of

the accused public officer;

3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
State;

4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material

points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a

crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should it turn
out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false and malicious
or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way
prejudicing the public officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so
denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal, against said
informant or witness.

Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal,

judge or committee, and all proceedings undertaken in connection therewith,
shall be strictly confidential or private in order to protect the reputation of
the official under investigation in the event that the report proves to be
unfounded or no prima facie case is established.
 8. Republic Act No. 4908 (1968)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4908

AN ACT REQUIRING JUDGES OF COURTS TO SPEEDILY TRY CRIMINAL

CASES WHEREIN THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A PERSON ABOUT TO DEPART
FROM THE PHILIPPINES WITH NO DEFINITE DATE OF RETURN

Section 1. Any provision of existing laws, executive order, rule or regulation to

the contrary notwithstanding, the trial of criminal cases wherein the offended
party is a person who is about to depart from the Philippines without a definite
date of return, shall take precedence over all other cases before our courts,
except election and habeas corpus cases.

The trial in these cases shall commence within three days from the date the
accused is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted
except on the ground of illness on the part of the accused, or other grounds
beyond the control of the accused.

Section 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

9. Republic Act No. 6033 (1969)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6033

AN ACT REQUIRING COURTS TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO CRIMINAL CASES

WHERE THE PARTY OR PARTIES INVOLVE ARE INDIGENTS.

Section 1. Any provision of existing law to be contrary notwithstanding and with

the exception of habeas corpus and election cases and cases involving detention
prisoners, and persons covered by Republic Act Numbered Four thousand nine
hundred eight, all courts shall give preference to the hearing and/or disposition of
criminal cases where an indigent is involved either as the offended party or
accused. The trial in these cases shall commence within three days from date of
arraignment and no postponement of the hearings shall be granted except on the
ground of illness of the accused or other similar justifiable grounds. City and
provincial fiscals and courts shall forthwith conduct the preliminary investigation
of a criminal case involving an indigent within three days after its filing and shall
terminate the same within two weeks.

Section 2. As used in this Act, the term "indigent" shall refer to a person who has
no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of
his family, to be determined by the fiscal or judge, taking into account the
members of his family dependent upon him for subsistence.

Section 3. An indigent who is the offended party, respondent or an accused in a

criminal case and who desires to avail of the preference granted under this Act
shall file a sworn statement of the fact of his being indigent and the said sworn
statement shall be sufficient basis for the court or fiscal to give preference to the
trial and disposition of such criminal case.

Section 4. Any willful or malicious refusal on the part of any fiscal or judge to
carry out the provisions of this Act shall constitute sufficient ground for
disciplinary action which may include suspension or removal.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

C. Cases
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

PETITIONER: Ernesto Miranda

RESPONDENT: Supreme Court of Arizona

DOCTRINE:

The PROSECUTION may not use statements, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.

When an individual was taken into custody and subjected to questioning, the U.S.
Const. amend. V (Fifth Amendment) privilege against self-incrimination was
jeopardized. To protect the privilege, procedural safeguards were required.

● A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the

right to remain silent,
● and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law.
● A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to the
presence of an attorney,
● and if he cannot afford an attorney one was to be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desired.
● After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights
● and agree to answer questions or make a statement.

Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was NOT TO BE USED

AGAINST A DEFENDANT AT TRIAL unless the prosecution demonstrated
the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.

Effective waiver required that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently
and understandingly rejected the offer. Presuming waiver from a silent record was
impermissible.

FACTS:
● This involves 4 cases. All having almost the same facts.
● In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he
was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full
and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process.
In all four cases the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of
them signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials.

Miranda’s Case:
● Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a
Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness.
 The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective
bureau.
● There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial
that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney
present. Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room
with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was
a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without
threats or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me."
● At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence
over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior
oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation.
● Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to
30 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.

SC OF ARIZONA: held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in

obtaining the confession and affirmed the conviction. In reaching its decision, the
court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.

ISSUE: Whether the written confession obtained from Miranda was admissible - NO

RULING:

From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it is clear
that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney
and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner.

Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he
signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full
knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.

"Custodial interrogation" is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.

Decision of SC of Arizona was reversed.

2. People v. Santocildes, Jr., 321 SCRA (1999)

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN

DOCTRINE: Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the

Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should be set aside and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.
FACTS:
● Appellant was charged with the 1 crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9)
years old.
● Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and
the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6)
year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
● For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself.
Appellant denied committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to
stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
● The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged.
● Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named
Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel
and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the
witnesses.
● On appeal, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S.
Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a
member of the bar.
○ Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this
fact.
● Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel
should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
● The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding the fact
that appellant’s counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant
was afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to
be heard and the records reveal that said person “presented the
evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in
general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful
manner.”

ISSUE: Whether an accused not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar
during trial, would result in the judgment be set aside and the case remanded to the
trial court for a new trial. - YES

RULING:
Delgado v. Court of Appeals: The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded
the case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that this is so because an
accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a
criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in
her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills
needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.

Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused
was represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorney’s Office, the
Court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given
mere perfunctory representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not
properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should

never be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel
is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused
is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State.
Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections
12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in
Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares
the right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment.

In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to the Supreme
Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are
entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for
the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.

Jurisprudence has also held that “the right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing
and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust.”

Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED
to the trial court for new trial. With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the
person named Gualberto C. Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt
and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to
the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties,
including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for
their appropriate action. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

3. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)

DOCTRINE:
The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other
rights in the Constitution for the protection of the accused:
1. There is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate
from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused
2. Deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage
3. The right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights.

2 suggested approaches of eliminating some of the uncertainty which

courts experience in protecting the right to speedy trial:
1. Fixed-time period (Require a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a
specified time period, on the basis of the Constitution)
2. Demand-waiver rule (Restrict the consideration of the right to those cases in
which the accused has demanded a speedy trial)
The court rejected these views/approaches.
 A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any
inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which
the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The court
should assess such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant

ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Willie Barker

FACTS:
● Willie Barker and Silas Manning were arrested for allegedly beating to death an
elderly couple with an iron tool.
● Initially, Barker’s initial trial was set for Sept 1958. The Commonwealth
(prosecution or state) believed that Barker could not be convicted unless Manning
testified against him.
● The Commonwealth (CW) thus first prosecuted Manning to remove possible
problems of self-incrimination and to assure his testimony against Barker.
● CW however encountered difficulties in prosecuting Manning. He was convicted
only after 6 trials or on Dec 1962. All the while, Barker’s trial was kept on being
postponed (a total of 16 continuances).
● Before Manning’s conviction or on june 1959, having spent 10 months in jail,
Barker was released by posting a $5K bond. He however made no objection to
the first 11 continuances (postponement to next term of the Court) of his trial.
● When CW moved for the 12th time to continue the case until the following term
of the Court, Barker’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. This was
however denied.
● On the 13th and 14th continuances, Barker again did not object.
● Following Manning’s conviction, the trial of Barker was scheduled on March 1963.
However, CW again moved for a continuance/postponement for the reason that
the chief investigating officer was sick. Barker objected, but this was denied.
● Finally, the trial was set for Oct 1963 (over 5 years since his trial was initially
scheduled).
● Barker moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his right to a speedy trial
had been violated.
● He was convicted, with Manning as the Chief prosecution witness.
● His appeal being denied, he filed this petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether Barker’s right to speedy trial was violated, thus rendering his
conviction invalid - NO

RULING: Petition Denied.

The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights in the
Constitution for the protection of the accused:
1. There is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from,
and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused
- inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog
of cases in courts
- persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an
opportunity to commit other crimes
- the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his
opportunity to jump bail and escape
2. Deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage
- As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens,
witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade; case will be
weakened
 - unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se
prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself.
3. The right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights.
- impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied
- there is no fixed point in the criminal process when the State can put the
defendant to the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy
trial
- "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays,
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does
not preclude the rights of public justice."

Because the speedy trial right is so slippery, 2 rigid approaches of eliminating

some of the uncertainty which courts experience in protecting the right were
introduced:
1. Require a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period, on
the basis of the Constitution.
- There is however no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right
can be quantified into a specified number of days or months
2. Restrict the consideration of the right to those cases in which the accused has
demanded a speedy trial (demand-waiver doctrine)
- provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial
for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial. Under this rigid
approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of the
speedy trial right
- This view, however, provides for a presumption of a waiver of a fundamental
right from inaction, which is inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights.

The court rejected the 2 views or approaches – the fixed-time period because it goes
further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is
insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental. The Court, instead, adopts
a balancing test approach, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed.

A Balancing Test compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
4 factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right are:
1. Length of delay
- Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance; the
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case
2. Reason for the delay
- A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should
be weighted heavily against the government
- A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered
- a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.
3. Defendant’s assertion of his right
- failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that
he was denied a speedy trial.
4. Prejudice to the defendant
- should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial
 incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired (inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system)

In this case, there was over 5 years delay between the arrest and trial of Barker (only
7 months can be attributed to a strong and valid excuse - illness of the chief
investigating officer), but more than four years was too long a period, particularly
since a good part of that period was attributable to the CW’s failure or inability to try
Manning under circumstances that comported with due process.

Two counterbalancing factors, however, outweigh these deficiencies:

1. The prejudice was minimal. He was prejudiced to some extent, by living for
over 4 years with anxiety and having spent 10 mos in jail. However, there was no
claim that any of his witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable due to the
delay.
2. Barker did not want a speedy trial. He moved to dismiss the indictment only on
the 11th postponement of his trial. The record strongly suggests that, while he
hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby
obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried. Barker was
gambling on Manning’s acquittal. It was not until Manning’s conviction became final
that he began to object to further continuances.

4. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 372 P. 2d 919

(1982)

DOCTRINE: Absent the privilege against self-crimination or other privileges

provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying
the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case.

FACTS:
1. The day set for his trial on the charge of rape, Petitioner Neal Jones filed a
motion for continuance and an affidavit wherein he alleged that he was and
for a long time had been impotent and that he needed time to gather medical
evidence including medical reports in connection with injuries he suffered
then.
2. This was granted.
3. The district attorney filed a motion for discovery, requesting petitioner and
his attorney to make available to the prosecution:
a. The names and addresses of all physicians and surgeons testifying on
his injury and impotence
b. Name and addresses of all physicians who have treated Jones prior to
the trail
c. All reports of doctors or other reports pertaining to the physical
condition of petitioner relating to said injuries and his impotence
d. All X-rays of petitioner taken immediately following his said injuries
4. The Court granted the motion over petitioner’s object. Petitioner sought a writ of
prohibition to restrain enforcements of the trial court’s order.

ISSUE: WON the defendant has interest to deny the prosecution access to evidence
that can throw light on issues in the case? NO

RULING: Absent the privilege against self-crimination or other privileges

provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in
denying the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on issues in
the case

Petitioner contends that discovery order in the case violates the privilege against
self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege, for it is settled that a defendant in
a criminal case may not be compelled to testify, and it has generally been held that he
may not be required to produce private documents in his possession.

The prosecution, however, is entitled to discover the names of the witnesses petitioner
intends to call and any reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence in
support of his particular affirmative defense of impotence.
Although such discovery may require a defendant to disclose information that
would lead to effective rebuttal of his defense, these statutes have uniformly
been upheld against the claim that they violate the privilege against
self-crimination.

The identity of the defense witnesses and the existence of any reports or
X-rays the defense offers in evidence will necessarily be revealed at the trial.
The witnesses will be subject to cross-examination, and the reports and
X-rays subject to study and challenge. Learning the identity of the defense
witnesses and of such reports and X-rays in advance merely enables the
prosecution to perform its function at the trial more effectively. Thus, "the
alibi statutes do not infringe on the privilege against self-incrimination.

Insofar as the trial court's order herein requires petitioner to reveal the names and
addresses of witnesses he intends to call and to produce reports and X-rays he intends
to introduce in evidence to support his defense of impotence, it does not violate the
privilege against self-crimination. Nor to this extent does it violate the attorney-client
privilege. It simply requires the petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly
reveal anyway. Such information is discoverable. The order, however, is not limited to
the discovery of such information, and therefore cannot be enforced in its present
form.

5. People v. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 743 (1949)

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Alejandro Mendiola, Florentino Zapanta and Gregorio

Reyes

DOCTRINE: The discharge contemplated in the clear text of section 9 of Rule 115
can be effected at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to
the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. And once the discharge is ordered,
any future development showing that any or all of the five conditions have not
actually been fulfilled, may not affect the legal consequences of the discharge, as
provided by section 11 of Rule 115.

The exception in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 against the defendant who
"fails to testify against his co-defendant" refers exclusively to a failure attributable
to defendant's will or fault. It is unfair to deprive defendant of an acquittal for a
failure attributable to the prosecution.

FACTS:
1. Spouses Justina Rizal and Teofilo Ampil had been quarreling because of the
latter's amorous relations with other women. During the Japanese occupation
they were invited to live with her brother Dr. Sisenando Rizal in Calamba.
There were times during which he did not sleep there. There were occasion
 on which husband and wife were not on speaking terms. Justina went to the
extent of complaining to her brothers and sisters against her husband.
2. On March 31, 1946, her brother Taciano V. Rizal came from Calamba to
Manila in a weapons carrier, accompanied by appellants Alejandro Mendiola,
Florentino Zapanta and Gregorio Reyes, his townmates. In the evening of the
same day, Taciano borrowed an ambulance car from Arturo Gomez. Later,
Taciano alone went to the house of his sister Justina at 514 Aviles, Manila,
and talked with her for a short time.
3. Early in the morning of the next day, Taciano and the three appellants asked
for the ambulance of Arturo Gomez and drove it to Teofilo's house in Aviles.
Upon seeing Teofilo, they forced him to go with them in the ambulance. After
sometime, they were driving through Taft Avenue. At about 7 o'clock in the
morning, upon reaching the intersection of Libertad, Teofilo jumped out of
the car through the backdoor. Alejandro Mendiola shot him. After the
shooting, Taciano and appellants scampered away. Teofilo was helped by
traffic policeman Leonardo Roxas, who took him to the Philippine General
Hospital, where a few days later he died to generalized peritonitis and
hyphostatic pneumonia, secondary to gunshot wounds thorough the
abdomen, lacerating the omentum and transversing the colon.
4. Sometime later, appellant Alejandro Mendiola was arrested and sometime
after him the other two appellants. Taciano V. Rizal on the other hand
continues to be at large.
5. The original information for murder committed on the person of
Teofilo Ampil was filed on April 27, 1946, against Taciano V. Rizal
alone. On October 30, 1946, an amended information was filed
including new defendants, among them Alejandro Mendiola. On
November 6, 1946, assistant city fiscal Engracio Abasolo filed a
motion to discharge defendant Alejandro Mendiola in order that he
may be utilized as witness for the prosecution, which motion was
granted.
6. On February 7, 1947, the counsel moved to quash the new
information against Alejandro Mendiola in the ground that he has
previously been acquitted of the offense charged. The motion was
denied and erroneously.
7. The Prosecution contends that appellant Mendiola is not entitled to
the benefits of the discharge under section 11 of Rule 115 on the
following grounds:
a) Because Mendiola, upon developments subsequent to his discharge on
November 6, 1946, appears to be one of the most guilty, for having
fired the fatal shot, his discharge having been based on the main
proposition that by using him as a witness the prosecution would be
enabled to prove it case against the most guilty accused, and the
prosecution no longer wanted to avail, as it never availed, of his
testimony to successfully prosecute the real and most guilty culprits.
b) That the failure to testify mentioned in the proviso of section 11 of
Rule 115 comprehends the failure due to the prosecution's omission or
refusal to use the discharged accused as its witness.
c) That the discharge, to operate as an acquittal under section 11 of Rule
115, must have taken place after the discharged accused shall have
been arraigned and shall have entered his plea and after the trial of
the case shall have actually begun, and Mendiola had not even been
arraigned when he was discharged on November 6, 1946.

ISSUE: Whether Mendiola is entitled to the benefits of discharge under Section 9

and 11 of Rule 115 (YES)

RULING:
The above three proposition announced by the prosecution are not
supported either by law or by reason. Section 9 and 11 of Rule 115 which
read as follows:
SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the
prosecution. - When two or more persons are charged with the commission
of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time before they have
entered upon their defense, may direct any of them to be discharged with the
latter's consent that he may be a witness for the government when in the
judgment of the court:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
d) Said defendant does not appear to be that most guilty; and
e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

SEC. 11. Discharge of defendants operate as acquittal. - The order

indicated in the two preceding sections shall amount to an acquittal of the
defendant discharged and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same
offense, unless the defendant, in the case provided in section 9 fails or
refuses to testify against his co-defendant.

The discharge contemplated in the clear text of section 9 of Rule 115 can
be effected at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the
information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. The clause
"any time before they have entered upon their defense," used in the section, is so
clear as not to give rise to any misunderstanding. The words "any time before"
imply an indefinite period of time limited only by the time set by a court's
jurisdiction and the very nature of things, and that limit is set at the moment of the
filing of the information.

Before the discharge is ordered, the prosecution must show and the trial
court must ascertain that the five conditions fixed by section 9 of Rule 115
are complied with. But once the discharge is ordered, any future
development showing that any or all of the five conditions have not
actually been fulfilled, may not affect the legal consequences of the
discharge, as provided by section 11 of Rule 115. Any writing or unwitting
error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge and of the court in granting the
petition no question of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the
discharged accused of the acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115 and
of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

The exception in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 against the

defendant who "fails to testify against his co-defendant" refers exclusively
to a failure attributable to defendant's will or fault. It is unfair to deprive
defendant of an acquittal for a failure attributable to the prosecution, and
it would be an abhorrent legal policy to place defendant's fate at the mercy
of anyone who may handle the prosecution. The willingness or unwillingness of
the discharged defendant is the only test that should be taken into account to
determine whether or not he fails to testify against this co-defendant and,
consequently, whether or not he should be excluded from the benefits of the
acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115.

In the present case, it is not disputed that Alejandro Mendiola had always
been willing to testify for the prosecution and upon the same facts bared to
the prosecution for which the latter, among other grounds, decided to
move for his discharge from the information. As a matter of fact, although
testifying for himself, he reiterated substantially in open court what he had
testified before the officers for the prosecution. Under the circumstances
and the law, he is protected by the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.

6. Flores v. Sandiganbayan, 124 SCRA 109 (1983)

PETITIONERS: LEO M. FLORES, MODESTO L. LICAROS and MARIO LOPEZ VITO
RESPONDENTS: THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS

DOCTRINE: At any rate, the discharge of an accused may be ordered "at any
time before they (defendants) have entered upon their defense," that is, at any
stage of the proceedings, from the thing of the information to the time the
defense starts to offer any evidence.
→ In the case at bar, considering the opposition to the motion for the discharge of
Abelardo B. Licaros, particularly the contention that he is the most guilty and
that his testimony is not absolutely necessary, the trial court should have
held in abeyance or deferred its resolution on the motion until after the
prosecution has presented all its other evidence.

There lies the danger where one or more of the defendants are discharged before
the commencement of the hearing, he/they may disappear in which case the
purpose of his/their exclusion will come to naught. It is necessary that certain
safeguards be taken, otherwise an injustice may be committed.

FACTS:
● The Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank of the Philippines was robbed
and divested of cash amounting to P19,731,320.00.
● A sizable portion of the money was recovered at the Home Savings Bank &
Trust Company Building in Intramuros, Manila after a raid by the police
authorities.
● The Tanodbayan filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging
Modesto Licaros, Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Glicerio Balansin Rolando Quejada
Pio Edgardo Flores, Mario Lopez Vito and Rogelio dela Cruz, as principals, and
herein private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros, as accessory with the crime of
robbery
● The NBI, which investigated the case, recommended that Abelardo B. Licaros
be charged as principal but the Tanodbayan included him only as an
accessory after the fact.
● The Tanodbayan filed an amended information naming the same persons as
principals, except Rogelio dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory,
together with private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros.
● The accused were arraigned, including private respondent Abelardo B.
Licaros, who pleaded of not guilty.
● The Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Discharge" of
accused Abelardo B. Licaros to be utilized as state witness, alleging
that all the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
have been fully complied with.
● Petitioner Leo Flores opposed, on the ground:
(1) that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Abelardo B. Licaros;
(2) that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense charged except his testimony; and
(3) that his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points,
are all self-serving' allegations which are not substantiated.
 ● Further, petitioner Flores claims that from the records of the preliminary
investigation of the robbery case conducted by the Tanodbayan, Abelardo B.
Licaros appears to be the most guilty and is, in fact, the mastermind in the
commission of the offense charged.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Issued a resolution granting the motion and ordering the

discharge from the information of private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros.

ISSUE: WON Licaros may be discharged as state witness. (NO)

RULING:
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution —
When two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense,
the competent court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may
direct one or more of them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or
they may be witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the court:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge
is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

The discharge of an accused from the information so that he may be utilized as a

state witness is the exclusive responsibility of the trial court provided that it
sees to it that the requisites prescribed by the rules exist, particularly the requisite
that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge
is requested.

The fiscal must show that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
the defendant whose discharge he seeks, in order to be a witness for the
prosecution. This requirement is aimed to curtail miscarriage of justice, before too
common, through the abuse of the power to ask for the discharge of one or more
defendants. Absolute necessity of the testimony of the defendant, whose discharge
is requested must now be shown if the discharge is to be allowed, and the power to
determine the necessity is lodged upon the court. (People vs. Ibanez, 92 Phil. 933).

The expedient should be availed of, only when there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has
knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution (People vs.
Borja, 106 Phil. 1111).

At any rate, the discharge of an accused may be ordered "at any time before they
(defendants) have entered upon their defense," that is, at any stage of the
proceedings, from the thing of the information to the time the defense starts to
offer any evidence.
→ In the case at bar, considering the opposition of herein petitioners to the motion
for the discharge of Abelardo B. Licaros, particularly the contention that he is the
most guilty and that his testimony is not absolutely necessary, the trial court
should have held in abeyance or deferred its resolution on the motion until after the
prosecution has presented all its other evidence. Thereafter, it can fully determine
 whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the new Rules of Court,
are fully complied with. Besides, there lies the danger where one or more of the
defendants are discharged before the commencement of the hearing, he/they may
disappear in which case the purpose of his/their exclusion will come to naught. It is
necessary that certain safeguards be taken, otherwise an injustice may be
committed.

7. People v. Feliciano, 367 SCRA 53 (2001)

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: CARLOS FELICIANO

DOCTRINE: It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a

state witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge
would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor
would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution.

A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is

equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state
witness in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an
instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and
refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be
withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense.

FACTS:
● At around 5:30 in the morning of 5 June 1995, the lifeless body of Teresita
Fuentes was found in Brgy. Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan. The autopsy report
showed that whoever bludgeoned the hapless Teresita Fuentes to death had
used a blunt instrument, inflicting twelve different wounds on her head and
face.
● An Information for the crime of Robbery with Homicide was then filed against
Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano. The prosecution sought the
discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify against
his co-accused Carlos Feliciano.
● Pending resolution by the trial court, on motion, the two accused were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, the court
a quo granted the motion of the prosecution and Rodel de la Cruz was
utilized as state witness.
● Rodel de la Cruz testified that before two o'clock in the morning of June 5,
1995, Carlos Feliciano, as security guard of "Superstar" disco pub, told de la
Cruz to assist him in going after a customer who did not pay his bill. He
accompanied Feliciano who rented a tricycle from its driver, Ruben Barte, who
stayed behind. But, instead, Feliciano waited for Teresita Fuentes, poked his
gun at her face, dragged her towards the tricycle and ordered her to board it.
Feliciano threatened de la Cruz and instructed him where to proceed, being
the driver of the rented tricycle. During the ride, despite de la Cruz's protest,
Feliciano held Fuentes who was crouching, by her hair, pressing her head
down. He also kicked her and struck her head with the butt of his gun
whenever she struggled. Later when they reached New Buswang, Kalibo,
Aklan, Feliciano killed and robbed Teresita Fuentes.
● Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the asseverations of state witness
de la Cruz. He claimed that the accusations were motivated out of pure spite
and revenge borne of the hostility between them due to work-related
differences. Two additional witnesses for the defense testified that it was de
la Cruz with one male and the other female who were responsible for the
 death of Teresita Fuentes. Accordingly, Carlos Feliciano was convicted of the
crime charged and the supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the state witness’s (co-accused de la Cruz) testimony is valid as to

assure his exemption from punishment - YES

RULING:
The Court agreed with appellant that state witness Rodel de la Cruz appeared to be far
from the inculpable young man who had simply been an unwitting and reluctant
accomplice to a gruesome crime. Several incidents militated against his innocence.
The events, related by him, made tenuous the purported threat and intimidation
exerted by appellant over him. However, despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his
own participation in the crime, state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege
from his agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed
substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the
trial court.

On significant points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant was

corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael. Further, appellant Carlos Feliciano was
not able to sufficiently dispute his participation therein. Neither his blanket denial nor
his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, were amply proved. Thus, the judgment of
the court a quo was affirmed, except as it imposed on appellant Carlos Feliciano the
penalty of death which was hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua.

8. Chua v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 112 (1996)

Petitioner: WILSON CHUA

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: The discharge of an accused who may turn state witness is expressly
left to the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility
to see that the conditions prescribed by the rules exist.

GENERAL RULE: the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from

the Information, in order that he may be utilized as a prosecution witness
rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion
should be exercised by it strictly on the basis of the conditions therein set
forth in Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

EXCEPTION: The court’s discretion is not absolute and arbitrary.

Sound judicial discretion should be exercised with due regard to the proper
administration of justice.

FACTS:

● Wilson Chua was charged with a criminal case for Falsification of Private
Documents by complainant Tolong Aquaculture Corporation (TAC) for the
lease of several earth-moving equipment.
● TAC was alleging that Chua instigated and indorsed Enriquez, project
accountant of TAC, to make alterations and changes in the Daily Equipment
 Utilization Reports (DEUR) to enable Chua to charge more than what was
legally due him for the use of the equipment.
● The Inquest Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on December 19, 1989, on
the ground of lack of probable cause.
● TAC then appealed with the DOJ, which ordered the prosecutor to file an
information on the ground that "there exists a prima facie case of
Falsification of Private Documents."
● The prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Arcadio Enriquez so that
he can be utilized as a state witness, but the same was denied by the TC on
two grounds:
○ (1) the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to the effect that all the
requirements for the discharge of Enriquez had been complied with;
and
○ (2) that accused Enriquez, whose discharge is sought, appears to be in
possession of the documents in question and has admitted that he was
the one who falsified the same.
● The TC believes that Enriquez is most guilty of the crime charged.
● However, the CA declared the TC’s decision as null and void, and ordered that
Enriquez be discharged so that he may testify as a state witness.

ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the motion to discharge Enriquez
as a state witness -YES

RULING: CA is AFFIRMED in toto.

In the case at bar, the Information charges only two defendants of having
committed the offense of falsification of private documents, to wit: petitioner and
Arcadio Enriquez. The allegations in the information show that the two had
conspired to commit the crime charged. In the Flores case, the crime of bank
robbery was done in public and was witnessed by several persons. In this case, the
crime of falsification of private documents was done clandestinely. In fact, only two
persons — petitioner and Arcadio Enriquez — had knowledge of the criminal
conspiracy.

Clearly then, only one person can supply the DIRECT evidence required by Section
9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and that is Arcadio
Enriquez. Hence, the principle that, where a crime is contrived in secret,
then the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so he can testify
against the other conspirators, is applicable in this case.

With regard to the other witnesses listed in the Information who have not
yet been called to the witness stand, they would not constitute DIRECT
evidence of petitioner’s guilt. This is because none of these witnesses was privy to
the conspiracy between petitioner and Arcadio Enriquez. Their testimony would
merely corroborate the testimony of Enriquez although such corroborative
testimony is necessary to fulfill one of the conditions for the discharge of an
accused as stated in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz: "that
the testimony of the discharge accused "can be substantially corroborated in its
material points."

Furthermore, the said Rule does not require the prosecution to present all its
other evidence before an accused can be discharged. An accused may be
 discharged at any time before the defendants have entered upon their
defense. In fact even the Flores case which was heavily relied upon by
petitione.r

Petitioner also contends that respondent court gravely erred in not upholding
the exclusive responsibility of the trial court in the matter of discharging
an accused for use as a state witness.

The Court held in the case of People v. Tabayoyong:

The discharge of an accused who may turn state witness is expressly

left to the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive
responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rules exist.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a
co-accused from the Information, in order that he may be utilized as
a prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court, 8 this discretion should be exercised by it strictly on the basis
of the conditions therein set forth in Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The court’s discretion is not absolute and
arbitrary. Sound judicial discretion should be exercised with due
regard to the proper administration of justice.

As regards the requisite that there must be absolute necessity for the
testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested, the trial court has
to rely on the suggestions and the information presented by the public prosecutor.
The reason is obvious. The public prosecutor should know better than the court,
and the defense for that matter, as to which of the accused would best qualify to be
discharged to become a state witness. He is also supposed to know the evidence in
his possession and whom he needs to establish his case.

In this case, the filing by the private prosecutor of the motion to discharge accused
Enriquez was done with the conformity of the public prosecutor to apprise the trial
court of the role and participation of petitioner in the commission of the crime
charged. Based on the foregoing allegations, only accused Enriquez can testify on
its truthfulness as the said facts are based on his personal knowledge. Thus, there
is absolute necessity for his testimony in order to provide direct evidence
to petitioner’s guilt.

The denial of the motion to discharge by the trial court is tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion which this Court must correct.

RE: ABSOLUTE NECESSITY

What then is the meaning of "absolute necessity" for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is sought?

The expedient should be availed of only when there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has
knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution.

When there is a conspiracy for example, and the crime is committed clandestinely,
then the discharge of a conspirator is necessary to testify against the other
conspirator. A conspiracy can be established by the testimony of a co-conspirator. In
a conspiracy which was done in secret, there is a necessity to discharge one of the
accused to provide direct evidence of the commission of the crime. For who else
outside the conspiracy can testify on what was concocted between the conspirators,
but they themselves?

9. Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

Doctrine:

Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an

accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to
establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.

It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981

vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.
Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose
who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this
provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because
it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.

● National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a

letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
● Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not
commit the crime at bar as he went to the United States. His alibi was
corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina
Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco. To further
support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a
bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said dates and
that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707
on June 14, 1991.
● Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr.
Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records
tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on
March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
● DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with
homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents,
● It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge
Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August
11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid
any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI
before his appointment to the bench.
 ● The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino
who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their
co-accused.
Petitioners contend:

(1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them:
(2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide;
(3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and
(4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

ISSUES:

1. WON respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their

discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them. NO
2. WON DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide. NO
3. WON DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation. NO
4. WON DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused. NO

HELD:
1. WON respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them. NO

DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a

finding of probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely
abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory
questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a
clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to
establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.

2. WON DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide. NO

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate
the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have
conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants
of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must
first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or
rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the
two (2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal
and Lolita Birrer35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently,
the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest
against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it
is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process
cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took
the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.36

3. WON DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation. NO

The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity
to prove lack of probable cause against them.

The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This
directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was
done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During
the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process
during the conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ
Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in
court against them.

Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an
Information in court after the consummation of the preliminary
investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a
review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
4. WON DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused. NO

The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled

"An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program
And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its
Section 10, which provides:

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that

they constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court
which has the power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an
accused as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938
which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be
a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and
who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does not
support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to
discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of
jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the
Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation
designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one
of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against
crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The
rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.:
"Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear
and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because
of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for
insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of
criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses
and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance
in investigative bodies/courts."40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity
of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to

due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no
procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial
risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot

be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by
kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few
cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about
the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public
with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers — have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of
media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
cannot be completely closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was wisely held:

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under

certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to
fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54 we held that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that
the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and
Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the
klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable
indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence
except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of
petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical
stage as petitioners will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress
that probable cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of
publicity may be a good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can
bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial
judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to the case at
bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice.55
The Court reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an
issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always
stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the
innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise
that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

PETITIONS ARE DISMISSED.

10. U.S. v. Catimbang, 35 Phil. 367 (1916)

DOCTRINE: It then rests with the accused to rebut the inference of fact as to his
guilt arising from his possession of the stolen goods by the submission of evidence
tending to prove that his possession of the stolen goods was not inconsistent with
his innocence of the crime of larceny. But this is not to compel him to give evidence
against himself. It is merely to give him the opportunity which is given the
defendant in all criminal cases, to submit evidence in his own behalf after the
prosecution has introduced evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction unless that
evidence is rebutted or satisfactorily explained.

FACTS:
● Two cows with their calves were stolen. Miguel Catimbang (accused) asked
Antonio Templo (owner) for P40 as ransom (rescate) for the return of his
property, warning him that if he did not pay the money demanded of him, he
would lose the animals altogether. Templo did not give the money demanded
and failed to recover the animals.
● Miguel Catimbang was arrested and posted bail. He then went to Templo and
promised to return the animals if he would aid him to escape from the
criminal charges pending against him. Templo agreed and Catimbang gave
them the calf which had been stolen but did not turn over the cow.
● Two brothers, named Lirit, testified that the appellants, together with a third
person unknown, approached them and asked to take care of the cows until
their owners should ransom them.
● The party had the animals with them, and the description as given by the
witnesses tallied with that given by the owners of the animals stolen.
● The brothers declined to take care of the cattle, and the party went away,
taking the animals with them.
● Catimbang went on the witness stand and testifying in his own behalf, denied
the accusation and testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
● The other accused, Pedro Malauan, did not go on the witness stand, and the
only other witness called for the defense was the owner of the hemp late on
which the brothers Lirit said they were working when they saw the accused
with the stolen animals, who testified that if the brothers were working on
the hemp late on that occasion, they doing so without his authority.
● The trial judge convicted the two defendants and appellants of the crime of
theft of large cattle and sentencing each of them to six years and one day of
prision mayor.
● Appellants contends that the doctrine upon which these convictions rest is
unsound, and that it runs counter to the constitutional provisions which
forbid that accused persons be required to testify against themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellants' right against self-incrimination was violated. - NO.

HELD:
● AFFIRMED.
● It has sometimes been said that the unexplained possession of stolen
property creates a presumption of law that the possessor committed the
larceny, and casts the burden of proving the innocent character of the
possession upon the accused; and thus, stated, it must be admitted that
there is some force in counsel's contention that such a ruling may have the
effect, in some instances, of destroying the right of the accused to be exempt
from testifying against himself, and of declining to testify without having that
fact used against him.
● According to the modern view, however, convictions in case of this kind are
not sustained upon a presumption of law as to the guilt of the accused. The
conviction rests wholly upon an inference of fact as to the guilt of the
accused. If as a matter of probability and reasoning based on the fact of
possession of the stolen goods, taken in connection with the other evidence,
it may fairly be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is
 guilty of the theft, judgment of conviction may properly be entered. The
conviction rests upon the evidence introduced by the prosecution —
not upon the refusal or failure of the accused to testify.
● The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of
men. But the experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty
possession may be explained so as to rebut such an inference and an
accused person may therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on the
witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable
explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection of the
crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to
have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen goods.
● It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of
recently stolen goods will sustain a conviction of the crime of felony.
● When the prosecution closes its case there must be enough evidence in the
record to establish the guilt of the accused if nothing further appears; and
proof of the possession of recently stolen goods taken together will be
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused, if there is nothing in the record
to raise a doubt as to the guilty character of the possession, though there is
no presumption of law to that effect.
● It then rests with the accused to rebut the inference of fact as to his guilt
arising from his possession of the stolen goods by the submission of evidence
tending to prove that his possession of the stolen goods was not inconsistent
with his innocence of the crime of larceny. But this is not to compel him to
give evidence against himself. It is merely to give him the opportunity
which is given the defendant in all criminal cases, to submit evidence in his
own behalf after the prosecution has introduced evidence sufficient to sustain
a conviction unless that evidence is rebutted or satisfactorily explained.

11. Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 phil. 483 (1937)

Complainant: Maria Bermudez

Respondent: Leodegario Castillo

Doctrine: The right against self-incrimination may be raised when one is required
to submit specimens of his handwriting during trial. In this case, the complainant
stated under oath that the letters were not written by her. Were she compelled to
write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said
documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade
prosecution for perjury.

FACTS

● In an investigation by the Solicitor-General against respondent Castillo, the

latter filed six letters to support his defense. He contended that these letters
were the complainant's but she denied it while testifying as witness.
However, she submitted three letters which she admitted to be in her own
handwriting
● The respondent believed that the letters admitted by the complainant were
insufficient for purposes of comparison. Hence, he required her to copy the
letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator
● The complainant refused to submit to trial invoking her right not to
incriminate herself. The investigator upheld her right and did not compel her
to submit to the trial required. Hence, the respondent filed a petition to
 require and compel the complainant to furnish new specimens of her
handwriting by copying the letters submitted in evidence

ISSUE

Whether the complainant may be compelled to submit the handwriting specimens

RULING: NO

The Constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant
to copy the six documents, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator
authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that
the documents in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to
write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said
documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade
prosecution for perjury

The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. But the privilege is an

option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on
the stand, and a self- criminating act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by
him, the question may be asked, and then it is for the witness to say whether he
will answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known beforehand what he will
do.

The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal
or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If
such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired
to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured
at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be
asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This
court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under
consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be
given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.

12. People v. Mamacol, 81 Phil. 543 (1948)

DOCTRINE: The denial of a motion to dismiss made by an accused, with or

without reservation to present his evidence, will not impair his right to present it.
Where the motion to dismiss is denied, there is no harm to the interest of the
administration of justice to allow the defendant to present evidence, which might
show his innocence.

FACTS:
 The attorney de oficio for appellant, who was sentenced by the lower court to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000
and to pay the costs, for the killing of Dagodob in the early morning of October 16,
1946, in Ramitan, Malabang, Lanao, raises three questions:

1. That at last hearing at Iligan on July 16, 1947, according to the record, appellant
was not present as he was still in Dansalan, and this is a reversible error as,
according to section 1 (a) of Rule 111, the accused is entitled to be present at
every stage of the proceeding and when the crime charged is a capital one, such
right cannot be waived.

2. That the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence after
denying a motion for dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without
reserving the right to present said evidence in the event the motion is denied.

3. That the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict the appellant.

ISSUE: WON an accused may present evidence after a denial of motion to dismiss
with or without reservation to present his evidence

RULING:

The first question is based on the fact that whether the accused was present
or not at the hearing which took place at Iligan on July 16, 1947, the records
appear blank. The controversy centers on whether that blankness must be
interpreted as that the accused was not present or it should be supplied by the
presumption that the official duty to have the accused present at the trial has been
complied with. It is not necessary, however, to decide this question in view of the
result we have arrived at in deciding the last two questions.

On the second question, we are of the opinion that the procedure which has
been practiced and is generally practiced in trial courts for a long number of years,
is based on sound reason. There are criminal cases in which because of the
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution, the presentation of defense's
evidence will only entail waste of time. Where the motion to dismiss is denied, there
is no harm to the interest of the administration of justice to allow defendant to
present evidence, which might show his innocence, may lead to a miscarriage of
justice. We rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss made by an accused, with or
without reservation to present his evidence, will not impair his right to present it.
The substantial rights of an accused should not be impaired because of his counsel's
anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted. The need of applying the rule appears
to be more emphatic in a case like this where life or death or perpetual
imprisonment of the accused are at stake.

Upon the last question we hold, after going over the evidence presented by
the prosecution, that the testimonies of Apuntok Mamangcas and Payocan Moro,
the two witnesses for the prosecution, are enough to give the latter a prima facie
case.

13. Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949)

G.R. No. L-2754 August 31, 1949

PETITIONER: FIDEL ABRIOL
RESPONDENT: VICENTE HOMERES, Provincial Warden of Leyte
DOCTRINE:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf. There is on law nor "procedural practice" under which the
accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced.cha
nroblesvirtualawlibrary

FACTS:

Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, were accused of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the
defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused.

The court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon
counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused.

The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense,

contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in
criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for
dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been denied.
Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition, without allowing the accused to
present evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein
petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P2,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Case appealed to the Court of Appeals, on its own motion and without notice to the
appellants, dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their brief within
the extension of time granted them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Fidel Abriol filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that the sentence entered
against him in said criminal case was null and avoid because it had been rendered
without due process of law. The judge who heard the petition denied it, the
judgement of conviction against the petitioner having become final, "this court is
entirely devoid of jurisdiction over and power to modify or in any war alter said
decision."

ISSUE/S:

WON The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs
in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which
resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights?

HELD:

The practice of dismissing the case immediately after the evidence for the
prosecution had been closed ought not to be followed, for when the order of
dismissal was appealed from and this higher court sustained the conviction of the
accused on that evidence of the prosecution he would have been convicted without
having been heard in his own defense which would work an injustice, and when to
avoid this difficulty the order of dismissal was overruled and the case returned for
rehearing, another difficulty would be encountered, which is that of subjecting the
accused a second time to another trial without action on his part and without need,
since all the evidence could and should have been taken at the trial already held,
and with the additional risk of all the inconveniences of delay.

We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to
place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his
defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such
constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government
has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right
to be heard but on the contrary - as in the instant case - invokes that rough, and
the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no
power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the
sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

14. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)

PETITIONER: GRIFFIN
RESPONDENT: CALIFORNIA

DOCTRINE: The comments of a prosecutor or the court towards the jury

that a defendant’s silence or failure to testify to matters that he can
reasonably deny or explain evidences guilt is a violation of the right against
self-incrimination.

FACTS:
Griffin was convicted of murder in the first degree after a jury trial in a California
court. Griffin did not testify at trial on the issue of his guilt, but he did testify at a
separate trial on the issue of penalty. The trial court instructed the jury on the issue
of guilt stating that if the defendant does not testify or does testify but fails to deny
or explain evidence, the jury can take that failure as an indication of truth of the
evidence. The prosecutor also emphasized the defendant’s failure to testify as an
indication of guilt.

The court convicted Griffin and imposed the death penalty, hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
WON comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court of the US ruled that the comment on the failure to testify was a
violation of the self-incrimination clause. In Wilson vs US, the Court stated that the
failure of a defendant to testify shall not create any presumption against him.
Although the Court stated that the jury is free to infer without the help of the court,
there is a violation of the self-incrimination clause when the court solemnizes the
silence of the accused into evidence against him.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment forbids either comment by the
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court is reversed.
 15. Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 (2002)

Ty-Dazo v Sandiganbayan GR 143885-86 (2002) DIGEST

Rule 119 Trial

DOCTRINE:

The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is:

a. attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;

b. or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and

secured,

c. or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is

allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are:

a. the length of the delay,

b. the reasons for such delay,

c. the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and

d. the prejudice caused by the delay.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be

sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.

FACTS:

Merced Ty-Dazo was mayor an Eastern Samar town. In 1993, police confiscated
illegally cut logs allegedly owned by Ty-Dazo. This resulted in two criminal cases
filed before the Ombudsman, one for violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the other for violation of Presidential Decree No. 706 or
the Forestry Code.

The Ombudsman received the first criminal complaint on 01 September 1993. The
Information against Ty-Dazo was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 17 February
1995. Ty-Dazo then moved for a reinvestigation on 04 July 1995. The Motion for
Reinvestigation was denied on 05 March 1995.

The second criminal case against Ty-Dazo was received by the Ombudsman on 11
May 1993. The corresponding Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 28
April 1997. Thereafter, Ty-Dazo moved for reinvestigation.

In March and September 1999, Ty-Dazo filed before the Sandiganbayan to separate
Motions to Dismiss the cases, alleging violation of her right to due process and
speedy disposition of the case.
Ty-Dazo alleged that, in the first case, it took the Ombudsman three (3) years after
the receipt of the complaint to file the corresponding Information before the
Sandiganbayan.

In the second case, Ty-Dazo alleged that it took the Ombudsman more than four
(4) years to resolve her Motion for Reinvestigation.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed Ty-Dazo’s Motions to Dismiss the cases for lack of
merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated by the delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation of the criminal case. (No, there was
no violation of the right to speedy trial.)

RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition of Ty-Dazo for lack of merit.

Ty-Dazo tried to invoke the ruling in Tatad where it was held that "the inordinate
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information"
constituted a violation of the right of the accused to due process and to a speedy
disposition of cases.

In Tatad, the Court found that political motivation played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there was a blatant departure from
the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary
investigation; and that the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation
could not be justified on the basis of the facts on record.

Reliance by petitioners on Tatad is utterly misplaced. In the first place, there is no

showing that the filing of the cases against petitioners was politically motivated.

Moreover, unlike in Tatad, the established procedure prescribed for the conduct of
preliminary investigation was observed in the case of Ty-Dazo who was given the
opportunity to submit evidence to refute the charges before the corresponding
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, Ty-Dazo herself contributed to the delay. The Court said that
notwithstanding Ty-Dazo’s claim that the lapse of time from the conduct of the
preliminary investigation until the filing of the cases already violated her
constitutional right to due process, Ty-Dazo still filed a motion for reinvestigation of
the cases which admittedly served to further delay the cases.

The Court thus found that there was no basis for petitioner’s allegations that her
constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.

The bare allegation that it took the Ombudsman more than three (3) years to
terminate the preliminary investigation and file the necessary information would not
suffice.

As earlier stated, "a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
be sufficient."
 -30-

XV. JUDGMENT - Rule 120

A. Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14

B. Statutes/Rules
1. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120

Judgment - RULE 120

Section 1. Judgment definition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication

by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged
and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a)

Section 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction,

it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of

the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (2a)

Section 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more

offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense. (3a)

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. —

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a)
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint
or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. (5a)

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by

reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the

judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating
the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to
approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and
resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present
at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused tried in absentia
because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation

of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice. (6a)

Section 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may,

upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
 final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)

Section 8. Entry of judgment. — After a judgment has become final, it

shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36. (8)

2. Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (1991), Section 14

Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. — Before conducting the trial, the court
shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation
of facts may be entered into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to
enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be considered, or such other
matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy
disposition of the case.However, no admission by the accused shall be used
against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel.A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.

3. Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended by R. A.

No. 10707

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10707

AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE

KNOWN AS THE “PROBATION LAW OF 1976”, AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, is

hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree,

the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such
judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the
defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified
decision before such decision becomes final. The application for probation
based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the
judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was
rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been re-raffled. In
a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal,
the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written
application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of
conviction.

“The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed, suspend the
execution of the sentence imposed in the judgment.

“This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation

should he seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a
probationable penalty.

“Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.1âwphi1

“An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.”

SECTION 2. Section 9 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further

amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not

be extended to those:

“a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six

(6) years;

“b. convicted of any crime against the national security;

“c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense

punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day
and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);

“d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree;
and

“e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions
of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.”

SECTION 3. Section 16 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further

amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and

upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation
officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
“The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to totally
extinguish his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was
granted.

“The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a
copy of such order.”

SECTION 4. Section 24 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as

follows:

“SEC. 24. Miscellaneous Powers of Regional, Provincial and City

Probation Officers. — Regional, Provincial or City Probation Officers shall
have the authority within their territorial jurisdiction to administer oaths
and acknowledgments and to take depositions in connection with their
duties and functions under this Decree. They shall also have, with respect
to probationers under their care, the powers of a police officer. They shall
be considered as persons in authority.”

SECTION 5. Section 27 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as

follows:

“SEC. 27. Field Assistants, Subordinate Personnel. – Regional,

Provincial or City Probation Officers shall be assisted by such field
assistants and subordinate personnel as may be necessary to enable them
to carry out their duties effectively.”

SECTION 6. Section 28 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as

follows:

“SEC. 28. Volunteer Probation Assistants (VPAs). — To assist the

Chief Probation and Parole Officers in the supervised treatment program of
the probationers, the Probation Administrator may appoint citizens of good
repute and probity, who have the willingness, aptitude, and capability to act
as VPAs.

“VPAs shall not receive any regular compensation except for reasonable
transportation and meal allowances, as may be determined by the
Probation Administrator, for services rendered as VPAs.

“They shall hold office for a two (2)-year term which may be renewed or
recalled anytime for a just cause. Their functions, qualifications,
continuance in office and maximum case loads shall be further prescribed
under the implementing rules and regulations of this Act.

“There shall be a reasonable number of VPAs in every regional, provincial,

and city probation office. In order to strengthen the functional relationship
of VPAs and the Probation Administrator, the latter shall encourage and
support the former to organize themselves in the national, regional,
provincial, and city levels for effective utilization, coordination, and
sustainability of the volunteer program.”

SECTION 7. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is

declared invalid, the provisions hereof not affected by such declaration shall
remain in full force and effect.

SECTION 8. Repealing Clause. — All laws, executive orders, or

administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended, repealed or modified
accordingly.

SECTION 9. Appropriations Clause. — The amount necessary to carry

out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law.

SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within sixty

(60) days from the approval of this Act, the Department of Justice shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act.

SECTION 11. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect immediately after
its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
 4. Republic Act No. 9344 (2006), Sections 38-56

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9344

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

TITLE V

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM

CHAPTER 4

COURT PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is

under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the
recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the
court shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been
suspended and against whom disposition measures have been issued, and
shall order the final discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of the
disposition measures have been fulfilled.

The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil
liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be
enforced in accordance with law.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.

SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the
law shall be credited in the services of his/her sentence with the full time
spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.

SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court

may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the
law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu
of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest of the
child. For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise
known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby amended accordingly.

CHAPTER 5

CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 43. Confidentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All records and

proceedings involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact
until final disposition of the case shall be considered privileged and
confidential. The public shall be excluded during the proceedings and the
records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the
parties or the participants in the proceedings for any purpose whatsoever,
except to determine if the child in conflict with the law may have his/hes
sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted probation under the
Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.

The component authorities shall undertake all measures to protect this

confidentiality of proceedings, including non-disclosure of records to the
media, maintaining a separate police blotter for cases involving children in
conflict with the law and adopting a system of coding to conceal material
information which will lead to the child's identity. Records of a child in
conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings for cases
involving the same offender as an adult, except when beneficial for the
offender and upon his/her written consent.

A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held
under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or
recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him/her
for any purpose.

TITLE VI

REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The

objective of rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with the
law is to provide them with interventions, approaches and strategies that
will enable them to improve their social functioning with the end goal of
reintegration to their families and as productive members of their
communities.

SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in any

rehabilitation or training facility without a valid order issued by the court
after a hearing for the purpose. The details of this order shall be
immediately entered in a register exclusively for children in conflict with the
law. No child shall be admitted in any facility where there is no such
register.

SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation or

training facilities, it shall be mandatory that children shall be separated
from adults unless they are members of the same family. Under no other
circumstance shall a child in conflict with the law be placed in the same
confinement as adults.

The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in conflict with

the law shall provide a home environment where children in conflict with
the law can be provided with quality counseling and treatment.

SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the law
placed in an institution shall be given special attention as to their personal
needs and problems. They shall be handled by female doctors, correction
officers and social workers, and shall be accommodated separately from
male children in conflict with the law.

SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of rehabilitation

and training facilities shall handle children in conflict with the law without
having undergone gender sensitivity training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The LGUs shall
set aside an amount to build youth detention homes as mandated by the
Family Courts Act. Youth detention homes may also be established by
private and NGOs licensed and accredited by the DSWD, in consultation
with the JJWC.

SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the Law.
- The expenses for the care and maintenance of a child in conflict with the
law under institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents or those
persons liable to support him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or
those persons liable to support him/her cannot pay all or part of said
expenses, the municipality where the offense was committed shall pay
one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which the
municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the remaining one-third
(1/3) shall be borne by the national government. Chartered cities shall pay
two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay
said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the
unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said
obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that the child in conflict
with the law is not a resident of the municipality/city where the offense was
committed, the court, upon its determination, may require the
city/municipality where the child in conflict with the law resides to shoulder
the cost.

All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the immediate
establishment of local detention homes for children in conflict with the law.

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps

and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. -

Children in conflict with the law, whose sentences are suspended may,
upon order of the court, undergo any or a combination of disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in conflict with

the law, he/she shall be released to parents, guardians, relatives or any
other responsible person in the community. Under the supervision and
guidance of the local social welfare and development officer, and in
coordination with his/her parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the law
shall participate in community-based programs, which shall include, but not
limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;

(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;

(3) Community volunteer projects;

(4) Leadership training;

(5) Social services;

(6) Homelife services;

(7) Health services; .

(8) Spiritual enrichment; and

(9) Community and family welfare services.

In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the law shall
endeavor to actively participate in the community-based rehabilitation.

Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final report will be
forwarded by the local social welfare and development officer to the court
for final disposition of the case.

If the community-based programs are provided as diversion measures

under Chapter II, Title V, the programs enumerated above shall be made
available to the child in conflict with the law.

SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth rehabilitation center

shall provide 24-hour group care, treatment and rehabilitation services
under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for under a
structured therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating them
in their families and communities as socially functioning individuals. A
quarterly report shall be submitted by the center to the proper court on the
progress of the children in conflict with the law. Based on the progress of
the youth in the center, a final report will be forwarded to the court for final
disposition of the case. The DSWD shall establish youth rehabilitation
centers in each region of the country.

SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The objectives

of community-based programs are as follows:

(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in

conflict with the law in case he/she is studying, working or attending
vocational learning institutions;

(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her
parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered by their
relationship and to create greater awareness of their mutual and reciprocal
responsibilities;

(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict

with the law and encourage community support and involvement; and

(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law
by preventing jail detention.

SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every LGU shall

establish community-based programs that will focus on the rehabilitation
and reintegration of the child. All programs shall meet the criteria to be
established by the JJWC which shall take into account the purpose of the
program, the need for the consent of the child and his/her parents or legal
guardians, and the participation of the child-centered agencies whether
public or private.

SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in Conflict with

the Law. - Children in conflict with the law whose cases have been
dismissed by the proper court because of good behavior as per
recommendation of the DSWD social worker and/or any accredited NGO
youth rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care services by the local
social welfare and development officer for a period of at least six (6)
months. The service includes counseling and other community-based
services designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-offending and
make the children productive members of the community.
 5. Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated 21 June 1993

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 7-A-92 June 21, 1993

TO: THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND
SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE ARCHIVING OF CASES

Administrative Circular No. 7-92, dated October 12, 1992, is hereby amended to
read as follows:

The attention of the Court has been called to the lack of uniformity in the policies
adopted by the individual judges with respect to the archiving cases. There are
likewise reports of indiscriminate archiving of cases without apparent justifiable
reason. The following guidelines are therefore established in the archiving of
cases:

I. CRIMINAL CASES

a) A criminal case may be archived only if after the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the delivery of the
warrant to the proper peace officer. An order archiving the case shall require the
peace officer to explain why the accused was not apprehended. The court shall
issue an alias if the original warrant of arrest is returned by the peace officer
together with the report.

b) The court, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, may likewise archive a
criminal case when proceedings therein are ordered suspended for an indefinite
period because:

1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition

which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently, or to undergo trial, and he has to be
committed to a mental hospital;

2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the

pendency of the criminal case unless the civil and the criminal cases are
consolidated;

3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to,

and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher
court which has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction; and

4) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be
arrested by his bondsmen.
 II. CIVIL CASES

In civil cases, the court may motu proprio or upon motion, order that a civil case
be archived only in the following instances:

a) When the parties are in the process of settlement, in which case the
proceedings may be suspended and the case archived for a period not exceeding
ninety (90) days. The case shall be included in the trial calendar on the day
immediately following the lapse of the suspension period.

b) When an interlocutory order or incident in the civil case is elevated to, and is
pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which
has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

c) When defendant, without fault or neglect of plaintiff, cannot be served with

summons within six (6) months from issuance of original summons.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

a) Copies of the Order archiving the case shall be furnished the parties.

b) A special docket shall be maintained to record the cases both criminal and civil
that have been archived.

c) A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the Presiding Judge.

d) The Presiding Judge shall, motu propio or upon motion by any party, order the
reinstatement/revival of an archived case and its withdrawal from the archives
whenever the same is ready for trial or further proceedings.

e) The Branch Clerk of Court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator
a consolidated list of archived cases not later than the first week of January of
every year.

6. A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC dated March 18, 2014

A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC

GUIDELINES FOR DECONGESTING HOLDING JAILS BY ENFORCING THE

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS TO BAIL AND TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Whereas, the Constitution provides in Section 13, Article Ill, that all
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties or released on recognizance as the law may provide and further, that
excessive bail shall not be required;

Whereas, the Supreme Court has allowed the summary hearing of

applications for bail of persons charged with offenses punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment;

Whereas, there is a need to effectively implement existing policies laid

down by the Constitution, the laws and the rules respecting the accused's rights
to bail and to speedy trial in the context of decongesting our detention jails and
humanizing the conditions of detained persons pending the hearing of their
cases;

Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee for the Decongestion of

Provincial, City, and Municipal Jails has recommended for the adoption of
guidelines for decongesting holding jails by enforcing the rights of accused
persons to bail and to speedy trial; and

Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc, finds merit in the

recommendation;

Now, therefore, all trial courts, public prosecutors, public attorneys,

private practitioners, and other persons involved in protecting and ensuring the
grant to the accused of his rights to bail and to speedy trial are enjoined as
follows.

A. THE RIGHT TO BAIL

Sec. 1. Duly of the court to fix the appropriate bail. (a) The court
shall, after finding sufficient cause to hold the accused for trial, fix the amount
of bail that the latter may post for his provisional release, taking into account
the public prosecutor's recommendation and any relevant data that the court
may find from the criminal information and the supporting documents submitted
with it, regarding the following:

(1) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(2) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) Penalty for the offense charged;
(4) Character and reputation of the accused;
(5) Age and health of the accused;
(6) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(7) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) Fact that accused was a fugitive justice when arrested; and

(10) Pendency of cases in which the accused is under bond.

The Department of Justice's Bail Bond Guide shall be considered but shall not
 be controlling. In no case shall the court require excessive bail.

Sec. 2. Fixing of the amount of bail. Pending the raffle of the case
regular branch of the court, the accused may move for the fixing of the amount
of bail, in which event, the Executive Judge shall cause the immediate raffle of
the case for assignment and the hearing of the motion.

Sec. 3. When amount of bail may be reduced. — If the accused does

not have the financial ability to post the amount of bail that the court initially
fixed, he may move for its reduction, submitting for that purpose such
documents or affidavits as may warrant the reduction he seeks. The hearing of
this motion shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases.

Sec. 4. Order fixing the amount of bail inappealable. — The order fixing the
amount of the bail shall not be subject to appeal.

Sec. 5. Release after service of minimum imposable penalty. — The

accused who has been detained for a period at least equal to the minimum of
the penalty for the offense charged against him shall be ordered released, motu
proprio or on motion and after notice and hearing, on his own recognizance
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him. [Sec. 16,
Rule 1 14 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 103891

Sec. 6. Bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua

or life imprisonment. — a) The hearing of the accused's motion for bail in
offense’s punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be
summary, with the prosecution bearing the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong. The accused may at his option, if he wants the court
to consider his evidence as well, submit in support of his motion the affidavits
of his witnesses attesting to his innocence.

b) At the hearing of the accused's motion for bail, the prosecution

shall present its witnesses with the option of examining them on direct or
adopting the affidavits they executed during the preliminary investigation as
their direct testimonies.

c) The court shall examine the witnesses on their direct testimonies

or affidavits to ascertain if the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The
court's questions need not follow any particular order and may shift from one
witness to another. The court shall then allow counsels from both sides to
examine the witnesses as well. The court shall afterwards hear the oral
arguments of the parties on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.

d) Within forty-eight (48) hours after hearing, the court shall issue
an order containing a brief summary of the evidence adduced before it, followed
by its conclusion of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Such
conclusion shall not be regarded as a pre-judgment on the merits of the case
that is to be determined only alter a full-blown trial.
 Sec. 7. Frivolous complaints against judges. — A party or a lawyer
who is guilty of filing a frivolous administrative complaint or a petition for
inhibition against a judge arising from the latter's action on the application for
bail may be appropriately sanctioned.

B. THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

Sec. 8. Observance of the time limits. — It shall be the duty of the

trial court, the public or private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure,
subject to the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time limits in the
prosecution of the case against a detained accused:

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court
to which it is assigned within three days from the filing of the information;

(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date
of the raffle;

(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference with in thirty (30) days
after arraignment or within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive
detention; provided, however, that where the direct testimonies of the
witnesses are to be presented through judicial affidavits, the court shall give
the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from arraignment within which
to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time [Or the pre-trial
conference;

(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the
case in the pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days from the termination
of the pre-trial conference; and

(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred
eighty (180) days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) clays,
reckoned from the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or
postponements specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998.

Sec. 9. Dismissal on ground of denial of the right to speedy trial.

—
The case against the detained accused may be dismissed on ground of denial of
the right to speedy trial in the event of failure to observe the above time limits.

Sec. 10. Provisional dismissal. (a) When the delays are due to the
absence of an essential witness whose whereabouts are unknown or cannot be
determined and, therefore, are subject to exclusion in determining compliance
with the prescribed time limits which caused the trial to exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days, the court shall provisionally dismiss the action with the
express consent of the detained accused.

(b) When the delays are due to the absence of an essential witness whose
presence cannot be obtained by due diligence though his whereabouts are
known, the court shall provisionally dismiss the action with the express consent
of the detained accused provided:

(1) the hearing in the case has been previously twice

postponed due to the non-appearance of the essential witness and
both the witness and the offended party, if they are two different
persons, have been given notice of the setting of the case for third
hearing, which notice contains a warning that the case would be
dismissed if the essential witness continues to be absent; and

(2) there is proof of service of the pertinent notices of hearings or

subpoenas upon the essential witness and the offended party at
their last known postal or e-mail addresses or mobile phone
numbers.

(c) For the above purpose, the public or private prosecutor shall first present
during the trial the essential witness or witnesses to the case before anyone
else. An essential witness is one whose 'testimony dwells on the presence of
some or all of the elements of the crime and whose testimony is indispensable
to the conviction of the accused.

Sec. 11. Service of subpoena and notices through electronic

mail or mobile phones. — Subpoena and notices may be served by the court
to parties and witnesses through electronic mails (e-mail) or through mobile
phone either through phone calls or through short messaging service (SMS)

Sec. 12. Proof of service and notice of hearing or subpoena. To

ascertain the proper service of notice of hearing or subpoena:

(a) The public prosecutor shall, during inquest or preliminary investigation,

require the complainant and his witnesses and, in proper cases, the police
officers who witnessed the commission of the crime subject of the investigation,
to leave with him their postal and e-mail addresses and mobile phone numbers
for use in summoning them when they need to appear at the hearings of the
case.

(b) When requesting the court to issue a subpoena or subpoena duces

tecum for their witnesses, the parties shall provide the court with the postal
and e-mail addresses and mobile phone numbers of such witnesses.

(c) The service of notice of hearing or subpoena at the postal address,

e-mail address, or through mobile phone number shall be proved by any of the
following:
( l) an officer's return or affidavit of service if done by personal
service, or by registry return card;
(2) printouts of sent e-mail and the acknowledgement by
the recipient;
(3) printouts of electronic messages transmitted through
the court's equipment or device and the acknowledgement by the
 recipient; or
(4) reports of phone calls made by the court.

(d) The postal and e-mail addresses as well as the mobile phone numbers
supplied by the parties and their witnesses incident to court cases shall be
regarded as part of the judicial processes in those cases. Consequently, any
person who uses the same without proper authority or for purposes other than
sending of court notices shall be deemed guilty of indirect contempt and
accordingly punished.

(e) In cases of police officers whose testimonies are essential to the

prosecution of the case, service of the notice of hearing or subpoena on them
shall be made through the police unit responsible for the arrest and prosecution
of the accused, copy furnished the Personnel Department of the Philippine
National Police. It shall be the responsibility of the head of that police unit to
ensure the transmission of the notice or subpoena to the addressee. Service
upon the police unit shall be deemed service upon such police officers.

(f) The court shall cause the service of a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal upon the offended party in the manner provided above.

Sec. 13. Report of government expert witnesses. — A certified copy

of the report of a government medical, chemical, or laboratory expert relating to
a criminal case shall be admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth of its
contents. The personal appearance in court of a witness who prepared the report
shall be unnecessary unless demanded by the accused for the purpose of
cross-examination.

Sec. 14. Revival of cases provisionally dismissed. — The one or two-year

period allowed for reviving a criminal case that has been provisionally dismissed
shall be reckoned from the issuance of the order of dismissal. The dismissal
shall become automatically permanent if the case is not revived within the
required period. Such permanent dismissal shall amount to an adjudication of
the case on the merits.

Sec. 15. Local Task Force Katarungan at Kalayaan. — (a) The Court
shall establish a Task Force Katarungan at Kalayaan in appropriate places for the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. It shall be chaired by a Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Judge, with a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court Judge as
vice-chairman, both to be appointed for a term of two years by the Executive
Judge of the place. The city or provincial prosecutor of the place or his
representative and the local head of the Public Attorney's Office or his
representative shall be members of the Task Force. The assistance of the local
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Office of the Provincial
Governor may be enlisted.

(b) The Task Force shall track and keep a record of the progress of
the criminal cases of all detained persons within their jurisdiction and ensure
that such persons are accorded the rights and privileges provided by law, the
 rules, and these guidelines.

(c) Each court shall maintain a "Detainees Notebook," that shall be

supplied free by the Office of the Court Administrator and shall contain (i) the
full name of the accused; (ii) the docket number and title of the case' (iii) the
kind of crime charged; (iv) the date his detention began; (v) the date when his
detention becomes equal to the minimum of the imposable penalty; (vi) the date
when his detention becomes equal to the maximum imposable penalty; (vii) the
date of arraignment; (viii) the date of pre-trial hearing or conference; (ix) the
first day of trial; (x) the statutory last day of trial if no excluded delays or
postponements arc incurred; (xi) sufficient space for entering the progress of
the hearing of the case; and (xii) such other data as may be essential to the
monitoring of his or her case. One (1) copy of the notebook shall be attached to
the record of the case and other copy kept by the jail warden which copy shall
be brought with the accused at the hearing. The branch clerk of court shall
update the two copies of the notebook at every hearing by stating what action
the court has taken in it, the next scheduled hearing, and what action the court
will further take on the case.

(d) The Task Force shall have access to all case records and
information relating to detained persons and shall advise the judges hearing
their cases, when warranted, of the need for them to act on any incident or
situation that adversely affects the rights of detained persons or subject them
to undue or harsh treatment.

(e) The Office of the Chief Justice shall exercise direct supervision
over all such Task Forces.

These guidelines shall take on May 1, 2014 after publication in a newspaper of

general circulation in the Philippines and shall apply to all accused persons
under preventive detention.

Manila, Philippines, March 18, 2014

C. Cases
1. People v. Tamayo, 86 Phil. 209 (1950)

DOCTRINE:
Judgment in a criminal case may be revised or modified only within the
period to appeal, or fifteen days from the date of its promulgation.

FACTS:
 · Timoteo Tamayo, the appellant, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

· He pleaded guilty and the court sentenced him to pay a fine of P100
and costs.

· Subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal moved the court to reconsider its

decision on the ground that the imposable penalty was that provided in
Republic Act No. 4, which became effective on July 19, 1946.

· The defendant's counsel objected to the motion for reconsideration.

· Nevertheless, the court amended its decision and sentenced the

accused to five years of imprisonment, accessories of the law, and costs.

ISSUE:

Whether the court below had jurisdiction to modify its decision after the lapse of
nearly seven months from the date of its promulgation, notwithstanding the fact
that the fiscal's motion for reconsideration was filed within fifteen days.

HELD:

NO. The modified judgment of the lower court dated August 7, 1947, will be set
aside and the original judgment declared final.

RATIO:

Both the appellant and the Solicitor General concede that under section 7 of Rule
116 a judgment may be amended within fifteen days from the date of its
promulgation; their objection is that the amendment in this case was made outside
that period. However, some members of the court believe that without the consent
of the defendant a judgment may not at any time be altered beyond the correction
of clerical or inadvertent errors. They rely on section 1 of Rule 117 for this view.

Other, including the writer of this decision, maintain that section 1 of Rule 117 does
not control. They are of the opinion that this rule has no bearing on the case at bar;
that the applicable rule is section 7 of Rule 116, and that this rule and Rule
117, section 1, relate to different subjects and do not conflict or interfere
with each other.

Section 7 of Rule 116 refers to modification of judgment, as its title shows,

while section 1 of Rule 117 refers to new trial.

What is a new trial? While "new trial" is a term of broad signification, we think that
section 5 of Rule 117 furnishes a clue to its meaning as the term is employed in
Rule 117. Said section 5 is as follows:

SEC. 5. Effect of granting a new trial. — The effects of granting a new trial
are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or

irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence not
 affected by the commission of such errors and irregularities shall stand, but
those affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in
the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
the evidence already taken shall stand, and the newly discovered and such
other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already
in the record.

(c) In all cases, the original judgment shall be set aside and a new judgment
rendered, and the former shall not be used or referred to in evidence or
argument on the new trial.

These directions portray a proceeding whereby errors of law or irregularities are

expunged from the record, or new evidence is introduced, or both steps are taken.
In a new trial, by the very nature of its purpose and what is to be done, both
parties intervene. On the other hand, section 7 of Rule 116 contemplates no
new hearing or proceeding of any kind or change in the record or evidence.

To modify a judgment, the court alone, of its own motion and without any notice to
either party, may and does generally act. This so because a simple modification of a
judgement is accomplished on the basis of what is already in the record. No
irregularities or omissions are involved and absolutely nothing is added to or taken
from what is before the court. Only wrong conclusions from or wrong appreciation
of the proofs already at hand are corrected in the decision.

Motion for new trial (section 5 of Modification of judgment (section

Rule 117) 7 of Rule 116)

"the original judgment shall be set
aside and a new judgment rendered,
and the former shall not be used or
referred to in evidence or argument
in the new trial"
the integrity of the decision already
handed down is unaffected, except for
the proposed change, change which
may consist of alteration, insertion, or
elimination of a word, phrase,
sentence or paragraph, although
there is nothing to prevent the entire
decision from being rewritten as was
done in this case.

To summarize, judgment in a criminal case may be revised or modified only

within the period to appeal, or fifteen days from the date of its
promulgation.
THE PENALTY OF RA NO. 4 WAS SUSPENDED ITS EXCEPTIONS DOES NOT
APPLY IN THE PRESENT CASE.

The allegation in the information do not constitute cause of action. Republic Act No.
4 became effective on July 19, 1946, but the President, in Proclamation No. 1, by
virtue of the power conferred upon him act, fixed August 31, 1946, up to which
possessor of unlicensed firearms might surrender them to lawful authorities without
incurring any criminal liability. The clear inference from the terms of the
proclamation is that from the date of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 4 to
August 31, 1946, the penalty for mere possession of firearms, ammunition,
etc., was suspended. The only instances in which such possession was punishable
before August 31, 1946, were making use of the firearms, except in self-defense, or
carrying them for purposes other than surrendering them to the proper authorities.

However, this case is not before us on appeal on the merit. We are requested not to
review the original judgment but to declare it subsisting and to set aside the
modified judgment.

SIDE ISSUE:

WON IN MODIFYING THE PENALTY IMPOSED THE ACCUSED WOULD BE PUT

TWICE IN JEOPARDY. no

Our answer is that the doctrine of double jeopardy does not enter into the case for
the reason that jeopardy does not attach until the period for appeal has
expired.

The matter relative to the time when jeopardy attaches is largely statutory, and
section 7 of Rule 116, in express and plain language, fixes such time at the
expiration of fifteen days.

Rules cited:

Section 7 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may be

modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has
become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.

Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 118 provide:

SECTION 1. Appeal. — From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance
or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now
provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court
of Appeals or to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen

days from the rendition of the judgment or order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new
 trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the defendant or his attorney.

2. People v. Romero, 89 Phil. 672 (1951)

∫DOCTRINE:A motion for reconsideration filed in a criminal case in a Court of First

Instance by the Fiscal on the ground of error of law in the judgment or grave abuse
of discretion is equivalent to a motion for new trial

FACTS:

● The defendant Godofredo Romero was charged in four separate criminal

cases with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, attempted murder, and
illegal possession of firearms,and pleaded not guilty.

● The parties agreed to try jointly the four cases but fiscal moved for the
postponement and the court postponed the trial of the cases.

● But warned the prosecution that it would be the last postponement.

● When the cases were called for hearing, they moved for another suspension.

● The counsel for the defense objected to the postponement of the trial and
invited the attention of the court to its that the cases would be dismissed if
the fiscal was not ready to proceed with the trial and the court issued order
of dismissal.

● In view of the opposition of the defense to a further postponement, the court

issued the order of dismissal

● The attorneys for the defendant filed with this Supreme Court a motion to
dismiss the fiscal’s appeal on the ground that the defendant, having been
already in jeopardy, would be placed in double jeopardy by the appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that, in the order above-quoted of the court below
dismissing the four cases against the defendant

The defense contended:chanrobles..ph

". . . it is indubitable that your defendant did not himself personally move for the
dismissal of the cases against him nor expressly consent to it; and that the
dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal on the merits for failure to prosecute, because
no reservation was made in favor of the prosecution to renew the charges against
your defendant in ulterior proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library

In opposing the postponement of the trial of the cases and insisting on the
compliance with the order of the court dated May 25, 1950, that the cases be
dismissed if the Provincial fiscal was not ready for trial on the continuation of the
hearing on June 14, 1950, he obviously insisted that the cases be dismissed.

The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the defendant himself
personally, moved for the dismissal of the cases against him, had the same effect
as if the defendant had personally moved for such dismissal, inasmuch as the act of
the counsel in the prosecution of the defendant’s cases was the act of the defendant
himself, for the only case in which the defendant cannot be represented by his
counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration on the ground of error of law or grave
abuse of discretion is equivalent to a motion of new trial (YES)

HELD:

"According to Section 9 of Rule 113, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than

upon the merits at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the
case shall be definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it
is dismissed upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, because, in the last case, the defendant’s action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to be prosecuted again
for the same offense.

"If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case.

If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the court believes
that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the
accused to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed with
the trial and require the fiscal to present the witnesses for the prosecution;

and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and consequently fails to
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court, upon the motion of
the defendant, shall dismiss the case.

Such dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so called,

but an acquittal of the defendant, because of the prosecution’s failure to prove the
guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express
consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal
obtained upon the defendant’s motion.brary

A motion for reconsideration filed in a criminal case in a Court of First Instance by

the Fiscal on the ground of error of law in the judgment or grave abuse of discretion
is equivalent to a motion for new trial
 3. Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559 (1976)

Petitioner: Odelon Ramos (RAMOS)

Respondent: Hon. Arsenio Gonong (GONONG)

DOCTRINE:
Before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the trial court has "plenary power
to make, either on motion of one of the parties, or motu propio, such
amendments or alterations as it may deem best, within the frame of law, to
promote the ends of Justice. Thereafter, upon its finality, the trial court is divested
of all authority to amend or alter the aforesaid judgment, except to correct
clerical errors.

FACTS:
- A trial was rendered convicting petitioner of a, the dispositive portion read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Odelon
Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple
Slight Physical injuries thru Reckless Imprudence as defined and penalized in
Art. 365. par. 3, and Art. 266, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code, in relation to Art. 26 &
48, having also in mind Art. 66 and 75 of the same code, sentencing him to
double the amount of P7,425.95 or a total of P14,851.95; to pay P2,000.00
as moral damages and finally, to pay the statutory costs.

- The decision was promulgated on October 20, 1975.

- RAMOS manifested in open court his intention to appeal
- The following day RAMOS filed a written manifestation withdrawing his
intention to appeal and praying that the decision be executed.
- The court granted the withdrawal and executed the decision.
- 2 days later, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration to amend the
dispositive portion of the decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Odelon
Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple
Slight Physical Injuries as defined and penalized in Art. 365, par. 3, and Art.
266, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code, in relation to Art. 26 and 48, having also in
mind Art. 66 and 75 of the same code, sentencing him to a 'fine' of double
the amount of P7,425.95 or a total of P14,851.95; 'to pay Mariano Nalupta
Sr., the said amount of P14,861.95 as damages and to suffer a
subsidiary personal imprisonment of not more than six (6) months in
case of insolvency (Art. 39, par. 2, R.P.C.), to pay P2,000.00 as moral
damages, and finally, to pay the statutory costs.

- The respondent court granted it and the amendment was adopted by the
court.
 - RAMOS filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent court may order the amendment of the decision. -
NO!

RULING:
It is clear that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-IV became final and executory
upon the filing of the written manifestation by the accused, withdrawing his appeal,
with prayer that the judgment in said case be executed, coupled with the approval
by the court of such withdrawal.

The full import of the prayer for the execution of the judgment, together with the
clear and express withdrawal of "his intention to appeal the decision" demonstrates
the conformity of the accused to the sentence of conviction within the intendment
of the aforequoted section 7 of the Rules and, therefore, after its approval by the
Court, should have the legal effect of rendering the decision final.

RULE 120, SEC. 7. Modification of judgement. - A judgment of conviction

may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment
has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for, perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totality satisfied or served or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. (Emphasis
supplied).

It is manifest from the foregoing that, before a judgment of conviction becomes

final, the trial court has "plenary power to make, either on motion of one of the
parties, or motu propio, such amendments or alterations as it may deem best,
within the frame of law, to promote the ends of Justice. Thereafter, upon its finality,
the trial court is divested of all authority to amend or alter the aforesaid judgment,
except to correct clerical errors.
 4. People v. Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454 (1984)
Petitioner: PEOPLE
Respondent: TERESA JALANDONI

Doctrine

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be

filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted.

Facts:
This refers to the MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT as to appellant's civil liability filed
by the BPI, the private complainant.
In one Criminal Case Teresa Jalandoni was accused of estafa. The information
alleged that she issued several checks drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation in favor of BPI and the checks were dishonored for lack of funds, a fact
which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof the BPI suffered
damage.

Trial Court:
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced her to
a penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify BPI representing the
balance of the amount which she swindled from the said bank; and to pay
the costs.

Supreme Court in the criminal case:

The Court ruled that the guilt of the appellant was not demonstrated beyond
reasonable doubt, and the appealed judgment was set aside and another one
is entered acquitting her of the charge.

Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a
Court of Appeals decision People vs. De Castillo, where the court acquitted the
appellant who was accused of malversation of public funds on the ground of
reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay the amount of her civil
liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid
multiplicity of suits.

The appellant opposed the Motion on the following grounds: (a) People vs. de
Castillo is not in point because it was decided under the old Rules of Court; and (b)
the amount of civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires necessarily the
introduction of proof.

Issue:
• Whether or not the Motion to Modify Judgment must be granted
• Whether the amount of civil liability is unsettled and requires the
introduction of proof

Ruling:
1. Yes, the Motion to Modify Judgment is granted and no separate civil action is
required.
On May 31, 1984, the Court En Banc promulgated its decision in the case of Padilla,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals where it held "that the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal." The reason therefor
has been stated thus:
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still
be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact,
exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys
and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a
separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.

Jalandoni's claim that "the amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and
requires necessarily the introduction of proof is utterly devoid of merit. The
appellant has formally admitted that BPI suffered damage in the amount of
P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil liability, if any, is unsettled is an
insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a party to state a fact only to
disown it afterward because of convenience.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby granted; the judgment of this Court is modified
in that the appellant is ordered to pay the Bank of the Philippine Islands the amount
of P1,391,780.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the filing of
the action until paid.
SO ORDERED.
 5. Cea v. Paguio, 397 SCRA 494 (2003)

PETITIONER: ATTY. MELENCIO A. CEA

RESPONDENT: JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC-Br. 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan

DOCTRINE:

The delay in the promulgation of the criminal cases could have been avoided had
respondent judge resorted to the remedy provided in Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is to promulgate the decision in
absentia by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof
served upon counsel of the accused.

FACTS:

Complainant Atty. Melencio A. Cea, in an Affidavit-Complaint, charged Judge

Orlando C. Paguio with violation of the Code of Legal Ethics and The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019).

Complainant’s grievance arose from Crim.inal Cases where the respondent judge
rendered a decision dated 3 July 2000 convicting the complainant's daughter, the
accused in the said criminal cases, on all counts.

The complainant alleged that at the instance of respondent judge they met at a
restaurant to discuss the status of the criminal cases. That the respondent judge
intimated that he would lose the cases and solicited P100,000.00 from him in
exchange for a favorable decision.

True enough, judgment was rendered and promulgated on 4 December 2000

finding complainants daughter guilty as charged.

PETITIONER: That although the decision was dated 3 July 2000, it was only
on 4 December 2000 that the same was promulgated. According to him, the
delay in the promulgation of the judgment was a ruse employed by respondent to
give him time to come up with the required amount.

RESPONDENT: The delayed promulgation on 4 December 2000 of the

decision dated 3 July 2000 was caused not by any devious design on his
part but by the continuous failure of the accused to appear in court for the
promulgation.

ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS GUILTY OF DELAY IN

PROMULGATING HIS DECISION.

RULING: YES.

Respondent has not shown enough justification to stay our hand in exercising
disciplinary powers.

The delay in the promulgation of the criminal cases could have been avoided had
respondent judge resorted to the remedy provided in Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is to promulgate the decision in
absentia by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof
served upon counsel of the accused.

For his inexcusable delay in promulgating the criminal cases, respondent deserves
to be sanctioned as his action is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution, which
enshrines the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.

The Court observes that this is not the first time that respondent judge was made
subject of an administrative proceeding. In another proceeding, he was found guilty
of delay in deciding criminal cases and was accordingly fined.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The Complaint against respondent Judge Orlando C.

Paguio is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, considering the delay
in the promulgation of the consolidated Decision in the criminal cases, respondent
Judge is meted a fine of P3,000.00, the amount to be deducted from whatever
retirement benefits may be due him.
 6. People v. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407 (2011)
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Respondent: PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, P/S INSP. LORIEMAN* L. MANRIQUE, and
RODIE J. PINEDA @ "Buboy," Accused.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, Accused-Appellant.

Doctrine

The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

The fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in view of a credible
eyewitness account or sufficient evidence proving the existence of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

● Charges for kidnapping and illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions

were brought against Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda. Trestiza was acquitted
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
● The Public Prosecutor directed by the judge to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the cases filed a Motion to Withdraw Information of
Kidnapping with Ransom and to Admit Information for Robbery, pointing out
that he found no probable cause to warrant the indictment of the accused for
the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom and added that they should be charged
instead for the crimes of Robbery and Grave Threats.
● Upon a re-assessment and re-evaluation of the evidence presented, the
Prosecution filed a Motion to Resolve (Motion to Withdraw Information of
Kidnapping) and maintained that the correct and appropriate charges to be
filed against accused should be for ROBBERY and GRAVE THREATS but for
two (2) counts each, and NOT for KIDNAPPING as initially filed and prayed for
to allow the withdrawal of the Information for Kidnapping.
● The Public Prosecutor argues in essence that the crime of Kidnapping could
not be possibly committed by the accused as they, except for one, are police
officers, who at the time the complainants were divested of cash and other
personal belongings were conducting a police operation to enforce the
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Law, thus, contrary to the provisions of
Art 276 of the RPC, which provides that any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
● The Court found it unmeritorious and held that even a public officer can
commit the said crime within the context of the aforesaid legal provision.
● The Court denied the Motion to Withdraw Information for Kidnapping and
granted the Motion to Amend Information for Robbery.
● The cases were set for arraignment and the Amended Information for
Robbery was ADMITTED. When the case was called for arraignment, the
accused all pleaded not guilty to all the charges against them.
● Trial ensued and the RTC found them all guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom but were all acquitted for the crime of
robbery.
 ● The accused filed a notice of appeal but the appellate court dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
● Trestiza alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s
decision. In his Motion, Trestiza claimed that he was merely a driver of the
vehicle when the alleged crime took place, he never communicated with the
complainants, and none of the items allegedly taken from the complainants
were recovered from his possession. Under the circumstances, Trestiza
claimed he should be held liable only for Arbitrary Detention.
● The appellate court denied his Motion for Reconsideration but Trestiza still
filed a Notice of Appeal of the appellate court’s decision which the appellate
court initially denied due to late filing, but his Motion for Reconsideration on
the resolution denying his Notice of Appeal was eventually granted.
● Trestiza filed a supplemental brief before the SC and raised the following
argued that it was not sufficiently shown that all the accused conspired in
committing the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and the same was not
proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that he had no malicious or evil
intent in acquiescing to drive the vehicle used in the buy-bust operation and
that he is innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

ISSUE:

WON there is a variance between the offense charged by the RTC (kidnapping with
ransom) and the offense proved (arbitrary detention) contemplated in Sec. 4 of
Rule 120

RATIO:

NO.

In fact, in this case, the offense charged and the offense proved are one and the
same.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ‒ Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount
of time spent in determining whether kidnapping for ransom was the proper crime
charged against the accused, especially since Trestiza and Manrique were both
police officers. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code specifically stated that the
crime should be committed by a private individual.

The trial court settled the matter by citing the ruling in People v. Santiano, thus:

The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and
appellant Sandigan a member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal
liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the
victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of official functions nor in
the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their
office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with
their co-appellant Santiano and Chanco.

Thus, even a public officer can commit the said crime within the context of
the aforesaid legal provision. This is settled in our jurisprudence.

Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B. Regalado elucidates on this point clearly:

This article provides that the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are
committed by private individuals obviously because if the offender is a public officer
the crime is arbitrary detention under Art. 124, but passing sub silentio on the
matter of kidnapping. It should be understood however, that the public
officer who unlawfully detains another and is punishable by Art. 124 is one
who has the duty to apprehend a person with a correlative power to detain
him. If he is only an employee with clerical or postal functions, although
the Code considers him as a public officer, his detention of the victim is
illegal detention under this article since he is acting in a private, and not an
official, capacity. If a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when legally
authorized as part of police operations, he cannot also be said to be acting
in an official capacity, hence he is to be treated as a private individual
liable under this article.

In the present case, the trial court asked for further evidence which
support the defense’s claim of holding a legitimate police operation.
However, the trial court found as unreliable the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet
was not authenticated, and the signatories were not presented to attest to
its existence and authenticity.

The second to the last paragraph of Article 267 prescribes the penalty of death
when the extortion of ransom was the purpose of the kidnapping. Yu and Navarro
were released only after they were able to give various personal effects as well as
cash amounting to P300,000, with the promise to give the balance of P1,000,000 at
a later date.

Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the Mitsubishi
Adventure van but Yu testified otherwise. The appellate court’s assessment was
correct, that Trestiza’s acts were far from just being a mere driver. The series of
events that transpired before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than
shows that Trestiza acted in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.