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Survey of Authentication and Privacy Schemes

in Vehicular ad hoc Networks
Mahmood A. Al-shareeda, Mohammed Anbar, Iznan H. Hasbullah, and Selvakumar Manickam

Abstract— Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have become increasingly common in recent years due to their critical
role in the field of smart transportation by supporting Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication.
The security and privacy of VANET are of the utmost importance due to the use of an open wireless communication
medium where messages are exchanged in plain text, something which allows attackers to intercept, tamper, replay, and
delete them. Hence, there is a high probability that the safety of a VANET-based smart transportation system could be
compromised. Nowadays, securing and safeguarding the exchange of messages in VANETs is the focus of many security
research teams, as reflected by the number of authentication and privacy schemes that have been proposed. However,
these schemes have not fulfilled all aspects of the security and privacy requirements. The present paper is an effort to
provide a thorough background on VANETs and their components; various types of attacks on them; and all the security
and privacy requirements for authentication and privacy schemes for VANETs. This paper is among the first to provide
a comprehensive survey of the existing authentication and privacy schemes and compare them based on all security
and privacy requirements, computational and communicational overheads, and the level of resistance to different types
of attacks. It also provides a qualitative comparison with the existing surveys. This paper could serve as a guide and
reference in the design and development of any new security and privacy techniques for VANETs.
Index Terms— Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), VANET authentication, VANET privacy, VANET privacy scheme

I. I NTRODUCTION
Annually, almost 1.3 million people are affected by road
accidents. Road traffic injuries are the ninth leading cause of
death globally [1] and incur a loss of around 3% or USD
1 trillion of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [2],
[3]. It is estimated that by 2030, road accidents will be the
fifth leading cause of death [4]. Traffic jams also waste an
enormous amount of time and fuel.
Intelligent Transport System (ITS) plays an extremely im-
portant role in the mobility of modern life in today’s digital
world. The global demand for connected vehicles was valued
at $63,026 million in 2017 and is forecast to increase to be
$225,158 million by 2025, with a compound annual growth Fig. 1: Compound annual growth rate of 17.1% (2018–2025)
rate of 17.1% between 2018 and 2025, as shown in Figure 1. [5].
To improve the management of vehicular traffic in the
future, ITS offers comprehensive and innovative services in
order to control these unpleasant events [6]. It is being
rapid growth of wireless communication technology [7]–[10].
introduced in order to build intelligent vehicles through the
Modern vehicle manufacturers and telcos have accepted the
This paragraph of the first footnote will contain the date on which you fact that wireless equipment will be an integral part of every
submitted your paper for review. It will also contain support information, vehicle, enabling them to communicate with other vehicles as
including sponsor and financial support acknowledgment. For example,
“This work was supported in part by the U.S. Department of Commerce
well as with road infrastructures [11]. These vehicles form a
under Grant BS123456.” particular type of ad hoc network, where the vehicles are the
M. A. Al-shareeda is with the National Advanced IPv6 Centre, nodes of the network. Such a network is known as a vehicular
the Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia (e-mail:
m.alshareeda@nav6.usm.my).
ad hoc network (VANET).
M. Anbar is with the National Advanced IPv6 Centre, the Uni- VANET is a subclass of the mobile ad hoc networks
versiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia (e-mail: an- (MANETs) that uses wireless technology for vehicle com-
bar@nav6.usm.my).
I. Hasbullah is with the National Advanced IPv6 Centre, the Uni- munication and proximity to fixed infrastructures [7]. The
versiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia (email: iz- wireless access in vehicular environment (WAVE) is based on
nan@nav6.usm.my). IEEE 802.11p standard and provides basic radio standard for
S. Manickam is with the National Advanced IPv6 Centre, the
Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia (e-mail: dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) operating in
selva@usm.my). 5.9 GHz frequency band [12], [13]. Each vehicle distributes

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2 IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2017
periodic traffic related messages to other vehicles or to road-
side units (RSUs) within a time-interval of 100 to 300 ms
[14]. The DSRC protocol stipulates that the VANET data
communication speed ranges from 6 to 27 Mbps and the
coverage should be up to 1,000 m.
VANET communications are categorized as either Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) or Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I). In V2V
communication, every vehicle exchanges traffic-related in-
formation, such as about traffic jams, accidents, turning in-
tentions, etc., with neighbouring vehicles [15]–[17]. In V2I
communication, on the other hand, the Trusted Authority (TA)
shares information related to the roads through a GUI [18] that
allows vehicle drivers, in exceptional circumstances, to make
an early informed decision or respond to the situation that
could prevent untoward incidents or avoid inconveniences.
From this list of advantages, it is apparent that when it
comes to modern traffic management, VANET is its enabling
technology. Since each vehicle transmits a periodic safety and
traffic messages with their location, speed, heading, and traffic
events, any node within range, whether legitimate or not, will
receive these traffic messages due to the nature of broadcasting
in an open access environment. However, this will also allow
attackers to replay, omit, or modify these messages and spread
them in the networks. The spread of these altered and false
messages could lead to situations such as traffic disruption,
road accidents, etc., and thus justify the call for changes to
be made to secure the messaging. The security and privacy of
VANETs needs to be addressed before they become practical.
Many researchers have suggested advanced authentication and
privacy schemes for VANETs [19]–[23] that fulfilled VANET
security requirements such as non-repudiation, traceability,
unlinkability, and unobservability; however, they are not en-
tirely secure and require high computational resources, have
high communicational overhead, or need substantial storage
capacity.
The reason these schemes require high computational re-
sources and have high communicational overhead is because
each vehicle must check other vehicles’ signatures, which
raises two issues [24]. First, the computational power of the
on-board unit (OBU) is limited and insufficient to process
and verify each and every message signature, particularly
at a location with high traffic density. Second, the addition
of signatures and public certificates as payload into each
traffic-related message increases the packet size and thus the
communicational overhead is very high.
The present paper surveys several authentication and privacy
schemes that aim to secure V2V and V2I communications in
VANETs. There are at least three contributions of this paper
to the body of knowledge.
• This paper introduces a classification of the existing
authentication and privacy schemes based on the methods
used: public key infrastructure-based security and privacy
schemes (PKI-SPS); group signatures-based security and
privacy schemes (GP-SPS); and identity-based security
and privacy schemes (ID-SPS). Besides, the strengths and
weaknesses of each schemes are evaluated and compared
with the others.
• This survey not only provides a comprehensive analysis
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of the existing schemes in fulfilling the security and
privacy requirements of VANET, but also provides detail
explanations on the attacks that target these schemes,
such as impersonation, modification, replay and bogus
information attacks.
• Qualitative comparison with other surveys [19]–[23] is
performed by analysing the schemes in terms of security
and privacy requirements, security attack resistance, and
performance parameters in terms of computational and
communicational overheads.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
deals with the security and privacy aspects of VANETs. The
different classifications of security and privacy are set out in
Section III. Section IV presents a critical review of the existing
work. Section V presents a comparison between this survey
and the existing work. Section VI presents the directions for
future research in VANETs. Conclusions of the survey are
outlined in Section VII.
II. B ACKGROUND
A. Vehicular ad hoc networks
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) comprises a group
of vehicles, moving or stationary, that are connected through
a wireless network. The original purpose of VANETs was to
provide drivers with safety and comfort in vehicular environ-
ments. This perspective is changing, as VANETs are now being
positioned as an infrastructure for smart transport systems that
support autonomous vehicles and any activity that requires
Internet access in a smart city ecosystem. VANETs also enable
onboard computers with minimum Internet infrastructure sup-
port, mainly in stationary vehicles such as at airport car parks,
to serve as mobile computing cloud resources. The content
produced and consumed by vehicles is relevant only in a local
context in terms of time, space, and the agents: the producer
and the consumer. The information generated by the vehicles is
local in validity, has a limited spatial extent, explicit life span,
limited temporal extent, and has local interest. For example, it
is only relevant to the specific segment of the road at a certain
time and for vehicles not too far from the approaching area of
a highway. Three major components of VANET architecture
are the TA, the RSU, and the OBU, as shown in Figure 2.
Table I gives detailed descriptions of all three components.
B. Security and Privacy in a VANET
Being a subclass of MANET, VANET is vulnerable to
security attacks [27] since it also inherits some of MANET’s
security problems. However, due to its special characteristics,
such as the highly dense and dynamic topology for the
network, its security aspects have received far less attention.
However, VANET’s security is extremely important, since
traffic related messages contain vital information. To guarantee
that attackers do not modify traffic related messages, the
VANET system should be able to identify any modification
on the message [28].
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AUTHOR et al.: PREPARATION OF PAPERS FOR IEEE TRANSACTIONS AND JOURNALS (FEBRUARY 2017)
TABLE I: Description of VANET’s main components
Component Description
A trusted, highly capable third party responsible to register
Trusted other components in VANETs. It can also securely connect
Authority via wired networks to the RSUs. Before joining a network,
(TA) all RSUs and vehicles in the system must be registered
with the TA [25].
Used on the side of the road and can manage vehicles
within its range of communication. RSUs that further
Roadside
transmit messages to vehicles locally or send them to the
Unit (RSU)
TA can confirm the validity and authenticity of the
received message [1].
Vehicle with OBU can communicate with other vehicles or
On-Board RSUs using the DSRC Protocol. There is a tamper-proof
Unit (OBU) device (TPD) in every OBU to ensures no information is
exposed or leaked [26].
Fig. 2: A typical structure of a VANET’s environment.
1) Classification of Attackers: Attackers can be classified
according to their behaviour in the network. An adversary
node is defined as any entity that injects or alters messages and
disrupts the network. The attacker’s primary aim is to cause
problems in the network for the attacker’s benefit. According
to [29], [30], attacks on VANETs are commonly classified into
three types, as illustrated in Figure 3.
• Internal vs. external attacks.
An internal attack is generally perpetrated by authenti-
cated users from within the network who are familiar
with the details of the network configuration. An internal
attack is extremely dangerous, and more damaging than
external attacks. An external attack typically comes from
an unauthenticated user from outside the network and is
usually less severe and not as damaging.
• Active vs. passive attacks.
A passive attack does not involve injecting or tampering
with messages in the network. A passive attacker con-
nects to the wireless network to learn about the pattern
and frequency of the data transfers, possibly for use
in the future. In contrast, an active attacker alters the
information it receives, generates false signals, drops
received packets, or changes the data stream, in order to
disrupt the network efficiency or to access unauthorized
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3
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3: Different attacks on VANETs. (a) internal vs. external
attacks; (b) active vs. passive attacks (c) malicious vs. rational
attacks.
services.
•Malicious vs. rational attacks.
Not all attacks are perpetrated for personal gain. Certain
attacks are launched by malicious users to disrupt the
network or to create a hurdle for targeted victims in the
network. Rational attacks, on the other hand, are very
simple to predict, for they are attacks on the network for
the attacker’s own benefit.
2) Resistance to attacks: A better understanding of attacks
against VANETs is needed. [27], [31] discussed different types
of attacks on VANETs.
• Impersonation Attack: This attack targets other legitimate
vehicles by sending fake messages to other vehicles in
which the attacker tries to masquerade as a legitimate
vehicle.
• Modification Attack: To achieve their specific aim, an
adversary could transmit modified messages into the
VANET network. In order to obtain an optimal trans-
portation path, an adversary could, for example, feed false
information to nearby vehicles. Therefore, the verification
of the receivers (e.g. other vehicles and RSUs) cannot be
carried out with modified messages.
• Replay Attack: A replay attack is a type of network attack
where captured information is re-transmitted belatedly or
replicated fraudulently to create the illusion that incidents
are occurring.
• Bogus Information Attack: The attacker injects incorrect
information into the messages broadcast for, personal
advantage.
3) Requirements for the security and privacy of a VANET:
The requirements for a security and privacy scheme of a
VANET are mainly to protect the communication link between
vehicles, the vehicles and the TA, as well as the vehicles and
the RSU. Figure 4 shows the security and privacy requirements
of a VANET.
a) Security requirements:
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TABLE II: Parameter value of performance [33]

Performance Parameter Low Medium High

Communicational Overhead (bytes) 1 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 140
Computational Overhead (ms) 1 to 3 3.1 to 6 6.1 to 10

• Entity Authentication (auth.): A receiver (vehicle or RSU)

in the VANET network should be able to check the
messages it has received and to ensure the legitimacy
of the sender.
• Message Authentication (or integrity): The vehicle should
authenticate every message received from the RSUs and
other vehicles, and the receiver should be able to detect
any modification to the messages.
• Non-repudiation: The sender should not be able to deny Fig. 4: Security and privacy requirements for VANETs
or dispute the authorship of messages that were sent.
• Low overhead: The best security level should be achieved
with the least amount of computational resources and
lowest communication overheads possible for all parties
involved.
• Traceability: These requirements are necessary for
VANETs since the users (vehicles) are anonymous. The
TA is the only entity that is given the privilege to know
the identity of a vehicle and is capable of preventing other
entities from participating in the VANET network, when
necessary (e.g. a malicious vehicle).
b) Privacy requirements:
Preservation of privacy: RSUs, vehicles, and third-party
•
participants should not be able to retrieve any identifiable Fig. 5: Taxonomy of authentication and privacy schemes in
information about a vehicle from the messages. VANETs
• Unlinkability: RSUs, vehicles, and third-party partici-
pants should not be able to track the actions of a
vehicle by examining its transmitted messages. In other
III. TAXONOMY OF AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY
words, they should not be able to determine whether two
SCHEMES IN VANET S
different messages originated from the same vehicle or
not. Authentication and privacy are two main aspects of secu-
• Unobservability: During communication, the unobserv- rity that are required for the establishment of trust between
ability is maintained if the vehicle can broadcast the mes- the vehicles in a VANET. The use of proper authentication
sage without being observed by others, particularly third and privacy schemes assures the security of a VANET and
parties. Therefore, a malicious vehicle or RSU should not makes it easier to identify non-legitimate nodes and fake
be able to determine the legality of the communication messages. Many researchers have proposed authentication
[32]. Unlike the anonymity which ensures the original schemes to address common attacks on VANETs to ensure
identity of a registered vehicle is not exposed unless secure communication. Schemes that use message signatures
malicious activities are detected [1]. and signature verification mostly rely on various techniques.
In a nutshell, any proposed security scheme to secure a These types of schemes are classified in this paper into
VANET should address each of these requirements. Failure three categories: public key infrastructure-based security and
to fulfil any of these requirements could potentially render a privacy schemes (PKI-SPS), group signatures-based security
VANET vulnerable to attacks. and privacy schemes (GP-SPS), and identity-based security
and privacy schemes (ID-SPS). The inherent relationship be-
tween PKI-SPS and ID-SPS is that both use cryptography,
as illustrated in Figure 5. The existing schemes have been
examined in terms of fulfilling the security requirements,
attack resistance, and performance (computational and com-
municational overheads). The performance parameters used
in this paper to define the calculation and communication
overheads, as tabulated in Table II, are based on the work
by Manvi and Tangade [33] who assigned linguistic values

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TABLE III: Security and privacy requirements fulfilled by PKI-SPS

Security Requirements Privacy Requirements

Entity Message Trace- Non- Low Low communi- Un- Un-
Papers Privacy
auth. auth. ability repudiation computational cational linkability observability
[34] 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 7
[35] 3 3 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
[36] 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 7

TABLE IV: Controlled PKI-SPS security attack resistance the certificates issued to the vehicles in these schemes. Thus,
the TA could determine, if necessary, the identity of the users.
Security attack resistance
Bogus The process of revocation is the biggest weakness of a PKI
Papers Impersonation Modification Replay scheme. The requirement of loading a large number of vehicle
information
[34] 3 7 7 7 certificates renders the management of one vehicle inefficient
[35] 3 3 7 7
[36] 3 7 3 7 since the revocation of many certificates in the certificate
revocation list (CRL) is required by the revocation of even
one vehicle. When the CRL is large, this problem is basically
TABLE V: PKI-SPS overhead for computational and com- fatal. Since all revoked public keys are maintained by the CRL,
municational the public key should also be authenticated when the signature
is verified. However, it is not as easy to verify the authenticity
Computational Communicational of a public key on a VANET as it is on a wired network.
Papers
Overhead Overhead
[34] High High The more users are revoked, the bigger the size of the CRL,
[35] Medium High thereby increasing the signature verification time. The reason
[36] Low High for this is because the vehicles are required to first ensure that
the signature is not revoked before verifying the CRL.
In one of the pioneering studies, Raya et al. [34] distributed
– high, medium, or low – to the numerical values that were thousands of pseudonyms to vehicles with the correspond-
obtained from the results of comparing various schemes by ing privacy keys. The sender of the message selects one
[29], [34]. pseudonym and the corresponding private key is used to sign
Table II shows a range of high, medium or low overall the message. The receiver can use the corresponding certificate
values for computational and communicational overheads. to verify the pseudonym.
After computing the computational overhead for signing and Calandriello et al. [35] identified three overall reductions
verifying the message, the summation of these overheads gives and robustness optimizations. The first optimization involves
the total computational overhead. Meanwhile, the communi- a sender signing the signature of each pseudonym only
cational overhead is proportional to the message size for each once since the signature remains unaltered over the whole
scheme, which differs according to the payload within the mes- pseudonym. The verifier only confirms the signature of the
sage. The computational overhead has a direct relation with pseudonym once it is received. The checker will then store
the message size. Table II allows us to objectively determine the signature for later use. The second optimization is to add
which scheme has low, medium or high total computational only the certificate of the pseudonym once every message,
and communicational overheads. which then has the same validity period of certificate. All
messages are sent with a four-byte key ID field that contains
the pseudonym that is needed to check the message. This
A. Public Key Infrastructure-based Security and Privacy decreases the strength of the new node because the messages
Schemes (PKI-SPS) may have to wait for the subsequent pseudonym transmission.
The authentication schemes that use public key infrastruc- The third optimization was suggested in order to resolve this.
ture (PKI) operate with the idea of preloading a large anony- When the pseudonym has already been issued, the pseudonym
mous pool of roughly 43,800 certificates and their respective certificate will be repeated for consecutive messages. In order
private keys at their required levels. The certificates, all signed to optimize the integrity monitoring process, Wasef et al.
by the TA, do not carry any identifiable information related [36] introduced the expedite message authentication protocol
to the identity of the vehicles, which make these certificates (EMAP) that adopts PKI for vehicle authentication and a hash
completely anonymous. Each vehicle should have enough authentication code.
preloaded certificates to guarantee long term security and Tables III and IV present a summary of the security and
privacy, e.g. for one year. During annual vehicle inspection, the privacy requirements that are fulfilled by PKI-SPS schemes
certificates could be updated. Initially, anonymous certificates and the level of security attack resistance, respectively. Table
and their respective private keys are randomly chosen for V presents the results of a performance analysis of the PKI-
signing the vehicle’s traffic related messages. To verify a SPS schemes in terms of computational and communicational
signature using anonymous certificate, the verifying vehicle overhead. In the security requirements, all schemes in PKI-
obtains the signer’s public key from the TA, which stores all SPS category satisfy the entity and message authentication.

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TABLE VI: Security and privacy requirements fulfilled by GP-SPS

Security Requirements Privacy Requirements

Entity Message Trace- Non- Low Low communi- Un- Un-
Papers Privacy
auth. auth. ability repudiation computational cational linkability observability
[37] 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 7 7
[38] 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 7 7
[39] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
[40] 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 7
[41] 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 3 7
[42] 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 7 7

TABLE VII: Controlled GP-SPS security attack resistance can reveal its identity as a group manager. However, there
are linear proportional delays in the verification technique
Security attack resistance
Bogus
of this signature especially in large networks like VANETs
Papers Impersonation Modification Replay where the number of vehicles removed is so high. In addition,
information
[37] 3 3 7 7 in the schemes of group signature the whole group must be
[38] 3 3 3 7
[39] 3 3 7 7
reconstructed, with every vehicle receiving a key of the new
[40] 3 3 3 3 group when the number of vehicles revoked is higher than that
[41] 3 3 3 3 of the group threshold.
[42] 3 3 3 3
The TA should register each vehicle in the GP-SPS schemes
and receive the private key via a secure channel. This process
TABLE VIII: GP-SPS overhead for computational and makes it very difficult for vehicles to change their private
communicational keys. Thus, the probability of attack increases. With group-
based signatures, there is a trade-off between anonymity and
Papers
Computational Communicational group size. While the members in a large group remain
Overhead Overhead
anonymous, the time required to check the signatures increase.
[37] High High
[38] Medium 7 In contrast, a small group size facilitates the identification of
[39] Medium Medium group members for the attacker. Anonymity is therefore not
[40] 7 7 completely preserved.
[41] High 7
[42] High 7 Zhang et al. [37] proposed a location-based service (LBS)
protocol that addresses authentication and privacy issues re-
lated to LBS in VANETs. A vehicle only needs a member key
in this scheme to generate group signatures. These signatures
However, none of the schemes satisfy all privacy requirements,
are validated without any compromise of the privacy of a
such as un-linkability and unobservability, as presented in
vehicle by the LBS. If an LBS application is found to be
Table III. The schemes in PKI-SPS category are resistant to
incorrect, a key generation certificate may evaluate the identity
security attacks such as impersonation, as presented in Table
of the vehicle.
IV. However, the communication overhead is high for schemes
Mohammadi et al. [38] have proposed a secure V2V scheme
in PKI-SPS category, as presented in Table V.
that addressed this privacy issue of two conflicting goals and
Sybil attack in VANET. Boneh and Shacham (BS) approach
B. Group Signatures-based Security and Privacy for a short group signature and the batch verification seems to
Schemes (GP-SPS) be the foundation for this scheme [38]. Their approach is based
The first researchers to propose a group signature (GS) on a lightweight signature approach to ensure the privacy of
based authentication scheme are Chaum and van Heyst [43]. V2V communications. The proposed scheme also employed a
This scheme enables the members of the group to anony- rapid batch signature test procedure which uses the BS method
mously sign on behalf of the entire group. However, the group to ensure a secure group communication for a short period of
manager may reveal the signer’s identity in the event of a time.
dispute. Thus, in secure authenticated messages, anonymity The IEEE Security Standard 1609.2 by Hasrouny et al. [39]
can be preserved in group signature schemes. These types of presents the ways in which WAVE devices secure message
schemes can also ensure secure communication with condi- formats, application messages, and message processing sys-
tional privacy. These schemes can be used to sign the messages tems. They proposed a secure VANET identity authentication
to hide the signer’s identity. scheme by combining group signatures and ID-based signing
GP-SPS schemes allow every member of the group to sign systems [40].
on behalf of the group without revealing the identity of each Shao et al. [41] proposed the use of bilinear pairings in
member. Signatures can be verified using the public group distributed grouped entities with an anonymous authentication
key to maintain high privacy standard for users. Note that protocol. This scheme is based on a new group signature
no signature or verification of a message exposes the identity system that provides the anonymous protocol with threshold
of the user, even though the trustworthy third party (TTP) authentication characteristics. The process of verification is

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based on a verification method for batch signatures. As a
result of this strategy, the TA is not required to generate any
certificate and therefore no CRL from the TA needs to be
downloaded. Lim et al. [42] proposed a well-organized system
for the distribution of loads from the TA to the RSU to verify
the group signatures.
Tables VI and VII present a summary of the security and
privacy requirements that are fulfilled by GP-SPS schemes
and the level of security attack resistance, respectively. Table
VIII presents a GP-SPS performance analysis in terms of
computational and communicational overhead. In the security
requirements, many schemes in GP-SPS satisfy the entity and
message authentication and traceability. However, none of the
schemes satisfy all privacy requirements, such as unlinkability
and unobservability, as presented in Table VI. The schemes
in GP-SPS category are resistant to security attacks such as
impersonation and modification as presented in Table VII.
However, majority of the schemes in this category have high
computational overhead, as presented in Table VIII.
C. Identity-based Security and Privacy Schemes
To tackle the problems described above, many researchers
have suggested identity-based security and privacy schemes
(ID-SPS) for VANET. In 1984, Shamir [54] presented an ID-
SPS scheme that uses identity information as the public key of
the node, while private keys are generated by the same TA and
then distributed to nodes using the same identity information.
The recipients verify the message with the sender’s public
key and sign it with the sender’s private key. Four algorithms:
setup, extract, sign, and verify, form the basis of ID-SPS [55].
The scheme consists of three parts: the TA, the signer, and the
verifier.
• Setup: The TA uses this algorithm to generate T pub =
rP by taking a random number r to r ∈ Zq∗ , whereby
P ∈ G1 is a generator for the group G1 . The TA stores
the secret r.
• Extract: Once you have asked for a secret key that
corresponds to your identity ID in 0, 1∗ , the TA will run
the algorithm. The TA then calculates and supplies the
signer with the secret key for the ID as SID = rH(ID).
• Sign: This algorithm is run by the signer to sign the
message m ∈ 0, 1∗ . The signer selects Q ∈ G1 , chooses
a number z ∈ Zq∗ , and computes λ = e(Q, P ), γ =
h(m, λ), and δ = γSID + βQ. The pair (δ, γ) ∈ Zq∗
is the signature on message m.
• Verify: When a message m and the message signa-
ture (δ, γ) are received, the verifier computes λ =
e(δ, P ).e(H(ID), −Tpub )γ . If the signature is γ =
h(m, λ), the checker accepts the signature, otherwise the
signature will be refused.
For the hierarchical aggregation of signatures and batch
verification, Zhang et al. [44] introduced an approach that
produces signatures based on the identity of various vehi-
cles which can be aggregated and verified in a batch and
the message collector is used to reassemble the aggregated
signatures. By using identified vehicles and RSUs, this scheme
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significantly reduces the computational process of certifi-
cate verification. He et al. [45] designed an identity-based
conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for V2I
and V2V communications in VANETs. In their scheme, a
bilinear pair is not used in the signature verification process
due to it being one of the most time-consuming operations
in cryptography. Instead, they proposed a scheme based on
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
Wang and Yao [46] proposed a local identity-based anony-
mous message authentication protocol for VANETs with PKI
and traditional identity-based authentication protocols due to
the complexity and inefficiency of CRL authentication. A
certification authority is responsible for the certification of
each vehicle and RSU for the long term and the RSU manages
and distributes the local vehicles’ master keys. Vehicles can
use these master keys to form pseudonyms in order to protect
their privacy.
Cui et al. [47] proposed the use of cuckoo filter for
secure privacy-preserving authentication (SPACF) to increase
the success rate at the batch verification stage compared
to some of the schemes previously proposed. The use of
cuckoo filter and binary search have been shown to be more
efficient than some other systems because it is free to pair
and does not use map-to-point hash functions. Zhang et al.
[48] proposed a protocol to authenticate a vehicle system
with multiple trustworthy authorities to use a single identity-
based aggregate signature technique, known to as a distributed
aggregate privacy-preserving authentication. A vehicle can
simultaneously verify multiple messages and can add their
signatures into a single message that reduces storage space
for a vehicle or a data collector. Bayat et al. [49] developed
an RSU based scheme in which a TA master key is fitted to
the RSUs with a TPD. The strategy of saving the TA’s master
key in the RSUs is reasonable because the communication
channels of the RSUs and TAs are more secure and faster
compared to incorporating a master key into all the OBUs
(e.g. TPD schemes).
Zhang et al. [50] designed a Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT) to secure communication in VANET. They proposed
a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme that
needed realistic TPDs to guarantee the top security level for
the whole VANET. In their scheme, the master key of the
system does not need to be preloaded into the OBU of the
vehicle. Cui et al. [51] proposed a secure mutual authentication
scheme with regard to privacy preservation. By regularly
updating the data saved on the TPD, malicious users will be
prevented from obtaining useful information that can be used
to disrupt the VANET network via a side channel attack. Ali
and Li [52] proposed an effective authentication system based
on a bilinear map for communication between the vehicles
and the infrastructure. Instead of map-to-point hash functions,
this system uses one-way general hash functions. Cui et al.
[53] proposed a privacy preserving data downloading scheme
by adapting the concept of edge computing for VANETs.
Their scheme allows the RSU to discover the common data
by capturing the encrypted requests transmitted from nearby
nodes without sacrificing the privacy of the download requests.
Table IX summarizes the level of fulfillment of the security
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8 IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2017

TABLE IX: Security and privacy requirements fulfilled by ID-SPS

Security Requirements Privacy Requirements

Entity Message Trace- Non- Low Low communi- Un- Un-
Papers Privacy
auth. auth. ability repudiation computational cational linkability observability
[44] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
[45] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
[46] 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 7 7
[47] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
[48] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
[49] 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 3 7
[50] 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 7
[51] 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
[52] 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 7
[53] 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 7 7

TABLE X: Controlled ID-SPS security attack resistance IV. C RITICAL R EVIEW

Security attack resistance In VANET, any authentication and privacy scheme should
Bogus
Papers Impersonation Modification Replay
information
comply with all security and privacy requirements. Authenti-
[44] 3 3 3 3 cation and privacy schemes are usually categorized by type:
[45] 3 3 3 3 PKI-SPS, GP-SPS, and ID-SPS authentication schemes. In
[46] 3 3 3 3
[47] 3 3 3 7
PKI-SPS, a large number of anonymous certificates and pub-
[48] 3 3 3 3 lic–private key pairs need to be generated prior to the installa-
[49] 3 3 7 3 tion in the vehicle, which will put a huge burden on the TA to
[50] 3 3 3 3
[51] 3 3 3 7
manage. The vehicle also suffers from a storage management
[52] 3 3 3 3 burden due to its limited storage capacity. Furthermore, the
[53] 3 3 3 3 recipient is required to verify the validity of the certificate in
the verification phase, which incurs an additional cost. Table
III shows that [35] is better than other PKI-SPS schemes in
TABLE XI: ID-SPS overhead for computational and com- satisfying most of the security and privacy requirements, such
municational as entity authentication (auth.) and message authentication,
as well as having low computational overhead. Moreover,
Computational Communicational
Papers
Overhead Overhead
as shown in Table IV, [35] also has a high resistance to
[44] Low Low impersonation and modification attacks, while [36] is highly
[45] Low Low resistant to impersonation and replay attacks.
[46] Low Medium
[47] Low Low GP-SPS schemes avoid the burden of certification man-
[48] Low Medium agement. However, the size of the CRL keep increasing as
[49] High High the number of reclaimed vehicles increases. Since each CRL
[50] Low Medium
[51] Low Low operation involves two combined operations, the computa-
[52] High High tional overhead of the signature verification also increases.
[53] Low Medium In addition, the computational cost of a general signature is
less than that of a group signature. The scheme proposed
by [39] is better than other GP-SPS schemes in fulfilling
most of the security and privacy requirements, including
and privacy requirements for ID-SPS schemes, and Table X entity authentication (auth.), message authentication, traceabil-
summarizes the level of attack resistance. Table XI presents ity, non-repudiation, low computational and communicational
an ID-SPS performance analysis in terms of computational overheads, and preservation of privacy, as presented in Table
and communicational overheads. In the security requirements, VI. Moreover, Table VII clearly shows that the proposals of
many schemes in ID-SPS category satisfy the entity and [40]–[42] are better at resisting attacks than other schemes in
message authentications, traceability, non-repudiation and has the GP-SPS category. Table VIII clearly shows that [37] has
low computation overhead. However, none satisfies all privacy a higher computational and communicational overheads than
requirements, such as un-linkability and unobservability as [40].
presented in Table IX. Majority of schemes in ID-SPS cat- Several researchers have suggested ID-SPS schemes to
egory are resistant to security attacks such as impersonation, address the problems associated with PKI-SPS and GP-SPS
modification, and replay, as presented in Table X. Most of the schemes. Despite the importance of privacy in VANETs, the
schemes in this category has low overhead, as presented in privacy requirement is not completely complied with. The
Table XI. only two recommendations that are satisfied are the anonymity
and unlinkability of the sender and recipient. Due to the
associated overhead, unobservability is largely overlooked.

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AUTHOR et al.: PREPARATION OF PAPERS FOR IEEE TRANSACTIONS AND JOURNALS (FEBRUARY 2017)
TABLE XII: Summary of schemes, by category
Schemes Limitations
• A large number of keys and certificates must be
stored.
• Requires large storage area.
PKI-SPS- • Revocation checking process.
based • Vulnerable to DoS attack.
• Requires maintaining large CRL.
• Requires distribution of CRL to every vehicle.
• Distribution of protected private keys.
• Requires frequent changes of private/public keys.
• Key management.
• Conditional privacy preservation messages not
GP-SPS- considered.
Based • Verification of batch messages not included.
• No strategy to protect against compromise.
• Not suitable for vehicles with high-speed mobil-
ity.
• Ineffective average verification time.
• When TA is impaired, all RSU and vehicle com-
munications are compromised.
ID-SPS-
Based • Computational time is still needed for pairing
operations.
• All private keys can be calculated by TA.
The schemes of [47], [48] are better than the other ID-
SPS schemes in fulfilling the largest number of security and
privacy requirements, including entity authentication (auth.),
message authentication, traceability, non-repudiation, have low
computational and communicational overheads, preservation
of privacy, and unlinkability, as shown in Table IX. In addition,
Table X shows that the schemes of [44], [46], [48], [51]
are better than the other ID-SPS schemes at resisting all
security attacks. The proposals of [44], [47], [51] have lower
computational and communicational overheads than those of
[46], [48], [49], [52], as indicated in Table XI.
Table XII summarizes the limitations of each of the three
categories of related work.
V. Q UALITATIVE C OMPARISON
This section provides a qualitative comparison between this
survey paper and other surveys in the literature. There are
many surveys in the literature, such as [19]–[22].; but these
surveys are not as comprehensive.
Willke et al. [19] surveyed the applications of vehicu-
lar communication protocols. They studied V2V applications
based on a detailed analysis of their communication require-
ments. Moreover, they provided additional details on the
selection of a protocol that would be suitable for each type
of application and defined as well as discussed important
strengths and weaknesses of the surveyed research. However,
no extensive investigation was done on the security attack
resistance, security and privacy requirements, and perfor-
mance (computational and communicational overheads) for
each scheme.
Riley et al. [20] surveyed and categorized some of the
existing authentication and privacy schemes based on spe-
cific requirements. They also documented the advantages and
disadvantages of each scheme. They classified the existing
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9
authentication schemes into three groups: (i) asymmetric; (ii)
symmetric; and (iii) infrastructure requirements. However, its
focus is limited to only one feature of the privacy require-
ments, namely, the preservation of privacy, and they ignored
others, such as unlinkability and unobservability. Furthermore,
there is no comprehensive investigation for each scheme of
its attack resistance, security requirements, and performance
analysis.
Petit et al. [21] offered a further discussion of the challenges
and conditions of the abstract lifecycle pseudonym schemes.
The schemes were grouped in accordance with their general
approach to pseudonymisity. The paper identified four main
classifications that reflect the dominant research direction: (i)
asymmetric cryptography-based pseudonym schemes; (ii) pub-
lic key infrastructure, identity-based cryptography schemes;
(iii) group signature schemes, and (iv) symmetric cryptography
schemes. However, the schemes surveyed do not fulfill all the
requirements of security attack resistance and performance.
Boualouache et al. [22] presented a comprehensive survey
based on the classification of pseudonym-changing strategies.
They classified schemes for mixed zone-based strategies as
well as for mixed context-based strategies. They identified the
strengths and costs of the strategies outlined. But their survey
did not consider the security attack resistance, fulfillment of
security requirements, and performance of each scheme.
The limitations of existing surveys fall under at least four
broad areas: a lack of an analysis of security attack resistance,
incomplete compliance with security requirements, incomplete
compliance with privacy requirements, and no performance
analysis.
• Security attack resistance: Most of the surveys did not
discuss in detail the security attacks that could compro-
mise the security of a VANET. Nor did they completely
compare a schemes resistance to attacks such as im-
personation, modification, replay, and bogus information
with that of other schemes.
• Security requirements: Most of the existing survey pa-
pers, such as [19]–[22] provide partial discussions of
the security requirements, such as message authentication
and integrity, but ignore others, such as traceability, non-
repudiation, and low overhead.
• Privacy requirements: None of the existing survey pa-
pers fully investigate the privacy requirements for each
scheme. For example, the survey [22] investigated the un-
linkability privacy feature, but completely ignored other
privacy features.
• Performance analysis: The majority of existing surveys,
such as [19]–[22], did not conduct a performance analysis
of the computational and communicational overheads of
the schemes.
The main goal of this survey is to provide a clear and
comprehensive classification of the authentication and privacy
schemes for vehicular networks. This survey differs from the
above-mentioned surveys by providing (i) a comprehensive
analysis of fulfillment by each scheme of the security and
privacy requirements of a VANET, (ii) comprehensive details
on the security attacks that target authentication and privacy
schemes, and (iii) an analysis of the performance, such as
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10
TABLE XIII: Summary of the comparison between this
survey and existing surveys
Metrics
[19] [20]
Security attacks resistance 7 7
Security requirement 7 7
Privacy requirement 7 7
Performance analysis 7 7
the computational and communicational overheads for each
scheme for authentication and privacy. A summary of the
qualitative comparison of the existing surveys with this survey
is presented in Table XIII.
VI. F UTURE R ESEARCH D IRECTIONS
In this section, some directions for future research are
discussed in detail.
• Security: Since communication is carried out in an open
access environment, VANETs are more vulnerable to
attacks, which leads to multiple security threats. One
of the most dangerous attacks on VANET is imperson-
ation attack. Many researchers are currently working to
prevent impersonation attack. Nevertheless, regardless of
the approach taken, the balance between privacy and
non-repudiation cannot be ignored. Furthermore, many
other attacks on VANETs, such as replay attack and
modification attack also require attention. To secure V2I
and V2V communications from internal and external
attacks, a robust authentication scheme along with a
secure message exchange method are needed. The issues
with trusted authorities and schemes that rely on private
keys to protect V2I and V2V communication are high
computational and communicational overheads and lim-
ited scalability.
• Identity-based security and privacy schemes: This is a
robust authentication approach to support communication
security in VANETs. However, rapid movement of the
vehicles in VANET creates a problem with the authenti-
cation process since it is a time-consuming operation due
to high computation requirement. Thus, it is an issue that
needs further research.
• Reliability of the links: Many proposals have been made
to prevent attacks on VANET by malicious nodes; how-
ever, even under normal condition, there is still an issue
with lack of reliable links between the components in
VANET due to the rapid movement of vehicles.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
VANET is vital and one of the enabling technologies in ITS
that allows vehicles to broadcast and exchange messages be-
tween them to support safety and route management services.
Moreover, ITS offers several convenience and entertainment
applications via VANET to drivers as well as passengers
throughout their journey. However, due to the use of open
wireless communication medium, VANET is vulnerable to
several types of attacks. Therefore, there is a need for an
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efficient security scheme to address the threats on the security
and privacy of VANET that fulfills all the security and privacy
requirements.
This
[21] [22] work
This paper discusses the issues related to the security and
7 7 3 privacy for VANET. Because of the sensitivity of the traffic-
7 7 3 related messages being exchanged to and from vehicle nodes,
7 7 3 privacy and security are of the utmost importance to the
7 7 3
VANET technology. We identify several important security
and privacy requirements for authentication that serve as a fun-
damental step to ensuring security in a VANET. Authentication
schemes for VANETs are classified into three types: public
key infrastructure-based security and privacy schemes (PKI-
SPS), group signatures-based security and privacy schemes
(GP-SPS), and identity-based security and privacy schemes
(ID-SPS). We surveys and compares all the schemes in the
three categories in terms of their strengths and weaknesses,
fulfillment of the security and privacy requirements, level of
attack resistance, as well as their performance (computational
and communicational overheads). The security and the effi-
ciency of the existing authentication schemes for VANETs are
evaluated and presented to assist researchers and developers in
identifying and distinguishing key features of the security and
privacy of a VANET. It is our hope that this paper can serve as
a guide and reference in the research, design and development
of any new security and privacy techniques for VANETs in
the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This study has been funded in part by Universiti Sains
Malaysia external agency grants from U MOBILE Sdn Bhd
304/PNAV/650958/U154.
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Mahmood A. Al-shareeda received his B.S. in

communication engineering from Iraq University
College, and an MSc in Information Technol-
ogy from the Islamic University of Lebanon in
2018. Currently, he is a Ph.D. candidate at the
National Advanced IPv6 Center, the Universiti
Sains Malaysia. His research interests are se-
curity and privacy issues in vehicular ad hoc
networks and network optimization.

Mohammed Anbar obtained his Ph.D. in Ad-

vanced Computer Network from University Sains
Malaysia (USM). He is currently a senior lec-
turer at National Advanced IPv6 Centre (NAv6),
Universiti Sains Malaysia. His current research
interests include malware detection, web secu-
rity, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS), network monitoring,
Internet of Things (IoT), Vehicular Ad hoc Net-
work (VANET) security and IPv6 security.

Iznan Husainy Hasbullah is a Research Officer

in the Next Generation Unified Communication
Group at the National Advanced IPv6 Centre,
the Universiti of Sains Malaysia. His research
interests include unified communications, video
conferencing, next generation networking, and
capture systems for GUIs and lectures. He had
experience working as a software developer,
project manager, R & D consultant, CTO and
security auditor prior to joining the NAv6 in 2010.
He holds a B.Sc. in Electrical Engineering from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York.

Selvakumar Manickam is an associate pro-

fessor working in cybersecurity, the Internet of
Things, Industry 4.0, and Machine Learning. He
has authored or co-authored more than 160
articles in journals, conference proceedings, and
book reviews, and has supervised 13 PhDs. He
had 10 years of industrial experience prior to
joining academia. He is a member of technical
forums at national and international levels. He
also has experience building IoT, embedded,
server, mobile and web-based applications.

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