Civpro Case Digests 2C.

Justice de Leon

Cases (for motion): Butch

Sec of Finance, Sec of Justice, Auditor general and the Office of the President
and all of these were denied.
Victory Liner v. Malinias: A motion without a notice of hearing (to all parties
 He went to the lower court (petition for mandamus) to have the resolution
concerned, including the date of hearing) is a mere scrap of paper that does not toll
annulled and for him to be reinstated. The respondents (members of the board
the period to appeal and upon the expiration of the 15 day period, the questioned
of Lanao) moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and it was
order/decision becomes final and executory. granted.
 The motion to dismiss was filed in Feb 1, 1961 and set for hearing on Feb 10.
 A bus owned by Victory Liner and a truck used by Malinias collided in La Union.
On Feb 8, Llanto moved to postpone (not acted upon) and he failed to appear
This resulted into damage on both vehicles. Malinias filed a complaint for sum
on the hearing date.
of money (47k) and damages against Victory Liner in the MTC of Benguet.
o However, on March 4, 1961, he filed his written opposition to the
 In the trial, Victory Liner did not appear and was declared to have waived its
motion to dismiss. On May 15, 1961, the court dismissed Llanto’s
right to present evidence. In January 13, 1998, the MTC ruled in Malinias’ favor
petition, including therein his arguments and thereafter concluding
and awarded him 82k.
that Llanto did NOT have a cause of action.
 Victory Liner filed a motion for reconsideration. It stated: “Please submit the
o He filed a motion for reconsideration and this was thereafter denied
foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for hearing at a schedule and time
 Llanto contests the dismissal of his petition because the court granted the
convenient to this court and the parties” In February 23, 1998,iIt was denied
motion to dismiss without any hearing.
for not conforming with the mandatory requirements and was treated as a
mere scrap of paper. Thus, it was deemed to have not tolled the
Issue: Was the dismissal void due to lack of hearing on the motion to dismiss?
reglementary period to appeal. The decision of the MTC was deemed to
have become final and executory.
 No. The SC here stated the rationale for requiring a hearing on a motion. The
 Victory Liner got desperate and filed several petitions: First, a petition for relief
court elucidated that its purpose is to enable the parties to adduce
from judgment with the MTC. Second, a petition for certiorari (rule 65) in the
evidence in support of their opposing claims (due process, the party
RTC. Third, petition for certiorari to annul judgment (rule 47) in the CA. All
opposing the motion needs to be given his day in court)
were denied on the ground that the decision was already final and executory.
 In this case, however, the motion to dismiss is due to lack of cause of action.
Existence of a cause of action or lack thereof is determined by the allegations in
Issue: Was the motion of Victory Liner valid?
the complaint and is question of law.
 Llanto was able to file his written opposition and the order of dismissal took into
 No. In fact, the SC held that the motion filed in the MTC was the most crucial
consideration his arguments against the motion to dismiss. There was no need
failure of Victory Liner. It cited Sections 5 and 6 of rule 15 which stated the
for hearing.
requirements for a valid motion namely:
 Furthermore, his motion for reconsideration cured the defect of lack of hearing
o A date must be set for hearing by the applicant
o The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned and
Vlason Enterprises v. CA: shit case:
shall specify the time and date of the hearing
o There must be proof of service of the notice of hearing of the motion
 Sec 4 and 5 of the RoC ideally requires a movant to address and serve on the
 Because of this failure, the motion failed to toll the period to appeal. It
counsel of the adverse party the notice of hearing of its motion.
was not deemed to have been filed. A motion without a notice of hearing is
 Service of a copy of a motion must contain a notice of the time and the place of
a mere scrap of paper.
hearing. There are, however, exceptions to the rule:
o The rationale behind this rule is plain: Unless the movant sets the
o Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent
if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules on its face or from the recitals contained therein
themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his
o Where the interest of substantial justice will be served
reply/opposition
o Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound
and judicious discretion of the court
Lanto v. Dimaporo: No need for hearing on the motion IF the adverse party had
o Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate to the
sufficient opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss. degree of his failure to comply with prescribed procedure
 In this case, Vlason was not informed of any cause of action against it. It was
 The position that was previously held by Llanto was abolished due to a
not validly summoned.
resolution of the provincial board of Lanao del Norte. He appealed to the CSC,
 Its vessels that it used for its salvaging business was levied upon and sold in
execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this to happen

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

simply because of its failure to comply with the notice requirement

 Meanwhile, the CA case held that the only remaining balance
would result into manifest injustice.
that Petitioners had to pay was only 1.4M
 In response, DATICOR filed a case against PDCP and FBTC to get back the
Cases (Motion to dismiss)
excess payment they made (CIVIL CASE 1) and the RTC ordered PDCP to
give back the excess payment
Boticano v. Chu: Chu was held in default. This doesn’t mean that he didn’t have
o PDCP appealed this order (CIVIL CASE 2) and the CA ruled that
the chance to question the court’s jurisdiction over his person. He subsequently filed
indeed, the petitioner’s outstanding obligation was 1.4M and it
pleadings and even voluntarily appeared in court. Therefore, he cannot just raise
cannot be increased or decreased. However, the CA ruled that it
the question of jurisdiction only for the first time in his appeal to the CA.
was FBTC that should return the amount of (only) 965k, the
amount that DATICOR prayed for.
 Boticano’s truck carrying logs was rear-ended by a truck driven by Sigua and
 Thereafter, DATICOR filed a complaint against FEBTC to recover the
owned by Chu. Chu agreed to pay for the damages but when he thereafter
excess payment (CIVIL CASE 3). FBTC denied responsibility and only
failed to comply. Summons was not duly served on Sigua but it was served
wanted to pay the 965k
on Chu, through his wife. It was served at their dwelling.
o FBTC then filed a complaint against PDCP, alleging that it
 Boticano filed a complaint with the RTC of Nueva Ecija. Chu was declared to
should pay the 965k and the complete overpayment
have been in default for failure to file an answer, and Boticano was
o In this case (CIVIL CASE 3), the most important one, the RTC
allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. Chu an was adjudged to be
dismissed DATICOR’s complaint against FBTC, because it
negligent and was ordered to pay actual damages, 73.7k as unrealized income
amounted to a splitting of a cause of action and because of res
and attorney’s fees.
judicata.
 Chu timely filed an appeal and was even granted an extension. Boticano
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and it was dismissed. The case went to the
Issue: Is DATICOR entitled to collect the full overpayment from FBTC? No
CA and the CA ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC because the RTC
did not properly acquire jurisdiction over Chu. The CA agreed with Chu’s
 First off, the SC ruled that Civil Case 2 had the effect of res judicata. The
argument that summons was not validly served on him.
judgment in Civil Case 2 was a final judgment: it ruled that DATICOR
overpaid by 5.3M, FBTC must only pay 965k and that PDCP had no more
Issue: Did the RTC validly acquire jurisdiction over Chu? Can Chu validly raise the
claim against DATICOR
question of jurisdiction only for the first time on appeal?
 To allow re-litigation of the issue in that was settled in CIVIL CASE 2
that was finally settled would allow the splitting of a cause of action,
 YES the RTC had jurisdiction and NO, Chu cannot question jurisdiction over his
which a ground for dismissal under the RoC.
person for the first time in appeal.
o This rule prevents a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of
 The fact that Chu was declared in default is of no moment. He had a chance to
action it into several parts or claims and instituting two or more
question the RTC’s jurisdiction in the subsequent pleadings he filed.
actions based on it
 Besides, he was deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s
o Clearly then, the judgment in CIVIL CASE 2 bars further recovery
jurisdiction. He did this by filing a notice of appeal, appeal bond, motion for
 Basically, DATICOR can’t ask FBTC to overpay because their rights were already
extension to file record on appeal, opposition to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
litigated. Its cause of action was based on the same facts because the same
appeal. He also appeared in person in a hearing.
alleged wrongful act (refusing to return the overpayment) is the one put at
 His voluntary appearance is deemed to be equivalent to service.
issue.
 Res Judicata Elements:
Del Rosario v. Far East Bank and Trust Company: Elements of Res judicata 1. Finality of Former Judgment
2. Court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction
 Petitioner DATICOR and Respondent PDCP entered into an agreement whereby 3. Judgment must be on the merits
PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign loan of 4.4M (dollar loan and peso loan) 4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of
with various rates of interest on both parties, SM and causes of action
 Petitioners paid a total of 3M but was still left with an outstanding balance of
more than 10M. Petitioners contested this loan for being usurious and this was
pending in a CA case.
o Meanwhile PDCP assigned its receivables to co-respondent FBTC
o FBTC and DATICOR agreed that DATICOR would pay, and they did,
6.4M as full settlement

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Halimao v. Villanueva (1996 case): If ground for motion to dismiss is RJ, it

pleadings. It can look at the records, apply relevant laws and jurisprudence
does not operate as a hypothetical admission of the alleged facts. However,
to adjudge whether or not there really is a cause of action.
the general rule is that a MTD based on lack of cause of action operates as
a hypothetical admission of all the facts alleged therein.
 Tan Kiat, his complaint, argues that he bought 2 parcels of land from Tan Keh.
The title couldn’t be transferred to his name because Tan was not yet a citizen.
 Halimao wrote the chief justice and said that the respondents Attys Villanueva
Thereafter, Tan Keh sold the lands to the Remigio Tan with the understanding
and Ferrer entered the Oo Kian Tiok Compound in Cainta with guns. Halimao
that they would only hold it in trust for Tan Kiat. To assure Tan Kiat, Tan leased
was the caretaker of the compound. He wishes to have them disbarred for
the properties him.
serious misconduct.
 Tan died and his heirs never transferred the subject properties. In fact, his
 The respondents argued that the complaint was a mere duplication of an
heirs transferred it to their names. Tan Kiat, as aforementioned, filed a case
already dismissed administrative case against them filed by Danilo Hernandez
for recovery of property.
(a security guard of the compound) They filed a motion to dismiss.
 The Tans filed a MTD alleging lack of cause of action, prescription, res judicata,
 The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP held that res judicata applied, as
waiver/extinguishment/laches. The RTC dismissed the case. The CA set aside
though the parties were different, they substantially had the same interests
the dismissal, stating that the complaint had a cause of action because by filing
 Halimao argues that by filing a motion to dismiss, the respondents
a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the Tans hypothetically
hypothetically admitted the facts alleged in the complaint.
admitted all the facts alleged therein.
Issue: Did the respondents hypothetically admit the alleged facts in light of their
Issue: Was the CA’s order improper? YES Should the dismissal be upheld? YES
motion to dismiss based on res judicata?
 There are limitations to the general rule that averments in the complaint
 NO. A motion to dismiss is considered a hypothetical admission of the facts
are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to
alleged when the ground for dismissal is the failure of the complaint to state a
dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action. A MTD based on
cause of action. When such motion is filed based on the aforesaid
this does not admit:
ground, the defendant in effects says that even assuming the facts to
1. The truth of mere description of fraud
be as alleged by the plaintiff, he has still failed to prove that he had a
2. Allegations of legal conclusions
right that was violated. (Fine, even if it’s true, but you still don’t have a
3. An erroneous statement of law
cause of action)
4. Inferences from facts not stated
 This rule DOES NOT apply to a case where the defendant files a motion to 5. Conclusions of law
dismiss based on: 6. Allegations of fact, the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the person/SM/nature of the action
7. Surplusage/irrelevant matters
2. Improper venue
8. Scandalous matter
3. Lack of capacity to sue
9. Legally impossible facts
4. Litis Pendencia
10. General averments contradicted by more specific avrements
5. Res Judicata
 A more judicious resolution of a MTD necessitates that the court should
6. Prescription
not be constrained to the consideration of facts alleged in the
7. Unenforceability
complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may
 In such cases, the hypothetical admission is limited to the facts alleged
consider facts within the range of judicial notice and other relevant
in the complaint which relate to and are necessary for the resolution of
laws and jurisprudence. They can also examine records/documents
these grounds as preliminary matters involving substantive or
incorporated into the complaint.
procedural laws.
 The court found here the following:
 In this case, the investigating commissioner properly dismissed the case for res
o Tan Kiat cannot question his landlord’s ownership, him being the
judicata, it being that the two cases were the same (Both Hernandez and
lessee
Halimao were employed at the compound) The admin case brought by
o Tan was able to mortgage the lands in question therefore he was the
Hernandez was barred for want of prima facie showing of professional absolute owner
misconduct. The issue was settled in the FIRST admin case. o There was no trust, express or implied
 Clearly then, the complaint DID NOT have a cause of action. It has also
Tan v. CA and Tan Kiat (1998 case): Limitation on the Halimao Doctrine:
prescribed, because of the lapse of the 10 year period for reconveyance and
The hypothetical admission of the facts in a MTD based on lack of cause of because of laches, the complaint being filed 18 years after the land was
action does not mean that the court is constrained to the facts in the registered in the name of the Tans.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Asia Production and Wang v. Pano, Hua and Dy

 Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies was not complied with. This
 Hua and Dy claimed to have been owners of a building constructed on a lot
calls for resort first to the appropriate admin authorities in the resolution of a
leased from a certain San Andres. They ORALLY agreed to sell the building to
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to
petitioners for 170k, with the ORAL assurance that that they would also
the courts of justice. (Go to admin bodies first and have them resolve it before
transfer their contract of lease to the petitioner.
going to Court)
 Petitioners constructed a factory on the lot and made several payments
o Non-observance of this doctrine results in lack of a cause of action,
(reaching 50k) to Hua and Dy. However, the respondents did not execute a
which is a ground for dismissal. This deficiency is NOT jurisdictional
deed of sale nor an assignment of the lease. In response, petitioners went to
and failure to object to this in a MTD operates as a waiver. In this
court and filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money.
case however, the petitioners timely brought up the issue in
 Dy filed a MTD on the ground that the action is covered by the statute of frauds
their MTD.
therefore it must be in writing. The RTC granted the MTD, agreeing with Dy
 The respondents should have gone first to DENR because DENR is
that the agreement should’ve been in writing to be enforceable (lease
empowered to rule in the first instance of any controversy relating to
agreement for a period longer than one year)
the violations of a TLA. This comes within their expertise so they can
properly evaluate evidence to resolve factual issues coming within
Issue: Was the MTD properly granted? NO
their competence.
 The SoF was not designed to perpetuate fraud. Furthermore, it only makes
Municipality of Binan v. CA and Garcia: a preliminary hearing on an
ineffective actions for specific performance of the contracts covered by it.
affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of actions is NOT necessary
 The SoF applies only to executory contracts and in actions for their specific
performance. It does NOT apply to actions which are neither for violation of a
 The petitioner Municipality, through its mayor, filed an unlawful detainer case
contract nor for the performance thereof. In this case, the contract was already
against Garcia in the MTC, alleging that it was not amenable to extending the
partially performed (due to the payment)
lease contract that it had. Garcia, in his answer, argues that he still had a right
 More importantly, in this case, the complaint petitioners filed was NOT for
to stay (the lease for 25 years still hasn’t expired AND that he exercised his
specific performance of the agreement to sell and to assign the leasehold right.
option to renew)
They merely seek to recover their partial payment for the building.
 Garcia then filed a “Motion for preliminary hearing as if a motion to
 By their motion to dismiss, private respondents hypothetically admitted
dismiss has been filed” on the ground that the complaint had no cause
the truth of the allegations in the complaint (that the petitioners are
of action. Petitioner opposed the motion and the MTC ordered Garcia to
seeking to recover the 50k partial payment they made)
vacate.
o Logically, it was just really for collection of sum of money. To
 Garcia then filed a motion before the MTC praying that the issues raised in the
reiterate, the action is not one for specific performance so the SoF
motion for preliminary hearing be resolved first because it was in the nature of
does not apply and even if it was, it still won’t apply since it was
a motion to dismiss. His motion was not granted.
already partially performed.
 Garcia appealed to the RTC and in the meantime, upon motion of the
petitioner, the judge issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
Sunville Timber v. Abad: Non-observance of doctrine of exhaustion of
 Garcia went to CA, arguing that he was not sent a copy of the motion (for
admin remedies can be a ground to dismiss (lack of cause of action)
execution pending appeal)
 The CA overturned the lower courts, holding that under the RoC, no motion
 Sunville was granted a TLA authorizing it to cut forest land in Zamboanga for
shall be acted upon by the court w/o proof of prior notice. It also annulled the
10 years. The private respondents then filed a petition with the DENR for the
order for Garcia to vacate because the MTC did not grant the preliminary
cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of the TLA. They
hearing.
subsequently filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC of Pagadian City against
the petitioner.
Issue: Was the CA correct in overturning the lower courts?
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the civil case for injunction on the ground
that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the respondents have
 No. The CA was wrong. The lower court did NOT commit GADLEJ in when it
not yet exhausted the administrative remedies. This was denied. On
failed to conduct a preliminary hearing as prayed for in Garcia’s “motion for
appeal, the CA held that this case falls under one of the exceptions of the
prelim hearing as if a motion to dismiss has been filed”
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies because of the urgency of the matter
o This is because the said motion of Garcia is anchored on the ground
and public interest (The logging was causing flooding)
that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original
term stipulated in the contract (25 yrs) has not yet expired.
Issue: Should the MTD be granted?

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 This was 1993 so at this time, the rule (now Rule 16 sec 6) stated: “Any of the
However, the law expressly powers NPC to directly service all the requirements
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule may be pleaded as an affirmative
of a BOI registered enterprise, like FINE. The CA committed GADLEJ in
defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
upholding the injunction since NPC was fully within its right to directly service
had been filed”
FINE. Meralco’s petition is dismissed.
 This provision allows the grounds for a MTD to be set up as affirmative
defenses in the answer (in case no MTD was filed)
o Note: Now, the rule states “At the discretion of the court x x x a
preliminary hearing may be had”
 This hearing, however, is NOT mandatory for it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an
affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of actions is NOT
necessary
o This is because the courts must determine the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself (w/n it states a cause of action) The
sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
complaint. No extraneous matter may be considered, nor facts not
alleged.  this was before the Tan Kiat case, which obviously is
contradictory to this.

Napocor and FINE Chemicals v. CA and Meralco (Alternative remedy if

motion to dismiss is denied: Rule 65 GADLEJ)

 FINE Chemicals filed an application for a direct power connection with NPC.
NPC, acting on the same, asked Meralco if it would grant FINE a direct
power connection too (Because NAPOCOR and Meralco agreed not to
compete)
 Meralco told NPC not to grant FINE’s request. Meralco stated that it is capable
of serving FINE’s power requirement. NPC ignored this and proceeded to supply
electricity to FINE.
 Meralco went to the RTC of Pasig and filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus with injunction against NPC and FINE.
 FINE filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegations of the petition
failed to state a cause of action. The RTC, however, denied the motion to
dismiss, stating that based on the facts alleged, a cause of action
exists. FINE went to the CA, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which was also DENIED by the CA.

Issue: Should Meralco’s petition be dismissed? YES

 The ordinary procedure would have been as follows: When FINE’s MTD was
denied, it should have just filed an answer, gone to trial and if the
decision is adverse, should’ve reiterated the issue on appeal.
o However, this is subject to certain exceptions. One would be if the
court, in denying the MTD commits GADLEJ. This is because it would
be unfair to require the defendant to undergo the ordeal and expense
of the trial under such circumstances as the remedy of appeal would
not be plain and adequate.
 In the case at bar, Meralco’s claim in its petition for prohibiton and mandamus
in the RTC is based on its standing as a holder of a franchise. It asserts that it
has the right to be heard on any application for direct power connection.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Cases: (Dismissal of Actions): Sandy

o Third Case: CASE #3: Injunction: Filed in RTC by Bunag’s against
Bunag’s . Dismissed for res judicata since there is a substantial
O.B. Jovenir Construction v. Macamir Realty, spouses Miranda
identity of parties in this case and with case #2
o Fourth Case: CASE #4: Annulment of title with damages: Filed in RTC
 Due to misrepresentation by OB Jovenir as a legitimate contractor, owners of by Bunag against Cruz
the Macamir Realty, the spouses Miranda, sought the termination of their  In case #4, Cruz’s filed a motion for dismissal, arguing res judicata, since the
agreement to erect a condominium for the spouses parties and subject matter in this case is the same as CASE #2. The RTC
 In doing so, the spouses filed for a TRO in behalf of Macamir Realty in RTC dismissed case #4.
Makati(3 feb 1997).
o In an MR, however, this was reversed and case #4 was ordered to
o However, the Macamir BoD did not approve of this proceed. Cruz was ordered to file an answer
o Thus, the Spouses filed a motion to withdraw the complaint (13  Aggrieved, Cruz went to the CA, still arguing res judicata. The CA denied this.
feb 1997)
 Subsequently, the spouses filed another TRO for Macamir Realty, this
Issue: Should Cruz’s motion to dismiss prosper? YES
time with approval of the BoD (17 Feb 1997)
o However, at this time, the motion to withdraw the original complaint  Review: Elements of RJ:
hasn’t been granted yet
1. Final judgment/order: In this case, there was a final judgment in
 Petitioner now assails that since the original complaint hasn’t been
civil case #2
dismissed, the spouses are violating the non-forum shopping rule. 2. Judgment/order must be on the merits
 Bunags argue that the dismissal of case #2 will not bar the
Issue: W/N there was a valid dismissal of the original complaint - YES
filing of case #4 SINCE there was no litigious consideration of
the evidence
Ratio:
 The SC, however, stated that the dismissal of case #2 was
 Section 1 Rule 17 : An Action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
the Bunags fault. The case was dismissed for their failure to
of court by:
appear on several hearings wherein they could’ve presented
1. filing a notice of dismissal at any time
their evidence.
 This is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs
 Further, since the RTC ordered the dismissal without a
even if the motion cites the most ridiculous grounds for
qualification on whether the same is w/o or w/o
dismissal.
prejudice, following Section 3 of Rule 17, it should be
 Trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint
considered with prejudice and shall have the effect of
as dismissed.
an adjudication on the merits
2. motion for summary judgment
 A ruling based on a MTD, without any trial on the merits or
 in the case at bar, while the motion is styled as a motion and contains
formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on
prayers, there are innocuous erros and superfluities that do not detract
the merits
from its being a NOTICE OF DISMISSAL made under Sec 1 Rule 17 which
3. Court must have jurisdiction: Jurisdiction of the court was never
ipso facto dismissed the case: (considered as notice of dismissal)
questioned
 It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations thereat that 4. The two cases must have the same parties, SM and cause of
determines its nature. Thus, said court order is a mere surplusage as it action
can be done without order of the court.  Pertinent Rule: Dismissal of actions through the fault of plaintiff:
1. If he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his
Cruz v. CA (If RTC orders dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff, this will evidence in chief
have the effect of adjudication on the merits. This dismissal will operate as 2. If he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time
fulfilment of the SECOND element of RES JUDICATA) 3. If he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court
 There are 4 cases involved in this controversy. Bunag’s and Cruz’s are fighting
over land.
o First case: CASE #1: Unlawful Detainer: Filed in MTC by Cruz against
Boy Bunag. Cruz won.
o Second case: CASE #2: Quieting of Title: Filed in RTC by Bunag
against Cruz. Dismissed for failure to prosecute

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago (Plaintiffs filed a case. Defendant had a
counterclaim. It was dismissed due to their own fault. Defendant can still
prosecute his counterclaim even after the dismissal of the main case)
Facts:
 The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga
had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood
and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees.
 As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which
Pinga was harvesting the fruits.
 However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings, the
court ordered the dismissal of said case.
 Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the case but to ask for the
entire action to be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present
evidence ex parte,
o RTC granted it, hence the counterclaim was dismissed.
o RTC ruled that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated
independently of plaintiff’s cause of action vis a vis the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim
 Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule 45 on pure questions
of law (Santiagos motive: They just asked for the dismissal of their entire case
so that their ownership wouldn’t be put in controversy in the counterclaim)
Issue: W/N dismissal of original complaint affects that of the compulsory counter
claims? NO the counterclaims, in this case, can stand on its own
Ratio:
 The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the dismissal of the
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute
his counterclaim
 Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified
by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was
petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial.
 This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial
interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the
court.
 Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim,
permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of
evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is
considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.
 This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of
evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same arises
out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely
terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work
injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into
Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists
even by mere implication.
 hus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief
can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on
his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any
reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or
implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his
counterclaim
 The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a
more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that
any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim
itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.
 Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is
not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that
the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those
defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended
rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal
by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
 Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: “If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on
the date of his presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action”
 Petitioner wins, the counterclaim should proceed.
Ko V PNB (Plaintiffs filed a case. It was dismissed due to their fault.
This dismissal has the effect of adjudication on the merits. Their remedy is
RULE 41)
1. Ko filed for the annulment of a mortgage, extra-judicial foreclosure and
the annulment of a TCT and deed for sale. It was alleged that
the mortgage, the foreclosure proceedings were null and void because
the written consent of the petitioners (as the beneficiaries of the
mortgaged property, was not secured).
2. During the proceedings, the petitioners failed to attend trial, despite proper
notice, and upon motion of PNB the complaint was dismissed. PNBs counsel
pointed to an apparent lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute the action. The case was thus dismissed.
3. Ko filed an MR claiming that this whole time they had been
actively negotiating with PNB to buy back the property and that
there were positive results. But the MR was denied.
4. Petitioners filed for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not an appeal
with the CA.
Issue: W/N RTC dismissed the case erroneously? W/N procedure should yield in this
case?
Held: NO
 Petitioners should have filed for an appeal with the CA . Sec 3
Rule 17 provides that if a plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence, or to prosecute the action for an
unreasonable period of time, the complaint may be dismissed upon
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

motion of the defendant or by

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

the court motu proprio, without prejudice to the defendant’s right to

prosecute a counter claim or separate action.
 The dismissal is equivalent to an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by the court
 The MR of the petitioners was dismissed because failure to prosecute
has the effect of adjudication on the merits, the proper action is an
ordinary appeal with the CA under rule 41 and not petition under rule 45.
Rule 41 provides: Appeal to CA from cases decided in RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by filing a notice of
appeal with the court that rendered the judgment and serving a
copy upon the adverse party.
 The rule is clear, in order to perfect an appeal all that is required is
a pro forma notice of appeal within the reglementary period. The
rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigalnts. The
rules provide order and to enhance efficiency of the judicial system, mere
invocation of “substantial justice” will not overturn them. The plaintiff did
not prosecute the case with utmost diligence and was in effect clogging the
dockets of the court.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Cases: Default Rule 9: PDG

no opportunity to present evidence. The extent of the relief that may be
granted is only as much as has been alleged and proved.
Gajudo v Traders Royal (A complaint is not automatically entitled to the
 A complainant is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for
relief prayed for just because the defendant is in default. Default operates
because a defendant is in default. Declaration of default is not a waiver of
only as a waiver of right to be heard and to present evidence in trial)
rights, only right to be heard and to present evidence in trial. Anything
more would be denial of due process. In this case the petitioners were not
1. Gajudo filed before the RTC QC a petition for Annulment of extrajudicial
able to establish their case under the required quantum of proof.
foreclosure and auction sale by the sheriff of QC. She prayed for
conventional redemption and damages. The foregoing is rooted in a loan
Vlason v CA
availed of by petitioners from Traders Royal Bank in the Amount of 75k secured
by REM over the land. Loan was not paid hence the foreclosure.
1. Poro Point Shipping is the local agent of Omega Transpo (of Panama). One of
2. Auction was set in june 1981 and moved to August 1981 on the request
its Vessels, Star Ace had engine trouble and requested to unload cargo and
of one of the Petitioners Chua, but without notice to his co-petitioners.
store it at the Philippine Ports Authority in San Fernando La Union. Despite
It was sold at the auction for 24k to Traders. Chua had attempted to buy back
being granted permission by Customs, several of its personnel boarded the
the subject property, plus interest, by making an initial payment of 4k covered
vessel on suspicion that it was the hijacked Silver Med and that its cargo would
by a check, but was later told to make a new offer because of a change in the
be smuggled into the country. Vessel and all cargo was seized pursuant to the
market value.
tariff and customs code.
3. Petitioners complained that the sale was irregular because of the
2. During this time La Union was hit by three typhoons and the vessel ran aground
shocking or unconscionably low bid price and that they had been
and was abandoned. Cadacio entered into a salvage agreement with the
denied their right to redeem the property because they were not
respondents to secure and repair the vessel at $1M and 50$ of the cargo after
informed of the sale. Traders filed a counterclaim claiming that petitioners
all expenses, cost and taxes. Private respondent Duraproof (seeking to enforce
had slept on their rights and that it (traders) was acting within the law
a preferred lien as a salvor[person engaged in salvage of a ship or items lost at
and legitimate banking practice and regulations.
sea]) filed a petition with the RTC Manila, for certiorari, prohibition and
4. In 1988 the records in the city hall were destroyed, along with the records of
mandamus. Vlason was among those who opposed. Duraproof moved to
the case. After reconstitution the petitioners discovered that the
declare several of the defendants in their petition in default, but was denied by
property had beensold to a Ceroferr Realty Corp and that the
the RTC. (impt to note that it did not include any allegation against Vlason nor
annotation of Lis Pendens on the Certificate of Title was cancelled.
any prayer for relief against it)
5. The complaint was refiled with these facts and summons was properly served
3. Duraproof eventually had Singkong, Comissioner Mison (PPA) and Omega in
upon the bank. A motion to declare Traders in default was filed and was
default. It was allowed to present evidence ex parte against the defaulting
granted. Petitioners were allowed present their evidence ex parte. On
respondents. When only the private respondent and the parties declared in
Appeal CA ruled for Traders.
default were present at the hearing, the trial court declared the other
respondents in default and allowed duraproof to present evidence against them.
Issue: W/N CA erred in failing to apply Section 3 Rule 9 instead of applying
4. Vlasons was never ordered in default. However a judgment against it was
the rule on preponderance of evidence under Rule 133 section 1?
entered. In fact they alleged that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
Held:
petitioner.
 Rule 9 Sec 3 provides: When a defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed, the court shall upon motion of the claiming party with notice to
Issue: W/n the judgment by default was defective? YES. W/n the RTC
the defending party and with proof of failure shall declare the defending party
default judgment is binding on VEC? No.
in default. The court shall then proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading warrants, unless it shall require the
 RTC had declared the other respondents in default upon motion of Duraproof
claimant to submit evidence.
because after due notice to them they failed to appear. No such order was
 A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not
issued ordering VEC in default. Thus there being no order of default against
to take part in the trial. He may, after notice and before judgment, file VEC, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered against it.
under oath a motion to set aside the order of default upon showing that his
 The issuance of an order of default is a condition essential In order that a
failure to answer was due to FAME (fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
judgment of default be clothed with validity. There was never any record which
negligence) and he has a meritorious defense.
shows that the court allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte against VEC.
 There is no incompatibility between 133 and 9. Parties must still rely on the
 Without a declaration of default, trial court has no authority to order the
strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense of
presentation of evidence exparte against the petitioner. The rule that when a
their opponent. This principle is especially true when their opponent has
party fails to appear despite summons waives the objection to the presentation
of evidence against it, applies only if the petitioner has submitted itself to
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

jurisdiction of the court. But as earlier mentioned the default judgment was
improvidently rendered.
Martinez v. Republic: a defendant party declared in default retains the right to
Ramnani V CA
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
1. Spouses Dizon filed a complaint with RTC Makati against Spouses Ramnani for
prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is
the collection of a sum of money representing an alleged unremitted amount of
contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside
jewelry received by Ramnani on consignment. Ramnani counterclaimed, saying
the order of default.
that while she did receive jewels in the amount of 900k from Dizon, Dizon
received 1.6m worth of jewels and cash from Ramnani plus unpaid checks in
the amount of 160k. In sum, DIzon owed her 787k.
Remedies from judgment by default:
2. The Ramnanis did not show for pre-trial and they were consequently declared in
default on August 14, 1990, motioned for its lifting on Sept 12 1990 and were
1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
denied Nov 20, 1990. Evidence was received ex parte from Dizon, as per the
before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of
default order. Judge Guerrero rendered judgment against Ramnani, holdling
default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
that they were liable in the amount of 884k plus legal interest, and 170k in
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec
damages plust cost of the suit.
3, Rule 18)
3. Ramnani Filed an MR on the ground that a personal obligation contracted by
2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered
the wife without the consent of the husband was being made enforceable
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may
against the conjugal partnership despite absence of allegations, much less
file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
proof that the same redounded to the benefit of the family, pursuant to the
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
Family Code.
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule
4. Ramnani filed for certiorari before the CA, saying that the denial of the motion
38; and
to lift order of default was erroneous because Ramnani possessed a meritorious
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
defense and that the reason for non-appearance was excusable neglect.
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
Issue: was the decision of the RTC to deny the motion for lifting the order of
default proper?
Jao & Co. vs. Court of appeals
Held:
 A party who fails to appear at pre-trial may be considered non-suited or in
 Due to non-appearance of Jao & Co. during a hearing, RTC declared the
default (Rule 20 section 2) A party declared in default may, at any time after
petitioner in default and allowed evidence to be presented ex-parte. Thereafter,
the declaration and before judgment file a motion under oath to set
a decision was rendered ordering Jao to pay respondent Top Service P150K as
aside the order on the ground that the failure to answer was due to
agreed rentals.
FAME and that he has a meritorious defense. (rule 18 sec 3)
 After receipt of the decision, Jao filed a Motion for reconsideration which was
 If a judgment has already been rendered but before it is final and executory he
denied and the court allowed the sheriff to sell two barges previously levied on.
may file for a new trial under Rule 37 Sec 1a. If it is after it has become final
Jao filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of appeals contesting
and executory he may file petition for relief from judgment under rule 38
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA issued an order to stop the sheriff
sec2. If the judgment rendered is contrary to evidence or to law he may
from conduction the said auction sale, but it was too late since the two barges
appeal from the judgment under Rule 41 Sec 2.
were already sold to third parties.
 The first remedy was adopted in this case but was denied because the non-
 Thus, Jao brought to the Supreme court the instant petition for
appearance was judged to be inexcusable by the trial court. It was claimed
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 to nullify the said auction sale
that Ramnani was sick but no medical certificate was presented to
evidence such illness. for GADLEJ. On the other hand, respondent Top Service argued that the
decision of the lower court had already become final and that the 2 barges have
 A satisfactory showing of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
already been sold to third parties in good faith.
neglect is indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a judgment of
 Jao argued that the decision of the lower court cannot be final because
default or the order of default. Ramnani utterly failed to do so. The mere
the trial court improperly declared Jao in default since it was not given
allegation, even assuming it were true, of a meritorious defense (that Dizon
notice of the Order declaring it in default
owed them 900k as alleged in the counterclaim) is not sufficient to justify the
lifting of the order of default. The two conditions must coincide ot grant the
Issue: is certiorari the proper remedy in contesting a default improperly issued?
relief sought.
Decision:
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 Under ordinary circumstance, the proper remedy of a party wrongfully declared

 However, exception to such are: a) when issues are purely legal; b)
in default is either to appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition
public interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d) special
for relief from judgment and not certiorari.
circumstances so warrant. In the case at bar, regulation of educational
 A default judgment is an adjudication on the merits, and is thus
institutions is invested with public interest; thus there is not need to resort first
appealable. Since appeal is the proper remedy, the extraordinary writ
to a motion for reconsideration.
of certiorari will not lie.
 Lastly, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory; the proper
 Likewise, Jao’s contention that it did not receive the copy of the decision was
remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.
due to its own fault since the trial court was not furnished of its forwarding
 A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
address.
interlocutory ruling, it is resorted only to correct grave abuse of
discretion
 In the case at bar, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court’s
Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education
denial of the Motion to Dismiss since the acts of CHED such as declaring in a
 CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional Regulatroy
newspaper that Indiana was ordered closed for illegal advertisement,
Commission inquiring whether Indiano Aerospace already acquired university
undermined the public's confidence in Indiana as an educational institution. This
status in view of its advertisement as such in Manila Bulletin. Upon
was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.
investigation, it was verified from SEC that Indiana School of Aeronautics failed
to amend its articles if Incorporatio to change its name to Indiana Aerospace
University. Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term University.
 Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand filed a motion to
Dismiss. The lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and Granted
Indiana’s prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
 Likewise, Indiana Aerospace filed before the lower court a Motion to declare
CHED in Default. CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File its Answer.
The lower court ruled on Indiana’s motion to declare CHED in Default and
directed it to present evidence ex parte.
 CHED filed with CA a petitioner for certiorari arguing that RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss and in declaring it in default
despite its filing an Answer. CA ruled that Indiana had no cause of action
against CHE since it failed to show that it had been granted university status by
CHED, and ruled that CHED should not have been declared in default since its
Answer had long been filed before the lower court ruled upon Indiana’s Motion
to declare it in default.
 Indiana claims that the Petition for Certiorari of CHED should have been
dismissed by CA because it was filed out of time and was not preceded by a
motion for reconsideration in the RTC.

Issues: Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed?

Decision:
 CHED’s Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed. In computing its
timeliness, what should have been considered is the date when the
respondent received the Order declaring it in default. In the case at bar,
CHED was able to comply with the 60-day reglamentary period to file its
Petition for Certiorari.
 As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should precede the
petition for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower court should be
given the opportunity to correct itself and thus a motion for
reconsideration should precede a petitioner for certiorari.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Cases: Rule 18 (pre-trial) Geoc

stating that it was interested in prosecuting the complaint against defendant
Acropolis and Salceda, and that Filipinas Bank will move for the issuance of
LCK Industries vs. Planters Development Bank
Alias summons on them. Again, the pre-trial was for Jan 1988.
 LCK obtained a loan from Planters Bank amounting to P3M. As security, a real
 During the scheduled pre-trial, Filipinas Bank’s counsel was 15 minutes late due
estate mortgage was executed on 2 lands located in QC and in Baguio. Upon
to heavy traffic. Thus, the case was dismissed by the lower court ad affirmed
default in payment, Planters Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
by CA.
Baguio property which was sold for P2.6M and the QC property sold for P2.2M.
 Thus, Calalang filed this case alleging that CA erred in absolving Filipinas Bank
 Prior to the auction sale, LCK Industires filed with RTC an action for Annulmet
for the delay; declaring the January 1988 pre-trial as premature; and holding
of the Foreclosure of Mortgage and the Auction sale of the QC property on
Filipinas bank did not entirely fail to appear.
ground that Planters failed to comply with the requirements on posting and
publication and that the foreclosure was not filed with the clerk of court.
Issues: was the pre-trial scheduled on Jan 1988 premature?
Thereafter a pre-trial was conducted.
 The issues raised during the pre-trial were: whether the foreclosure was filed
 The pre-trial conference scheduled for Jan 1988 was not premature. A pre-
with wit the clerk of court, whether there was compliance with the posting and
trial cannot be validly held until the last pleading has been filed.
publication requirements, and whether the parties are entitled to their
 Thus, the period to file the necessary pleading having expired on the Acropolis
respective attorney’s fees.
Trading, the lower court can direct that a pre-trial be held among the
 After the pre-trial, LCK, in its memorandum, claimed that there was an
answering defendants.
overpayment of the loan by P1.8M. the lower court declared the sale valid but
 Likewise, the fact that counsel for Filipinas Bank was late during the pre-trial,
ordered Planter Bank to return the overpayment,. CA reversed the portion of
the trial court should have called the case again.
the decision regarding the payment of the overpayment since it was raised long
 Absent any negligent or irresponsible conduct by the party, the court
after the pre-trial conference.
should consider lesser sanctions than dismissing the case.
Issue: whether the issue of overpayment was raised by the parties an included in
the pre-trial order?

 The conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory in civil action wherein parties are given
the opportunity to arrive at a possible amicable settlement and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts which must be recorded in the pre-trial
order.
 A pre-trial order, however, is not mean to state each and every issue that may
be taken up during trial. Issues that are impliedly included are as much
integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly stipulated.
 The case at bar fall under that case since the parties stipulated the price each
property was sold for, and applying simple math by deducting LCK’s obligation,
the fact of overpayment, though not expressly included in the pre-trial order
can be evidently inferred from the admissions of the parties.

Calalang vs. CA
 Filipnas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for a collection of sum of money
against Calalang, Arca, Salceda and Acropolis Trading. Clalang filed a Motion to
Dismiss, Arca filed a motion for Bill of Particular, while the two other were
summoned but only a clerk-employee of Acropolis Trading received he
summons. During the pendency of the cases, the Judiciary Reorganization Act
was passed.
 The motion for Bill of Particulars was granted while the motion to dismiss was
dismissed. The case has been set several times for pre-trial. For the first two
scheduled meetings, the counsel for Filipinas Bank failed to appear. For the last
two, Arca’s counsel failed to appear. It was again rescheduled to April 1987.
 The court ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Acropolis and Salceda for
improper service of summons. Filipinas Bank, in response, filed a manifestation

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Spouses Corpuz vs. Citibank
 Azucena Corpuz was a cardholder of Mastercards and Visa Credit Cards issued
by Citibank, each having a credit limit of P40K. in view of her impending
business trip to Europe, Azucena paid in full her monthly charges on both credit
cards via checks and made advance check payments of P20K for her Visa Card.
While in Europe, both her Visa and Mastercard were not honored, making her
pay the bill in cash. Upon inquiry of her husband Renato, Citibank informed the
spouses that the said checks were not yet cleared at that time.
 Upon her return, she wrote Citibank to cancel the said cards. Notwithstanding
her request, Citibank continued to send billing statements, charging her interest
charges and late payment penalties. Thus, spouses Corpuz filed a complaint for
damages against Citibank at RTC Las Pinas. On the other hand, Citibank filed its
answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. During the pre-trial, the spouses Corpuz
and their counsel failed to appear since the counsel failed to inform the spouses
of the scheduled pre-trial since he forgot about it due to heavy workload . Thus
their complaint was dismissed and directed Citibank to present evidence on its
Compulsory Counterclaim.
 Spouses moved for reconsideration but was denied. On the same Order, the
trial court directed Citibank to present evidence on its counterclaim within 30
days from receipt. However, Citibank, having failed to present evidence within
30 days from its receipt, the trial court dismissed it Counterclaim. Both spouses
and Citibank moved for reconsideration and partial reconsideration, but only
Citibank’s partial reconsideration was granted on ground that its prior dismissal
is without prejudice to the right of Citibank to prosecute its counterclaim in the
same or separate action.
 The spouses however assert that their non-appearance at the pre-trial may be
excused if there is a valid cause such as when a party forgets the date of the
pre-trial, thus the merits of their case should have been considered when their
Complaint was dismissed.
Issue: Does the Spouses Corpuz failure to appear at the pre-trial warrant dismissal
of their complaint?
Decision:
 YES. The spouses’ excuse to justify their non-appearance at the pre-does not
warrant reversal of lower court’s decision. While Sec 4 of Rule 18 allows as an
exception a valid cause for the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial, the
instances cited by the spouses and counsel hardly constitute compelling
situations which warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules.
 The failure of petitioner’s counsel to record the scheduled pre-trial in his diary
to justify his absence at the pre-trial cannot amount to excusable negligence.
 To constitute excusable negligence, the absence must be due to petitioner’s
counsel’s failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in
consequence of his carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the process
of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance
or accident.
 As the failure of the spouses to appear at the pre-trial was due to their fault,
Citibank could still prosecute its Counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. However, Citibank should present its evidence within the 30-day period,
as mandated by the trial court.
 In the case at bar, Citibank failed to present the same within the stipulated
period, the trial court likewise properly denied its ex parte motion to present
evidence.
Citibank N.A. vs. Chua
 Citibank granted to spouses Velez credit lines secured by real estate and chattel
mortgages on equipment. Likewise, Citibank offered them special additional
accommodation of P5M in exchange for the Spouses’ purchase of Citibank
checks by exchanging their manager’s check. In Mar. 1986, Spouses Velez tried
to exchange with Citibank 6 checks amounting to P3M but Citibank refused to
continue with the arrangement. Instead, Citibank suggested to the spouses that
the total amount covered by the arrangement be restructured to 30 months
with prevailing interest on the diminishing balance. Pursuant thereto, the
spouses Velez delivered a check for P75K but Citibank refused to accept the
same demanding instead full payment of the entire amount. Thus, for the
failure of Citibank to comply with this restructuring agreement the spouses
Velez sued for specific performance and damages.
 The case was set for pre-trial and Citibank was directed to submit its pre-trial
brief at least 3 days before the pre-trial conference. However, Citibank filed its
pre-trial brief only on the date of the pre-trial conference itself.
 On the date of the pre-trial conference, the counsel for Citibank presented a
special-power-of-attorney (SPA) in his favor executed by Citibank to bind the
bank at the pre-trial. Notwithstanding this, the counsel for spouses Velez
moved to declare Citibank in default on ground that the SPA was not executed
by the board of Directors of Citibank. Respondent Judge Chua declared Citibank
in default on ground that the bank has no proper representation during the pre-
trial.
 Citibank contends that no board resolution was necessary for its legal counsel
or its employees to act as its attorney-in-fact in the case at bar because its by-
laws grant to its Secretary power to delegate to a Citibank officer, in this case
William W. Ferguson, the authority to represent and defend the bank and its
interests. On the other hand, spouses Velez assail the authority of Citibank’s
counsel to appear at the pre-trial conference grounds that the authority did not
come from the Board of Directors; and that the authority granted to the
Executing Officer in the by-laws was ineffective because the same were not
submitted to the SEC.
Issues:
a. whether a resolution of the BOD of the bank necessary for granting authority to
an agent to represent the corporation in court cases? Otherwise, the declaration of
default will have no basis
b. whether the by-laws of Citibank, foreign corporation previously been a license to
do business in the Philippines, are effective in this jurisdiction?
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Decision:
Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by
 As a general rule, all corporate powers are to be exercised by the BOD,
evidence presented during the trial.
however the same may be delegated to corporate officers or agents by the by-
 However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action
laws, articles of incorporation, or by a board resolution.
in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for
 In the case at bar, resolution of the BOD of Citibank appointing an attorney in
failure to allege the essential facts.
fact to bind it during pre-trial is not necessary because its by-laws allows its
 It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued
Officers, such as the Secretary to execute a power of attorney to a designated
cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging
bank officer, William W. Ferguson in this case, clothing him with authority to
the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending.
direct and manage corporate affairs.
 In the case at bar, the defect of lack of cause of action at the commencement
 As to its second contention, the Court ruled that SEC grants licenses in favor of
of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the
a foreign corporation only when it has complied with all the requirements of
pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the
law, it follows that when it decides to issue such license, it is satisfied that the promissory notes on 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.
applicant's by-laws meet the legal requirements. This, in effect, is an approval
of the foreign corporations by-laws. In the case at bar, SEC’s granting of a
license to Citibank implies that its by-laws, though originating from a foreign
jurisdiction, are valid and effective in the Philippines.

Cases: TRIAL

Swagman hotels vs. CA: Generally, the lack of cause of action may be cured
by evidence presented during trial but such can take effect only when the
complaint indeed states a cause of action. Otherwise, the absence of a
cause of action cannot be cured by evidence presented during trial.

 Swagman Hotels obtained a loan from Neal Christian evidence by three

promissory notes. Subsequently, Christian informed Swagman Hotels that it
was terminating the loans since the latter only paid 6% annual interest instead
of the 15% as agreed in the promissory note. Christian filed a complaint for the
sum of money amounting to $150K and $13.5K unpaid interest
 Swagman, in its Answer, alleged that Christian had no cause of action since the
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
 Subsequently, since Swagman was experiencing huge losses, Christian agreed
to waive the 15% interest and instead accept a payment of $750 per month.
 In the course of the hearing and after the hearing, the trial court ruled that the
first 2 promissory notes were already due and demandable, and ordered
Swagman to pay the amount of the checks plus 6% annual interest.

Issue: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured
by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case?

 At the time the complaint was filed with the trial court, none of the three
promissory notes was due, although two of which matured during the pendency
of the case. Thus, when the complaint was filed, there was still no cause of
action against Swagman.
 The defect of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment (citing Rule 10, Sec
5). Section 5 applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised
in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to
such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Cases: Demurrer to causes of action between the two cases.

Evidence Republic vs.

Tuvera

 Twin Peaks is a real estate business with 5 incorporating stockholders including

respondent Victor Tuvera. Subsequently, President Marcos granted a Timber
License Agreement in favor if Twin Peaks allowing the latter to engage in
logging operations. President Marcos was ousted. President Corazon Aquino
assumed presidency. She established the PCGG and granted it the power to
issue writs of sequestration. Pursuant thereto, PCGG issued a Writ of
Sequestration on all properties of Twin Peaks on ground that all its assets are
ill-gotten wealth acquired through fraud.
 PCGG filed this complaint against respondent Tuvera and President Marcos for
the recovery of funds allegedly acquired through fraud. It likewise alleged that
Tuvera, as presidential executive Assistant of Marcos, unjustly enriched himself
accomplished by securing the TLA in behalf of Twin Peaks. On the other hand,
respondent Tuvera filed a motion to nullify the Writ of Sequestration which was
granted by the Sandiganbayan.
 During the trial, Republic presented several witnesses and rested its case after
its formal offer of evidence. Subsequently, with leave of court, respondents
Tuvera filed a Demurrer to Evidence on grounds that the Republic failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove its claim. They further claim that the TLA
presented during trial is not legal evidence; and that the income tax returns are
not sufficient to show one’s holding in a corporation. Republic, on the other
hand, contended that the demurrer is not based on the insufficiency of its
evidence but on the strength of the evidence of the respondents. The
Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and held that the validity of
the TLA cannot be disputed.
 The Republic now questions the correctness of the Sandiganbayan’s decision to
grant the demurrer to evidence because it was not based solely on the
insufficiency of its evidence but also on the evidence of respondent Tuvera
mentioned during the pre-trial conference

Issue (1): was the grant of Sandiganbayan of the demurrer to evidence valid?

 NO. Sandiganbayan’s Resolution shows that dismissal of the case on demurrer

to evidence was based on the Republic’s failure to show its right to relief
because of the existence of a prior judgment which consequently
barred the re-litigation.
 Sandiganbayan did not dismiss the case on the insufficiency of the Republic’s
evidence nor on the strength of respondents’ evidence. Rather, it based its
dismissal on the existence of the Ysmael case because of the
“substantial identity” between the parties.
 This Court however disagrees and rules that there is not such identity in
the parties. Republic’s cause of action lies in the alleged abuse of power on
respondents’ part in violation of the law. .Ysmael, on the other hand, sought
the revocation of a TLA and the reinstatement of its own timber license
agreement. Indeed, there is no identity of parties and no identity of

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

Issue (2): What now is the course of action to take since we cannot affirm the
Sandiganbayan’s grant of the demurrer to evidence?

 The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate
court, the defendant loses the right to present his evidence and the appellate
court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiff’s evidence.
 It thus becomes the Court's duty to rule on the merits of the complaint, duly
taking into account the evidence presented by the Republic, and without need
to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have, they having waived their
right to present evidence in their behalf.

The Manila Banking Corporation vs. University of Baguio

 Manila Banking Corp. granted a P14M credit line to University of Baguio for the
construction of additional buildings and purchase of new equipment. On behalf
of the University, its Vice-Chairman Bautista signed 4 promissory notes and
executed a continuing suretyship agreement. He, however, diverted the net
proceeds of the loan to Group Developers Inc. (GDI). The loan was not paid.
Thus, Manila Banking filed a complaint for a sum of money with application for
preliminary attachment against the University and Bautista. Later on, it
amended its complaint, impleading GDI.
 However, by way of cross-claim, the University prayed that GDI be ordered to
pay the University the amount it would have to pay the Bank. In addition, the
University filed a third-party complaint against Victor G. Puyat, GDI’s President
and the heirs of Vicente G. Puyat, Manila Banking’s president. Subsequently,
Manila Banking and GDI executed a deed of dacion en pago, transferring to
the Bank a parcel of land, in full settlement of the loan. Because of this, TC
ruled that the University’s motion to implead GDI had been mooted by the
dacion en pago.
 The University moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was
no more cause of action against it since the loan had been settled by GDI . This
motion was denied on ground that the matters relied upon by the University
were evidentiary in nature. The TC ruled that the Bank had no cause of action
against the defendants because its claim for a sum of money had been paid
through the dacion en pago.

Issue: Was the Order dismissing the said motion to dismiss proper?

Decision:
 The Court distinguished between a motion to dismiss for failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of
cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g),Rule 16, while the
second by Rule 33,of the Rules of Court.
 The first, where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action, is
raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is
filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading
and not from evidentiary matters.

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 The second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action
alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has
rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has
presented in support of his claim.
 The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations
while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth
and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting. Hence, a
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant
after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has
shown no right to the relief sought.
 While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections
which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss
under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his
case.
 In this case, the University’s motion to dismiss the complaint was improper
under Rule 16 because it was filed after respondent university filed its
responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motion’s merit could not be
determined based solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the
amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of dacion en
pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of
dacion en pago had been expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its
finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed.
 In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had "no more cause of action" or
lacked a cause of action against the university. That motion was a motion to
dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to evidence and would be
proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In
the case at bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner
had not rested its case.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Cases: Rule 34 Judgment on the Pleadings
Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: Who can ask for judgment on the
pleadings? Only be the claimant.
 Petitioners Meneses et al were co-owners of a rice land in Bulacan. However,
these were distributed to farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to PD 27.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for determination of just
compensation alleging that they still haven’t been paid and that the value of
their land was 6M
o Answers were filed by the DAR (alleging that the value should be at
the time of the taking), Farmers (they they paid rentals), LBP (that the
computation was proper)
 The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action
because the determination of just compensation must be filed with the
DAR.
 The RTC reversed its dismissal upon an MR, gave the complaint due course and
in trial, it was agreed upon that the issue to be resolved was what
valuation was to be used (under RA 6657 and Consti OR PD 27) The parties
were then required to file their respective motions for judgment on the
pleadings
 Thereafter upon submission, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that PD
27 was to govern the valuation of the property (value at the time of taking)
 Petitioners prayed for the case to be remanded back to the RTC for further
proceedings (so they can present evidence to prove the value of their land) CA
however, affirmed RTC, stating that the motion for judgment on the pleadings
filed by respondents (DAR) is valid, arguing that DAR was considered a
counter-claimant.
Issue: Was the RTC correct in requiring the respondents to file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings? NO
 The SC held that the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings was
improper. This is because a judgment on the pleadings is only proper when an
answer fails to render an issue OR otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
 A judgment on the pleadings may be sought ONLY by the claimant, the party
seeking recover upon a claim, counter-claim or cross-claim. In this case, the
separate Answers filed by the respondents tendered issues AND made
specific denials and asserted affirmative defenses.
 Moreover, it was incorrect for the RTC to require LBP and DAR to file a motion
for judgment on the pleadings for in the first place, they are neither
plaintiffs nor counter-claimants.
 What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary
judgment (Rule 35), a way to promptly dispose of actions, which may be
rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on
file show that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact. In
this case, the answers raised issues but they were not factual ones/genuine
issues requiring trial.
Diman v. Alumbres: Rule 34 v. Rule 35
 A complaint was filed for quieting of title by Heirs of Lacalle against the
Dimans in the Las Pinas RTC. The heirs claimed that their mother was the
owner of a certain parcel of land in Las Pinas. When their mother bought it, the
Narios were occupying the lot.
 However, the Narios were ordered to vacate the land upon the order of the
court (in a complaint for ejectment filed by the Dimans) In their answer in the
quieting of title complaint, the Dimans aver that they own the land and
they had the right to eject the Narios.
 After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the heirs of Lacalle a
“request for admission” of the truth of certain matters (like the fact that
the Lacalle heirs’ TCTs were not registered and that the Dimans’ TCTs
were) This request was received but the Lacalle heirs did not respond.
 The Dimans then submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing further
that the matters they brought up in the request for admission be deemed
admitted. Dimans basically asserted that since no genuine issue existed, a
summary judgment be entered dismissing the quieting of title case.
 This was motion was denied by the court, stating that since both parties
claim ownership over the land and that the presentation of evidence
was required to determine factual issues. In trial, the Lacalle heirs
presented very little evidence (they couldn’t produce the original copy of
the TCT showing that the land was registered in their mother’s name,
only a Xerox copy)
 After the heirs rested their case, Dimans filed a motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence, alleging that the evidence of the heirs was weak. This
was, however, denied. Rebuffed again, Dimans went to the CA (certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition) for the denials to be overturned. This was again
DENIED. They went to the SC and their petition was given due course.
Issue: What should the court do with the quieting of title case? Dismiss
 As can be seen with the procedural antecedents, this case should have been
dismissed already because there was NO genuine issue. The issues arising
from the pleadings were fake.
 When the heirs failed to respond to the request admission, they were deemed
to have admitted all the facts in the request for admission.
 Doctrine: (The SC stated when a summary judgment is proper and when a
judgment on the pleadings is proper)
o Summary Judgment: Although the pleadings on their face appear to
raise issues of fact (like a denial/conflict of factual allegations), if it is
shown by admission, depositions or affidavits, that those issues
are fake (not genuine except as to the amount of damages), the court
shall render summary judgment for whoever asks for it(plaintiff or
defendant)-> Judgment on the facts as summarily proven by the
A/D/A
o Judgment on the pleadings: Here, there is no issue at all. ->
Judgment on the facts as pleaded. Only claimant can file.
 The judge made a mistake in denying the motion for summary judgment as he
stated that there was a material issue raised in the pleadings (he obviously had
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judgment on the pleadings in mind, for his reasons were reasons to DENY a
Asian Construction v. PCIB
motion for judgment on the pleadings!)
 Also, it was obvious that the heirs did not have title to their land. They did not
 PCIBANK filed a collection case in the RTC against petitioner ASIAKONSTRUKT.
present sufficient evidence to prove their claim.
PCIBANK alleges that the petitioner obtained a $4M loan. Petitioner then
secured the loan by assigning its receivables to PCIBANK. PCIB also asked for
Cases: Judgment on the
damages, alleging that petitioner already collected the amounts on the
receivables and also for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Pleadings Ontimare v. Elep
 The RTC granted the writ for attachment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed an
answer, admitting the debt BUT denies its non-payment and the
 Ontimare and Elep are neighbors. Elep wanted to build an apartment on their
amounts allegedly due. Petitioner also pleaded as a defense (fortuitous
lot and applied for a building permit. Elep asked Ontimare if he could build a
event) the economic crisis at that time (1997: After EDSA 2)
firewall next to his existing firewall. Ontimare filed a complaint with the building
 Thereafter, PCIBANK filed a motion for summary judgment, contending
official, requesting that the permit be withheld.
that the defenses of petitioner were fake. Petitioner opposed the motion for
 Elep got the permit but a cease and desist order was issued due to Ontimare’s
summary judgment, alleging that there were genuine issues that
complaint. It was, however, lifted upon Elep’s explanations. Construction
required trial like w/n petitioner misappropriated the proceeds in the deed of
began but while Elep’s workers were working on the firewall, Ontimare filed his
assignment. However, petitioner did not append to its opposition any
shotgun and threatened to kill anyone who would work on the firewall. As a
affidavit in support of the alleged genuine issues.
result, the firewall was unfinished and water seeped into the
 The RTC then came out with its summary judgment and ordered
apartment.
petitioner to pay the $4M loan. PCIBANK waived its claim for damages.
 Elep filed an action for damages w/ injunction with the RTC. After trial,
Petitioner went to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision. Petitioner argues
Ontimare moved for a summary judgment while Elep moved for
that the summary judgment was improper as there was a genuine issue
resolution on the merits. Afterwards, the RTC issued a “summary
that needed presentation of evidence.
judgment in favor of Elep”, granting him actual and compensatory damages
(from unrealized income), reimbursement and exemplary damages.
Issue: Was the summary judgment proper? YES
 CA modified and awarded Elep even higher compensatory damages. (from 75k
to 344k) Ontimare died so his heirs appealed. They question the propriety of
 The determinative factor in a motion for summary judgment is the
the RTC’s summary judgment because Ontimare was the one who moved for
presence/absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. A genuine
the summary judgment and not Elep.
issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence.
 When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is
Issue: Was the summary judgment proper? Not really
no real or genuine issue as to the facts and summary judgment is
called for.
 SC stated requisites of summary judgment namely:
 The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
1. There must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact. More importantly, when the
amount of damages
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed/contested, proceedings for
2. The moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.
 When on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment
 In this case, petitioner did not deny its liability for the principal amount
is not proper. (Remember, in the previous case, as distinguished from a motion
claimed by PCIB. Further, the “genuine issues” and defenses that
for judgment on the pleadings, the issues in a summary judgment ARE
petitioner claimed were NOT supported by affidavits. It could have shown
apparent but are in fact proven to be fake as per the affidavits, depositions or
figures showing its financial condition. It did not controvert the claims of PCIB.
admissions) An issue is genuine if it requires the presentation of
 Thus, petitioner failed to show that its defenses were NOT merely for delaying
evidence as distinguished from a fake/false claim.
tactics. The summary judgment was therefore proper, there being no genuine
 In this case, the summary judgment was rendered AFTER the presentation of
issue as to the facts.
evidence by both parties in a full blown trial. The RTC decision was called
a summary judgment but it is ACTUALLY a judgment on the merits. Hence, it
follows that the rules on summary judgment were not applicable.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Cases: Judgments Final Orders and Entry
BA FINANCE DOCTRINE:
 The settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the merits may be
the subject of an appeal.
o A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject
matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.
o An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its
merits
Eternal Gardens v. IAC
 ETERNAL GARDENS entered into a Land Development Agreement with North
Phil Union Mission Corp. (MISSION)
o Eternal – to make a memorial park on mission’s land and divide and
sell them accordingly.
o MISSION – will receive 40% gross profit from the sale
o Eternal paid MISSION around 1M for the sale of the land which is part
of the 40% GP
o Maysilo Estate then asserted its claim of ownership on said land
o Eternal then files interpleader against MISSION and Maysilo in CFI
o Eternal wants to protect its interests and that it doesn’t care who owns
it, as they are willing to pay whoever owns the land.
 MISSION then files a motion for the placing of judicial deposit of the rest
of the money owed by ETERNAL from the sale of land
o Trial court denied such motion stating that the ownership of the
lands are still being tried on (prejudicial question).
o Trial court then subsequently reverses its decision and now
wants MISSION to deposit the 1M paid by ETERNAL
 MISSION then files with the IAC praying to reverse the judgment of the RTC
o Again, it first dismissed the petition and consequently reversed it
stating that Eternal must deposit said amounts owing to
MISSION, based on the LDA, to a reputable bank
 Thus, eternal files a petition for certiorari
Issue: W/N CA committed GADLEJ by reconsidering its resolution and ordering
Eternal Gardens to deposit the amount owed in the LDA to a reputable bank? No
 The courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make them
conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgements have not yet
attained finality.
 Motions for Reconsiderations are allowed to convince the court that their rulings
are erroneous and improper and in so doing the courts are given opportunity to
correct their errors.
 In the case at bar, Eternal Gardens admitted in its interpleader that it
claims no interest in the amounts due and that it is still obligated to
pay whoever is declared entitled to amounts under the Land
Development Agreement. Such admissions were reaffirmed in open court
before the IAC
NUNAL V. CA
 Emma Lyon de Leon as guardian ad litem to the respondents filed a case
against Nunal, now represented by her heirs for partition and accounting of a
parcel of land in Isabela
o The land was owned by Frank Lyon under the TCT
 Said land was claimed to be in possession by Nunal since 1946 and made no
accounting of the income that was derived therefrom, despite demands of
partition and delivery of the shares to the respondents
 TC renders judgment in favor of respondents partially
o TC grants the partition but dismisses the accounting
o TC recommends that should there be no agreement as to partition, it
shall appoint commissioners to make said partition
o CA affirms judgment of CFI and an order for the writ of execution was
issued
 Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of Frank then files a motion to quash said order
with preliminary injunction
o She contends that not being a party to the case, her share should not
be prejudiced and that the partition should not include her share of the
land.
o TC dismissed said motion and ordered the commissioner to partition
said land
o However, the board of commissioners found out her name was
included in the TCT and she should therefore be construed as one of
the heirs.
 TC then issues an order to petitioner to list all the heirs
o Petitioner files a manifestation praying that the partition be that of the
previous ruling (di kasama si Mary basically)
o TC then orders the commissioners to partition without ruling on the
manifestation
o TC then issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon
Martin as co-owner.
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ISSUE: W/N the TC may order the inclusion of Mary as Co-owner? No. Partition was
already final and executory.
 Nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment
becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.
 The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court
of the land.
 The only recognized exceptions are:
o the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
o where the judgment is
RATIO:
 It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no
longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. HOWEVER, this principle admits of
exceptions, as where the facts and circumstances transpire which render
its execution impossible or unjust and it therefore become necessary,
“in the interest if justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the
disposition with the prevailing circumstances. ”
 5 years had already lapsed since the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on Feb
26 1987. Thus a Recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and
proper determination of the monetary awards due to private
respondents.

void Industrial Timber Corp v. NLRC

 Private Respondents obtained a favorable decision from Arbiter Amado

Solamo on Feb 26, 1987.
o Order called for a reinstatement and payment of back wages and
other benefits amounting to P24,300 each.
o This decision was affirmed by the NLRC on Feb 3, 1992.
o In view of the 5year lapse since the promulgation of the decision, the
NLRC likewise directed Petitioner Corp to pay the respondents
severance benefits
 1 month pay for every year from employment to date of
resolution if reinstatement is not possible
 Decision became final and executory by Mar 9 1992
o Entry of judgement was made on Mar 25, 1992.
o Respondents filed an ex parte motion for issuance of writ of execution
with manifestation from Feb 26, 1987 till present, they have not
been reinstated,.
o Thus they were entitled to back salaries for the said period until actual
reinstatement shall have been made.
 The amount totalled P387,122.65, including 3 years back wages, ECOLA, 13th
month pay, holiday pay, VL and SL pay and other benefits.
o Both parties filed objections to the computation and on appeal, the
Commission only made a slight modification, totalling to P375,795.20.
 Petitioners then filed an MR but was late and was denied due to
tardiness. Thus, Petitioners filed against the NLRC and is faulted with GADLEJ
for merely modifying the award of damages and denying the MR

ISSUE: W/N the judgment can still be modified after it has become final and
executory? YES. this case belongs to the exception

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Esquivel v CA
judgment. In fact there was no declaration of the rights and duties of
the parties.
 The case arose from an ejectment case where a certain Alaurin secured a
 The decision merely said that ENCINAS was the successor in interest of
judgment against the private respondents Magno and spouses Encinas. Private
Alaurin and that whatever the decision in the ORIGINAL complaint
respondent alleged that they had prior possession of the land and that
would be binding on Encinas. Further Esquivel appealed the original
Esquivel’s OCT was acquired through fraud. Alaurin won the case and the
complaint in the CA, it cannot be said that they truly believed that the
judgment became final and executory, thus a writ of execution was issued.
supplemental decision had superseded the original decision, if at all it could.
Before it could be enforced, spouses Esquivel filed against Alaurin a case
for reconveyance with nullity of judgment damages and preliminary
Cardoza v Singson
injunction. The preliminary injunction was granted
 Alaurin naturally opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and
 In 1979, Sitoy (counsel for private respondents Alvarez) as counsel for the
filed a petition for certiorari with the SC to set aside the order granting
administrator of the Estate of Cardoza filed for a motion for execution of
the writ. During this hearing (regarding the prelim injunc) the parties,
judgment of a decision which had allegedly become final and executory in
assisted by counsel, set forth that they agreed to a suspension of the
1938. It was alleged that by Cardoza that they had only acquired knowledge of
consideration of the petition for certiorari and agreed to have the case
the decision in 1974 because of the death of the original counsel in 1944.
(annulment of judgment and reconveyance) to be tried on the merits.
Attached to the motion was a certification to the effect that the plaintiffs nor
They also agreed that the party who won the litigation (in this case
their counsel had received a copy of the decision.
Alaurin won) would possess the land.
 Defendants did not submit a memorandum or reply. Cardoza moved for a
 In light of this joint manifesto, court dismissed the case and ordered that the
deferment of the motion for execution because there was allegedly no entry of
trial for the reconveyance begin and be decided within 90 days. When they lost,
judgment therefore they prayed that the decision be recorded in the CA’s book
the Esquivels filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They
of entries of judgment.
were directed to amend their appeal. But before they could amend their
 Pursuant to this the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment. Thereafter
appeal, they filed a motion to file a supplemental complaint impleading
the sheriff of southern leyte was directed to enforce the decision of the trial
spouses Encinas (Alaurin had sold the land to Encinas as evidenced by
court. When the copy of the writ of execution was served upon Cardoza, e filed
a deed of sale). The supplemental complaint was admitted in court and on
for a motion for reconsideration and that the execution be held in abeyance. It
motion of the respondents Alaurin, the defendants in the supplemental
was.
complaint were declared in default (Encinas).
 Heirs of Alvarez (private respondent) filed a manifestation to the effect that
 Encinas was declared the successor-in-interest of Alaurin and that the case
they did not object to the nunc pro tunc judgment. Cardoza was again
would be binding upon them. Encinas was not satisfied with the judgment and
furnished with a copy of the writ and was ordered to turn over the property. He
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA praying that the decision against the
harvested coconuts in the parcels of land and thereafter was ordered to appear
supplemental defendants (encinas) be declared null and void. Denied. The
in court to explain why he should not be held in contempt for the harvesting of
supplemental complaint was resolved in favor of Esquivel, and affirmed
the land in question.
by the CA. Petitioners now claim that the supplemental complaint
 Cardoza filed the instant petition for certiorari mandamus with prohibition with
revised the decision in the original complaint. That this amounted to a
preliminary injunction alleging that the respondent judge singson had usurped
reversal of the original decision rendered by respondent Judge Alegre.
the jurisdiction of the CA by directing a nunc pro tunc decision be declared.
Because the non-action for 40 years was a ground for the denial.
Issue: W/N The supplemental decision amounted to a amendment or
reversal of the original decision? NO
Issue: W/N the decision of the trial court as modified by the CA can still be
 Amended judgment v Supplemental judgment. The former is where the lower
enforced? (this is the one from 40 yeas ago) W/N Singson committed
court, through a thorough study of the original judgment renders and amended
GADLEJ when it made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued a
and clarified judgment after considering all the factual and legal issues, an
writ of execution? YES and NO GADLEJ
amended decision is an entirely new decision and supersedes the original
decision.
 Under the code of civil procedure which took effect in 1901, the prevailing party
 A supplemental judgment does not take the place or extinguish the existence of
in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment w/in 5
the original, it serves only to add to or to reinforce the primary decision. It
years from its date of entry. The period is counted 5 years from the entry
exists side by side with the original and does not replace it.
of judgment and not promulgation
 In this case the record shows that there was no restudy made by the
 The trial court acting as a court of law and a court of equity correctly made the
respondent court of the original decision but only on issues raised in the
entry of judgment a nucn pro tunc decision. IT was merely ordering the
supplemental complaint. The said decision cannot stand on its own as a
execution of the judgment of the CA.
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 The decree of a judgment nunc pro tunc was not done arbitrarily as the cause of action
petitioner was given ample time to oppose the motion in court and even submit
a memorandum to support his position. HE failed to submit a memorandum nor
adduce evidence to support his claims.
 Nunc pro tunc definition: A latin expression which means now for then. In
general a court ruling nunc pro tunc applies retroactively to correct an earlier
ruling. A judgment nunc pro tunc by the trial court corrects a clerical
rather than a judicial error in a prior judgment (in this case it was the
non entry of the judgment in the entry book).

Del rosario V Far east Bank

 Davao Timber (DATICOR) entered into a loan agreement with Private

Development Corp (PDCP) worth $265K USD and 2.5M PHP for a total of 4.4M
PHP at the prevailing USD exchange rate. The loan agreement provided a 1%
service fee (later increased to 6%) 12% interest and penalty charges of 2% per
month in case of default. Loans were ecured by REM over 6 parcels of land
including the Otis property in manila, in the name of Del Rosario. The other 5
parces were located in Davao Oriental. Chattel mortgage over machinery and
equipment also.
 DATICOR paid 3M total which was applied by PDCP to interest, service fees and
penalty charges. This left an outstanding balance of 10m. DATICOR filed in the
CFI of Manila for a violation of Usury law, annulment of contract and damages.
Dismissed by CFI. Set aside by the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring the
stipulation of interest in the loan void and of no effect.
 During this time, PDCP assigned to Far East for 5.4M its receivables via a deed
of assignment. DATICOR And Far East executed a memorandum of agreement
where DATICOR agreed to pay 6.4M as full settlement. SC later ruled that the
total remaining was only 1.4M. DATICOR filed for recovery of sum of money of
5.3M in excess payment. RTC ordered PDCP and far east to pay back the
money and for the release or cancellation of the parcels of land from mortgage.
But CA Ruled that since DATICOR only prayed for relief of 900k from Far east, it
could not award more than the amount prayed for. PDCP for its part
contended that there had been a previous final and executory decision
which cannot be relitigated thus DATICOR had no cause of action and
that FEBTC could not make it liable for the payment of money to
DATICOR in any case.
 PDCP claimed that It was not privy to the MOVA between FEBTC and DATICOR
thus it was explicitly excluded from the SC decision. DATICOR filed in the trial
court for summary judgment, it was denied for lack of merit and on the ground
of res judicata. Trial court noted that the moa between FEBTC and DATICOR
clearly stated that the petitioners agreed to pay 6.4 m for full settlement of
obligation and that the parties cannot be allowed to welsh on their contractual
obligations.

Issue: W/N there is res judicata between the parties? NO.

 Section 49(B) Bar by prior judgment: the judgment of a court of

competent jurisdiction n the merits prevents further litigation between the
parties and their privies, either in a new action or suit for the same

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

before any tribunal. This is otherwise known as bar by prior

judgment/estoppel by judgment. This makes judgment conclusive as
to matters offered and received as well as any other matter which
may and which could have been offered and adjudged. This is a
ground for motion to dismiss.
 Sec 47 C Conclusiveness of judgment: conclusiveness of judgment
provides that any right , fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved n the determination of an action where a judgment is
rendered n the merits is conclusively settled by judgment and cannot be
litigated again. Basically that a judgment in the prior action only operates
as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or necessarily
included.
 This case qualifies as a bar by prior judgment fulfilling the 4
conditions a) finality of former judgment b) court had jurisdiction c)
judgment on the merits d) identity of the parties, subject matter and
cause of action between the first and second actions.
 In this case there was a judgment on the merits which determined the
rights and liabilities of the parties. Namely that DATICOR overpaid, FEBTC
was bound to refund the excess payment but only up to the extent prayed
for by DATICOR and that PDCP had no further claim against DATICOr.
 Right or wrong, this judgment bars another case upon the same cause of
action.

Griffith v Estur

 Estur and co filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of legal

holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay against Gerald
and Giffith. The Griffith corp is engaged in the manufacture of furniture. The
labor arbiter ruled in favor of Estur and ordering Griffith to pay the amounts.
The decision became final and executory and petitioner received the writ of
execution. He filed a motion to quash this writ.
 He stated that he was unaware of the labor case as he was VP of Lincoln for
Southeast Asia Operations. Further that he was not personally liable to pay the
judgment debt because he acted in good fatih and within the bounds of his
authority. Denied by the labor arbiter, motion for recon in NLRC.
 After another writ of execution was issued, he filed with the CA for a TRO or
prelim injuction. CA dismissed and denied the subsequent MR. Hence this
petition for review.
 Later claimed he was no longer part of Lincoln. He insists that the writ was
defective because it should have been the sole liability of Lincoln, because he
was only a coporate officer acting in good faith. He should not have been
ncluded in the writ as solidarily liable with Lincoln.

Issue W/N the writ was proper?YES

 Labor arbiter’s decision is already final and executory and can no longer be
subject of an appeal. He is bound by the decision and may no longer impugn
the same.
 Once a decision has attained finality it may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if it is meant to correct was a erroneous conclusion of law or fact

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 He moved to quash the writ because it modified the decision of the labor arbiter
 Incidentally, the Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is
including the amount of the execution in the writ. This inclusion of the amount
non-litigious in nature, which does not require a hearing under the
to be executed is not a modification. The amount to be executed is based on
Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC without prejudicing
the amount of the award. Thus it could only have been determined after the
the rights of the respondents.
order had been promulgated.
Marina Properties v CA
PCI Leasing v. Milan (two motions for reconsiderations allowed on
equitable grounds)
 Marina, a real estate company, had a condominium project in Paranaque. Its
contractor was H.L. Carlos. HL Carlos bought a unit, under a contract to sell in
 PCI Leasing filed a complaint for sum of money against the Milans (civil case 1)
installments, (in the project it was in charge of) and even paid 1M as down
in RTC QC. PCI alleged that it extended loans to the Milans and in consideration
payment. After paying more than half of the contract price, HL Carlos
thereof, the Milans assigned their receivables (checks) However, when PCI
demanded for the delivery of the unit but Marina refused. In turn, HL Carlos
encashed the checks, it was dishonored. The Milans still owed PCI 2.3M.
filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. Marina responded by taking over the
 When summons was attempted to be served on the Milans, they could not be
completion of the project, alleging that HL Carlos abandoned construction AND
found in their residence in Novaliches. In view of this, PCI filed a motion to
cancelling the contract to sell.
archive the case, subject to its reinstatement after the whereabouts of the
 HL Carlos then filed a complaint for specific performance with the HLURB,
Milans were determined. This was, however, denied. Thereafter, PCI Leasing
seeking to enforce the contract to sell, alleging substantial compliance. HLURB
filed a motion for an issuance of alias summons but in the hearing for
declared the cancellation of the contract to sell as null and void (basically ruled
the motion, the counsel of PCI failed to appear because he was late. Due
in favor of HL Carlos due to the Maceda law, ordering Marina to turn over the
to this, the RTC ordered the civil case to be DISMISSED.
condo unit)
 PCI prayed that the order of dismissal be reconsidered. The RTC denied this
 Marina appealed to the board of commissioners of HLURB but the previous
MR stating that PCI was remiss in its duty to prosecute the case. PCI then filed
decision was affirmed. The OP also affirmed the previous decision. Marina also
an ex parte motion for reconsideration, stressing that it had a valid cause
filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP but it was denied for
of action and that it never lost interest. This was also denied.
being pro-forma (did not raise any new issue as the issues were already
 PCI then went to the CA under rule 65 (denied for being filed out of time and
discussed in its decision) It then filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA
because the petition involved pure questions of law) then went to the SC under
also ruled that Marina did not raise any new issue in its MR.
rule 45. PCI alleges that the CA ignored its efforts to seek a rectification of the
 In the SC, Marina asserts that the complaint of HL Carlos should’ve dismissed
RTC’s acts
and HL Carlos asserts that the complaint was filed out of time as the decision of
the OP became final and executory as the MR did not create a fresh period, it
Issue: Did the RTC err in dismissing PCI Leasing’s case? YES
being pro-forma.
 In the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI
Issue: Was Marina’s MR merely pro forma? Did it toll the period to appeal to the
Leasing, i.e., the sum of money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. It
CA?
will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTC’s dismissal of the case
with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily upheld by
 The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of
appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural
the period to appeal, unless the motion is pro forma. An MR is deemed pro
lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or
forma if it does not specify the finding or conclusions in the judgment
tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes
which are not supported by evidence or contrary to law, making
 In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse
express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions.
to collect the amount ofP2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents.
 It is settled that although an MR may merely reiterate issues already passed
Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from collecting the aforesaid
upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma and is
amount, respondent Milan stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of PCI
immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites
Leasing.
of the rules -> The MR must precisely convince the court that its ruling is
 In its original MR, PCI Leasing explained that its counsel merely came late
wrong and improper, contrary to law and the like.
during the hearing scheduled for the said date, arriving at the time
 HOWEVER, where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the
when Judge Domingo-Regala was already dictating the order of
part of the pleader to merely delay and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to
dismissal. Said hearing was not even for the presentation of the evidence in
present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the
chief of PCI Leasing, where the latter’s presence would be indispensable, but
courts should not swiftly declare the motion as pro forma as this has a direct
merely for the issuance of Alias Summons.
bearing on the movant’s right to appeal.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 In this case, the SC held that the MR of Marina was not pro forma as the
 In 2001, Petitioner Encarnacion then filed a complaint for ejectment in the MTC
motion adequately pointed out the conclusions Marina regarded as wrong and
of Isabela. It was granted but on appeal, the RTC dismissed the case because
contrary to law. It even referred to findings not supported by evidence as well
the MTC had no jurisdiction. Encarnacion then filed a petition for review under
as other jurisprudence to support its claim. It is of no moment that the OP
Rule 42 with the CA. The CA then ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC
already passed upon the issues as the declaration of an MR as pro forma is
for further proceedings, ruling that it was an accion publiciana.
vital.
 Encarnacion argues that the CA erred in ruling that it was an accion publiciana
Republic v. ICC
Issue: Was the action properly characterized by the CA? YES
 ICC, a holder of franchise to operate domestic telecommunications, filed with
 There are three kinds of actions for recovery of possession of real property to
the NTC an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to
wit: an ejectment proceeding (accion interdictal), an action for the recovery of
install, operate and maintain an international communications leased circuit
the real right of possession (accion publican) and an action to recover
service. The NTC approved the application subject to the condition that ICC pay
ownership (accion reinvindicatoria) The last two have to be brought in the RTCs
a permit fee (1.1M)
 The material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the
 ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration insofar as it required the payment
recovery of possession of the property in this case is the length of time of
of a permit fee. It was denied. ICC then went to the CA under 65. The CA
dispossession. In this light, the CA committed no error in holding that the
sustained NTC. ICC filed an MR. On September 30, 1999 CA reversed itself in
proper action is accion publiciana since Encarnacion was already dispossessed
an amended decision and decided that ICC does not have to pay a permit fee
of ownership for more than 1 year.
 Then in January 24, 2000, NTC filed an MR but it was denied. NTC went to the
 Further, it was correctly ruled by the CA that the RTC should not have
SC, alleging that the CA erred in not reversing the NTC. ICC contends,
dismissed the case. This is because if the case was tried on the merits by the
however, that the NTC petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of
MTC without jurisdiction over the SM, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss
time. ICC argues that petitioner’s MR filed with the CA vis-à-vis its amended
the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer
decision is a pro forma motion and therefore, did not toll the running of the
try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the
period to come to the SC.
evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the
amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
Issue: Was NTC’s motion for reconsideration pro forma?
o Legal basis: Sec 8 Par 2 of Rule 40-> Basically, RTC knew MTC did
not have jurisdiction and it should not have dismissed the case
 It is established that the mere fact that a MR reiterates issues already passed
because it had original jurisdiction over the case anyway, it being an
upon by the court does not by itself make it a pro forma motion. The purpose of
accion publiciana.
a MR is to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary
o Otherwise put, if MTC tries a case and it had no jurisdiction over the
to law or evidence, and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of necessity on
SM and a party appeals and the RTC has original jurisdiction over the
issues already passed upon.
case, the RTC shoudn’t dismiss the appeal and instead decide the
 If a MR may not discuss those issues, the consequence would be that after a
case!
decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions
for reopening and new trial.
Canlas v. Tubil
 In fact, even if NTC’s MR was indeed pro forma, it would still be in the
interest of justice to review the CA’s amended decision a quo on the
 In 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil against
merits, rather than to abort the appeal on mere technicalities,
the Canlas family before the MTC. (*Note: Tubil and Canlas: relatives)
especially where as here, the industry involved (telecom) is vested
 Canlas filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC is without
with public interest.
jurisdiction over the SM, and instead the RTC had jurisdiction.. This
 As for the merits, the SC ruled that indeed, ICC should not pay any other
motion was denied because grounds relied upon were evidentiary in nature
permit fee as its franchise exempts it from payment of all taxes, assessments,
which needed to be litigated.
charges, fees or levies of any kind except for a franchise tax.
 Petitioners, in their answer, claim that they were the owners of the land
pursuant to a free patent and that Tubil’s cause of action was for an accion
Encarnacion v. Amigo
publiciana. MTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Tubil to show that
Canlas’ possession was by mere tolerance. Tubil appealed to the RTC
 Encarnacio was able to register a certain parcel of land in his name in Isabela in
which affirmed the MTC. Respondent Tubil then filed a petition for review
1996. However, he discovered that sometime in 1985, Amigo, without the
with the CA which reversed the dismissal and ordered the RTC to
permission of the then owner, took possession of the lot and continued even
decide the case on the merits merits.
after a TCT was issued to Encarnacion.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 Canlas went to the SC, assailing the CA order and alleging that the RTC does
not have original jurisdiction over the SM of the case as it was an
unlawful detainer case.

Issue: Does RTC have jurisdiction? NO. MTC decision dismissing the unlawful
detainer case is AFFIRMED. Petition granted.

 In this case, Tubil’s allegations in its complaint clearly make a case for
unlawful detainer, essentially conferring jurisdiction on the MTC. The
complaint alleged that Tubil merely tolerated the Canlas’ family’s
presence and that on January 12, 2004, Tubil made a demand for Canlas to
vacate. The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on June 9, 2004 (within 1
year from the time the last demand to vacate was made)
 The timeliness of the filing of the complaint is not at issue here as the
dispossession of the property has not lasted for more than 1 year. The
ruling of the RTC that Tubil was dispossessed for 36 years and therefore the
proper action was accion publiciana was without legal and factual basis. (In the
previous case, it was different as it was proven that the dispossession lasted for
more than 1 year)
 Also, the RTC affirmed the MTC and thus ruled that the MTC indeed acquired
jurisdiction. It thus properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint
for unlawful detainer by affirming the MTC. Sec 8 Par 2 of Rule 40 DOES NOT
APPLY HERE as the MTC had jurisdiction in the first place!

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Silverio, Jr. vs. CA
 In the settlement of the estate of Beatrice Silverio, the RTC issued an
Omnibus order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate a property belonging
to said Estate.
 Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, Silverio-Deee filed a
MR of the Order. This was denied. Thereafter Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of
Appeal and also a Record of Appeal.
 The RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that no appeal may be taken
from an order denying a Motion of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 41
and (2) for filing beyond the reglementary period.
 Consequently, Silverio-Dee filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the
CA. The CA annulled the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether the Omnibus order is an interlocutory order?
 Yes. While generally a denial of a motion of reconsideration of a complaint is
not an interlocutory order but a final order (as correctly ruled by the CA), the
SC held in this particular case the RTC Order is not a final determination of the
settlement case
o Rationale: It is only upon the partition of the Estate that each
heir may lay claim on their share. The order was only for Silverio-
Dee to vacate the premises!
 An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be decided upon while a final order is one that disposed of
the subject matter in its entirety.
o A final order is appealable while an interlocutory order is
generally non-appealable. It is only when such interlocutory
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.
 Since Silverio-Dee failed to employ the proper remedy of certiorari, the case is
dismissed. The CA decision is reversed.
Manila Memorial Park v. CA
 Respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of lands
against MMP and co-defendants United Housing Corp, Hernandez, heirs of de
Leon and heirs of Gatchalian. After a protracted litigation, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on due to lack of merit and was already barred by
laches. Thereafter, respondents received the decision only on July 4, 1983 and
subsequently filed on July 19, 1983, the last day for appeal a motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration. The motion was denied and respondents received
the decision on Nov 28,1989
 Respondents then filed a notice of appeal on Dec 7,1989 to which the trial
court gave due course and directed the transmittal of records to the CA.
However, the transcripts were missing.7 years after that the trial court made
the parties appear in conference. Still, no transcripts were submitted to the trial
court even after a year has passed.
 Thus, on Feb 28, 1997 respondents filed a motion for new trail for the retaking
and presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that
the reconstitution of the transcripts were no longer possible and said
stenographer had already been retired and could not be found.
 Petitioner then on Apr 22 1997, filed a MTD the appeal due to it having
passed the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Trial court however
dismissed the MTD and granted the new trial. The court rationated that
because the final resolution of the case cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely
and MMP waited for 8 years before filing a MTD
 Petitioner now files a petition for certiorari to the CA insisting that TC
committed GADLEJ. CA however sided with the Trial court based on the ground
that MMP should have filed it as early as 1989.
ISSUE: W/N MMP is estopped from raising the timeliness of the appeal considering it
waited for 8 years to file an MTD? NO
 In an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order – 15 days
o If such is interrupted or suspended by motion of new trial or
reconsideration and is denied, the party has only the remaining period
from the notice of denial in which to file an appeal
o In this case, respondents had 1 day after Nov 28, 1989 to file such an
appeal. Thus upon failing to do so, the judgment became final and
executory.
 The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo. Failure
to perfect an appeal renders its judgment final and executory
o As such, the legality of an appeal may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings and the court cannot dismiss the action for being out of
time.
 NOTE: there are few exceptions where the court relaxed the reglementary
period, however the respondents did not give reason as to why it should be
relaxed instead relying on the timeliness of petitoner’s MTD
NEYPES v. CA (Fresh Period Rule)
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC
against Bureau of Forestry and Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of
the Phil. and the heirs of del Mundo. In the course of the proceedings both
parties filed various motions with the trial court
o Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents in default
o Land Bank and heirs filed their MTDs respectively
 The court ruled in 1997 on the motions as follows
o Respondents were declared in default for failure to file an answer
except that of the heirs of del Mundo as there was an improper service
of summons
o Land Bank’s MTD for lack of cause of action was denied due to
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only
after trial
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
o Heirs’ MTD based on prescription again based on factual matters that
could only be determined after trial
 Respondent heirs then filed an MR on the ground that the court can resolve the
issue based on the allegations of the complaint without waiting for the trial.
 The trial court ultimately dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that
the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a MR.
 the trial court issued another order dismissing the MR which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. On July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. The court a quo then denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998.
 Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before
the Court of Appeals.
 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15 -day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the 'final order appealable
under the Rules
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners filed their appeal within the reglementary period? YES
new ruling : now you get a fresh 15 day period after getting denied of MR or Motion
for New Trial
 the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right
to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
 However, jurisprudence has shown that the courts seem confused as to what is
the “final order” – the order dismissing the complaint or the one dismissing the
MR.
 The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
 Thus, petitioners seasonably filed their appeal within the fresh period of 15
days counted from July 22, 1998 the order dismissing the MR
Trans International v. CA
 Trans International filed a complaint for damages against NAPOCOR and two
of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply
and delivery of woodpoles. The trial court rendered a decision sustaining the
claim of petitioner. It awarded to petitioner the following amounts representing
the amount of profits, expenses and attorney's fees.
 Respondents filed an MR but it was denied by the RTC. A copy of the aforesaid
order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCOR'S office on August 23,
1996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the
office of the VP-General Counsel.
 Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside
the drawer of his table. However, on August 26 and 27, 1996 (Monday and
Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report for work due to an illness
he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was
retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was
immediately forwarded to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for
the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that same day, respondents thru counsel filed
their notice of appeal.
 On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial
court contending that its decision dated May 22, 1996 had become final and
executory since respondents failed to make a timely appeal and praying for the
issuance of an order granting the writ of execution.
Issue: W/N the delay for filing of an appeal was justified? NO
Ratio:
 The one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen
illness of the receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel
of petitioner NAPOCOR.
 The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the
prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason,
such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar
supervening casualty, without fault of the appellant, which the court may deem
sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his failure to
comply strictly with the law.
 Absent in the record is any independent proof of the alleged indisposition of
Ronald Lapuz. To his affidavit, he attached an approved leave of absence form
for two (2) days (Monday and Tuesday) to prove that he was absent on those
days due to illness. However, there is no medical certificate to attest to the fact
of illness, thus, there is no competent supporting proof of the alleged extraction
of three front teeth.
 Another capital sin of Ronald Lapuz is his admission that he "forgot to deliver
immediately the copy of the order . . .," despite the instruction of Atty. Collado
for him to "immediately deliver to his secretary any order" in this case.
Forgetfulness is neither accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would
warrant justification for the one day delay in filing the notice of appeal.
 In essence, the court is NOT convinced that the test for substantial justice and
equity considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome
the one day delay in the perfection of their appeal.
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon
Kho vs. Camacho
Facts
 As satisfaction for attorney’s fees due to Atty. Camacho, Narciso Kho issued
6 post-dates Manila Bank checks in the aggregate amount of P57, 349.
o One of the checks worth 10k was lost.
o The other 5 checks were negotiated by Camacho to Philippine
Amanah Bank, but the same were returned because the CB closed
down Manila Bank.
 Kho refused to replace the Manila Bank checks, so Camacho instituted an
action for a collection of a sum of money.
o Kho’s contentions: he was under no obligation to replace the check
worth 10k because it was Camacho that had lost it. Furthermore, he is
in no position to pay Camacho until his money in the beleaguered
bank is released.
 Contending that petitioner's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho
moved for a judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste
granted.
 Kho seasonably filed a notice of appeal, which was granted by respondent
judge. Camacho thereafter filed a motion to strike the notice of appeal off
the record which was also granted by Leviste.
o Leviste opined that since only questions of law were involved in
the appeal, it should have been filed with the SC and not the CA.
Issue
Whether Leviste gravely abused his discretion in issuing the order which cancelled
the order approving the appeal.
Held: YES. Leviste acted with grave abuse of discretion. The RTC cannot
dismiss an appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved.
 What respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was to
sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of
Appeals to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted.
o Under the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the
record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not a
notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of
the trial court.
 The question of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both
questions of fact and law should be left to the determination of the CA and
not the RTC who rendered the decision appealed from.
 However, to give due course to the appeal and allow the records to be
elevated to the appellate court would serve no useful purpose and will only
delay the resolution of the case. The SC affirmed the order of Leviste which
ordered Kho to pay P57,349.00 "minus the P10,000.00 pertaining to the lost
check”.
Citytrust Banking vs. CA
 Private respondent Samara, an American who does business in the Philippines,
filed a complaint against Citytrust and Marine Midland for the recovery of a sum
of money. The complaint alleged that Samara purchased from Citytrust a bank
draft for $40K, the drawee being Marine Midland. Subsequently, Samara
executed a stop payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform
Marine midland of such, which acknowledged the receipt of the said stop-
payment order. Pursuant to the said order, Citytrust credited back Samara’s
account due to the non-payment. However, after seven months, Citytrust re-
debited Samara’s account for $40K upon discovering that Marine Midland had
already debited Citytrust’s own account.
 The lower court ruled in favor of Samara, ordering Citytrust and Marine
Midland solidarily liable to pay Samara P40K with 12% annual interest with
damages amounting to P100K. Citytrust and Marine Midland filed separate
appeals. Citytrust’s appeal was however dismissed for having been filed out of
time since it was file 51 days after it received a copy of the trial court decision.
Marine Midland’s was on the other hand seasonably filed. The CA modified the
decision of the trial court, lowering the interest rate to 6% and removing the
award for exemplary damages in favor of Samara
 Citytrust filed with SC a petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of its
appeal alleging that the timely appeal of Marine Midland inured to its benefit.
The SC denied the said petitioner on ground that the rights and liabilities of
Citytrust and Marine Midland are not interwoven and that lthough the two were
solidarily liable, only Marine Midland was ultimately held responsible for
damages because it was the one ordered to reimburse Citytrust for whatever
amount Citytrust will be made to pay the Samara by reason of the judgment.
 Citytrust alleges that the CA decision dated has superseded and rendered
functus oficio the earlier decision of the trial court and is applicable not only to
Marine Midland but also to the Citytrust.
Issue: is the decision of CA reducing the interest rate and damages in favor of
Marine Midland applicable also to Citytrust, despite its own appeal being denied?
 The Court does not agree with Citytrust’s contention that it can benefit from the
modification of the judgment even if it has lost its own appeal on ground that
rights and liabilities of Citytrust and Marine Midland are not so interwoven and
thus the judgment cannot affect the party who failed to appeal. It was the trial
court judgment that created a joint and several obligation to pay the Samara
certain sums, not the relationship as drawer-drawee in the draft transaction.
 The joint and several obligation imposed by the lower court had a three-fold
purpose: (1) to declare the prevailing party to be entitled to recover damages
on account of the prejudice which resulted from the acts of the co-defendants;
(2) to give the prevailing party the right to proceed against either one of them
to recover the amounts awarded to him; and (3) to impress upon Marine
Midland its ultimate liability to fully reimburse the petitioner Citytrust consistent
with the finding that the proximate cause of the injury to the private
respondent was the wrongful deed of Marine Midland.
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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon

 This judgment, however, does not alter the fact that the respective defenses of
the co-defendants are distinct on trial and even on appeal.
 However, the Court in the case at bar decides not to apply the literal application
said rule where the execution against Citytrust would be based on the trial
court decision.
 The Court cannot close its eyes to the inexplicable situation where
Samara would be given a choice of executing his claim for US
$40,000.00 plus bigger interest exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees from petitioner Citytrust, or US $40,000.00 plus a smaller sum
inclusive of simple interest and reduced attorney's fees from Marine
Midland.
 Even if it is admitted that Citytrust would anyway be reimbursed for the whole
amount which Citytrust may be ordered to pay, such reimbursement would be
a circumvention of the appellate court's judgment that Marine Midland is liable
only for the modified sum.
 Thus, the Court shall apply basic principles of justice and equity.
o There was substantial evidence to show that Marine Midland is the one
actually responsible for the personal injury to Samara since it
continued to release payments despite the stop payment order by
Samara. If it were not for the said payments, Citytrust would not have
debited the said amounts from the account of Samara.
o Considering the above circumstances, the Court will not allow the
absurd situation where a co-defendant who is adjudged to be
primarily liable for sums of money and for tort would be
charged for an amount lesser than what its co-defendant is
bound to pay. Such a situation runs counter to the principle of
solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants established
by a judgment for recovery of sum of money and damages.
o Substantial justice shall not allow Marine Midland, which is the source
of the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct
execution against him of the judgment for the reduced amount or by
the indirect execution by way of reimbursement at a later time.