Global leadership is missing in action

economist.com/special-report/2020/06/18/global-leadership-is-missing-in-action

June 18, 2020

A FEW WEEKS after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, Winston Churchill was a guest at
the White House. President Franklin Roosevelt was so eager to tell him he had come up
with a name for what would become a new world security organisation that, the story
goes, he hurried into Churchill’s bedroom, to find the prime minister naked save for a
bathrobe. What is striking about the origins of the “United Nations”, Roosevelt’s choice,
is not this unorthodox manner of communication (a modern American president might
have tweeted his idea) but that, in the midst of war, statesmen were already planning
for the peace.

On the economic front, this led to the creation, in 1944 at Bretton Woods in New
Hampshire, of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the
security side, plans for the UN were fleshed out at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC,
agreed to in outline by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea and
finalised at a conference in San Francisco after Roosevelt’s death. “Oh what a great day
this can be in history,” proclaimed President Harry Truman at the concluding session
on June 26th 1945, when the founding charter was signed. Countries had put aside their
differences “in one unshakable unity of determination—to find a way to end wars.”

Euphoria soon gave way to frustration as the cold war set in. Yet, as the new
organisation’s second secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, observed, the UN “was not
created to take mankind to heaven but to save humanity from hell”. For 75 years there
have been no world wars (though too many smaller ones). Unlike its precursor, the
League of Nations, the UN has proved resilient. Its membership has grown from 51
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countries to 193, through decolonisation and the break-up of the Soviet empire. It sits at
the centre of a rules-based world order, and its activities and those of its specialised
agencies span almost every aspect of life.

Yet no international order lasts for ever. Over time the balance of power shifts, systems
fail to adapt and the rot sets in. The peace after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 eroded
slowly; that after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 collapsed fast. A change from one
dominant power to another has usually meant war (the shift from Britain to America
over a century ago being a rare exception).

Covid-19 is a new challenge. A vacuum exists where the world would normally look for
American leadership. Instead it sees President Donald Trump making a fool of himself,
suggesting wacky cures. Mr Trump has been more interested in blaming China for the
pandemic than rallying an international response, his most prominent move being to
suspend funding to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and threaten to leave it. In
March G7 foreign ministers could not even issue a statement because Mike Pompeo,
America’s secretary of state, insisted it refer to the “Wuhan virus”.

China’s initial response to the virus was a bungled cover-up, but since its harsh
lockdown brought covid-19 under control, it has touted its successes around the world
and supplied protective kit to thankful countries. The Europeans, meanwhile, closed
borders, including in their supposedly frontier-free Schengen area. A divided UN
Security Council has been missing in action.

The world order was already looking wobbly. The global financial crisis of 2007-09 fed
populism and a wariness of international institutions. These often reflect the realities of
decades ago, not today (the Security Council’s five veto-holding permanent members
are the victorious powers of 1945), yet they resist reform. The rules remain, but the big
powers increasingly feel free to ignore them. Russia has brazenly grabbed a piece of
Ukraine. China has occupied disputed territories in the South China Sea.

America has long complained about the cost of propping up the multilateral system and
fretted about “Gulliverisation”, being tied down by punier powers. Along with Britain it
invaded Iraq in 2003 without a mandate from the Security Council. President Barack
Obama, prioritising “nation-building at home”, began a semi-retreat from the burdens
of global leadership. But the principal architect of the system now has a president who
seems to delight in taking a wrecking ball to it.

Mr Trump has withdrawn from the Paris agreement on climate change and the nuclear
deal with Iran. He has cast doubt on America’s commitment to NATO (though he has
strengthened its forces in many parts of Europe). He has continued to undermine the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) by blocking the appointment of new judges to its
appellate body. He has called the European Union a “foe”. His love of sanctions causes
further friction, prompting complaints that America is abusing the “exorbitant
privilege” of having the world’s reserve currency and stimulating interest (among allies
and rivals alike) in reducing the dollar’s dominance.
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At the UN, America’s allies complain that Mr Trump “cherry-picks”. What is new is not
pulling out of an agency or two (Mr Trump has pulled out of the Paris-based education
and cultural agency, UNESCO , and the Geneva-based Human Rights Council,
complaining of anti-Israel bias), but the lack of commitment to the system. His America
First rhetoric echoes the language of Henry Cabot Lodge, an isolationist senator who
successfully fought against joining the League of Nations in the 1920s. It is a stark
contrast with the internationalism of Roosevelt and Truman. “The future does not
belong to globalists,” Mr Trump told the UN General Assembly last September. “The
future belongs to patriots.” All this means that, far from looking forward to a happy
birthday, the UN approaches its 75th anniversary in a state of high anxiety.

Its secretary-general, António Guterres, a jovial former prime minister of Portugal,

divides the UN’s history into three periods. The first was “bipolar”, characterised by
cold-war rivalry between America and the Soviet Union. Although the Security Council
was largely frozen, there was a certain predictability in the stand-off, and the UN was
inventive enough to expand into areas such as peacekeeping, which is not even
mentioned in its charter.

After the collapse of communism came a brief “unipolar” period, when America’s
dominance was barely contested. The Security Council was able to function as its
founders envisaged, launching a flurry of peace missions as well as authorising the
American-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. George Bush senior hailed a “new world
order”. The UN developed the principle of a “responsibility to protect” populations
against mass atrocities.

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But, bogged down in the Middle East and Afghanistan, America has grown weary and
inward-looking. In the wider world, wariness about the West imposing its values,
especially by force, has increased. A revanchist Russia and a soaring China increasingly
challenge America’s supremacy. The Security Council is once again stuck, reflecting
renewed great-power rivalry. This third period, as Mr Guterres sees it, is still unsettled.
“The world is not yet multipolar, it’s essentially chaotic,” he says.

America, first
A degree of chaos is not surprising, given the dramatic shifts that are starting to divide
the world into competing spheres of influence. Take the economy. Since 2000 China’s
share of global GDP at market rates has gone from less than 4% to nearly 16%. Its
technology giants, such as Alibaba, Tencent and Huawei, are spreading Chinese digital
infrastructure abroad, especially in emerging markets. China is the world’s largest
exporter, and although a relative newcomer (having joined the club only in 2001) now
presents itself as chief defender of a WTO under assault from America.

In finance, though the dollar still dominates, the yuan is poised to gain ground. At the
IMF, China remains underrepresented, with a quota and voting share of only 6%. But as
the fund strives to support a stricken global economy, China will be a core
consideration, whether in the design of debt relief (China is reckoned to have lent more
than $140bn to African governments and state-owned enterprises since 2000) or in
increasing quotas.

These upheavals spill over into the diplomatic and security dimensions that are the
focus of this special report. Are the UN, and the collaborative global governance it
embodies, doomed to be less relevant in a world of great-power competition? It is surely
too soon to give up on them. But to retain its clout and character the liberal order needs
restored leadership and difficult reforms.

The multilateral system has important strengths. One is that it is patently needed. The
biggest problems cry out for international co-operation—as the pandemic powerfully
illustrates. The world needs to work together on vaccines, on economic recovery and to
support the most vulnerable countries. The head of the World Food Programme, David
Beasley, a former Republican governor of South Carolina, has said speedy action is
necessary to prevent “multiple famines of biblical proportions”. Concerted efforts are
also needed on climate change, another challenge no country can tackle on its own. The
risk of nuclear proliferation is growing.

A second advantage is that the UN is popular. It has made shameful mistakes. It failed to
prevent genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica. UN peacekeepers are blamed for bringing
cholera to Haiti and sexual abuse to many of the places they were meant to protect. The
UN’s oil-for-food programme with Iraq led to a $1.8bn scam. Yet it is more trusted than
many governments, according to the 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. Across 32
countries surveyed by Pew last year, a median of 61% had a favourable opinion of the
UN, against 26% with an unfavourable view. A comfortable majority of Americans think
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well of it, though there is a growing partisan divide: 77% of Democrats approve, but only
36% of Republicans.

In another survey last year, by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, seven out of ten
Americans said it would be best if the country took an active part in world affairs, close
to the highest on record. That points to a final force that should not be underestimated:
the potential for American re-engagement. America remains a more powerful economy
with greater reach in hard and soft power than any rivals. It could again be the
standard-bearer for a liberal world order.

It would be naive to expect sudden enthusiasm for multilateralism from Mr Trump—

and even beyond him. American suspicion of foreign entanglements is as old as the
republic. Frustration with the WTO, NATO and the rest was mounting before Mr Trump
tapped into it. The divisions at home that have deepened under his presidency make
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leadership abroad harder. Still, victory for Joe Biden in the presidential election in
November would be, if not exactly a game-changer, at least a game-restarter. “We will
be back,” Mr Biden promised last year’s Munich Security Conference.

The UN wants to use its 75th anniversary for a grand consultation on the future of
multilateralism. Covid-19 has hijacked the global agenda. But it also creates an
opportunity. Rather than destroying the system, the upheaval could spur countries into
strengthening it. That will require planning for the future while tackling the crisis of the
present. Today’s leaders need to emulate what their predecessors achieved so
magnificently in 1945.■

This article appeared in the Special report section of the print edition under the
headline "Missing in action"

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