Schenkerian Theory's Empiricist Image

MARK DEBELLIS

Drawing on logical positivism and recent philosophy, Matthew Brown, Douglas Dempster, and
Dave Headlam interpret Schenkerian theory as empirical science. They view the theory as a gen-
erative system. An empirical theory of music would have the virtue of being intersubjective and
grounded in sense experience. But Brown et al. do not specify a generative system in terms explicit
or rigorous enough to yield a theory that is observationally adequate. Their test of the #IV(W)
Hypothesis, which relies on the notion of a plausible interpretation, is inconsistent with the generative-
system view. Because that view does not account for what it is for an analysis to be correct or incor-
rect, it fails as a rational reconstruction. If Schenkerian theory is empirical, then its analytical terms
should be regarded not as theoretical, but as observational. That construal is plausible, however, only
if theorists' arrival at judgments about structure is best explained on the hypothesis that the works
really do have that structure.

Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015

Keywords: Schenker, empiricism, metatheory, science, philosophy

B OTH INDIVIDUALLY AND IN VARIOUS COMBINATIONS,

Matthew Brown, Douglas Dempster, and Dave Headlam
have argued that Schenkerian theory is an empirical,
scientific theory of the kind outlined in positivist or logical-
empiricist philosophy.1 The question of whether Schenkerian
theory is empirical is foundational and important, and we are
indebted to Brown et al. for raising it. In this article I shall ex-
amine the claim and their arguments for it, and point out some
difficulties with their interpretation. I shall go on to suggest—
with some caveats—that, if Schenkerian theory is. indeed to be
understood as empirical and scientific, then we should con-
ceive of analyses and their theoretical role in a way different
from that of Brown et al.
I. BROWN ET AL.'S INTERPRETATION OF SCHENKERIAN
THEORY AS EMPIRICAL
Brown et al.'s conception of empirical science stems from a
movement known as logical empiricism, or logical positivism,
which included such figures as Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap,
Otto Neurath (all members of the Vienna Circle), and Hans
Reichenbach.2 Brown et al.'s assimilation of Schenkerian theory
to this framework is offered not as exegesis, but as rational recon-
struction.3 Following empiricist tenets, Brown et al. understand
I am indebted to Joseph Dubiel and Dmitri Tymoczko for advice and
criticism.
Brown (2005, 1-25), Brown et al. (1997), Brown (1997, 340-341), Demp-
ster and Brown (1990, 256-260), and Brown and Dempster (1989, 85-92).
2 For useful background, see Ray (2000), Salmon (2000), Passmore (1967),
and Suppe (1977, 3-56). Some writers treat the terms "logical empiricism"
and "logical positivism" as synonymous, though others, e.g. Salmon, do not;
I draw no distinction.
3 Brown et al. (1997, 156, Note 2), citing Brown (1989). For the notion of
rational reconstruction, see Carnap (1967, v), and, for useful discussion,
Beaney (2004, 125-28).
an empirical theory to be one that is testable, that is, it makes
predictions that may confirm or disconfirm it.4 Such predictions
are based on laws, or "law-like generalization[s]."5 (Laws are an
essential element in Carl Hempel's deductive-nomological
model of scientific explanation, on which model Brown et al. lay
great, perhaps excessive, emphasis.6) In addition, Brown et al.
take Schenkerian theory to be (at least approximately) empiri-
cally adequate,7 which is to say that it makes true, and only true,
predictions.
More specifically, Brown et al. regard Schenkerian theory as
a generative system, or, rather, as a theory based on such a sys-
tem. In their view, Schenkerian theory "claims that any piece of
music is tonal if and only if it is derivable within [a certain axi-
omatic] system."8 In that system, "any complete, continuous,
functional monotonal piece can be generated from a single pro-
totype by the recursive application of certain transformations",9
moreover, the system generates "all and only" such pieces.1°
Brown et al.'s conception of Schenkerian theory is, then, es-
sentially that of an (at least) observationally adequate generative
grammar. A grammar for a language is observationally adequate
if it generates all and only the sentences of the language, that is,
utterances that would be judged grammatical by a qualified
4 Brown (2005, 12); Brown and Dempster (1990, 69); cf. Hempel (1965, 3).
5 Brown and Dempster (1989, 69); cf. Hempel (1965, 264-65). Not all em-
pirical theories need be scientific, but Brown et al. do not put much weight
on the distinction, and neither shall I, or at least not until the last section
of this article.
6 Brown and Dempster (1989, 68-69 and 96). In Hempel's deductive-nomo-
logical model, an event is explained by deducing its occurrence from laws
and initial conditions (or other particular facts); see Hempel (1965, 232
and 336).
7 Brown and Dempster (1989, 88 and 92-93).
8 Ibid. (88).
9 Brown (2005, 91).
Ibid. (12 and 67).

III
 II2 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 32 (20I0)
B: tonal, not generated
• I A: generated, not tonal
n 1
Tonal Generated
EXAMPLE I. A generative system that is not observationally adequate
EXAMPLE 2. An observationally adequate generative system
speaker. 11 In the case of Schenkerian theory, the property of
being tonal—or, more precisely, the property of being judged
tonal by qualified listeners—corresponds to grammaticality.
Brown et al.'s view is equivalent to the claim, then, that
Schenkerian theory is observationally adequate, reading "tonal"
for "grammatical." 12
Notice that there are two ways in which a theory of tonality
could fail to be observationally adequate: it could generate a
piece that is not tonal (Example 1 [see A] ), or fail to generate
one that is (Example 1 [see B]). In Brown et al.'s view of
Schenkerian theory, the system does not fail in either of those
ways: everything that it generates is tonal, and every tonal piece
is generated (see Example 2). Thus construed, Schenkerian
theory is straightforwardly empirical: it predicts that a piece will
be judged tonal by qualified listeners if, and only if, it can be
generated by the grammar.
II On the issue of observational adequacy I follow Allerton (1979, 60-61),
and Botha (1980, 218). The term originated with Chomsky (1964, 28-29).
I say "at least" because, as a referee for this journal pointed out, Brown et al.
may well conceive of Schenkerian theory as adequate in a stronger sense,
that of descriptive adequacy. It is not necessary to adjudicate the question
because observational adequacy is implied by descriptive adequacy, and the
weaker notion is sufficient for present purposes.
12 To be sure, Brown and Dempster (1989, 88) grant that there can be bor-
derline cases, so the claim might be more accurately stated: Schenkerian
theory is at least approximately observationally adequate. I pass over this
complication.
POSTULATES
PRIMITIVE
CONCEPTS
i
1 1 DEFINED
CONCEPTS
EMPIRICAL
1 CONCEPTS
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
"SOIL" of
OBSERVATION
(EXPERIENCE)
EXAMPLE 3. The positivist picture of a scientc theory.
Reproduced by permission from Feigl (1970, 6). 1970
University of Minnesota Press
2. THE EMPIRICIST CONCEPTION OF MEANING
But why should we regard it as a good thing if a theory of
music is empirical? It is in part because empirical theories are
"testable" and "explanatory," but the reason runs deeper. It lies in
the fact that empiricism is centrally concerned with meaning.
Empiricism begins with the thought that the content of our
ideas is derived from sense experience. Language, then, is
grounded in experience: the meaning of an expression is derived
from the sense experiences that give rise to its use. Some expres-
sions, such as "That's red," are connected more or less directly to
experience; others, such as "That's an electron," are indirect.
It follows, then, that a scientific theory has a structure, one
that is determined by the relation between theoretical constructs
such as "electron," on the one hand, and data—what is given,
observable, or available to sense experience, comprising the
theory's epistemological starting point—on the other. In the
picture of a scientific theory advanced by the early positivists, a
theory contains, in addition to data, two components: the "pure
calculus," or theoretical apparatus in the form of an axiomatic
system, and bridge principles. 13 The pure calculus makes state-
ments about some class of entities posited by the theory, and
can be thought of as "hovering" over the data (see Example 3).
The bridge principles connect the pure calculus to the data.
By virtue of that connection, meaning "seeps up" from observ-
ables to theoretical terms.
Feigl (1970, 5-7); Suppe (1977, 16-27); Hempel (1970b, 142).
 SCHENKERIAN THEORY'S EMPIRICIST IMAGE
As an example, consider electrical experiments and their re-
lation to physics. Physics asserts laws governing subatomic par-
ticles such as electrons: those laws are the pure calculus. Bridge
principles allow us to infer, from those laws and auxiliary hy-
potheses about electrons in a wire, conclusions about pointer
readings on a voltmeter. It is in virtue of such inferential con-
nections that statements about electrons have an empirical
meaning. This example serves to illustrate the positivists' view
that statements about theoretical entities are meaningful inso-
far, but only insofar, as they predict and explain observables.
But why were the positivists so concerned with meaning?
Influenced by Wittgenstein, they thought that many apparent
philosophical problems, such as abstruse questions of meta-
physics, were only "pseudoproblems" resulting from the misuse
oflanguage. Hence they wanted to state conditions that must be
satisfied for discourse to be "cognitively meaningful." Carnap
branded claims about the Hegelian Absolute and Heidegger's
dictum that "The Nothing itself nothings" as "metaphysical
pseudo-statements":14 positivists regarded such statements as
strictly meaningless, because their truth or falsity could rnake no
observable difference to experience. They endorsed a doctrine
known as the verification theory of meaning, which was ex-
pressed in the slogan, advanced by Moritz Schlick, "The mean-
ing of a proposition is its rnethod of verification."15 According
to Schlick, "Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stat-
ing the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and
this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or
falsified)."16 The empiricists saw the verification theory as a
powerful principle that could be used to distinguish science
from metaphysics.17
As empiricism developed, the notion of verification or falsi-
fication of any conclusive sort gave way to that of confirmation
or disconfirmation, or evidence that was favorable or unfavor-
able, though not necessarily conclusive.18 In connection with
science, the empiricist principle came to be that sentences using
"theoretical" terms (e.g., "electron") get their meaning from the
"observation" sentences (e.g., "There's a cloud trail") that, in the
context of the theory, they imply.19
The notion of bridge principles, and of the work they were
meant to do in linking theoretical entities and observables, also
underwent change as empiricism developed. At a very early
stage, each theoretical term was held to receive an explicit
14 Carnap (1959, 69-73). For another example, see Ayer (1946, 36).
Schlick (1936, 341). See also Carnap (1936, 37); Ayer (1946, 5-16) and
Chapter I; and Suppe (1977, 13). As Reichenbach (1938, 46-49) points
out, there is an affinity between positivist conceptions of meaning and
those of pragmatists.
16 Schlick (1936, 341).
17 This line of thought can be traced back to Hume, who wrote, ca. 1748: "If we
take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance;
let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of 'act and
existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but
sophistry and Hume ([1748] 1993, 114, italics are Hume's).
18 Carnap (1936, 420-22), Hempel (1965, 3-4).
19 Feigl (1970, 5-7).
113
definition in terms of observables: in P. W. Bridgman's view as
explicated by Frederick Suppe, each concept was to be given an
C`operational definition,"2° for example, length or mass was de-
fined in terms of certain operations of measurement. Over time,
this requirement was seen to be too restrictive and was relaxed
to the requirement that theoretical terms be "partially inter-
preted" through links to observables.21 Eventually, the notion of
bridge principles as distinguishable from the rest of the theory
was called into question. In W. V. Quine's view, which is more
or less a natural outgrowth of logical empiricism, we find, in-
stead of Herbert Feigl's vertical arrangement, the metaphor of a
web or fabric with theoretical constructs at the center and ob-
servables at the periphery. In Quine, the unit of meaning is not
the term or sentence, but the theory, which "face[s] the tribunal
of sense experience" as a whole.22
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
One key requirement of empiricism is worth emphasizing. A
theory is not empirical if it is compatible with any observation
whatever, that is, if it cannot in principle be disconfirmed. An
empirical theory admits certain observable consequences and
rules out others. A statement that excludes nothing is a tautol-
ogy; it does not "say anything about the world."23 This point was
developed by Karl Popper, who emphasized falsifiability, in con-
trast to verifiability, as a mark of science.24 A theory is falsifiable
if it is possible for there to be evidence that would show it to be
false. This does not mean that such evidence actually exists; it is
sufficient if we can clearly grasp what would count as evidence.
Popper wrote, "A theory which is not refutable by any conceiv-
able event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a the-
ory (as people often think) but a vice."25 Astrology, Popper
argued, makes predictions so vague as to be unfalsifiable, since
any outcome whatever could be shoehorned into accordance
with them. For that reason, astrology is not science. Popper ar-
gued that psychoanalytic theory was in much the same boat.26
There is one further, crucial matter we need to take up,
which is the vocabulary of observation reports. Hempel de-
scribes two alternative ways of conceiving of that vocabulary: a
phenomenalistic conception on which "experiential data [con-
sist of] sensations, perceptions, and similar phenomena of im-
mediate experience," and one on which the data are physical
facts "accessible to direct observation, such as the coincidence of
the pointer of an instrument with a numbered mark on a dial."27
In the first, the data are sensations; in the second, they are
zo Suppe (1977, 18-19).
21 Ibid. (22-23).
22 Quine (1961, 41-43), Quine (1960, 11); cited in Brown (2005, 15). Quine
is to be regarded as a later empiricist, not a positivist.
23 Ayer (1959, 12). For this notion of a tautology see Wittgenstein (1972,
68-69), and, for a worry about a tautology in Schenker, Kerman (1985, 82),
cited in Brown et al. (1997, 156, Note 4).
24 Popper (1959, §6, 17-20).
25 Popper (1989, 36).
26 Ibid. (34-38).
27 Hempel (1970a, 673-74); for discussion, see Bogen (2009). Brown and
Dempster (1989, 70-71) suggest that logical positivism commits one to
phenomenalism, but it does not; cf. Carnap's remarks in Schilpp, ed. (1963,
50 and 870).
 114 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 32 (2010)
physical objects. Since sensations are necessarily private to, or
accessible only by, the individual who has them, whereas physi-
cal objects can be observed by several individuals, the latter con-
ception has the advantage (as Hempel tells us) of explaining the
objectivity of scientific discourse. It explains how scientists
mean the same things by their terms when they talk to each
other, and hence how they are genuinely able to communicate.
Since there is intersubjective, or public, agreement on the mean-
ing of observation terms, 28 and since the meanings of theoreti-
cal statements are rooted ultimately in observables in (at least
approximately) the same way for different speakers, the mean-
ings of theoretical statements are likewise intersubjective.
Because the physical-object conception of the observational vo-
cabulary explains this, I assume it in what follows.
3. WHY WE SHOULD CARE WHETHER OR NOT
A MUSIC THEORY IS EMPIRICAL
What relevance can the empiricist conception of meaning
have for music theory? Empiricism is given work to do when we
adopt a critical attitude toward a concept. By a critical attitude I
mean one in which we do not take the meaning of the word or
expression for granted, but ask what that meaning could consist
in. Suppose, for example, in the context of casual conversation
you and I take up the question of whether or not intelligence is
inherited. As is well known, the meaning of the word "intelli-
gence" is multivalent and vague. (By now, some people have re-
sorted to defining intelligence as whatever intelligence tests
measure. But there are different kinds of intelligence.) It is pos-
sible that one or both of us might fail to attach any clear meaning
to the word, or we might attach different meanings. If either of
those possibilities holds, then, when one of us says, "Intelligence
is inherited," and the other says, "Intelligence is not inherited," we
are not actually disagreeing about anything. For that matter, if we
appear to agree about intelligence but fail to attach the same
meaning to it, we are not agreeing either! We adopt a critical at-
titude toward the concept when we recognize this possibility and
ask, "What exactly do we mean by intelligence?" We answer this
question in an empiricist spirit if we insist that intelligence must
be specified in terms of what can be measured or observed, for
example, by reference to behavior. In so doing, we associate the
same empirical meaning with "intelligence," and this may pro-
mote genuine communication between us.
To take another example from psychology, Freudian theory
postulates the existence of unconscious desires. We may be
moved to ask: What might it mean to say that a person desires
something unconsciously? An empiricist will insist that there is
no real content to this notion until it is connected, by bridge
principles, to statements about possible behavior (such as a slip
of the tongue).
There is good reason for the adoption of a critical attitude
toward the concepts of Schenkerian theory. A central tenet of
that theory is that a piece has a structure of a certain kind. But
28 Hempel (1965, 127 and 178-79).
what sort of fact is that? In what does this fact consist? What
exactly do we assert or deny when we attribute a certain struc-
ture to a piece? What, if anything, are theorists who disagree
about the structure of a piece disagreeing about? Answers to
these questions are not obvious. This is evidenced by the "dark
suspicions" aired by Joseph Kerman and others, 29 which point
out the need for clarification of the content of Schenkerian
concepts. It is evidenced also by Joseph Dubiel's remark, "The
hardest thing in this business . . . is knowing what to introspect
for in order to tell whether you're having the experience that is
supposed to go with some analytical description of a passage." 3 °
Dubiel's remark suggests that the meanings of Schenkerian
terms, even if they are about experiences, are far from transpar-
ent. Such considerations motivate a critical attitude toward
Schenkerian concepts.
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
Empiricism, in turn, provides a way of answering those ques-
tions. If—following Brown et al. we construe Schenkerian
theory in terms of a generative grammar, then we can say that
what it is for a piece to have a certain structure is that a correct
grammar, one that generates all and only tonal pieces, assigns
that structure to it. The structure of a piece, in this view, is just
the structure that a successful theory associates with it, where
the criterion of success is the prediction of listeners' judgments
about what is tonal or non-tonal.
4. PROBLEMS WITH BROWN ET AL.'S INTERPRETATION
But is Brown et al.'s interpretation of Schenkerian theory a
plausible one? 31 If one is going to say that a theory is empirical,
then one has to be clear on two fronts: what the data are, and
how the theory predicts the data. Insofar as Brown et al. inter-
pret Schenkerian theory as a generative grammar, the first point
would seem, at least at first glance, not to be too much of an
issue: the data are judgments about whether or not a piece or
passage is tonal. 32 I shall argue, however, that it is obscure in
Brown et al.'s account what theoretical apparatus predicts the
data, or how it predicts them. Furthermore, Brown et al.'s own
presentation of their view is inconsistent: their procedure for
testing what they call the #IV(W) Hypothesis does not mesh
with the generative-grammar view and points to a misunder-
standing of empiricist principles. This inconsistency, however,
provides a clue to a better understanding of the theoretical func-
tion of analytical terms.
The claim that a theory is an observationally adequate gen-
erative system will not remain plausible for long, absent some
explicit statement of what that system is, one rigorous and de-
tailed enough for us to tell what is or is not generated by it. 33
We cannot tell if a theory is observationally adequate if we do
29 Brown et al. (1997, 156).
3o Dubiel (1996, 31).
31 One issue I shall pass over is the question of whether or not "tonal" is
observational. It is a crucial assumption of the generative-system view, but
I do not take it up here.
32 I shall register some caveats below.
33 Brown et al. (1997, 158, Note 14).
 SCHENKERIAN THEORY'S EMPIRICIST IMAGE
not know what it is. Brown and Dempster mention Michael
Kassler's formalization of Schenkerian theory, 34 but they pro-
vide no argument that it is observationally adequate, and I have
never seen any evidence that it is. Brown and Dempster do not
give an explicit formulation of a generative system rigorous
enough to be tested for empirical adequacy. 35 As far as I am
aware, no one has. Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff explain
why they did not undertake the project of reconstructing
Schenkerian theory as a generative grammar; 36 the complexity
of their own system is an indication of what would be involved
in the task.
There is another problem. In their article on the #IV(1,V)
Hypothesis, Brown et al. claim to subject Schenkerian theory
to empirical test, but their procedure is not in line with the
generative-grammar view. Brown et al. say that they are test-
ing a claim about where the boundary between tonal and non-
tonal music lies, which they call the #IV(1,V) Hypothesis. This
hypothesis states that if a piece is tonal, it will contain no "di-
rect and unmediated succession from I to #IV or t,V", at most,
it will contain some indirect relationship between I to #IV or
1,V. For convenience, I will abbreviate "direct and unmediated
succession from I to #IV or 1,V" to "T-succession"; the hypoth-
esis can thus be formulated:
#IV(6V) Hypothesis: No tonal piece contains a T-succession.
Brown et al. argue that, though Schenker never explicitly for-
mulated the Hypothesis, "scattered remarks" indicate that it is
suggested by Schenkerian theory. 37 Hence, according to Brown
et al., by testing the Hypothesis, we test Schenkerian theory.
Brown et al.'s test of the Hypothesis considers several ex-
amples: Chopin's Etude in F major, Op. 25, No. 3; Beethoven's
String Quartet No. 7 in F major, Op. 59, No. 1, II; Brahms's
Ein deutsches Requiem, Op. 45, II; Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique,
Op. 14, III: "March to the Scaffold"; Schubert's "Totengdbers
Heimweh," D. 842; Debussy's Images Pour Orchestre, III: Rondes
de printemps, Berg's "Nun ich der Riesen Sdrksten berwand,"
Op. 2, No. 3; Bartók's Mikrokosmos, Book 4, No. 100; and
Webern's "Dies ist een Lied far dich allein," Op. 3, No. 1. Their
basic strategy is:
to search . . . for examples in which direct relationships between I
and #IV or 6V seem to occur, then examine them for plausible inter-
pretations as indirect relationships. 38
Alternatively, an example can be classified as not tonal, or "not
entirely tonal." The testing method consists, then, in attempting
to demonstrate that putative counterexamples, pieces that appear
both to be tonal and to contain a T-succession, are not genuine
counterexamples, by arguing either that, despite appearances,
they are not tonal, or that they cannot be plausibly interpreted as
containing a T-succession (but, at most, indirect relationships).
34 Brown and Dempster (1989, 88), citing Kassier (1968) and (1977).
35 Nor does Brown (2005).
36 Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983, 111-12).
37 Brown et al. (1997, 160-62 and 170).
38 Ibid. (182).
115
Brown et al.'s test produces the following results. The Chopin,
Beethoven, and Brahms examples can plausibly be interpreted
in terms of indirect relationships. (The Chopin and Brahms ex-
amples are particularly challenging, since extant analyses by
Felix Salzer and Allen Forte represent them as T-successions.)
The Berlioz is tonal, but with qualifications. The Schubert can
be analyzed in terms of indirect relationships—though Brown
et al. acknowledge that the interpretation is "strained"—or
deemed ambiguous. Of the remaining examples, the Debussy
and Berg are plausibly interpreted in terms of indirect relation-
ships, and the Bartók and Webern are not tonal. 39 Hence, no
counterexamples (except perhaps, if I read Brown et al. right,
the Schubert).
But this testing procedure makes no sense if the theory is a
generative system. The notion of a plausible interpretation, in-
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
voked to support the claim that a piece contains no direct rela-
tionships, has no role to play in such a system. If a generative
system is tested empirically, then the question is not whether a
given structural description is plausible, but whether the piece is
generated by the system.
In order to subject a generative system to empirical test, one
must compare its output with the data in order to see whether
it generates what it is supposed to. This requires, in turn, an ex-
plicit formulation of the generative mechanism—the grammar
so that it is clear what the system does or does not generate. As
we have noted already, no such formulation is to be found in the
writings of Brown et al., or any other writer on Schenkerian
theory.
In order to remedy this indeterminacy, I think, Brown et al.
appeal to the notion of a plausible interpretation. But in doing
so they invoke a hermeneutical paradigm rather than an em-
pirical or scientific one. The notion of plausibility, however im-
portant it may be in the practice of interpretation, cannot
legitimately be brought in as part of an empirical test of a gen-
erative system, since that notion—or our intuitions about what
is plausible—would then be doing the work that the theory it-
self should be doing. A theory is supposed to formulate, explic-
itly, the principles of some domain. A generative grammar is a
kind of machine meant to encapsulate such principles. We test
our attempt to formulate those principles by comparing the
grammar's output with what we intuitively take to be tonal. If
output and intuitions agree, then the theory is confirmed; oth-
erwise not. Insofar as that output needs to be filtered further by
intuitions about what interpretations are or are not plausible,
the theory has failed to make the principles explicit; hence fil-
tering the output in that way defeats the purpose of a test. An
empirical theory must be tested by examining its predictions
just as they are; we should not be allowed to pick and choose
only those we like. To do so would violate the principles of em-
piricism, and of good science.
The right way to test whether a generative system is obser-
vationally adequate is to examine its output and see if it gener-
ates all and only tonal pieces. The salient worry, it seems to me,
39 Ibid. (170-80).
 116 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 32 (2010)
is that the grammar might generate too much: it might produce
a non-tonal surface, perhaps after sufficiently deep nesting of
the operations. In order to tell whether it does, we would need
definitions of the relevant operations that specify exactly which
pairs of passages belong to them. Only then would we be able
to tell whether the operations are degned in a way that is inclu-
sive enough to allow all tonal pieces, yet restrictive enough to
exclude nested or iterated operations sufficiently complex to de-
stroy a sense of tonality. Doubt whether this could be done is
raised by the Schubert example, where Brown et al. have it both
ways: though the passage can plausibly be argu' ed to be non-
tonal, the system generates a structural description that repre-
sents it as tonal. This is just one example, of course, but Brown
et al. give us no reason to think that the problem is not systemic.
If Schenkerian theory is a generative system, then the way to
test it is to try to break it. Let it crank away, and see if it gener-
ates any surfaces that are not intuitively tonal. (The intuitions to
be tapped here are intuitions about whether a piece is tonal, not
whether an analysis is plausible.) If "indirect" relations between
I and #IV or W are nested to many levels, will we still intuitively
find a passage tonal? An aggressive search for counterexamples,
one that actively looks for possible weaknesses in the system, is
a better test than the examination of a few examples. Only in
the context of such a search are confirming instances apt to be
significant. We might initially think that counterexamples could
be generated in a certain way; but if we found to our surprise
that they could not, this would tell us something. As Popper
writes, "Confirmations should count only if they are the result
of riskypredictions."4° I recommend, then, a Popperian approach,
one that puts the emphasis on falsification.
That Brown et al. do not test the theory in a way consistent
with their construal of it as generative and empirical does not,
of course, prove that it is not generative or empirical. However,
their appeal to the notion of a plausible interpretation suggests
that, despite themselves, they take Schenkerian theory to be
fundamentally a hermeneutical rather than empirical enterprise.
Before we turn away from Brown et al., we should observe
one more problem with their argument: they misconstrue dif-
ferent empirical hypotheses as different degrees of confirmation.
They write,
We have claimed that the hypothesis is confirmed . . . because
our aural intuitions of tonal coherence or incoherence seem to cor-
relate with the relative ease of finding, through analysis, indirect
relations between the tonic and the #IV or W events.
This sort of analytic test is, however, only weak confirmation of
the hypothesis. That some indirect relation between the tonic and
#IV or [,\T can be found or constructed through analysis proves only
the possibility that a qualified auditor could conceivably be parsing
the piece in a way that inaintained its tonal coherence. It does not
prove that qualified auditors actually do so parse the piece or that
the mere analytical possibility of so parsing the piece is in fact an
aural possibility. In other words, however strongly the analytical
evidence confirms the hypothesis, none of it shows that the #IV(W)
Hypothesis describes a psychological reality of qualified auditors.41
40 Popper (1989, 36). Italics are Popper's.
41 Brown et al. (1997, 182).
Here, Brown et al. invoke a supposed distinction between
‘`weak confirmation," which the #IV(W) Hypothesis is said to
receive from a certain correlation of intuitions and "ease" of
analytical discovery, and "strong confirmation," which concerns
psychological reality and parsing.42
This formulation betrays a basic misunderstanding of the
guiding ideas of empiricism. What Brown et al. are talking
about are not two different ways of confirming the same hy-
pothesis, but two different hypotheses. One hypothesis says that
certain relationships can be found in tonal Music through anal-
ysis. The other says that certain relationships are grasped or
mentally represented by auditors. These are quite different hy-
potheses, and empiricism readily captures the difference, in that
very different things would confirm them. A hypothesis about
T-succession confirmed through analysis is not a hypothesis
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
about "parsing" at all; any claim about parsing would be a dis-
tinct claim and would be confirmed in a much different way.
This is not mere hair-splitting because, on the empiricist con-
ception of meaning, the meaning of "That's a T-succession" is a
matter of what can count as evidence for the claim: the very iden-
tity of the hypothesis depends on what data are relevant to it.
(The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification.) Different
empirical connections, different conceptions of T-succession,
different hypotheses. If we are concerned to show that the #IV(W)
Hypothesis is empirical, we must fix a steady gaze on it, and
avoid confusion with other hypotheses.
Brown et al. allege that the fact that indirect relations can be
found or constructed through analysis "proves . . . the possibility
that a qualified auditor could conceivably be parsing the piece in
a way that maintained its tonal coherence." But if this means
that finding indirect relations through analysis provides evi-
dence that qualified auditors parse the piece in a corresponding
way, then why should we think that? The idea that parsing and
analyzing are somehow connected is certainly an interesting
empirical claim, but what is the evidence for it? This is precisely
an area in which empirical research would be relevant, but
Brown et al. cite none. In the absence of such evidence, the
analytical results prove nothing whatsoever about "parsing." The
claim that they do is no more than wishful thinking, and quite
unempirical.43
42 Ibid. As I read Brown et al., "parsing" is something that the qualified audi-
tor does even when he or she does not undertake analysis of the music, but
listens at a less reflective level.
43 Another departure from empiricisrn might be mentioned in passing. An
empirical theory starts with a notion of the data or the phenomena to be
explained. For the data we get, at various points in Brown et al.'s texts, a
wide array of candidates: properties of tonal surfaces, the property of being
tonal, and auditors' "judgments about closure, completion, openness, sta-
bility, transition, goal-directedness," and so on (Brown et al. [1997, 157—
58]). See also Brown and Dempster (1989, 88) and Brown (2005, 4). This
inclusivity is not a virtue, but represents a certain indecisiveness, for with-
out a clear conception of precisely what constitute the data, and of how
the theoretical concepts link up with them (via bridge principles, or in
some other way), we do not have a tenable empiricist construal of Schen-
kerian theory.
 SCHENKERIAN THEORY ' S EMPIRICIST IMAGE
Brown et al.'s invocation of the notion of a plausible inter-
pretation betrays, I think, the real problem with their construal
of Schenkerian theory as a generative grammar. Their notion of
a plausible interpretation is basically a foreign element in the
generative-grammar framework. Indeed, Brown points to this
very problem:
[G]iven the complexity of most functional monotonal pieces, we have
every reason to suppose that there may be more than one way to de-
rive a particular surface from a given prototype, provided that each
derivational scheme follows the prescribed laws. In practice, however,
it is clear that Schenker endorsed some derivations and not others."
The generative-system model, then, does not capture certain
distinctions between analyses significant to Schenker and
Schenkerians. Such distinctions, or at least many of them, are
not just peripheral to Schenkerian theory, but are centrally im-
portant. They ought to be captured on any adequate rational
reconstruction. If they are not, that is a defect of the reconstruc-
tion. The generative-system model does not distinguish be-
tween certain analyses that Schenker "endorsed," and others
that he did not or would not have endorsed. Or, to put it more
simply, it does not fully capture the distinction between correct
and incorrect analyses.
In what is perhaps an attempt to remedy this defect, Brown
goes on to state the need to find "criteria" for determining which
derivations, out of all those permitted by the laws, are "preferable"
(i.e., correct). One important such criterion, he tells us, is the
principle of "hidden repetitions," or parallelism between levels. 45
But there are two problems with this response. First, it
seems unlikely that the principle of hidden repetition can adju-
dicate more than a few cases in which we should wish to make
a distinction between correct and incorrect analyses. Indeed,
nothing seems to rule out the possibility that there are cases
(though I shall not attempt to construct one here) in which
some unprepossessing piece is better analyzed in a way that
does not involve hidden repetition, than in some artificial, con-
voluted way that does."
Second and more important, it is a mystery what "preferable"
might even mean, or how the additional "criteria" would be mo-
tivated, within the framework of a generative system. In such a
framework, the very notion of the correctness of a structural
description depends on that of the predictive success of the
theory as a whole. Within that paradigm, there is no basis for
"endorsing one analysis over another, if each is generated by a
"
theory that successfully predicts the data. (For at bottom, all
there is to a scientific statement's being true, according to em-
piricism, is that it predicts the data.) But then it would seem
that, from the standpoint of the generative-grammar frame-
work, any additional "criteria" would be ad hoc.
44 Brown (2005, 91). In saying that we have "reason to suppose" this, Brown
oddly distances himself from the theory; presumably it is a fact that can be
checked straightforwardly by computation.
45 Brown (2005, 91-92).
46 Brown (2005, 92) attributes to Milton Babbitt the claim that the principle
of hidden repetition is both normative and explanatory, but it is hard to see
how it can be both.
117
5. SCHENKERIAN ANALYSES AS OBSERVATION SENTENCES
It would be a good thing if Schenkerian theory were empiri-
cal, but Brown et al.'s construal of it as a generative system is
unsatisfactory. Can the claim that it is empirical be salvaged?
Can it be salvaged in a way, moreover, that gives a better ac-
count of the notion of a correct analysis? Let me suggest the
outlines of such an account, although I do not know if it will
ultimately prove to be tenable.
Matters are complicated; the goals of theory and analysis are
many and varied. What I propose to sketch is, as it were, an
empirical strain in Schenkerian theory. What follows, then, is
an account meant to capture a substantial chunk of theoretical
activity, but not necessarily all of Schenkerianism.
In order to proceed, however, we need to rethink one of
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
Brown et al.'s central assumptions. Recall the positivists' dis-
tinction between theoretical and observational terms, between
"electron" and "red." In Brown et al.'s account, Schenkerian
terms such as "middleground" and "implied dominant" desig-
nate theoretical entities. Such terms are, in the positivists' sense,
theoretical terms. 47 This, it seems to me, is a fundamental mis-
diagnosis of their function. Such terms are, I maintain, not
theoretical, but—if Schenkerian theory is empirical at all-
observational.
In defense of this claim, I should like to say, first, that it is
intuitively plausible. For how is a Schenkerian analysis justified,
that is, determined to be correct or incorrect? How is it deter-
mined which tones are structurally important and which are
embellishing, whether a certain chord expands tonic harmony
or has a passing function? In an overwhelming range of cases,
we use our ears: "I hear it that way." Perhaps not all analytical
decisions are justified by appeal to aural experience, but such
experience is a common and indispensable justification in music
theory and analysis, and in Schenkerian theory and analysis in
particular."
Hence, on the face of it, it would seem that terms for
Schenkerian relations are observational. And, since the central
concept here is diminution, this boils down to the claim that
diminution—the term "diminution" itself, as well as terms for
particular types of diminution, such as "arpeggiation," "passing
motion," and so on—is observational. But in order to replace in-
tuition with argument, we must invoke some account of what it
is for a term to be observational, and to explain how Schenkerian
terms come to have that status.
It seems to me that if there is any such story to be had, then
it would have to follow in broad outline the behavioristic, em-
piricist account of observation terms given by Quine." It would
say that our talk of diminution, our grasp of the concept, is
47 Brown and Dempster (1989, 97).
48 Interpretations are sometimes justified in other ways, for example, by ap-
peal to the principle of motivic parallelism or considerations of coherence.
But such principles are insufficient to decide more than a fraction of the
cases in which there is, nonetheless, a right answer. Aural intuition is indis-
pensable.
49 Quine (1960, 5-8 and 31-46).
 118 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 32 (2010)
Salto di Quinta Ascendente
• 0. • • ..•
EXAMPLE 4. Giovanni Battista Bovicelli, Regole passaggi di musica (1594). Reproduced by permission from
Forte and Gilbert (1982, 8), 1970 W W Norton
typically rooted in exposure to paradigmatic cases, such as—I
would suggest—the illustrations by Bovicelli, Simpson and
Handel given early in Forte and Gilbert's textbook, reproduced
as Example 4.50 We latch on to the meaning of "diminution,"
the account would go, through exposure to simple, clear-cut ex-
amples such as these, and we then project the term to new
cases.51 We need not be exposed to exactly the same instances,
but our training must instill in us similar dispositions to apply
the term "diminution," or terms for specific types of diminution,
to a wide range of unproblematic cases. Hence, even when ana-
lysts disagree on cases that are unclear or ambiguous, they have
a basis for meaning—they are speaking the same language—by
virtue of, and to the extent of, their similar training and behav-
ioral dispositions with respect to uncontroversial cases.
It would be in this way that structural descriptions
Schenkerian theory and analysis could come to function as ob-
servation reports. They would be (an important part of) the
data. And, when they function in this way, a "correct" analysis
would mean a true observation report, one that reports what we
observe.52
If this account of Schenkerian terms as observational is cor-
rect, it could explain how their meaning is grounded in sense
experience, and how, or to what extent, theorists mean the same
thing when they use the same term, and thereby communicate
and arrive at objective knowledge. But, even if this account is
correct, would we have then salvaged the view that Schenkerian
theory is empirical science?
There are at least two reasons why we might hesitate to de-
clare success. In order to understand the first, it is useful to note
50 Forte and Gilbert (1982,8-9).
51 The latter cases may in turn reshape our notion, but I shall suppress this
complication.
52 It should be noted that "observation" does not imply naive perception.
Typically we make such reports only after we adopt a certain analytical
posture toward the music, different from a naive or ordinary way of listen-
ing. This psychological attitude consists in a particular mode of attention
to structure. We have the capacity to adopt this attitude partly as a result of
exposure to Schenkerian theory. See Hanson (1958,13-19), Kuhn (1970,
§ X, 111-35), and Suppe (1977,147-66). We may also call the relevant
observations about structure "intuitions," as do Lerdahl and Jackendoff
(1983,39); for discussion, see DeBellis (2009).
0
*
d • dP°
(11
Hempel's distinction between "two levels of scientific systemati-
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
zation," which he calls "empirical generalization" and "theory
formation," respectively.53 He writes,
It is a remarkable fact . . . that the greatest advances in scientific
systematization have not been accomplished by means of laws refer-
ring explicitly to observables, i.e., to things and events which are as-
certainable by direct observation, but rather by means of laws that
speak of various hypothetical, or theoretical, entities, i.e., presumptive
objects, events, and attributes which cannot be perceived or other-
wise directly observed by us.54
According to Hempel, the earlier and less advanced stage of
scientific systematization is that of empirical generalization,
which involves laws that apply to what is "directly observable."
At the second level, laws formulated "in terms of hypothetical
entities . . . account for the uniformities established on the first
level."55 An example of a régularity on the first level would be,
according to Hempel, "Wood floats on water"; on the second
level, Galileo's or Kepler's laws.
Hence, we move on to the more advanced, or theoretical,
stage of science when we have some explanatory construct, at a
remove from the data, that explains patterns and regularities we
see in the data by means of unifying facts at a deeper, theoretical
level. (This is what, in Feigl's picture, hovers above the data,
distinct from it.) But, to the extent that its constructs are obser-
vational, Schenkerianism remains at the level of empirical gen-
eralization. To this extent, Schenkerian theory would be
analogous not so much to physics as to our ordinary talk of ta-
bles and chairs, not so much to cognitive science as to folk psy-
chology. Even if the data of musical experience can be explained
by reference to facts about linear progressions, passing motion,
and so on, there is an important disanalogy between that expla-
nation and the way "electron" plays a role in the explanation of
everyday phenomena, because the Schenkerian concepts are in
the data. By analogy, it is not incorrect to say that the hypothesis
that there are tables and chairs—the "folk theory" of ordinary
physical objects—explains, at some level, its appearing to us that
53 Hempel (1965,178), italics omitted.
54 Ibid. (177).
Ibid. (178).
 SCHENKERIAN THEORY'S EMPIRICIST IMAGE
there are tables and chairs; but that is not science (in Hempel's
second sense). Insofar as its constructs are limited to the obser-
vational, then, Schenkerian theory does not ascend to Hempel's
second level of scientific systematization. 56
The second reason we should hesitate to declare Schenkerian
theory empirical science is this: Schenkerian analyses are plau-
sibly understood as observation reports only if the fact that an
analyst judges that the piece has a certain structure is best ex-
plained on the hypothesis that the piece really does have that
structure. 57 This reflects a general requirement on scientific ob-
servation. "Round" is observational only because the best expla-
nation of things looking round to us is, in part, that they really
are round: the judgment results from a certain causal operation
of the roundness of the object on our senses. For this reason,
Gilbert Harman has argued that ethics is not empirical: it is not
necessary to suppose that actions have ethical properties in
order to explain why people make the ethical judgments they
do, since their judgments are better explained by such factors as
their upbringing. 58 In the case of music analysis, the question is
whether an analyses belief that a piece contains certain middle-
ground events is better explained on the hypothesis that there
are such events, or by the fact that the analyst believes that
Schenker claimed that there were such events, accepts his au-
thority, and wishes to emulate him. We should construe
Schenkerian concepts as observational only if analysts' arrival at
beliefs about Schenkerian structure is best explained on the hy-
pothesis that the words really do have that structure. 59
6. CONCLUSION
It has been said in music-theoretic circles that we are living
in a post-positivist era. 60 But it would be a naive historicism
that allowed us to conclude that the positivists' insights must be
irrelevant to contemporary music theory. The positivists were
on to an important idea: that words become meaningful by vir-
tue of their tether to experience. This principle expresses a deep
insight about the notions of cognitive significance and genuine
communication, and can illuminate the content of our concepts
where a critical attitude is called for. A critical attitude is not out
of place with regard to the content of Schenkerian concepts. It
is not pointless to ask what it means to say that a given passage
is a prolongation of some simpler passage, or that a passage is
correctly analyzed in this way rather than that. Insofar as there
is cognitive content to such assertions, an empiricist spirit can
help us see what that content might be. Music theory has not
developed to the point where it has nothing to gain from the
empiricists' insights. To understand the meaning of a theoretical
56 On the "hypothesis of ordinary physical objects" and how physics goes be-
yond it, see also Quine (1960, 21-22). I am indebted to Joseph Dubiel for
a discussion of this point.
57 Cf. Harman (1977, 8).
58 Ibid. (4).
59 The line of thought developed in this paragraph was prompted in part by
discussions with Dmitri Tymoczko.
6o See, e.g., Cross (2000-01).
119
claim, look to its observable consequences, to see how it is
tested. We may be living in a post-positivist era, but there is stil
much to be learned from empiricism.
WORKS CITED
Allerton, D. J. 1979. Essentials of Grammatical Theory: A Consen-
sus View of Syntax and Morphology. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul Ltd.
Ayer, A[lfred]. nules]. 1946. Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed.
London: Victor Gollantz.
. 1959. Editor's introduction to Logical Positivism. New
York: The Free Press.
Beaney, Michael. 2004. "Carnap's Conception of Explication:
From Frege to Husserl?" In Carnap Brought Home: The View
Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015
from Jena. Ed. Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein. 117-50.
Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company.
Bogen, Jim. 2009. "Theory and Observation in Science." In The
Stanford Encydopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition). Ed.
Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/
entries/science-theory-observation/ (accessed 10 August
2009).
Botha, Rudolf P. 1980. The Conduct o Linguistic Inquiry: A Sys-
tematic Introduction to the Methodology of Generative Gram-
mar. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. Originally published
as Generatiewe Taalondersoek: Sistematiese Inleiding. Kaaps-
tad: Hollandsh Afrikaan Uitgevers Mif., 1978.
Brown, Matthew. 1989. "A Rational Reconstruction of Schen-
kerian Theory." Ph.D. diss., Cornell University.
. 1997. "Adrift on Neurath's Boat': The Case for a Nat-
uralized Music Theory." The Journal of Musicology 15 (3):
330-42.
. 2005. Explaining Tonality: Schenkerian Theory and
Beyond. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
Brown, Matthew, and Douglas J. Dempster. 1989. "The Scien-
tific Image of Music Theory." Journal of Music Theory 33 (1):
65-106.
Brown, Matthew, Douglas J. Dempster, and Dave Headlam.
1997. "The #IV(I,V) Hypothesis: Testing the Limits of Schen-
ker's Theory of Tonality." Music Theory Spectrum 19 (2): 155-
83.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1936-37. "Testability and Meaning." Pts. 1 and
2. Philosophy of Science 3 (4): 419-71 and 4 (1): 1-40.
. 1959. "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Log-
ical Analysis of Language." Trans. Arthur Pap. In Logical
Positivism. Ed. A. J. Ayer. 60-81. New York: The Free Press.
. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems
in Philosophy. Trans. Rolf A. George. Berkeley: University of
California Press. Originally published as Logische Aufbau der
Welt: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. Hamburg: Felix Mei-
ner Verlag, 1928.
Chomsky, Noam. 1964. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. The
Hague: Mouton Publishers.
Cross, Ian. 2000-01. "Music(s), Science(s), Post-Positivist Plu-
ralities." Intégral 14/15: 20-26.
120 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 32 (203[0)

DeBellis, Mark. 2009. "Perceptualism, Not Introspectionism:
The Interpretation of Intuition-Based Theories." Music Per-
ception 27 (2): 121-30.
Dempster, Douglas, and Matthew Brown. 1990. "Evaluating
Musical Analyses and Theories: Five Perspectives." Journa/ of
Music Theory 34 (2): 247-79.
. 1989. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scien-
tific Knowledge. 5th ed. London: Routledge Classics.
Quine, W[illard]. V[an Oman]. 1960. Word and Object. Cam-
bridge [MA]: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology.
. 1961. From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico Philo- -

Dubiel, Joseph. 1996. "Hearing, Remembering, Cold Storage,
Purism, Evidence, and Attitude Adjustment." Current Musi-
cology 60-61: 26-50.
Feigl, Herbert. 1970. "The 'Orthodox' View of Theories: Re-
sophical Essays. 2nd ed. rev. Cambridge [MA]: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Ray, Christopher. 2000. "Logical Positivism." In A Companion
to the Philosophy of Science. Ed. H. W. Newton Smith. 243
- -

marks in Defense as well as Critique." In Analyses of Theories
and Methods of Physics and Psychology. Vol. 4 of Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Ed. Michael Radner and
Stephen Winokur. 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press.
51. Malden [MA]: Blackwell Publishers.
Reichenbach, Hans. 1938. Experience and Prediction: An Analysis
of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Salmon, Wesley C. 2000. "Logical Empiricism." In A Compan-

Downloaded from http://mts.oxfordjournals.org/ at Carleton University on June 13, 2015

Forte, Allen, and Steven E. Gilbert. 1982. Introduction to Schen- ion to the Philosophy of Science. Ed. H. W. Newton Smith. -

kerian Analysis. New York: W. W. Norton. 233 42. Malden [MA]: Blackwell Publishers.
-

Hanson, Norwood Russell. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: An In-
quiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction
to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hempel, Carl G. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and
Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. 1963. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.
La Salle [IL]: Open Court Publishing Company.
Schlick, Moritz. 1936. "Meaning and Verification." Philosophical
Review 45 (4): 339-69.
Suppe, Frederick, ed. 1977. The Structure of Scientific Theories.
2nd ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. [1921] 1972. Tractatus Logico Philosoph--

Press. icus: The German Text ofludwi g Wittgenstein's Logisch Philos- -

. 1970a. "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Em- ophische Abhandlung. 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan
pirical Science." In Foundations of the Unity of Science. Vol. 2. Paul.
Ed. Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles W. Morris.
651-745. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
. 1970b. "On the 'Standard Conception' of Scientific
Theories." In Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and
Psychology. Vol. 4 of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence. Ed. Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur. 142-63.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hume, David. [1748] 1993. An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. 2nd ed. Ed. Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Kassler, Michael. 1968. "A Trinity of Essays: Toward a Theory that
is the Twelve-Note Class System, Toward a Development of a
Constructive Tonality Theory Based on Writings by Heinrich
Schenker, Toward a Simple Programming Language for Musi-
cal Information Retrieval." Ph.D. diss., Princeton University.
. 1977. "Explication of a Middleground of Schenker's
Theory of Tonality." Miscellanea Musicologica 9: 72-81.
Kerman, Joseph. 1985. Contemplating Music: Challenges to Mu-
sicology. Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lerdahl, Fred, and Ray Jackendoff. 1983.A Generative Theory of
Tonal Music. Cambridge [MA]: The MIT Press.
Music Theory Spectrum, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 111-120, ISSN 0195-6167,
Passmore, John. 1967. "Logical Positivism." In The Encyclopedia
electronic ISSN 1533-8339. 2010 by The Society for Music Theory.
of Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards. 5: 52-57. New York: Mac- All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy
millan Publishing Company. or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's
Popper, Karl. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/
Hutchinson. reprintinfo.asp. DOL 10.1525/mts.2010.32.2.111