Macalanda vs.

Acosta
G.R No. 197718, September 06, 2017

FACTS:

 Respondent Atty. Roque Acosta filed a complaint for ejectment, collection of deliberately unpaid
rentals and share of land produce plus damages against petitioner Primitivo Macalanda, Jr. before
the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

 Macalanda is Acosta’s caretaker of his land. Macalanda deliberately violated the proprietary rights
of Acosta by ignoring the Acosta’s demands for accounting of the proceeds of sale of the land's
harvest for several years. Macalanda, like his father before him, is simply a caretaker of his land,
whose compensation is on a sharing basis.

 Macalanda has become arrogant and high-handed, considering himself as virtual owner by
illegally withholding the amounts due to Acosta. Acosta prayed for a judgment ordering
Macalanda, not being a tenant under agrarian laws, to vacate the land and to account and pay for
the produce of the land illegally withheld from and due to Acosta, and to pay attorney's fees and
damages. In his position paper, Acosta added that Macalanda, without the former's knowledge,
put up a furniture and fixture shop.

 In his Answer, Macalanda, moving for the dismissal of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds,
alleged that: he is a tenant of the land as established by the findings of the facts by the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. Macalanda contended that he had been religiously
paying all his obligations to Acosta.

 Aacosta earlier filed a letter-complaint with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on the issue of fixing the leasehold rentals over the subject landholding,
an issue which is substantially the same with the issue in the instant complaint.

 In his position paper, Macalanda reiterated that he is a tenant of the subject land with Acosta
recognizing him as such, as evidenced by a Deed of Agreement and several letters by Acosta to
him.

 Macalanda files the instant Petition insisting that he is a tenant of Acosta. Macalanda alleged that
his occupation and cultivation of the subject land is with the consent of Acosta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between Macalanda and Acosta.

RULING:

 The petition is unmeritorious. The question of whether there is a tenancy relationship between the
Macalanda and Acosta is basically a question of fact, and the findings of the CA and the DARAB
as to the fact that Macalanda is not a bona fide tenant of Acosta is entitled to respect and non-
disturbance.

 In the case of Vicente Adriano, v. Alice Tanco, Geraldine Tanco, Ronald Tanco, and Patrick
Tanco, the Court held that: Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a
landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right
to continue working on and cultivating the land.

 For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements must be shown to concur, to
wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant(2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and, (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.

 The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence, thus, the absence of
one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status
 as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to be covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

 Crucial for the creation of tenancy relations would be the existence of two of the essential
elements, namely, consent and sharing and/or payment of lease rentals. The existence of a
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically
give rise to security of tenure.

 Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy relationship, the Macalanda carries the
burden of proving his allegation that tenancy exists. Macalanda however miserably failed to prove
the existence of such tenancy relationship.

 We hold that the essential element of consent is not sufficiently established because its alleged
proof, that is the Deed of Agreement, does not categorically constitute Macalanda as de
jure tenant of the subject land. In fact, in the signature portion of the Deed of Agreement, it
referred to Macalanda as a "tenant/caretaker" of the subject land. Thus, the Deed of Agreement is
ambiguous as to whether Macalanda is a tenant or a caretaker. Aside from the said deed,
Petitioner failed to present any independent and concrete evidence to prove consent.

 Further, the essential element of sharing of harvest was also not sufficiently established.
Macalanda failed to show any evidence that there is sharing of harvest between him and the
Acosta. Common sense dictates that Macalanda, if he is indeed a de jure tenant, should fully
know his arrangement with Acosta as to the sharing of harvest. Macalanda however, failed to
persuasively show their arrangement. Evidence such as receipts which prove the sharing of the
harvest between Macalanda and Acosta were not presented in evidence.

 The DARAB, by reason of its mandate and functions have acquired expertise in specific matters
within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve full respect. Without justifiable reason, their
factual findings ought not to be altered, modified or reversed especially, such as in this case, the
CA affirmed such findings of facts.
 Automat Realty and Development Corporation., et.al v. Sps. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 192026, October 1, 2014

FACTS:
 Romero vs. Sombrino
G.R No. 241353, January 22, 2020

FACTS:

 Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the heirs of Lutero Romero (Lutero), i.e., petitioners Danilo Romero, Victorio
Romero, and El Romero (petitioners Heirs of Lutero), against respondent Crispina Sombrino.

 The instant Petition centers on a two-hectare portion of Lot No. 23, Pls-35 located at Marauding
Annex, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte (subject property), with an aggregate area of 12.0717
hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-2261, which is registered in the name of
Lutero after the latter's homestead application was approved in 1967.

 The Sps. Romero begot nine children.

 Prior to the present controversy, the subject property was subject of a legal dispute involving
Lutero and his siblings, the heirs of the late spouses Eugenio Romero (Eugenio) and Teodora
Saltiga (Teodora) (collectively referred to as the Sps. Romero). TWO civil cases the
Reconveyance with Damages and Cancellation of Registration of Mortgage and Annulment
of three Affidavits of Sales, Recovery of Possession with Damages.

 It was alleged in the 1st civil case that Lutero merely held the subject property in trust for the
benefit of the heirs of his father Eugenio since the latter was actually the one who first applied for
the homestead, but such application was denied because Eugenio was already disqualified to
apply for a homestead, having previously applied for a homestead over another parcel of land with
the maximum limit of 24 hectares. Moreover, it was alleged that Lutero employed fraud in
procuring the homestead patent covering the subject property.

 1st case also claimed that Lutero subsequently sold the subject property by allegedly executing
three affidavits of sale in favor of the respondents in civil case no. 2, Hence, it was alleged that
Lutero no longer has any claim over the subject property pursuant to these affidavits of sale.

 The RTC rendered a Decision dated March 11, 1991 in favor of Lutero, declaring the three
affidavits of sale null and void for being violative of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, which prohibited the alienation of a homestead within five years from the issuance of the
patent. and ordering the respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 to surrender possession of the
subject property to Lutero. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

 The consolidated cases were then resolved with finality the Court held that Lutero is the
true and lawful landowner of the subject property, having exclusively acquired the subject
property after successfully applying for a homestead patent over the land in 1967. Lutero's
exclusive ownership over the subject property was even recognized by some of Lutero's
sisters, i.e., Gloriosa, Presentacion, and Lucita.

 The Decision in De Romero v. CA likewise found that the family patriarch, Eugenio, never owned
the subject property. Eugenio himself tried to apply for a homestead patent over the subject
property, but this was denied "because he was disqualified by virtue of the fact that he already had
applied for the maximum limit of 24 hectares to which he was entitled [pertaining to land located
on the adjacent lot; and the] land in question could not therefore have passed on from him to his
children.
 Heirs of Lutero filed for a writ of execution. The RTC issued.

 However, the implementation of the Writ of Execution was held in abeyance because
respondent Sombrino filed a Motion for Intervention, alleging that she was a tenant of the
subject property. The RTC allowed the intervention and granted respondent Sombrino the
opportunity to present evidence to show good cause why the Writ of Execution should not
be implemented against her.

 Writ of execution was subsequently issued together with writ of demolition, thus, Sobrino was
ejected.
 Sobrino sought relief from PARAD by filing a Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of
Possession (PARAD Complaint) against the petitioners Heirs of Lutero.

 Sobrino alleged to be an actual tenant-cultivator of the subject property as she and her late
husband Valeriano were installed as tenants over the subject property in 1952 by the alleged
original owners of the subject property, the Sps. Romero, until the said spouses were succeeded
by Lucita and her heirs as landowners.

 PARAD ruled in favor of Sobrino and declared as tenant de jure and ordering
her reinstatement to the subject landholding and Directing the MARO, DAR of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte to execute an agricultural leasehold contract between the herein parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1993

 Sombrino was able to establish that she was installed as tenant by the Sps. Romero in 1952.

 While indeed, there was no tenancy relations that existed between respondent Sombrino and the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero] as there were no shares received by the latter, x x x it is as if Lutero
succeeded the ownership of the subject land from Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero; thus,
the petitioners Heirs of Lutero] who inherited the property were bound to assume and
respect the tenancy rights of [respondent Sombrino.

 DARAB sutained the decision of PARAD.

 Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 384426 states that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not
be extinguished by mere sale, alienation, or transfer of the leaseholding and that the
transferee shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor; the agricultural leasehold relation instituted between the Sps. Romero
and respondent Sombrino "is preserved even in case of transfer of the legal possession of
the subject property.

 CA sustained. respondent sufficiently established by substantial evidence the essential elements

of tenancy. The late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero are the landowners; respondent,
together with her late husband, is their tenant.

 Accordingly, respondent cannot be dispossessed of her possession and cultivation of the

subject agricultural land without any valid and just cause. Security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their land
holdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.

ISSUE:

Whether there exists an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the petitioners Heirs of
Lutero and respondent Sombrino.

RULING:

 Petition Granted.

 The instant Petition is meritorious. Respondent Sombrino is not a tenant de jure and does
not enjoy the security of tenure accorded to agricultural tenants. There is no tenancy
relationship between the petitioners Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino.

 The Court is aware that the determination of whether a person is an agricultural tenant is basically
a question of fact.

 As a general rule, questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law.

 Nevertheless, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions such as when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.

 According to RA. 1199, as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines, an agricultural leasehold tenancy exists "when a person who, either personally or
 with the aid of labor available [from] members of his immediate farm household,
undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single
person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally
possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in
both.

 Indispensable elements;
o 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
o 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
o 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
o 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
o 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
o 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

 The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided. In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind the legal heirs

 The Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to provide sufficient evidence that there
was, in the first place, an agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement entered into by herself and the
alleged landowners, the Sps. Romero.

 Jurisprudence has held that self-serving statements regarding supposed tenancy relations
are not enough to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, certifications
issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional, not conclusive on the courts, and have little evidentiary value without any
corroborating evidence. There should be independent evidence establishing the consent of the
landowner to the relationship

 Joint Affidavit of Sarillo Bacalso and Neil Ocopio, whom she allegedly hired in several occasions
as planters, mud boat operators and thresher operators.

 With regard to affidavits of the planters, Such evidence severely fails to establish the existence of
a tenancy agreement. At most, the aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely establishes that
respondent Sombrino occupied and cultivated the subject property at some point in time.

 DARAB also gave credence to "the Affidavit of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman. the barangay captain x x x whose attestation appears on the document-was
not the proper authority to make such determination [because even] certifications issued by
administrative agencies and/or officials concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy
relationship are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding on the courts.

 With respect to acknowledgment receipts presented by respondent Sombrino showing the

payment of irrigation fees and rentals to Lucita (sister of lutero), such pieces of documentary
evidence fail to show that the Sps. Romero installed respondent Sombrino as a tenant of the
subject property. The said receipts merely establish that, at most, respondent Sombrino entered
into an arrangement with Lucita and not with the Sps. Romero.

 Eugenio Romero died sometime in 1948." To recall, at the heart of respondent Sombrino's claim
of tenancy is her allegation that Eugenio, together with Teodora, installed her as tenant in 1952.
Needless to say, with the death of Eugenio in 1948, contrary to the contention of respondent
Sombrino, it was impossible for Eugenio to have instituted respondent Sombrino as tenant of the
subject property.

 Assuming that it even existed, the supposed tenancy agreement was invalid as it was not
entered into with the consent of the true and lawful landowner of the subject property.

 Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landowner who is
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land. It cannot be created by the
act of a supposed landowner, who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy, much
less by one who has been dispossessed of the same by final judgment.

 Sps. Romero never became the owners of the subject property. Neither did they become the
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the subject property. Hence, the Sps. Romero
 had no capacity whatsoever to install respondent Sombrino as a leasehold tenant on the
subject property. Consequently, neither could the heirs of the Sps. Romero (aside from Lutero)
validly enter into any tenancy agreement over the subject property.

 with the absence of the first essential requisite of an agricultural tenancy relationship, i.e., that
the parties to the agreement are the true and lawful landholders and tenants, respondent
Sombrino cannot be considered a de jure tenant who is entitled to security of tenure under
existing tenancy laws. And corollarily, there being no agricultural tenancy relationship existing in
the instant case, the PARAD and DARAB acted beyond their jurisdiction when they ordered
the petitioners Heirs of Lutero, among other things, to restore possession of the subject
property to respondent Sombrino.
 Stanfilco v. DOLE Philippines
G.R. No. 154048, November 27, 2009

FACTS:

 Petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (SEARBEMCO) asailing the decision of the CA.

 SEARBEMCO, as seller, and respondent DOLE Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division) (DOLE), as
buyer, entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement 4 (BPPA). The BPPA
provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the latter shall buy from the
former, all Cavendish bananas of required specifications to be planted on the land owned by
SEARBEMCO.

 In the case of any such rejected bananas, the SELLER shall have the right to sell such
rejected bananas to third parties, for domestic non-export consumption.

 IX. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTE: All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall
be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce by three (3) Arbitrators appointed in accordance with said Rules. The Arbitration shall
be held in a venue to be agreed by the parties. Judgment upon the award rendered may be
entered in any Philippine Court having jurisdiction or application may be made to such court for
judicial acceptance of the award and as order of enforcement, as the case may be.

 On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against
SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos (spouses Abujos), and Oribanex
Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for specific performance and damages, with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and of a temporary restraining order.

 DOLE alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and delivered to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos,
the bananas rejected by DOLE, in violation of paragraph 5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited
the sale of rejected bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE further alleged that
Oribanex is likewise an exporter of bananas and is its direct competitor.

 1st 373 "CONSUL" marked boxes were packed and knowingly sold by defendant SEARBEMCO to
ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC. plus 648 "CONSUL in the second instance.

 SEARBEMCO filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, for
failure to submit to arbitration which is a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint, and the
complaint’s defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

 SEARBEMCO argued that jurisdiction falls on DARAB since the dispute between the
parties is an agrarian dispute.

 The filing of the complaint is premature.

 It did not violate Section 5(p), Article V of the BPPA, since the rejected bananas were sold to the
spouses Abujos who were third-party buyers and not exporters of bananas; and

 The complaint is fatally defective as the Board of Directors of DOLE did not approve any
resolution authorizing Atty. Reynaldo Echavez to execute the requisite Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping and, therefore, the same is fatally defective.

 RTC declared that it has jurisdiction over the case being not an agrarian dispute.

 SEARBEMCO filed a certiorari in the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
for denying its motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
 CA declared that RTC has jurisdiction because the action contemplates an action for
specific performance. Arbitration only in cases where there is no third-party involve.

 On SEARBEMCO’s argument that the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping
under DOLE’s amended complaint is defective for failure to state that this was based on "personal
knowledge," the CA ruled that the omission of the word "personal" did not render the Verification
and Certification defective.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.

Whether or not Arbitration is a condition precedent before filing in courts in this case.

RULING:

 Petition unmeritorious.

 DOLE’s complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not the DARAB.

 SEARBEMCO mainly relies on Section 50 of RA No. 6657, the BPPA being a JVA.

 SEARBEMCO also asserts that the parties’ relationship in the present case is not only that of
buyer and seller, but also that of supplier of land covered by the CARP and of manpower on
the part of SEARBEMCO, and supplier of agricultural inputs, financing and technological
expertise on the part of DOLE. Therefore, SEARBEMCO concludes that the BPPA is not an
ordinary contract, but one that involves an agrarian element and, as such, is imbued with
public interest.

 Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657 is clear in defining an agrarian dispute: "any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including dispute concerning farm-workers’ associations
or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions
of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

 RA No. 6657 is procedurally implemented through the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure where
Section 1, Rule II26 enumerates the instances where the DARAB shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction. A notable feature of RA No. 6657 and its implementing rules is the focus
on agricultural lands and the relationship over this land that serves as the basis in the
determination of whether a matter falls under DARAB jurisdiction.

 In Heirs of the Late Hernan Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals, for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a
case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.

 In Vda. De Tangub v. Court of Appeals

o a.) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
o b.) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
o c.) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural
lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

 The case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals28 lists down the
indispensable elements for a tenancy relationship to exist:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or the agricultural lessee."
 The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relationship that
could bring their controversy within the ambit of agrarian reform laws and within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB. Tenancy relations cannot be presumed. In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation
whatsoever in its motion to dismiss regarding any tenancy relationship between it and
DOLE that gave the present dispute the character of an agrarian dispute.

 The definition of agrarian dispute was relaxed. Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Muti-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Lapanday Agricultural and Dev’t. Corporation and Cubero v. Laguna
West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
 [The definition of ‘agrarian dispute’ in RA No. 6657 is] broad enough to include disputes
arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond the traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-
lessee relationship. xxx [A]grarian reform extends beyond the mere acquisition and
redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other modes of tenurial arrangements to effect the
implementation of CARP.

 The Court declared that when the question involves the rights and obligations of persons
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of an agricultural land covered by CARP,
the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the DAR.

 Islanders case cannot be used in this case. significant differences exist in the factual
circumstances between those cases and the present case, thus rendering the rulings in these
cited cases inapplicable.

 In two cases cited, the issue of the nullity of the joint economic enterprise agreements in
Islanders and Cubero would directly affect the agricultural land covered by CARP. Those
cases significantly did not pertain to post-harvest transactions involving the produce from
CARP-covered agricultural lands, as the case before us does now.

 the resolution of the issue raised in Islanders and Cubero required the interpretation and
application of the provisions of RA No. 6657, considering that the farmer-beneficiaries claimed that
the agreements contravened specific provisions of that law.

 In the present case, DOLE’s complaint for specific performance and damages before the
RTC did not question the validity of the BPPA that would require the application of the
provisions of RA No. 6657; neither did SEARBEMCO’s motion to dismiss nor its other
pleadings assail the validity of the BPPA on the ground that its provisions violate RA No.
6657. The resolution of the present case would therefore involve, more than anything else,
the application of civil law provisions on breaches of contract, rather than agrarian reform
principles.

 Even assuming that the present case can be classified as an agrarian dispute involving the
interpretation or implementation of agribusiness venture agreements, DARAB still cannot
validly acquire jurisdiction, at least insofar as DOLE’s cause of action against the third
parties – the spouses Abujos and Oribanex – is concerned. To prevent multiple actions, we
hold that the present case is best resolved by the trial court.

 DOLE’s complaint validly states a cause of action

 In the case of Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana

o the complaint is sufficient "if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though
the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in which event, the proper recourse would be,
not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

 The filing of the complaint is not premature since arbitration proceedings are not
necessary in the present case.

 SEARBEMCO relies on Article V, Section 30(g) of DAR AO No. 9-98 and Section 10 of DAR
AO No. 2-99 which provide that "as a rule, voluntary methods such as mediation or
conciliation, shall be preferred in resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises."
SEARBEMCO also cites Section IX of the BPPA which provides that all disputes arising out of or
in connection with their agreement shall be finally settled through arbitration.

 Following our conclusion that agrarian laws find no application in the present case, we find – as
the CA did – that SEARBEMCO’s arguments anchored on these laws are completely baseless.
 Furthermore, the cited DAR AO No. 2-99, on its face, only mentions a "preference," not a
strict requirement of referral to arbitration.

 We agree with the CA ruling that the BPPA arbitration clause does not apply to the present
case since third parties are involved.

 Would in effect result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. On the
other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the complaint against all
herein respondents and adjudicates petitioner’s rights as against theirs in a single and complete
proceeding.

 DOLE’s complaint validly states a cause of action

 SEARBEMCO asserts that the pleading containing DOLE’s claim against it states no cause of
action. It contends that it did not violate any of the provisions of the BPPA, since the bananas
rejected by DOLE were sold to the spouses Abujos who are third-party buyers and are not
exporters of bananas – transactions that the BPPA allows. Since the sole basis of DOLE’s
complaint was SEARBEMCO’s alleged violation of the BPPA, which SEARBEMCO insists did not
take place, the complaint therefore did not state a cause of action.

 In the case of Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana

o In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material

allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This hypothetical admission extends to the
relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deductible from, the
complaint. Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of
the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer?

 To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the plaintiff’s claim for relief does
not exist at all.

 In applying this authoritative test, we must hypothetically assume the truth of DOLE’s
allegations, and determine whether the RTC can render a valid judgment in accordance
with its prayer.

 Hypothetically admitting the allegations in DOLE’s complaint that SEARBEMCO sold the
rejected bananas to Oribanex, a competitor of DOLE and also an exporter of bananas,
through the spouses Abujos, a valid judgment may be rendered by the RTC holding
SEARBEMCO liable for breach of contract.

 That the sale had been to the spouses Abujos who are not exporters is essentially a denial
of DOLE’s allegations and is not therefore a material consideration in weighing the merits
of the alleged "lack of cause of action." What SEARBEMCO stated is a counter-statement
of fact and conclusion, and is a defense that it will have to prove at the trial.

 The filing of the complaint is not premature since arbitration proceedings are not
necessary in the present case.

o Heirs of Salas
 To split the proceedings into arbitration for respondent Laperal Realty and trial for
the respondent lot buyers, or to hold trial in abeyance pending arbitration between
petitioners and respondent Laperal Realty, would in effect result in multiplicity of
suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, it would be
in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the complaint against all herein
respondents and adjudicates petitioner’s rights as against theirs in a single and
complete proceeding.

o The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a dispute. Clearly, the
issue before us could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety if we allow
simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial, or suspension of trial pending arbitration.
Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court hears and
adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.

o DARAB’s quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of RA No. 6657 may be invoked only when there
is prior certification from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (or BARC) that the
 dispute has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation, without any success of
settlement.

People v. Vanzuela
G.R. No. 178266, July 21, 2008

FACTS:

 The petitioner People of the Philippines (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Order dated May 18,
2007, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Surigao City, which dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter the criminal case for estafa filed by private complainant
Veneranda S. Paler (Veneranda) against respondents Samuel Vanzuela (Samuel) and his wife,
Loreta Vanzuela (Loreta) (respondents). The case ostensibly involves an agrarian dispute, hence,
according to the RTC, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

 Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr.3 who is the registered owner of a parcel of
irrigated riceland, containing an area of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini
(Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte.

 One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as
agricultural tenants for more than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one
half (12½) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest.

 The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the
matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no
amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against the respondents.

 Having harvested and accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the past 10 harvest seasons
of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in trust by them or a total value of ₱80,000.00, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said sum of
₱80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Veneranda Paler
and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr.

 Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the
respondents had been the agricultural tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that
the palay was harvested twice a year on the subject property. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence,6
praying that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish the culpability
of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition7 arguing that
the respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law to hold the lease rentals in trust for
the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.

 RTC dismissed the criminal case ratiocinating the instant case pertains to the non-payment
of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural
land by the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case at bench
involves an agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant
to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure.

 Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of Republic Act (RA) 6657, Special
Agrarian Courts (SACs) were vested with limited criminal jurisdiction, i.e., with respect only to
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the said Act; that the only penal provision in
RA 6657 is Section 73 thereof in relation to Section 74, which does not cover estafa.
 That no agrarian reform law confers criminal jurisdiction upon the DARAB, as only civil and
administrative aspects in the implementation of the agrarian reform law have been vested in the
DAR;

 That necessarily, a criminal case for estafa instituted against an agricultural tenant is within the
jurisdiction and competence of regular courts of justice as the same is provided for by law; that the
cases relied upon by the RTC do not find application in this case since the same were concerned
only with the civil and administrative aspects of agrarian reform implementation;

 That there is no law which provides that agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for
estafa after they have misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that to
insulate agricultural tenants from criminal prosecution for estafa would, in effect, make
them a class by themselves, which cannot be validly done because there is no law allowing
such classification.

 Petitioner submits that there is no substantial distinction between an agricultural tenant who incurs
criminal liability for estafa for misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-
agricultural tenant who likewise incurs criminal liability for misappropriation.

 Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss the merits of the case
because the RTC has yet to receive in full the evidence of both parties before it can render a
decision on the merits. Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the merits of the case
at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed RTC Order is simply lack of jurisdiction.

 Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now automatically converted into
leasehold tenancy wherein one of the obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay rentals,
not to deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that respondents misappropriated
the landowner's share of the harvest is not tenable because share tenancy has already been
abolished by law for being contrary to public policy.

 Accordingly, respondents contend that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals does
not give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Respondents stand by the ruling of the RTC that
pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction
over agrarian disputes; and that respondents did not commit estafa for their alleged failure to pay
their lease rentals.

 Respondents submit that a simple case for ejectment and collection of unpaid lease rentals,
instead of a criminal case, should have been filed with the DARAB. Respondents also submit that,
assuming arguendo that they failed to pay their lease rentals, they cannot be held liable for Estafa,
as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, because the
liability of an agricultural tenant is a mere monetary civil obligation; and that an agricultural
tenant who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely a debtor, and, thus, cannot be held
criminally liable for estafa.

 The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are:

o the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; - conferred by law,
determined based on the material allegations of the complaint or information and
the law at the time the case was filed. Here RTC has jurisdiction over subject
matter. Since penalty exceeds 6 years RTC has jurisdiction.
o the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed; and
– venue is jurisdictional
o the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. – thru arrest, whether
with warrant or not, or thru voluntary submission of his person to the court. The RTC
likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they
voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority.

 Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously
concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is
purely an agrarian dispute. The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely, David v. Rivera and
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,20 are of different factual settings. They
hinged on the subject matter of Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOAs), respectively.

 Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,22 where we upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction to try the
private respondents, who claimed to be tenants, for the crime of qualified theft.
 However, we stressed therein that the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its
competence. Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the determination of whether
private respondents were guilty of the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to
pass upon the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate
to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction
and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive domain.

 In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for
estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of ₱80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which
the RTC clearly has jurisdiction.

 Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other
hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, we
outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit:

o For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).

 Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the conferment of any
criminal jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB.

 It is worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offenses in
violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the SACs and not with the DARAB.

 There is no law which prohibits landowners from instituting a criminal case for estafa, as defined
and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, against their tenants. Succinctly put,
though the matter before us apparently presents an agrarian dispute, the RTC cannot shirk from
its duty to adjudicate on the merits a criminal case initially filed before it, based on the law and
evidence presented, in order to determine whether an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.

 The court reiterated the ruling on Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, that while we do not
begrudge a party's prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may have
wronged him, we now remind landowners that such prerogative of instituting a criminal
case against their tenants, on matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised
with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and
justice.

 Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant criminal
case, we still deny the petition.

 The court held that the cited cases of the petitioner is not applicable.

 People v. Carulasdulasan and Becare involved a relationship of agricultural share tenancy

between the landowner and the accused. In such relationship, it was incumbent upon the
tenant to hold in trust and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to the
landowner, failing which the tenant could be held liable for misappropriation.

 As correctly pointed out by the respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary
to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844. What prevails today, under R.A.
6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy
have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy.

 In such a relationship, the tenant’s obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the
landowner’s share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner’s allegation that the respondents
misappropriated the landowner’s share of the harvest – as contained in the information – is
untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable under Article 315, paragraph
4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

 In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. However, we find no necessity to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution of this case. We have opted to
rule on the merits of the parties’ contentions, and hereby declare that respondents cannot be held
liable for estafa for their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural land subject of the leasehold.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 The court may conduct preliminary hearing whether tenurial agreement exist or it may be
referred to the PARO for the conduct of summary hearing to determine the existence of
tenurial agreement.

Mendoza v. Geronimo,
G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010

TOPIC:

CASE:
ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AGAINST NARCISO.

FACTS:
 Petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza filed a complaint of forcible entry with the MTC against
Narciso

 Petitioner owned a land (5 hectare of land) in Nueva Ecija. They filed with MTC an action for
forcible entry against Narciso.

 According to Jose, Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and
stealth, without his knowledge. Despite repeated demands, Narciso failed to vacate the
property.

 According to Narciso, Benigno is Jose’s agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter
in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.

 Jose filed a motion to remand the case to DARAB in view of the tenancy issue raised by
Narciso.

 MTC: remanded the case without conducting a hearing and with Narciso’s objection.

 Jose filed an amended complaint with the PARAB, impleading Benigno as additional
defendant.

o PETITIONER’S ALLEGATION:

 alleged that Efren Bernando was the agricultural lessee and Benigno unlawfully
entered the property, sometime in 1982, without his consent;
 withheld the same until 1987;
 appropriated the land’s produce to himself despite Jose’s repeated demands to
return the property.
 In 1987, they discovered that Benigno transferred the possession of the land
to Narciso who still refused to return the same and appropriate land’s produce
for himself.
 The respondents were able to harvest 13,000 cavans of palay during their
possession

 PRAYER: demanded
1. respondents be jointly and severally held liable for the palay’s
monetary equivalent as actual damage,
2. return the possession of the property and
3. attorney’s fee.
 o Respondent’s ARGUMENT:

 Petitioner has no right over the property as he agreed to sell the same to
Benigno for P87k and
 Benigno already paid P50k, but petitioner refused to receive the balance and
execute a deed of conveyance, despite repeated demands.
 Jurisdiction over the case lies with RTC since ownership and possession are
the issues.

Ruling of Lower Courts:

1. PARAD ruled in favor of petitioner.

 Respondents were mere usurpers and failed to prove that they were agricultural
lessees of Jose.
 DARAB has the jurisdiction because the amended complaint sufficiently alleged an
agrarian dispute, not the MTC’s referral of the case.
 Ordered to vacate the property and
 pay 500 canvas of palay as actual damage.

 Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB

1. case should have been dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB was
void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which repealed the rule on
referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316

2. DARAB: it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently alleged an
agrarian dispute

 Respondents elevated to CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of ROC.

3. CA reversed DARAB’s ruling; remanded to MTC

 The allegations in the complaint are for forcible entry, not agrarian dispute.
 The subsequent filing of the amended complaint did nor confer jurisdiction upon DARAB.


PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
 Jurisdiction lies with the DARAB since the nature of the action and the
allegations of the complaint show an agrarian dispute.

RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATION (Benigno and Narciso):

1. MTC’s referral to DARAB was invalid as RA 6657 repealed the rule on referral
under PD 316.
2. Neither ROC nor Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP) provides that
forcible entry cases can be referred to DARAB.
3. The jurisdiction over the case lies with RTC since ownership and
possession are the issues.

ISSUE:
 Whether MTC or DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

 MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

 It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law.

 It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.
Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter
being legislative in character.

BP 129 and not RA 6657

 BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, MTC have the exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. RRSP governs the remedial aspect of these suits.

 Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, as well as Sec. 34 of EO 129-A, DARAB has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.

 In this case, Jose (plaintiff in MTC) alleged an action for forcible entry.

Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction

 MTC continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss .
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.

 Under the RRSP, the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference and, if
necessary, to receive evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been
shown to be the real issue.

 MTC may even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and affirmative defense of the
defendant, although under the RRSP, such a hearing is not a matter of right. If it is shown
during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.

 In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, MTC immediately referred
the case to DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.

 Besides, Sec. 2 of PD 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an
agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by Sec. 76 of RA 6657 in 1988.

Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the DARAB

 Jose alleged in the amended complaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren,
and respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge and consent.

 In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for
recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

 CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we
lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a
position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is
different from that of administrative agencies.

OTHER POINTS:
1. Agrarian disputes
 refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted
to agriculture.

 Essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

2. Portion of Petitioner’s complaint in MTC (determination of forcible entry) x x x

“8. The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded or prayed for, and the whole or part of such
relief/s consist of immediately or permanently RESTRAINING, ENJOINING or STOPPING the
defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from entering, occupying, or in any manner
committing, performing or suffering to be committed or performed for him, any act indicative of, or
tending to show any color of possession in or about the tenement, premises or subject of this suit,
such as described in par. 3 of this complaint; x x
 (e) Ligtas v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015;
TOPIC: PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of
CA which affirmed decision of RTC finding petitioner guilty for the crime of THEFT

o WHEN: June 29, 2000

o WHERE: Municipality of Sogod, Southern Leyte
o HOW:
 With intent to gain, entered abaca plantation of Anacita Pacite, without consent
 Harvested 1,000 kg of abaca fiber valued at P28 per kilo

DECISION: Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:

 PROSECUTION:
o Presented 5 witnesses: (CCP-VP)
1. Efren Cabero
2. Modesto Cipres
3. Anecitea Pacate
4. SPO2 Enrique Villanueva
5. SPO2 Ernesto Pacate

o THEIR VERSION OF THE FACTS:

 Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation.
 Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men, including Cipres,
went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions.
 They were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was
accompanied by three (3) unidentified men.
 Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there will be loss of life if they insisted on
harvesting the abaca.
 Cabero reported the matter to petitioner and the police.
 They also went back to the location and found that Ligtas was able to harvest
1,000 kg of abaca fiber valued at P28 per kilo.

 DEFENSE:
o PRESENTED 3 WITNESSES:
1. Ligtas himself
2. Celia – his wife
3. Pablo – neighbor

o ALLEGATION:
 DENIED the harvest in June 29, 2000.
 Further alleged that on said date, he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a
fiesta.
 He had been a tenant by the Spouses Pacate since 1993
 Anecita installed him as a tenant in 1.5 to 2 ha of land (subject of the case)
 1st harvest was made in 1997 and that he has remitted Anecita’s share of
harvest
 Him and Palo are workers of the petitioner in another land consisted of 15ha.
 June 28, 2000, he alleged that several men were sent to havest the subject land
however he prevented it since HE WAS THE RIGHTFUL TENANT OF THE
LAND
 Anecita’s complaint is tainted with vengeance or to ensure that he would be
evicted from the land

 Meanwhile, Ligtas filed complaint to DARAB

 o DARAB:
 Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land; maintain plaintiff in the peaceful
possession of the land in dispute
 No objection from PP
 MARO and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster
 Assist the parties in in the execution of a leasehold contract
covering the land in dispute

 RTC: Ligtas is guilty of Art. 308 of RPC
o All elements of theft are present
o Failure to provide concrete and substantial evidence of tenancy relationship
o Nor the claim of sharing of harvest between Anecita and Ligtas
o Alibi of petitioner was negated by positive identification of the witnesses

 CA: affirmed decision of RTC

o Burden of proof lies upon Ligtas
o Failure to establish essential elements of tenancy relationship
o Reliance on DARAB’s decision is irrelevant in the case
o CONFLICTING POSITION:
 Ligtas assailed the ownership of Anecita
 Under Rule 131, Sec 2, tenants cannot deny title of land owner upon
commencement of tenancy relationship
o Guilty of theft

 Ligtas filed Motion for Reconsideration: DENIED by CA. Hence this petition

 PETITIONER’S ALLEGATION:
o The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the DAR is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise
on matters relating to tenancy relationship.
o Admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of
the Rule he seeks redress from.
o However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the
subject of a petition for review under Rule 45:
 Findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for
being "conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and
 premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as]
tenant."
 RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATION:
o CA correctly disregarded DARAB’s decision: courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases
o Petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship
between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp
o petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship between
him and private complainant

ISSUE:

1. WON, questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court

2. WON, DARAB’s Decision is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal

case for theft;

3. WON, CA erred in its decision

RULING:

1. YES. The court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified
"when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken
into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable
doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal."
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a
question of fact. To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal
conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the
essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having
been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole.

A review of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

2. DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on

courts if supported by substantial evidence.

DARAB Case involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship between
petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case involves determination of whether petitioner
committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements
of theft were proven by the prosecution.

DARAB found that plaintiff has established all essential elements to prove agricultural tenancy
relationship and these evidences were NOT CONTROVERTED by any evidence submitted by private
respondent. Hence, DARAB rendered the decision that Ligtas is a bona fide tenant of the land in
question and as such is entitled to a security of tenure.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the
abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a
legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been
taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty.[145] "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person."[146] Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of
innocence[.]"[147] Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of
which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted."[148

NOTES:
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court
has ruled in a number of cases that:

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are

independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission.
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice
versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed
and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in
one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
cases.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Only questions of
law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court (SC) when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA)
—Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

This court has differentiated between a question of law and question of fact:

A QUESTION OF LAW exists when:

 I. the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts; or
II. when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

A QUESTION OF FACT exists when the

I. doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or

II. when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the:

1. credibility of the witnesses,

2. the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and
3. the probability of the situation.

There are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition
for review under Rule 45

—Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of
the Rule he seeks redress from. However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law
should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings,
the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9)
when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is the quasi-judicial tribunal
that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between
adverse parties
— The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.

This court has held that “judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect
as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.”

Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to: tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
 (f) Galope v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012;

TOPIC: The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law;
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds

CASE: PETITION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, EJECTMENT AND PAYMENT OF

RENTALS BEFORE DAR
PARTIES: P- Juan Galope; R- Cresencia BUGARIN represented by CELSO RABANG

o Petitioner Juan Galope appealed the decision of CA, finding that no relationship exist
between the parties.

FACTS:
o Respondent, CRESENCIA BUGARIN, owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija.

o Barangay Case No. 99-6:

 respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an
agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant.
 Respondent wants to recover the land to farm it on her own.

 PETITIONER’S ANSWER: respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had
been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to
P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.

 The case was not settled.

o Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession,

ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB.

 RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATION:
 BUGARIN lent the land in 1991 to petitioner and receive NOTHING in
return
 petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses
the land.

o PARO: dismissed the petition; petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure.

 Substantial evidence proved existence of tenancy relationship

 Certification of DAR that petitioner is the registered farmer of the land;
 Barangay Tanods attested to the fact that petition is the tenant of the land
 affidavits of Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cru
 affidavit of Jose Allingag affirmed petitioner’s possession and cultivation of the
land;
 Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as farm helper; and that
 respondent’s own witness, Cesar Andres, said that petitioner is a farmer of the
land

o DARAB: disagreed with the PARO and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant; no
tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that the
 elements of consent and sharing are not present.
 absence of receipts to show petitioner’s payment of rentals
 Order petitioner to vacate
 MARO to assist in computing rentals
 Affidavits of witness are self-serving and are not concrete proof to rebut the
allegation of nonpayment of rentals.
 respondent’s intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be taken as
implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration

o CA affirmed DARABs ruling. Hence, this petition.

o PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
o his possession of the land is undisputed;
o DAR certified that he is the registered farmer of the land; and
o receipts prove his payment of irrigation fees.
 o On the absence of receipts as proof of rental payments, he urges us to take
judicial notice of an alleged practice in the provinces that payments between
relatives are not supported by receipts.

o He also calls our attention to the affidavits of Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and
Angelito dela Cruz attesting that he pays 15 cavans of palay to respondent

 RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
(1) nonpayment of any consideration,
(2) lack of tenancy relationship,
(3) petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly possesses the land, and
Findings:
Allingag himself denied it in his affidavit. No such a deed of mortgage was submitted in evidence.
Rabang’s claim is based on a hearsay statement of Cesar Andres that he came to know the
mortgage from residents of the place where the land is located.
(4) she will manage/cultivate the land.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

2) whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.

RULING:

1. YES. CA Decision reversed.

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing the petitioner to
cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten
tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of
a written contract alone.

Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present.

Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is
agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and
share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production.

After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondents
motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the
purpose of their agreement.

Lastly, petitioner’s personal cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who likewise never
denied the fact that they share in the harvest.

Petition Granted.

2. NO. Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a
lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. The
tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.

Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:

SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the

period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to
his rights under Sections [25] and [34], except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee
may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of
the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession; (REPEALED BY SEC. 7RA 6389)

SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had
been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section [29];

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the
non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a
result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section.

NOTES:
While the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on
the land, the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency
basis does not negate the existence of the element of “personal cultivation” essential in a
tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship.—We have held that the employment of farm
laborers to perform some aspects of work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of
cultivation in the hands of hired helpers.

Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on
the land, the court nevertheless declared that the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a
temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not negate the existence of the element of “personal
cultivation” essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. There is no showing that
petitioner has left the entire process of cultivating the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has
admitted that petitioner still farms the land.

The law provides that nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess
the tenant from the landholding —On respondent’s claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no
longer a valid ground to eject petitioner. The original provision of Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844 has
been removed from the statute books after its amendment by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 on
September 10, 1971, to wit: SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows: (1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years. Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner may not
be ejected from the landholding.
We emphasize, however, that as long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner must continue
paying rentals. For the law provides that nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to
dispossess him of respondent’s land. Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his rental payments
are properly covered by receipts.
(g) Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007;
TOPIC:

CASE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of CA; ruled that
petitioner’s title is cancelled and reinstated the COT in the name of Virginia Roa.
ORIGIN: PR - filed Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of possession and Damages against
Nicolas Juralbot;

FACTS:
 The subject property was registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa.
 The property was originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A.
Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966.
 In 1988, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was registered and issued in favor of Nicolas
Jugalbot based on his claim that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the
1950s, with an area of 6,229 square meters, located at Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City.
o Certification from DAR by TL Maantig was issued declaring the subject property
tenanted since 1972; devoted to rice and corn
o EP was registered in ROD in 1988
 Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial
Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of Possession
and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot

 DARAB Provincial Adjudicator:

o dismissed private respondents' complaint and
o upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent.

 DARAB Central Office: affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on the sole ground that
private respondents' right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot's title was barred by
prescription.
o action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the
expiration of one year from the decree of registration.

 CA: reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office
o (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship;
o (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR;
o (3) the area of the property which was less than one hectare and deemed swampy,
rainfed and kangkong-producing; and
o (4) the classification of the subject property as residential, which is outside the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.

Issues:
WON a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, and private
respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27.

Simply stated, are petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process
because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party .
The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N.
Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the
property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been
therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

NOTE:
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land—it is also a legal relationship.
—The doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question
does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. The following essential requisites must
concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural
production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests
between the parties. Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 666 (2003), further affirms the doctrine
that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give
rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant
to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled
the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between
petitioner and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA
503 (1993). The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Due Process; The landowner is denied due process where the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) took the property without sending notice of the impending land reform coverage to the
proper party
—The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27
due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of
Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR
failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show
that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the
owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be
gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on
her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership; The presumption under civil law that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof
that the property was acquired during the marriage
—Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 641 (1997), held that the presumption under civil
law that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is
proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. In Spouses Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any proof that the
property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact
that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to
Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of “Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo
Gaza,” does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

Tenancy; Due Process; The issuance of a certification that a property is tenanted and
primarily devoted to rice and corn in the absence of an ocular inspection or on-site fact-
finding investigation and report deprives the land owner of her right to property through
denial of due process.
—The defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team
leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of
October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular
inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of
Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-
site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property
through the denial of due process.

Eminent Domain; Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating
private property, the law must be strictly construed —any act committed by the DAR or any of its
agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a
violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

—Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be
strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed.

In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR.
Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation.
Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply
with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and
should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Evidence; Independent evidence, aside from the self-serving statements of alleged tenants, is
needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner, and
establish a tenancy relationship.
—There is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the
petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests,
except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of
his farm household cultivated the land in question. No proof was presented except for their self-
serving statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent evidence, aside from their
self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the
landowner, and establish a tenancy relationship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla
of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established—there must be concrete evidence on
record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.—In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 164
SCRA 431 (1988), we ruled that the respondents’ self-serving statements regarding their tenancy
relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on another’s
landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial
evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of
sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove
the element of sharing.

Same; Same; The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants
de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.—The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient
to establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 168 SCRA 247
(1998), we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make
the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The
security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by
those who are not true and lawful tenants.

Subdivisions; An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be

devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision
—In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 398 (1989), we held that an agricultural leasehold
cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its
conversion into a residential subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the
land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the
conversion of the land into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.

Social Justice; Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social
justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged—they apply with equal force
to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts.
—On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the
preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and
underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable
position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the courts.

Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of defending the poor,
where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them. As the court of last resort, our
bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny
justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side. For in the eyes of the
Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the bedrock principle by
which our Republic abides.
(h) Crisostomo v. Victoria, G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015;
TOPIC:
CASE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
(i) Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003;
(ii) TOPIC:
(iii) CASE:
(iv) FACTS:
(v) ISSUE:
(vi) RULING:
5.b. Certifications of Administrative Agencies Re: Tenancy Relationship

JV Lagon Realty vs. Heirs of Vda. de Terre,

G.R No. 219670, June 27, 2018.

TOPIC:

CASE: The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal ejectment, payment of disturbance
compensation, and damages filed by Leocadia Vda. De Terre (Leocadia) against petitioner J.V.
Lagon Realty Corporation (J V. Lagon) before the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD),

DECISION: petition is GRANTED.Respondents were order to VACATE.

FACTS:
 Leocadia Vda. De Terre was allegedly instituted as tenant of the 5-hectare land in suit by the
original owner Antonio Pedral sometime in 1952.
 Pedral sold the land to Jose Abis (Abis) who, in turn, sold the same to Augusto Gonzales
(Gonzales) in 1958.
 During the said transfers of ownership, the spouses Terre were allegedly retained as tenants
of the entire 5-hectare landholding.

 In 1988, the spouses Terre were surprised when they were informed that J.V. Lagon had
already bought the entire 5-hectare land from the heirs of Gonzales.
 J.V.Lagon constructed a scale house within the 2.5 hectare land tilled by the spouses
Terre.
 J.V. Lagon warned the spouses to stop cultivating the land because the whole lot was to be
developed for commercial or industrial use.
 In that same year, Delfin died, purportedly due to mental anguish over the turn of events.
 J.V. Lagon filled the eastern portion of the land with earth and boulders.

 Leocadia filed a complaint before the (BARC).

 on 8 May 1991, a complaint was also lodged before (MARO).
o No appropriate action, however, was taken on the said complaints
o until the dispute was eventually brought before the PARAD on 19 June 1997.

o LEOCADIA’S ALLEGATION:
 She claimed that the works done by J.V. Lagon were tantamount to conversion
of the land for non-agricultural purposes, and
 that she was not duly notified of the sale,
 thus, she is entitled to redeem the property.

 To prove the existence of tenancy, Leocadia relied, inter alia, on the following
documents:
(a) 23 April1997 Certification issued by the Municipal Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat,
certifying that the spouses Terre were actual tenants of the land;

(b) Pedral's affidavit dated 4 July 1987, confirming his consent for the spouses Terre to be his
agricultural tenants at a 70-30 sharing of harvest in their favor;

(c)affidavit executed by MARO Perfecto Bergonia, Jr. stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a complaint
on 7 July 1991, concerning her illegal ejectment.

 PARAD: ruled in favor of JV Lagon and declared that the complaint is barred by prescription;
o the filing of the complaint with the MARO in 1991 did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period because it was the DARAB that had jurisdiction over agrarian
disputes.
o Leocadia had actual knowledge of the sale as early as 1988 when she confronted J.V.
Lagon about the scale house.
o held that Leocadia failed to establish her status as a de jure tenant.
o certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers as regards tenancy relations
are merely provisional in nature.
o disputed real property was not an agricultural land.;
Urban Land Use Plan as certified by the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator,
the said land was already classified as commercial.
 DARAB: reversed and set aside the PARAD's ruling.
  Leocadia's action was not barred by prescription because the filing of the
complaint with the BARC on 7 May 1991 tolled the running of the prescriptive
period.
 DARAB found probative value on the documents Leocadia presented
 It concluded that tenancy existed, as evinced by the fact that Leocadia's house
was erected inside the subject landholding;
 attested to by the affidavits of the former MARO Perfecto Bergonia and of Mayor
Geronimo P. Arzagon of Tacurong City.
 opined that Pedral's affidavit declaring that he installed the Spouses Terre as
share tenants sufficiently proved the existence of tenancy relationship.
 Citing Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844,14 it held that tenancy is attached to the land
regardless of whoever may have become the owner thereof. Thus, Leocadia's
status as a tenant was not extinguished by the successive transfers of ownership
from Pedral to Abis, and then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V. Lagon, as the latter
assumed the rights and obligations of the preceding transferors.
 DARAB further ruled that Leocadia was entitled to redeem the land from J.V.
Lagon

 CA: affirmed in toto DARAB’s ruling

 Considering that there was tenancy between Pedral and Leocadia, the CA
decreed that there was subrogation of rights to Abis, then to Gonzales, and
finally to J.V. Lagon, as landowners

J.V. LAGON’s ALLEGATION:

 the subject landholding is no longer agricultural;
 that Leocadia's cause of action has already prescribed; and
 that she has no right to redeem the property nor to receive disturbance
compensation.
 Stripped to its core, the petition before the Court posits the kernel argument
that there is no tenancy relation between J.V. Lagon and Leocadia.

ISSUE:
 WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN J.V. LAGON
REALTY AND LEOCADIA.

RULING:
NO. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that certifications of administrative agencies and
officers declaring the existence of a tenancy relation are merely provisional. They are persuasive but
not binding on the courts, which must make their own findings.

As held in Soliman v. PASUDECO (Soliman), 589 SCRA 236 (2009):

The certifications attesting to petitioners’ alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given
locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative,
like the MARO or the BARC, concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such
certification does not bind the judiciary.

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that are of his own personal
knowledge; that is, those which are derived from his own perception. Therefore, even if the Court
were to take hook, line, and sinker Pedral’s declaration that he installed Leocadia and Delfin as
tenants, such declaration may be accorded probative value only during the interim period within which
he was the owner of the land.

The logic behind is simple, i.e., Pedral ceased to have any personal knowledge as to the status and
condition of the land after he had sold the same to Abis. Put differently, absence of personal
knowledge rendered Pedral an incompetent witness to testify on the existence of tenancy from the
moment the land was passed on to Abis and his subsequent transferees.

NOTES:
Tenancy Relationship; Elements of.—There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential
elements concur:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

All of the above requisites are indispensable in order to create or establish tenancy relationship
between the parties. The absence of at least one requisite does not make the alleged tenant a de
facto one, for the simple reason that unless an individual has established one’s status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure guaranteed by agricultural tenancy laws. J.V. Lagon
Realty Corp. vs. Heirs of Leocadia Vda. de Terre, 869 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 219670 June 27, 2018

Agricultural Tenants; It bears to stress that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural

land does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws. — The Court’s pronouncement in the foregoing cases applies with
equal force to the certification issued by the municipal mayor of Tacurong. Like the MARO’s affidavit,
the municipal mayor’s certification deserves scant consideration simply because the mayor is not the
proper authority vested with the power to determine the existence of tenancy.

Besides, the MARO and the mayor merely affirmed the fact that Leocadia lived in a hut erected on
the subject landholding. If we subscribe to the DARAB’s fallacy, then anyone who squats on an
agricultural land or constructs a hut with the consent of the owner becomes a tenant. It bears to
stress that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller
or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws.