Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 3, No.

1, 1987

Fear of Victimization and Sensitivity to Risk

Mark Warr I

The degree to which a crime is feared is dependent not only on the perceived
risk of that crime, but also on individuals' sensitivity to risk. We show that
sensitivity to risk varies systematically across offenses in proportion to their
perceived seriousness. Based on these findings, some generat principles about
fear are stated, and the relation between this work and some of our earlier work
on fear is discussed.

KEY W O R D S : fear of crime; victimization.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
One of the facts of everyday life--particularly urban life--in the United
States is fear of criminal victimization in one's home, workplace, or neigh-
borhood. Charges that the United States has become a fortress society are
common today and probably overstated, but the ubiquity of fear and its
effect on American life-styles cannot be denied (see generally Hindelang et
al., 1978; DuBow et al., 1979).
Criminologists have been drawn to fear of crime, it would seem, because
fear is among the most overt social reactions to crime and because its
consequences are so prevalent, potentially severe, and easily demonstrable
(e.g., DuBow et aL, 1979; Warr, 1985). Still, as a field of research, fear of
victimization is viewed with a skeptical and even contemptuous eye by some
criminologists, and not without justification. Beyond a few widely used
concepts [e.g., indirect victimization (see Conklin, 1971)] and evidence on
the correlates of fear, there is almost nothing in the way of general theory
or cumulative knowledge in the area. Indeed, after 20 years and countless
papers, it is sad that so much work in the field continues to be "exploratory".
Part of the problem no doubt lies in the terminological and methodological
anarchy that prevails in the field, and in the tendency to concentrate on

~Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712.

29
0748-45[8/87/0300-0029505.00/0 @ 1987 Plenum Publishing Corporation
30 Warr

policy questions without basic research. But whatever the causes, the field
must undergo major changes if it is to occupy a reputable place in
criminology.
The purpose of the present paper is to extend and integrate some
previous work on fear of victimization. First, we take a close look at the
phenomenon of sensitivity to risk and its applications to the study of fear
of victimization. Building on our earlier work in this area (Warr, 1984,
1985), we show that differential sensitivity to risk can explain not only
differences in fear among population subgroups (e.g., young and old), but
also variation in the degree to which different crimes are feared. After
presenting and applying our scheme to sample survey data, some general
principles of fear of victimization are offered. Then the relationship between
the sensitivity model and the multiplicative model of fear (Warr and Stafford,
1983) is considered, and some other issues pertaining to fear are examined.

2. FEAR A N D S E N S I T I V I T Y T O RISK
Sensitivity to risk refers to the relation between fear of a particular
offense--say, armed robbery, rape, or burglary--and the perceived risk of
that offense (i.e., the subjective probability that it will occur). Since this
relation appears to be uniformly linear (see Warr, 1984), it is best to think
of sensitivity to risk as a simple regression line linking fear and perceived
risk. Once it has been estimated, this line describes the degree of fear that
will be produced by any given level of perceived risk. Put another way, it
depicts the relation between perception and the affective reaction it evokes.
Figure 1 gives a hypothetical example of sensitivity to risk. Observe
that sensitivity to risk is characterized by three central parameters.
(1) The threshold of fear (x intercept) is the point along the risk
continuum at which fear is "triggered" (attains a nonzero value).
The threshold indicates the minimum level r perceived risk
necessary to produce fear, and it is important from a policy stand-
point: as long as perceived risk is maintained below the threshold,
fear will be absent. Offenses with low thresholds of fear will
necessarily require greater attention from public officials concerned
with "managing" fear.
(2) The slope of fear is the rate at which fear increases with perceived
risk.
(3) The maximum fear that the offense is capable of producing (i.e.,
at maximum perceived risk) is a redundant parameter, meaning it
is a simple function of 1 and 2. But is is nonetheless important
because it indicates the full degree of fear that any particular
offense is capable of producing. In that sense, it is useful for grading
offenses according to their "fear potential."
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 31

MAX

<
LIJ maximum fear --...~
LI.

0 MAX
PERCEIVED RISK
Fig, 1. Hypothetical example of sensitivity to risk.

One major advantage to analyzing fear of victimization in terms of

sensitivity to risk is that it avoids the apparently common notion that there
is some direct, constant relation between fear and perceived risk, such that
a given level of perceived risk will always produce the same level of fear,
A much more fruitful approach is to imagine sensitivity to risk as a variable,
one that conditions the relationship between fear and perceived risk, deter-
mining the "output" of fear that is produced by a given ~ of perceived
risk. Viewed this way, fear of victimization is a function of not one, but
two variables--perceived risk and sensitivity to risk. This sort of analytic
scheme has analogues in many areas of science. In economics, for example,
the relation between price and quantity (referred to as a demand curve) is
known to be quite inconstant across different good and services or among,
for example, different consumer income brackets. Predicting the price of a
product, then, requires knowledge of both the quantity and the price/quan-
tity relation (i.e., the demand curve) for that product (e.g., Peterson, 1974).
Is sensitivity to risk in fact a variable? An earlier paper (Warr, 1984)
presented an extensive analysis of age- and sex-related variation in sensitivity
to risk, showing that differences in sensitivity are crucial in explaining the
well-known higher fear of females and the elderly. Our concern in this
paper, however, is not with variation in sensitivity to risk among groups
32 Wart

but, rather, with this question: How does sensitivity to risk vary from one
c r i m e to another? Is sensitivity to risk the same for rape as for robbery, the
same for burglary as for petty theft? And assuming that sensitivity to risk
does vary among crimes, what accounts for that variation? As we begin to
think about differences in sensitivity to risk from crime to crime, other
questions naturally begin to emerge. Are all offenses capable of producing
high fear? Are some offenses always feared more than others?
Before turning to some data on these matters, let us first apply some
simple deductive reasoning. Suppose that one has recently moved into a
neighborhood in which the chances of being assaulted with a weapon on
the street and having one's car stolen from the garage are subjectively equal.
Which offense would one fear the most? Assuming that these two offenses
are indeed viewed as equally likely to occur, we could reasonably suppose
that the more serious offense--in this case the assault--would be most
feared. In order for this to be true, however, sensitivity to risk for the two
offenses m u s t differ. That is, the more serious offense must have a higher
slope of fear a n d / o r a lower threshold (x intercept). Extending this reason-
ing to the more general case, we should expect (1) substantial variation in
sensitivity to risk across crimes and (2) sensitivity to risk proportional to
the perceived seriousness of offenses.

3. DATA
The data come from a 1981 mail survey of Seattle residents. A mail
survey was chosen not only because it is relatively inexpensive, but also
because fear of victimization appears to be a primary cause of nonresponse
in urban surveys using personal interviews (see Fischer, 1981). That is,
surveys using personal interviews tend to undersample fearful individuals,
a finding that is borne out by the fact that 18% of our respondents reported
that they have refused to answer their doors due to fear of victimization.
The survey was designed in accordance with Dillman's (1978) methods
for mail surveys. Respondents were chosen randomly from the Seattle
telephone directory, and to minimize the sometimes enormous attrition of
such listings over time, the survey was timed to coincide with the annual
publication of the telephone directory. One week after the initial mailing,
all respondents received a reminder postcard. A letter and replacement
questionnaire were mailed to nonrespondents 3 weeks and, if necessary, 7
weeks after the initial mailing. Of the 500 respondents to whom question-
naires were mailed, 3% were lost due to migration, mortality, nondeliverable
addresses, lost mail, or impairments that prevented completion (e.g.,
glaucoma). Of the remaining respondents, 71% (346) returned question-
naires, of which 339 were usable.
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 33

Respondents' fear of victimization for 16 offenses was measured using

the following question.
At one time or another, most of us have experienced fear about becoming the
victim of a crime. Below is a list of different types of crime. We are interested
in how afraid you are about becoming the victim of each type of crime in your
everyday life. If you are not afraid at all, then circle the number 0 beside the
crime. If you are very afraid, then circle the number 10 beside the crime. If your
fear falls somewhere in between, then circle the number beside the crime which
best describes your fear about that crime.

The question was followed by a list of the 16 offenses, with an ll-point

(0-10) scale printed beside each offense. To enhance comprehension, the
phrases "not afraid at all" and "very afraid" appeared above the numbers
0 and 10, respectively.
The perceived risk of victimization and the perceived seriousness of
the offenses were also measured using an identical question format. A list
of the 16 offenses accompanied by ll-point (0-10) scales followed each of
these questions.
For each type of crime listed below, please indicate how likely you think it is to
happen to you during the next year. If you feel certain that it will not happen to
you, then circle the number 0 beside the crime. If you feel certain that it will
happen to you, then circle the number 10. If you think the likelihood that it will
happen to you lies somewhere in between, then circle the number between 0 and
10 that best indicates how likely you think it is to happen to you in the next
year. No one can predict the future, of course, so your answer will only be a
guess. But give us your best guess based on your own circumstances and
experiences.

There are many different types of crime. Some are considered to be very serious,
others not so serious. We are interested in your opinion about how serious each
type of crime is. If you think it is among the least serious, then circle the number
0 beside the crime. If you think it is among the most serious, then circle the
number 10 beside the crime. If you think the crime fails somewhere between the
least serious and the most serious, then circle the number between 0 and 10
which best indicates how serious you think the crime is. Remember that the
seriousness of a crime is only a matter of opinion, and it is your opinion that
we want.

Respondents were again reminded of the direction and meaning of the

scales by the use of phrases printed above the scales ("certain it wilt not
happen" and "certain it will happen" in the perceived risk question, "least
serious" and "most serious" in the perceived seriousness question).
The 16 offenses included personal, property, and "public-order"
offenses and were chosen with a view to covering the entire effective range
(across offenses) on each of the three subjective dimensions. The offense
descriptions were written in the passive tense, emphasizing (along with the
prologue) that the respondent was the hypothetical victim in each question.
In each of the questions, the two offenses that lay at the extremes of the
scales according to pretest data (e.g., those that produced the highest and
34 Warr

lowest fear) were placed at t h e beginning of the list in order to give

respondents an immediate sense of the range of the scales and thereby
minimize clumping, rescoring, and other potential sources of measurement
error.

4. ANALYSIS
The sensitivity parameters (threshold, slope, and maximum fear) for
each offense were obtained through an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). ~
Recall that sensitivity to risk is highly age and sex dependent; hence any
analysis of sensitivity to risk across offenses must hold constant these factors.
Accordingly, in addition to perceived risk (the covariate), age and sex
(coded as dummies) were included as factors in the ANCOVA model for
each offense. The age categories (19-35, 36-50, 51-65, 66+) were not chosen
arbitrarily but, rather, through a preliminary analysis of covariance in which
more finely graded age categories (5-year intervals) were used. The age
categories used here capture virtually all of the significant age contrasts.
The final model for each offense was determined using standard hierar-
chical comparisons. The main effects (perceived risk, age, and sex dummies),
first-order interactions (risk x sex, risk x age dummies), and second-order
interactions (risk x sex x age dummies) were entered in blocks. If the block
significantly improved the fit of the model (at the 0.05 level), then the
particular term(s) responsible for the improvement was isolated and retained
in the model. Dummy coding, of course, reveals significant contrasts only
between the omitted category and the remaining categories, not between
all possible pairs of categories. Consequently, when the coefficients for age
dummies appeared to be similar, those coefficients were tested for
equivalence by constructing a dummy representing the joint categories and
comparing that model with one using separate categories.
Table I shows the ANCOVA results obtained for each offense. From
each of these models can be derived the three sensitivity parameters for the
offense among each of the eight age/sex groups (i.e., males and females in
four age groups). With 16 offenses, 8 age/sex groups, and 3 parameters of
interest in each instance, the analysis quickly becomes complicated, par-
ticularly for a phenomenon that is best conceived in simple graphic terms.
For this reason, most of the analysis that follows pertains to a single
group--females aged 19-35--that is termed the standard group. After
developing our findings and conclusions from this group, a comparison
with the remaining age/sex groups is offered.

2One offense was deleted due to insufficientvariation in both fear and perceived risk.
 "xl

T a b l e 1. Fitted E q u a t i o n s f r o m A n a l y s i s o f C o v a r i a n c e "

Offense Fitted e q u a t i o n R

1. Being t h r e a t e n e d with a knife, club or g u n F - 3.20 + 0 . 4 7 ( R ) - 0.99(S) 0.39

2. R e c e i v i n g an o b s c e n e p h o n e call F= 1.12+0.34(R)-0.75(S)-0.20(RS)-O.13(A3+A4)+ 0.56
0 . 2 0 ( R A 3 + RA4)
3. H a v i n g s o m e t h i n g t a k e n f r o m you b y force F=2.54+O.69(R)-O.31(MI2) 0 . 4 7 ( R M 12) 0.54
4. Being c h e a t e d or c o n n e d out of y o u r m o n e y F = 1.14+0.52(R)+O.14(A3)+O.29(RA3) 0.55
5. Being b e a t e n u p by a s t r a n g e r F = 2.90 + 0.68(R) - 1.70(S) 0.54
6. Being a p p r o a c h e d by p e o p l e b e g g i n g for m o n e y F = 1.02+ 0.10(R) - 0.71(S) + 1.17(A2 + A3) - 0.10(A4) + 0 . 3 7 ( R A 4 ) 0.36
7. Being m u r d e r e d F = 3.06 + 0.60(R) - 1.01 (S) 0.39
8. H a v i n g strangers loiter n e a r y o u r h o m e late at n i g h t F = 2.92 + 0.35(R) - 1.32(S) + 0.01 (A3 + A4) + 0 . 2 4 ( R A 3 + RA4) 0.49
9. Being r a p e d h F = 4,58 + 0.79(R ) - 1.34(A2 + A3) - 2.00(A4) 0.59
10. Being sold c o n t a m i n a t e d f o o d F = 0.66 + 0.48(R) + 0.1 l ( A 3 ) + 0 . 3 6 ( R A 3 ) 0.58
11. H a v i n g s o m e o n e b r e a k into y o u r h o m e w h i l e y o u ' r e
away F = 3.77 + 0.52( R ) - 1.67(S) + 0.26(RS) 0.54
12. H a v i n g y o u r car s t o l e n F = 1.55 + 0 . 8 1 ( R ) - 1 . 1 0 ( F M 3 ) 0.67
13. Being hit by a d r u n k e n d r i v e r w h i l e d r i v i n g y o u r car F = 2.76 + 0 . 6 2 ( R ) + 0.74(A3) 0.48
14. H a v i n g a g r o u p o f j u v e n i l e s d i s t u r b the p e a c e n e a r
your home F = 1.73 +0.32( R ) + O.lO( A3 + A4) +O.41( RA3 + R A 4 ) 0.56
15. Having someone break into your hmne while you're
home F = 3.32 + 0 . 7 4 ( R ) - 1.82(S) 0.62

"F=fear; R = p e r c e i v e d risk; S = s e x (1 = m a l e , 0 = f e m a l e ) ; A I = 1 % 3 5 ( o m i t t e d c a t e g o r y ) ; A 2 = 3 6 - 5 0 ; A3 = 51-65; A 4 = 6 6 + ; R S = R x S;

RA2 = R x A2; R A 3 = R x A3; R A 4 = R x A4; M 12 = m a l e s a g e d 19-50; R M 12 = R x M 12; F M 3 = f e m a l e s (all ages) a n d m a l e s a g e d 51-65.
h F e m a l e s only.

ta~
 t~

Table I1. Sensitivity Parameters and Other Characteristics of the 15 Offenses Among Women Aged 19-35

Mean Mean
Maximum perceived Mean perceived
Offense Threshold" Slope fear ~' seriousness fear risk

1. Being threatened with a knife, club or gun 3.20 0.47 7.90 8.48 4.34 2.33
2. Receiving an obscene phone call 1.12 0.34 4.52 3.21 2.92 4.74
3. Having something taken from you by force 2.54 0.69 9.44 7.29 4.54 2.65
4. Being cheated or conned out of your money 1.14 0.52 6.34 5.55 2.60 2.48
5. Being beaten up by a stranger 2.90 0.68 9.70 8.18 4.40 2.30
6. Being approached by people begging for
money 1.02 0.10 2.02 1.79 1.73 7.76
7. Being murdered 3.06 0.60 9.06 9.92 3.67 1.08
8. Having strangers loiter near your home late
at night 2.92 0.35 6.42 4.03 4.69 4.46
9. Being raped 4.58 0.79 12.48' 9.64 6.81 2.80
10. Being sold contaminated food 0.66 0.48 5.46 5.12 1.76 2.24
11. Having someone break into your home while
you're away 3.77 0.52 8.97 7.19 5.84 4.23
12. Having your car stolen 0.45 0.82 8.65 6.36 3.49 2.77
13. Being hit by a drunken driver while driving
your car 2.76 0.62 8.96 8.02 5.35 3.52
14. Having a group of juveniles disturb the peace
near your home. 1.73 0.32 4.93 4.12 3.60 5.12
15. Having someone break into your home while
you're home 3.32 0.74 10.72" 8.18 5.58 2.71

"y intercept.
~Fear at perceived risk = 10.
'Exceeds upper limit of fear scale because fear reaches its maximum before perceived risk does.
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 37

4.1. S e r i o u s n e s s and S e n s i t i v i t y

Table II shows the sensitivity parameters for each offense for the
standard group, along with the mean perceived seriousness o f the offenses.
Because the regression line for each offense passed t h r o u g h the positive
region o f the fear axis (i.e., the y intercept is positive), the thresholds given
in Table II are the y intercepts rather than the x intercepts (as shown in
Fig. 1). 3 Since the y and x intercepts are negatively correlated (i.e., x
intercept = y intercept/slope), the choice o f intercepts is largely incon-
sequential.
Figure 2 shows plots o f sensitivity to risk for eight of the offenses. The
plots for the remaining seven offenses largely overlap with those in Fig. 2,
and including them crowds the figure and makes individual lines difficult
to discern. All essential points, however, are illustrated by Fig. 2.
L o o k i n g at the figure, we see immediately that sensitivity to risk varies
over a wide range, fanning out, as it were, across the fear/risk plane. It is
clear from the figure that a unit of perceived risk will not p r o d u c e an equal
a m o u n t o f fear for each crime. To illustrate, a m o d e r a t e degree o f risk (say,
r i s k = 5) will elicit a high degree of fear (8.53) in the case o f rape (the
u p p e r m o s t plot). But the same degree o f risk will create relatively little fear
(1.52) in the case o f begging (the lowermost plot). Then consider the
converse: any given level o f fear can be attained t h r o u g h quite different
levels o f perceived risk, d e p e n d i n g on sensitivity to risk. For example, to
achieve a fear score of, say, 6 requires only 1.80 units o f risk in the case o f
rape, versus 8.8 units o f risk when it comes to " h a v i n g strangers loiter near
y o u r h o m e late at night." A n d in the case o f begging, no a m o u n t o f risk
could p r o d u c e that degree o f fear, since the m a x i m u m fear for that offense
(i.e., at risk = 10) is merely 2.02 (although it is higher for older age groups).
O u r initial argument, then, is confirmed by these data: sensitivity to
risk is not a constant, but rather a variable, across crimes. Figure 2 also
speaks to the second argument, i.e., the relation between sensitivity to risk

3The fact that the y intercepts are positive means, of course, that there is some fear even when
perceived risk is zero. While this might seem to indicate an irrational component to fear, it
more likely reflects the temporal referent used in the perceived risk question. Recall that
respondents were asked to report their perceived risk of victimization for a particular period,
that is, "during the next year." That temporal referent was used to standardize responses
(i.e., to ensure a consistent reference period), but it is, of course, arbitrary. Accordingly,
respondents' "residual" fear may simply reflect the fact that fear is dependent on a longer
subjective time frame, meaning that the absence of apparent risk only during the next year
is not sufficient to extinguish fear altogether. Extending the time frame in the survey question
(to, say, 3-5 years) would presumably eliminate the residual fear (by moving the thresholds
into the positive region of fear) but would not alter relative differences in the thresholds from
one offense to the next.
38 Warr

10

.5 '5
rr"
i11
U_

0 10
PERCEIVED RISK
Fig. 2. Sensitivity to risk for eight offenses.

and the perceived seriousness of offenses. Above the regression line for
each offense is the mean perceived seriousness of the offense. As we move
from the uppermost to the lowermost lines, perceived seriousness decreases
in a clear monotonic fashion. The pattern is not perfect, but the exceptions
are easily within what could be expected from sampling fluctuations alone
in a small sample.
Apart from this visual evidence, the link between sensitivity to risk and
perceived seriousness can be documented by calculating the correlations
(r's) between the sensitivity parameters in Table II and the mean perceived
seriousness of the offenses. There is a moderately strong correlation ( r =
0.70) between perceived seriousness and the thresholds (y intercepts) of
the offenses; as the perceived seriousness of the offenses increases, the y
intercept increases (or, alternatively, the x intercept decreases). Similarly,
the perceived seriousness of the offenses is also correlated with the slopes
of fear (r = 0.80); the greater the perceived seriousness of an offense, the
more rapidly fear increases with perceived risk. Finally, since the maximum
fear associated with each offense is a function of the threshold and slope,
and since the latter two parameters are themselves correlated with perceived
seriousness, then we should expect a strong correlation between perceived
seriousness and maximum fear, and in fact, r = 0.91.
The findings thus far are consistent with our expectations; sensitivity
to risk varies from offense to offense, in proportion to their perceived
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 39

seriousness. But how do the findings for our standard group (females aged
19-35) compare with those for the other age/sex groups? The other young
age/sex groups (i.e., males aged 19-35 and males and females aged 36-50)
are quite similar to the standard group. But a significant change occurs with
age. Among the four age/sex groups over 50, differences in sensitivity to
risk from one offense to the next are largely a matter of differing t h r e s h o l d s - -
not s l o p e s - - o f fear. For example, among young females (our standard
group), the range of the slopes is 0.72 (i.e., 0.10 to 0.82), with a variance
of 0.04. Among elderly women (66+), however, the range drops to 0.36
(0.46 to 0.82), and the variance to 0.01. The lower variability among older
age groups is a consequence of the generally strong slopes of fear for all
offenses among the elderly (see Warr, 1984), coupled with what appears to
be a natural ceiling on sensitivity slopes of about 0.8. As a result of this
restricted variance, the correlation between the perceived seriousness of the
offenses and the slopes of fear is lower among the older age groups (from
0.32 to 0.55) as compared to the young (from 0.60 to 0.80).
The limited variability in the slopes among the older age/sex groups
could easily lead one to conclude that older individuals are equally afraid
of (or, more precisely, sensitive to) all offenses. But that is not true. For
reasons we do not pretend to understand, the older age/sex groups exhibit
fully the same range and variance in thresholds of fear as the young, and
those thresholds are strongly correlated (0.51 to 0.80) with the perceived
seriousness of the offenses.
Among older age groups, then, sensitivity to risk behaves in a way that
is distinct from, but not fundamentally different from, that of younger age
groups.

4.2. Sensitivity and Fear

Although sensitivity to risk has been examined in some detail, we have

yet to demonstrate empirically its impact on fear. Consider first the correla-
tion between the mean fear of the offenses in Table II and the mean perceived
risk of those offenses. If, as we have argued, sensitivity to risk mediates the
effect o f perceived risk on fear, then there is no necessary relation between
the fear and the perceived risk of those offenses. In fact, the correlation is
small and actually negative (-0.26). Now returning to Fig. 2, suppose that
we were to draw a line perpendicular to the x axis (perceived risk) and to
record the intersection of this line with the sensitivity lines for each offense
(including those not shown). The resulting scores would tell us the expected
levels of fear for the offenses based solely on differences in sensitivity to
risk among the offenses (that is, holding perceived risk constant). And the
correlation between these scores and the observed means in Table I would
give an estimate of the proportion of variance in fear that is attributable to
differential sensitivity to risk alone. If we calculate these expected scores
40 Warr

using risk = 5, the correlation between these expected scores and the actual
mean fear of the offenses (from Table II) is 0.90. Accordingly, most of the
variation in fear of these offenses is attributable to differences in sensitivity
to risk among the offenses.
The sensitivity model of fear can now be stated succinctly: the perceived
seriousness of an offense affects fear by altering the functional relation
between fear and perceived risk (i.e., sensitivity to risk). Sensitivity to risk
in turn affects fear by determining the "output" of fear produced by a given
"input" of perceived risk. Sensitivity to risk can thus be viewed as a property
of offenses (as well as groups) that interacts with perceived risk to produce
fear and that is itself determined in large part by the perceived seriousness
of an offense.

5. S O M E PRINCIPLES OF FEAR

The foregoing findings enable us to state some general principles

pertaining to fear of victimization among types of offenses. The principles
are interrelated, meaning that some are deducible from or are partially
redundant of others. The reason, of course, is that all the principles are
simply describing different aspects of the same phenomenon. In any event,
we have tried to isolate the major points to be learned from our analysis
of sensitivity to risk.
(1) Because sensitivity to risk varies from one offense to another,
identical levels of perceived risk for different offenses will not
necessarily produce identical levels of fear.
(2) Because fear is a function of both perceived risk and sensitivity to
risk, high perceived risk does not necessarily result in high fear.
Thus, an offense that is viewed as certain to occur will not be highly
feared if sensitivity to risk for that offense is low. In the same way,
high sensitivity to risk does not guarantee high fear.
(3) Because of point 2, one offense may be feared more than another
even if it is viewed as less likely to occur (for a related example,
see Wart, 1984).
(4) Because sensitivity to risk increases with the perceived seriousness
of offenses, the more serious an offense, the lower the perceived
risk needed to attain a given degree of fear.
(5) Because sensitivity to risk increases with the perceived seriousness
of offenses, serious offenses are uniquely capable of producing the
greatest fear (i.e., maximum fear is highest). But this potential in
no way implies that serious offenses are necessarily feared the most,
because despite the higher sensitivity to risk associated with these
offenses, their perceived risk is typically low (see last column in
Table I).
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 41

(6) Because sensitivity to risk increases with the perceived seriousness

of offenses, less serious offenses are often simply incapable of
producing intense fear, even if they are viewed as certain to occur.

6. O T H E R I S S U E S

The above findings demonstrate the importance of sensitivity to risk

in understanding the degree to which offenses are feared. We now demon-
strate the relation between these findings and some of our earlier work.

6.1. Fear and the Multiplicative Model

In an earlier paper (Warr and Stafford, 1983), we showed that the mean
degree of fear evoked by any particular offense in a given population can
be predicted with a high accuracy from two perceptual characteristics of
the offense: (1) the (mean) perceived seriousness of the offense and (2) the
(mean) perceived risk of the offense. Neither of these two factors, however,
is itself sufficient to produce high fear; even an extremely serious offense
will not be highly feared if it is viewed as highly unlikely, nor will an
apparently inevitable offense be greatly feared unless it is sufficiently serious.
Instead, fear is dependent on the joint distribution of these factors, meaning
that an offense must be viewed as sufficiently serious and likely in order
to be highly feared. In formal terms, this means that, across offenses, fear
is a multiplicative function of perceived risk and perceived seriousness, i.e.,
= a / ~ , S b2, where Fj, Rj, and ~ are the mean fear, perceived risk, and
mean perceived seriousness, respectively, of the jth offense, and a, bl, and
b2 are empirical coefficients.
Although it may not be readily apparent, the multiplicative model and
the sensitivity model are very closely related; indeed, all of the principles
of fear stated earlier are deducible from the multiplicative model as we!l
as the sensitivity model. The reason is that the models are based on different,
but related, variables, and both models postulate the same functional
relations among variables. Under the multiplicative model, the fear associ-
ated with any offense is determined by the perceived risk and perceived
seriousness of that offense. Under the sensitivity model, fear is determined
by perceived risk and sensitivity to risk for that offense. Holding age and
sex constant, however, the major determinant of sensitivity to risk for any
offense is the perceived seriousness of that offense. Hence the models can
be reduced to the same variables. Furthermore, while the sensitivity model
is linear (additive) for any one offense, it is multiplicative when applied
across crimes (i.e., where crimes are units of analysis). That is, even an
offense that is viewed as highly probable will not be highly feared if
42 Warr

sensitivity to risk for that offense is low. Nor will high sensitivity to risk
guarantee high fear if perceived risk is sufficiently low.
The similarity between the two models can also be demonstrated
empirically. Suppose that we calculate the expected fear scores for each
offense in Table II, first under the sensitivity model (with risk = 5 for each
offense) and then under the multiplicative model (again, with risk = 5 for
each offense). Since we have equated risk for both models, and since we
have already established a relation between seriousness and sensitivity, then
we should anticipate a strong correlation between the expected values under
the two models. And indeed, r = 0.90.
If the multiplicative and sensitivity models of fear are so closely related,
why is the sensitivity model needed? The answer is that the sensitivity model
offers a more general and unified system for analyzing fear of criminal
victimization. As we have already demonstrated, the sensitivity model, like
the multiplicative model, can be used to analyze differences in fear from
one crime to the next. In this application, it has the advantage of permitting
prediction of fear at any level of perceived risk, not just the mean. Beyond
this, the sensitivity model is ideally suited for analyzing differences in fear
between groups (say, men and women) since it falls within the general
framework of analysis of covariance or regression standardization. Further,
the sensitivity model can be used to examine the subjective links between
fears of different offenses (see the following section). None of this should
be construed to mean that the multiplicative model is in any way "wrong".
On the contrary, the multiplicative model of fear is a simple, elegant model
with a high predictive accuracy [R 2 = 0.93 for the Seattle sample (see Warr
and Stafford, 1983)]. And because it incorporates simple direct effects of
perceived risk and seriousness, we prefer to use the model where the issue
at hand is simply understanding why offense x is feared more than offense
y in, say, city z. Again, however, the sensitivity approach offers a broader
range of applications in answering questions about fear of victimization.

6.2. Fear and Perceptually Contemporaneous Offenses

One final topic deserves discussion. As noted earlier, the Seattle survey
included items measuring fear of 16 different offenses. If we inspect the
correlation matrix of these items, we find many instances where there are
strong correlations between fears of certain offenses. Examined closely,
these configurations of offenses are usually composed of crimes that can
(logically or empirically) occur together or in continuous sequence (e.g.,
robbery and murder, burglary and rape), and the fact that fear of these
offenses is highly correlated strongly suggests that they are in fact viewed
as likely to occur together as part of a single criminal event. Where offenses
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 43

are subjectively linked (i.e., where an offense is viewed as likely to ensue

from or a c c o m p a n y another offense), we have referred to such offenses as
perceptually contemporaneous (PC) offenses (Warr, 1984, 1985).
One offense that nicely illustrates the meaning of PC offenses is bur-
glary. A number of different crimes may arise in the course of a burglary,
and indeed, there are strong correlations among all respondents in the
Seattle sample between fear of burglary and fear of murder ( r = 0 . 6 3 ) ,
assault (0.65), threats with a weapon (0.61), and, among women, rape (0.66).
Furthermore, these PC offenses appear to contribute to the high sensitivity
to burglary found among our respondents. Among the full sample, the slope
of fear on the perceived risk of burglary is 0.81, indicating strong sensitivity.
But if we regress fear of burglary on the perceived risk of burglary controlling
for fear of murder, the slope drops to 0.48. In other words, sensitivity to
burglary diminishes significantly when fear of murder is held constant.
Similar results obtain when we hold constant fear of assault by a stranger,
threats with a weapon, and rape (among women), with the partial slope
for burglary falling to 0.54, 0.51, and 0.52, respectively, when each of the
other offenses is held constant. PC offenses, then, can alter sensitivity to
risk. Moreover, we have found that sensitivity to virtually any offense can
be reduced by identifying and controlling PC offenses.
Measuring and interpreting the effects of PC offenses on sensitivity to
risk are not always a simple matter. To begin with, it is sometimes difficult
to distinguish between offenses that are truly PC (i.e., believed to precede
or accompany one another) and offenses that are components or constituents
of one another. For example, it is easy to imagine that fear of murder
increases sensitivity to burglary or that fear of rape underlies fear of receiving
an obscene phone call. But does fear of assault (being beaten up) contribute
to fear of robbery (i.e., by increasing sensitivity to risk), or is it part of fear
of robbery (viewed as part of the act of robbery itself)? Similarly, the strong
correlation (0.78) among our respondents between fear of murder and fear
of assault by a stranger probably indicates nothing more than that these
two phrases connote much the same event to most individuals.
Then there is the problem of determining what might be called the
symmetry of PC offenses. It is often the case that PC offenses exhibit some
logical or natural sequence, so that one offense can be viewed as contributing
to fear of the other, but not vice versa. To use an earlier example, the strong
correlation between fear of rape and fear of burglary among women suggests
that rape is viewed as a likely outcome to burglary. The alternative interpreta-
t i o n - t h a t burglaries are seen as likely to follow r a p e s - - s e e m s implausible.
In the same way, an association between fear of begging and fear of robbery
would seem to indicate a belief that begging is often followed by robbery,
but not the reverse. Both of these examples are cases of what could be
44 Wart

called (for want of a simpler phrase) asymmetrical PC offenses. In such

cases, the subjective association between offenses exists in only one direc-
tion, such that "if offense x, then offense y," but not the reverse. Occasionally,
however, there is no logical or empirical evidence for determining symmetry.
For example, there is a strong correlation among our sample women between
fear of rape and fear of robbery. But does fear of robbery add to fear of
rape, or does fear of rape add to fear of robbery? Or, perhaps rape and
robbery are symmetric PC offenses--each implies the other.
Unfortunately, there is no way to answer such questions with purely
correlational evidence. An alternative method would be to use direct survey
questions worded something like this: "In about what proportion of rob-
beries of women do you think the victim is raped? . . . . In about what
proportion of rapes do you think the victim is robbed?" Such questions
not only would resolve questions of symmetry, but also would provide a
more direct (noncorrelational) method for identifying PC offenses.
Because of the foregoing problems and issues, neither the multiplicative
nor the sensitivity model of fear formally takes into account PC offenses.
Indeed, because PC offenses consist of unique configurations of subjectively
associated offenses, it may be impossible to build a general model of fear
of victimization that incorporates them. When it comes to predicting
differences in fear across crimes, this may not be a major problem. After
all, PC offenses notwithstanding, both the multiplicative and the sensitivity
models are very accurate predictors of fear across offenses. It would be a
serious mistake, however, to ignore PC offenses, particularly when it comes
to explaining differences in fear among groups. The reason is that PC
offenses can lie at the very heart of group differences in sensitivity to risk
and, hence, fear. For example, we have shown elsewhere that rape is closely
tied to the fears of women (but not, of course, men) and that it is evidently
viewed as both a prelude to certain kinds of offenses (e.g., homicide) and
a potential consequence of others (e.g., burglary) (see Wart, 1985). Rape,
of course, is a special case, since it is limited to one group. But offenses to
which any group is susceptible (e.g., homicide) may nonetheless be PC in
one group but not another (see Warr, 1984). So the matter deserves system-
atic attention.

7. C O N C L U S I O N
The principles of fear developed in preceding sections may seem far
removed from the everyday fears of citizens, but they are not. Consider,
for example, an urban resident walking to or from work on an ordinary
workday. As he/she walks along, features of the immediate environment
provide cues or signals about risk. Am I on a "dangerous" block at the
Fear and Sensitivity to Risk 45

moment? Is this a dangerous time of day? Is there something about myself

(dress, color, sex, demeanor) that puts me at high risk in this area? Who
are those people across the street?
As these perceptions congeal into a sense of risk, they set the stage for
potential fear. But recall that the level of fear our traveler experiences will
depend not only on perceived risk, but also on his/her sensitivity to
risk, which in turn depends on the nature of the apparent risk, as well as
characteristics of the traveler himself/herself. Does the potential offense
appear to be theft of one's wallet or purse (moderate sensitivity) or, say,
armed robbery (high sensitivity)? If robbery, does this imply assault, homi-
cide, or perhaps rape to our traveler (still higher sensitivity) ? Is our traveler
a young male (lower sensitivity) or an elderly female (higher sensitivity)?
Finally, perceived risk and sensitivity to risk act in conjunction to
produce fear. Is perceived risk below the threshold level? Then our traveler
remains unafraid. Is perceived risk high but sensitivity low (e.g., the apparent
offense is trivial) ? Then our traveler is unafraid or mildly afraid. Is perceived
risk high and sensitivity high (e.g., our traveler is elderly a n d / o r the potential
offense is serious)? Then our traveler experiences great fear.
Then consider one policy implication of our findings. Students of public
policy as well as scientists in many fields have become increasingly con-
cerned with the issue of "acceptable risk" (Fischoff et al., 1981; Short,
1984). That is, at what point does the risk of, say, unemployment, radioactive
exposure, criminal victimization, or man-made toxins become "unaccep-
table"? If acceptable risk is defined in terms of public reactions or con-
sequences (e.g.,fear, anger, migration, violence), then the concept of sensitiv-
ity to risk clearly has direct relevance to such questions. In the present case,
for example, thresholds of fear can be used to provide a baseline for
determining acceptable risk for different offenses. More generally, sensitivity
to risk can be used to project outcomes of changes in risk. For example, if
armed robbery increases by 35% in a city over the course of 1 year, what
changes in fear can be anticipated? Assuming a known relation between
perceived risk and actual risk (see Warr, 1980), the present scheme enables
answers to such questions, not only for different types of risk (e.g., residential
burglary, rape, fraud), but also for subgroups of the population (e.g., elderly
males, young females).

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