III.

CHOICE OF LAW

A. Methods or Approaches to Choices of Law

1. Single-Aspect Method – are choice of law theories traditionally concentrated on one element of a
situation to connect case to particular legal community. Goal: simplicity, convenience, uniformity.

The Philippines follows single-aspect method. Our conflicts rules are mostly found in the Civil Code.

a. Arts. 15-17, Civil Code of the Phil.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)

2. Multi-Aspect Method/Depecage - modern approach by which all important factors (non/territorial)

are analyzed. The applicable law is arrived at by elaborating policies & purposes underlying rules,
and the needs of international intercourse or dealings. Goal: just resolution of case

Depecage:
From depecer, which means “to dissect.”
Different aspects of a case involving a foreign element may be governed by different systems of laws.

Von Mehren & Trautman:

A man dies intestate domiciled in state A & w/ movable properties in State B.
How will the man’s estate be divided? State A conflict rules refer to laws of domicile. Intestate
law of State B gives the widow a definite share in the estate of deceased. But the determination
of WON the woman claiming the share is a “wife” is referred to family law, not laws on succession.

Issues of law governing movable properties & successional rights of spouse are of primary
importance, embodying substance of claim. Validity of marriage ‘affects solution because it answers a
preliminary or incidental Q.
The presence of an incidental Q is one instance which calls for the employment of depecage.
Merits of Depecage:
This technique allows other relevant interests of parties to be addressed. Thus, it permits courts to
arrive at a functionally sound result w/out rejecting the methodology of the traditional approach. This
nuanced single-aspect method employs depecage by choice.

Haumschild vs. Continental Casualty (1959)

FACTS:
Haumschild and Gleason were married in Wisconsin, their domicile. Haumschild was
injured in California while riding a motor truck driven by Gleason. Their marriage was later
annulled. An action for recovery of damages was filed by Haumschild in Wisconsin.
Continental alleges that under California law, a spouse is immune from suit by the other
spouse.

HELD:
The law of the domicile (Wisconsin Law) shall be applied in any issue of incapacity to
sue based upon family relationship. The policy reason for denying the capacity to sue (preventing
family discord) more properly lies within the sphere of family law, where domicile usually controls the
law to be applied, than it does tort law, where the place of the injury generally determines the
substantive law which will govern.
The court decided that the law of the place of accident (California) governed the issue of
negligence while Wisconsin law governed the issue of interspousal immunity. The
characterization process was taken one step further by not limiting the classification to the case itself
but likewise, to the issue arising from the case.

The 1969 Restatement 2d adopted depecage & set out a number of factors to be considered in
choosing the applicable law:
a. needs of interstate & international system
b. relevant policies of the forum
c. relevant policies of other interested states & the relative interests of those states in the
determination of a particular issue
d. protection of the justified expectations of the parties
e. the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
f. certainty, predictability, uniformity of results, and
g. ease in determination & application of law to be applied

The consideration of any elements & acceptance by courts of depecage help ease restrictions of
single aspect method.
Courts not compelled to apply entire law to all aspects of case that might produce egregious results.
Cutting up the case issue by issue is fair & reasonable.
But even if a useful tool in modern choice-of-law analysis, the express reference to depecage in case
law, both in US & the Phil still uncommon.
3. Traditional Approach - are theories that emphasize simplicity, convenience and uniformity
Note: Traditional approaches do not consider policy.

a. Vested Rights Theory

- advanced by Prof. Beale (1st Restatement)
- an act done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to a right if the laws of that state provides so. The right
vests and he can bring suit in any forum he chooses.
- The forum refers law of the place of the “last act” necessary to complete the cause of action. (place
of injury)
- If place of the last act creates no legal right, although forum court creates such right if act is done
within its territory, it will not enforce the right.

Criticisms to the Approach: failure to resolve conflicts cases with considerations of policy and
fairness.

b. Cook’s Local Law Theory

- treat conflicts cases as a purely domestic case that does not involve a foreign element
- power of a state to regulate within its territory has no limitation except as imposed by its own
positive law
- criticism: appeals to narrow-mined who favors an exaggerated local policy because a sovereign can
do as they please, depreciating the practical and equitable considerations that should control the
case.

c. Caver’s Principles of Preference

- choice-of-law decisions should be made with reference to principles of preference which are
conceived to provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies and afford fair treatment to the
parties.
- Caver’s principles have a territorialist bias; it looks to the place where the significant events occurred
or where the legal relationship is centered.
- Court should:
1) scrutinize the event/ transaction giving rise to the issue
2) compare carefully the proffered rule of law & the result of its application with the rule of the
forum & its effect
3) appraise these results from the standpoint of justice between the litigants or of
considerations of social policy

Gray v Gray87 N.H. 82 (1934)

FACTS:

The husband and wife (Mr. and Ms. Gray) are domiciled in New Hampshire, a state which
permits the wife to sue the husband for personal injuries caused by the husband's negligence.
While a passenger in an automobile driven by the husband in Maine, the wife is injured as a
result of the husband's negligence. Under Maine law spouses are barred from maintaining an
action against each other. Thus, Ms. Gray sued Mr. Gray in New Hamsphire.

ISSUE:

WON in conflicts arising from a tort, lex loci governs (the law of the country in which a transaction is
performed, a tort is committed, or a property is situated.)

HELD:

YES. The effect of the prohibition in Maine is to divest the Wife of any cause of action against
Husband. If there is a conflict between lex fori (the law of the country in which an action is
brought) and lex loci, lex loci governs in torts in respect to the legal effect and incidents of the
act.

The status as spouses is determined by New Hampshire law but the incidents of that status is
governed by the law of the place of the transaction (Maine).

Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 87 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1893)

FACTS:
W. D. Carroll, a brakeman, was injured when a link between two of the freight train cars broke.
Carroll was injured in Mississippi. It was the duty of railroad employees to inspect the links
and remove defective links. Carroll brought suit against his employer, Alabama Great
Southern Railroad Company (“railroad company”) under common law and under the
Employer's Liability Act of Alabama. Mississippi bars recovery. Alabama makes employer
liable. Suit is filed in Alabama.

ISSUE:
Was the employer Alabama railroad company liable for damages due to a personal injury suffered by
brakeman Carroll suffered in Mississippi during the course of his employment?

RULING:
No. The court reversed that judgment on appeal and held that (1) at common law in Alabama and
Mississippi, negligence of railroad employees in inspecting railroad cars could not be attributed to the
company, and the company was consequently not liable for it, (2) there was no law in Mississippi that
was similar to the Employer's Liability Act of Alabama, (3) there could be no recovery in Alabama for
injuries to the person sustained in Mississippi unless the infliction of the injuries was actionable under
Mississippi law, (4) negligence of duty unproductive of damnifying results would not authorize or
support a recovery, (5) no injury resulted in Alabama, and (6) the action could only be brought under
the laws of Mississippi, where the injury occurred, and the brakeman could not obtain relief under
those laws.
There can be no recovery in one state for injuries to the person sustained in another unless
the infliction of the injuries is actionable under the law of the state in which the injuries were
received. Although it is claimed that the negligent conduct was done by Alabama Great
Southern Railroad Company, the injury sustained creates the cause of action and not the
negligence. (law of the place of injury)

4. Modern Approaches: - Note: all modern approaches look at policy.

a. Place of the Most Significant Relationship
-identifies a plurality of factors:
i. needs of the interstate and international system
ii. relevant policies of the concerned states
iii. relevant policies of other interested states
iv. protection of justified expectations of the parties
v. basic policies underlying the particular field of law
vi. certainty, predictability and uniformity of result vii. ease in the determination and application of law
to be applied

Examples of application:
 i. torts – place of injury, place of tortious conduct, domicile, residence or nationality of parties,
place where relationship is entered
ii. contracts – choice of law of the parties, place of contracting, place of performance,
domicile, residence, nationailty, place of incorporation and place of business.
b. Interest Analysis
- resolve conflicts cases by looking at the policy behind the laws of the involved states and the
interest each state has in applying its own law.
- Tasks of the court:
1st: determine whether the case involves a true, false or apparent conflict (false conflict: only
one state has an actual interest in having the law applied and the failure to apply the other
state law will not impair its policy)
2nd: if there is apparent or true conflict, court should take a second look on the policies and
interests of the states. If only one has a real interest, the other is insubstantial, then there is
false conflict. If both have real interests in applying their law, then the apparent conflict is a true
conflict.
- Criticisms to Approach: not all state legislatures publish reports that explain the background and
purpose of the laws, thus, court is left to speculate on the purpose of the law and not all reflected
policy or had a purpose other than to decide cases.

c. Comparative Impairment
- subordination of the state objective which would be least impaired
- How? Court should weigh conflicting interests and apply the law of the state whose interest would
be more impaired if its laws were not followed.

d. Trautman’s Functional Analysis

- this approach looks into:
1) the general policies of the state beyond those reflected in substantive law
2) policies and values reflecting effective and harmonious relationship between states
ex. Reciprocity, advancement of multistate activity, protecting justifiable expectations,
evenhandedness and effectiveness.

- after determining these policies, court should then weigh the relative strength of a state policy
- HOW? Court should consider whether the law of a state reflects an “emerging” or “regressing”
policy.

e. Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations

- 5 major choice-influencing considerations:
1) predictability of results
2) maintenance of interstate and int’l order
3) simplification of the judicial task
4) application of the better rule of law
5) advancement of the forum’s governmental interest

- Court should prefer a law that make good socioeconomic sense and are sound in view of present
day conditions.
- Criticism: no principled or objective standard to determine “better rule”.

Auten v. Auten – 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954)

FACTS:
Spouses were married and lived in England. The husband left and went to New York. Spouses
executed support agreement in New York. The husband failed to pay support. Wife sued her
Husband for legal separation. Wife sued in New York to enforce agreement. Husband claimed
that legal separation suit, extinguished liability under New York law.

ISSUE:
Was the New York law applicable in the case at bar?

RULING:
No. The English law should govern the parties. England has all the truly significant contacts while
the connection to New York is entirely fortuitous.
England is the seat of marital domicile and the place where the Wife & children were to be, it
has the greatest concern in defining and regulating the rights and duties existing under the
agreement and the circumstances that affect it. Whereas New York is only the place of the
agreement and where the trustee, where moneys will be paid for the account of the Wife &
children, had his office.
In applying the “grouping of contacts” theory, courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the
intention of the parties or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather on the law
of the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.

Haag v. Barnes - 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961)

FACTS:
Dorothy Haag (resident of New York) entered into an agreement with Norman Barnes (resident
of Illinois) for the support of a child born out of wedlock (born in Chicago Illinois). The parties
agreed that the laws of the state of Illinois would govern their agreement. In opposition to the
court's grant of Barnes’ motion to dismiss, appellant contended that New York, not Illinois,
law applied; and that the agreement in question was not a sufficient basis for a motion to
dismiss under either New York Law.

ISSUE:
Was the motion to dismiss properly granted on the basis of traditional conflicts rule?

RULING:
Yes. The court held that the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Haag could not upset a
support agreement, which was itself perfectly consistent with the public policy of New York,
which was entered into in Illinois with the understanding that it would be governed by the laws
of that state and which constituted a bar to a suit for further support under Illinois law. The
agreement, in so many words, recited that it "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the state of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by Haag in
Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would treat those factors as conclusive and result in the
application of Illinois law.
Suit is barred by the prior support agreement. Court found that Illinois has the most significant
contacts. It is what the parties intended to apply, the place of performance, the place of
business of Barnes & the agents and the place where support are being made compared to
New York whose contacts are of less weight & significance. (place of liaison & residence of H &
child)
Criticisms to approach: no standard to evaluate the relative significance/importance of each contact
such that court may use approach to support any preconceived result without explaining its real
motives.

Babcock v. Jackson - 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963)

FACTS:
In 1960, plaintiff Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents
of Rochester, New York, left that city in Jackson's automobile, Babcock as guest, for a week-
end trip to Canada. Some hours later, as Jackson was driving in the Province of Ontario, he
apparently lost control of the car; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and
Babcock was seriously injured. Upon her return to New York, Babcock brought the present
action against William Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in operating his automobile.
At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers
for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the
death of any person being carried in the motor vehicle." Even though no such bar is recognized
under this State's substantive law of torts, defendant Jackson moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the law of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's
guest statute barred recovery. The court at Special Term, agreeing with defendant, granted the
motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of dismissal without opinion.

ISSUE:
Was plaintiff Babcock, because she was a guest in defendant Jackson’s automobile, barred from
recovering damages for a wrong committed in Ontario, Canada?

RULING:
No. The reviewing court reversed its prior choice of law rule for torts, which was based on the
law of the place of the tort, and held that the applicable choice of law rule should also reflect a
consideration of other factors relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial of
the remedy. Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in
the action made it clear that the concern of New York was unquestionably greater and more
direct, and the interest of Ontario was at best minimal.
Babcock should be allowed to recover. New York had a greater & more direct interest than
Ontario. New York’s policy is to afford compensation to a guest against tortfeasor host while Ontario’s
policy is to prevent fraudulent collusion to the prejudice of Ontario defendants-insurance companies.
Thus, Ontario had no interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against a New York
host. The rule on tort claim is: Where the issue involves standard of conduct, law of the place of
the tort is controlling, but as to other issues, court must apply the law of the state which has
the strongest interest in the resolution of the issue presented.

B. Choice-of-Law Principles
Sec. 6, U.S. Restatement (Second) of Laws

s 6. CHOICEOFLAW PRINCIPLES TEXT

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in
the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Arts. 15-16, Civil Code of the Philippines

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

PITZER COLLEGE vs. INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY

FACTS:
Pitzer College (“Pitzer”) is one of the Claremont Colleges in Southern California. The
Claremont University Consortium (“CUC”) is an umbrella entity that enters into insurance
contracts on behalf of the Claremont Colleges. CUC purchased an insurance policy (the
“Policy”) from Indian Harbor Insurance Company (“Indian Harbor”) to cover Pitzer for
remediation expenses caused by pollution-related damage. New York law governs any issues
arising under the Policy.
On January 10, 2011, Pitzer became aware of darkened soils at the construction site for a new
dormitory. By January 21, 2011, Pitzer determined that remediation would be required. After
assessing its options, Pitzer secured one of two Transportable Treatment Units (“TTU”) located in
Southern California to remediate the soils. The remediation treatment was successful, and Pitzer
completed the dormitory a few days before the students' move-in date.
In its section describing coverage for remediation expenses (Section I.B.), the Policy
contained a notice provision requiring Pitzer to provide Indian Harbor with notice of any
condition requiring remediation. In its section describing reporting (Section VII.B.), the Policy
contained a consent provision stating that Indian Harbor would not cover any expenses Pitzer
incurred for remediation without first obtaining Indian Harbor's consent. The consent
provision included an exception for emergencies, but required Pitzer to notify Indian Harbor
“immediately thereafter” it incurred any emergency expenses.
Pitzer did not inform Indian Harbor of the remediation until July 11, 2011, approximately three
months after it completed remediation and six months after it discovered the darkened soils.
Nor did Pitzer obtain Indian Harbor's consent before commencing remediation or paying
remediation costs. On August 10, 2011, Indian Harbor acknowledged receipt of Pitzer's notice
of remediation. On March 16, 2012, Indian Harbor denied coverage on the basis of Pitzer's late
notice and its failure to obtain Indian Harbor's consent.
Pitzer sued Indian Harbor in Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging that the insurer breached
the Policy by failing to indemnify Pitzer for the remediation costs. Indian Harbor removed the case to
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted Indian Harbor summary judgment. The district court applied New York law,
finding that Pitzer failed to establish that the California notice-prejudice rule was a fundamental public
policy that overrode the Policy's choice of law provision. The district court determined that summary
judgment was warranted because Pitzer failed to notify Indian Harbor. The district court also
concluded that summary judgment was separately warranted because Pitzer failed to comply with the
Policy's consent provision. The district court further concluded that Pitzer's remediation work did not
fall within the emergency exception, but that, even if it did, Pitzer was not entitled to rely on the
exception because it failed to “immediately thereafter” notify Indian Harbor of the emergency.
Pitzer timely appealed.

RULING:
Resolution of this appeal turns on whether California's notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public
policy for the purpose of choice-of-law analysis. If the California Supreme Court determines that the
notice-prejudice rule is fundamental, the appeal then turns on whether, in a first-party policy like
Pitzer's, a consent provision operates as a notice requirement subject to the notice-prejudice rule. No
controlling California precedent answers either question. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(a). Because the
district court determined that “[i]f prejudice is required, [Indian Harbor] would not be able to prevail at
summary judgment,” these questions are dispositive. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(a).
These questions involve issues of significant importance to the state. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d
1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). In an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court, the Council of
State Governments emphasized the “integral” policy behind California's notice-prejudice rule. Br. for
Council of State Governments, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868), 1999 WL 9773, at*3. Moreover, numerous
California insurance contracts contain choice-of-law decisions and the resolution of these questions
will apply to insureds throughout the state.
The following is a summary of the relevant case law and the parties' arguments with respect to these
questions.
Under California common law, the notice-prejudice rule provides that an insurer must show that it was
prejudiced by late notice in order for a notice clause in the policy to bar coverage. Clemmer v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1106 (Cal. 1978). Under California choice-of-law analysis, the
parties' contractual choice of law governs unless it conflicts with a fundamental public policy of
California, and California has a greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct., 834 P.2d 1148, 1151, 1155 (Cal. 1992) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)).4 The California Supreme
Court has not yet stated whether the notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy.
Pitzer argues that the notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy. 5 California and federal
courts have generally recognized the importance of the notice-prejudice rule. See, e.g., Ward, 526
U.S. at 372; Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 155, 157 (Cal. 1963). But none have done so in
the choice of law context.
Indian Harbor argues that the notice-prejudice rule is not a fundamental public policy of California.
First, citing Nedlloyd, Indian Harbor argues that a rule cannot be fundamental public policy unless
established by the constitution, a statute, or it is related to a “principle of contractual
unconscionability.” 834 P.2d at 1153, 1155. It is unclear whether California law requires that a rule be
statutory, constitutional, or related to unconcsionability in order to constitute a fundamental public
policy. See, e.g, Clemmer, 587 P.2d at 1106; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 187 cmt. g.
Indian Harbor also argues that the notice-prejudice rule cannot be fundamental because California
law recognizes exceptions for claims-made policies, time-limited reporting policies, policies with
statutes of limitations, and policies with consent provisions. See Burns v. Int'l Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422,
1425 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that California's notice-prejudice rule does not apply to claims-made
policies which “reduce[ ] the potential exposure of the insurer and [are] therefore less expensive to the
insured”); Venoco, Inc. v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 417 (Ct. App. 2009)
(explaining that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to time-limited reporting requirements
because the rule “would expose [the insurer] to a risk broader than the risk expressly insured against
in the policy” (emphasis omitted)); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Super. Ct., 258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 418
(Ct. App. 1989) (explaining the purposes behind statutes of limitations); Insua v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 141 (Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that the notice-prejudice rule does not apply to
consent provisions as their purpose is to provide the insurer the opportunity to control expenses).
With respect to the consent provision, Pitzer argues that its remediation fell under the emergency
exception because it operated on a tight schedule and had a time-limited opportunity to utilize the
only available TTU machine. Pitzer also argues that the consent provision should be interpreted as a
notice provision because the Policy covers first-party claims. See Howard v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.,
115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 70 (Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that first-party policies “obligate the insurer to pay
damages claimed by the insured itself,” while third-party policies “obligate the insurer to defend,
settle, and pay damages claimed by a third party against the insured”).
According to Indian Harbor, Pitzer's actions did not fall under the emergency exception to the consent
provision, and even if they did, Pitzer failed to “immediately” notify the insurer of any emergency. In
Jamestown Builders, Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co., the California Court of Appeal held that the
notice-prejudice rule does not apply to consent provisions. 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 519 (Ct. App. 1999).
The Jamestown court, however, did not consider whether a consent provision in a first-party policy is
analogous to a notice provision in a third-party policy, and therefore subject to the notice-prejudice
rule.
Finally, Indian Harbor argues that the consent provision should not be interpreted as a notice
provision because such an interpretation would render the provision redundant in violation of contract
interpretation principles.
V. Accompanying Materials
The clerk of this court is hereby directed to file in the California Supreme Court, under official seal of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, copies of all relevant briefs and excerpts of
record, and an original and ten copies of this order and request for certification, along with a
certification of service on the parties, pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.548(c) and (d).
This case is withdrawn from submission. Further proceedings before us are stayed pending final
action by the California Supreme Court. The panel will resume control and jurisdiction of this case
upon receiving a decision from the California Supreme Court or upon that court's decision to decline
to answer the certified question.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Cadalin vs POEA Administrator

FACTS:
BRII is a foreign corporation and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers
for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals. Bienvenido M. Cadalin and 2
others, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers, instituted a
class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the POEA for money claims arising from
their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely. Claimants are of the view that Article
291of the Labor Code of the Philippines refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of
the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on
the violation of their employment contracts and therefore the claims may be brought within
ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. AIBC and BRII,
insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
(Bahrain Law) which provides that, "A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not
be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract.”
Thus, they argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the
common-law conflicts rule.
ISSUE:
Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23of 1976 or a
Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

RULING:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis
(unique) in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization
of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a "borrowing statute." A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law.
Even though a law on prescription may be considered as substantial or procedural, its
characterization as either becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing
statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one
of substance. Under the Rules of Court of the Philippines, it is provided that “if by the laws of
the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in
the Philippines.” The Bahrain law on prescription should apply. However, it cannot be
enforced as it would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Philippine law will
then be applied.

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation GR 133876 December 29, 1999

FACTS:
Bank of America granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third-party
mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, Bank of America filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the
said mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, ARC filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages
against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the
principal loan.

ISSUE:
WON the English Law is applicable in this case.

RULING:
NO. Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there
is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact.
Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, Feb. 5, 2010

FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The following
year, respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In
June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage and awarded to the
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack
of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.

ISSUE
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement
on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

RULING
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable
of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions . Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory
maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on
child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child . As the question of custody is already
before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed
inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to
allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the
custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.

Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. - (2006)

FACTS:
Employees at the Atlanta-based branch of defendant Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (SSB) — a
large, nationwide brokerage firm that has numerous offices and does extensive business in
California — repeatedly have recorded telephone conversations with California clients without
the clients' knowledge or consent. Consequently, several California clients of SSB filed a
putative class action against SSB seeking to obtain injunctive relief, and also seeking to
recover damages and/or restitution based upon recording that occurred in the past.
SSB filed a demurrer (objection) to the complaint, maintaining that no relief is warranted
because the conduct of its Atlanta-based employees was and is permissible under Georgia
law. The trial court sustained SSB's demurrer and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment rendered by the trial court, concluding that application of Georgia law
was appropriate and supported the denial of all relief sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE:
1. Was the grant of injunctive relief proper?
2. Was the dismissal of the claims for monetary damages and restitution proper?

RULING:
1) Yes. 2) Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the state appellate court as to the
grant of injunctive relief, but affirmed as to the dismissal of the claims for monetary damages
and restitution. The Court found a true conflict between California and Georgia law. Under a
comparative impairment analysis, the Court determined that California has a strong and
continuing interest in protecting the privacy of its residents, as set forth in Pen. Code, §§ 630,
637.2, 632, and that the application of California law would not severely impair Georgia's
interests under Ga. Code Ann., §§ 16-11-62, 16-11-66, because a Georgia company that has a
valid business justification for recording telephone calls could comply with California law by
disclosing at the outset of a call made to or received from a California customer that the call
was being recorded. However, Georgia law have a legitimate interest in protecting its
companies from unexpected liability based on past actions that were lawful in Georgia.

Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC - 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Michael Butler and Richard Butler ("the Butlers") have been registered domestic
partners in the state of California since 2000. In 2002, they were seeking to adopt a child and
had been certified and approved to adopt in California. Defendants Dale R. Gwilliam and
Nathan W. Gwilliam were Arizona residents who run businesses that operate adoption-related
websites. The defendants adopted a policy allowing only individuals in an opposite-sex
marriage to post profiles. Plaintiffs sued defendants, alleging violations of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 and 51.5; and violations of California's unfair competition and
false advertising laws, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 and 17500. Each side moved for summary
judgment.

ISSUE:
1. Should the defendants be subjected to damages for marital status discrimination in connection
with their rejection of plaintiffs’ application?
2. Should the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief be granted under the circumstances?

RULING:
1) No. 2) Yes.
CONCLUSION:
In deciding which state's law to apply, the court found that the failure to apply California law
would have undermined the Unruh Act, thus California had a significant interest to protect
while Arizona's interests would not be seriously impaired by applying California law. The court
found that there was a triable issue as to whether the policy of not allowing unmarried couples to post
profiles on the adoption website amounted to marital status discrimination. The court also found,
given the unclear status of California law at the time, the operators should not be subjected to
damages for marital status discrimination; however, the claim for injunctive relief could go forward as
the court found that the operators had not actually articulated any legitimate business reason for its
"married-couples-only" policy. The unfair competition and false advertising laws claims were
dismissed. Accordingly, the partners' motion for summary judgment was denied; the
operators' motion for summary judgment was granted as to the unfair competition and false
advertising claims; granted as to the claims of alter ego and successor liability; and denied as
to the claims under the Unruh Act.

Hancock v. Watson 962 So.2d 627 (2007)

FACTS 1
¶ 4. David and Lori Watson, both residents of Tennessee, were married in 1989. During the first ten
years of their marriage, the couple had two children. According to the allegations of David Watson's
amended complaint, Hancock began a sexual affair with Lori in 1999. The last incident alleged in
the amended complaint occurred in 2000. The affair ended without Watson ever knowing that the
affair existed. Lori continued in her marriage to Watson, giving birth to the couple's third child in
August 2002.
¶ 5. On May 19, 2003, while Lori was six months pregnant with the couple's fourth child, Watson
learned of the affair. On November 12, 2003, Watson filed for divorce, citing May 20, 2003, as the
date of separation. A Tennessee court granted the irreconcilable differences divorce on February
20, 2004. Despite the divorce, the couple continued to reside together in the house that had served
as the marital residence and to share responsibilities in raising their four children. 2
ANALYSIS
¶ 6. Hancock argues that, for a variety of reasons, the trial court should have applied Tennessee law.
Tennessee has abolished alienation of affection as a viable cause of action; therefore, Hancock
argues, the trial court, applying a choice of law analysis, should have granted Hancock's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Alternatively, Hancock argues that
even if Mississippi law applied, the statute of limitations has expired, and Watson is procedurally
barred from bringing his claim.
¶ 7. Watson contends that the trial court properly applied Mississippi law because Watson is bringing
a claim for a tort that occurred in Mississippi. Watson also disputes Hancock's assertion that the
statute of limitations has expired. Watson contends that whether the trial court applied the one-year
or the three-year statute of limitations, his complaint is not procedurally barred because he filed the
claim within one year of his discovery of the affair.
1. Choice of law analysis
¶ 8. The situation before the Court is a classic conflict of laws issue. In Mississippi, alienation of
affection is a viable cause of action. See Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414, 418(¶ 17) (Miss.1999)
(stating that the court “decline[s] the invitation to abolish the tort of alienation of affection.”). See
also Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220 (Miss.1992) (upholding an award of $50,000 on an alienation of
affection claim). In Tennessee, however, both the legislature and judiciary have abolished alienation
of affection as a viable cause of action. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-3-701 (2006) (abolished in
1989); Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn.1991) (stating that “in the final analysis, the
action does not protect marriage or the family-its only real justification-and the harm it causes far
outweighs any reason for its continuance.”) (citation omitted).
¶ 9. Choice of law analysis is a three step process. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920
So.2d 427, 433-34 (¶¶ 9, 11, 13) (Miss.2006). First, the Court must determine whether the
conflicting laws are substantive or procedural. See id. at 433(¶ 9). The Court must then classify
the substantive area of law-contract, tort, or property-applicable to the conflicting laws, as each area
of law has its own choice of law provisions. See id. at 433(¶ 11). Finally, the Court must apply the
appropriate analytical provisions to the conflict. See id. at 434(¶ 13).
¶ 10. In the case before the Court, the first two steps in the process are easily resolved. Clearly,
the conflicting laws are substantive, as the outcome will determine whether Watson has a viable
cause of action. If Tennessee law applies, the suit must be dismissed, as alienation of affection has
been abolished in Tennessee. Categorizing the substantive area of law for an alienation of affection
claim is also a simple step. Alienation of affection claims are tort actions. Accordingly, the Court
will apply the test adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court to resolve tort choice of law questions-
the “most significant relationship test” set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
Section 145. See McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). The Restatement section
provides as follows:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.3
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable
to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 145 (2003).
¶ 11. After reviewing the limited facts available in the record, given that this appeal is before the
Court as an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of Hancock's motion to dismiss, the Court
finds that it is unable to complete the conflict of law analysis due to the lack of factual information
available from the record. Although the amended complaint alleges that Lori Watson conducted her
affair with Hancock in the State of Mississippi, those allegations do not end the inquiry as to the place
where the injury or the conduct causing the injury occurred.
¶ 12. An alienation of affection claim requires a finding of the following elements: “(1) wrongful
conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consortium; and (3) causal connection between
such conduct and loss.” Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414, 417(¶ 13) (Miss.1999) (citations omitted).
Moreover, “[a] claim for alienation of affections does not require that the plaintiff prove an adulterous
relationship.” Id. Due to the nature of the marital relationship and the type of conduct necessary to
create a loss of affection or consortium, application of these elements cannot be satisfied simply by
an allegation that an extra-marital affair took place. Unlike a tort claim arising from an automobile
accident, determining the location of an alienation of affection claim is not a simple matter of naming
the site of the incidents of Hancock's sexual encounters with Lori. To determine where the injury or
the conduct causing the injury occurred would require an in-depth inquiry into the scope of the
relationship between Lori and Hancock-including, for example, the manner and frequency and
content of their communications outside of their face-to-face meetings. The record provides us with
no such additional information.
¶ 13. Accordingly, the Court remands this case to the trial court so that the trial court may direct the
parties to engage in discovery on the details of the communications and actions between Hancock
and Lori which Watson contends led to the alienation of Lori's affections. After that discovery is
complete, the trial court should then be able to apply “the most significant relationship” test and
complete the conflicts of law analysis.
2. Statute of Limitations Analysis
¶ 14. Both parties stated initially in their briefs that alienation of affection claims are governed by a
three-year statute of limitations. Hancock argues alternatively, however, that because Watson is
pleading an intentional tort rather than negligence, the one-year statute of limitation set forth in
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-35 should apply.
¶ 15. Alienation of affection is an intentional tort with no specifically prescribed statute of
limitations; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations applies to alienation of affection claims.
Carr v. Carr, 784 So.2d 227, 230(¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2000). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49
(Rev.2003). On May 19, 2003, Watson discovered that his wife, Lori, engaged in an affair with
Hancock between 1999 and 2000. He filed his claim for alienation of affection on April 23, 2004,
less than a year after he discovered the affair but more than three years after the affair ended.
¶ 16. Accordingly, the crux of the statute of limitations issue in this case lies in the accrual of the
claim for alienation of affection. Under Mississippi law, “[a] claim of alienation of affection accrues
when the alienation or loss of affection is finally accomplished.” Carr, 784 So.2d at 229-30(¶ 8)
(citations omitted). The accrual of the claim, then, occurs when the affections of the spouse involved
in the extramarital relationship are alienated. The affections of the spouse wronged by the affair are
irrelevant to a determination of when the cause of action accrued.
¶ 17. Watson argues that the claim accrued when he learned of the affair in May 2003 because it
was his discovery of the affair that led to the divorce. Hancock, however, argues that he has had no
contact with Lori since the affair ended in 2000; therefore, the cause of action could have accrued no
later than the date of his last contact with Lori. Because his last contact with Lori was more than four
years ago, Hancock argues that the statute of limitations has expired.
¶ 18. Again, due to the procedural posture of this case, the Court is unable to determine when the
cause of action accrued. Based on the limited facts before the Court, however, it appears that
Watson was never aware that the affair existed until several years after it had ended. Additionally, it
appears that Watson, not Lori, ended the marriage, as he is the one who initiated the divorce. The
limited information available for this Court to review indicates that although Lori was engaged in an
affair, she continued to live with Watson in the matrimonial home and maintained the appearance, at
least, of a stable married family, as evidenced by Watson's ignorance of the affair. After the affair
ended, Lori continued her marriage to her husband and proceeded to have two more children with
him.
¶ 19. On remand, the Court instructs the trial judge to direct the parties to engage in discovery that
will ascertain when “the alienation or loss of affection [was] finally accomplished.” Watson's
arguments before this Court-in both his brief and during oral argument-have left the Court, in light of
Lori's decision to remain with her husband during the course of the affair and afterward, with the
impression that Watson is arguing that the cause of action accrued upon his discovery of the affair.
In other words, Hancock's affair with Lori caused his affections to be alienated. Under Bland, 735
So.2d at 421(¶ 33) (Miss.1999), a claim for alienation of affection must be proven with evidence “that
the acts of the defendant in alienating the affection of the spouse were done with malice or that there
were circumstances or aggravation․” Again, Lori's affections must be the focus of the discovery.
Watson's affections have no relevance in the statute of limitations analysis.
¶ 20. Alternatively, Watson's arguments have raised questions with this Court as to whether Watson
is simply disguising a claim for criminal conversation 4 , which has been abolished in Mississippi, as a
claim for alienation of affection. These issues can be resolved, in conjunction with the question of
the accrual of the claim, only after further discovery between the parties.
¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REMANDED FOR
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

ALLISON G. GIBBS, PETITIONER-APPELLE, VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. L-35694; December 23 1933

FACTS:
1) Eva Johnson Gibbs; died intestate in Palo Alto, California on November 28, 1929. At the time of
her death, she and her husband Allison Gibbs, were citizens of the State of California and domiciled
therein. Allison filed a petition with the trial court to transfer to his name, several parcels of land
located in Manila.
2) Court of First Instance of Manila, issued a final order requiring the register of deeds of the City of
Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City
of Manila, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs
without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI
of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
2) The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said
certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouse Gibbs
3) The register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court of
September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison
D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid citing Section 1547
of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real
property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or
inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be
shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them…
5) December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the
said register of deeds “to issue the corresponding titles” to the petitioner without requiring previous
payment of any inheritance tax.
6) After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and
entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
7) The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the
title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336
and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent
of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of
California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil
Code
a. Article 9 of the Civil Code:
“The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.” -- It is argued
that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a
personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the
law of California.
b. Article 10 of the Civil Code:
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.”
8) The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband through absolute
ownership and not by sucession, thus there can be no inheritance tax.

1st ISSUE: WON the Government of the Philippines ( at the time, was still a colony of the United
states) can apply the principles of Private international law.
2nd ISSUE: WON the transfer of title in favor of Allison Gibbs from the conjugal ownership with Eva
Gibbs, his wife, be subject to succession or inheritance tax by the government of the Philippines?

RULING ON 1ST ISSUE: YES, The Philippines can apply conflict of law rules
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones
Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the Government of
the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or state of the United
States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs.
Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her
status.

RULING ON 2ND ISSUE: YES, The Lands are subject to Inheritance Tax.
1) Upon the death of the wife, under California law, the husband is the absolute owner of all the
community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue
of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he
acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but
because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her
death.
a. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419):
“The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the
husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he
holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. … It never belonged to the
estate of the deceased wife.”
2) Following the Californian law, there was no inheritance.
a. Article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
b. However, it is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478 (United States jurisprudence):
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of
husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the
law of the place where the property is situated.

c. It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of
the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was
vested of a title equal to that of her husband. The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs.
Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in
accordance with the lex rei sitae.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of
partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property
of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs.”
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein
equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law
vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is
true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession.
(Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
d. The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her
heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. ORDER
REVERSED. PETITION DISMISSED.

Grant v. McAuliffe - 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953)

RULE:
Survival of causes of action are governed by the law of the forum. Survival is not an essential part of
the cause of action itself but relates to the procedures available for the enforcement of the legal claim
for damages. Basically the question is one of the administration of decedents' estates, which is a
purely local proceeding
FACTS:
Plaintiffs W. R. Grant, R. M. Manchester, and D. O. Jensen, passengers and driver, were injured in
an Arizona automobile accident in Arizona with the automobile driven by deceased-tortfeasor W. W.
Pullen. All parties were domiciled in California. Plaintiffs brought an action for damages against the
administrator of Pullen's Estate for injuries sustained as a result of Pullen's negligence. In California,
causes of action for negligent torts survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be maintained against
the administrator or executor of his estate. The Administrator McAuliffe, administrator of Pullen’s
estate, filed a demurrer and moved for abatement of the claims. McAuliffe argued that the survival of
a cause of action is a matter of substantive law, and that the courts of California must apply the law of
Arizona governing survival of causes of action. There was no provision that in the event of the death
of a party to a pending proceeding his personal representative can be substituted as a party to the
action. The trial court granted the motions, and the plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE:
Did the causes of action survived Pullen’s negligence and were maintainable against Pullen's estate?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that California, the forum state, shall govern. The responsibilities of defendant
McAuliffe, as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death were
governed by the laws of California state. When all of the parties were residents of California, and the
estate of the deceased tortfeasor is being administered in California, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their
causes of action is governed by the laws of this state relating to administration of estates. The Court
reversed the decision granting McAuliffe’s motion, and the causes were remanded.

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of

1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATOR,
NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other
OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims
arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and
employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with
headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts,
which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the
Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding
tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by
AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on
granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked
that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na
remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the
parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position
papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC
and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the
amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or
appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some
of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions
filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were
deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on
June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of
Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to
being from seven o’clock in the evening until seven o’clock in the morning .”
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.”
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be
paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his employer shall be
entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period
not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his
service in that year.”
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by
either party thereto after giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in
respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation
equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.”
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a
leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for
each year of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for each year of service
thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.”
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who
have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23
of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants’
claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the
pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those
stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the
laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the
POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of
the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided
that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and
conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment
contract which provides that the compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that
the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation” therein
agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits
do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII,
the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused
the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared
form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or
leave it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the
relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities
to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of
the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The
said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is
protected by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must,
however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because
the services were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years,
as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from
the date of the expiry of the Contract”.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth,
are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias
v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of
the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code,
the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations
of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it
was not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of
the forum should apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a
foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the
enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to
which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose,
this test is the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in
question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives.” The American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that
the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription
of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
when the country of the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the
state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based
on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an
action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though
the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the state or country
where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the
1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:“The state
shall promote social justice in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the
litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should
govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and
condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on
the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall
be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employee’s benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on
the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the
other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other
claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked
in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.
D. Renvoi

1. Definition:
Renvoi – is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conflict of laws rules of
the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter to the law of
the forum or a third state.

Remission: reference is made back to the law of the forum

Transmission: reference to a third state

Renvoi has been employed in cases where the domiciliary and nationality laws are applied to the
same individual in issues involving succession, domestic relations and real properties.

3. Ways of Treating the Renvoi Problem:

4 WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF RENVOI (PROF. GRISWOLD):

1) if the conflicts rules of the forum court refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to
mean only the “internal” law of that state (internal law: that which would be applied to a domestic case
that has no conflict-of-laws complications) – rejects the renvoi
2) the court may accept the renvoi and refer not just to another state’s “internal” law but to the “whole”
law (includes choice-of-law rules applicable in multi-state cases)
3) by desistance or mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction– the same result as the acceptance of the renvoi
doctrine but the process used by the forum court is to desist applying the foreign law.
4) “foreign court” theory – the forum court would assume the same position the foreign court would
take were it litigated in the foreign state
Disadvantage to renvoi: if both courts follow the same theory, there would be no end to the case
since the courts would be referring it back to each other. It gives rise to situations that have been
invariably described as resembling “revolving doors,” a “game of lawn tennis,” a “logical cabinet of
mirrors” or a “circulus inextricabilis.”

Options which the forum court may do:

a) accept the renvoi (apply forum law)
b) reject the renvoi (apply the internal law of the foreign state)
c) desistance/mutual disclaimer
d) “foreign court” theory - the difficulty with the foreign court theory is that the forum court will have to
anticipate or guess how the foreign court will act.

 Renvoi is optional, based on the discretion of the court and the facts of the case.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA G.R. No. L-16749 - January 31, 1963

FACTS:
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar
according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her
legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI
Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives
her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by US an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the
time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
What law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
“national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The
rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So, it can refer to no other
than the private law of the State of California.

HELD: Philippine law should apply. Art. 16 of the Phil. Civil Code provide that the national law of the
decedent governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions. Such national law means the law on
conflict of laws of the California code, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the
law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile (the Philippines
in the Citizenship Ammendment Bill). The Phil. court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent.

BELLIS VS BELLIS GR # L-23678, JUNE.6,1967

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he
had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given
anything. Texas has no conflicts rule (rule of Private International Law) governing
successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and
therefore, no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they
have been deprived of the legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to
apply).

ISSUE:
Are they entitled to their legitimes?

RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his
will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then
his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under
the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

(1) Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas law which we must
apply(because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2,Civil
Code).
(2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L6759, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. In the present case, the decedent
was BOTH a national and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that
Texas has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence however of proof as to the
conflicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil.
427; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).
(3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be
disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect provides that our prohibitive laws should not be
rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG, firstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art.1039 are
special provisions while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because
Congress deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article”
when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is, therefore, evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
(4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in
this regard, cannot be ignored. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide,
however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
(Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 [1967]).

INTRINSIC VALIDITY
1) From the viewpoint of TIME—successional rights are governed by the law in force at the time of
the DECEDENT’S DEATH. (See Art. 2263).
2) From the viewpoint of PLACE or COUNTRY— the national law of the decedent, that is, the law of
his country or nationality (Art. 16)— regardless of the place of execution or the place of death. (See
Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867). Thus, a provison in the will of an alien to the effect that his properties
should be distributed in accordance with internal Philippine law, and not in accordance with his own
national law, is void because said proviso contravenes Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code. (Bellis v.
Bellis, L-23678, June 8, 1967)
If a Texan (US) provides in his will that his properties in the Philippines should be distributed
in accordance with the Philippine law on succession, the provision is to be regarded as VOID
because it contravenes Art. 16 (par. 2) which ordains the application of his own national law.
Thus, if the Texan, under Texan law, has no compulsory heirs, the Philippine law on the
legitimes of compulsory heirs cannot be applied.

HELD: Texas law should apply. The decedent was both a national and a domiciliary of Texas,
so that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the law of the domicile
should govern, the rule would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law.