50 Years from San Francisco:

Re-examiningthe Peace Treaty

andJapan's Territorial Problems
Kimie Hara1

InSeptember 1951,aagainst the background

with
of the escalating cold war in
countries and returned
Asia,Japan signed peace treaty forty-eight
to the international community as a member of the Western bloc. A
half-century has passed since then and one decade has passed since the end
of the U.S.-USSR cold war,the collapse of the Yalta System and the beginning
of the so-called "post-cold war" era. However, except for the demise of the
Soviet Union, the international political environment surroundingJapan in
the Asia-Pacific is not greatly different from the cold war era.2
The emergence of the cold warwas a process in which the nature of Soviet-
U.S. relations altered from cooperation to confrontation and, in terms of
the Asia-Pacific international order, the Yalta blueprint became distorted
and transformed into the "SanFrancisco System."In Europe, the U.S.-U.K.-
USSR Yalta Agreement of February 1945 became the basis of the cold war
structure. After it went through a series of East-West tensions, such as the
communization of Eastern Europe and the division of Germany, the Yalta
System was consolidated and received international recognition as the status
quoin the 1973 Helsinki Agreement. But by the early 1990s the Yalta System
had collapsed, accompanied by democratization of Eastern Europe,
demolition of the Berlin Wall, achievement of independence by the Baltic
states, reunification of Germany, and the demise of the Soviet Union. In
December 1989, when Presidents Gorbachev and Bush released the "end of
the cold war"declaration in Malta, the expression "fromYalta to Malta"was
often employed in the mass media as symbolizing the advent of a new era.

1 This paper is a part of the author's book tentativelyentitled TheSan FranciscoSystemand the
ColdWarFrontiersin theAsia-Pacific.The research upon which this paper is based was funded by the
Universityof Calgary'sresearchgrants,KillamResident Fellowshipand the East-WestCenter Visiting
Fellowship.The author would like to thank GeoffreyJukes,CharlesMorrison,Robert Eldridge,John
Stephan, and anonymous reviewersfor valuable comments and suggestions.
2 The term "Asia-Pacific" is used here to indicate the region that includes the countries on the
Pacific side of the Eurasiancontinent, i.e., in East Asia and the Pacific, in contrast to the "Euro-
Atlantic"region on the Atlanticside. For a discussionof the remaining cold warstructureand regional
conflicts in the Asia-Pacific,see Kimie Hara,: A DifficultPeace(London and New York:Routledge,
1998), pp. 153-54, pp. 193-95, pp. 211-14; "Rethinking the 'Cold War' in the Asia-Pacific,"Pacific
Review,vol. 12, no. 4 (1999), pp. 515-36.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

Since then, "collapse of the Yalta System" tends to be used as a synonym for
"end of the cold war."
The "YaltaSystem," however, was never established as an actual inter-
national order in the Asia-Pacific region. The post-war international order
was discussed atYalta and some secret agreements affectingJapan were made
there. The term 'Yalta System" or "East Asian Yalta System" is sometimes
used to describe a regional post-war order based on those agreements.3
However, it was a "blueprint" that would have been established only if such
agreements had been implemented immediately after the war.By 1951, when
the Peace Treaty with Japan was signed, the Yalta Agreements had been
distorted or made equivocal. Under the new circumstances of an escalating
East-Westconfrontation that had begun on the Atlantic side of the continent,
the post-warAsia-Pacific took a different path from that originally planned.
The San Francisco Peace Treatyis an international agreement that largely
determined the post-war political order in the region. With its associated
security arrangements, it laid the foundation for the regional structure of
cold war confrontation, the "SanFrancisco System,"fully reflecting the policy
of the peace conference's host nation, the United States, and the complexities
of the region's politics.4 Along with political and ideological conflicts,
significant elements within the cold war structure in the Asia-Pacific are
regional conflicts among its major players. The San Francisco Peace Treaty
concerns the origins of various regional conflicts. The treaty did not specify
to which countryJapan renounced its former territories, nor did it define
the precise limits of these territories; this has created various "unresolved
problems" in the region. These include the "Northern Territories"/Southern
Kuriles, Tokdo/Takeshima, the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Spratly/Nansha island
sovereignty disputes, the "one China" issue and the treatment of Taiwan,
and the still divided Korean Peninsula.
As for the first three territorial problems involvingJapan, many separate
studies have been written in the past. They deal with them under headings
such as international law,economic interests or history going back to ancient
times. Most of those studies, however, limit their scope to the bilateral
framework or to the states directly involved in disputes. They treat Takeshima
and Senkaku as problems of a different nature from the "Northern
Territories" issue, and Japan's three frontier problems have never been
examined altogether in the same context of the cold war. This is probably
because the Takeshima/Tokdo and Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes involve states
that have remained in the Western bloc, namely, South Korea (Republic of
Korea, ROK) and Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC). Both Korean Peninsular
and China-Taiwanrelations, however, are issues involving the ultimate long-

3 For example,AkiraIriye,TheColdWarin Asia:A HistoricalIntroduction, (EnglewoodCliffs,New

Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 93-97;Yoshihide Soeya, Nihongaiko to chugoku1945-1972 (Tokyo:
Keio gijuku dakugakushuppan-kai,1995), pp. 33-38.
4 Hara, "Rethinkingthe Cold War,"p. 517-18.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

term goal of reunification. The disposition of these territories was prepared

for inclusion in theJapanese peace treaty in the early post-waryears, when it
was considered possible that North Korea might forcibly reunify the Korean
peninsula and that communist China might "liberate"Taiwan.These disputes
did not exist before the World War II, i.e., these islands had beenJapanese
territories. The problems were seeded in 1951 when the Japanese peace
treaty,which contains the controversial territorial disposition, was signed in
San Francisco.
An important key to solving problems is to understand how they were
created. Paying attention to their common foundation in the early post-war
years, this paper re-examines Japan's three territorial problems together
within the cold war context.

I. Japan-USSR/Russia:
The "Northern Territories"/Southern Kuriles Dispute
A focal point of the dispute over the "Northern Territories" is whether
the disputed islands were included in the "Kurile Islands" that Japan
renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, together with Southern
Sakhalin.5 The Russians consider the disputed islands the southernmost
islands of the Kuriles, a Russian-held archipelago that stretches between
Hokkaido and Kamchatka. TheJapanese government, however, claims that
these islands are distinct from the Kuriles.

The Kurilesin the YaltaBlueprint

The renunciation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles originated from
the Yalta Agreement of February 1945. Roosevelt and Churchill promised
Stalin that these islands would be ceded to the USSR in return for its
participation in the war against Japan. Other wartime international
agreements also related toJapanese territories. Prior to the YaltaConference,
ajoint U.S.-U.K.-Chinese Declaration was released in Cairo on 27 November
1943. It outlined the principle of "no territorial expansion," specifying that
Japan would be expelled from all the territories that it had taken "byviolence
and greed."6 This principle of "no territorial expansion" was originally
enunciated in the Atlantic Charter,proclaimed in August 1941 by the Anglo-
American leaders.7 The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, which Japan
accepted at the time of its surrender, stipulated "the terms of the Cairo

5 The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Chapter II Territory,Article 2 (c) states "Japan
renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the
islands adjacentto it over whichJapan acquired sovereigntyas a consequence of the Treatyof Ports-
mouth of September 5, 1905."
6 U.S.Departmentof State,Foreign RelationsoftheUnitedStates(hereafterFRUS)1943, theConference
of Cairo,pp. 448-49.
7 TheDepartment of StateBulletin,4 December 1943, vol. IX, no. 232, p. 393.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

Declaration shall be carried out, andJapanese sovereignty shall be limited

to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,Shikoku and such minor islands
as we [the Allied Powers] determine."8
The YaltaAgreement was, however, a controversial secret agreement that
went beyond the principle of "no territorialexpansion." The frontier between
Russia andJapan had been established in 1855 by the Treaty of Shimoda as
passing between the islands of Iturup (Etorofu) and Urup. The rest of the
Kurile Islands became Japanese territory by the Treaty of St. Petersburg in
1875 in exchange forJapanese renunciation of claims over Sakhalin. Thus
the present "Northern Territories"or "Southern Kuriles"(the islands of Kuna-
shiri, Etorofu and Shikotan, and the group of islets known as the Habomais)
were never Russian, the rest of the chain was Russian for only twenty years
and the status of the entire island chain was determined not by violence but
by two Treaties, mutually agreed upon by RussiaandJapan. Southern Sakhalin
was the only territory in the area which Japan had taken "byviolence," as a
result of its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The YaltaAgreement
implicitly recognized a distinction, by stating that the Kuriles were to be
"handed over" to the Soviet Union, while Southern Sakhalin was to be
"returned" to it.
Prior to the Yalta meeting, the U.S. State Department prepared a briefing
for President Roosevelt, known as the Blakeslee Report, which suggested
that Japan should retain the Southern Kuriles.9 However, Roosevelt
promised the entire chain to Stalin. It has been suggested that Roosevelt,
who did not closely consult State Department, hence was not well informed
about the background to the issue, or perhaps because of ill- health (he
diedjust over ten weeks later), agreed to transfer the Kuriles in the mistaken
belief thatJapan had taken them by aggression.10 Recent studies, however,
indicate that Roosevelt was aware of the Soviet aspiration to the Kuriles from
an earlier time and that his decision was not based in ignorance or lack of
thought.11
It is also clear that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill was inexorably wedded
to the principle of "no territorial expansion," since at Yalta both acquiesced
in Soviet territorial expansion at the expense of Poland and Germany (East

8 FRUS1945, Vol.II, Conference ofBerlin(Potsdam),p.1281.

9 FRUS1945, TheConferences at Malta and Yalta,pp. 379-83;John J. Stephan, TheKurilIslands:
Russo-JapaneseFrontierin thePacific,Clarendon Press,Oxford, 1974, pp. 24044.
10 John Lewis Gaddis, The UnitedSatesand the Originsof the ColdWar,1941-1947, (New York:
ColumbiaUniversity,1972), p.79; Stephan, TheKurilIslands,pp. 155, 216.
11 For details see MarcGallicchio,"TheKurilesControversy:U.S. Diplomacyin the Soviet-Japan
BorderDispute,1941-1956,"PacifcHistoricalReview (February1991), pp. 69-101;NHKnissopurojekuto
(NHKJapan-Sovietproject), Koregasorenno tainichikoshoda - hiroku,hopporyodokosho,(Tokyo:Nihon
hoso shuppan kyokai, 1991), p. 2-24; Haruki Wada, Hopporyodo- rekishito mirai,(Tokyo:Iwanami
shoten, 1999), pp. 144-52;TsuyoshiHasegawa,TheNorthernTerritories DisputeandRusso-Japanese
Relations,
Vol.1: BetweenWarandPeace,1697-1985,(Berkeley,Calif.:Universityof California,Internationaland
Area Studies, 1998), pp. 14448.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia). The Yalta agreement over the Kuriles was a
reward for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, which both the
U.S.A. and Britain considered necessary in order to win the war most rapidly
and with fewest casualties.'2 In addition, Soviet cooperation was necessary
for establishment of the United Nations, intended to be the central inter-
national organization in building a new post-war order. Instead of following
the draft policies prepared by the State Department's Far East specialists,
Roosevelt probably used his own judgment over the Kuriles from his global
perspective. The terms of the Yalta Agreement were not revealed until 29
January 1946. Until then Japan, then legal owner of the Kuriles, did not
even know of its existence.
Incidentally, as the war situation deteriorated, the Japanese government
sought Soviet mediation to make peace and both the military and the Foreign
Ministry considered various possible concessions in 1945. Even inJuly, when
the plan became one for surrender, including dissolution of the military and
renunciation of Okinawa, Bonin and Karafuto (Sakhalin), it never included
cession of the Southern Kuriles.13The content of the Yalta Agreement, dis-
closed in the next year, was a considerable shock.
After accepting the Potsdam Declaration, it became critical forJapan to
identify the "minor islands"the Allies would allow it to retain. After disclosure
of the YaltaAgreement in 1946, it then became a question of recovering the
islands on its northern frontier that were not part of the Kuriles. During the
Allied occupation, theJapanese Foreign Ministry prepared a series of English-
language booklets to explain Japan's positions.'4 The first pamphlet on the
"Northern Territories" entitled MinorIslands adjacentJapanProper:TheKurile
Islands, theHabomaisand Shikotanwas prepared in November 1946.
Half a century after its preparation, a copy of this long-sealed document
was unearthed in the Australian Archives.'5 Although the Yalta Agreement
is not mentioned, the 1946 pamphlet emphasizes that the Habomais and
Shikotan are not part of the Kuriles and, as a whole, indicates that the
Japanese Government's goal at that time was "two islands," i.e., recovery of
Shikotan and the Habomais. It presents the "two islands return thesis (nito
henkan-ron) " as a result of World War II, reflecting the reality thatJapan was
a defeated country and the Soviet Union one of the victorious Allies.
The 1946 pamphlet contradicts the current Japanese argument on the
extent of the Kuriles, as it clearly recognizes Kunashiri and Etorofu as part

12 Hara,Japanese-Soviet/Russian
Relationssince1945 (1998), p. 15.
13 Wada,Hopporyodo- rekishito mirai,pp. 153-56.Japan tried to negotiate Soviet mediation with
the concession plan. However,the Soviet Union, which had alreadyin Februarypromised its allies to
participatein the waragainstJapanin returnfor larger rewards,stalled theJapanese until it wasready
to attack.
14 KumaoNishimura,Sanfuranshisuko heiwajoyaku,(Tokyo:Kajimakenkyujoshuppan-kai,1983),
p. 44.
15 For details see HaraJapanese-Soviet/Russian
Relationssince1945 (1998), pp. 24-33.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

of them. Although the pamphlet also suggests that Japan had already
prepared the basis for its present arguments, it was not based on the present
definition of the Kuriles.16

The Kurilesin the San FranciscoSystem

The current dispute over the "Northern Territories" is a byproduct of the
cold war, which was at the center of post-war international politics. In the
San Francisco Treaty, Japan renounced the Kurile Islands together with
Southern Sakhalin. However, the treaty neither defines the extent of the
Kuriles, nor specifies to which countryJapan renounced them. Furthermore,
the USSR did not sign it. The "Northern Territories" problem was left
unresolved against the background of the cold war in Asia, where East-West
confrontation was intensifying and turning towards actual "hot war."
It was during the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty negotiations in the mid-
1950s that "four islands return" became a core policy of the Japanese
Government. The key events that brought this about were U.S. intervention
and the establishment of the "1955 System." The U.S. involvement in the
Soviet-Japanese negotiations is best known as "Dulles' Warning." In August
1956 the Japanese plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu,
was about to accept the Soviet offer of "twoislands return," and to conclude
a peace treaty on that basis. However, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles put pressure on him by warning him thatJapan's residual sovereignty
over Okinawa could be endangered if it were to make concessions to the
USSR.17Recent scholarship and documentary evidence indicate that there
were two major reasons for Dulles' intervention. One was to secure U.S.
control over Okinawa, and the other to prevent a rapprochement between
Japan and the USSR.
The strategic importance of Okinawa increased as the cold war escalated
in the Asia-Pacific. Dulles was recorded as stating "the Ryukyus [Okinawa]
were more valuable to the United States than the Kuriles were to the Soviet
Union."18 The United States did not have a strong basis for its retention of
Okinawa. IfJapan settled the "Northern Territories"problem with the USSR,
there would be considerable pressure on the U.S. to vacate Okinawa.
However, using Article 26, which Dulles had himself inserted in the Peace

16 Ibid.These pamphlets were handed to the AustralianMission in Tokyo around May 1947. A
recent study suggests that the same pamphlet was handed to the GHQ earlier, on 12 March 1947
(RobertEldridge,"Showatenno to okinawa,"Chuokoron [March1999], p. 156). However,the document
has not been opened in the U.S. Archives.
17 Shunichi Matsumoto, Mosukuwa ni kakeruniji - nisso kokkokaifuku hiroku,(Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-
sha, 1966), pp. 114-17; Masaaki Kubota, Kuremurin eno shisetsu - hoppo ryodo kosho 1955-1983, (Tokyo:
Bungeishunju-sha, 1983), pp. 133-37; FRUS 1955-57, Vol.XXIII, Part I, Japan, pp.202-3; Hara, Japanese-
Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945 (1998), pp. 42-46.
18 FRUS1955-57,p. 43.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

Treaty, he argued that if Japan made concessions to the USSR over the
Northern Territories, the U.S.A. could claim Okinawa.19
The U.S. administration officially supportedJapan's "four islands" claim,
not because it necessarily considered these islands distinct from the Kuriles,
but because it knew the claim would be unacceptable to the USSR. The
primary objectives of U.S. cold war policy in the Asia-Pacific were to secure
Japan for the Western bloc and to prevent it from achieving a rapprochement
with the communist bloc. The peace negotiations started in the "cold war
thaw"or "peaceful coexistence" atmosphere of the mid-1950s. But the U.S.A.
perceived this "detente" as temporary and as working strategically to the
Soviet Union's advantage through its "peace offensive," while threatening
the West through expansion of the Soviet sphere of interest by initiatives
seen as responding to or even stimulating nationalistic and anti-colonial
movements in Asia.20
Conclusion of a peace treatywith the Soviet Union would put on the agenda
the question of normalizing relations betweenJapan and communist China.
That, too, was unacceptable to the United States; China's intervention in
the Korean War had made it a prime target for U.S. containment strategy. In
September 1954, the year before the Japanese-Soviet peace negotiations
began, the crisis over the Taiwan-controlled Chinese offshore islands of
Quemoy and Matsu had erupted. Dulles' demarche over Okinawawas designed
to prevent any Soviet-Japaneserapprochement- no matterwhich island territories
were involved.21The "four islands"claim was a "wedge,"set in place because
of the cold war.
Domestically, the Soviet-Japanesenegotiations in the mid-1950s overlapped
with the period when the long era of Liberal Democratic Party hegemony,
the so-called "1955 system,"was being established. This system reflected cold
war politics in the domestic arena. Their policies toward peace negotiations
with the Soviet Union became political bargaining tools between the two
conservative parties, the Liberals and Democrats, which then merged to form
a large ruling party in opposition to the then-strengthening socialist parties.
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, of the Liberal party, compromised with
the Democrats, led by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose policy
priority was cooperation with the U.S.A. The "four islands" claim became

19 Article26 in part states "ShouldJapanmake a peace settlement or warclaims settlement with

any State granting that State greater advantagesthan those provided by the present Treaty,those
same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty."Dulles argued that, since
transfer of territories to the USSR had not been mentioned in the San FranciscoTreaty,Japanese
acceptance of the Sovietproposalto returnonly some of them would meanJapanwasgrantinggreater
advantagesto the Soviet Union than to the U.S.A. and, in that case, Article 26 would enable to the
U.S.A. to claim Okinawa.[FRUS1955-1957,p. 202-4;Hara,Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relationssince1945
(1998), p. 45.]
20 Hara, ibid.,p. 42.
21 Hasegawa,TheNorthernTerritories Dispute,p. 115; Hara, ibid., pp. 42-46.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

established as a core policy of the new Liberal Democratic Party; and that
was tantamount to government policy thereafter.

II Japan-Korea: The Takeshima/Tokdo Dispute

A focal point of the dispute over the Takeshima/Tokdo Islands is whether
they were included in the "Korea"thatJapan renounced in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty.22

Takeshimain the YaltaBlueprint

Takeshima was declared part ofJapan by Cabinet resolution in 1905, the
year Korea was made Japan's protectorate and five years before its formal
annexation. In the wartime Allies' agreements, the Cairo Declaration of 1943
stipulated, "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." At
Yalta, Roosevelt and Stalin informally agreed that Korea would become
independent after a period of joint trusteeship by the U.S.A., USSR, China
and possibly also the British.23 However, none of these agreements made
any specific reference to the Takeshima/Tokdo Islands.

Takeshimain the San FranciscoSystem

Globalization of the cold war brought an international order to Asia that
differed from the Yalta blueprint. WhenJapan surrendered in August 1945,
Korea was divided along the 38th parallel of latitude and occupied by the
U.S. (south) and USSR (north). Later in 1948, without going through the
trusteeship system, two governments were established in the divided
peninsula; then, inJune 1950, the Korean War broke out. The Peace Treaty
with Japan was prepared against this background.

Takeshimaand earlyU.S. Peace Treatydrafts

During the Allied occupation ofJapan, Takeshima was divided fromJapan
by the so-called "MacArthurLine."24This was drawn only for the occupation
authorities' administrative convenience and was not necessarily intended as
a final border demarcation. In fact the same directives that provided the
MacArthur Line also detached the whole of the "Northern Territories"and
Okinawa from Japan.

22 The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Chapter II Territory,Article 2 (a) states "Japan,
recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the
islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet."
23 FRUS1945, TheConferences at Maltaand Yalta,p. 770.
24 General MacArthur'sDirectivesto theJapanese Government, SCAPIN1033 of 22June 1946.
SCAPIN677 of 29January 1946 also detached TakeshimafromJapan.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

From late 1946 onward, several drafts of a peace treaty with Japan were
prepared in the State Department.25 Those drafts and other relevant
documents retained in the U.S. Archives suggest that the U.S. government
indeed favored the transfer of Takeshima to Korea - until November 1949.
In the early drafts "Takeshima,"also under its English name "Liancourt
Rocks," was clearly specified as among the "offshore Korean islands" that
Japan was to renounce. For example, the 2 November 1949 draft states
(Chapter II, Territorial Clauses, Article 6)

Japan hereby renounces in favor of Korea all rights and titles to the
Korean mainland territory and all offshore Korean islands, including
Quelpart (Saishu To), the Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do)
which forms Port Hamilton (Tonankai), Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To,
or Matsu Shima), Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima), and all other islands
and islets to whichJapan has acquired title lying outside the line described
in Article 3 and to the east of the meridian 124? 15' E. longitude, north
of the parallel 33? N. latitude, and west of a line from the seaward
terminus of the boundary approximately three nautical miles from the
mouth of the Tumen River to a point in 37? 30' N. latitude, 132? 40' E.
longitude.26

Takeshimain theDecember1949 Draft

Only one month later, the December 1949 draft contained an important
change, by including Takeshima in the areas that were to remain Japanese
territory. The draft stated (Chapter II, Territorial Clauses, Article 3),

The territory ofJapan shall comprise the four principalJapanese islands

of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor
islands, including the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai), Tsushima,
Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks), Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri....All of the
islands identified above, with a three-mile belt of territorial waters, shall
belong toJapan.27

This change of the Takeshima disposition appears to have been influenced

by a commentary on the previous (November) draft, sent to the State
Department by William J. Sebald, political advisor to the Supreme

25 These peace treatydraftsrelatingto the Takeshimadisposition are introduced in theJapanese

language in TakashiTsukamoto,"Heiwajoyakuto Takeshima (sairon)"Reference 1994. 3, pp. 31-56.
The author revisited the U.S. Archivesfor their English originals and other documents relevant to
this project.
26 NND913302, RG59,Lot 56D527, Box 1, General Records of the Department of State, Office
of NortheastAsia Affairs,RecordsRelatingto the Treatyof Peace withJapan- SubjectFile, 1945-51.
Box 6, National Archives,College Park,Maryland,U.S.A. (NA hereafter). Underlined by author.
27 MicrofilmC-43, Reel 14, 54-D423:Japanese Peace TreatyFiles of John Foster Dulles, 1947-
1952, SubjectFiles, UniversityPublicationsof America Bethesda, Maryland;Tsukamoto, op.cit,p.43.
Underlined by the author.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

Commander Allied Powers in Japan (MacArthur).28Sebald suggested that

Takeshima be specified as belonging to Japan, and directly or indirectly
provided the reasons of (1) historical validityand (2) strategic considerations.
On historical validity, Sebald stated thatJapan's claim to Takeshima was
"old and appeared valid,"and "it is difficult to regard them as islands off the
shore of Korea." The U.S. government, in principle, respected historical
validity. Later, in July 1951, when South Korea requested revisions to the
draft treaty, Dulles said that if those islands had been Korean before the
Japanese annexation, there should be "no particular problem" in including
them in the area thatJapanwas to renounce.2 The U.S. official view, delivered
to the South Korean side in the next month, was, however, that they should
belong to Japan.
Asregardsthe islandof Dokdo [Tokdo],otherwiseknownasTakeshima
or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was
accordingto our informationnever treatedas part of Koreaand, since
about 1905, has been under thejurisdictionof the Oki IslandsBranch
Officeof ShimaneprefectureofJapan.Thisislanddoes not appearever
before to have been claimedby Korea.30

As for the above, "our [U.S.] information," it should be remembered that,

in the early post-war years ,the Japanese Foreign Office presented to the
U.S. government several pamphlets concerning the Japanese territories,
including the "Northern Territories" pamphlet mentioned earlier. One of
them appears from its title to be relevant to Takeshima, namely, "Minorislands
in the Pacific and the Sea ofJapan (taiheiyooyobinihonkai sho shoto)"of June
194731 and it may have influenced this U.S. policy change. However, the
booklet has not yet been released into the public domain, so its content is
not known.
The second reason for the change was strategic considerations. Sebald's
commentary touched on a security aspect of the Takeshima disposition, when
he wrote that "security considerations might also conceivably render the
provision of weather and radar stations on these islands a matter of interest
to the United States."32

28 "Commenton Draft Treatyof Peace with Japan,"To the Secretary of State, From Office of
United StatesPoliticalAdviserforJapan (WJ.Sebald),November 19, 1949, 740.0011 PWPEACE/11-
1949, RG59,decimal file 1945-49,Box 3515, NA.
29 RG59, Lot 54 D423 Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles, Box 8, Korea, NA;
FR1951Vol.VI,Part 1 p.1206; Tsukamoto,"Heiwajoyakuto Takeshima (sairon),"p.49.
30 Ibid. (NA); Tsukamoto,ibid., p.50. Underlined by the author.
31 KumaoNishimura, Sanfuranshisukoheiwajoyaku, p.46.
32 "Commenton Draft Treatyof Peace withJapan,"To the Secretary of State, From Office of
United StatesPoliticalAdviserforJapan (W.J. Sebald), 19 November 1949, 740.0011 PWPEACE/11-
1949, RG59,decimal file 1945-49,Box 3515, NA.

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 Japan 's TerritorialProblems

This was in late 1949, in the midst of escalation of the cold war, when
communism was expanding internationally and had just taken power in
China. Japan therefore came to be viewed as the country of primary
importance for U.S. strategy in Asia, whereas Korea, whose future appeared
unclear, was accorded only secondary importance. If the communists of the
North came to dominate the whole of Korea, it was preferable for those
islands (Takeshima) in the Sea ofJapan not to be Korean territory.
This line of thinking, i.e., territorial disposition to suit security concerns,
appeared earlier among the Commonwealth countries, at the Canberra
conference of 1947. Although no discussion of Takeshima was recorded,
Quelpart Island was discussed as strategically desirable to be retained by
Japan33 and the British brought this idea up again during the final stages of
preparation of the joint U.S.-U.K draft Treaty inJune 1951.34Japan did in
fact renounce Quelpart in the Peace Treaty, but it seems possible that the
same kind of thinking, though with a different outcome, was applied to the
Takeshima disposition.

Takeshimain Dulles'Draftsafter1950
InJune 1950, two months after Dulles was appointed to oversee drafting
of the Peace Treaty, the Korean War broke out. Thereafter, "Takeshima"
disappeared from U.S. treaty drafts. For example, the first draft (7 August
1950) prepared under Dulles, states (Chapter IV, Territory, Article 4),

Japanrecognizesthe independence of Koreaand will base its relations

with Koreaon the resolutionsadoptedby the United NationsAssembly
on December,1948.35

The date for the resolutions passed by the UN Assembly in December

1948 has been left blank. That, and the reference to "resolutions" indicates
that the document was a provisional draft, as the reference can only be to
the UN General Assembly resolution (not "resolutions") passed on 12 De-
cember 1948, which formally recognized the Government of the Republic
of Korea in the South. Thus the draft was intended to identify "Korea"in the
treaty with the Republic of [South] Korea as its sole legitimate government.
In addition, as the draft was prepared six weeks after North Korea's invasion
initiated the Korean War,which was being fought in the name of the United
Nations, to equate Korea's future with the terms of a UN decision was
undoubtedly advantageous to the U.S.A. and its allies.

33 Documentson CanadianExternalRelations,Vol. 13, 1947, p. 22; FR1947, Vol.VI,pp. 532-33.

34 SummaryRecord of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office, at 10:30. a.m. on 5 TuesdayJune,
1951, F0371/92554, Public Record Office, London, U.K. (PRO hereafter).
35 NND913302, RG59, Lot 56D527, General Records of the Department of State, Office of
NortheastAsiaAffairs,RecordsRelatingto the Treatyof Peace withJapan- SubjectFile, 1945-51.Box
3, NA.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

The UN "resolutions" formula was, however, dropped from the March

1951 draft,36presumably because of the change in the Korean War situation,
as communist China's intervention in November 1950 prompted Washington
to consider "loss of Korea" a possibility.37In addition, there was a danger
within the UN framework that other peace settlements, namely the
disposition of Formosa (Taiwan) and the issue of Chinese representation,
could be affected and Formosa might be ceded to communist China (PRC),
which the British had already recognized in January 1950. The word
"Takeshima"never thereafter appeared in U.S. peace treaty drafts, and it
was not mentioned in the actual Peace Treaty signed in September 1951.
The main question to be addressed here is why "Takeshima"disappeared
from the treaty text after 1950. The most valid explanation may be simply a
change in format, which greatly shortened the text of the whole treaty.The
earlier drafts were lengthy and very detailed, listing many islands in border
areas, specifying to which country they should belong, and demarcating
borders specifically in terms of latitude and longitude. Other sections of the
treaty were also very lengthy, so when Dulles took charge, he decided to
make it shorter and simpler, thus easier to read and comprehend. To this
end the names of many islands, including Takeshima, were deleted.
But if that was the case, was it not anticipated that problems would be
created? It was in fact pointed out, within the State Department, that this
shorter form of peace treaty might lead to future territorial disputes and
Takeshima was also mentioned in that context. On 9 August 1951, Robert A.
Feary, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, raised the following question
on Dulles' first draft of 7 August 1951.

Are the territorialdimensions of the newJapan sufficientlyclear,for

example, offshore islands like Sado and islands to which title may be
disputedsuch as Tsushimaand Takeshima?38

This point was not reflected in the later drafts, however, probably because
it was expected that such disputes would be dealt with under a procedure
specified in Chapter VI, Article 22 of the Treaty.
If in the opinion of any Partyto the present Treatythere has arisena
disputeconcerningthe interpretationor executionof the Treaty,which
is not settledby other agreedmeans,the disputeshall,at the requestof
anypartythereto,be referredfor decision to the InternationalCourtof
Justice.39

36 Ibid.(NA), Box 6.
37 Chihiro Hosoya, Sanfuranshisuko enomichi(Tokyo:Chuokoron-sha,1984), p. 150.
38 FromR. Feareyto Mr.Allison,9 August1950,NND913302,RG59,Lot 56D527,GeneralRecords
of the Department of State, Office of NortheastAsiaAffairs,RecordsRelating to the Treatyof Peace
withJapan- SubjectFile, 1945-51.Box 6, NA.
39 Shigeta Hiroshi, SuezawaShoji eds., Nissokihonbunsho/shiryo-shu,
1855-1988,(Tokyo:Sekaino
ugoki-sha,1990), p. 118.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

In addition, at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951, Dulles

stated

Some Allied PowerssuggestedthatArticle2 should not merelydelimit

Japanesesovereigntyaccordingto Potsdam...so farasJapanis concerned,
leavingthe future to resolvedoubts by invokinginternationalsolvents
other than this treaty.40

Another possible explanation is that Dulles purposely made the treaty

less detailed in full knowledge that doing so could give rise to disputes, and
did so in order to give the U.S.A. room for future manoeuver. This expla-
nation fits with his later action in issuing the "Dulles' Warning" to Japan
over the "Northern Territories"question in 1956, i.e., providing a "wedge"to
secure Japan in the western bloc.
The U.S. defense line in the Western Pacific, stretching from the Aleutians
throughJapan to the Philippines came to be known as the Acheson Line, as
it was proclaimed by Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, inJanuary 1950.
Acheson made no mention of Taiwan or Korea, which the U.S.A. then saw as
capable of being "lost"to communism, as China already had been. Japan's
three frontier disputes - the "Northern Territories,"Takeshima and Senkaku
- line up north, west and south along the Acheson Line.
On 11 January 1951, at a meeting with a House subcommittee, Dulles
gave a long exposition of the philosophy behind United States policy toward
aJapanese peace settlement, in which he stated,

with Communistdominationof China and Manchuria,Sakhalin,the

Kuriles,and possiblyall of Korea,Japanwouldbe placedin an invidious
positionand wouldbe vulnerableto Communistdominationunless the
United Statesand the otherfriendlypowerswereable to assureJapanof
a reasonablepolitical,economic and militarystabilityover the future.41

Dulles perhaps left some potential "wedges"for defense ofJapan against

communist expansion, or to prevent any "domino effect," by not defining
the territorial dispositions clearly in the Treaty so as to retain some potential
sources of discord between Japan and its neighbors. Whether purposely or
not, Dulles planted the seeds of future disputes in the treaty and, in the case
of Takeshima, created a source of discord in preparation for the possible
"loss of Korea."

40 JapanesePeaceConference,San Francisco,September4-8, 1951, reprinted from the Departmentof

StateBulletinof17 September1951,Departmentof State,Publication4371, InternationalOrganization
and Conference Series II, FarEastern2, Released September 1951, Division of PublicationsOffice of
Public Affairs,p. 11.
41 NND913302, RG59, Lot 56D527, General Records of the Department of States, Office of
NortheastAsiaAffairs,RecordsRelatingto the Treatyof Peace withJapan- SubjectFile, 1945-51,Box
4, NA.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

It seems that this "wedges ofJapan" thinking was not clearly formulated
in U.S. policy in the early 1950s, however, as Dulles introduced the "inter-
national solvents" option at the peace conference.Japan did in fact propose
in 1954 that the case of Takeshima be brought to the International Court,
but South Korea refused.
The "wedges ofJapan" appeared more obviously in U.S. policy over the
"Northern Territories"question. When theJapanese-Soviet peace talks began
in 1955, the U.S.A. supported resolution of the territorial dispute through
an international conference. However, while delivering his "Warning"in
August 1956, Dulles responded negatively to hisJapanese counterpart's query
about convening one. Such a conference might have opened up "disagreeable
questions" about Okinawa and Taiwan, but Dulles' main aim, as mentioned
earlier, was undoubtedly to prevent any rapprochement between Japan and
the USSR.42

Proclamationof theRheeLine
On 28 April 1952 the Peace Treaty came into effect and the MacArthur
Line, which administrativelyseparated Takeshima fromJapan, was abolished.
Before that, however, Syngman Rhee's regime in South Korea on 18January
unilaterallyproclaimed the so-called "Rhee Line," essentiallywith the purpose
of keeping the MacArthur line in place. The Japanese Government then
protested and the dispute emerged.
Two major reasons may be advanced for the "Rhee Line" announcement.
The first is historical validity.Korea probably believed that it had the stronger
case, regardless of the U.S. orJapanese positions. This can be assumed from
the fact that Korea even today bases its case on historical claims from ancient
times. South Korea still uses the MacArthur Line as a basis of its argument.
This may sound illogical, as the MacArthur Line should have been abolished
when the Peace Treaty came into effect, but its existence up to then proves
that the United States was considering the possibility of Takeshima/Tokdo
becoming part of Korean territory soon after the end of the war - before the
cold war escalated in Asia. As mentioned earlier, Takeshima was designated
to become Korean territory until the November 1949 draft of the Peace
Treaty.
The second reason was Korea's dissatisfaction with U.S. policy. Rhee's
government needed U.S. support to confront the communist regime in the
North, but was not satisfied with U.S. policy as a whole. The U.S. had fought
the Korean War on the ROK's behalf, and temporarily occupied much of
North Korea, but after the Chinese intervention it gave up the idea of an
advance to the North. Instead it settled for "containment" of the inter-
nationalized civil war in Korea along the North-South Korea border at the

42 FRUS 1955-57, Vol. XXXIII, p. 203; Hara, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, pp. 50-51.

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 Japan's Territorial
Problems

38th parallel and in China along the Taiwan Strait, in order to avoid a direct
clash between the superpowers or a total war. Rhee opposed the resulting
cease-fire, as he wanted the United Nations forces to continue advancing
northwards to reunify the whole Korean Peninsula.
Rhee was particularly dissatisfied with the U.S. policy of giving priority to
Japan. As the cold war escalated in Asia, the United States changed its policy
towardJapan and this was reflected in various parts of its post-war arrange-
ments. Territorial disposition was no exception. It appears that its disposition
of Takeshima was made in Japan's favor because, in the cold war,Japan was
more important to the U.S.A. than Korea. Given Korea's anti-Japanese
nationalism, Rhee was naturally not happy with a peace settlement relatively
generous to Japan. Furthermore, because of U.S.-U.K. differences over
Chinese participation, neither Korea was invited to the Peace Conference, so
South Koreawas not able to argue its case there. Thus the Takeshima problem
arose both directly and indirectly as a consequence of U.S. cold war policy.

III. Japan-China: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

The question at the heart of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
is whether they are a part of Japan's Okinawa prefecture, or should have
been renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as part of Taiwan.43

Senkaku/Ryukyusin the YaltaBlueprint

The Senkaku Islands were incorporated intoJapan's Okinawa prefecture,
itself created from the Ryuku Islands in 1879, by cabinet decision inJanuary
1895.44The wartime international agreements, such as the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations and the Yalta Agreement, made no specific mention of the
intended dispositions for Senkaku or Okinawa. In hindsight, however, there
was general agreement atYalta on post-wartrusteeship arrangements, which
appears to have some connection with the U.S. proposal of trusteeship systems
over the Ryukyus, Bonins and other islands in the Peace Treaty.

43 In The San Francisco Peace Treatyof 1951, Chapter II Territory,Article 2 (b) states "Japan
renounces all right, title and claim to Formosaand the Pescadores."Article 3 states"Japanwill concur
in any proposal of the United Statesto the United Nations to place under its trusteeshipsystem,with
the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29? north latitude
(including the RyukyuIslandsand the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the
Bonin Islands,RosarioIsland and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and MarcusIsland. Pending
the making of such a proposal and affirmativeaction thereon, the United Stateswill have the right to
exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitantsof these islands, including their territorialwaters."
44 Ryukyuwasonce an independent sovereignkingdom and became a tributarystate toJapan in
1609. It also kept tributaryrelationswith China until 1872, when it wasincorporated intoJapan as the
Ryukyu-han.In 1879, it became Okinawaprefecture.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

Senkaku/Ryukyusin the San FranciscoSystem

Senkaku was placed under U.S. control, together with Okinawa, by Article
3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Although the status of the territories
mentioned in Article 3 was not clearly defined in the treaty text, Dulles
recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over these islands at the Peace
Conference in September 1951. For almost two decades after the signing of
the treaty, none claimed that these islands were not part of Okinawa, and
should therefore have been renounced as part of the Formosa (Taiwan)
thatJapan renounced in Article 2(b) of the Peace Treaty.
The territorial problem betweenJapan and China then was Okinawa. On
several occasions during the war, Chang Kai-Shek's Republic of China had
taken to expressing an interest in obtaining or "recovering"Okinawa45and
it therefore refused to recognize Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa
that Dulles had acknowledged at the Peace Conference. While the ROC
insisted on its traditional claim, the newly established Communist
government of China (PRC), on the contrary, supported the return of
Okinawa to Japan in 1951.46 This was, however, nothing but political
propaganda aiming at the removal of U.S. military bases from Okinawa and
a peace treaty with (i.e., expansion of communist influence to) Japan. It was
not until around 1970 that both Chinas (PRC and ROC) began to claim that
the islands are part of Taiwan.

Okinawa'sReversionand the SenkakuDispute

By 1972 the United States had relinquished its administrative rights over
all the territories mentioned in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty,without placing
them under UN trusteeship. From the late 1960s onwards, the value of the
natural resources around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands began to receive
attention. This made ownership of the islands more important to both Chinas,
especially during a period of emergent resource nationalism. In parallel
with the Okinawa reversion movements betweenJapan and the U.S.A., both
Chinas began to claim ownership of Senkaku. Then the dispute erupted.
For Japan, because the Senkaku had never been disputed before, it was a
"problem that emerged suddenly (kyu ni okottamondai),"as described in a
government pamphlet published in 1972.47 The ROC in Taiwan retained

45 For example, in a pressstatement of November5, 1942, ForeignMinisterT.V.Soong included

the islandswith Manchuriaand Formosa as territorythat China expected to recover.He also stated
on 29 October 1944 that "Japanwill have to evacuatethe Liuchiu [Ryukyu/Okinawa]Islands,"and at
a press conference a few dayslater he added that Chinawould "recover"them after the war.[T-343,2
July 1943, "LiuchiuIslands (Ryukyu),"RG 59, General Record of Department of State, Records of
HarleyA. Notter, 1939-45, Records of the AdvisoryCommittee on Post-WarForeign Policy 1942-45,
Lot 60D224, Box 64; CAC-307,14 December 1944, "Japan:TerritorialProblems:Liuchiu (Ryukyu)
Islands,"Microfilm 1221, Roll 6, NA.]
46 DailyBulletin,16 August 1951; People'sDaily,26 March 1958.
47 http://www.worldtimes.co.jp/gv/data/senkaku/main.html. Gaimusho joho-bunka-kyoku,
Senkaku-rettoni tsuite,1972.

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 Japan 's TerritorialProblems

the position that OkinawawasnotJapanese territoryand opposed its "reversion"

toJapan. The PRC also criticized this "reversion,"but for a different reason,
calling it "afraud" because the U.S. military remained on the island.48
U.S. policy over Senkaku at the time of the Okinawa reversion deserves
special attention, as maybe the most important key to understanding the
problem. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson successively con-
firmedJapan's residual sovereignty over the territories mentioned in Article
3 of the Peace Treaty, and the U.S.' intention to return them. Accordingly,
the Amami Islands (northernmost of the Ryukyu chain) and Bonin
(Ogasawara) Islands were returned toJapan in 1953 and 1968 respectively.
Before the reversion of Okinawa, there was certainly an understanding in
the U.S. government that Senkaku was part of Okinawa. However, the Nixon
administration adopted a policy of taking "no position on sovereignty,"while
returning "administrative rights" over these islands to Japan along with
Okinawa, thus leaving the dispute to theJapanese and Chinese. This policy
was, as a matter of course, questioned. In March 1971 the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD) sent a memorandum to the State Department, recalling
that the U.S.A. had recognized and disposed of Senkaku as part of Okinawa
in the past. It stated:

Our [DOD's]searchhas indicatedthatthe coordinatesproposedin the

cable call for identical points to those found in CivilAdministration
ProclamationNo. 27 of December25, 1953,and these in turnarefound
in ArmyMapServiceGazetteerto Mapsof Ryukyu-Retto and Ogasawara-
Gunto, publishedin October 1944. Moreover,the Gazetteer,which is
undoubtedlythe source of the Proclamationcoordinatesrefersat this
point to the Senkakusas part of the Okinawaprefecture. It would
therefore dignifythe Japaneseclaim to the Senkakus,contraryto the
neutral position assumedby the United States....Unquestionablythe
United States"administered" the SenkakuIslandsas partof the Okinawa
administration,and such an administration took place (a) without
questionor issueraisedbythe UnitedStatesas to itspowersto administer,
and (b) apparentlywithout Taiwanmaking a claim or attempting to
claimthe Senkakuuntiloil becomesan issue.Underthesecircumstances,
the United States "position"is not entirely free from an element of
recognition....49

However, these points do not seem to have been reflected in U.S. Senkaku
policy. Why did the Nixon administration not take a position on the sov-
ereignty over these islands, although aware of its past treatment of them as
part of Okinawa?

48 Ibid.
49 19 March 1971, Memorandum for Mark Greenwood, Department of State from Harry H.
Almond, Jr., Office of the AssistantGeneral Counsel, International Affairs,Department of Defense,
NND9609043, RG59, Entry 1613, Box 2571, General Records of the Department of State, Subject
Number Files 1970-73,Political & Defense, FromPol.19 RYUIS 4/1/70 to Pol 19 RYUIS 3/1/71, NA.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

The explanation often used in State Department correspondence is "the

U.S. did not want to get 'caught' in the middle."50This reflects developments
in relations with both Chinas. The first is obviously the PRC. The time was
one of global detente and a dramatic transformation was taking place in the
Asia-Pacific international relations structure. The Nixon administration,
inaugurated in 1969, had a primary diplomatic agenda of normalizing
relations with the PRC. It had inherited the Okinawa reversion agreement
from the Johnson period, but had no intention of allowing the tiny islands
of Senkaku (Diaoyu) to impede development of its policy towards China.
The United States was also concerned for the other China, the ROC.
Although Nixon visited Beijing in 1972 and opened de facto diplomatic
relations with the PRC, the U.S.A. did not establish official relations till 1979.
Until then it maintained official diplomatic and security relations with Taiwan
and its defense relationship with Taiwan has remained important up to the
present.51 A document in the U.S. archives draws attention in this regard, a
letter dated 8 July 1971, from Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, to Secretary of State Rogers. It states

I have noticed in recent press articles,and severalwitnessesbefore the

Committee have brought to my attention, reports that the State
Departmenthasconcurredin a proposalthatsome of the tacticalnuclear
weapons now stored in Okinawabe moved to storage spots in other
places,one of whichis Taiwan.52

If this is true, the U.S.A. definitely needed Taiwan's cooperation, and it

was not to be put at risk over the small islands of Senkaku (Diaoyu).
In addition to the above points, and even though it was a period of d6tente,
some elements of previous U.S. cold war policies seem to have been carried
over from "Dulles' Warning" of the mid-1950s. They include (1) retention
of U.S. control over Okinawa and (2) use ofJapan's territorial dispute as a
"wedge"against its communist neighbor.
For Okinawa, the aim was to ensure retention of the U.S. bases on the
islands. In the late 1960s PresidentJohnson had promised future reversion
of Okinawa toJapan. However, the U.S.A. had no incentive for reversion; on
the contrary, during the Johnson administration, Okinawa's strategic
importance had increased with the north's advance in the Vietnam War.

50 For example, telegram, FM AMEMBASSYTOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4289,

NND9609043, RG59, Entry 1613, Box 2571, General Records of the Department of State, Subject
NumberFiles 1970-73,Political& Defense, FromPol.19 RYUIS 4/1/70 to Pol 19 RYUIS 3/1/71, NA.
51 The TaiwanRelationsAct was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979. It states its purpose as "To
help maintain peace, security,and stabilityin the Western Pacificand to promote the foreign policy
of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations
between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan,and for other purposes."
52 NND 960943, RG 59 Entry 1613, Box 2573, General Records of the Department of State,
SubjectNumber Files 1970-73,Political & Defense, NA.

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 Japan's TerritorialProblems

Johnson's promise was a political compromise, rendered necessary by the

growth of movements demanding reversion, not only in Okinawa, but all
over Japan. ManyJapanese opposed the U.S. intervention in the Vietnam
War.The increased use of the Okinawa bases for that war further provoked
anti-U.S. demonstrations and there were signs that the Japanese Socialists
and Communists were regaining popularity. Hence the Johnson admin-
istration's political compromise, undertaken to appease anti-U.S. feelings
among theJapanese, and to prevent the Communists from taking advantage
of the situation.
Thus, even though the U.S.A. would "return"Okinawa toJapan, it desired
to retain its bases there. Nor was the Vietnam War its only reason for so
desiring. There was also China. The 1969 U.S.-Japan (Nixon-Sato) Com-
munique contained a more specific promise of Okinawa reversion, but also
included the so-called "Taiwan and South Korean provisions."53 The
implication of these provisions, which directly linkedJapan's security to that
of Taiwan and South Korea, was that communist China was continuously
perceived as a threat in the region, especially since it had become a nuclear
power in 1964.
U.S. recognition of communist China was not an "end"of the cold war. It
was a reconciliation between superpowers that do not share common values.
Its primary purpose was to obtain the PRC's cooperation to end the Vietnam
War and it could take place only against the background of the Sino-Soviet
dispute. The U.S.A. was "losing"Vietnam to the communists. Its recognition
of communist China was simply defacto recognition of the political status
quo, i.e., of China as the regional communist power in Asia, or simply a
transformation to an "engagement" policy, rather resembling Roosevelt's
recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, or British recognition of the PRC
in 1950.
As for Senkaku, a territorial dispute betweenJapan and China, especially
over islands near Okinawa,would make the U.S. military presence in Okinawa
more acceptable to Japan. While emphasizing the "China threat," and
"defense ofJapan" to theJapanese, Nixon managed to secure tacit Chinese
approval of the U.S. presence in Okinawa as "defense from Japan," thus
exploiting China's fear of a revival ofJapanese militarism.
Henry Kissinger, the architect of Nixon's diplomacy, wrote:

One of the principal tasks of statesmanshipis to understand which

subjectsare trulyrelatedand can be used to reinforceeach other. For
the mostpart,the policymakerhaslittlechoice in the matter;ultimately,
it is reality,not policy, that links events. The statesman's role is to

53 Nihon gaiko shuyo bunsho - nenpyo (2) 1961-1970, (Tokyo: Hara-shobo, 1984), p. 543, cited in
Soeya, Nihon gaiko to chugoku, p. 113-14.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

recognize the relationship when it does exist - in other words, to create

a network of incentives and penalties to produce the most favorable
outcome.54

Referring to Nixon's U.S.-China-USSR triangular diplomacy, Kissinger also

wrote:

In the analysis of Nixon and his advisers, so long as China had more to
fear from the Soviet Union than it did from the United Sates, China's
self-interest would impel it to cooperate with the United States...
America's bargaining position would be stronger when America was
closer to both communist giants than either was to the other.55

A similar line of analysis was probably also applied to policy towardJapan

and China, rising economic and political giants in Asia. The U.S.A. achieved
a series of difficult diplomatic objectives, such as withdrawal from Vietnam,
reconciliation with communist China, and resolution of the Taiwan problem
and the Okinawa problem, one after another, by recognizing their
relationship and tactically linking them to its advantage. The Senkaku dispute
was only another emergent reality, which could be used "to create a network
of incentives and penalties to produce the most favorable outcome" for the
U.S.A. in the context of the time.
U.S. policy toward Sino-Japanese relations in the early-1970s resembles
U.S. policy toward Soviet-Japanese relations in the mid-1950s. It was the period
of East-West detente, just as the mid-1950s were the period of "peaceful
coexistence" or "thaw." Basic U.S. cold war policy continued to function in
both periods. Thus, even after "reversion," the U.S. military remained in
Okinawa under the renewed U.S.-Japan security alliance.5 A "wedge" called
the "Northern Territories problem" was inserted withJapan's "four islands"
claim against the USSR in the mid-1950s and, in the earlyl970s, when
Okinawa was returned toJapan, another "wedge," called "Senkaku/Diaoyu,"
was inserted between Japan and China.

IV. Conclusions

Many agree that there has as yet been no "post-postwar" forJapan. This is
so not only in the context of its security alliance with the U.S.A.57 and its war

54 Henry Kissinger,Diplomacy,(NewYork:Simon & Schuster,1994), p. 717.

55 Ibid., p. 729.
56 Therewasalsoa secretagreementregardingemergencytransferof nuclearweaponsto Okinawa
after the reversion. [KeiWakaizumi,Tasakunakarishio sinzemutohossu,(Tokyo:Bungeishunju,1994),
p. 447, cited in Seigen Miyazato"Okinawahenkan o meguru saikinno kenkyu,"Kokusaiseiji,vol. 108
(1995), p.190.]
57 Bruce Cumings"Japan'sPosition in the WorldSystem,"in AndrewGordon, ed., PostwarJapan
as History,(Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1993), p. 61.

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 Japan's Territorial
Problems

responsibility,58but also in its territorial problems with its neighbors. Before

the war could be ended with clear settlements, Japan became involved in
the "cold war."More than a half-century has passed since the end of World
War II and one decade has already passed since the so-called "end of the
cold war." However, many problems still remain with regard to Japanese
post-war settlements.
Including the frontier problems ofJapan, the regional cold war structure,
the "San Francisco System," essentially remains in the Asia-Pacific. China
and Korea are still divided and their communist or authoritarian sides are
still a "threat"for their neighbors to this date. The U.S. maintains its forward
deployment through its bilateral security arrangement, known as the "San
Francisco Alliance System." In the sense that the cold war tensions became
relaxed but its structure remained; the regional "end of the cold war"
movement since the late-1980s appears to resemble that of detentein the
1950s and the 1970s. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and global-scale development in democracy in recent years, the "domino"
theory of the "cold war"era, during which the territorial problems played a
convenient role to "contain" communism, is no longer valid.
Examination of the post-war territorial disposition of Japan seems to
suggest "linkage"and "multilateralism"as keys to the understanding of many
regional conflicts in the Asia-Pacific. This paper limits its scope to Japan's
three territorial problems. Yet, even these cases alone hint at several political
linkages, e.g., between the dispositions of Korea and Formosa/Taiwan in
the negotiations prior to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference; the
"Northern Territories";Okinawa and Taiwan during the 1955-56Japanese-
Soviet peace negotiations; and America's China policy and Senkaku at the
time of Okinawa's reversion. Kissinger was known for his secret diplomacy
apart from the State Department, while Dulles closely followed the State
Department studies, but they shared a common strategy of linkage politics.
American policy makers carefully and tactfully contemplated their
dispositions, recognizing "realities,""toproduce the most favorable outcome"
in each era.
As for "multilateralism,"those problems were set in place by third party
involvement in the process of constructing the post-war international order
and bequeathed unresolved to the countries concerned. And they are likely
to remain unresolved so long as they remain confined to the nations directly
involved. "Internationalization,"or "re-internationalization"of the problems
may therefore be a necessary step towards their solution. Japan in fact
attempted unsuccessfully to "internationalize" or "multilateralize" the
"Northern Territories" question during its peace talks with the USSR in the

58 Gavan McCormack, TheEmptinessofJapaneseAffluence,(Armonk, N.Y.:M.E. Shape, 1996),

especiallypp. 225-77.

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 PacificAffairs:Fall 2001

mid-1950s. The complicated international situation of the time did not allow
the concerned states to re-examine the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaty.
But the current regional political environment is greatly different from that
time. The differences between the U.S.A. and U.K. over China/Taiwan policy
have dissolved since the 1970s and the U.K. withdrew from Hong Kong in
1997. With the end of the U.S.A.-USSR cold war, Russia and the U.S.A. now
call each other "partners." The importance of the region, especially its
economic importance, has greatly increased. Solution of the conflicts is not
only an important diplomatic agenda item for the countries directly involved
in the disputes, but also of crucial concern for the security of the entire
region.
The time shift to the "post-cold war"era does not negate the significance
of the cold war origins of these problems. The fiftieth anniversary of the
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is marked in 2001, of its
implementation in 2002. It seems reasonable to remember their common
origin in the post-war peace settlements with Japan, and consider the
possibility of achieving solutions by re-linking them back in a multilateral
context.

Universityof Calgary,Canada, April 2001

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