Professional Documents
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[ISSN: 0303-9951]
A Peer-Reviewed Journal
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The Indian Journal of Politics
A Peer-Reviewed Journal
Contents
ABSTRACT
and leaders who are close to ulama and Islam are rolled out in each of
these Islamic activities and events. Furthermore, by mobilizing the
masses, religious activities and Islamic events have become a political
magnet in shaping the legitimacy of electoral politics. The consequence
is that Harnojoyo's theme is that he was a leader who is close to the
ulama and Islam as a result of the accumulation of religious activities.
In the contextof general elections which relation to populism in
Indonesia, it has attracted many attention of scholars with a number of
findings of their interesting phenomenon. Studies of general elections in
relation to populism were mostly carried out by Aspinall,11Mietzner,12
dan Margiansyah.13Meanwhile,studies on democracy, populism and
oligarchy were conducted by Hadiz, and Robinson,14 Hadiz,15 Arifin,16
and populism with marginalized Muslims middle class17in Indonesia.
These studieswere so much consensus in the literature that discusses
populism which are mainly still much focused on the reference to the
theoretical concept on leadership style, multi-class or organizational
styles at various political levels.In addition, as a comparison material in
the aspect of the same study locus. Until now, the literature that examines
political election in 2018, can be said to be nil. Even if it exists, it does
not study the concept of populism. They more examined on the context
on how the environmental communication18 and the involvement of
Malay figures aspect.19
A few discussions about political populism from the discursive
side, especially in relation to Islam are presented here. This study wants
to focus on the context prior to the Palembang Mayoral Elections,
2018.This study intends to examine the political dynamics and forms of
political populism of Harnojoyo in the political contestation of
Palembang city in 2018. In depth, this paper will also discuss the form of
mass mobilization with the theme of religious activities and Islamic
events as the goal of establishing Harnojoyo's political legitimacy.
Furthermore, the discussion will be followed by an analysis of the
problem regarding the political map in the city of Palembang and the
underlying factors, patterns of populism, as well as the context, actors,
and political competition between contestants' alliances in the electoral
contestation process. Thus, the elaboration of the series of issues above
can help broaden the reader's insight in understanding the dynamics of
populism and Harnojoyo in the 2018 mayoral election and become a
direction in seeing the political map of the city of Palembang in the
future.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Understanding populism is not an easy thing. The concept of
populism is greatly influenced by differences in the lens of discourse,
political realities and phenomenon being studied that finally cannot be
made a unanimous conclusion. At the same time, in the theoretical
4 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
the dismissal of Romi Herton who was involved in the bribery case of
Constitutional Court judge, Akil Mochtar. Harnojoyo, who was
previously a deputy, was later appointed as the definitive mayor. Since
then,especially 2018, it is estimated that he will run again in the
nomination for mayor of Palembang. The position as an incumbent is
certainly something that must be utilized optimally.
Publicly, Harnojoyo is also known as the successor to the decree
of the Major (Romi Harton) who still has a good mass base and
popularity. It doesn't stop there, the dawn safari, which was just
implemented in 2017, and often does mutual cooperation in every
schedule and free time when outside the office.Harnojoyo's political
modality comes from the leader of "Wong Cilik", who has a dialectic
from his past history as a trader in the markets of Palembang. From the
supporting parties (PDI-P, Democrat, PKB, PBB and PAN). This capital
is important because the conditions for political support have been met.
PDIP supports it because currently its representative is a PDIP cadre
(Fitrianti Agustinda). This becomes a strength because then the political
machine can run better and stronger. The Democrat and PDIP networks
are also believed to be strong in South Sumatra to the lowest level. At the
parliamentary level, these two parties are also included as the parties with
the most seats, so that political institutional support has been obtained.
Political party machines can move stronger and faster. In that context,
Harnojoyo can be said to have so many qualified political modalities.
However, all of the above modalities are not entirely strong and
safe for Harnojoyo to maintain his position.This can be seen from the
opposing candidate who was an "old enemy" in the previous elections,
namely Haji Sarimuda. There was competitors who already have
extensive party networks and strong mass base support. According to the
analysis of many parties, the strongest competitor would be Sarimuda.
This figure is rather phenomenal. He has already run for mayor three
times, but always fail. The last failure was against the pair Romi Herton
and Harnojoyo. Even this failure occurred because there was a vote in the
Constitutional Court. Initially Sarimuda won by a very narrow margin of
13 votes, but then he was sued to the Constitutional Court and the result
was the opposite. This means that here, Sarimuda still has a fairly solid
mass base, and it could become a serious threat later.This could be a
potential strategic threat, because H Sarimuda's mass base is quite strong
and militant. Sarimuda has a fairly solid mass base, especially from the
FAKEM (Death Charity Forum) group spread across all urban villages in
Palembang.
Besides that, there was a fierce feud between Harnojoyo and Haji
Sarimuda due to the quick qount results from various institutions.31From
the various surveys published both nationally and locally, revealing that
Harnojoyo's position and electability always being squeezed and
Islam and Populism: Palembang …. 9
people of the city of Palembang. Second, with the theme "Step for Sure
in Knitting Ukhuwah Islamiah". Harnojoyo, in his opening remarks, said
that Mr. Guru Bajang is an example of a good leader, a leader who puts
forward Islamic programs because he is one of the Governors of
Indonesia who is hafiz Qur'an, of course, making his region prioritize its
area with Islamic programs ". Third, Haul Parents Kms. H. Abdul Halim.
On this occasion also attended directly by the Mayor of Palembang
Harnojoyo. In front of the famous Ulama', Habaib, and the Muslims of
Palembang City, Harnojoyo took the time to deliver a speech
representing the Palembang City Government. As the Mayor of
Palembang who proposed Palembang Emas Darussalam, Harnojoyo said
that he would always support Islamic events like this, especially in the
month of Ramadan. Fourth, the 2017 tabligh akbar event, inviting Ustazh
Abdul Somad. Although the event was not attended by Harnojoyo, the
message of the lecture delivered by Ustazh Abdul Somad was to choose a
leader who understands Islam and all the rules of Islamic law. Even
though every event organized by FPI is not always attended by
Harnojoyo, but in his remarks the chairman of the Tabligh event
committee Akbar Maspuroh as well as the Secretary General of the South
Sumatra FPI DPD, Habib Mahdi Muhammad Syahab thanked the
Palembang City Government (Palembang City Mayor H Harnojoyo) who
had allowed the Tabligh Akbar Maspuroh event to be held in the
courtyard of the Kuto Besak Fort.
The interpretation of desires is chosen and political interests are
accumulated from every Islamic event (tabligh akbar, Islamic recitation,
haul Ulama) which is attended directly by Harnojoyo. At the same time,
the presence of ulama, ustazh and governor Hafizh (Tuan Guru Bajang),
ulama and ustazh and Islamic boarding schools in Palembang city
became the momentum in giving a signal that Harnojoyo had an
emotional connection with Ulama', Habaib, Islamic organizations
especially FPI had the same thoughts. and has plans for Islamic programs
in the city of Palembang. Not only that, the activities carried out in the
courtyard of the Kuto Besak Fort Palembang, which so far have only
been used as a place for entertainment events, are filled with Islamic
events.
Harnojoyo Close to Ulama
Although basically, the organization of Islamic events and
Islamic religious activities that have been organized by FPI in order to
enliven Islamic traditions. However, looking at the momentum and time
span that are very close to political events. So, the above activities are
certain to contain elements and nuances of political interests.
Islam and Populism: Palembang …. 11
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16 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
Hm Izhar Alam*
ABSTRACT
foreign policy,” Ian Hall concludes that amid all the drama and
commotion, Modi’s administration accomplished nothing to change
India’s foreign policy direction, core values, or vital practices.5 The
revision of the “Look East” strategy into “Act East” is similar to the
perpetuity in the Indian foreign policy in general; it demonstrates
consistency with past governments’ policies6. Eventually, this appears to
be valid as Madan argues that “there is much more continuity than a shift
in India’s perspective of and attitude toward China since 2008” in Modi’s
foreign policy.” 7
India and China
India seeks to restrict Chinese influence in Asia while carving out a
strategic space as a significant force in a multipolar Asia and maintain its
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Nevertheless, though India has
managed its rivalry with China, it does not have a credible economic
plan. As a result, in the coming years, India’s search for suitable
solutions to an assertive China might instigate more sources of conflict in
the China-India engagement.
The main reason for the Sino-Indian rivalry is structural: their parallel
desire for prominent power position and concurrent areas of dominance
in Asia; the Tibetan de jure government-in-exile and the presence in
India of the Dalai Lama, and thousands of Tibetan exiles; the China-
Pakistan alliance; a major border issue involving huge territory; and
India’s emerging relationships with the US, Japan, and other East Asian
countries8. The Sino-Indian rivalry, on the other hand, is asymmetric.
India considers China its most potent competitor and a much more severe
threat than Pakistan, despite India being rated lower than the United
States or Japan among China’s adversaries9. The successive Modi
administrations have maintained a complex combination of internal
balance, minimal external balancing, cooperation/accommodation, and
competition dependent on the matter. Policies aimed at assisting India’s
development in a multipolar world but avoiding an open and militarised
confrontation with China. Because the rivalry is not likely to be resolved
shortly, the goal is to retain the China-India relationship as a “managed
rivalry”10. China is claiming around 90,000 square kilometres in the
eastern sector, roughly coeval with the Arunachal Pradesh state. India
claims the Aksai Chin, which is around 38,000 square kilometres in the
western sector under the Chinese part of Xinjiang. The middle sector,
which spans around 2000 square kilometres and is squeezed between the
India-Nepal-Tibet trijunction and Aksai Chin, includes many passes and
historic trade routes that remain ambiguous on the Sino-Indian border.
Although the China-India frontier is the lengthiest unmarked border
globally, it remained peaceful from 1975 until the 2020 Ladakh conflict,
when 20 Indian troops died. Although major militarised crises, such as
the 1986-87 dispute of Sumdorong Chu, the 2017 stand-off at Doklam
India and China: Act East Policy after Pandemic 19
and the 2020 conflict at Ladakh, have periodically erupted along this
border. Even though low fistfights and stone-pelting continue to be
prevalent, the two sides have so far managed to keep the crises from
intensification to widespread warfare leading to death and destruction11.
Nonetheless, India is apprehensive about Chinese “transgressions” in the
LAC, the de facto boundary between India and China.
Indian leaders are optimist of the country’s prospects in the long run.
India confronts substantial structural economic hurdles, and even before
the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Modi government was reprimanded for its
economic mismanagement12. Nonetheless, If the Indian economy grows
faster than China’s in the following decades, India would be the only
significant global power to surge compared to China, since Japan and the
US are predicted to slow down in the following decades and therefore
“decline” compared to China13. Although the current Minister of External
Affairs and former Foreign Secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has
approved that the performance of India in recent decades in comparison
to China has been “sobering.” However, the country’s goal looks in
creating a “multipolar world” with “a multipolar Asia at its core.” He
states that one of these poles is India, which in future will be a leading
power14. According to Vijay Gokhale, India’s then-Foreign Secretary
states, the Indian government have made it clear to the Chinese that both
nations are aspirational and shaping themselves as significant economic
and political entities, not only one but both. When dealing with one
another, each country must keep this in mind15. In other words, the
“desire” to be a major force in Asia and across the globe has been
expressed by India to the highest echelons of the government of China.
Starting with President Xi Jinping, Chinese leaders have acknowledged
the ambitions of India. Xi Jinping said India and China are “two major
powers in moulding a multipolar world and two vibrant forces driving
Asian and global economic growth” during his 2014 visit to India16.
Nonetheless, it is generally assumed that “government-affiliated elites”
of China continue to underestimate the potential of India as a great
power17. In the discussion on Sino-Indian relations, the prominent theme
is whether India will ever “catch up” to China18.
The Doklam Stand-off in 2017 to Galwan Tragedy in 2020
The confrontation in Doklam arose from India’s rebuttal to be
intimidated by the increasing assertiveness of China. The Doklam
plateau, which is being disputed, is located near Tibet, Bhutan, and
Sikkim. The confrontation began with the Chinese decision of
constructing a road through the Bhutanese territory. As part of a treaty
obligation to assist Bhutan in addressing its security concerns, India
dispatched soldiers to the disputed area, restricting China from seizing
physical control over the area19. Bhutan would have given China
20 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
in the political elite’s attitude toward China. China has breached two
crucial red lines by forcefully grabbing land and killing Indian troops31.
It is generally understood that the post-1988 arrangement for the ties
between India and China is based on recognising that despite border
conflict, both sides should preserve order along the disputed borders.
While negotiations on resolving the dispute could continue, India and
China needed to focus on building up relations in other areas.
Regrettably, this roadmap lasted only thirty years. India’s stance on LAC
is unambiguous, but its several appeals to China to clarify its position on
LAC have been ignored since it would deprive China of the opportunity
to continue changing goals and forcefully create compromises. China’s
recent declaration denying recognition to the creation of Union Territory
of Ladakh and condemning infrastructure development for military
control objectives in disputed border regions exemplifies this mentality32.
Numerous possible explanations for China’s aggressive attitude have
been advanced. India is nearing completion of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat
Beg Oldie (DSDBO), a strategic road that is more than a 250-kilometre
all-weather road that will significantly reduce transit time from Leh to
Daulat Beg Oldie. China was most likely considering a route from
DSDBO to the Galwan Valley as a possible “back door” in Aksai Chin.
The Chinese move seizing chunks of the Galwan Valley might well be
intended to restrict any strategic advantage India could gain from
enhanced infrastructure in the border33. China is also being criticised for
obfuscating the COVID-19 Pandemic severity. China has been
attempting to deflect attention away from its apparent delay in
announcing the Pandemic to the rest of the globe through targeted
influence operations. Military assertiveness across the LAC is understood
as a clear message for India that efforts to counterweight China would
backfire. Another cause for China’s numerous policy blunders is Xi
Jinping’s excessive concentration of power34.
China-Pakistan Entente and the Status of Jammu Kashmir
Another significant factor is the abrogation of Article 370 that has
imparted China a new point of disagreement. By requesting the United
Nations Security Council’s intervention in India’s decision to amend the
Jammu and Kashmir Constitutional status, Beijing aided Pakistan’s
internationalisation of the Kashmir issue. However, the joint efforts of
China and Pakistan failed because most UNSC members felt no
requirement for a declaration or conclusion following the discussions in a
meeting held on August 16, 201935. In January 2020, China tried again at
the UN to internationalise the Kashmir issue but failed because the other
14 members of the UNSC decided the issue did not need any
discussion36. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) urged China
should acknowledge the international understanding on the issue of
Kashmir and avoid bringing it up at the UN, reiterating that the question
22 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
warship refuelling support that enables China to extend its naval presence
in the Indian Ocean45. As a result, New Delhi has taken China’s maritime
assertiveness seriously. As a result, bilateral and multilateral defence
cooperation with regional actors such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Australia and Vietnam has reached new heights. The Indian
government’s “Look East” strategy has been enhanced to “Act East,”
with the primary goal of improving Connectivity infrastructure in Greater
Mekong, which covers Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and
Vietnam.
Many countries on the periphery that see China as a threat see India as a
power balancer. Several political analysts see India’s increased
engagement with regional states to counter China’s growing power46.
India could use the chance to create a relationship and have the region on
its side through Act East Policy. Prime Minister Modi’s statement on
January 26, 2018, in an op-ed published in 27 newspapers circulated in
ASEAN nations, said that ASEAN-India ties are “free from contests and
claims” and believe in “sovereign equality of all nations irrespective of
size”47. This statement may be construed as a veiled allusion to China’s
disputed South China Sea territorial claims. With a strong fleet and
current geopolitical dynamics, the geostrategic significance of India in
the Indian Ocean leaves Washington with no option but to co-opt New
Delhi as the strategic ally of America. India’s strategic preference for the
US was made reasonably apparent by India’s government, which signed
the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and
the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA) in 2018. It is a big difference from India’s long-standing
stance of not joining any great power military alliances.
Together with this shift, the word “Asia-Pacific region” is now replaced
by “Indo-Pacific region” with the foreign policy terminology in India,
Japan, the US, and Australia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(QSD), which was suspended a decade earlier between India, Japan, the
US, and Australia due to Chinese apprehensions, resurfaced on the
sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in 2017 after ten years. The Modi
administration established a new Indian Foreign Ministry ‘Indo-Pacific
Division’ before the legislative elections in May 2019. The Quad
convened in New York at the end of September 2019, coupled with the
General Assembly of the United Nations, which was a significant
development. The formalisation of the discussion suggests that the
informal framework on regional security issues, such as Chinese
increased economic influence, military might, and the Indo-Pacific
diplomatic presence, will be institutionalised48. The quad cooperation
expanded to Quad-plus, including three additional Indo-Pacific countries
following the COVID-19 pandemic, namely South Korea, New Zealand
and Vietnam. New Delhi’s support for the process reflects the country’s
growing acceptance of an American vision of the world that seeks to
India and China: Act East Policy after Pandemic 25
1
Minxin Pei, “COVID-19 is finishing off the Sino-American relationship,” The
Japan Times, May 01, 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/05/01/commentary/world-
commentary/covid-19-finishing-off-sino-american-relationship/.
2
Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in 2014 and was re-elected in
2019
3
Sumit Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign
Policy?,” TheWashingtonQuarterly40, no. 2 (2017): 131-
143, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1328929.
4
Rajesh Basrur, “Modi's foreign policy fundamentals: A trajectory
unchanged,” International Affairs 93, no.1 (January 2017): 7-
26, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiw006
5
Ian Hall, Modi and the reinvention of Indian foreign policy (Bristol: Bristol
University Press, 2019), 7.
6
Manjeet S. Pardesi, “The initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry,” Asian Security
15, no. 3 (2019): 253-284, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1471060.
7
Tanvi Madan, “Managing China: competitive engagement, with Indian
characteristics,” ‘Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World’
project of the Brookings Institute, February, 2020, 3,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/managing-china-competitive-engagement-
with-indian-characteristics/.
8
John W. Garver, Protracted contest: Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth
century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001)
9
Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Modi: From ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’: Semantic or
substantive change?,” International Studies Perspectives 20, no. 1 (2019): 29-
33.; T.V. Paul, ed. The China-India rivalry in the globalization era (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018).
10
T.V. Paul, “Explaining conflict and cooperation in the China-India Rivalry,” in
The China-India rivalry in the globalization era, ed. T.V. Paul (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 6.
11
Manjeet S. Pardesi, “India’s China strategy under Modi: continuity in the
management of an asymmetric rivalry,” International Politics (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00287-3
12
Raghuram Rajan, “I’m Worried by the Extent of Economic Catastrophe India
is Facing,” The Wire, May 27, 2020, https://thewire.in/economy/raghuram-rajan-
lockdown-india-economic-catastrophe.
13
Luis Enriquez, Sven Smit, and Jonathan Ablett, “Shifting tides: global
economic scenarios for 2015-2025,” McKinsey&Company, September 01, 2015,
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-
finance/our-insights/shifting-tides-global-economic-scenarios-for-2015-25#.
14
“S Jaishankar at RNG Lecture full text: ‘How do you reconcile Howdy Modi
and Mamallapuram? Look beyond dogma’,” The Indian Express, November 16,
2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/full-text-how-do-you-reconcile-
30 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
howdy-modi-and-mamallapuram-look-beyond-dogma-says-s-jaishankar-
6122001/.
15
Committee on External Affairs (2017-2018), Sino-Indian relations including
Doklam, border situation, and cooperation in international organizations,
Report no. 22 (New Delhi: Sixteenth Lok Sabha, September 2018), 3,
http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/16_External_Affairs_2
2.pdf.
16
Xi Jinping, “Let Us Become Partners in Pursuit of our Dreams,” Daily News,
September 18, 2014, https://www.mfa.gov.lk/exclusive-xi-jinping-president-
peoples-republic-of-china-to-daily-newsreaders-let-us-become-partners-in-
pursuit-of-our-dreams/.
17
Minxin Pei, “Dangerous misperceptions: Chinese views of India’s rise,” India
in Transition. Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of
Pennsylvania, May 23, 2011, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/pei.
18
Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulat Singh, Chasing the Dragon: Will
India catch up with China? (Delhi: Pearson, 2009).
19
Sumit Ganguly, “The Doklam dispute in context: China Is Drawing India's
Neighbors Closer to Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, August 09, 2017,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-08-09/doklam-dispute-
context.
20
Sumit Ganguly, “India and China: On a collision course?,” Pacific Affairs 91,
no.2 (2018): 231-244, http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2018912231.
21
Sutirtho Patranobis, “Lessons for India and China from 1967 Nathu La clash,”
Hindustan Times, July 01, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-
news/lessons-for-india-and-china-from-1967-nathu-la-clash/story-
IjZMtQb92D98pFgiCFN3ON.html.
22
Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Managing the 1986-87 Sino-Indian Sumdorong Chu
crisis,” India Review 18, no.4 (2019): 534-551,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2019.1703364.
23
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on
August 28, 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1487932.sht
ml.
24
Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, China’s search for security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012), 159.
25
Prabhas K. Dutta, “Doklam standoff: Why Indian Army must prepare to beat
back more Chinese incursions,” India Today, August 07, 2017,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/general-bipin-rawat-doklam-india-china-
indian-army-1032230-2017-08-27.
26
Bharat Karnad, “China is the villain,” The Week, February 23, 2019,
https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2019/02/23/china-is-the-villain.html.
27
Pangong Tso is an endorheic lake that extends over East Ladakh and West
Tibet. About half of the total length of the lake is in Tibet's China, 40% in
India and China: Act East Policy after Pandemic 31
Ladakh India and the remainder, which is a de facto buffer zone between China
and India. Pangong Tso is in controversial territory and the LAC runs through
the lake. A portion of the lake about 20 km east of the LAC is controlled by
China but is claimed by India. Pangong Tso is strategically important since it is
extremely near to Chusul Valley, which during the 1962 war was one of the
battlefronts.
28
At the north-western part of the disputed Aksai Chin area of Kashmir, the
Depsang plains is gravelly plain area in high altitude, split between Chinese and
Indian portions across the LAC. India holds the western section of the plains as
part of Ladakh, but China controls the eastern part and India claims it.
29
The Galwan River runs from China's disputed Aksai Chin to the Ladakh region
of India. A flashpoint between China and India in its border dispute is a small
valley of the Galwan River which runs through the Karakoram Mountain. In
April 2020 India began its own building operations to create a DS-DBO road on
the LAC side over the remainder 4-5 km of Galwan Valley. On 5 May 2020,
China launched a deployment across the Galwan Valley, putting soldiers in
tented stations. India reacted equally by sending its own soldiers to the region.
30
Hot Springs is the campground located in the Chang Chenmo Valley on the
Indian Border Checkpoint in Ladakh near the disputed China border. It's so
called since there's a hot spring here. The LAC near Kongka Pass is only 3
kilometers east. The region is located north of the Karakoram Range mountains
to the north of Pangong Tso Lake, and south-east of Galwan Valley, a significant
site for the deadly clash in June 2020.
31
Dan Altman, “What the history of modern conquest tells us about China and
India’s border crisis,” War on the Rocks, July 09, 2020,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/what-the-history-of-modern-conquest-tells-
us-about-china-and-indias-border-crisis/.
32
Pushkar Banakar, “Bejing never accepted 1959 perception of LAC: India calls
out Chinese doublespeak,” New Indian Express, September 30, 2020,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/sep/30/bejing-never-accepted-
1959-perception-of-lac-india-calls-out-chinese-doublespeak-2203677.html.
33
Altman, “What the history of modern conquest tells us about China.”
34
Minxin Pei, “Strongman rule inhibits internal debate and makes poor decisions
more likely,” Japan Times, July 13, 2020,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/13/commentary/world-
commentary/political-logic-chinas-strategic-mistakes/#.XwyzTChKjIU.
35
“Lost battle due to China’: How Pak’s effort to internationalise Kashmir issue
was broken piece by piece at UN,” News18, August 17, 2019,
https://www.news18.com/news/india/pakistans-efforts-to-internationalise-
kashmir-snubbed-as-unsc-consultations-endwithout-outcome-2273895.html.
36
Geeta Mohan, “China isolated on Kashmir issue at UNSC, 14 nations refuse
discussion in big win for India,” India Today, January 16, 2020,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-pakistan-isolated-on-kashmir-issue-
at-unsc-1637238-2020-01-16.
32 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
37
Associated Press, “Avoid raising Kashmir dispute at United Nations, India asks
China,” South China Morning Post, January 16, 2020,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3046450/avoid-raising-
kashmir-dispute-united-nations-india-asks-china.
38
Press Trust of India, “China defends raising Kashmir issue at UNSC to de-
escalate Indo-Pak tensions,” Economic Times, January 17, 2020,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-defends-raising-
kashmir-issue-at-unsc-to-de-escalate-indo-pak-
tensions/articleshow/73330246.cms.
39
K. McCauley, “Snapshot: China’s western theatre command,” China Brief 17,
no.1 (January 13, 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-
western-theater-command.
40
Subir Bhaumik, “Kashmir casts a long shadow on India-China relations,” The
Telegraph, September 12, 2019,
https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/kashmir-casts-a-long-shadowon-india-
china-relations/cid/1704482.
41
Ashley J. Tellis, Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian border
confrontation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 04, 2020),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in-himalayas-sino-indian-
border-confrontation-pub-81979.
42
Takenori Horimoto, “Explaining India’s foreign policy: From dream to
realization of major power,” InternationalRelationsoftheAsia-Pacific 17, no.3
(September 2017): 463-496, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx011.
43
Takenori Horimoto, “Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific
Age-Transcending the Quad framework,” Japan Review 3, no.2 (Fall 2019): 54-
70, https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/japanreview/pdf/JapanReview_Vol3_No2.pdf.
44
Mari Izuyama and Masahiro Kurita, “Security in the Indian Ocean region:
Regional responses to China’s growing influence,” in East Asian Strategic
Review, ed. Shinji Hyodo (Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies,
2017), 39-69,
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2017.html.
45
Same Bateman, Rajni Gamage, & Jane Chan, “ASEAN and the Indian Ocean:
The key maritime links” (Monograph No. 33, S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, July 2017), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/idss/mn33-asean-and-the-indian-ocean/.
46
Reuters, “India eyes ‘Act East’ policy, plans closer ASEAN maritime ties to
counter China,” Hindustan Times, January 24, 2018,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indiaplans-closer-asean-maritime-
ties-to-counter-china/story47qO3x4scI18H9yGiHxIbL.html; Udai Bhanu Singh,
“Significance of India’s act east policy and engagement with ASEAN,”
InstituteofDefenseStudiesandAnalyses, December 04, 2018,
https://idsa.in/backgrounder/significance-india-act-east-policy-and-engagement-
with-asean-ubsingh_041218.
India and China: Act East Policy after Pandemic 33
47
“On Republic Day, PM Modi writes op-ed, says India, ASEAN relations ‘free
from contests, claims,” Indian Express, January 26, 2018,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/covid-19-fm-nirmala-presents-first-
batch-of-supplementary-demands-seeksadditional-rs-2-35-lakh-crore/story-
82wPS2uNLSfdcqzB9LJWhI.html.
48
Jason Scott and Isabel Reynolds, “India, US, Japan, Australia come together to
give impetus to ‘anti-China’ Quad,” The Print, September 27, 2019,
https://theprint.in/world/india-usjapan-australia-come-together-to-give-impetus-
to-anti-china-quad/297520/.
49
Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue,” Royal United Services
Institute(RUSI) Commentary,June12, 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-our-
research/publications/commentary/india-and-the-%E2%80%98quad-
plus%E2%80%99-dialogue.
50
Ling Shengli, “Complex ties confound Indo-Pacific strategy,” Global Times,
September 24, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165392.shtml.
51
Shweta Sunil & Vrishti Beniwal, India’s growing economic reliance on China
may be tough to break, Bloomberg, July 01, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-01/india-s-growing-
economic-reliance-on-china-may-be-tough-to-break.
52
“After India, US looking at banning TikTok, other Chinese apps,” Outlook,
July 07, 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/world-news-us-
looking-atbanning-tiktok-other-chinese-apps-mike-pompeo/356199.
53
Jeffrey Wilson, “India’s RCEP exit a setback, but not a disaster,”
TheInterpreter, Lowy Institute, November 06, 2019,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-s-rcep-exit-setback-not-
disaster.
54
Sanjaya Baru, “What’s going wrong with India’s Act East policy?,” The Indian
Express, May 26, 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-
singapore-relationship-southeast-asia-policy-7330227/.
55
Sharon Seah, Hoang Thi Ha, Melinda Martinus and Pham Thi Phuong
Thao,The State of South East Asia: 2021 Survey Report(Singapore: ISEAS-
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/category/articles-
commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/.
56
Baladas Ghoshal, “India’s ‘Act East’ must factor this in: Post-pandemic,
Southeast Asia increasingly distrusts China and trusts the US,” Times of India,
March 12, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/indias-
act-east-must-factor-this-in-post-pandemic-southeast-asia-increasingly-distrusts-
china-and-trusts-the-us/.
34 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
ABSTRACT
Youth have a role to establish peaceful and stable life in the community
since they participate in preventing stealing and robbery. They
participate in keeping peace in collaboration with security agents during
demonstration. Youth are also leading in settling the problem when
crisis occurred.
Accordingly, it is clear that youth can contribute for community
development through their participation in building and sustaining
peace and security.
The study also pointed out that youth are instrumental for community
development by eliminating malpractices in the public administration
areas. In this regard, participants of the study described that, youth do
not regret to expose malpractices in public administrations. Through
peaceful demonstration, social media campaigns and other informal
communications, youth strived to reveal corruptions and unnecessary
bureaucracies in public offices.30 It also indicated that deepening
participation at grass roots levels can strengthen the exercise and
assimilation of democratic principles on the public life since local
democracy and local development are inseparable. Hence, the activities
of youth are unquestionably important to bring local development. One
of the participant from FGD two explained that:
Youth showed unreserved efforts to prevail good governance in public
institutions. They need reform in public offices and are actors in such
processes. Among other, they demand democracy and resection of
human rights. They quest infrastructures and employment opportunity
for themselves and for their community. Youth are engines in bringing
any change in public administrations of any aspects (November 09,
2019). Hence one of the areas that youth can contribute for local
community development is through promoting good governance and
fight against maladministration in public offices.
The study revealed that youth in the study area also have their own
contribution in the area of economy as they have engaged in various
economic activities like service deliveries and small scale industries.
Concerning to this, participants discussed that the attitudes of youth
towards entrepreneurship and their participation in economic activities
has improved. The study found that some youth have been involved in
small scale industries like garment and powder factories, agricultural
productions, coble stone industries, hotels and lodge services. In such
areas of investment, youth investors can create job opportunities for
other individuals. They also actively involved in tourism activities like
tour guide activities, receiving and accommodating tourists.
Therefore, it reasonable to argue that youth’s participation in various
economic activities can be seen as important contribution in community
development.
40 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
Moreover, the study further showed that youth have their own
contribution in developing the socio-cultural values of the communities.
In time of religious and other cultural celebrations, it is witnessed that
youth are front runners in arranging programs and presenting shows
that reflect their community norms and values. They participated in
voluntary services like helping the poor, elders, orphans and evicted
persons in the area. Interviewee 10 (December 20, 2019) explained
that: ‘‘youth’s experience in providing voluntary services are
interesting. They help the needy people during holidays and they
organize and facilitate different religious and cultural celebrations’’.
Accordingly, we can conclude that youth’s role in community
development can also be manifested in sociocultural activities.31In line
with this it is stated that young people is increasingly taking as central
stage in discussions of sustainable socio-economic developments.32
Moreover, AU (2011) explained that youth have important roles
towards social advancement.33
ii. Challenges to Youth’s Participation in Community Development
The study indicated that low access for job opportunity in the study
area is one of the challenges that restrict youth’s participation in local
community developments. Participants explained that when there are
job opportunities in the area, the government gives priority for investors
which in turn resulted to increase the number of youth unemployment.
Government’s effort in providing training to youth towards
entrepreneurship is very low. As a result, many youths are not willing
to engage in low level activities. They do not want to grow gradually.
Hence, unemployment is one of the challenge that impedes the
contribution of youth in community development.
The study showed that, low participation of stakeholders is the other
challenge that reduces youth’s role in community development. As
participants discussed, to bring community development, stakeholders
including government, family, school, investors and religious
institutions have to work in creating responsible, ethical and rational
youth. However, such stakeholders did not discharge their duties fully
in shaping youth. Interviewee 08 (November 15, 2019) stated that:
parents are not in a position to grow their children in an ethical manner;
schools have not designed programs to create role model citizens;
religious and other government institutions have also not utilized their
full efforts to create productive youth.
The study showed that government’s activity to answer youth’s
questions in the area of employment, good governance, infrastructure
and the like is very limited. According to Israel and Ilven overlooking
the young people from making contributions to community affairs
unnecessarily limits a community’s capacity to solve local problems. 34
Roles and Challenges of Youth Participation in …. 41
social norms and deteriorated work habits on the part of youth were
other challenges that hinder their contribution in development.
References
1. J. C., Iwuchukwu, O. I. Ogbonna & O. I Agboti, ‘Roles of youth’s groups
in Rural Community Development in Ebonyi State, Nigeria’, Journal of
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, vol. 7(2), 2015 pp. 41-47
2. W. Kadmiel, ‘Local Government and Local Economic Development in
Southern Africa’. Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Midlands
State University, 2014.
3. Gebrehiwet Haileleul, ‘Assessing the Status of Community Participation in
Local Development’ International Journal of Engineering Development
and Research, vol. 4(4), 217-228, 2016m.
4. W. Kadmiel, ‘Local Government and Local Economic Development in
Southern Africa’. Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Midlands
State University, 2014.
5. G.D., Israel and T.W. Ilvento, ‘Building a Foundation for Community
Leadership: involving youth in Community Development Projects’.
Mississippi State, Southern Rural Development Center, 1996, Pp.146-160
6. Gebrehiwet Haileleul, ‘Assessing the Status of Community Participation in
Local Development’ International Journal of Engineering Development
and Research, vol. 4(4), 217-228, 2016m.
7. J. C., Iwuchukwu, O. I. Ogbonna & O. I Agboti, ‘Roles of youth’s groups
in Rural Community Development in Ebonyi State, Nigeria’, Journal of
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, vol. 7(2), 2015 pp. 41-47
8. Gebrehiwet Haileleul, ‘Assessing the Status of Community Participation in
Local Development’ International Journal of Engineering Development
and Research, vol. 4(4), 217-228, 2016m.
9. L.O. Udensi, G.L., Daasi, D.S. Emah, S.A. Zukbee, ‘Youth Participation in
Community Development (CD) Programmes in Cross River State:
Implications for Sustainable Youth Development in Nigeria’. Journal of
Humanities and Social Science/IOSR-JHSS, vol. 13(5), 2013, pp. 61-67.
10. W. Kadmiel, ‘Local Government and Local Economic Development in
Southern Africa’. Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Midlands
State University, 2014.
11. J. C., Iwuchukwu, O. I. Ogbonna & O. I Agboti, ‘Roles of youth’s groups
in Rural Community Development in Ebonyi State, Nigeria’, Journal of
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, vol. 7(2), 2015 pp. 41-47
12. L.O. Udensi, G.L., Daasi, D.S. Emah, S.A. Zukbee, ‘Youth Participation in
Community Development (CD) Programmes in Cross River State:
Implications for Sustainable Youth Development in Nigeria’. Journal of
Humanities and Social Science/IOSR-JHSS, vol. 13(5), 2013, pp. 61-67.
Roles and Challenges of Youth Participation in …. 43
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In the history of western philosophy, Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is
one of the most renowned philosophers. In his work, Hegel exclusively
explored the science of logic, the philosophy of nature, and the
philosophy of spirit. As a social and political thinker, he grappled with
the concepts of freedom, reason, self-consciousness, and recognition. In
spite of some critics believing that Hegel is a philosopher of states and
second way of interpreting the 'Idea of the State' and international law
according to Hegel, is also dogmatic. This is because it completely
ignores the significance of the historical features of individual states.
Therefore, Hegel's logic is entirely justified, since a state cannot engage
in the international sphere if it does not recognize its unique historical
features.
Finally, the third approach establishes a concept that a state is an
isolated and autonomous entity, but regarding the relationships with other
states, each state is considered to be a component or part of some higher
totality or whole. At this juncture, Hegel argues that there must be a third
abstract factor that stands above the relationship between the two
individual states in the international arena that can bind them together.
He presumes that this third factor can be associated with the ‘world-
mind.’ Hegel interprets the ‘mind’ as giving itself actuality in the world’s
history and is the absolute judge of states.9 In Hegel’s opinion, this third
approach to understanding ‘the Idea of the State’ contains the strengths of
the first two approaches and the weaknesses of neither. Hegel, as a
strong cosmopolitan thinker, believes in an overarching totality that
indicates the potential of a cosmopolis or a world-state. In this
cosmopolis-state, he envisions that the relationship between nations will
be based on mutual respect, acknowledgement, and peaceful
collaboration rather than conflict and war.
In short, these three Hegelian approaches are associated with a
different perspective of Hegel’s thought on global politics; each of
which constitutes a distinct position within the communitarian versus
cosmopolitan debate. The discussion in the following part will be based
on this constructive debate concerning Hegel's stance between these two
extremes. Our main aim is to find which extreme will be best suited to
his ideas on global politics.
Hegel as Communitarian
The debate over ‘Hegel as a communitarian’ begins with definite
claims made by some commentators who believe that Hegel's political
thought is largely linked with communitarianism. According to
Thompson10, Hegel asserts that people’s moral lives are necessarily
intertwined with their participation in a particular political society. Also,
philosopher Brown11 in his survey of international theory chose Hegel as
the classic representative of communitarianism. He apparently asserts
that Hegel offers a complete account of the world from the
communitarian position. Similarly, philosopher Heater12 claims that
Hegel affirms the moral primacy of the community and considers society
as the source of ethical and political standards of life.
In ‘Philosophy of Right,’ Hegel claims that the community is
established by those individuals who are its member citizens, and he
In Search of a Holistic Approach to Global…. 49
through the presence of an enemy abroad, which will unite 'us,' or the
citizens of a certain state, against 'them,' or the citizens of other states.
These two logics of communitarianism make Hegel sceptical
about the possibility of the emergence of a cosmopolis or world-state, in
which all human beings are member citizens. If every citizen in the world
banded together to form a universal community, then ‘war’ and
‘solidarity’ of an individual state would become a vague concept, which
Hegel rejects with his rational logic. Instead, he explains that even if
some states make peace with one another and form a group, such an
alliance as an individual entity must engender an opposing force and
create an enemy.21 So, this strong communitarian logic supports the
notion that Hegel is unquestionably a communitarian thinker.
Hegel as a Cosmopolitan Thinker
Even though Hegel may oppose the international political
thought of a world-state, he does, however, recognize the need for a just
global order that promotes the freedom of individuals, the mutual
recognition of diverse national-states and cultures, and a global
commitment to the ideas of right and justice.22 In this way, Hegel
emphasizes a more rational and unique view of cosmopolitanism. His
logic comprises an idea that the unity of nation-states is “historically
suited and institutionally rooted.”23 Hegel’s historical explanation
suggests that world history is a history of nation-states where the
individual state maintains a diplomatic relationship with other states for
their existence. Moreover, the history of society and state articulates the
demand for global processes ranging from the effects of economic
globalization to the global expansion of supranational organizations.
Therefore, his juxtaposing perspective emphasises the need for
transnational legal systems, global institutions, sub-political cultural
groupings, and independent nation-states.24 Here, we will present some of
his valid judgments of moral and economic cosmopolitanism.
Hegel has always espoused the moral cosmopolitanism of the
Enlightenment, emphasizing the ethical value of individuality. In his
view, the acknowledgement of that person as a human is the cornerstone
of ethical living. As such, Hegel insisted that a modern state cannot be
bound by its territorial edge or by a narrow notion of ethnicity or
nationality.25In contrast, it must be multicultural or multinational, with
the state tolerating and protecting ethnic, cultural, and religious
distinctions. It is significant because it shapes one’s identity as an
emancipated soul or as an absolute human being. Freedom is the value
that Hegel most greatly admires, and this value can be best ensured by a
secular or modern state. For instance, if we look at Canada as a modern
state, we can see Hegel’s logical explanation of moral and ethical
cosmopolitanism26. In Canada, multiculturalism means that all Canadians
can maintain their identities, be proud of their ancestors, and have a
In Search of a Holistic Approach to Global…. 51
1
David Boucher, Political Theory of International Relations- From Thucydides
to the Present, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998).
2
Ibid.
3
G.W.F Hegel, Philosophy of Right (trans. TM Knox), (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979 [1821]).
4
G.W.F Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction (trans.
HB Nisbet), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 [1830]).
5
G.W.F Hegel, Hegel: Elements Of The Philosophy Of Right, (Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
6
Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7
Op. Cit. I
In Search of a Holistic Approach to Global…. 59
8
Tony Burns, Hegel and Global Politics: Communitarianism or
cosmopolitanism. Journal of International Political Theory, 2014, Vol- 10(3), p.
325–344.
9
Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the
Phenomenology of Spirit (ed A Bloom), (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell
University Press 1996 [1947]).
10
Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry,
(London: Routledge, 1992).
11
Chris Brown, Practical Judgement in International Political Theory: Selected
Essays, (Routledge: London, 2010).
12
Derek Heater, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents,
(London: Continuum, 2002).
13
Op. Cit. 8
14
Shlomo Avineri, Hegel and nationalism, Review of Politics, (1962), Vol-
24(4), p.461–482.
15
Op. Cit. 3
16
S.V. Hicks, “Hegel on cosmopolitanism, international relations, and the
challenges of globalization. In: Buchwalter A (ed.) Hegel and Global
Justice,”(Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, and London: Springer, 2012), p.
21–47.
17
G. K. Browning, “Hegel on war, recognition, and justice. In:Buchwalter A
(ed.) Hegel and Global Justice,”(Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, and
London: Springer 2012), p.193–210.
18
Op. Cit. 3
19
Op. Cit. 17
20
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: With Leo Strauss’s Notes on
Schmitt’s Essay (trans. G Schwab and JH Lomax), (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1996).
21
Andrew Buchwalter, “Hegel’s Concept of an International ‘We.’ In: Grier PT
(ed.) Identity and Difference: Studies in Hegel’s Logic, Philosophy of Spirit and
Politics,” (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), p. 155–176.
22
Sean Sayers, Individual and society in Marx and Hegel: Beyond the
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, Science and Society, 2007, Vol-71(1), p.
84-102.
23
Op. Cit.1
24
Op. Cit. 8
25
G.W.F Hegel, Hegel: Elements Of The Philosophy Of Right, (Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
60 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
26
L. L. Moland, “Evolving nationalities: Ethical cosmopolitanism: Hegel beyond
the nation-state. In: Moland LL (ed.) Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism,
Nationality, Cosmopolitanism,”(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
2011), p. 149–175).
27
Hans M. Jaeger, Hegel’s reluctant realism and the transnationalization of civil
society, Review of International Studies, (2002), Vol- 28(3), pg. 497-517
28
Alexander Wendt, Why a world state is inevitable, European Journal of
International Relations, (2003). Vol- 9(4), p. 491–542.
29
Andrew Vincent, The Hegelian state and international politics, Review of
International Studies, Vol- 9(3), (1983), p.193–205.
30
Op. Cit.3
31
Op. Cit.16
32
Andrew Buchwalter, Hegel and Capitalism, (State University of Newyork
Press, 2015).
33
Takeshi Nakano, Hegel's theory of economic nationalism: Political economy in
the Philosophy of Right, The European Journal of the History of Economic
Thought, 2006, Vol-11(1), p. 33-52.
34
H. M. Mitias, Hegel on International Law, (Millsaps College Jackson,
Mississippi, 1980).
35
James L. Briely, The Basis of Obligation in International Law,( Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1958).
36
T. M. Knox, Introduction in Hegel's Political Writings, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1964).
37
Op. Cit. 16
38
Errol E. Harris, “Hegel’s theory of sovereignty, international relations, and
war. In Hegel’s social and political thought: The philosophy of objective spirit,
ed.”(D.P. Verene, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press,1980), p.123–150.
39
Daniel Woodley, Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics: Sovereignty and
State Power in a Multipolar World, (Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group:
London and New York, 2015).
40
Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
41
Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,
International Security, (1994), Vol-19(2), p. 5–49.
42
Ibid.
43
Philippa Levine, The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset, (Pearson Education
Limited, 2007).
44
Op. Cit. 3
In Search of a Holistic Approach to Global…. 61
45
Op. Cit. 27
46
Op. Cit. 16
47
S. A. Gunaratne, Globalization: A Non-Western Perspective: The Bias of
Social Science/Communication Oligopoly, Communication, Culture & Critique,
(2009), Vol- 10(29), p. 60-82.
48
Stephen P. Halbrook, Left Hegelianism, Arab Nationalism, and Labor Zionism,
The Journal of Liberation Studies, 1982, Vol- VI(2) p. 181–199.
49
Alison Stone, Hegel and Colonialism, The Hegel Society of Great Britain,
Hegel Bulletin, (2017), p- 1-24.
50
Andrew Buchwalter, “Hegel, Global justice, and Mutual Recognition. In:
Buchwalter, A. (ed.) Hegel and Global Justice,”(Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New
York, and London: Springer 2012), p. 211–232.
51
Op. Cit. 8
52
Richard Mullender, Hegel, human rights, and particularism. Journal of Law
and Society, (2003), Vol- 30(4), p. 554–574.
62 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
Abdus Sabur*
ABSTRACT
2 Muslim 34.22
3 Christian 3.74
4 Sikh 0.07
5 Buddhist 0.18
6 Jain 0.08
7 Others 0.16
Source: Census Report in Assam, 2011.
The above census data shows that Muslims in Assam is the second
largest group of people and also the primary religious minority group in
the state. If we go through the proper meaning of minority, we must read
the definition provided by Louis Wirth. According to him, “ Minority is
a group of people who because of their physical or cultural
characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which
they live for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard
themselves as objects of collective discrimination.3
This definition of Louis Wirth is probably the most appropriate definition
in so far as the minority Muslims in Assam is concerned because there
are vast differences of culture, language, traditions, rituals, dresses, etc.
between the indigenous Assamese people and other caste community
people as stated above. TheMuslim’s are mainly migrated people who
have come from neighbouring Bangladesh.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AND MINORITY MUSLIMS IN
ASSAM:
It is said that Assam is a land of Red rivers and Blue Hills. It has huge
beautiful sceneries and fertile land useful to cultivation. Usually
Assamese people are peaceful and cultured. But when any threats come
to this brave community, they come together to resist that and to establish
their supremacy. It is in this context, mentionable that the demographic
pattern of Assam has drastically changed in the previous years due to
external and internal migration to this fertile land. The following table
will depict a clear picture to this regard.4
Table-2
Period Total Interstate Total Foreign Immigrants
Immigrants Immigrants (estimated)
Total Legal Illegal
1951-61 1067846 260636 807219 314183 493027
(75.60) (75.60) (29.42) (46.18)
1961-71 835937 495461 495461 330015 165446
Human Rights and Minority Muslim in…. 65
The huge immigration to Assam has created chaos and havoc among the
indigenous Assamese people. They became apprehended of losing their
identity and cultural heritages. Therefore, the Assamese people in the
state staged several agitations in the state. Most notable among these is
‘the Assam Movement, 1979-85.’
The Assam movement was led by All Assam Student’s Union (AASU),
Axom Jatiyatabadi Yuba Satra Parishad (AJYCP), Axom Sahitya Sabha,
Sadou Axom Karmachari Parishad, etc, etc. The demand of the agitators
was to deport illegal outsiders of Assam. The outsiders meant illegal
Bangladeshi nationals as well as people came from other states of India,
etc. The agitation was so organised that it was spread almost all corner of
Assam. During this agitation thousands of innocent people especially
Bengali speaking Muslims and Bengali Hindus were brutally killed.
According to print media report, about 3000 people were killed in Nellie,
Nagaon district on 18th February 1983.5 Besides Nellie, innocent people
were killed in Barpeta, Samaria (kamrup), Lakhimpur, Darrang etc. etc.
After the killing of Nellie, the Government set up an enquiry commission
headed by TP Tiwary, an IAS Officer. The commission enquired into the
incident, but no fruitful conclusion has come out. The commission
submitted its report in 1984. But it is not published yet now.6 Only a few
pages of the report are leaked. The guilty officers, Police personnel’s,
Administrative Officers and other responsible people did not play proper
role to provide safeguards to the victims. Later, the Government of Assam
offered next to kin of victim’s family a sum of Rupees 3000/ and few
bundle of GI Sheets.7The killers were identified but trial is not held till
date. Interestingly the same type of massacre was held in 1984 in Delhi
and the victims were provided justice after a long gap. In this context, it
may be said that justice delayed is justice denied.
A big question arises here that the leaders of the Assam movement
formed the next government in the state in 1985. Mr. Prafulla Kumar
Mahanta (the erstwhile President of AASU) became the Chief Minister in
the State. This government came to power with a major promise to deport
illegal foreigners. Accordingly, they formed Foreigners Tribunal Court in
the state. Since then, the successive governments in Assam have been
trying to detect and deport illegal foreigners from Assam through
Foreigners Tribunal (FT) Court. Various Tribunals have since 1985
declared 61,774 persons as foreigners, both from the 1966-71stream and
66 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
the post 25th March, 1971 stream.8.A table indicating the stream to which
these foreigners belong on being so declared by appropriate tribunals at
various phases is placed below:
TABLE-3
Period 1966-1971 Post 1971 Total ‘D’ Voters Total with
Stream declared as ‘D’ Voters
Stream
foreigners
1985- 14801 6724 21525 - 21525
1990
1991- 4005 2577 6582 - 6582
1995
1996- 6026 902 6928 6590 (1998 to 33667
2000 31.7.2012)
2001- 4593 2643 7236
2005
2006- 3112 9801 12913
2012
(July)
Grand 32537 22647 55184 6590 61774
Total
Police services, etc. are provided to them. There is about 61.47 percent of
Hindus, 34.22 Percent Muslims, 3.74 Percent Christians, 0.07 percent
Sikhs in Assam. Out of the 61.47 percent Hindus, there is about 18
Percent Bengali speaking Hindus in Assam.13 Let us look into the
following data on distribution of job share scenario in Assam.
*Distribution of workers in each Socio-religious category by enterprise
type in Town Area’s in Assam. 14
Table No. 4
SECTOR HINDU MUSLIM OTHER
MINORITIES
Public Sector 15.4 5.6 15.5
Public Sector 7.7 2.3 8.1
company
remarks should be inside the room. In the gathering with us, we have the
Bajrang Dal, Yuba Morcha, BJP, Ram Sena, all with varied interest. It
does not matter as whoever does what and can have to. We have to stay
united and divide our work as Hindu and we have to punch Islam with
our whole fist and not with our fingers”, said Satyaranjan Bora.17This is
the violation of Fundamental rights of Muslims in Assam, as guaranteed
by the Indian Constitution under Article 25-28 as right to Religion.18
It is in this context needed to mention that the BJP led coalition
government in Assam has prepared and published National Register of
Citizens (NRC) on 31st August, 2019 under the direct supervision of the
Supreme Court of India. All political parties, Student Organisations,
intellectuals and others were too much happy during the preparatory
period of NRC. But after the final publication of the same, it is seen the
welcoming parties of NRC are getting disappointment and the minority
people have become the target of extreme nationalists in Assam on the
ground that they have entered their name by forgery. But it is a well-
known fact that the NRC is prepared with the direct guidance of the
Supreme Court of India. Now some organisations are asking for complete
revision of NRC. The story is not ended here. A section of so called
people including some ruling party members in Assam have been making
some rubbish remarks against the minority people specially the Bengali
speaking Muslims questioning their citizenship again and again. But no
action is taken against those rebuke and hate speech makers. But at the
same time; it is an admitted fact that migration has posed a serious
challenge in Assam. The Assamese society has come under threat due to
migration from both internal and external migration. It is a serious matter
and none should overlook it. But at the same time, it is to be kept in mind
that while checking migration, we shouldn’t go beyond humanity. The
government should check the issue by law. Besides, birth control scheme
with strict legislation must be implemented among the legally migrated
people (prior to 24th March, 1971).
The livelihood of minority people in Assam is basically dependable on
agriculture and small scale business scattering here and there. While the
religious minorities are mostly farmers and hard labourers, the linguistic
minorities have been engaged in business and commerce sector in the
state. Everything was running in fine tune. But since the BJP led
coalition government has come to power in the state in 2016, the things
are going to be changed drastically. The new land policy as evolved in
2019, the use of the word ‘ khilanjia’(indigenous) instead of ‘Axomiya’
or ‘citizen’ has been creating fear among the minority groups. Amidst the
apprehension and suspicion situation among this section of people, the
eviction in many places in Assam including ‘Dhalpur-Garukhuti’ in
Sipajhar Legislative Assembly Constituency in Mangaldoi District has
created a fear and apprehension among the minority Muslim’s in the
state. It is a well-known fact that in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, some
70 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
almost like the beast. But for this under development, the political leaders
are responsible because they are used as vote bank of some political
parties. Even the leaders who belong to this community are also
suppressing them since long past. No higher education institutions are
there for char area people. Medical facilities are ceased to exist. Mother
care, child care facilities are like dream for the people of char areas in
Assam. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) has declared sustainable
development goals (SDG) to be achieved by 2030. Health service was in
seventeenth position in SDG where it was announced that the highest
attainable standard of health is a fundamental right of every person. It
gives me immense pleasure to state that the Assam Government has
formally accepted this goal in 2016 and launched “Assam Vision 2030
Initiatives.” Significantly it has selected Char areas under the SDG.23
But no mentionable or noticeable work is done in this regard. The
declaration is remained within the closed chapters of the Assam vision
2030 Initiatives. In a study, it is found that about 92 % delivery cases in
the Char areas take place at home. It is to be mentioned that there is
about 2251 Char villages in Assam.24 But there is no any Hospital facility
or doctors. This people have to go to the Town areas for treatment which
is not a easy matter, because the road communication is almost unseen in
those areas. Therefore, sicked people are carried to Hospital by cart or by
other people in a ‘Changari’ (which is like a casket pulled by two or four
persons). No floating Hospitals are there in the vast Char areas in Assam.
If Government want to do something, it will happen. But for this purpose
will power is necessary. But this is not done so far. Only Majuli, the
largest river island in the World is lucky enough of having almost all
civil facilities. Majuli is protected from erosion. It is welcome. But at the
same time Government has not paid proper attention to other ‘Char-
Chapori’ area of Assam. Erosion heated people are not provided safe
place for livelihood.
In the Banking sector, there is a huge gape of offering Loan to minority
Muslim’s in Assam. A comparative discussion to this field may be cited
for example.
Average Loan paid to persons belonging to various caste-community
people by Commercial Banks in Assam25
Table-7
Religious Groups Muslim Other Minorities Hindu and others
Assam 28176 39381 68742
The above table clearly shows that the Banking sector has been playing
dubious role to offer loan to the minority Muslim. There may be some
procedural difficulties, but as a whole, the gap is identical.
72 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
The poverty scenario among Muslims is higher than that of other caste-
community people in Assam. The poverty ratio is too high among
Muslims in Assam in both urban and rural areas. The data shown in the
following table will provide an idea on poverty among various caste-
community people.26
Table-8
Assam All All SC OBC Caste Muslim Other
community Hindu ∕ Hindu Minorities
ST
Urban 3 3 4 5 1 5 0
Poverty
Rural 18 12 14 16 7 27 20
Poverty
Swaleha Parveen*
ABSTRACT
accurate picture of the true health and wealth of the national economy
and to assess progress towards sustainable development”.
Economic and Environment conservation aspects in sustainability,
sustainable development will become an anti-development tool. The
aspect of sustainability in this definition according to
Lahsaeezadeh(2005) and Lellah(1995) consists of social, environmental,
and physical aspects, that to somehow come back to the sustainability of
things, conserving the natural environment, and social balance through
processes of growth and change in supplying reasonable needs of human
beings. Multifaceted of the objectives is another aspect of this that
includes: unity in aspects of human development, environment
conservation, decreasing poverty, eliminating hunger, and power
inequality through empowering people and developing democracy and
participation. The main focus of the concept of sustainable development
is “decreasing social inequalities”2 which so far has been ignored by
older patterns of development. Sustainable development implies attaining
a balance between environmental protection and human economic
development and between the present and future needs. It means equity
in development and sectoral actions across space and time. It requires an
integration of economic, social and environmental approaches towards
development. The research is focuses on the important of sustainable
development in global era. Human development is essentially what
sustainability advocates want to sustain and without sustainability,
human development is not true human development. In the last half of
the twentieth century, four key themes emerged from the collective
concerns and aspirations of the world’s peoples: peace, freedom,
development, and environment.
The process of globalizing the capitals and socio-economic benefits
which is called” Globalisation” due to the lack of providing essential
provisions for compensating its damages will lead to growing cultural,
economic, social and political gap between the developed countries and
the developing ones. The process of globalization in the conditions of
structural differences resulting from industrial gap not only rises social
inequalities and intensifies the gap of widespread poverty both in local
and international level, but also aggravates environmental challenges and
the crisis inside the society and outside it, especially in adjacent countries
of world system (as Wallerstein has argued).
The process of globalizing with respect to the economic, social, and
cultural implications connotes of integrating local and national societies
in international markets and unifying common cultural characteristics of
all societies is interrelated with the new wave of reconstruction. It is now
clear that economic, social and environmental implementation efforts
need to be reintegrated, and the tracks of discussion currently unfolding
under the rubrics of the Millennium Development Goals and future
Sustainable Development and Ecological …. 79
one -third of the world’s population has inadequate sanitation, one billion
people lack safe water. Making safe drinking water available to everyone
in the next generation will require an additional service for 3.7 billion
people living in urban areas and for 1.2 billion people in rural areas. For
sanitation, the problem is even serious; the number of urban dwellers
recently served is little more than one billion. There is increasing
recognition that current approaches are not adequate to meet the needs of
the coming years. Changes are needed in present policies dealing with
water and sanitation.
Seek for Inclusive Strategies and Technological Innovation in
Achieving Sustainable Development:
This concept of conserving resources for future generations is one of the
major features that distinguish sustainable development policy from
traditional environmental policy, which also seeks to internalize the
externalities of environmental degradation. The overall goal of
sustainable development (SD) is the long-term stability of the economy
and environment; this is only achievable through the integration and
acknowledgement of economic, environmental, and social concerns
throughout the decision making process. Components of a healthy
environment, such as clean air and water, are considered public goods in
that they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Thus, it is up to the
public sector to maintain the provision of these goods and services. More
recently, nations have moved towards the implementation of these
market based mechanisms to internalize the complete costs of pollution
and ensure long-term stability of the environment; in other words, to
ensure sustainable development.8
The outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development provides guidance for achieving the transition to
sustainable development as a means of increasing the well-being of
current and future generations in all countries. Sustainable development
strategies need to be inclusive and take special care of the needs of the
poorest and most vulnerable. Strategies need to be ambitious, action-
oriented and collaborative, taking into account different national
circumstances. (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013, p.
Viii). They will need to systemically change consumption and production
patterns, and might entail, inter alia, significant price corrections;
encourage the preservation of natural endowments; reduce inequality;
and strengthen economic governance. Such a process will need to
minimize the types of consumption and production that have negative
externalities, while simultaneously seeking to maximize the types of
consumption and production that create positive externalities. Examples
of minimizing negative externalities include reduction of environmental
pollution, while examples of positive externalities include, for example,
technology adaptation, reduction of food waste and enhanced energy
Sustainable Development and Ecological …. 85
ABSTRACT
state actors. These threats could be hunger, shelter, health, poverty, poor
environment, or environmental hazards, unhygienic water, etc.
Nigeria is a heterogeneous society with over 450 languages, 374
ethnic groups and a land mass of 923, 768 km. The country has a
population of about 200 million and divided into six geo-political zones.
These are, North-west, North-central, North -east, South-east, South-
south and South-west. Three major religions are practiced in Nigeria—
Islam, Christianity and African Traditional religion. However, while the
north is dominated by the Muslims, the south is dominated by the
Christians and pockets of traditional religion exists in both regions.
However, the country is constitutionally a secular state.6 The major
ethnic groups are the composite Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of
the southwest, and the Igbo of the southeast. These three ‘hegemonic’
ethnic groups are popularly referred to by the generic term ‘wazobia.’7
Nigeria has involved in international peace keeping missions
across the globe and particularly in Africa.8 Yet, the country battles with
numerous security challenges perpetrated by both State and non-state
actors. Nigeria has depended more on her security forces to confront
these threats. Ball and Fayemi viewed the security component as
encompassing all those state institutions that have a formal mandate to
ensure the safety of the State and its citizens from fear of violence.9 The
components of the Nigerian security comprised of the following: The
Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police Force, paramilitary bodies including
Customs and Excise, the Immigration Service, the Intelligence Services-
including military intelligence and the State Security Service; judicial
and public security bodies/governmental oversight organisations –
judiciary, justice ministry, correctional service prisons); private security
outfits; militia groups – including, for examples, the Odua People
Congress, Bakassi Boys, Hizba Corps and community vigilante groups.10
Although a look at the country’s constitution reflects federalism; in
practice it practices unitary system. Thus, the security structure or
architecture is designed in such a way that the directives are strictly top -
bottom. That is, only the President who is also the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces is entitled to give an order to the security agencies.11
Security Architecture of the Nigerian State
Although, directives flow via Federal- State-Local Government.
However, all the security agencies get orders from only the Presidency,
particularly the President. States and Local Governments which are
supposed to be autonomous also depend on the Federal Government for
security except they create an outfit which are not even allowed to carry
arms. In a case of threat, such outfits usually do not succeed as they are
not allowed to carry arms. Additionally, such outfits must get clearance
from the Federal government through the National Security and Civil
Defence Corp (NSCDC). The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior,
92 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
Office of the National Security Adviser and the Office of the Secretary
General of the Federation, heads the major security and intelligence units
in the country are immediately under the jurisdictions of the President.
Spiraling Insecurity and Responses
Nigeria, since the return to democracy in 1999, has been battling with
various security challenges. From Niger-Delta crisis, Boko Haram,
secessionist threat, banditry, poverty, Farmer-herders’ crisis to the recent
Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic; these security threats seem to be
overwhelming the Nigerian State. This article focuses on three of these
security challenges. These are Boko Haram, Farmer-Herders conflict, and
banditry amid the pandemic.
The History of the Boko Haram has been well documented.12
State response as well as its the history of poor governance and poverty
level in the north heightened the activities of the insurgents. The agenda
of the group is to forcefully Islamise the country. A faction led by the son
of Muhammad Yusuf, Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi, broke away in 2016 in
opposition to Shekau's indiscriminate targeting of civilians. The splinter
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) group has the backing of
IS. The conflicts apart from spreading to other regional States through
Nigeria’s porous borders,13 it has further led to the death of more than
38,781 people and led to the displacement of more than three million
people, about 292,510 Nigerian refugees in Chad, Cameroon and Niger,
about 550,000 displaced in Chad, Cameroon and Niger, with about 3.5
million people in dire need of food.14 The farmers-herders’ conflict
which had been a menace since the 1980s was not too much of a threat
before 2015, but it got to an alarming stage from the inception of
President Muhammadu Buhari, particularly in the north-central. Some
analysts opine that the clashes were also fueled by the Fulani factor
inspired by the sentiments that one of their own is in power. The causes
of violence orchestrated by the farmer-herders’ clashes are environmental
degradation, desertification of the Sahara, rapid urbanization, fear of
cattle rustlers, diminished cattle route among others.15
Another security challenge facing the Nigerian State is rural
banditry. Though originated from Zamfara State, it has spilled into other
states including geo-political zones namely Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto,
Kebbi, Niger, northwest and the last of which is in North-central. It has
created instability, resulted in loss of lives, property, livelihood, human
rights abuse, hampered socio-economic development, widened poverty
and undermined democratic governance in the North-West region.16
Moreover, it has had enormous impact on out- of -school children.17
Although a report earlier indicated that about 6,319 lives have been lost
since 2011 in Zamfara State alone.18 A recent study show that more than
8,000 people have been killed – mainly in Zamfara state – with over
200,000 internally displaced and about 60,000 fleeing into Niger
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 93
Republic over the last decade.19 Although most literature continue to tag
it as rural banditry, the activities of the criminal group have shown that
they also operate in urban spaces particularly with no or little security
apparatuses.
The characteristics of these numerous security challenges to the
Nigerian State is that lives have been lost, properties destroyed,
livelihood threatened and causes of food insecurity. Attempts to curtail
these spiraling insecurity has continued under different leadership since
2009.20 There seemed to be light at the end of the tunnel when the
spiritual home of the sect ‘Camp Zero’ was captured in December 2016
and the flag handed to President Buhari,21 however, recent events show
that the light was a mirage . Aside insurgency, secessionists movements
are also evolving.22
Federal Government Response
The Niger-Delta question was President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s
biggest security challenge until he confronted it by offering the militants’
amnesty. Although he did not witness the peaceful transition of the area
in his lifetime,23 his erstwhile deputy, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, who was
confirmed as the President in 2010 did not only witnessed but sustained
it.
When Boko Haram was at infancy, there was a time late Umaru
Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan administrations decided to
dialogue with the group. They sent emissaries including prominent
religious leaders and other dignitaries to placate the sect to sheath its
sword. For example, late Yar’Adua established a committee of inquiry
led by Ambassador Usman Galtimari to identify the grievances of the
sect and make possible recommendations.24 Private individuals also
made concerted efforts to curb the conflict. In September 2011, former
president Olusegun Obasanjo held talks with some members of the group
in their birthplace and strongholds where they tabled demands for a
ceasefire which included an end to arrests and killings of their members,
payment and compensation to families of their members killed by the
security personnel, and prosecution of the police officers responsible for
the killing of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf.25 In 2012, Datti Ahmad,
president of the National Supreme Council on Sharia who is widely
believed to have the respect of the group also reached out to the group
but this failed after accusations of bad faith on the part of government.26
Before the 2015 election was postponed from 14th February to
28 March for obvious reasons---insecurity,27 Goodluck Jonathan
th
the election and President Muhammadu Buhari became the new head of
state on 29 May, 2015.
The coming of President Muhammadu Buhari was believed to be
a relief for most Nigerians who voted overwhelmingly for him as a result
of his antecedent. On his inauguration, he decried the use and reliance on
foreign mercenaries and countries for arms and ammunition. He also
promised to end the Boko Haram insurrection and turn the tide around.29
He also continued to use carrot and stick approaches on the group. For
instance, he negotiated the release of some Chibok girls and 105
surviving Dapchi girls kidnapped by the Boko Haram sect. Though the
government denied paying any ransom for the release of the girls, reports
showed that millions of foreign currency was paid.30 The actual cost of
the ransoms remains sketchy, but this was in the range of six to 13
million dollars ($6,000,000-$13,000,000).
In 2016, the Federal Government operated Operation Safe
Corridor to reintegrate low-risk Boko Haram members. A year later in
2017, the Federal Government with the support of the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) adopted an initial Action Plan for
demobilization, disassociation, reintegration, and reconciliation for Boko
Haram repentants.31 These repentant members were screened,
deradicalized, empowered and then reintegrated into the society. So far,
thousands have been reintegrated and released to their families, however
with mixed feelings. In September 2019, the Nigerian Army under retired
Tukru Buratai acknowledged that Boko haram could not be defeated by
kinetic military warfare alone and thus embarked on a spiritual warfare to
counter Boko Haram propaganda.32
A bill proposing a national agency for integration of repentant
Boko Haram into civil society was sponsored by a former Governor and
serving Senator representing Yobe State, Ibrahim Gaidam (APC Yobe
east) in February 2020.33 The bill proposed among other things, an
avenue for rehabilitating, de-radicalisation, educating and reintegrating
the defectors, repentant and detained members of the insurgent group into
the society. However, the bill was rejected on the floor of the House of
Representatives and by Nigerians including some members of the
Nigerian Armed Forces.34 These approaches have also been replicated in
dealing with banditry while the controversial rural grazing area
(RUGA)35 and the recovery of old grazing routes have also been
proposed to mitigate the farmer-herders’ clashes.36
Thus, while the Federal Government has continued to use violent
means against banditry and Boko haram, it has continued to propose the
recovery of old grazing routes for the herders. It has also taken some
measures against curbing the novel coronavirus pandemic by setting up
isolations centres, providing palliatives, enforcing inter-state travels,
closure of religious places and public gatherings, enforcing social
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 95
unaddressed is that it props the door for violent nationalism in the future.
The insecurity has further been affected by ethnic divisions and identity
crises, fear of domination. For instance, when the federal government
proposed the rural grazing area (RUGA) to address the perennial farmer-
herders conflict, most people particularly the Christian south saw it as an
attempt by the Fulani to dominate other ethnic groups.
Another issue is nepotism. Putting square pegs in round holes is
a major feature of bad leadership. For example, some concerned
Nigerians have repeatedly written to President Buhari on the need to
make appointments based on merit and expertise rather than ethnic lines.
A retired top military officer, Col. Abubakar Dangiwa Umar in an open
letter to President Buhari warned that his skewed appointment may lead
to the destruction of the nation.58 As if this was not enough, another elder
statesman from Ijaw ethnic group, Chief Edwin Clark wrote another letter
confirming the nepotist nature of President Buhari and the
marginalization of the people of the South-south.59 He noted that such
discriminatory act poses a serious danger to any society, particularly a
plural society like Nigeria.
Enemy Within: Sympathisers of criminals
Most of the criminals have sympathisers within the government circles. It
was once reported that the Boko haram sect had sympathisers in every
levels and organs of government such as federal, state, local levels as
well as in the judiciary, armed forces and among the law enforcement
agencies. For example, a commander of the Boko haram sect, Shuaibu
Mohammed Bama was arrested in the home of a serving government
official. Similarly, a sect member, Kabiru Sokoto was released by a
personnel of the Nigerian Police,60 though he was later re-arrested and
alleged to still be in police custody.
In April 2012, a former national security adviser (NSA), Retired
General Owoye Andrew Azaazi at a south -south panel discussion in
Asaba, Delta State, stated that the issue of violence did not increase in
Nigeria until when Mr Goodluck Jonathan declared that he was going to
contest and that the sect became radicalised as a result of the internal
wrangling in the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party.61 An Australian
negotiator, Dr Stephen Davis also alleged that apart from getting funds
through raids, imposing taxes on captured communities, the Boko Haram
sect were also sponsored by some top government officials including a
former Borno State governor, Ali Modu Sherrif, General Azubuike
Ihejirika and a top official in the Central Bank of Nigeria.62 While the
accused denied it,63 the notion corroborates the hypothesis that there are
sponsors and sympathisers within government circles.64
There are also allegations of the army aiding the terrorists and
herders’ militia in north-central. In 2018, a retired Army General,
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 99
Aminu Waziri Tambuwal claimed that despite the efforts of the Military
in taming the menace of banditry in the region, the undulating terrain
and bad roads were the major hindrance to the military high
command.102 Worryingly is the fact that government has confirmed that
they have no solution to these border threats. The Minister of Internal
Affairs, Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola confirmed that while arms
proliferation in the country is as a result of its porous borders, the
government could not stop cross-border movement as they are difficult
to manage.103
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
There is no doubt that illegal weapons are in wrong hands. Attempts by
government to mop up these illegal small arms and light weapons, have
not yielded desired results. President Buhari stated in 2019 that the
herdsmen who were used to carrying only sticks had turned to AK-47
carrier as a result of the security lapses in Libya under President Muamar
Gaddafi in 2011. Senator Ahmad Lawan noted that proliferation of small
and light weapons and arms in the hands of non-state actors across the
country than in the hands of security operatives is one of the causes of
the spiraling insecurity and killings across the country.104
Poor Economy and Unemployment
Nigeria is the second biggest economy, the third largest military power
and the biggest oil producer (10th oil producer in the world).
Paradoxically, many youths are unemployed and Nigeria is the poverty
capital of the world as about 82.9 million people living below the poverty
line with the exception of Borno State.105 Most of these poor people live
in the north. These conditions have further provided a breeding ground
for criminals to recruit since an idle hand is usually available as the
devil’s tool. Boko Haram and other criminals will continue to tap from
this pool of unemployed youth and children. For instance, children were
recruited for suicide missions in the past, and recently Almajirai has
become a security threat to the state.106 In June, more than 190 Almajirai
tested positive for COVID-19,107 thus constituting both human and
national threats.
Emergence of Coronavirus (COVID 19)
The country is also confronted with the dreaded coronavirus
(COVID-19), which emerged with its first case being a returning Italian
expatriate in February 2020.108 Securing a troubled country amid
pandemics can also become a nightmare to soldiers and civilians alike
including humanitarian works.109 In fact, President Buhari on his 12 June
2020 Democracy Day speech highlighted that the heightening insecurity
situation in the country was because criminals were taking advantage of
the COVID-19 restrictions.110 Lending credence to the impact of the
COVID-19, a report committee headed by Vice President, Yemi
104 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
1
S. M Patrick S.M. 2017. ‘Europe’s Insecurity Dilemma’ Council on foreign
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Floyd-and-the-effects-of-violent-protest
2
O.O. Thompson, O.G.F. Nwaorgu, and F. I.O. Boge. ‘The Leahy Law,
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3 C. Cohn, “India and Nigeria: Similar Colonial Legacies, Vastly Different
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4
D. A Baldwin, “The Concept of Security” Review of International Studies, 23,
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5
M. Stone, “Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security
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106 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
6
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
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7
A. R. Mustapha ‘Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public
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8
S. O. Akinboye, ‘Beautiful Abroad but Ugly at Home: Issues and
Contradictions in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.’ Lagos: University of Lagos
Inaugural Lecture Series, 2013; O. A. Akinyeye, ‘Clothing Others While Naked:
West Africa and Geopolitics’ Lagos: University of Lagos Inaugural Lecture
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9
N. Ball and J.K. Fayemi. eds. Security-Sector Governance in Africa: A
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10
Ibid, vii; A. N. Thomas and I. Aghedo. ‘Security Architecture and Insecurity
Management: Context, Content and Challenges in Nigeria’ Sokoto Journal of the
Social Sciences, 4, 1, (2014): 22-27; DCAF and PLAC. Structural and
Institutional Mechanisms for Security Sector Oversight in Nigeria: issues and
Challenges Abuja: DCAF & PPLAC, 2017, 3-5.
11
Thomas and I. Aghedo. ‘Security Architecture and Insecurity, 32.
12
A Thurston. ‘The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political
worldview. Brookings: Analysis Paper No 22. January (2016), 5-33.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/brookings-analysis-
paper_alex-thurston_final_web.pdf accessed 11/2/2021
13
D. E. Agbiboa, “Borders that continue to bother us: the politics of cross-border
security cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin.” Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics, 55, 4: (2017): 403-425
14
Global Conflict Tracker. 2020. ‘Boko Haram in Nigeria’ Council on Foreign
Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-Haram-
nigeria; UNHCR, 2020. ‘2.4 million people in the Lake Chad Basin.’
https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria-emergency.html
15
E. O. Ojo, “Nigeria’s democracy: the trilemma of herdsmenism, terrorism and
vampirism” Inkayinso, 9, 1. (2017): 13-26; J. S. Ojo, “Governing ‘Ungoverned
Spaces’ in the Foliage of Conspiracy: Toward (Re)ordering Terrorism, from
Boko Haram Insurgency, Fulani Militancy to Banditry in Northern Nigeria.”
African Security, 13, 1 (2020): 77-110
16
A. C. Okoli, and A.C. Ugwu. “Of Marauders and Brigands: Scoping the
Threat of Rural Banditry in Nigeria’s North West’ Brazilian Journal of African
Studies 4, 8. (2019): 201-222; WANEP (West African Network for
Peacebuilding) “Addressing Armed Banditry in North-west region of Nigeria:
Exploring the Potentials of a Multi-Dimensional Conflict Management
Approach” WANEP Policy Brief. Accra, Ghana: (2020): 1-12; ICG
[International Crises Group] “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back
the Mayhem” Africa Report N°288. 2020.
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 107
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/288-violence-in-nigerias-north-
west_0.pdf
17
About 12 million children have been forced out of school as a result of
banditry and other forms of insecurities in northern Nigeria. It may be more
owing to poor records. See, Ronke Idowu, “Insurgency, Banditry Have Forced
Over 12m Children Out of School, Says Presidency” Channels Television, 27
October 2021. https://www.channelstv.com/2021/10/27/insurgency-banditry-
forcing-children-out-of-school-says-presidency/ accessed 18/2/2022.
18
WANEP “Addressing Armed Banditry in North, 2.
19
ICG, “Violence in Nigeria’s North West,” i-ii.
20
Thurston. ‘The disease is unbelief’” 5; The administrations of Olusegun
Obasanjo, Umaru Yaradua, Goodluck Jonathan, Muhammadu Buhari all
attempted to curtail these insecurities through various intervention programmes
from kinetic to diplomacy and financial incentives.
21
O. O. Thompson, A. S Afolabi, and A.S. Abdulbaki. 2019. ‘‘Beyond the
‘Capture of ‘Camp Zero’: Terrorism and Insecurity in a Failing-Weak State’
Indian Quarterly, 75, 3. (2019): 303-322.
22
O. O. Thompson, C. C. Ojukwu, and O. G. F. Nwaorgu. “United we Fall,
Divided we Stand: Resuscitation of the Biafra state secession and the National
Question Conundrum.” Journal of Research in Development, 14, 1. (2016): 255-
267; G. Onuoha, “Bringing back Biafra back in: narrative, identity, and the
politics of non-reconciliation in Nigeria” National Identities, 20, 4. (2018): 379-
399
23
S. O. Aghalino, “Brief but revolutionary: Yar’Adua and the sustainable
development of the Niger Delta, Nigeria” Global Advanced Research Journal of
History, Political Science, and International Relations, 1, 6. (2012): 144-151;
A. I. Ajayi and A.S Adesote, 2013. ‘The Gains of the Amnesty Programme in
the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 2007-2012: Preliminary Assessment.’
Journal of Asian and African Studies. 48, 4. (2013): 506-520.
24
F. C. Onuoha, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extremist Islamic Sect.” AL Jazeera
Centre for Studies 29, 2. (2012): 1-6.
25
D. E. Agbiboa, “Peace at dagger’s drawn? Book Haram and the state of
emergency in Nigeria.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37.1. (2013): 41-67
26
D. E. Agbiboa, and Benjamin Maiangwa. ‘Nigeria united in grief; divided in
response: religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response’
African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14, 1. (2014):63-97
27
U.S. Embassy Nigeria 2015 ‘Postponementof Elections in Nigeria’ 7 February
2015. https://ng.usembassy.gov/postponement-elections-nigeria-february-7-
2015/
28
Obi Anyadike, ‘‘Year of the Debacle’: How Nigeria Lost Its Way in the War
Against Boko Haram” World Politics Review. 30 October, 2018.
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26632/year-of-the-debacle-how-
nigeria-lost-its-way-in-the-war-against-boko-Haram
108 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
29
M. Buhari. “Inaugural speech by His Excellency, President Muhammadu Buhari following
his swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29th May, 2015”. Guardian
Newspaper. 29 May, 2015. https://guardian.ng/features/president-muhammadu-
buharis-inaugural-speech/See video here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-pLUu1PIlY
30
Sahara Reporters, “UPDATED: Nigerian Govt Lied, 5 Million Euros, Boko
Haram Fighters, Swapped for Dapchi Girls.” 21 March, 2018.
http://saharareporters.com/2018/03/21/updated-nigerian-govt-lied-5-million-
euros-boko-haram-fighters-swapped-dapchi-girls
31
S. Brechenmacher, “Acheiveing Peace in Northeast Nigeria: The
Reintergation Chalenge” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 5
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in-northeast-nigeria-reintegration-challenge-pub-77177
32Premium Times. “Why we adopted spiritual warfare to counter Boko Haram –
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news/359136-why-we-adopted-spiritual-warfare-to-counter-boko-haram-
buratai.html
33 H. Umoru, “Senate moves to establish national agency for ex- Boko Haram
members.” Vanguard. 20 February 2020.
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/02/senate-moves-to-establish-national-
agency-for-ex-boko-haram-insurgents/
34
Q. Iroanusi 2020 “Nigerians oppose commission for ‘repentant’ Boko Haram
members” Premium Times. 3 March, 2020.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/380026-nigerians-oppose-
commission-for-repentant-boko-Haram-members.html
35
A.S. Afolabi, Thompson, O.O., Ademola, O.E., Nwaorgu, O.G. F., & Onifade,
C.A “Public reaction to federal government’s farmer-herder conflicts through the
Ruga Policy: Can one continuously do the same and expect different result?
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36 O. Nnodim and J. Alagbe “No going back on grazing routes recovery – FG”
Punch. 19 June 2021. https://punchng.com/no-going-back-on-grazing-routes-
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37
I. Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah “Boko Haram uprising: How should Nigeria
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38
ICG [International Crises Group] ‘Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante
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39
V. Felbab-Brown, “The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent
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Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 109
40
Borno State Government, “Gov Zulum Strengthens Gajiganna CJTF and
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41
J. Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker” Council on Foreign Relations. 1 June
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42
J. C. Uche and C. K Iwuamadi, “Nigeria: Rural Banditry and Community
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43
F. Igata, Francis. “Enugu: Blow-by-blow account of how herdsmen killed 46
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44
O. O. Thompson, I. A. Jawondo, O. G. F. Nwaorgu and A.S. Afolabi, “How
can we Sing the Lord’s Song in a Strange Land?’ Internally Displaced Persons
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http://iksiopan.pl/images/HEMISPHERES_34_INTERNET.pdf
45
Ojo, O. 2020. ‘Real reasons Yoruba leaders created regional security outfiit’
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46
O. O. Thompson, “An Appraisal of the Amotekun Security Corps in Oyo
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Akoka, Nigeria, 2021
47
Ibid, 59-61; See also, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwdVwgodBAI
48
B. Bello, “INSECURITY: Masari dialogues with bandits today” Vanguard. 4
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49
J. Shiklam and Sardauna, F. 2020. ‘Nigeria: No More Deals with Katsina
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https://allafrica.com/stories/2020.06040502.html
50
F. Olowolagba, “El-Rufai cries out as bandits take over Northwest” Daily
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51
NSRP. “The 2011 elections in northern Nigeria post-electoral violence: origins
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52
Thurston, “The disease is unbelief” 11; A. J. Omede, “Nigeria: Analysing the
Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration.” Canadian
Social Science. 7, 5. (2011): 90-102.
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110 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
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T. Cocks and Felix Onuah 2011 ‘INTERVIEW-Nigeria might talk to Boko
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54
M. Nwankpa, ‘Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for
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M. M Nasir, “Nigeria—remove Chief Security Nomenclature from
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56
M. Olaniyi A. Salau., H.K. Matazu B. Alkassim and R. Mutum. 2020..
‘Buhari: I’m surprised by rising insecurity’ Daily Trust. 29January, 2020.
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57
B. Badmus, “Yoruba nation becomes 45th member of UNPO, says Professor
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58 C. Ukpong. Umar to Buhari: You’ll destroy Nigeria with lopsided
appointments. Premium Times. 31 May 2021.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/395471-umar-to-buhari-
youll-destroy-nigeria-with-lopsided-appointments.html
59
E. K. Clark, “Let us call a Spade, A Spade: An Open Letter to President
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https://web.facebook.com/109595267376363/posts/report-sectionlet-us-call-a-
spade-a-spade-an-open-letter-to-president-muhammadu-
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60
BBC, 12 October, 2012.
61
E. Ogala and Bassey U. “NSA AZAZI blames PDP for book Haram attacks”
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62
Business Day, August 27, 2014
63
Igbonwelundu, P. 2014. ‘Who are Boko Haram’s sponsor? The Nation.
September 9.
64
W. O. Iyekekpolo, “Political Elites and the Rise of the Boko Haram
Insurgency in Nigeria” Terrorism and Political Violence, 32, 4. (2018): 749-767
65This Day, “Danjuma Accuses Armed Forces of Complicity in Killings Across
Nigeria” 25 March 2018.
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/03/25/danjuma-accuses-armed-
forces-of-complicity-in-killings-across-nigeria/
66
P. Uzoho, “Presidency accuses Katsina Traditional Rulers of aiding banditry”
Business Day. 16 June, 2020.
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020./06/16/presidency-accuses-katsina-
traditional-rulers-of-aiding-banditry/
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 111
67
S. Oshunkeye, S. 2019. ‘Anini, Wadume, and their friends in uniform.’ Sun
News. 1 September, 2019. https://www.sunnewsonline.com/anini-wadume-and-
their-friends-in-uniform/
68
BBC, May 14, 2014; O. O. Thompson, “Mutiny, Desertion and State Response
in the Nigeria Armed Forces and its Implications. Ife Social Sciences Review, 29,
1. (2020): 14-30.
69
G. E. Jonathan, My Transition Hours. Texas: Ezekiel Books, 2018, 35-36.
70
BBC, November 11, 2014; Thompson, et al, ‘The Leahy Law”
71
Reuters, August 7, 2015),
72
Several MOUs have been signed since 2016 for fighter jet spare parts and
vehicles.
73
Thompson, “Mutiny, Desertion and State Response,” 14-30; See Thompson,
2020; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tP3MmO2T5aE.
74
S. Aborisade, “Why Nigeria is losing war against insecurity—Lawan” The
Punch. 8 June, 2020. https://punchng.com/why-nigeria-is-losing-war-against-
insecurity-lawan-2/
75
C. Obasi “The soldiers are less motivated than the Boko Haram insurgents’
International Crisis Group.18 January, 2015
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/soldiers-are-less-
motivated-boko-Haram-insurgents
76
I. Ahmed and Mike Eckel. “In Boko Haram Fight. Lines Blur Between
Nigeria Troops, Foreign mercenaries” VOA. 20 March, 2015
https://www.voanews.com/africa/boko-Haram-fight-lines-blur-between-nigeria-
troops-foreign-mercenaries
77
(The Cable, January 22, 2020). This was attributed to inter-agency rivalry.
78
H. Y. Bappa “Nigeria's military failure against the Boko Haram insurgency.”
African Security Review, 25, 2. (2016): 146-158
79
S. Ogundipe, “Boko Haram: Army Chief Buratai spits fire; warns commander
against fleeing from terrorists.” Premium Times. 3 August, 2018.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/278792-boko-Haram-army-
chief-buratai-spits-fire-warns-commanders-against-fleeing-from-terrorists.html
80
PM News, 19 July, 2019.
81
Premium Times July 14, 2020; Thompson, “Mutiny, Desertion and State
Response,” 14-30
82
FRN, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, LL 112.
83
O. Olawoyin, “Benue Killings: Why Buhari did not know IGP Idris disobeyed
him – Femi Adesina” Premium Times. 13 March, 2018.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/261593-benue-killings-why-
buhari-did-not-know-igp-idris-disobeyed-him-femi-adesina.html
84
Daily Trust, February 9, 2020.
112 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
85
S. Aborisade, “Foreign soldiers saving Nigeria from bandits—Senator” The
Punch. 20 May, 2020. https://punchng.com/foreign-soldiers-saving-nigerians-
from-bandits-senator/
86
D. Oyedele, “Army Currently Deployed in 32 States, Says Buratai” This Day.
15 February, 2017. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017./02/15/army-
currently-deployed-in-32-states-says-buratai/
87
D. Tonwe, D., and S. Eke. “State fragility and violent uprising in Nigeria.”
Africa Security Review, 22, 4. (2013): 232-243; Thompson, et al ‘‘Beyond the
‘Capture of ‘Camp Zero’”
88
Premium Times, 8 June, 2020.
89
M. Maina ‘Army reacts as governor Zulum raises alarm over extortion by
officers in Borno’ Daily Post. 7 January, 2020
https://dailypost.ng/2020./01/07/army-reacts-as-governor-zulum-raises-alarm-
over-extortion-by-officers-in-borno/
90
M. T. Page “Nigeria Struggles with Security Sector Reform.” Chatham House.
April 2 2019. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/nigeria-struggles-
security-sector-reform
91
Ibid
92
Ibid
93 Channels television, “Extrajudicial Killings: Katsina Government Bans
Ƴansaki Vigilante Group” 15 February, 2022.
https://www.channelstv.com/2022/02/15/extrajudicial-killings-katsina-
government-bans-%C6%B3ansaki-vigilante-group/
94
D. K. Banini, “Security sector corruption and military effectiveness: the
influence of corruption on countermeasures against Boko haram in Nigeria.”
Small Wars & Insurgencies. 31, 1. (2020): 131-158.
95
R. L. Feldman, “Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces”
Defense &Security Analysis. 24, 3. (2008):267–272
96
R. Ajakaye “Nigeria: Evidence lacking, 475 Boko Haram suspects free”
Anadolu Agency.18 February, 2018. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/nigeria-
evidence-lacking-475-boko-Haram-suspects-free/1066987
97
A.I. (Amnesty International) “Willingly Unable: ICC Preliminary
Examination and Nigeria’s Failure to Address Impunity for International
Crimes’ UK: AI. 2018.
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4494812018.ENGLISH.PD
F; HRW (Human Rights Watch). ‘Flawed Trials of Boko Haram Suspects:
Ensure Due Process, Victim Participation.’ 17 September, 2018.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018./09/17/nigeria-flawed-trials-boko-Haram-
suspects
98 Chris, “Banditry, Politics and Changing Narratives in Zamfara” Leadership.
23 April, 2019. https://leadership.ng/banditry-politics-and-changing-narratives-
in-zamfara/
Defying the Odds: Nigeria’s Spiralling…. 113
99
D. E. Agbiboa, “Borders that continue to bother us:
100
A. C. Okoli, and E. N. Lenshie, ‘Nigeria: Nomadic migrancy and rural
violence in Nigeria’. Conflict Studies Quarterly, 25 (2018): 68-85.
101
Okoli, and Ugwu. “Of Marauders and Brigands”
102
R. Sobowale “Bad road, rough terrain hinder army to counter bandits—
Tambuwal” Vanguard 28 May, 2020
103
A. Olufemi, “Many Nigerian borders artificial, difficult to manage—
Minister.” Premium Times. 11 June, 2020
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/397131-many-nigerian-
borders-artificial-difficult-to-manage-minister.html
104
Agency Report. “Insecurity: Tambuwal Seeks death sentence for unlawful
possession of arms.” Premium Times. 14 June, 2020.
105
O. Mailafia, “Poverty capital of the world’ Business Day. November 15 2019.
https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/poverty-capital-of-the-world/amp/ ;NBS,
(Nigeria Bureau of Statistics) 2020. ‘Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria 2019.:
Executive Summary’ Abuja: NBS, 2020
106
I. Aghedo, James S. Eke “From Alms to Arms: The Almajiri Phenomenon
and Internal Security in Northern Nigeria.” The Korean Journal of Policy
Studies, 28, 3. (2013) : 97-123.
107
Vanguard, July 3, 2020
108
P Adepoju, “Nigeria Responds to COVID-19: First case detected in sub-
Saharan Africa” Nature Medicine, 26,4. (2020):444-448
109
A. Synenko ‘In pictures: fighting conflict and coronavirus in Nigeria’s
Borno” Al Jazeera. 29 April, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/pictures-fighting-conflict-
coronavirus-nigeria-borno-200426173641182.html
110
M. Buhari, “Full text of President Muhammadu Buhari’s Democracy Day
Speech’ Affairs TV. 12 June, 2020. https://affairstv.com/2020./06/12/full-text-
of-president-muhammadu-buharis-democracy-day-speech/
111
FGN-ESC Report. Bouncing Back: Nigeria Economic Sustainability Plan.
Abuja: Government Printers, 2020
112
N. Ibekwe, “COVID-19: Nigerian govt begs Tesla founder, Elon Musk for
ventilators” Premium Times. 2 April, 2020.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/385537-covid-19-nigerian-
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113
T. Ayeni, “Nigeria: The mystery of expired Covid vaccines” VOA.21
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114 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
Zulafqar Ahmed*
ABSTRACT
that as long as these dogmas and beliefs are not eradicated from the
Hindu society the caste would remain here. He further argues “Caste is
not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire which
prevents the Hindus from co-mingling and which has, therefore, to be
pulled down. Caste is a notion; it is a state of the mind. The destruction
of Caste does not therefore mean the destruction of a physical barrier. It
means a notional change. Caste may be bad. Caste may lead to conduct
so gross as to be called man’s inhumanity to man. All the same, it must
be recognized that the Hindus observe Caste not because they are
inhuman or wrong-headed. They observe Caste because they are deeply
religious. People are not wrong in observing Caste. In my view, what is
wrong is their religion, which has inculcated this notion of Caste. If this
is correct, then obviously the enemy, you must grapple with is not the
people who observe Caste, but the Shastras which teach them this
religion of Caste."6
Ambedkar was against the traditions of ancient Hindu society
and he did not like Hindu religion. He observed that Buddhism is the best
religion which could promote justice for the deprived sections of the
society. He argued that “By discarding my ancient religion which stood
for inequality and oppression today I am reborn, I have no faith in the
philosophy of incarnation; and it is wrong and mischievous to say that
Buddha was an incarnation of Vishnu. I am no more a devotee of any
Hindu god or goddess. I will not perform Shrardha. I will strictly follow
the eight-fold path of Buddha. Buddhism is a true religion and I will lead
a life guided by the three principles of knowledge, right path and
compassion.”7Ambedkar had felt that caste system has deeply rooted in
Hindu society. Therefore, he realized that it is very hard to get rid of this
curseuntil and unless we abandon the Hindu religion.
Ambedkar’s Views on Social Justice
Ambedkar was an ardent advocate of social justice. His concept of social
justice generated from the French Revolution’s slogan Justice, Liberty,
and Equality. His concept of social justice was based upon the social
democracy which he believed is more significant than political
democracy. He addressed the Constituent Assembly and said that “The
third thing we must do is not to be content with mere political
democracy. We must make out political democracy a social democracy
as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it
social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of
life, which recognizes liberty, equality, and fraternity as the principles of
life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be
treated as separated items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the
sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of
democracy.”8
118 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
1
Raghavendra. R.H, "Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s Ideas on Social Justice in Indian
Society." Sage, May 2016: pp. 24-29
2
Archana. Chaturvedi, "The concept of Social justice." International Research
Journal of Commerce Arts and Science, Vol.6, no. 12 (2015): pp.100-104
3
Varna is a Sanskrit word which mean colour or class.
4
A member of the lowest-Caste Hindu group contact with whom was considered
that to defile the members of higher castes.
5
Vasant. Moon,"Annihaliation of Caste." Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and
Speeches . Vol. 2, No. 01, New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundtion , January 201
6
Niranjan. Rajadhyaksha. "B R Ambdkar:In his own words." Livemint, April 14,
2016.
7
Ranjit. A, Kumar. "Ambedkar's Notion of Social Justice- A Different
Prespective." International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research,
Vol. 2, no. 12 (December 2011): pp. 1-5.
8
Ibid. pp.7-8
9
Monika. Sharma, "Ambedkar’s Struggle for Empowerment of Downtrodden."
International Journal of Research in Economics and Social Sciences,Vol. 5, no.
6 (June 2015): pp. 251-257.
10
Vasant. Moon, "Annihaliation of Caste." Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings
and Speeches , Vol. 01, New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundtion , January 2014.
11
Alex.Tabarrok, "The Relevance of B.R Ambedkar in Modern India." Marginal
Revolution, April 14, 2017.
12
Scroll. March 30, 2018. https://scroll.in/latest/873946/gujarat-dalit-man-killed-
allegedly-by-villagers-who-were-upset-after-he-bought-a-horse (accessed March
30, 2019).
13
Gopi. Maniar, May 23, 2018.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ahmedabad-dalit-youth-attacked-for-
124 The Indian Journal of Politics 2021, Vol. 55, No.1-2
adding-sinh-to-his-name-on-facebook-1239761-2018-05-23 (accessed
September 20, 2019).
14
Press Trust of India. August 20, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/dalit-student-stoned-to-death-for-not-withdrawing-sexual-harassment-case-
in-mp/story-Wdi1dIJn2qpQ32vgEyKOEI.html(accessed September 20, 2019).
15
Deep. Mukherjee, The Indian Express. May 14, 2019.
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/alwar-rape-case-among-five-accused-a-
truck-driver-tea-stall-worker-labourer-57 (accessed September 21, 2019)
16
Dalit Atrocities. September 17, 2019. https://scroll.in/latest/937585/up-
congress-hits-out-at-bjp-after-dalit-man-is-burnt-alive-says-social-fabric-is-
being-attacked (accessed September 21, 2019).
17
The Hindu. March 5, 2019. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/65-of-
hate-crimes-against-dalits-amnesty/article26440412.ece (accessed September 21,
2019).
18
N.Ram. "Relevance of Ambedkar." Vol. 27. no. 01. The Hindu, Jan 2, 2010.