RAMON P.

BINAMIRA, petitioner,
vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 92008 | 188 SCRA 154 | July 30, 1990

Topic: Appointment and designation

Doctrine:

It is an appointment (and not a designation) that results in security of tenure. where the person
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.

Facts:

In 1986, petitioner Binamira, as evidenced by the memorandum which allowed him to qualify,
was designated General Manager (GM) of the Phil Tourism Authority (PTA) by the then Minister
of Tourism and Chair of the PTA Board. In 1990, President Aquino, on noting that he was not
designated by herself but merely by said Minister contrary to that required by law, designated
the new Sec. of Tourism respondent Garrucho as the GM until such time she makes an
appointment thereto. Binamira now seeks reinstatement, claiming he has been removed
without just cause in violation of his security of tenure.

Issue:

Does Binamira have a claim on security of tenure?

Held:

No. It is not disputed that Binamira was not appointed by the President but only designated by
the Minister of Tourism. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at
will by the appointing authority.

Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the
Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the
petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where,
under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice
to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of
the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication
is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner

cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall
be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the
exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was
not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of
the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he
happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Additional Notes:

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was
true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds
that such acts shall be considered valid only if not 'disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive,

With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground.
His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not
acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be
and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl
In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
Republic v. Capulong
199 SCRA 134 (1991)

Doctrine:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER MIRA
BREHM,petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Topic: Mandatory and Permissive

Facts:

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at
Subic Bay. He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth. The spouses
filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the
minor Elizabeth. The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court adjudged minor Elizabeth is freed
from all obligations to her natural father and the child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and
Ester Mira Brehm, on the ground that Elizabeth has always been under the care and support of
Gilbert and his declared intention of permanently residing herein. The Solicitor General claimed
that it was error for the Court in adjudging Elizabeth. On appeal however, the court find
otherwise.

Issue:
Whether or not Brehm is qualified to adopt Elizabeth.

Held:

No, Brehm is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth

According to Art. 335, it clearly states that non-resident aliens cannot adopt. It is therefore,
mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative
terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the
other hand, Art. 338, can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the
mandatory provisions of Art. 335.

In the instant case Brehm is clearly a non-resident alien by his own testimony. Therefore he is
disqualified to adopt Elizabeth.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and Brehm’s Petition to adopt the child
EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.

Notes:
A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply
in the case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a
relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents
are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and
Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code, expressly authorizes the adoption
of a step-child by a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls.

ARTURO SERIÑA, Petitioner, v.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BUKIDNON, ERNESTO VILLALON, Respondents.

Topic: Mandatory and Permissive

Doctrine:

Inferior tribunals must bear in mind that where the provisions of the Election Code as in
Sections 142 and 162 are couched in mandatory form, the power does not exist for any court to
distinguish between material and immaterial omissions. What the law decrees must be obeyed.
It is as peremptory and as simple as that.

Facts:
 Arturo Seriña, then Municipal Mayor of Kibawe, Bukidnon, and a candidate for
reelection to the same position filed for a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction and mandamus for the setting aside of an order of the respondent Court of
First Instance of Bukidnon, the Hon. Abundio Z. Arrieta presiding, dated December 14,
1967, denying his motion: to permit the Municipal Treasurer to open the ballot box of
Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe, Bukidnon for the sole purpose of retrieving the ballot box
copy therein contained, and directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proceed
with the canvass of the votes in such precinct without requiring such Board of
Inspectors to fill up omissions of certain data in both the Commission of Elections as
well as the Municipal Treasurer’s copies of election returns as required by Section 162
of the Revised Election Code.
 Petitioner received a report that the election returns of Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe was
tampered with, altered and falsified particularly the copies thereof which correspond to
the Provincial Treasurer, Municipal Treasurer and the Commission on Elections.
Thereupon, Petitioner filed with respondent Court a petition for the judicial recount of
the ballots in Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe."
 it was noted that according to the copy for the Commission on Elections, the other
respondent, Ernesto Villalon, likewise a candidate for municipal mayor, received 525
votes while in the copy for the Municipal Treasurer, the number of votes appearing
opposite his name is 2,525. "the Comelec’s and Municipal Treasurer’s copies of the
election returns, the spaces on Page 1 thereof, regarding the number of voters
registered, number of voters who actually voted, number of ballots found in the
 compartment for valid ballots and others, have not been filled up nor accomplished by
the Board of Inspectors of said Precinct No. 20.
 Petition for dismissal was filed contending that the issue had become moot and
academic.
 He was opposed to the dismissal of the petition, however, as according to him, there is
another issue still to be resolved centering "on the question as to whether the
respondent Court correctly considered that the matter of the omitted information in the
election return as to the total number of registered voters, the total number of ballots
found in the compartment for valid ballots and others are mere ’Clerical Omissions’ that
may be disregarded or rather are ’Substantial, Material and Requisite Omissions’ which
must first be completed by the Board of Inspectors before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers can proceed to the canvass of the votes
 Court denied the motion to dismiss of the respondent Villalon and granted respondents
a period of 10 days from notice within which to submit the reply memorandum.
 An MR was filed on the denial.
 it was stated: "1. The main petition in the Court below which is a petition for judicial
recounting of the votes in precinct No. 20 of Kibawe, Bukidnon, has already been
dismissed by the Lower Court . . .; and 2. Since the principal petition has already been
dismissed it follows, as a legal and logical consequence that the other relief sought,
namely, that an order be issued to comply with the resolution of the Commission on
Elections requiring the observance of Section 162 of the Revised Election Code first
require the Board of Inspectors to fill up or comply the requisite information omitted in
the election returns, be denied as this is merely ancillary to the principal petition for
judicial recount as adverted to above, has already been dismissed by the Court below.
 MR was denied

Issue:

WON clerical omissions as argued by villalon may be ignored

Ruling:

No. Inferior tribunals must likewise bear in mind that where the provisions of the Election Code
as in Sections 142 and 162 are couched in mandatory form, the power does not exist for any
court to distinguish between material and immaterial omissions. What the law decrees must be
obeyed. It is as peremptory and as simple as that.

The respondent court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction under either Section 163 or 168
of the Revised Election Code as the case may be, should dispose of the matter with promptness
and dispatch. That would assure that the proclamation would not be unduly delayed. It is
equally relevant to state that under such circumstances there should not be on the part of the
judiciary timidity and hesitancy in lending its approval to pleas from any party before it, if
thereby the true and honest result of the elections could be elicited. That would enable the
provincial or municipal board of canvassers to discharge its function in the shortest possible
time and with the utmost degree of accuracy.
Prov. Treasurer of Negros Occidental v Azcona,
115 Phil 588

Topic: Mandatory and Permissive

Doctrine:

Decisions contrary to mandatory rules are null and void.

All cases involving disputed assessment of Internal Revenue taxes or customs duties pending
determination before the Court of First Instance shall be certified and remanded by the
respective clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final disposition thereof", are
mandatory. Their open disregard by a court of first instance renders its decision null and void.

Facts:

A civil case questioning the legality of an assessment of properties for taxation purpose was on
going within the Court of First Instances, when on June 17, 1954, 18 months before the decision
in said case was rendered CFI, RA 1125, was enacted granting to the CTA exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, and Provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in all cases
involving disputed assessments of internal revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property
taxes, and providing that all said cases that were then pending determination in the courts of
first instance shall be certified and remanded by the respective clerks of court to the Court of
Tax Appeals for final disposition.

However, in spite of the fact that when said Act was approved the present assessment case was
still pending decision by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the latter court, denied
the motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Tax Appeals.in open disregard of the
mandatory provisions of said Act, decided the same on the merits, instead of remanding it to
the Court of Tax Appeals.

Issue:

whether or not the Court of First instance’s decision is valid.

Ruling:

No. The decision was invalid. the Supreme Court held that hat the provisions of Section 22 of
said Act which postulate that "All cases involving disputed assessment of Internal Revenue
taxes or customs duties pending determination before the Court of First Instance shall be
certified and remanded by the respective clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final
disposition thereof", are mandatory. The open disregard of The CFI renders its decision null
and void.
It is true that under Section 22 of said Act the only cases that are required to be certified and
remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals which upon its approval are pending determination
before
a court of first instance are apparently confined to those involving disputed assessment of
internal revenue taxes or customs duties, and the present case admittedly refers to an
assessment of land tax, but it does not mean that because of that apparent omission or
oversight the instant case should not be remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals, for in
interpreting the context of the section above adverted to we should not ignore section 7 of the
same Act which defines the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of said court.

As we have held in a recent case, "section 22 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be interpreted in
such a manner as to make it harmonize with section 7 of the same Act and that the primordial
purpose behind the approval of said Act by Congress is to give to the Court of Tax Appeals
exclusive appellate jurisdiction "overall tax, customs, and real estate assessment cases
throughout the Philippines and to hear and decide them as soon as possible". Considering this
interpretation of the law, it logically follows that the lower court did not act properly in denying
the motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Republic Vs Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211 (1970)

Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers

Doctrine:

As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor is that the purpose to
be sub served is the raising of revenue. A tax then is neither a penalty that must be satisfied nor
a liability arising from contract. Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee
as a manifestation of an exercise of the police power. “The Government is never estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its agents. It follows that, in so far as this record shows, the
petitioners have not made it appears that the additional tax claimed by the Collector is not in
fact due and collectible. The assessment of the tax by the Collector creates, it must be
remembered, a charge that is at least prima facie valid." That principle has since been
subsequently followed. While the question here is one of the collection of a regulatory fee
under the police power,
reliance on the above course of decisions is not inappropriate.

Facts:

Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. on January
17, 1963 alleging that the latter, as the registered owner of motor vehicles, paid to the Motor
Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of P78,636.17, for the second installment of registration
fees for 1959, not in cash but in the form of negotiable back pay certificates of indebtedness
Thus, it sought the payment of such amount with surcharges plus the legal rate of interest
from the filing thereof and a declaration of the nullity of the use of such negotiable certificate
of indebtedness to satisfy its obligation.

They countered that what it did was in accordance with the Back Pay Law, both the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the General Auditing Office having signified their conformity to such a mode
of payment. It then sought the dismissal of the complaint.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. upheld the
validity and efficacy of such payment made and dismissed the complaint holding that the
National Treasurer upon whom devolves the function of administering the Back Pay Law
(Republic Act 304 as amended by Republic Act Nos. 800 and 897), in his letter to the Chief of the
Motor Vehicles Office, had approved the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness
in payment of registration fees of motor vehicles with the view that such certificates 'should be
accorded with the same confidence by other governmental instrumentalities as other evidences
of public debt, such as bonds and treasury certificates'. Significantly, the Auditor General
concurred in the said view of the National Treasurer. The Republic of the Philippines appealed.
While originally the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals, it was certified to the
Supreme Court, the decisive issue being one of law.

Issue:

1. Is the registration fee a tax, and as such, its payment by back pay certificates valid?

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. A tax refers to a financial obligation imposed by a
state on persons, whether natural or juridical, within its jurisdiction, for property owned,
income earned, business or profession engaged in, or any such activity analogous in character
for raising the necessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government.

As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor is that the purpose to
be sub served is the raising of revenue. A tax then is neither a penalty that must be satisfied nor
a liability arising from contract. Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee
as a manifestation of an exercise of the police power. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction
as far back as Cu Unjieng v. Potstone, decided in 1962, that this broad and all-encompassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the
undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. Unlike a tax, it has not for its object the raising of
revenue but looks rather to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not
only as between
individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. To quote from Cooley
anew: "Legislation for these purposes it would seem proper to look upon as being made in the
exercise of that authority ... spoken of as the police power."

The registration fee which Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. had to pay was imposed by Section 8
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Its heading speaks of "registration fees." The term is repeated
four times in the body thereof. Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for registration." A
subsection starts with a categorical statement "No fees shall be charged." The conclusion is
difficult to resist therefore that the Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a tax but of a
registration fee under the police power. Hence the inapplicability of the section relied upon by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. under the Back Pay Law.

It is not held liable for a tax but for a registration fee. It therefore cannot make use of a back pay
certificate to meet such an obligation.
Dir. of Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, 33, SCRA 368 (1970)

Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers

Doctrine:

Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a
State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.

Facts:

 Belo, was the grantee of a Congressional franchise, Republic Act No. 2957, as amended,
to establish, maintain and operate a telephone system in Roxas City and in the province
of Capiz,
 That pursuant to said franchise he had put up in Roxas City, since July, 1961, at a cost of
P417,041.27, an automatic telephone system which had been operating and rendering
good service with 410 telephones and sufficient reserves for additional lines when
needed;
 the Bureau of Telecommunications, through therein respondents, was starting to
establish, maintain and operate in the same geographical area of Roxas City another
local telephone system which would directly compete with, and seriously prejudice, the
telephone system that he was already operating and would render ineffective his
franchise;
 Belo then prayed the Court of First Instance of Capiz that due to the urgency of the
matter a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte, enjoining therein respondents
from establishing another local telephone system in Roxas City; that after hearing, the
writ be made permanent; and that damages be assessed against therein respondents in
their personal and individual capacities.
 On the same day, August 1, 1969, Judge Jose A. Aligaen of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, entered an order authorizing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for upon Belo's posting a bond of P5,000, and, accordingly, a writ of preliminary
 injunction was issued, restraining therein respondents, their agents, and
representatives, from further committing and continuing the acts complained of, and
from constructing another telephone system in Roxas City.
 The Solicitor General, upon request of the Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, filed, on August 27, 1969, an answer to the petition for injunction
of Belo, denying the material allegations thereof and setting up special and affirmative
defenses, to wit: That the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the case, it being a
suit against the Government which had not given its consent to be sued; and
 That the Bureau of Telecommunications had authority to operate its own
telecommunications network in the whole country pursuant to Section 1930 of the
Revised Administrative Code, without need of a legislative franchise;

Issue:

W/N Bureau of Telecommunications is authorized to operate in the geographical area where

Belo is operating his Telephone system pursuant to his franchise.

W/N the action is one against the State.

Ruling:

1. No, the Bureau is not authorized to operate and maintain a telecommunication system
where such service already exists without negotiation with the existing providers under
such terms and conditions or arrangements as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of
all concerned.

Sec. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the following powers and
duties:

'(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio telegraph offices,
stations, and facilities, and those to be established to restore the pre-war
telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such additional
offices or stations as may hereafter be established to provide
telecommunications service in places requiring such service;

'(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-

telephone or radio telecommunications service throughout the Philippines by
utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found
feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present
owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all
concerned.

2. No, the action is not one against the State. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of
the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
 invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State
within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.
Leveriza vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-66614, January 25, 1988

Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers

Doctrine:

As a matter of law rooted in the protection of public interest, and also as a general policy to
protect the government and the people, errors of government personnel in the performance of
their duties should never deprive the people of the right to rectify such error and recover what
might be lost or be bartered away in any actuation, deal or transaction concerned.

Facts:

The issue in this case involves three contracts. The first one was entered into by CAA and the
petitioner, Leveriza. The second contract was a sublease made by Leveriza to Mobil Oil
Philippines Inc.

Upon knowledge of the sublease, CAA cancelled the first contract for violation of the terms and
conditions of the lease.

CAA executed the third contract with Mobil Oil Philippines Inc instead.

After cancellation of the first contract, the accounting department of the CAA billed Leveriza for
the rent.

Issues:

W/N the the billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA constitute as waiver and nullify
the recission of the first contract

Ruling:

No, because the mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest. As a
matter of law rooted in the protection of public interest, and also as a general policy to protect
the government and the people, errors of government personnel in the performance of their
duties should never deprive the people of the right to rectify such error and recover what might
be lost or be bartered away in any actuation, deal or transaction concerned. In the case at bar,
the Court affirmed the lower court in its decision, which has been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, ordering the CAA to refund to the petitioners the amount of rentals which was not due
from them with 6% interest per annum until fully paid.

Shauf vs. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1970)

Topic: Estoppel

Doctrine:

The government can do no wrong. It authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Its officers and
agents do wrong or commit unauthorized acts. When they do, they are not errors or-acts of the
government. For this reason, the government is never estopped by such mistake or error.
Neither does it bar future action in accordance with law. If the mistake or error causes prejudice
to another and it is done in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority, he alone is liable
therefor and he cannot invoke the non-suability of the state as a defense against his personal
liability.

Facts:

Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base. According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of
military or civilian personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be
limited to the dependents. As per records, she possessed all the qualifications for the job at that
time. Instead of hiring Shauf, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position who was
not a dependent of a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson apparently lacked
certain qualifications.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-
day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to
vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended. Thus, Shauf was never
appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi
denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)
and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex
(female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of
the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using
the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in
performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. CA reversed RTC’s decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune
from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit
against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their
immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &
employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
international law

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed
Forces

Ruling:

No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the
acts of its agents in the Philippines. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying
petitioner Shauf.

While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it
only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law &
injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates
the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit
will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the
public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. The person appointed was
not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the
US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof.
She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position. Shauf has
proven that discrimination did occur. Thus, Detwiler and Persi should be accountable. Though
Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had
she been hired as a Guidance Counselor.
Tatad v Garcia,
60 SCAD 480 [1995]

Topic: Estoppel

Doctrine:

Facts:

The Department if Transport and Communications had planned to construct the Light Rail
Transit 3 or LRT III). This new plan for the LRT III would travel the cities of Quezon, Pasay,
Mandaluyong, and Makati. An act was published entitled “An Act Authorizing the Financing,
Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, For
Other Purposes”.

This Act provides for schemes for all the necessary acts needed to enable the construction of
the LRT III a success. This was also known as Build-Operate-Transfer or BOT. In order to start
construction of the trains, there was a bidding committee that was established. They were
known as Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee or the PBAC. One bidder met the
qualifications of the PBAC but they were a foreign company. The DOTC requested for the
approval of the President but then Executive Secretary Drillon denied the request stating that
the president would not be able to sign the contract. Because of this, the DOTC re-negotiated
the contract to only reflect that upon full or partial completion of the project would entail the
obligation of the contractor to turn over the whole project

EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an
"Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the terms
of the BOT Law

Issue:

1. Whether or not EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., being a foreign company, can own EDSA LRT III
2. WON the fact that the contract for the construction of the EDSA LRT III was awarded
through negotiation and before congressional approval would

Ruling:
 1. Yes, EDSA LRT Corp., would only own the operations of the LRT III and not the property
itself. No where in the law can it be found that there is a prohibition against foreign
companies being allowed to operate on Philippine territories.

2. The fact that the contract for the construction of the EDSA LRT III was awarded through
negotiation and before congressional approval on January 22 and 23, 1992 of the List of
National Projects to be undertaken by the private sector pursuant to the BOT Law (Rollo,
pp. 309-312) does not suffice to invalidate the award.

Subsequent congressional approval of the list including "rail-based projects packaged

with commercial development opportunities" (Rollo, p. 310) under which the EDSA LRT
III projects falls, amounts to a ratification of the prior award of the EDSA LRT III contract
under the BOT Law.
Presidential Decree No. 1594 is the general law on government infrastructure contracts
while the BOT Law governs particular arrangements or schemes aimed at encouraging
private sector participation in government infrastructure projects. The two laws are not
inconsistent with each other but are in pari materia and should be read together
accordingly.

petitioners claim that the agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government
because the rental rates are excessive and private respondent's development rights
over the 13 stations and the depot will rob DOTC of the best terms during the most
productive years of the project.

Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioners have not presented
evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other. The matter of
valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to the experts and which this Court is
not eager to undertake.

That the grantee of a government contract will profit therefrom and to that extent the
government is deprived of the profits if it engages in the business itself, is not worthy of
being raised as an issue. In all cases where a party enters into a contract with the
government, he does so, not out of charity and not to lose money, but to gain
pecuniarily.

It is the Executive department, DOTC in particular that has the power, authority and
technical expertise determine whether or not a specific transportation or
communication project is necessary, viable and beneficial to the people. The discretion
to award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function.

BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILIPPINES, ET. AL., petitioners VS. THE HONORABLE
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., ET. AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-47051, July 29, 1988
Topic:

Doctrine:

Facts:

Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the COA initiated a special audit of
coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had received.

As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the
petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman, directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and
the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund,
in various letters to them to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy
claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.

The petitioners alleged that the supposed overpayments and/or deficiencies in their
remittances were due to the Chairman's refusal to recognize the validity of the resolution
passed in January 1975 by the then Governing Board of the PCA.

On January 8, 1975, the Governing Board of the PCA issued Resolution No. 01-75 which
reduced the rate of levy from P70.00 to P40.00 per 100 kilograms of copra and P110.00
to P70.00 per metric ton of husked nuts. The resolution was effective January 11, 1975.

On January 29, 1975, the same Governing Board of the PCA which issued the January 8,
1975 Resolution No. 01-75 issued Resolution No. 018-75 which deferred collection of the
CCSF levies from the desiccated coconut industry for a period not exceeding six (6)
months.

As a result, the petitioners did to get their subsidy claims,

Thus, this petition.

Additional facts:

On August 24, 1977, the COA Chairman wrote PCA Administrator Baltazar that the COA had no
objection to the release of the subsidy payments pending final resolution of the issues involved
in the claims provided that the end-users posted a bond equal to the aggregate amount of the
disputed claims, issued by a surety company mutually acceptable to the COA and PCA and
certified to be in good standing by the Insurance Commission.

the petitioners through the Chairman (COA Issue Committee, SDAP/CORA/APCD/PCOPA) wrote
the PCA Administrator informing him that in a meeting of all those concerned, "it was the
consensus that the terms and conditions set by Acting Chairman Tantuico are unacceptable.
On the ground that their letter request for reconsideration dated March 8, 1977 was deemed
denied by the September 5, 1977 letter of the COA Chairman to PCA Administrator Baltazar, the
petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction.

The above issue was raised when the respondent COA Chairman disregarded the two
resolutions (Resolution Nos. 01-75 and 018-75) of the PCA Governing Board on the ground that
the latter had no more authority to issue such resolutions because of P.D. 623 which reduced
the composition of the Governing Board. The respondent COA Chairman contended that the
questioned resolutions were ultra vires, hence cannot be enforced. It was actually the refusal of
the COA Chairman to recognize the two questioned resolutions which led to the filing of this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman was correct in disregarding the two resolutions
of the PCA Governing Board for being ultra vires? (Resolution Nos. 01-75 and 018-75)

Ruling:

No. This issue became academic when the then President of the Philippines informed the
Solicitor General that the Governing Board of the PCA would continue to function until the
formal organization of the new Governing Board. Following this ruling, the respondent COA
Chairman reconsidered his earlier stand and allowed the petitioners to get their subsidy claims
which he had earlier refused. In effect, the respondent COA Chairman eventually acknowledged
the validity of the two questioned PCA resolutions.