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Standards for Paradigm Evaluation

Robert C. Rowland

To cite this article: Robert C. Rowland (1982) Standards for Paradigm Evaluation, The Journal
of the American Forensic Association, 18:3, 133-140, DOI: 10.1080/00028533.1982.11951211
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 STANDARDS FOR PARADIGM EVALUATION
Robert C. Rowland
The choice among paradigms is now
the dominant theoretical issue in debate.
Not only do disputes over debate theory
increasingly focus on the contest among
debate paradigms, but specific debate
theories and tactics are often under-
standable only within the frame of
reference provided by a paradigm. And
in many cases, the justification for a
theory or tactic comes from a paradigm
or model of debate. Given the impor-
tance of paradigms to debate, it is
surprising that there has been little
consideration of standards for paradigm
evaluation.
In this essay, I shall attempt to
remedy the problem by developing
functional standards for evaluating
debate paradigms. I shall first outline
the two key functions which paradigms
serve in debate and then describe the
manner in which paradigms shape the
debate process. Following the description
of the structure and function of
paradigms in debate, I will consider the
work on paradigm evaluation of David
Zarefsky, Walter Ulrich, Allan Lichtman
and Daniel Rohrer. In the final section
of the paper, I will discuss five functional
standards for evaluating competing de-
bate paradigms.
In his classic work The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn
points toward two key functions
which paradigms fulfill within science.
Paradigms, he argues, provide the shared
perspectives and rules which dominate
the nonnal process of science. In so
doing, they provide criteria for distin-
Robert Rowland is an Honors Fellow in
Speech Communications at The University of
Kansas.
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Volume 18, Winter 1982
guishing between good and bad scientific
research. 1 Perhaps more importantly,
paradigms provide the lens through
which scientists view reality.2 Like Ernst
Cassirer, Kuhn argues that the world can
only be known through man's symbolic
representations of it. In the absence of a
paradigm a scientist may not even be
able to distinguish between relevant and
irrelevant data.a In addition, scientists
operating within different paradigms
often perceive very different realities,
even when looking at the same data:
Examining the record of past research from the
vantage of contemporary historiography, the
historian of science may be tempted to claim
that when paradigms change, the world itself
changes with them. Led by a new paradigm,
scientists adopt new instruments and look in
new places. Even more important, during
revolutions scientists see new and different
things when looking with familiar instruments
in places they have looked before.4
Paradigms do more than define what
constitutes acceptable scientific research;
they reveal the world.
Kuhn's explanation of the part which
paradigms play within science clarifies
the critical importance of paradigms
within debate. Not only do debate
paradigms provide the standards by
which judges evaluate debates, but
paradigms actually determine what the
judge perceives. The world of debate is
1 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, 2nd edition, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 109.
2 Frederick Suppe describes this function of
paradigms in "Exemplars, Theories, and Dis-
ciplinary Matrixes," in The Structure of Sci-
entific Theories, ed. Frederick Suppe (Urbana,
Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 495.
3 Kuhn, p. 15.
4 Kuhn, p. Ill.
134 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
quite different for a stock issues judge,
a policy maker, and a hypothesis tester.
An illustration makes this radical differ-
ence in perspective quite clear. When
an affirmative team is challenged to
explain the motives behind the structure
of the present system, representatives
from the three major debate paradigms
see a very different issue. The stock
issues judge (whose paradigm requires
nothing more nor less than "structural
inherency") sees an interesting request
for explanation, but nothing more. The
policy maker perceives an unimportant
challenge which does not alter the
systems defended by the affirmative or
negative. By contrast, the hypothesis
tester perceives a critical question which
the affirmative must answer in order to
demonstrate inherency. The argument is
the same, in each instance, but the way
that the judge views it is governed by
the decision paradigm.
In sum, debate paradigms are impor-
tant because they provide rules to which
debaters adapt in their quest for ballots.
As long as debaters prefer winning to
losing, those rules will play a major role
in shaping debate practices. Paradigms
are also important because they define
the argumentative world which debaters
and judges perceive. Given the role
which paradigms play in shaping debate
it is obviously important that appro-
priate criteria be developed for their
evaluation.
Although most of the literature on
debate paradigms is purely descriptive,
a few critics have considered the problem
of evaluating competing paradigms. In
"Argument as Hypothesis Testing,"
Zarefsky explains that arguments be-
tween the proponents of different
paradigms can most appropriately be
classified as ad hominem argument.5
See David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hy-
5 7 Kuhn, pp. 109, 148.
pothesis Testing," in Advanced Debate: Read-
ings in Theory and Practice, ed. David A.
Here Zarefsky borrows Johnstone's use
of the term ad hominem6 to suggest that
the world views flowing from competing
paradigms are so different, while still
internally consistent, that no real argu-
ment can take place among the
proponents of the different debate
models. Kuhn makes a similar argument
when he claims that the proponents of
competing scientific paradigms often
cannot understand each other because
they see the world in such different
terms.7 Zarefsky's position implicitly
suggests that rational standards for
choosing among debate paradigms
cannot be developed. Paradigms are
justified by their own internal logic. As
long as a paradigm is internally con-
sistent it is justified. Zarefsky even argues
that critics may be forced "to choose a
paradigm for reason-giving on the basis
of intuition.''S
Zarefsky also warns against using
practicality as a standard for evaluating
paradigms. He argues that a paradigm
should not be rejected merely because
of practical difficulties with its uses:
And it may put the cart before the horse, de-
fending one paradigm or another on the basis
of its suitability to a particular contest format,
forgetting that the contest format is a
contrivance to respond to theoretical and
pedagogical needs rather than the other way
around.9
Clearly, Zarefsky specifically rejects prac-
ticality as a standard for evaluating
paradigms and admits that the choice
of a paradigm may ultimately rest on
intuition.
Lichtman and Rohrer consider the
problem of paradigm evaluation by
arguing that because debate resolutions
are typically questions of policy, debate
Thomas (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook,
1979), p. 435.
6 Zarefsky, p. 4!15.
8 Zarefsky, p. 4!16.
9 Zarefsky, p. 4!16.
 STANDARDS FOR PARADIGM EVALUATION 135

judges should assume the role of policy stead theoretical issues should be decided
maker. They note: within the debate itself. Ulrich explains:
Thus the status of the judge as an arbiter of
"All issues are open to debate ... Just
policy choice and of debaters as advocates for as free debate should be used to de-
competing policy systems is inherent in the termine matters of policy, the debate
kinds of resolutions that debaters consider and forum should be used to determine
the type of decision that judges must render.lO matters of theory. . . . " 13 Here, Ulrich
implicitly denies the utility of pre-exist-
'Yhile Lichtman and Rohrer are quite
ing standards for paradigm evaluation.
nght, that debate has focused on policy
In his view, the judge should assume
questions, there is no necessary reason
no standard but should evaluate
that those policy questions must be
paradigms based only on the issues de-
evaluated through the specific policy
veloped in a debate. In this way, Ulrich
making model which they advocate.
sidesteps the whole question of paradigm
For example, Charles Lindblomn and
evaluation.
other incrementalists defend a method
of resolving policy disputes which bears The three views which have been
some likeness to the stock issues debate considered seem to offer little hope for
paradigm. Even hypothesis testing could the development of consistent criteria for
be viewed as a method for resolving evaluating competing debate paradigms.
policy disputes. Perfectly rational policy Zarefsky argues that the contest between
scientists could mirror the hypothesis paradigms cannot be resolved because
testing model by requmng the the proponents of each paradigm see the
proponents of policy change to both world in very different ways. Lichtman
refute all feasible alternative policies and Rohrer do not seem to realize that
and identify the motives which pre- policy disputes could be rationally
vented action in the present system. evaluated through means other than
Debate may inherently be a form of their policy making model. Finally,
policy-making, but it need not be the Ulrich sidesteps the problem altogether.
form described by Lichtman and Is it possible that no rational standards
Rohrer. Thus, coherence to the policy for paradigm evaluation can be de-
model is not a useful standard for veloped? Some critics of Thomas Kuhn
evaluating debate paradigms. have argued that very point by claiming
The final proposed standard for that the process of paradigm shift is an
evaluating debate paradigms is Ulrich's. ~ssentially irrational endeavor.t4 The
While defending tabula rasa as a key question remains, can rational
paradigm for judging debate, Ulrich standards be developed for evaluating
suggests that the judge should not enter debate paradigms?
a debate with pre-existing attitudes The difficulty in developing consistent
about the worth of a paradigm.t2 In- standards for evaluating the various de-
bate paradigms follows, as Zarefsky
to Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel Rohrer, "The
Logic of Policy Dispute," journal of the argues, from the very different, but
American Forensics Association 16 (Spring 1980), internally consistent assumptions upon
p. 247.
11 For a clear discussion of incrementalism
see Charles Lindblom, "Strategies for Decision- t3 Ulrich, pp. 4, 5.
making," University of Illinois Bulletin, 1971. 14See for mstance Imre Lakatos, "Falsification
12 Walter Ulrich, "Tabula Rasa as an Ap- and the Methodology of Scientific Research
proach to the Judging of Debates," paper Programmes," p. 16 in Criticism and the Growth
presented at the Speech Communication Asso- of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan
ciation Convention, Minneapolis, 4 November Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press,
1978. 1970), p. 93.
136 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
which the paradigms are built. However,
this difficulty can be resolved if the
evaluative standards are derived, not
from the individual paradigms, but from
the functions which the paradigms fulfill
for debate as an activity. Competing
debate paradigms could be evaluated
based upon their ability to meet the
goals of the debate activity itself.
Ironically, justification for functional
evaluative standards can be found in the
views of Lichtman and Rohrer, Zarefsky,
and Ulrich. Each of these theorists
justifies his position on paradigms with
reference to the needs of debate. Zarefsky
notes that paradigms are created to
meet the "theoretical and pedagogical
needs"15 of debate. Lichtman and
Rohrer make the same point in their
defense of policy-making. They argue
that any alteration in policy-making
"either begs the question of what should
guide debaters and judges or imposes
arbitrary and artificial standards that
reflect the idiosyncracies of particular
theorists." By contrast, "The clear yet
rigorous standards of policy systems
debate also foster the development of
persuasive skills . . . . " 16 Finally, Ulrich
justifies his tabula rasa approach by
claiming that it will better teach argu-
mentation skills.17 He also accepts
limitations upon tabula rasa where use
of the model would reduce the quality
or fairness of debate.1 8 In each instance,
Lichtman and Rohrer, Zarefsky and
Ulrich justify their view of paradigms
and paradigm evaluation with reference
to the ultimate function of debate.
Stephen Toulmin's recent work on
argument fields also supports the use of
functional standards as evaluative tools.
In An Introduction to Reasoning
Toulmin argues that the goals of an
argument field, shape the criteria with
15 Zarefsky, p. 436.
16 Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 247.
17 Ulrich, pp. 3, 4.
18 See Ulrich, p. 10.
which arguments in the field are
evaluated. He explains that a psychiatric
diagnosis might be evaluated by very
different standards and through very
different procedures depending upon
the goal of that diagnosis. If the goal
were treatment, then relatively informal
cooperative procedures might be used,
but if the goal were commitment, then
formal adversary proceedings would be
required.lfl In Toulmin's example, it is
the different functions2° which the
argument serves in the two circum-
stances which determine the appro-
priate standards for evaluating that
argument.
Nor is Toulmin the only theorist to
stress the importance of functional
categorizations. Cassirer suggests that
different symbolic forms should be
evaluated based upon the functions they
serve. 21 The same point has also been
made by critics who argue that
standards for evaluating discourse
cannot simply be transferred from one
field to another but must be adapted to
the unique circumstances surrounding
each rhetorical act.22
Some additional support for func-
tional standards for paradigm evaluation
can be found in Thomas Kuhn's de-
scription of paradigm shifts in science.
Like Zarefsky, Kuhn notes that the
proponents of competing paradigms
19 See Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and
Allan Janik. An Introduction to Reasoning
(New York: MacMillan, 1979), pp. 198·199.
20 For a more complete development of the
view that argumentative fields are organized
around the function or purpose which argu·
ments in the area fulfill, see Robert Rowland,
"Toulmin and Fields: From Form to Function,"
paper presented at the Speech Communication
Association, Doctoral Honors Seminar on Argu·
mentation at Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, Ohio, May 16, 1981.
21 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms, vol. 1: Language (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1955), especially pp. 79,
177.
22 See for instance Northrop Frye, Anatomy
of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957).
 STANDARDS FOR PARADIGM EVALUATION
speak different but internally consistent
languages. 23 Unlike Zarefsky, Kuhn al-
lows for the reasoned comparison of
scientific models. He suggests that the
comparison of paradigms must eventual-
ly be a persuasive activity24 based on a
rational evaluation of the paradigm's
relative utility for answering the ques-
tions which the scientific community
thinks are important.25 In Kuhn's view,
paradigms can only be evaluated based
on their usefulness for fulfilling the
needs of science. While the proponents
of competing paradigms speak different
languages, they still aim at common sci-
entific goals. Therefore, competing
scientific paradigms can be compared
based on their relative ability to meet
those goals. In science, paradigms are
evaluated based on the functions they
fulfill for the scientific community.
If standards for evaluating debate
paradigms should be based upon func-
tional analysis, then it is appropriate to
inquire into the proper function of
debate. Here it is important to note that
the purpose of debate is not primarily
to evaluate policy or to find truth. It is
obvious that other formats for argumen-
tation could better seek either truth or
the best policy. The strict time limits,
unrestricted topics, and inconsistent
competition in debate do not lend
themselves to finding truth or the best
policy.
While many different functions are
served by debate-teaching public ad-
dress and research skills, fun, competi-
tion, and so on-there is, in my view,
one overriding function of the activity.
The purpose of debate is to teach people
argumentation skills so that they may
seek for themselves the truth or the best
policy. The Sedalia conference explains
23 Kuhn, pp. 109, 148.
24 Kuhn, pp. 202·204.
25 See Thomas Kuhn, "Reflections on My
Critics," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowl·
edge, pp. 261-262.
137
that the purpose of academic debate is
to promote:
... an argumentative perspective in examining
problems and communicating with people. An
argumentative perspective on communication
involves the study of reason giving by people
as justification for acts, beliefs, attitudes and
values. From this perspective forensics activities,
including debate ... are laboratories for helping
students to understand and communicate various
forms of argument more effectively in a variety
of audiences.26
The ultimate goal of debate is to teach
people how to argue effectively.
If paradigms function as models which
define debate practice, and the ultimate
standard for evaluating these models is
their utility as tools for teaching
argument, what general criteria for
evaluating paradigms can be derived?
Initially, it is clear that no standard for
paradigm evaluation can be completely
objective. There is not even a simple
definition of what constitutes an argu-
ment. Given this ambiguity, absolutely
objective standards are not feasible. The
impossibility of developing such absolute
standards does not mean, however, that
paradigm evaluation must be based
upon whim. General criteria for distin-
guishing between good and bad debate
can be developed. Nor is it unfortunate
that these criteria must be somewhat
abstract. One of the strengths of argu-
mentation is that it is applicable in
situations where mathematical accuracy
is not possible. The distinctions which
follow are aimed at identifying those
paradigms which emphasize good argu-
ment, but do not unnecessarily restrict
debate to formal logic or any other
limited definition.
First, a debate paradigm should be
clear and consistent. The implications
of the paradigm should either be clearly
26 "Definitional Statement," in Forensics as
Communication: The Argumentative Perspective
ed. James H. McBath (Skokie, Illinois: National
Textbook, 1975), p. II.
138 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
explicated or follow clearly from its
central thesis. For example, a paradigm
drawn from a metaphor should include
a statement of when and where the
metaphor is applicable. The metaphor
would then provide the judge with a
model for evaluating debate. The
paradigm should also be consistent. A
paradigm which is built upon internal
inconsistency undermines its own pre-
suppositions. The importance of clarity
and consistency may seem obvious, but
it deserves emphasis. The function of a
debate paradigm is to provide appro-
priate standards for evaluating debates.
If those standards are unclear or in-
consistent, then neither the judge nor
the debaters involved will be certain
of their applicability. The resulting
uncertainty will make the paradigm less
successful in shaping debate toward good
argument. Unclear or inconsistent
paradigms produce argument which
mirrors the paradigm itself-unclear and
inconsistent argument.
The second characteristic of a good
paradigm is that it is fair. One of the
great attractions of the debate process
is that every debater is given an essential-
ly equal chance to defeat every other
debater. Without this chance for
eventual victory, the activity might
collapse because competitive urges would
no longer energize debaters. A paradigm
which gives a procedural advantage to
either the affirmative or the negative
destroys the competitive equity of the
debate process.
Third, a good paradigm should pro-
vide a more accurate reflection of the
issues being debated than its com-
petitors provide. All paradigms define
the world. They define the questions
which may be asked and those which are
not worthy of consideration. To borrow
Burke's terms, paradigms reflect, deflect
and select reality. The problem is that
no exact definition of what it means for
a paradigm to "reveal the real world"
can be provided.
Scientists have faced a similar problem
in the evaluation of scientific theories.
The match between a theory and the
"real world" is the most important
standard by which competing scientific
theories are judged, but there is no
single definition of the real world. Some
theories do a better job of describing
some aspects of that reality while other
theories do a better job of describing
other aspects of it. Scientists have re-
solved the problem by comparing
theories not against a Platonic form of
reality itself, but against competing
theories. The relative accuracy of each
scientific paradigm then becomes a
matter for argument. No scientific
paradigm ever completely describes
reality, but some paradigms provide
more useful descriptions of that reality
than their competitors. Those paradigms
which provide a clearer view of the
world supplant their rivals through a
reasoned persuasive process. The same
result should occur within debate.
Debate judges should accept the
general principle that a good paradigm
mirrors the important aspects of the
policy environment. The worth of any
specific paradigm must be evaluated by
comparing it with its competitors, in
order to discover rationally which
paradigm provides the most useful de-
scription of the policy world. Therefore,
while no debate paradigm perfectly
mirrors the world, a superior paradigm
provides a clearer, more insightful
understanding of the issues being de-
bated than its competitors provide. This
does not mean that a paradigm will
produce a view of the world that cor-
responds exactly to the way that issues
are decided in the real world but it does
mean that the issues upon which the
superior paradigm focuses the debate
will be understood more clearly than
 STANDARDS FOR PARADIGM EVALUATION
they would have been if another
paradigm had been utilized.
A hypothetical example may make the
point clear. A paradigm could define
"significance" in such a way that all
problems which did not involve at least
ten thousand deaths automatically
would be considered insignificant. A
judge operating in this perspective
would ignore problems involving a few
thousand deaths or any magnitude of
non-fatal injuries, or the general quality
of life. Clearly, such a significance re-
quirement would arbitrarily limit the
debate process.
A more realistic example can be
found in the conflict between policy-
makers and stock issues judges over the
value of the stock issues paradigm. The
policy-makers argue that stock issues
analysis is an absolutistic checklist ap-
proach to debate which oversimplifies
the complex interactions inherent in all
policy systems.27 According to the
policy-makers, the systems perspective
does a better job of revealing the real
policy environment, than does the stock
issues approach. If the policy-makers are
right, then the gradual shift of the last
decade from stock issues analysis to
policy-making has improved debate. In
sum, coherence to reality is one impor-
tant standard for evaluating competing
paradigms. However, any evaluation of
the worth of a paradigm as a description
of reality, must be based, not on ab-
solute standards, but on a reasoned
comparison with other paradigms.
A fourth criterion for distinguishing
between paradigms relates to the kind
and quality of arguments which the
paradigm encourages. A debate par-
adigm should encourage clash over the
issues. Clash is important because it
27 See Bernard L. Brock et al., Public Policy
Decisionmaking: Systems Analysis and Com-
parative Advantage Debate (New York: Harper
and Row, 1973), pp. 58·84, 146-163.
139
forces debaters to develop the best
possible arguments. In addition, a
paradigm should include standards for
distinguishing between good arguments,
weak arguments, and inadequate argu-
ments. Those standards might take into
account the quantity and quality of
proof supporting a point, the strength of
the relation being considered, and the
presence or absence of fallacious reason-
ing. For example the strict burden of
proof standards in hypothesis testing and
stock issue analysis clearly distinguish
between inadequate and adequate af-
firmative case analysis. Through the use
of probabilistic standards, policy makers
hope to draw very fine distinctions about
the quality of different arguments. If a
debate model rewards debaters equally
regardless of the quality of their argu-
ments, then debaters will be dis-
couraged from making the effort to
produce well-reasoned and well-docu-
mented claims. A paradigm should
provide a mechanism for the judge to
distinguish among good, weak, and in-
adequate arguments.
Finally, a debate paradigm should
operate within the current form of de-
bate. Unlike science, where a new
paradigm may encourage an entirely
new form of investigation, paradigms in
debate are applied to only a single form.
This form is, in its most restrictive sense,
the current cross exam debate format
and is a broader sense the whole process
of tournament debate.
Some, notably Zarefsky, have argued
that a debate paradigm should not be
tied to the practical concerns of debate's
current format. Instead, Zarefsky suggests
that the form of debate should be shaped
to the paradigm, rather than the
paradigm shaped to form.2s The search
for a more perfect format for debate is
certainly a laudable goal, but it is not
relevant to the point at issue. For the
140 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
time being, at least, debate is tied to the
current format or something very much
like it. Surely it is important to maximize
the educational value which can be
gained from the current format, while at
the same time searching for a better one.
Practical factors play a role in limiting
the scope of theories in many fields. Even
in science, theories have been rejected for
practical reasons. Ptolemaic astronomy
produced predictions which were every
bit as accurate as Copernican astronomy,
but the incredible complexity of the
Ptolemaic method (surely a practical
question) was one factor which led
to the Copernican revolution. If a
paradigm does not function adequately
within the current debate format, then
it should not be utilized within that
format. Perhaps it is an appropriate
model for evaluating some other kind of
dispute. If so, fine; use it there. But it is
foolish to try and pound a square
pegged paradigm into the round hole of
debate.
28 Zarefsky, p. 436
CONCLUSION
Debate is a limited activity. It is
limited by time constraints, unmanage-
able topics, restrictive rules and uneven
competition. As a search for truth or the
best policy, it fails miserably. The value
of debate is that it channels competitive
urges to teach debaters about reasoned
discourse, research, and most of all argu-
ment. The primary function of debate-
to teach argumentation skills-is aided
or impeded by the paradigms with which
judges both evaluate debate arguments
and view the world. Paradigms play an
especially crucial role in shaping debate
because debaters, in their quest for bal-
lots, adapt their arguments to the
paradigm which the judge uses. If debate
is to teach the most advanced argumen-
tative skills, then it is the various debate
paradigms which must direct debaters
toward superior analysis and away from
weak arguments. The criteria for
evaluating paradigms suggested in this
essay represent an attempt to guarantee
that good debate is produced through
the best available paradigm.