Imagine that in the company or organization of your choice there is a conflict of interest between

the majority shareholder and the CEO. You, an impartial outside consultant, should present a
report to the Chairman of the Board of Directors detailing the situation and its implications based
on two assumptions:
That the shareholder and the CEO will only be looking out for their own interests and are not
willing to cooperate for the good of the company or organization.
That both actors wish to cooperate despite their conflict of interest.

To do so, it applies at least two game theory models (prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes,
coordination game, game of chicken, etc.) to model both scenarios.

Includes the following:

At least two matrices (or decision trees) of games and the analysis of each (substantiates and
documents the calculation and development of each).

The conclusion reached after applying each game model.

To perform the first problem we will use the problem of the established closing time, for this case
both will be willing to cooperate despite their interests.

In this example, the battle of the sexes model will be used.

Battle of the sexes matrix:

Leoponcio General Manager

Early closing Late closing
Angel Early
1;1 1;2
majority closing
shareholde
r Late closing 2;1 2;2

In this problem both are looking for the best for the company, they will be separating their
personal interests and will be looking for the best solution for the company.

In the first one the early closing of the establishment is evaluated, the general manager knows
that his salary will invariably be the same whether the closing time is early or late but he seeks the
improvement of the establishment so he keeps his decision neutral and is interested in the early
closing but he knows that it is better to maintain a late closing time, since the sales of the
establishment will be higher and therefore its growth can be even more noticeable.

The second option evaluates the late closing of the establishment, for this option the majority
shareholder, shows data in which the sales of the company are better for the schedule in which it
is being managed, so he argues his decision to keep the closing time as high as possible but always
taking care of the schedules of workers to have high sales, that the staff is happy and that they can
also earn more by spending more time in the establishment, the CEO, although he knows that his
departure time would be a little later, he knows that his profits and growth would be higher and so
he decides to support the idea of closing time a little later.The general manager, although he
knows that his departure time would be a little later, knows that his profits and growth would be
greater and therefore decides to support the idea of closing time a little later so that the company
can obtain more profits and have growth in a shorter time.

Decision: The decision, since both are cooperative in this case would be for the closing time to be
set somewhat later and for both parties to be happy to be able to come to an agreement.

For this next example, now solved by Nash equilibrium, the same problem of whether the closing
will be early or late is established, but with the variant of whether the CEO should stay or leave
and delegate activities, in this example both will be looking out for their own interests.

To represent this problem we have the following matrix:

Leoponcio General Manager

Stay at Leaving early and delegating
Angel Early
3;8 3;2
majority closing
shareholde
r Late closing 6;5 8;5

The options shown are to close early and stay until closing, close early and leave early and
delegate activities, close late and stay, close late to leave early and delegate.

A point of equilibrium is shown between the decisions taken by Angel, in these we obtain that his
point of equilibrium will be the box where the number 6 is shown, after that we look for the point
of equilibrium for Leoponcio, in this we find that there is a point of equilibrium in two boxes and
that we could choose any of them.

In this game, the factors of number of sales, profit percentage, salary, personnel would come into
play.

Decision: the mediator has the last decision and makes a study for the relationship of the closing
hours, so he decides to establish the late closing time taking into account the decision of the
majority shareholder but in turn decides that the general manager will not be but only a couple of
extra hours to his normal schedule and after that he will be able to delegate his tasks freely, these
hours will be with an extra payment, so both parties are benefited and can have a mutual benefit,
one in his rest time and salary and the other in his profits on the establishment.