Puerto Rico and the Militarization of the Caribbean, 1979-1984

Author(s): Jorge Rodríguez Beruff

Source: Contemporary Marxism , Summer, 1985, No. 10, ISLANDS OF DISCONTENT
(Summer, 1985), pp. 68-91
Published by: Social Justice/Global Options

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29765815

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Puerto Rico and the
Militarization of the
Caribbean, 1979-1984

Jorge Rodriguez Beruff

Puerto Rico, like any other State in the Union [sic], will be part of
the total national effort in any action taken with regard to any country
and any situation in the entire world.
? Carlos Romero Barcel?,
former Governor of Puerto Rico
February 28, 1981

1. INTRODUCTION

Historically, Puerto
tary, and ideological Rico
functions in U.S.has fulfilled
policy toward the Carib? important economic, mili?
bean region. During the first decades of this century, the island became
the most important center for U.S. naval activities in the Eastern Carib?
bean, which facilitated the rise of the U.S. as a hegemonic military power
in the region and its application of a policy of direct intervention in neigh?
boring countries such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Beginning
in the '30s, the Good Neighbor Policy redefined the forms of regional con?
trol, one aspect being the relative withdrawal of a direct military presence
in the countries of the region. Because of their strategic importance,
Panama and Puerto Rico were the most notable exceptions to this policy.
The United States rapidly expanded its military presence during World
War II, considering Puerto Rico its "Caribbean Gibraltar," and as such,
essential to the defense of its southern flank and the Panama Canal. Puerto
Rico thereby became the axis of an extensive system of U.S. bases and
installations in the Caribbean. With the end of the war came a reduc?
tion in military activities in Puerto Rico, although these still remained
at a high level within the new context of the Cold War. During this period
the island was integrated into U.S. military plans on a global as well as
a regional level.
Translated by Maria Roof, Allegheny College.

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 69

In this way, Puerto Rico found itself involved, one way or another,
in all U.S. military conflicts of the postwar period and particularly in those
that occurred in the Caribbean region. For example, plans for interven?
tion in Guatemala in 1954 included the utilization of combat aircraft from
the National Guard of Puerto Rico.1 In the same way, the island played
a military role, on an active or a contingency basis, during the protests
against Vice President Nixon in Venezuela (1959), in the naval "quaran?
tine" of Cuba (1962), in the invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965),
during the leftist military rebellion in Trinidad (1970), and in the recent
invasion of Grenada (1983). In addition, although to a lesser degree than
Panama, the island was utilized in some aspects of counterinsurgency poli?
cies during the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson (training for
unconventional warfare, Peace Corps training, tests of chemical herbici
dal weapons, etc.). At the same time, high rates of economic growth and
relative internal stability made possible the presentation of the "Puerto
Rican Model" as an alternative to Cuban socialism, especially with respect
to the rest of the small nations in the region.2
Toward the end of the '60s, but especially after 1973, an important
reduction began in U.S. military activities in Puerto Rico, which seemed
to indicate that these would concentrate on their traditional naval func?
tion and the recruitment of Puerto Ricans for the regular armed forces
of the United States. The U.S. Army notably reduced its presence in Puerto
Rico with the closing of a number of installations which had been under
its control during World War II. It even planned to close Ft. Buchanan,
its principal installation in San Juan. The Air Force finally closed the
Strategic Air Command base at Aguadilla, Ramey A.F.B. The Navy also
reduced its level of activities, tending to concentrate them at the Roosevelt
Roads Naval Base. It should also be remembered that the Pentagon was
forced to make important concessions to the ami-military resistance that
developed in Puerto Rico during the heat of the Vietnam War: a halt
in the persecution of objectors to the draft, a reduction in the activities
of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) at the University of Puerto
Rico, and the transfer to civilian control of the land owned by the Navy
on the island of Culebra.
This process was due in part to military readjustments on a global
scale undertaken by the United States as a result of the Vietnam War,
with the eventual defeat of the U.S., and the aftermath of internal politi?
cal and economic crises.3 Also, the political and economic situation in
the Caribbean region and Central America was perceived as relatively
stable and without immediate threats to U.S. interests, so that it was not
necessary to maintain a military presence on the same scale as during
the previous decade. It should be remembered that the invasion of the
Dominican Republic had succeeded in stabilizing the internal situation

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 70 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

in the country; the first guerrilla wave in Central America had been con?
tained (for example, in Guatemala); and the rebellions that occurred in
the English-speaking Caribbean (Anguilla and Trinidad) did not require
the use of U.S. military forces. In Haiti an "orderly transition" had taken
place. The Eastern Caribbean was still in a process of decolonization,
and in Panama they were able to find a political and diplomatic solution
to the conflict over the Canal.
But since 1979, a redefinition of U.S. policy in the region began to
take shape, leading to a gradual revision in the functions for Puerto Rico
within the framework of that policy, in economic as well as political and
military aspects. The United States sought to involve Puerto Rico more
directly in the project of rebuilding its power in the region, by distancing
itself from the policy followed after the Cuban Revolution of keeping the
colony as isolated as possible from regional processes.
On the economic plane, Puerto Rico became integrated into techni?
cal assistance programs through AID. This increased the presence of Puerto
Rican civilian technicians in Central America and the contacts between
the government of Puerto Rico and the most conservative states in the
region.4 Emerging as an even more important long-term tendency was
the use of Puerto Rico as a center of coordination for the regional activi?
ties of transnational capital, as shown in the proposals for "twin plants,"
(a Caribbean version of las maquiladoras [on the U.S.-Mexican border ?
Eds.]), and for international commercial centers, and the increased interest
in the region by financial capital established in Puerto Rico.5
Puerto Rico also became integrated into all aspects of the new regional
military policy, but this time with entirely new implications for the role
assigned to the National Guard and the Police. This study will examine
this aspect of the new role of Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, which has
contributed to accelerating the militarization of the countries in the region.

2. FROM CARTER TO REAGAN: THE NEW REGIONAL POLICY

After the U.S. foreign policy crisis brought about by the defeat in Viet?
nam, the administrations of Ford and Carter sought to rebuild and relegiti
mate the international power of the United States. The foreign policy which
crystallized under Carter attempted: 1) to redefine alliances with other
developed capitalist countries in order to reflect the new international
power relations ? Trilateralism [the strategy of the Trilateral
Commission ? Eds.]; 2) to negotiate with the Soviet Union to stabilize the
international situation within the framework of a policy of detente and
arms reduction; 3) to place at the forefront of U.S. Third World policy
ideological, political, and economic means of influence. Carter's human
rights policy, for example, had the express purpose of improving the posi?
tion of the United States in its "ideological competition" with the Soviet

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 71

Union. During the first period of the Carter administration, the use of
direct military force was practically abandoned as inefficient and dan?
gerous. Foreign military aid was also kept at a relatively low level, with
some exceptions, and the increase in commercial arms sales which had
been pushed by Nixon was halted.
The agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean was delineated by
Carter during an address to the OAS as: 1) support for projects of eco?
nomic integration in Central and South America; 2) solution of the two
traditional problems: control of the Panama Canal and relations with
Cuba; 3) adoption of a bilateral rather than regional orientation in dealings
with Latin American countries; 4) the new policy would be based on three
principles: respect for the sovereignty and "individuality" of the coun?
tries, respect for human rights, and finally, that negotiations on economic
relations would be considered in the global context of North-South
relations.6
It is interesting that the most specific aspects of the policy toward Latin
America, according to this declaration, were related to the Caribbean
region and Central America. The new importance ascribed to the region
during the Carter administration was demonstrated not only by the steps
taken with respect to Cuba and Panama, but also by other concrete actions.
In regard to the Caribbean, for example, we can mention the 1979 trips
of Rosalynn Carter and Andrew Young, attempts to increase economic
aid through the World Bank, increased importance in diplomatic mat?
ters and aid policy directed toward the Eastern Caribbean, and the atten?
tion given to electoral conflicts in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.7
Carter also distanced himself from Gerald Ford's proposal of statehood
for Puerto Rico, which would have generated considerable opposition in
some countries of the region.
On the military plane, the initial regional policy of the Carter adminis?
tration was in line with the more general attitude toward the Third World,
which we have mentioned. It was hoped that an effective utilization of
non-military instruments of foreign policy (which did not exclude covert
actions or economic pressures, as demonstrated in Jamaica) would be suffi?
cient to reduce tensions in the region and channel popular movements
in directions that were not antagonistic to U.S. interests. For this reason,
the policy initiated by Nixon of reducing the direct U.S. military presence
in the area was continued, since it was not considered so critical for U.S.
national security. This perception was reflected in the military aspects
of the treaties with Panama and the relatively low level of military activi?
ties in Puerto Rico. Military assistance and commercial arms sales to Cen?
tral America and the Caribbean tended to shrink. Even in 1980, security
assistance for all the countries in the region8 was a mere $32.7 million,
of which only $17.5 million was specifically military aid. Commercial arms

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 72 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

sales for the entire region were $4.7 million in 1979, of which $3.6 mil?
lion corresponded to just three countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and
Panama.9
The origins of the new policy toward the Caribbean must be located
in the second half of 1979, when the original foreign policy premises were
revised. This shift was provoked by a series of international processes and
events, particularly in the Caribbean and in the Middle East, that the
U.S. ruling sectors considered unfavorable to U.S. interests and that there?
fore, required a more aggressive response.10 The adjustments made in
regional policy were explained by Robert Pastor [senior staff member of
the National Security Council responsible for Latin American and Carib?
bean affairs in the Carter administration ? Eds.] in the following way:
Changes in the region and the world in 1979 and 1980 made the Carter
administration more sensitive to traditional military concerns. The
coup in Grenada in March, 1979, and the collapse of the Somoza
dynasty in July both brought new leaders to power, who tended to
see Castro's Cuba as the answer. . .and the U.S. as the problem.
. . .Simultaneously an economic decline in the region and a more
aggressive Cuban posture ? exemplified by the obtrusive role played
by the Cuban ambassador in the 1980 Jamaican elections ? further
unsettled the region. This instability naturally was viewed in the U.S.
in the context of more ominous international developments ? the
invasion of Afghanistan, hostages in Iran, uncertainty in the Persian
Gulf, and Soviet threats against Poland. The U.S. cooled the rela?
tionship [with Grenada] and sought to expand aid to Grenada's neigh?
bors as a signal that only democracy would be rewarded in the region.
In the security area, a task force was established in Key West to
coordinate naval exercises in the region, and there was a modest
increase in security aid. Economic assistance also continued to
increase, as did the numbers and quality of official personnel sta?
tioned in the area.11

The artificial crisis created by the presence of a "Soviet Brigade" in

Cuba, September 1979, served to legitimate the new orientation toward
the region. The following month simultaneous announcements were made
of an increase in economic aid for the Caribbean and the creation of a
Joint Caribbean Task Force in Key West. Subsequently, intense military
activity began with an increase in military maneuvers, and numerous visits
by high level Pentagon officials to the region in order to offer military
aid and seek access to new bases.
Toward the end of 1979, Admiral Harry Train, Atlantic Fleet Com?
mander, visited Venezuela and other countries to discuss regional secu?
rity, and in a 1980 visit to the Dominican Republic, Major General Robert
L. Schweitzer offered "all types of military aid to combat communism."12

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 73

A later visit by Admiral Train to the same country provoked street distur?
bances. U.S. attempts to obtain additional military bases in Haiti and
the Dominican Republic came to light in the framework of these visits.13
Even though the overall picture of military assistance for the Carib?
bean (without taking into account Central America) was not dramati?
cally altered between 1979 and 1980, we can note a growing interest in
the Eastern Caribbean. In 1980 and 1981, there was a rapid increase in
all types of security assistance, particularly marked in those countries con?
sidered strategically important, such as Barbados (and others of the Eastern
Caribbean) and Jamaica.14
With the Reagan administration, revision of U.S. foreign policy acceler?
ated, and the goals to be pursued in the region were clearly delineated.
The order of priorities established by Thomas Enders [former Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs ? Eds.] in his June 1981
address is significant.
First, we will assist threatened countries to defend themselves. . .
Second, we will assist threatened countries to preserve their peo?
ple's right to self-determination. . .
Third, we will assist countries in the region to be economically
successful. . .
Fourth, and equally important, we will concentrate on the source
of the problem. . .
Cuba has declared a covert war on its neighbors, our neighbors.
The United States will join with them so that the costs of that war
will be borne by Havana...15
Only the third point refers to economic aspects. The first and second
emphasize the need for military assistance and preventive measures in
"threatened countries." The fourth point threatens to increase military
pressures against Cuba. Likewise, although Reagan did not mention mili?
tary measures in his address on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, he did
underscore that his leitmotiv was security considerations.16
In an extensive study concluded shortly after Reagan's address on the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College outlined a new military strategy for the region that would
be congruent with the new orientation in foreign policy.17 Although some
key parts of the document have been deleted, it reflects the central ele?
ments of regional strategy. Among its recommendations for the Carib?
bean, the following are significant:
1. A policy of "indirect confrontation" with Cuba, which could include
military measures in those countries where there is a Cuban presence.
This position was reiterated in a later study by the Rand Corporation (Sep?
tember 1982)18 and put into practice during the invasion of Grenada.
2. Increase in direct military presence in the region, unification of

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 74 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

commands to reflect the fact that Central America and the Caribbean
are a "single strategic entity," and improvement in the training of U.S.
regular forces. This would include, among other things, an increase in
the activities of the Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean.
3. Policies to increase the military capabilities, including intelligence
activities, of the armies and police forces of the region; to encourage their
integration through collective security agreements and a homogeniza
tion of their doctrines; to develop a strategy of "coalition war" between
these forces and those of the U.S.; and to "promote the admiration of
and confidence in the capabilities of the United States military forces and
their military technology." To achieve this, it mentions the need to fur?
ther liberalize commercial arms sales and to continue to increase mili?
tary assistance.
From this document, it can also be understood that the main secu?
rity concern at that time was the English-speaking Caribbean and in par?
ticular the countries of the Eastern Caribbean. The intention was to com?
mit the United States in a definitive way to filling the military void left
by Great Britain, promoting the militarization of societies with small or
non-existent military structures. Although the document does not dis?
cuss the role of Puerto Rico in detail, it recommends the expansion of
training and exchange activities by the Puerto Rican National Guard
throughout the region.
The military policy followed during the last few years corresponds in
all respects to the recommendations of the Strategic Studies Institute and
to the tendencies of the period just prior. Puerto Rico has played a
subregional role (specialized in the Caribbean islands) of increasing impor?
tance in all aspects of the new military policy. In spite of the differences,
its function has been similar to that of Panama and Honduras in Central
America.

3. PUERTO RICO IN U.S. MILITARY POLICY TOWARD THE REGION

The reorientation in U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean

produced an immediate increase in military activities in Puerto Rico. In
1979, for example, the regionalization of National Guard functions began,
when units were sent to the Dominican Republic to carry out rescue efforts
in the wake of Hurricanes David and Federico. Military maneuvers
increased in intensity, and the attitude of the Navy notably hardened in
the face of opposition to its practices on the Puerto Rican island of Vie?
ques. The geopolitical mindset that became dominant with the Reagan
administration served to emphasize the strategic military importance
assigned to Puerto Rico as an Eastern Caribbean enclave, and so to acceler?
ate and increase its integration into military policy toward the region.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick brazenly expressed the attitude of the U.S.

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean lb

government by saying that Puerto Rico was not a domestic or interna?

tional question, but rather a geopolitical bastion, strategic-military and
non-negotiable.19
The changes that have taken place in the military and security func?
tions of Puerto Rico in the Caribbean encompass the following aspects:
1. Increase in the presence and activities of the regular U.S. armed
forces and readjustments in command structures in order to improve their
capability for direct intervention, culminating in the use of Puerto Rico
to launch the invasion of Grenada.
2. Higher levels of recruitment of Puerto Ricans for all branches of
the regular U.S. armed forces, thereby increasing the number of Spanish
speaking members that could be utilized in the region.
3. Strengthening and regionalization of the role of the Puerto Rican
National Guard by integrating it into activities of aid and training of mili?
tary forces from Central America and the Caribbean, and increasing its
training as an auxiliary force for possible external use.
4. Regionalization of the functions of the Puerto Rican Police as an
intermediary in training activities, technical assistance, and intelligence
through Interpol (International Police Organization) and use of Puerto
Rico by the FBI for training police forces from the Caribbean and Cen?
tral America.
Principally in regard to the Navy installations on the eastern side of
the island, Puerto Rico has been used intensively since 1979 to train regular
U.S. forces (particularly elements of the Rapid Deployment Forces) in
joint operations. This training has had the express purpose of increasing
their capability for military intervention in countries in the region. The
intensification of training activities began with the reorientation of the
Carter policy, when new importance was given to the Readex '80 naval
maneuvers, and Solid Shield '80 maneuvers were carried out in Puerto
Rico and Guant?namo.
In 1981, a series of large scale maneuvers began. The first of these
was Ocean Venture '81, officially defined as the largest maneuvers under?
taken in the region since World War II, and it included simulated inva?
sions of Grenada and Cuba.20 120,000 troops, 240 ships, and 1,000 air?
planes participated in this maneuver. The following year, the Ocean
Venture exercises were repeated, this time with the participation of 45,000
troops, 60 ships, and 350 airplanes. According to Rear Admiral Robert
McKenzie, commander of the maneuvers, their purpose was to suggest
to those who oppose the United States in this part of the world that this
country can use its military might.21
Also carried out were UNITAS maneuvers with Latin American navies
that were coordinated from Puerto Rico, and Readex 2-82, which included
39 ships, two aircraft carriers, 200 airplanes, and an amphibious inva

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 76 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

sion of Vieques. In 1983, the Readex maneuvers were repeated on a larger

scale than in previous years, and the invasion of Grenada was given its
final rehearsal during the Universal Trek 1-83 exercises. These maneu?
vers, carried out only four months before the invasion of Grenada, simu?
lated a sea, land, and air attack on an island, the taking of an airport,
and defense against enemy ambushes. The same units that were later used
in Grenada participated in these maneuvers.
The latest maneuvers undertaken in Puerto Rico, Ocean Venture '84,
involved 30,000 troops, 250 airplanes, and a great number of ships. These
maneuvers were coordinated with the Grenadier I exercises carried out
in Honduras. The presence of a large number of B-52 strategic bombers
on bombing exercises in non-stop flights from bases in California indi?
cates that the objective of the maneuvers was no longer the Caribbean,
but the preparation for a military operation in Central America. All the
Ocean Venture maneuvers and the Universal Trek exercises included per?
sonnel from the Puerto Rican National Guard in the practice of amphibi?
ous landings and parachuting. This shows the Pentagon's interest in incor?
porating Puerto Rican units as auxiliary forces in U.S. military operations
in the region. The function of Puerto Rico in interventionist prepara?
tions was summarized by Commodore Diego Hernandez, Commander
of Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, in defining the island as the place where
"the orchestra practiced before playing in public."22
The regular armed forces' preparations have included a redefinition
of the command structure for the region. After World War II, Puerto
Rico was the home of the Antilles Defense Command, which was in charge
of joint operations in the Caribbean region. At the end of 1981, this com?
mand was transferred to Key West and integrated into the new regional
command created in 1979.23 Puerto Rico has retained, however, the Naval
Forces Caribbean Command. This creates a new triangular structure of
commands for the region with a unified command in Key West, the Army
command (USSOUTHCOM) in Panama, and the naval command in
Puerto Rico.24
The United States has also expanded its infrastructure of bases and
installations in Puerto Rico. These grew in importance since they
represented the principal direct U.S. presence in the Caribbean. The mili?
tary usefulness of the other traditional military enclave, Guant?namo,
was limited for obvious reasons. The United States had abandoned the
naval base at Chaguaramas in Trinidad, and in the Eastern Caribbean
kept only air and naval installations of some importance on the island
of Antigua.
In 1981, it was decided to move the Caribbean's main low frequency
communications tower (for communication with submarines) from
Panama to Puerto Rico.25 To this end, the communications installation

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 77

at Aguada, on the west side of the island, was reactivated. Puerto Rico
rose to the top of the list of options for relocating the sadly famous "School
of the Americas."26 The agreement reached with Panama and the arrange?
ments for training in Honduras had the effect of postponing this deci?
sion. The communications base at Ft. Allen, in the south, which was to
pass to civilian control and become a prison, was kept by the Pentagon
for joint use by the Army, Navy, and National Guard.27 Plans were also
abandoned to deactivate Ft. Buchanan, the principal installation of the
regular Army in San Juan.28 Roosevelt Roads Naval Base began an expan?
sion program that will cost $13.7 million during fiscal year 19 8 5.29 Also,
military operations have been reported at other points, such as Mona
Island, between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, the Las Mesas
hills near the city of Mayag?ez, and Cabo Rojo in the southwest.30
But the most important physical expansion has been the reintroduc
tion of the Air Force through the gradual reactivation of the old Ramey
Air Force Base of the Strategic Air Command in Aguadilla. This B-52
nuclear bombers base was deactivated in 1973 and placed under Coast
Guard control. It was used for civilian residential and commercial pur?
poses, and its final transfer to the Puerto Rican government was planned.
In the February, 1982 issue of Air Force Magazine, an article appeared
by General T.R. Milton, USAF (Ret.) in which he lamented the closing
of Ramey and recommended the acquisition of an air base in the Eastern
Caribbean.
The Air Force has long since given up its superb base, Ramey,
on the western end of Puerto Rico. While the Navy still hangs on at
Guant?namo, the military value of that facility is clearly limited.
We have, in short, little military presence in the Caribbean and
thus little clear evidence that we will be around if needed....
If Cuba can build a base on Grenada, we should be able to put
in an austere base somewhere along that island chain. Nothing fancy,
you understand [sic], with no great numbers of people permanently
on station. The mere fact of American air power operating in the
Caribbean might be a real signal... to the nations bordering the
Caribbean that Uncle Sam was around keeping an eye on things.31
In 1983, an official Pentagon document was made public that recom?
mended the gradual reactivation of Ramey,32 and the base was used in
a limited way in the maneuvers of that year. During the invasion of
Grenada, Ramey was used for refueling military aircraft.33 Finally, B-52
bombers, along with C-130 and C-141 transport planes, landed at the base
during Ocean Venture '84 maneuvers. Air Force expansion plans seem
to also include the base at San Isidro in the Dominican Republic.
Puerto Rico plays an additional role in the region through the mas?
sive participation of Puerto Ricans in the regular armed forces of the United

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78 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

States, particularly the Army. The high rate of unemployment, especially

among young people, has turned the island into a paradise for military
recruiters. Between 5,000 and 6,000 young people annually join the regular
armed forces, and more than 2,000 university students participate in the
Reserve Officers' Training Corps program (ROTC). Added to the recruit?
ment of Latin Americans in the United States, this has created a sizable
nucleus of Spanish-speaking officers and soldiers that can be used in the
region. For example, the officer in charge of the Pentagon's politico-military
planning for the Caribbean, Lt. Colonel Hector Andres Negroni, is Puerto
Rican.34 And in 1982, another Puerto Rican officer, Commodor Diego
Hernandez, was named commander of the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base
and of the naval forces in the Caribbean.35 His presence facilitated negoti?
ations on Vieques with the Puerto Rican government, improved "public
relations" for the U.S. Navy, and contributed to assuring the support of
major political parties for military escalation.
Puerto Rican officers and soldiers participated in the intervention in
Grenada,36 and there is an important participation by Puerto Rican mili?
tary personnel in training and intelligence activities in Central America.
According to a series of articles on the Puerto Rican presence in Central
America, there is a large group of Puerto Rican military personnel among
Special Forces (Green Berets) trainers assigned to the Regional Center
for Military Training (CREM) and to other locations in Honduras. There
are also Puerto Ricans in the 224th Intelligence Battalion that operates
intelligence flights over El Salvador and Nicaragua from the base at Palme
rola (in Honduras), and among the Marines assigned to radar facilities
at Tiger Island in the Gulf of Fonseca. These activities apparently include
support to the counterrevolutionary forces of the Nicaraguan Democratic
Front [the main organization of the Nicaraguan contras ?Eds.].37
Nevertheless, the really new elements in the military use of Puerto
Rico pertain to the integration of the Puerto Rican National Guard and
Police, formally part of the government of the Free Associated State, into
[U.S.] regional security policy.
The traditional function of the National Guard had been internal
control of the population, as in 1950 during the Nationalist Party insur?
rection, and in 1973 during the public employees strike. In the '70s, this
force increased from 7,000 to 12,400 members and its training and equip?
ment were improved. Toward the end of the Carter administration, the
role of the National Guard was redirected toward possible external par?
ticipation and use as an intermediary in assistance to the armies of the
region. Carter "federalized" some units in the summer of 1979 and sent
them to the Dominican Republic to participate in rescue activities. At
the beginning of the following year, General Orlando Llenza, Commander
of the National Guard, accompanied Admiral Harry Train on his trip

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 79

to the Dominican Republic with the apparent purpose of negotiating an

agreement of collaboration with the Dominican armed forces.38
The new role of the National Guard was defined by Army War Col?
lege recommendations in the following manner:
Exchange of Small Units. The exchange of ideas and good will
achieved by exchange programs of small units can produce great com?
pensations. For example, the work carried out by the Puerto Rican
National Guard in helping the Dominican Army solve a problem of
munitions storage was praised by Dominican leaders. Similar results
were obtained in Barbados. The exchange of small units can even
improve the capability of the foreign units and the climate for coali?
tion cooperation. Confidence and respect for the United States Army
can be gained at low cost with specialized teams. . . The task of small
units exchange is two-fold ? to improve both the image of the United
States and the military capabilities of the countries in the region.39

In this way, the National Guard is assigned a function of training Carib?

bean armies in line with the longer-range goal of creating the conditions
for coalition cooperation. This translates into agreements on military
cooperation, at least with Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Barbados,
and Dominica, in which the government of Puerto Rico does not partici?
pate.40 Since 1981, contingents from these countries began to train on
a regular basis at the National Guard Camp at Salinas, and units from
this corps have been sent to the Caribbean.
In addition, the increasing participation of the National Guard in
maneuvers carried out in Puerto Rico and its training in landing tactics
confirm the new regional role of this force. Although its activities have
centered on the Eastern Caribbean, it has also been integrated into mili?
tary activities in Central America. A contingent of 211 men participated
in the February 1983 Big Pine maneuvers in Honduras. At the end of
the maneuvers, a permanent National Guard presence remained in Hon?
duras to carry out logistical support and training in the Regional Center
for Military Training (CREM).41
The Puerto Rican Police Force has also been integrated into func?
tions analogous to those of the National Guard, in this case to channel
assistance to Caribbean and Central American police forces. The FBI
established a training center at Roosevelt Roads for police forces from
the region.
One of the recommendations of the previously cited study by the Army
War College referred precisely to this aspect of regional policy.
To provide assistance in the Caribbean islands for maritime security,
navigational security and for the forces of law and order: police, gen?
darmerie and coast guard.42

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80 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

It should be noted that this recommendation is in obvious contradic?

tion to resolutions of the U.S. Congress, which prohibit this type of
assistance. The Public Security Assistance Program of AID, which had
served to finance repressive activities in Latin America and in other parts
of the world, was abolished by the Foreign Aid Act of 1974. According
to Section 660 of that law, it was illegal to use funds to "provide training
or assistance or provide financial support to the police, jails or other forces
charged with enforcing the law of any foreign government. . "43
The interest in involving the Puerto Rican police in this type of activity
became obvious after the 1980 elections. One of the first steps of the newly
elected Governor Romero Barcel? was the creation of a joint U.S.-Puerto
Rican committee to fight terrorism. At the end of 1981, Thomas Lynn,
a Navy security officer, suggested in an article published in Defense and
Foreign Affairs that Puerto Rico could become a useful "testing ground"
for the antiterrorist campaign of the Reagan administration. In January
1982, William Webster, head of the FBI, judged Puerto Rican terrorism
to be the most serious in the United States and attributed it to the indepen?
dence movement.44 These declarations coincided with the appointment
of the Superintendent of the Puerto Rican Police as head of the U.S. dele?
gation to Interpols Fourth Regional Conference of the Caribbean and
Central America, held in the Dominican Republic. One of the topics dis?
cussed there was the "cooperation of police forces on a Caribbean and
Central American level."45
That meeting was followed by announcement of the creation of a
regional suboffice in Puerto Rico (the only one of its type) of the Washing?
ton, D.C., office of Interpol. As a result of these contacts, it was made
public that the Puerto Rican Police would offer training in "police manage?
ment" to a series of interested countries, among which were mentioned
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay, Honduras, and the Domini?
can Republic. This would be a first step toward offering guidance and
training in all areas to the police in the region.46 Jorge Collazo, the new
Superintendent of Police, has retained the role of U.S. representative to
Interpol.47 He has confirmed plans to use the Police Academy to train
officers from the Caribbean and Central America from now on. The num?
ber of instructors at this academy was increased from 24 in 1981 to 34
in 1982 and 1983.48
These activities by the Puerto Rican police can result in increasing
the repressive capability and militarizing the police forces in the region.
This body is highly centralized, has access to the most modern technol?
ogy (computers, communications, etc.), and is paramilitary in nature.
It has a Special Weapons and Training (SWAT) unit and a Unit of Tacti?
cal Operations (Shock Force), both with a military-type organization. The
United States is promoting the formation of precisely these kinds of milita

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 81

rized units in the Eastern Caribbean police forces. And the recently
restructured Intelligence Office has a long history of persecuting politi?
cal dissidents. The Lawyers' Association, in its report on the Police, empha?
sized the problem of the militarization of this body:
[In regard to] the demilitarization of the Police Force: The legal
precept that the Police is a civilian corps is a dead letter. The con?
duct, organization and nature of the Police Force do not reflect loyalty
to that ideal, which is a legal mandate.49
On the other hand, declarations to the New York Times by President
Alvaro Magana of El Salvador revealed another aspect of the assistance
to the police forces.50 The FBI had established, in cooperation with the
Navy, a Caribbean police school at the Roosevelt Roads Base. This school
had been secretly operating for two years, offering one-month courses
in crime scene investigation, "interviewing" techniques, and preservation
of evidence. An undetermined number of police from the English-speaking
Caribbean, including Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, had been trained
there. In the last class, 20 agents from Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Puerto Rico graduated.51 Judg?
ing by the size of this class, hundreds of agents must have received train?
ing in Puerto Rico.
The increase in the military activities in Puerto Rico has had an impor?
tant economic impact. Military spending has increased sharply during
the last few years, both in absolute terms and relative to total expendi?
tures by the U.S. government in Puerto Rico. For example, the operating
expenditures of the Department of Defense increased from $74.7 million
in 1980 to $174.7 million in 1983. Even without taking into account Pen?
tagon purchasing contracts with Puerto Rican industries, which have
increased substantially in the last two years, military expenditures are still
over $500 million.
This increase in military expenditures, in the context of a decrease
in "welfare" expenditures (food stamps, student scholarships, etc.), aug?
ments the dependence of the Puerto Rican economy on the process of
militarization of the U.S. budget and ties important sectors of the popu?
lation to military interests. A relatively new dimension of this process is
the tendency to integrate production by transnational corporations (phar?
maceuticals, electronics, etc.), and even smaller scale industries (e.g., cloth?
ing) into military production. The recent agreement for the "develop?
ment" of Vieques Island follows this model.52 One of the governments
goals is to achieve a substantial increase in purchases of military equip?
ment, and an important project for the construction of floating dikes for
the Navy at Ponce has been approved.53
It must be pointed out that the militarization of Puerto Rico and its

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82 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

new role in the Caribbean have been supported by the major political
forces [in Puerto Rico]. From the beginning of the new regional policy,
the Statehood movement, represented by the New Progressive Party,
endorsed it in its economic as well as in its political and military aspects.
The strategy of Governor Romero Barceld sought actively to make Puerto
Rico part of that policy by increasing contacts in the region, while negotiat?
ing those economic aspects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative that would
most affect Puerto Rico. This sector perceives that the increasing stra?
tegic importance of the island promotes the annexation project, by offering
the island as a "bastion state," like Hawaii. Moreover, the increase in military
expenditures is presented as a palliative for the economic crisis.

Table 1: Military and Security Expenditures by the United States

in Puerto Rico: 1979-19831 (In Millions of Dollars)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
U.S. Military Agencies:
Veterans Administration 54.7 72.3 77.3 86.0 95.3
Defense Department 101.2 74.7 152.1 142.7 174.7
Veterans' Benefits 202.4 223.3 230.5 274.1 279.9
Justice Department2
(includes the FBI) 11.7 9.6 8.1 22.0 13.8
Aid to Puerto Rican Agencies:
Civil Defense .8 9.9 2.5 n.d. n.d.
Police 1.3 5.4 1.9 n.d. n.d.
National Guard3 n.d. 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5
TOTAL 467.7 544.9

1. These figures apparently do not include military purchases of mat

exported to the United States from industries in Puerto Rico. In 1983 on
$52.6 million to the Pentagon.
2. Only a part of the expenditures are used to finance the FBI. Since we do n
we have included the total expenditures. This has the effect of inflating
ture totals.
3. The official budget of the National Guard is around $5 million, of which less than $2 million
is U.S. assistance. Nevertheless, this body received an additional $70 million in assistance in
1983, according to the deposition of its commander before the Legislature. These monies do
not pass through the Department of the Treasury and are not reflected in official documents.
1980-1982 figures are estimates based on that information.

The Popular Democratic Party has abandoned its initial criticisms

of the Caribbean Plan and has expressed its unequivocal support for the
military activities of the United States. According to Hernandez Colon,
gubernatorial candidate in 1984, and now Governor of Puerto Rico, this

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 83

is a "small contribution to the national defense."55 The small faction of

the party that expressed its opposition to this policy has been disavowed
and marginalized. The candidate of the Renewal Party, Hernan Padilla,56
has also de-emphasized the importance of the military escalation.
But we should not underrate the opposition generated by the militar?
ization process outside the principal parties. This opposition has gone
beyond anticolonial parties and organizations and includes important
religious sectors, a network of groups carrying out educational and
organizational work against militarism and for solidarity with countries
of the region, and organizations of communities directly affected. The
breadth of this opposition was partially felt at a large march called by
the Puerto Rican Independence Party in late 1984.57

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CARIBBEAN

The threat to the sovereignty of neighboring countries inherent in the

new role of Puerto Rico was made evident during the invasion of Grenada.58
The troops that invaded that country had been trained on Vieques. Bases
in Puerto Rico were used to launch the operation and as a strategic rear
guard. The troops and police forces of the region that make up the "pea?
cekeeping force" occupying Grenada (from Jamaica, Barbados, Domin?
ica, etc.) received prior training by the National Guard, the Puerto Rican
Police, and the FBI Office in San Juan.59
The new U.S. military policy toward the Caribbean has a logic that
goes beyond the invasion of Grenada. It is grounded in the premise that
the region has entered a prolonged crisis in the face of which a long-range
security policy must be articulated. Besides the increased direct military
presence, the United States is encouraging a rapid process of expansion
and integration of the military and police forces in the region.
This is reflected in a spectacular increase in security assistance to almost
all the countries in the Caribbean. Assistance to the Eastern Caribbean,
for example, increased from $4 million in 1980 to $13.3 million in 1983,
and the expenditure of $25.3 million is proposed for 1985. Assistance to
Jamaica will increase from $59.8 million in 1983 to $75.2 million in 1985.
The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Belize have also been receiving sig?
nificantly higher levels of security assistance. The increase is even more
dramatic when we take into account that many of these countries received
no U.S. military aid prior to 1979, and some of them did not even have
armies.
This has meant, in the English-speaking Caribbean, not only the
expansion of the existing military forces, but also the strengthening and
militarization of the police. Besides the training taking place in Puerto
Rico, there are 100 Special Forces (Green Berets) instructors in the Eastern
Caribbean, training military forces and police personnel.60 The Superin

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84 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 85

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 87
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88 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

tendent of Police in Dominica was forced to resign due to his opposition

to the creation of a military unit within that body.61
The framework of the Eastern Caribbean Security System (ECCS),
created in November 1982, is also being used to establish a regional mili?
tary force of 1,800 men with capabilities for intervention in any one of
the smaller islands.
The expansion of the repressive capabilities of the Caribbean states
is already accentuating a tendency toward authoritarian measures of polit?
ical control, restricting space for the exercise of democratic rights, and
consolidating in power a conservative leadership that governs in most of
the countries in the region.62 We could cite the brutal repression of popular
protests against the rise in the cost of living in the Dominican Republic
and in Haiti (and most recently in Jamaica), pressures against the press
in Barbados, the approval of "national security" legislation in Domin?
ica, the regional campaign unleashed against the Caribbean Council of
Churches (CCC), and the total exclusion of the opposition from the parlia?
ments of Jamaica, Antigua, and Anguilla, using the mechanism of "snap
elections" and restrictions on the registration of candidates.63 In addi?
tion, U.S. policy has aggravated the contradictions in the heart of CARI
COM (Caribbean Community) above all due to Trinidad's lack of
enthusiasm for the invasion of Grenada and U.S. military policy.
Puerto Rico's new role in the region as an intermediary in U.S. mili?
tary policy will alter the traditional attitudes of the political forces of the
Caribbean countries. Puerto Rico's status as a colony will no longer be
perceived as something outside of regional processes, and for that reason
tolerable. It will be understood that the decolonization and demilitari?
zation of this Caribbean country is vital for independence, respect for
human rights, and the possibility for peaceful development in the
Caribbean.

NOTES
1. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit (New York: Doubleday, 1982),
pp. Ill, 128, 162, 174, 242.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the military functions of Puerto Rico see M. Meyn and
J. Rodrfguez, "El aparato militar norteamericano en Puerto Rico" ("The U.S. Military appara?
tus in Puerto Rico)," Casa de las Americas, Nov.-Dec. 1980, pp. 7-25; John Enders, La presencia
militar norteamericana en Puerto Rico (The U.S. Military Presence in Puerto Rico), (Rio Piedras:
Proyecto Caribeno de Justicia y Paz, 1980); Jorge Rodriguez, "Imperialism and Militarism: The
Case of Puerto Rico," to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University.
3. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1982),
chapters 8-11.
4. This does not constitute a totally new element. During the '50s, rather intense exchanges
took place under the so-called Point Four (Program for Technical Assistance), but this type of
activity notably diminished during the following two decades.
5. Emilio Pantojas, La crisis del modelo desarrollista y la restructuracion capitalista en Puerto

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 89

Rico (Crisis of the Development Model and Capitalist Restructuration in Puerto Rico) (Rio Piedras:
Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriquena (CEREP), 1984).
6. Bernd Greiner, "Konturen der Aussenpolitik Pr?sident Carters" (Contours of President
Carters Foreign Policy") Bl?tterfur deutsche und internationale politik, Aug. 1977, pp. 948-69.
7. For an apologist view of Carters Caribbean policy see Robert Pastor, "U.S. Policy Toward
the Caribbean," in Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, Jack W. Hopkins (ed.),
Vol. I (N.Y. and London: Holmes and Meier, 1983), pp. 78-89.
8. By "region" we mean the islands of the Caribbean, Central America, and the small coun?
tries bordering the Caribbean.
9. Department of Defense, Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Programs, Fis?
cal Year 1982.
10. See Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, "El papel estrategico de Puerto Rico en el contexto de la
nueva poh'tica de Reagan hacia el Caribe" ("The Strategic Role of Puerto Rico in the Context
of the New Reagan Policy Toward the Caribbean") Cuademos (Rib Piedras: CEREP, 1982), pp. 3-5.
11. Pastor, p. 85.
12. Latin American Weekly Report, March 7, 1980. This officer was subsequently removed
from his post at the Pentagon for saying that the Soviet Union was "about to attack the United
States."
13. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 18, 1980.
14. Department of Defense, several tables.
15. "Discurso de Thomas Enders ante el Consejo de las Americas" ("Address by Thomas Enders
to the Council of the Americas"), June 3, 1981, INFO Service. [Here, and in several other quotes,
we have retranslated back to English from the Spanish translation ? Eds. ]
16. "I wouldn't propose it if I were not convinced that it is vital to the security interests of
this nation and of this hemisphere." New York Times, Feb. 25, 1982, p. A14.
17. Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. The Role of the U.S. Mili?
tary: Caribbean Basin. (ACN 80049), Final Report, Oct. 26, 1981, chapter 4.
18. Edward Gonzalez, A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s (Santa Barbara: Rand
Corporation, Sept. 1982). This document proposes the "Finlandization" of Cuba.
19. Pensamiento Critico, June-July 1981, p. 6.
20. Robert Rountree, "Largest Maritime 'Games' Since World War II, Ocean Venture '81,"
The San Juan Star, Aug. 2, 1981.
21. El Mundo, May 4, 1982.
22. For more detailed information on the maneuvers, see NARMIC, The Central Ameri?
can War; A Guide to the U.S. Military Buildup (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Com?
mittee, 1983), p. 7; Awilda Colon and Paulina Cruz, La escalada militar norteamericana: ^Se
prepara la invasion de Centroamerica? (U.S. Military Escalation: Is an Invasion of Central America
Being Prepared?) (Dossier 3) (Rio Piedras: Proyecto Caribeno de Justicia y Paz, 1984); Awilda
Colon, La militarizaci?n de Puerto Rico y la intervenci?n norteamericana en Centroamerica
y el Caribe (The Militarization of Puerto Rico and U.S. Intervention in Central America and
the Caribbean) (Dossier 1) (Rio Piedras: Proyecto Caribeno de Justicia y Paz, 1984).
23. El Nuevo Dia, Nov. 24, 1981,.
24. For a discussion of the regional command structures, see Lieut. Col. John A. Fesmire,
United States Military Command Relationships in Latin America: Could They Be Better? (Vir?
ginia: Army War College, 1982). Unpublished manuscript.
25. Testimony by Admiral Kaufman before the House Appropriations Committee, Fiscal
Year 1981, in DOD Appropriations, Part 7.
26. El Nuevo Dia, July 20 and 22, 1981.
27. El Mundo, May 11 and 12, 1983.
28. El Mundo, May 16, 1983.
29. Jose (Che) Paralitici, "Estrategia militar del imperialismo para Puerto Rico" ("Imperi?
alism's Military Strategy for Puerto Rico"), Pensamiento Critico, May-June, 1984, p. 4.
30. Paralitici, "Estrategia. . .," p. 3.
31. Reprinted in the Sunday Sun (Jamaica), April 4, 1982, with the title, "The U.S. Case
for a Carib Base."
32. The San Juan Star, April 27, 1983.
33. El Mundo, Oct. 28, 1983.

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90 RODRIGUEZ BERUFF

34. The San Juan Star, Jan. 27, 1981.

35. His dissertation at the Navy War College was on the use of the Free Associated State
model for the Central American countries.
36. See Paulina Cruz, "Puerto Rico in the Invasion of Grenada. . .," in Grenada (Dossier
2) (Rfo Piedras: Proyecto Caribeno de Justicia y Paz, 1984).
37. See "Vital rol boricua en entrenamiento Honduras" ("Vital PR. Role in Honduras Train?
ing"), El Mundo, May 8, 1984, and "Sandinista attribuye papel boricua en Honduras a relation
con EU" ("Sandinista Attributes P.R. Role in Honduras to Relations with U.S."), El Mundo, May
9, 1984.
38. This was reported by the Interpress Agency.
39. Strategic Studies Institute, chapter 4, section II, no. 23. Their emphasis.
40. Due to the colonial status of Puerto Rico, it is the federal government that involves the
military forces of the Free Associated State in these agreements. The accord with Jamaica
(Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States and the Govern?
ment of Jamaica for the Exchange of Personnel between the National Guard of Puerto Rico
and the National Guard of the Virgin Islands of the United States and the Jamaica Defense
Force, no date) cites the following purposes: a) improve the skill and esprit de corps of the per?
sonnel; b) develop appreciation for tactics and techniques of other forces; c) gain field experience
in different terrains and climatic conditions; and d) promote ties of friendship and understand?
ing between participating forces.
41. Currently there are eight National Guard officers in Honduras manning a C-7 transport
plane. See "Grupo boricua sirve en Honduras" ("P.R. Group Serves in Honduras"), El Mundo,
May 6, 1984.
42. Strategic Studies Institute, chapter 4, section VI, no. 23.
43. Michael Klare, "Abasteciendo represi?n" ("Supplying Repression"), Cuademos Semes
trales (CIDE), no. 4 (2d semester, 1978), pp. 105-06.
44. "No exagere Mr. Webster" ("Don't Exaggerate, Mr. Webster"), El Mundo, Feb. 2, 1982.
45. El Nuevo Dia, Feb. 3, 1982.
46. Jose* (Che) Paralitici, "La Policia de Puerto Rico expande servicios en el Caribe" ("Puerto
Rican Police Expands Services in the Caribbean"), El Reportern, Dec. 6, 1982. It should be
mentioned that Police Chief Supt. Desiderio Cartagena was forced to resign because of the scandal
provoked by the assassination of two pro-independence youths by members of the Puerto Rican
Police, in the so-called Maravilla Case.
47. El Nuevo Dia, May 23, 1984.
48. Government of Puerto Rico, 1983 Budget, Vol. I, sec. 29, p. 8.
49. El Reportern, March 23, 1984.
50. Lydia Chavez, "Salvador Leader Says the FBI Is Training Investigation Squad," New York
Times, May 30, 1984, pp. Al and A13.
51. This item, which appeared on the front page of the New York Times, was published
on p. 17 of a local paper. See Harold Lidin, "FBI Runs Carib Police School at Roosevelt Roads,"
The San Juan Star, May 31, 1984.
52. The San Juan Star, Oct. 12, 1983. According to this agreement, the Navy would pro?
mote the industrial development of Vieques through military industries.
53. This project will be carried out by the Ponce Cement Co. to which Luis A. Ferre, ex
Governor, Senator, founder of the New Progressive Party, and member of the Navy League is linked.
54. See Rodriguez Beruff, "El papel estrate*gico. . .," passim.
55. "RHC minimiza la Uamada militarizaci?n" ("RHC Minimizes So-Called Militarization"),
El Nuevo Dia, April 20, 1984.
56. Padilla is a colonel in the National Guard.
57. More than 30,000 attended.
58. We have discussed the consequences for Puerto Rico in "Militarizaci?n, dominaci?n
colonial y derechos humanos en Puerto Rico" ("Militarization, Colonial Domination and Human
Rights in Puerto Rico"), paper delivered at Seminar on Armament, Development and Disar?
mament, Paris, UNESCO, 1982.
59. For an excellent description of Puerto Rico's role in the invasion of Grenada, see Cruz,
passim.

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 Puerto Rico and Militarization of Caribbean 91

60. "Green Berets Beef Up Caribbean Forces," COHA's Washington Report on the Hemisphere,
May 15, 1984.
61. Communication with Atherton Martin, May 1984.
62. One should not overlook that this group of leaders (Edward Seaga, Vere Bird, Eugenia
Charles, Tom Adams, and John Compton) has not been a passive element, but rather has actively
demanded the type of policy that the U.S. is pushing, including its military aspects.
63. For a recent evaluation of the impact of the militarization of the police in the East Carib?
bean, see Bernard Diederich, "The End of West Indian Innocence, Arming the Police," Carib?
bean Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 10-13.

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