HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI vs.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
GR L-27873

FACTS:

The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar,
Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters The petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. The
petitioners furthermore contend that Lot 885 even if it is a mangrove swap is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property has been in actual possession of private persons for
many years and therefore, said land was already private land better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.

ISSUE:

WON Lot No. 885 is public forest land.

RULING:

YES. The petition is without merit. The disputed lot no. 885 is part of public domain, classified as
public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants. A forested area
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers
or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.

Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in
Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have
been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.

The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that
the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." Disposition WHEREFORE,
the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
 REPUBLIC vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES
GR 154953

FACTS:

T.A.N. Properties Inc. filed an Application for Original Registration of Title for a land. The land, with an
area of 56.4007 hectares, located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. TC set the case for initial
hearing. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation (Peoples Journal Taliba). The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as
in a conspicuous place on the land. All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing. When the trial court called the case for initial hearing,
there was no oppositor other than the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of
Lands (petitioner).

During the hearings, respondent presented three witnesses. The testimonies of respondents
witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, he was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga. Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in
favor of one of his children, Fortunato. Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land.
Hence, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of
Antonios children, Prospero. Then Porting sold the land to respondent. RTC adjudicated the land in
favor of respondent. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous and adverse possession
and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier.
2. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under Public Land Act.

RULING:

Petition is Granted.

1. NO. Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he
admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato,
which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the
relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by
Fortunato who was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas
testimony. The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were
only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession
of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

2. Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as
successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in
excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the
excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land
registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest
from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land,
not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of
law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
 HEIRS OF MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
GR 179987

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUE:

Can the heirs of Malabanan register the land?

RULING:

No. The Court needed to settle down the correct interpretation of Sec 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along
with CA 141. It should be noted that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to
those who satisfy its prerequisite, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not
repeal the other. The use of descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable” further limits the coverage
of Section 48 (b) to only agricultural lands of the public domain under the Constitution. The Court
rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Article 1113, Article 1137,
and Articles 420-422 of the New Civil Code. It is well-settled, per Article 1113, that only objects within
the commerce of men and that the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. It is also clear that in Articles 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, there is a
positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such. Hence, combining both rulings,
it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.
The Court held that the requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at
the time of the application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. The State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. Then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession – possession and occupation that
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of its
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise,
the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring
the land as no longer intended for public service for the development of the national wealth.
HEIRS OF NARVASA SR. vs. IMBORNAL
GR 182908

FACTS:

Basilia Imbornal had four children, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo, and from those arose the
following heirs: Heirs of the Francisco Narvasa— descendants of the Alejandra and Balbina Imbornal.
Heirs of Pablo Imbornal—descendants of Pablo Imbornal.

[Sabangan Property] During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan,
Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of 4,144 sq. m.), more or less
(Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina
(Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. [Motherland] On the other hand, the husband of Catalina
Imbornal, namely Ciriaco Abrio, was granted a homestead patent over a 31, 367 sq. meter riparian
land adjacent to the Cayanga River, Pangasinan.

Consequently, the heirs occupied the northern Motherland. On the other hand, the heirs of Pablo
Imbornal occupied the southern portion of the land. There were two accretions that occurred through
the course of time: 1st Accretion—occurred during 1949 and adjoined the southern portion of the
Motherland. A TCT was issued Victoriano, who is one of the heirs of Pablo Imbornal; 2nd Accretion—
occurred during 1971 and abutted the First accretion on the southern portion of the Motherland. The
TCT was issued in the name of all the heirs of Pablo Imbornal. The heirs of Francisco Narvasa filed
an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition and/or damages against the heirs of Pablo
Imbornal. The heirs of Francisco Narvasa anchored their claim on the following allegations:

Also, the heirs of Francisco Narvasa further alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood and
misrepresentation, the heirs of Pablo Imbornal had illegally registered the said accretions in their
names—notwithstanding that they were not riparian owners.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Francisco Narvasa own the motherland (riparian land) along with the subsequent
accretions?

RULING:

NO HELD: The Court first ruled over the existence of a valid implied trust between Ciriaco and the
Imbornal sisters. Implied Trust: There is no implied Trust

Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes." In this case, it cannot be said that, through oral evidence that
Ciricao was merely a trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal
sisters or their heirs. Weighed against the presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent
to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by mistake or
through fraud, the oral evidence of the heirs of Francisco Narvasa would not effectively establish their
claims of ownership.

Not Riparian owners; thus not owners of the accretion Subsequently, the Court further held that as
the heirs of Francisco Narvasa failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause
of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail.
The heirs of Francisco are not the owners of the two accretions Article 457 of the Civil Code states
the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Therefore, being
the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, the heirs of Pablo Imbornal are the riparian
owners, and they have preferential rights over the accretions.
 REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS
GR 160453

FACTS:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast
by the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A
also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

RULING:

No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. The RTC and
the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondent’s
property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The
process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no
legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of
Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502
of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its
property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds
should belong to some other person. The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the
gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to
belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed
through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than
thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by
other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of
its public dominion. Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable,
therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Subject to the
exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to
acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by
the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain
property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not
shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to
have acquired the property through prescription.
IGNACIO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
GR L-12958

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land. The land subject to registration
adjoins the land owned by the petitioner which he obtained by virtue of free patent. Petitioner alleged
that he owned the parcel of land by right of accretion pursuant to Art 457 of the Civil Code which
provides that “[t]o the owner of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” Moreover, petitioner contended that
Manila Bay is not a sea which makes Articles 1,4, and 5 of the Law of Waters inapplicable. Also, even
if Manila Bay is considered as sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary
for any public use or purpose. Hence, petitioner contended that the parcel, having been formed by
gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay which is not a sea, belongs to him.

On the contrary, the Director of Lands opposed the application contending that the petitioner has no
sufficient title thereto and that the land is a foreshore land covered by ebb and flow of the tide. Hence,
the land forms part of the public domain and cannot be the subject matter of an application for
registration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the land belongs to the petitioner by right of accretion which therefore entitles
petitioner to such land.
2. Whether or not, even if the land forms part of the public domain, the lower court erred in not
declaring it as no longer necessary for public use.
3. Whether or not the petitioner acquired the land through acquisitive prescription.

RULING:

1. No. Article 457 of the Civil Code is inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers. In this case, accretion was caused by action of the Manila Bay which is
considered as a sea.A bay is considered as part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same.
In several cases decided by the Supreme Court which applied the Law on Waters, they ruled that
accretion formed by the actions of the Manila Bay was considered as accretion formed by the
sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden and Francisco vs. Government of Philippine Islands). Hence, the
petitioner has not acquired the subject land through the right of accretion.

2. No. Under Article 4 of the Law of Waters, there is a need for a formal declaration on the part of the
government, through the Executive or the Legislative, that the lands formed by accretion are no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
the coastguard service. This is because the Courts are not called upon to determine whether any
public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. In this case,
there is no formal declaration by the Government that the land in question is no longer needed for
public purpose. Hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same to be the property of
the applicant-appellant.

3. No. Lands formed by accretion cannot be acquired through prescription if such land is part of the
public domain and is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby (Insular
Government vs. Aldecoa & Co.). In this case, the land formed by accretion is part of the public
domain. Moreover, there is no formal declaration providing that the land is no longer intended for
public use. Therefore, the petitioner has not acquired the land through acquisitive prescription.

Therefore, the land cannot be registered since the petitioner neither acquired it through the right of
accretion nor through acquisitive prescription.
 CHAVEZ vs. PEA
GR 133250
FACTS:

Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment was made on
a previous contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Prior
to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain for shore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
amended contract now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the development rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in the reclamation. Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land
reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred
to PEA. These covered three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands.” PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the Freedom Islands,
notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the plan. The JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. Former
President Fidel Ramos then approved the JVA.

Controversy broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands.
Moreover, the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that the JVA itself was
illegal. In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued that the
government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of the
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to public corporations. A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and
AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA). Former President Estrada
signed the Amended JVA.

ISSUES:

Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution.

RULING:

YES. The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been
reclaimed. The rest are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement,
AMARI will shoulder the reclamation of the freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable area.
AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 ha of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. However, at this
time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass after PEA had
already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still submerged and forming part of the
Manila Bay. There is also no legislative or presidential act regarding these remaining areas. Also, the
mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA. It still needs the authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of public domain into alienable or
disposable lands subject to the President’s approval.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. PEA is also mandated to call for a public bidding.
Only if this failed that a negotiated sale is allowed. The failure of the public bidding involving only
407.84 ha is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 ha. A private corporation, even one
that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban. Ownership of PEA of the said
lands of public domain does not convert them to private lands. Jurisprudence holding that there is
conversion to private land upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title does not
apply to government units like PEA. The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except
through lease, alienable lands of public domain is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage
"owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like
the instant case. Huge landholdings spawn social unrest. In practice, this ban strengthens limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area by simply stting up a corporation to acquire
more land.
CARINO vs. INSULAR GOVT.
GR 72

FACTS:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the
CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris,
April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots.
(grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for
pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but
process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act
No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE:

W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

RULING:

YES. Petition Granted. Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his
or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
 SPS. MORANDARTE vs. CA
GR 123586

FACTS:

Morandarte filed an application for free patent, dated December 5, 1972, before the Bureau of Lands,
Dipolog City District Land Office (BOL for brevity), covering a parcel of land located at Sta. Filomena,
Dipolog City with an area of 4.5499 hectares and described as a portion... of Lot 1038 of Dipolog
Cadastre No. 85. On July 27, 1976, the District Land Officer of the BOL approved the free patent
application of Morandarte and directed the issuance of a free patent in his favor. Accordingly, Free
Patent No. (IX-8) 785 for Lot No. 7, Csd-09-05-00078-D was issued in the... name of Morandarte.
Original Certificate of Title No. (P-21972) 5954. Morandarte caused a subdivision survey of the lot,
dividing the same into Lot No. 6781-A, with an area of 13,939 square meters, and Lot No. 6781-B,
with an area of 32,819 square meters. On May 22, 1981, Morandarte and his wife, Marina Febrera,
executed a real estate mortgage over Lot 6781-B, subject of TCT No. 1836, in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Dipolog City branch (DBP for brevity), in consideration of a loan
in the amount of P52,160.00. More than ten years after the issuance of the OCT in Morandarte's
name, or on March 19, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic for brevity),
represented by the Director of Lands, filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Reversion against the Morandarte spouses, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, the
Register of Deeds of Dipolog City, and DBP.

The Republic alleged that the BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River
which cannot be validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of
the BOL to dispose of Morandarte spouses deliberately and intentionally concealed such fact in the
application to ensure approval thereof. The Morandarte spouses denied the allegations of the
complaint and claimed that they were able to secure the title in accordance and in compliance with
the requirements of the law. As regards the Miputak River, they argued that the river changed its
course brought about by the fact that a portion of the Miputak River was leased by the Bureau of
Fisheries (BOF for brevity) to a certain Aguido Realiza whose rights were subsequently transferred to
Virginio Lacaya. In the alternative, they alleged that inclusion of the Miputak River should not render
the title void; only the portion of the property covered by the Miputak River should be nullified but their
title to the remaining portion should be maintained. Respondent spouses Virginio B. Lacaya and
Nenita Lacaya filed their Complaint-In-Intervention which alleged that they are holders of a fishpond
lease agreement covering a fishpond area of about 5.0335 hectares, 1.2681 hectares... of which have
been included in the title issued to the Morandarte spouses.

Considering that the land of the Morandarte spouses encroaches on the area leased to them, the
Lacaya spouses submit that the former's title thereto is void. They maintained that the portion of the
fishpond originally belonged to Antonio L. Morandarte, their... predecessor-in-interest, and the Lacaya
spouses have never been in possession thereof but are actually squatters therein.

ISSUE:

Assuming arguendo that the change of course of the old miputak river was due to natural cause only
a portion of the subject property of petitioners was affected thereby so that the title of petitioners to
the remaining portion is valid and cannot be nullified as it remained Private property

RULING:

The State, as the party alleging that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for free
patent, bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as
varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. In this case, the State failed to prove that fraud
and misrepresentation attended the application for free patent. Besides, it is undisputed that the
original survey plan submitted by Morandarte to the BOL reflected the true state of the Miputak River
in Lot 1038 but the BOL did not approve the plan because a 1916 survey did not so indicate the
existence of a river traversing Lot 1038 such that Morandarte was directed to submit an amended
plan deleting the existence of the Miputak River.
Accordingly, the 12,162-square meter portion traversed by the Miputak River and the 13,339-square
meter portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses which were
erroneously included in Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-21972
should be reconveyed back to the State. The Morandarte spouses cannot seek refuge in their claim
that Antonio A. Morandarte, their predecessor-in-interest, was already the owner of that portion of Lot
1038 when the fishpond application of Aguido S. Realiza was approved in 1948 because Lot 1038
was still part of the public domain then. Respondent Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision the 12,162-square meter portion... traversed by the Miputak River
and the 13,339-square meter portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya
spouses.
MATTHEWS vs. TAYLOR
GR 164584

FACTS:

Benjamin Taylor, a British subject, was married to Joselyn Taylor on June 30, 1988. While their
marriage was subsisting, the couple bought a parcel of land in Boracay. The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. When the relationship turned sour, Joselyn ran away
with another man. In 1992, she executed a special power of attorney in favor of Benjamin so he could
maintain, sell, lease, and sublease the property in Boracay.

Later that year, Joselyn entered into an agreement of lease with Philip Matthews. In the contract of
agreement, Benjamin’s signature appeared on the last page under the phrase “signed in the
presence of.” However, Benjamin later instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages because his consent was not obtained and that the property was conjugal.
Matthews claimed he was in good faith.

ISSUE:

Does Benjamin’s non-consent nullify the Agreement of Lease?

RULING:

No. It is a clear mandate from the Constitution that aliens may not be able to acquire lands in the
Philippines if they do not fall within the exceptions. The pertinent constitutional provision is Article XII,
Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.

Hence, even if the property was purchased by the alien, he cannot claim that trust was created in his
favor because the contract was illegal to begin with. Since in the Deed of Sale, Joselyn’s name was
listed as the vendee, she acquired sole ownership thereto. Thus, Benjamin’s consent is not even
required in the lease agreement.
 REPUBLIC vs. CA
GR 108998

FACTS:

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with
a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At
the time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were
no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic. The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks
this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a
quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.

ISSUE:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

RULING:

YES. With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and
ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates
back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino
citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in
question.

"The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone
established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit ‘P’). The investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied
by the applicants ‘whose house of strong materials stands thereon’; that it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same
by means of a public instrument entitled ‘Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan’ duly executed by the vendor,
Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits ‘I’ and 'J'); and that the applicants and their
predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing
of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were
Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the
land in dispute had already passed to them."

Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8
of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit: "Sec. 7. Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law." (Underscoring supplied