ULEP vs. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements
which invite potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and
annulment, absence, Visa, etc. It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article
entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in The Philippine Star because it is composed of specialists
that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is, especially on
marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.

Atty. Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of lawyers. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals. As for
its advertisement, respondent said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which
now allows it. And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services
that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Whether or not such is allowed;
3. Whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice
of law, however such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic offers services for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from installation of computer systems
and programs to the giving out of legal information to laymen and lawyers. The Legal Clinic is
composed mainly of paralegals and such services aforementioned are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only
reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to paralegals.

As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner
that a merchant advertises his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret marriages,
bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law. The only allowed form of
advertisements by the Supreme Court would be:
1. Citing your involvement in a reputable law list.
2. An ordinary professional card.
3. Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
 TAN vs. SABANDAL
206 SCRA 473

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in
view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then,
he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where
Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of
any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However,
the executive judge added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the
Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under
a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the
land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement
canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank;
provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the
mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining
from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a
certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted
three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been
terminated.

RULING:

NO. His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he
could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public
service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of
guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his
sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, Sabandal’s failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion
filed against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
 BORJA SR vs. SULYAP
399 SCRA 601

FACTS:

Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease
involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon City.
Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals, association dues and
deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract,
Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused
to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja.
Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a “Compromise
Agreement” stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any
amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month
until fully paid plus 25% attorney’s fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be
issued as a matter of right.

Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyap filed a
writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the
writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyap’s
fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed.

Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the
decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise
agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among
them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to
the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in case of default in payment.
He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the
said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his
signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the
court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.

Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the
inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the compromise
agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by
the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed
that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25%
thereof as attorney’s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The
trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even
noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25,
1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement
despite several opportunities to raise said objection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him
in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the government, and is thus prohibited
from engaging in the private practice of his profession.

RULING:

NO, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be
annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an
employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz
to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited
"private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the
law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case.
 MELENDREZ vs. DECENA
176 SCRA 662

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that
respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial
situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their
only residential lot in Pagadian City. That respondent, who was their counsel in an Estafa case
against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent’s overall acts constitute malpractice and breach of trust and therefore may be
disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. Respondent is disbarred. The following acts of respondent:

1. Making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to
complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. Exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. Making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended
to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. Failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing
them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of
"formality";
5. Failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before
effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. Failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage
had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed
property within a certain period of time.

These constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply
something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that
these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals." The court stressed that the standard required from members of the Bar is not, satisfied by
conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. The respondent's conduct, in fact, may be
penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal
or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes
so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court
must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Roll of Attorneys. The nature of the office of
an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of
privileges of members of the Bar.

Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of
professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. In the instant case, the exploitative deception
exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them, and
the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional
misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compelled the Court to the conviction that he
has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the
Bar.
 LAPUT vs. BERNABE
55 Phil 621

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first branch of the
municipal court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an accused person to avail
himself of the services of an agent or friend, not a licensed attorney-at-law, to aid him in the
litigation.

Laput is a law student and accordingly, not a recognized member of the Philippine Bar. The
written appointment of Laput was duly presented in court, but the respondent judge, Bernabe,
before whom the case was to be tried refused to allow Laput to act as the counsel of Salas.
Hence, this petition for a writ of mandamus.

The Judiciary Law, Act No. 136, enacted in 1901, in its section 69 provided: "The existing
courts of justices of the peace in the City of Manila shall be continued as now organized, and
with the same jurisdiction as is now by law conferred upon them, and shall so continue until
special provisions shall be made by law for the organization of inferior civil and criminal
tribunals for the City of Manila." The Manila Charter, Act No. 183, approved on the same year,
created municipal courts with criminal jurisdiction and justice of the peace courts with civil
jurisdiction.

Section 44 of Charter, in its first sentence, further provided: "There shall be appointed by the Civil
Governor, by and with the consent of the Commission, two justices of the peace and two auxiliary
justices of the piece for the City of Manila, who shall be subject to removal in the manner provided for
their appointment, and who shall exercise within the City of Manila the jurisdiction conferred upon
justices of the peace in Act numbered One hundred and thirty-six, providing for the organization of
courts; but no justice of the peace, or auxiliary justice of the peace, of the City of Manila, shall
exercise any criminal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction within the City of Manila being confined to courts of
First Instance and to the municipal courts herein provided.

This dual system of justice of the peace courts and municipal courts continued until Act No. 3107 was
enacted in 1923.

ISSUE:

WON the existing municipal court of the City of Manila maybe considered a court of a justice of the
peace within the meaning of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

RULING:

Yes. When the Code of Civil Procedure was placed on the statute books, there were in the City
of Manila justice of the peace courts to which section 34 naturally applied. In these justice of
the peace courts, there could have been no question that a party could conduct his litigation
which the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. That is, it may, at least,
for civil cases and for criminal cases with civil aspects.

When the Code of Civil Procedure was placed on the statute books, there were in the City of
Manila justice of the peace courts to which section 34 naturally applied. In these justice of the
peace courts, there could have been no question that a party could conduct his litigation with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. When the justice of the peace
courts were abolished, the law was made to provide for a municipal court which was to have
the same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, and the same incidental powers "as are at
present conferred by law upon municipal courts and justice of the peace courts of the city of
Manila." The intention here was, without doubt, to transfer the justice of the peace court as
then existing to the municipal court and to make it a branch thereof.

The justice of the peace court of the City of Manila, like all other justice of the peace courts, being
included within the wording of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the powers of this court
having been given to the municipal court, it follows as a matter of course that, in so far as the civil
jurisdiction of the municipal court was concerned, it was the same as the former justice of the peace
court of the City of Manila and akin to that of justice of the peace courts in general.

PEOPLE vs. SIM BEN

98 Phil 138

FACTS:

The appellant was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Cebu for violating paragraph
3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for exhibiting cinematographic films of indecent or
immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view, on
the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid of legal
counsel. The court informed the appellant of his right to have a counsel, which the appellant
rejected. The court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and answered “Yes, sir.”

It is shown that the Court fully complied with its duty when it informed the appellant of his right. The
appellant showed that he is fully aware of the consequences of the plea he entered, waiving his right
to have the aid of counsel and entered plea of guilty. However, appellant claimed that he only
entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be imposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant’s plea of guilty is violative of Rule 138, section 34 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

No. The Court hasn’t been negligent on its duty to inform the appellant of his right to have a
counsel and to make sure that he is fully aware of the consequences of the plea of guilty
which will impose the punishment provided for by law upon him if he pleaded guilty.
Notwithstanding the Court’s precaution and warning, the appellant insistently waived his right to have
the aid of legal counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information. The recommendation of the
fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to corroborate his claim, but such
recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime
charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render
the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and gives out to the defendant a
penalty which is provided by law.
 CRUZ vs. MINA
522 SCRA 387

FACTS:

On Sept. 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC (Metropolitan Trial
Court) a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. Ferdinand Cruz
described himself as a third-year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior
courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the
public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in
the prosecution of the said criminal case. The MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Law Student Practice Rule should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant.

RULING:

Yes, the MeTC was directed to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of the petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.

The rule, however, it is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides: SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court
of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act
as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the
petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts. Thus, a law student
may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of
a member of the bar.

PAAR vs. BORROMEO

79 Phil 344

FACTS:

Teofilo Paar is charged in Manila with treason before the People’s Court, and prayed that he be
assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a member of the bar. The People’s
Court denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-members of the bar may assist defendants in the People’s Court.

RULING:

NO. Petition denied.

Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 are as follows:

"SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have attorney. — If the defendant
appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires
and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.

"SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney ’de oficio.’ — The attorney so employed or
assigned must be a duly authorized member of the Bar. But in provinces where duly
authorized members of the bar are not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit
or assign a person, resident in the province and of good repute for probity and ability,
to aid the defendant in his defense, although the person so admitted or assigned be
not a duly authorized member of the Bar."

Sections 29 and 31 of Rule 127 reads:

"SEC. 29. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — ’A superior court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it
appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the
services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of
the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service,
unless he is accused there from by the court for sufficient cause shown.’

"SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar."

It is clear from these provisions that in Manila where there are many members of the bar,
defendants in the People’s Court may be assisted only by members of the bar.

Under sections 3 and 4 of rule 112 and sections 29 and 31 of rule 127, in Manila where there
are many members of the bar, defendants in the People’s Court may be assisted only by such
members.