Aristotle on Pleonastic Definitions

Pieter Sjoerd Hasper

(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

There are three passages in Aristotle where he is concerned with definitions leading to
repetition: saying several times the same thing, or adoleschein – which one might
translate as ‘babbling’. The first of these passages is Topics 6.3, the second chapters
13 and 31 of the Sophistical Refutations, and the third Metaphysics Z.5. The contexts
are different: in Topics 6.3 Aristotle is concerned with the perhaps relatively minor
flaw definitions might have of being not fully properly rendered because information
is repeated; in the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle discusses how to defend oneself
against sophists who employ certain features of definitions in order to make one look
a fool because of repetitive definitions; and in Metaphysics Z.5 he takes the
possibility of repetition to show that there are no proper definitions of non-substances
at all. Thus there seems to be a progression from hardly a serious problem with such
definitions to a really serious problem with metaphysical consequences.
The examples Aristotle uses in order to illustrate his arguments in Topics 6.3
return in the Sophistical Refutations, but there he also adds a second group of
examples – even though as far as his diagnosis is concerned he does not distinguish
between the two groups. Finally an example from the second group returns in
Metaphysics Z.5 – does the first group not return there because they do not suffer
from the same problem as the second group, or are they only less interesting, and
would the point Aristotle wants to make there apply to them as well?
So the question I want to address today is how much continuity and
discontinuity there is between these three passages: Is the progression in seriousness
real or to some extent apparent? Are the examples treated differently or not? I hope to
able to shed at least some light on these questions, and moreover to find out
something more about the ideas and concepts behind these arguments exposing
pleonastic definitions.
Of course it will not be possible to answer these questions without a detailed
discussions of Aristotle’s arguments in these three passages. It will appear that these
arguments are pretty difficult to understand, partly because we have to reconstruct the
fully worked out examples from Aristotle’s meagre indications, but also because there
are textual issues involved, especially in the Sophistical Refutations.

§ 1. Topics 6.3

In Topics 6 Aristotle is concerned with definitions in so far as they can be handled in

dialectical discussions. When discussing ways in which a definition may not be
rendered properly he mentions the possibility that ‘the same thing has been stated
several times’ (140b27). Definitions that are certainly wrong have the following
structure:

X =: Y - Z
 2

where Y and Z share information, so that that part is repeated in the definiens of the
definition. But he starts off with discussing another way there might be something
repetitive, as follows:

Further, [check] whether he has stated the same thing several times, for
example when he stated that appetite is desire for [something] pleasurable
(τὴν ἐπιθυµίαν ὄρεξιν ἡδέος). For all appetite is for [something]
pleasurable, so that also what is identical to appetite will be for
[something] pleasurable (πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιθυµία ἡδέος ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐπιθυµίᾳ ἡδέος ἔσται). Then there turns out to be the definiens
of appetite desire for [something] pleasurable for [something]
pleasureable / desire for [something] pleasurable for [something]
pleasurable (Ross: γίνεται οὖν ὁ ὅρος τῆς ἐπιθυµίας ὄρεξις ἡδέος
ἡδέος·/Brunschwig: γίνεται οὖν [[ὅρος τῆς ἐπιθυµίας]] ἡ ὄρεξις ἡδέος
ἡδέος·). For it does not matter whether one says appetite or desire for
[something] pleasurable, so that each of the two will be for [something]
pleasurable (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιθυµίαν εἰπεῖν ἢ ὄρεξιν ἡδέος, ὥσθ’
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἡδέος ἔσται). (Topica 6.3, 140b27-31)

Presumably the same argument is referred to in chapter 13 of the Sophistical

Refutations:

And is [there?] appetite for [something] pleasurable? But that is desire for
[something] pleasurable. Therefore appetite is desire for [something]
pleasurable for [something] pleasurable. (καὶ ἆρά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυµία ἡδέος;
τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὄρεξις ἡδέος· ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἐπιθυµία ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἡδέος.)
(SE 13, 173a38-40)

It is difficult to reconstruct the argument, for two reasons: there are textual problems
in the Topics passage; and there is a kind of ambiguity in the argument itself. What
text we read, depends in part on the interpretation, so I shall discuss the structure of
the argument first.
There are two possibilities for reconstruction, depending on whether in the end
we get ‘desire for something pleasurable for something pleasurable’ as a whole in the
predicate position, or whether ‘desire for something pleasurable’ is in the subject
position, with ‘for something pleasurable’ being predicated of that. That is, we either
reconstruct as follows:

(A) (1) X =: Y in relation to Z.

(2) X is in relation to Z.
(3) Therefore, there is Y in relation to Z in relation to Z.

or as:

(B) (1) X=: Y in relation to Z.

(2) X is in relation to Z.
(3) Therefore, Y in relation to Z is in relation to Z.

It seems clear that the argument in the Sophistical Refutations follows pattern (A). If
we follow Ross and the majority of the manuscripts, interpreting the argument in
 3

accordance with the same pattern (A) suggests itself as well. One might think that it is
not mandatory to have (A) with Ross’ text: perhaps, one might suggest, we could
understand the conclusion as saying that the definiens of appetite, that is, desire for
something pleasurable, is for something pleasurable, so that the conclusion is as in
accordance with (B). I really find that ugly, to be honest, but I do not have any good
argument against it. With Brunschwig’s text (following more or less the AB-tradition
among the manuscripts) the argument is of type (B).
It may seem that for the Topics passage the (B)-pattern seems preferable. First,
it is difficult to square the (A)-interpretation with the last line of the passage quoted:
‘so that each of the two will be for [something] pleasurable’, for that line must be
understood with ‘each of the two’ in the subject position. Moreover, with (A) the
solution Aristotle offers, especially the application to this argument, seems to become
difficult to understand. For he says the following:

Similarly also in the case of appetite, for being for [something]

pleasurable is not predicated of desire, but rather of the whole [scil. of
desire for something pleasurable], so that also there the predication occurs
[only] once. (141a2-4)

How could this solution apply unless ‘Y in relation to Z’ is in the subject position, of
which ‘in relation to Z’ is then predicated? These two difficulties can be subsumed
under the major difficulty for the (A)-interpretation: the (B)-pattern makes for a
straightforward argument, whereas on (A) there is a switch from X in (2) being in the
subject position to its definiens in (3) being in the predicate position.
However, there is also a cost on the other side. For one, the parallel between
the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations gets lost.1 It is of course possible that
Aristotle has two slightly different arguments in two different passages. However,
what is troublesome is that clearly the first two premisses are identical, so that one
wonders how Aristotle could have followed the (A)-pattern there. And if one can
formulate an answer to that question, why should it be impossible for Aristotle to
have presupposed that point in the Topics passage as well?
A second drawback of the (B)-interpretation is that one starts wondering why
Aristotle would need to solve the problem. For if there is nothing absurd about saying
that a man is a man, and thus that what is identical to a man is what is identical to a
man, so that Y-Z is Y-Z, why would it be absurd to predicate part of a definiens of the
whole definiens? This is in fact how Aristotle solves the argument:

Rather: that does not constitute anything absurd. For also man is two-
footed, so that also that which is the same as man will be two-footed; but
what is the same as man is a two-footed land-animal, so that there will be
a two-footed two-footed land-animal (ὥστε ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν δίπουν
ἔσται).
However, it is not because of this that something absurd follows. For
two-footed is not predicated of land-animal (for in that way two-footed
would be predicated twice about the same thing), but two-footed is rather

1
One could suggest that also in the Sophistical Refutations the conclusion should be interpreted as
saying that ‘appetite, that is, desire for something pleasurable, is for something pleasurable.’ However,
then the parallel between this example and the main example in the Sophistical Refutations, that
concerning double of half, gets lost – as we shall see later.
 4

said of two-footed land-animal, so that two-footed is only predicated once.

(Topica 6.3, 140b31-141a2)

If one believes Aristotle to have followed the (B)-pattern, this is all very obvious and
there does not seem to have been any reason to suspect anything fishy with (3) in the
first place. But that is not how Aristotle presents his solution: he takes it to be
necessary to insist that there is nothing absurd about (3) and explains rather carefully
why. Moreover, in his rerun of the argument with man and two-footed, he states the
conclusion in such a way that it seems that ‘two-footed two-footed land-animal’ is as
a whole in the predicate position, just as the (A)-interpretation has it.
Thus we have an interpretative dilemma here, with costs on both sides. I
propose to escape from this dilemma by ascribing a principle to Aristotle which
allows him to go from (B) to (A), namely in such a way that the conclusion (3) on (B)
is an intermediate step to the conclusion (3) on interpretation (A). In this way we can
maintain the parallel between the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. Moreover,
we can interpret Aristotle’s solution as making this very point, that we arrive at (A)
through (B).
The principle I have in mind is the following:

If X is Y, then there is an X which is Y, and thus an X-Y.

One could understand this principle as saying that the truth of a predicative sentence
‘X is Y’ can be accounted for, not only by positing a fact that X is Y, but also by
positing an object with certain properties: an X-Y object. I think this is an
unproblematic and rather typical move for Aristotle to make.
With this principle in hand, the conclusion (3) on (A) follows from the
conclusion in (B). Moreover, we can take Aristotle’s solution to make the point that a
phrase ‘Y in relation to Z in relation to Z’ seems illicitly repetitive, but that is because
we forget that it has a certain structure, which is a reflection from the way we arrived
at this phrase. For this phrase has an internal predicative structure which can be
represented as:

[Y in relation to Z] in relation to Z

so that the first ‘in relation to Z’ does not play the same role with respect to Y as the
second ‘in relation to Z’, because in the course of the argument first the first ‘in
relation of Z’ gets predicated of Y, namely in the definiens of X, and then the second
‘in relation of Z’ of the whole of Y in relation to Z, because X, that is, the whole of Y
in relation to Z, is in relation to Z.
With this reconstruction of the argument and of Aristotle’s solution in mind,
we must opt for Ross’ reading of the text, which has better support in the manuscripts
anyway. The argument makes it appear that the definiens of X is Y in relation to Z in
relation to Z, because X is the kind of thing which is in relation to something, namely
to Z, and this is treated as another major fact about X, in addition to ‘in relation to Z’
being mentioned in the definition of X – thus ‘in relation to Z’ appears to occur twice
in connection with the definition of X. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted, as
Aristotle explains.
 5

§ 2. Sophistical Refutations 13 and 31: ‘babbling’ arguments

In Sophistical Refutations 13 and 31 Aristotle distinguishes between two types of

cases in which repetition arguments may be construed. The example of Topics 6.3
belongs to the first type, and I shall discuss Aristotle’s more explicit account of this
type first. At least the vocabulary in Aristotle’s solution differs very much from that
in the Topics, so we need to address the question how much continuity there is
between the two solutions – I shall argue that, though the argument is exactly the
same, there is a real break with the Topics passage as far as the solution is concerned:
where Aristotle in the Topics tries to make the repetition harmless by way of
syntactical means, in the Sophistical Refutations he tries to block the very repetition.
This discontinuity allows Aristotle to apply his solution of the Sophistical Refutations
to another type of examples, namely with things which are not in terms of content
related to other things, but rather in terms of their metaphysical status. After
discussing this second type of examples in the Sophistical Refutation we can proceed
to the use Aristotle makes of them in Metaphysics Z.5.

§ 2.1. The first type of babbling arguments

Aristotle describes the first type of examples in which a repetition of terms

(‘babbling’) might be brought about as arguments:

in the case of things in relation to something, which not only with respect
to their kinds, but also themselves are said in relation to something, and
are rendered in relation to one and the same thing (ἔν τε τοῖς πρός τι, ὅσα
µὴ µόνον τὰ γένη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ πρός τι λέγεται καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν
ἀποδίδοται) (for example desire is desire for something and appetite is
appetite for something, and what is double is double of something, that is,
double of half). (SE 13, 173b1-5)

His solution is formulated as follows:

[These arguments] appear sometimes to bring [babbling] about without

really doing so because of failing to inquire in addition whether double
said for itself signifies something or not (διὰ τὸ µὴ προσπυνθνεσθαι εἰ
σηµαίνει τι καθ’ αὑτὸ λεχθὲν τὸ διπλάσιον ἢ οὐδέν), and if it does signify,
whether [it signifies] the same or something else (καὶ εἴ τι σηµαίνει,
πότερον τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον), and [by] stating the conclusion straight away.
But because of the words being the same, it appears that they signify the
same as well. (SE 13, 173b12-16)

To understand the solution we first need to reconstruct the example in terms of which
Aristotle formulates the solution. This example he sketches as follows:

If it does not matter whether one uses a word or a formula, then double
and double of half come to the same thing. Therefore, if [double]2 is

2
Only CVΛ have this, the other manuscripts do without. For the meaning it does not matter much, but
I think I prefer the majority reading, for otherwise (2) more or less repeats (1).
 6

double of half, there will also be double of half of half. And if instead of
double again double of half has been set, it will have been said three
times: double of half of half of half. (SE 13, 173a34-38)

The argument runs as follows:

(1) double = double of half X = X in relation to Y

(2) double/there is double of half X/there is X in relation to Y
(3) Therefore, there is double of half of half Therefore, there is X in relation
to Y in relation to Y

There are three points to notice if one compares this argument to the argument from
the Topics. First, definitions do not play a role in it, for (1) is not a definition; it is
merely an identity-statement, to the effect that the thing which is signified by double
is always a thing which is double of half. This means that not all babbling arguments
involve definitions; only some do, for Aristotle mentions the Topics argument here as
well, as we already saw. The second point to notice is that (1) here is a kind of
expanded version of (2) in that argument: where there we had ‘X is in relation to Z’,
we have here ‘X/there is X in relation to Y’. This expansion could be taken to rely on
the principle I ascribed to Aristotle. Thirdly, only this type of arguments lends itself to
an infinite regress.
The solution is couched in terms of this new type of example, but it should be
applicable to type involving definitions as well. What does Aristotle’s solution
amount to?
One way to take the solution is the following: double as said for itself, that is,
double in the left half of (1) either does not signify or it signifies something different
from double in the right half of (1). This is the way Ross took it, to judge from his text
of the passage in chapter 31 where Aristotle repeats the solution:

One should not grant of the things which are said in relation to something
that their predications separated for themselves signify something (οὐ
δοτέον τῶν πρός τι λεγοµένων σηµαίνειν τι χωριζοµένας καθ’ αὑτὰς τὰς
κατηγορίας), for example, double as opposed to double of half, because it
appears in it (οἷον ‘διπλάσιον’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘διπλάσιον ἡµίσεος’). (SE 31,
181b26-28, on Ross’ text)

All the manuscripts read ἄνευ instead of ἀντί. Ross’ reason for emending must have
been that he had difficulty understanding how double could be ἄνευ double of half if,
in the light of the solution just sketched, which is concerned with the significance of
the isolated double in the left half of (1).
The point of the solution thus interpreted is of course that (1) is discarded as a
nonsensical statement. But that is not a solution which explains why the argument
gives merely the appearance of having derived a repetitive phrase, but rather one
which rejects a premiss of the argument. Moreover, it does not fit the elucidation
Aristotle provides immediately afterwards:

… because [double] appears in [double of half]. For ten appears also in

ten minus one and do in not do and generally the affirmation in the
negation. Yet it is not the case that if someone says that this is not white,
he says that it is white. (SE 31, 181b28-31)
 7

Just as ten taken separately is the ten in the context of ten minus one, it is clear that
the double which either does not signify or signifies something else is double in
double of half, but taken outside that context. Thus ἄνευ means here: ‘outside the
context of …’ This is confirmed in Aristotle’s remark:

Double surely does not signify anything at all, just as it does not in the
case of half (τὸ δὲ ‘διπλάσιον’ οὐδὲ σηµαίνει οὐδὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ
ἐν τῷ ἡµίσει). And even if it therefore does signify, it does not signify the
same as when joined together. (SE 181b32-34)

A note on the text is due here. I follow the reading of all the manuscripts, rather than
Ross’ emendation into οὐδὲ τὸ ‘ἥµισυ’. I take Aristotle to refer to a similar argument
involving double and half, but now the other way round, with as first premiss:

(1) half = half of double

Presumably Aristotle takes it to be clearer that of double in the case of half of double
does not signify than that double in the case of double of half does not signify.
Thus interpreted, Aristotle’s solution accepts (1), but refuses to understand it
as a statement licensing substitution of double of half for double in its right half:
either double in double of half does not signify or it does not signify the same as
double in the left half. And this solution can easily be extended to the example from
the Topics. Appetite as defined in (1) as identical with desire for something
pleasurable, does not have the same significance as appetite in (2), which says that all
appetite is for something pleasurable. Thus Aristotle’s strategy in the Sophistical
Refutations is radically different from that in the Topics: instead of arguing that a
repetition is not so bad, he now shows how to block the repetition from arising in the
first place.

§ 2.2. The second type of babbling arguments

In addition to the examples involving relative terms, Aristotle gives in the Sophistical
Refutations also examples with different terms, namely with what in the Posterior
Analytics are described as per se predicates of the second type: predicates which
belong per se to a type of subject, because this subject is specified in their definition.
Aristotle’s examples are as follows:

For example, odd is number having a middle. But there is an odd number.
Therefore there is a number having a middle number. And if snub is
concavity of nose, and there is a snub nose, there is therefore a concave
nose nose. (SE 13, 173b8-11)

The structure of these arguments will be clear:

(1) snub =: concave nose. (1) X =: Y-Z.

(2) There is a snub nose. (2) There is X-Z.
(3) Therefore there is a concave nose nose. (3) Therefore there is Y-Z-Z.
 8

It will also be clear how Aristotle, on the basis of the solution provided in chapter 13,
would wish to solve this argument: he will deny that snub in snub nose in (2) signifies
the same as snub as it is defined in (1), thus blocking the substitution.
(Of course, Aristotle could also focus on the point that (1) is strictly speaking
not correct, as snub is not concave nose, but rather concavity of nose. He makes this
point at the end of chapter 31:

Further, one should not grant the formulation at the same level (ἔτι οὐ
δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ’ εὐθύ), for that is false. For snub is not a concave
nose, but rather this of a nose (οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σιµὸν ῥὶς κοίλη ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς
τοδί), for example an affection, so that there is nothing absurd if a nose
which is snub is a nose having the concavity of a nose. (SE 31, 182a3-6)

However, for the rest Aristotle seems not to heed his own advice, for he constructs the
arguments and gives his solutions as if there is nothing wrong with (1).)
In chapter 31, however, Aristotle’s discussion of these arguments is not
primarily concerned with snub having different meanings, though it takes some
accuracy to see this. He introduces the second type of examples in the following way,
according to Ross:

In the case of terms that are predicated of the terms through which they
are defined (ἐν δὲ τοῖς <τούτων> δι’ ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουµένοις), one
should say this: that the term defined is not the same in separation as it is
in the whole phrase (ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρὶς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
δηλούµενον).3 (SE 31, 181b35-37)

This would fit perfectly with the diagnosis just given: snub is predicated of nose, the
term through which snub is defined, and the point of the solution is that snub in
separation, as in (1), does not signify the same as in the whole phrase snub nose, as in
(2). However, if we proceed with Aristotle’s elucidation, that does not seem to be his
point:

For concave as a common term denotes the same in the case of snub and
of bandy (τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινῇ µὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ σιµοῦ καὶ τοῦ
ῥοικοῦ), whereas there is nothing against it signifying other things when
added, in the one case to nose, and the other to leg (προστιθέµενον δὲ
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄλλα, τὸ µὲν τῇ ῥινὶ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκέλει, σηµαίνειν·). For in the
former case it signifies snub, while it the latter it signifies bandy, and it
does not make a difference whether one says snub nose or concave nose.
(SE 31, 181b37-182a3)

The problem here is that Aristotle elucidates his general claim, which allegedly
concerns terms like snub, with considerations about the significance of terms like
concave. Another, though smaller, problem with the traditional reading is that we will
have to posit a shift in meaning for the verb δηλοῦν: in the classificatory clause it
should mean something like ‘clarify’ or ‘define’, whereas in the recommendation and
in the subsequent elucidation it serves as a synonym for σηµαίνειν. If we then also

3
Translation taken from Barnes, Collected Works of Aristotle, with small adaptations.
 9

add that this reading requires the insertion of an untestified τούτων, we seem to have
ample reason to look for a better translation.
Such a translation can be found if we take the context into account.
Immediately before Aristotle makes a remark about the significance of things like
knowledge, which as genus are relative to something, but which in their species are
not relative:

Also knowledge in the case of one of its species, for example if it concerns
medical knowledge, does not [signify] what [knowledge] as a general term
is (οὐδ’ ἡ ἐπιστήµη ἐν τῷ εἴδει, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήµη, ὅπερ τὸ
κοινόν·) – that was knowledge of [something] knowable (ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἦν
ἐπιστήµη ἐπιστητοῦ). (SE 31, 181b34-35)

I shall return later to the point Aristotle makes here. But here it provides with ‘what
[it, scil. knowledge] as a general term’ something which could serve as the subject
with δηλοῦται in the sentence we are concerned with. I suggest we translate that
sentence as follows:

In the case of things through which, when predicated, what it as a general

term is, is denoted (ἐν δὲ τοῖ δι’ ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουµένοις), one
should say that what is denoted is not the same in separation as it is in the
phrase.

Let me explain what I think is Aristotle’s line of thought. He introduces this kind of
terms by contrast with terms like knowledge, which in their species-context do not
mean what is as a general term is, because the general term or genus is said in relation
to something, whereas the species, e.g. medical knowledge, is not a relative; now,
Aristotle wants to say, we go over to terms which straightforwardly signify what it as
a general term is. Assume such a term to be predicated of a subject, for example
concave of nose:

(4) There is a concave nose.

Of concave in concave nose Aristotle says that it signifies what concave is, but that is
what it signifies in separation; in the context of the whole phrase concave nose it also
signifies snub. This is exactly what Aristotle explains in the elucidation: concave
signifies the same in the case of snub and of bandy, but nothing prevents it, when
added from signifying other things as well: on the grounds of the possibility of
substitution it signifies in the one context also snub, in the other also bandy, because
in the context of phrases it contributes the same as those terms.
Of course, this variation in significance of concave corresponds to a variation
in significance of snub. Snub in separation means concavity of nose, whereas snub in
the context of a phrase snub nose signifies concave. Thus Aristotle’s considerations
are perfectly compatible with his solution of the babbling argument; but in chapter 31
he goes beyond this solution in supplementing it with a point about the variability in
significance of concave as well.
 10

§ 3. Metaphysics Z.5

We are now in a position to analyse Aristotle’s use of repetition arguments in an

argument in Metaphysics Z.5. The argumentative context is very different from that of
the Sophistical Refutations. Here Aristotle is making a point concerning the issue
whether there is a definition stating the essence of other things than substances. He
uses the following argument to argue that all non-substantial things, which somehow
depend on substances and are thus paired with them, do not really have an essence:

There is also another puzzle about [things which have been paired
together (συνδεδυασµένων)]. For (i) if snub nose and concave nose are
the same, snub and concave will be the same (εἰ µὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι
σιµὴ ῥὶς καὶ κοίλη ῥίς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται τὸ σιµὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον·). But (ii) if
they are not, it is, because it is impossible to give the formula of snub
independently of the object whose affection it is for itself – for snub is
concavity in a nose – (εἰ δὲ µή, διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ σιµὸν ἄνευ
τοῦ πράγµατος οὗ ἐστὶ πάθος καθ’ αὑτό (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιµὸν κοιλότης ἐν
ῥινί), either (a) not possible to give the formula of snub nose (τὸ ῥῖνα
σιµὴν εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν) or (b) the same thing will have been said twice,
concave nose nose (ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται εἰρηµένον, ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη) (for a
nose which is snub, will be a concave nose nose). (iii) That is why it is
absurd that essence belongs to such things (διὸ ἄτοπον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς
τοιοῦτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι·). Otherwise they go to infinity, since there will be
yet another one in snub nose nose (εἰ δὲ µή, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν· ῥινὶ γὰρ
ῥινὶ σιµῇ ἔτι ἄλλο ἐνέσται). (Metaphysica Z.5, 1030b28-1031a1)

Commentators have found this passage baffling, but I think it can be made sense of in
the light of what we know from the Sophistical Refutations. The structure of the
argument is as follows: in (i) and (ii) a dilemma is set up, in which it is shown that
both horns are unacceptable. From this a conclusion is drawn in (iii), with a further
justification. What is most difficult to make sense of is this final justification and thus
the reason Aristotle must have had for concluding that the dilemma shows that non-
substances do not have a real essence.
If we first look at the dilemma, we see that in (i) it starts with the kind of
consideration Aristotle was expressing in Sophistical Refutations 31. We normally
take it that concave nose and snub nose have the same significance and are the same.
In the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle argues that from this it follows that in the
context of these phrases snub and concave have the same significance, though not in
separation. Here, however, Aristotle draws an unrestricted conclusion, that thus snub
and concave are the same – this conclusion is taken to be an obvious falsehood. How
could Aristotle think that he is entitled to this inference, which he rejects in the
Sophistical Refutations? This is because the whole argument is a reductio ad
absurdum argument, with as supposition for reduction that non-substances have
essences and thus in every context and in every use the same significance – that is
what is to have an essence.
In the second horn of the dilemma it is then assumed that it is not the case that
snub and concave are the same. However, it that is so, it is impossible to make sense
of phrases like snub nose. For we have within the second horn of the dilemma another
dilemma, based on the two presuppositions that snub and concave are not the same
and that snub is defined as concavity of nose. The second horn (b) is familiar to us:
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snub in snub nose is defined as concavity of nose, so that we get the repetitive
concave nose nose. Again if we compare this argument with the Sophistical
Refutations, Aristotle implies there that this conclusion does not follow, because snub
in snub nose does not signify the same as snub as defined with concavity of nose.
Here, however, this solution is blocked because it has already been assumed that snub
is not the same as concave – which assumption is ultimately based on the idea that
whatever has an essence in every context has the same significance. Thus we either
must accept the repetition of horn (b), or admit defeat and accept that we cannot give
the formula of snub nose, as in horn (a), since both possibilities: snub in snub nose
being the same as concave, and it being the same as concavity of nose are excluded
already.
Both horns (i) and (ii) are unacceptable. Since they are based on the
supposition that non-substances have essences, it is this supposition which has to be
struck, and that is the conclusion Aristotle draws in (iii). For every non-substance is
ultimately dependent on some type of substance, and thus suffers the same fate as
snub and concave.
Finally I think we can within the same framework make sense of the final
justification Aristotle offers for his thesis that there is no proper essence of non-
substances. The difficulty with this justification is the following. It is easy to see how
Aristotle gets from snub nose to concave nose nose, namely by substituting concave
nose for snub. However, that seems to be where the series stops, for there does not
seem to be any substitution possible any more. Still, Aristotle maintains that if there
were an essence of non-substances, the series would continue, and continue
indefinitely. How can such an infinite series be generated?
The answer I propose is the following. We have seen that on the
presupposition that having an essence involves having a fixed significance
independent from context, Aristotle argues that either snub is the same as concave or
that snub in snub nose means concavity of nose, leading to a repetition. Both
outcomes are not wanted – snub means different things in different contexts, thus
disqualifying itself for having an essence. However, if one then still wants to maintain
that snub has an essence, this essence must comprise both: being the same as concave
(and vice versa, of course) and being the same as concavity of nose. If we have this
assumption, we can generate an infinite series after all: concave nose nose becomes
snub nose nose, which in its turn becomes concave nose nose nose, and so forth. Thus
this serves as a further justification that snub and concave, being non-substances,
cannot have essences.

§ 4. Ontological dependence and repetition arguments

Now that we have seen how all these repetition arguments work in Aristotle and how
he tries to deal with them in different contexts, we are in a position to address a few
general questions about these repetition arguments. They can all be subsumed under
one big question, namely what the grounds are for Aristotle’s claim in Sophistical
Refutations 13 that all repetition arguments are based on the two types of examples he
distinguishes there:

All such [scil. repetition] arguments are either (a) in the case of things in
relation to something, which not only with respect to their kinds, but also
themselves are said in relation to something, and are rendered in relation
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to one and the same thing …. or (b) of things whose substance – the
things whose conditions or affections or something like it not being in
relation to something at all4 – is additionally denoted in their formula, [by
being] predicated of them († ὅσων ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ὄντων πρός τι ὅλως ὧν
εἰσιν ἕξεις ἢ πάθη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῶν προσδηλοῦται
κατηγορουµένων † ἐπὶ τούτοις). (SE 13, 173b1-8)

We have seen how Aristotle construes repetition arguments in these two cases, but
why could there not be such arguments in other cases as well? In particular, why
would the example he offers in Topics 6.3 of man being two-footed, and thus there
being a two-footed two-footed land-animal, not count as a repetition argument? And
why could there not be a repetition argument in the cases like that of medical
knowledge, which only in their genus (namely knowledge) are relative, but not
themselves? For one could easily imagine the following argument:

(1) Medical knowledge = knowledge of health.

(2) Medical knowledge is of health.
(3) Therefore, there is knowledge of health of health.

As we shall see, answering this question may also put us into a position from which
we can answer the further question as to why Aristotle gives up his syntactical
defusing strategy from the Topics and opts for a semantic blocking solution in the
Sophistical Refutations.
The key term in the answer is relative. If one looks at the two categories of
terms for which repetition arguments might be generated, one sees that Aristotle
stresses that there is something relative involved. The first category, that of appetite
and double, he characterizes as themselves relative to a single thing (and not merely
relative with regard to their genus, like medical knowledge). Of the second category
he stresses that the substance to which such terms belong are not at all relative – but
the terms themselves are still relative, in that they need a substance in their definition.
Thus we may distinguish between two kinds of relatives involved in repetition
arguments:

(a) things which in their being are related to other things outside;
(b) things which, though not in their being related to other things outside, do
require, as a matter of their being, a substance to be predicated of and thus to
be related to.

Are there other ways of being related in one’s being to something, except that one is
related by definition to some thing outside or that one is related by definition to
something as a bearer? I cannot think of any.
On the basis of this observation we can also try to formulate an answer to the
question why repetition arguments in the case of two-footed man and of medical

4
There is an issue about the translation and the grammar here, which even induced Ross to daggerize
the passage. Usually οὐκ ὄντων πρός τι ὅλως is taken to apply to the things characterized, so that ὧν in
ὧν εἰσιν ἕξεις ἢ πάθη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον can only be interpreted as referring to οὐσία, so that we have a
singular-plural clash. Another problem with this interpretation is that it is rather pointless to insist that
these terms are completely not relative. To solve these problems I take οὐκ ὄντων πρός τι ὅλως ὧν
εἰσιν ἕξεις ἢ πάθη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον to be one big genitive absolute, determining the domain from which
the οὐσία is taken.
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knowledge being of health are not considered problematic by Aristotle – though I

must confess I find it difficult to put the answer into words. In the arguments in which
a repetition is considered problematic by him, the crucial premisses: ‘appetite is for
something pleasurable’, ‘double is of half’, and ‘snub is something of nose’, these
premisses are in a different way true than premisses like: ‘man is two-footed’ and
‘medical knowledge is of health’. Because appetite, double and snub are by
themselves incomplete, the required unique complements for something pleasurable,
of half, and of nose are not just ordinary parts of the definition, but super-necessary,
as it were – necessary in a way different from the way man is two-footed or medical
knowledge is of health, when ordinary parts of a thing’s definiens are predicated of
that thing. Thus it may seem that there are two facts which have to be accounted for
by the definitions of such things: the fact that they need a complement and the fact
that their ordinary definition is such, the full definiens comprising both facts – but
then it turns out that such a full definition is repetitive, and that should not happen.
Thus repetition arguments are to be blocked, not because of the repetition
itself, but because they yield the impression that the definiens is repetitive. In the case
of two-footed man and medical knowledge being of health it may be possible to bring
a repetition about, but because two-footed and being of health do not belong to man
and medical knowledge as complements of these things, there is no temptation to
interpret the resulting repetition as the definiens. Returning to the repetition argument
of Topics 6.3, I would thus stress two elements in that argument: that in premiss (2)
all appetite is for something pleasurable, indicating that this point is stronger than
normal predication; and that the conclusion is that the definiens of appetite is
repetitive.
I assume that Aristotle became aware of this common feature of all repetition
arguments and that that is why he decided to drop the syntactical, limited, solution of
the Topics and in its stead adopt a semantic approach. I guess he drew at the same
time the more radical conclusion that things making such repetition arguments
possible could not really be defined, in the way substances can be, that is, by way of a
simple definiens which is true of it regardless of context. Dependent things always
have something double about them, which is mirrored by the fact that one can
construe repetition arguments if one neglects this doubleness.